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Time, Tense, and Eternal Recurrence

Sam Cowling

October 22, 2010

Abstract

Nietzsche’s discussion of eternal recurrence (hereafter, ER) raise a


range of interpretive questions. In this discussion, I have two aims.
The first is to consider the tenability of ER as a metaphysical thesis in
light of recent commentators’ objections to it. The second is to exam-
ine how, if at all, we might develop a metaphysics of time and tense
that accommodates the central commitments of ER. After cataloguing
these central commitments, I survey a dilemma that arises in recon-
ciling them with a plausible metaphysical picture. I then consider a
number of views about the metaphysics of time and tense, and defend a
version of dynamic eternalism that captures the central commitments
of ER and avoids the dilemma posed earlier. I conclude by noting the
interpretive challenges for this metaphysics of ER.

1 Introduction
Nietzsche’s thesis of eternal recurrence (hereafter, ER) finds its most vivid
presentation in the form of a thought-experiment:

What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into
your loneliest loneliness and say to you: “This life as you now live
and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumer-
able times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every
pain and every joy and every thought and sight an everything
unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you,
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all in the same succession and sequence—even this spider and


this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I
myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down
again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!”
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and
curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experience a
tremendous moment when you would have answered him: “You
are a god and never have I heard anything more divine.”1

Nietzsche accords ER enormous importance. In Ecce Homo, he describes


the thesis as “the hardest, most terrible insight into reality” and the “most
abysmal thought.”2 In The Gay Science, he accords it “the greatest weight”3
and urges us to “stamp the form of eternity upon our lives.” He concludes
The Twilight of the Idols by marking himself as the “teacher of the eternal
recurrence.” And, in The Will to Power describes the doctrine as “powerful
enough to work as a breeding agent: strengthening the strong, paralyzing
and destructive for the world-weary.”4
In light of the privileged place Nietzsche gives ER, the many difficult
issues it raises cannot be ignored. Here, we might distinguish four sorts of
issues. The first family of issues are interpretive. They concern the nature
and role of ER in Nietzsche’s thought. Among these is perhaps the most
commonly addressed question about ER: Does Nietzsche conceive of it as
genuine cosmological hypothesis or something like a heuristic for normative
guidance?5 The second family of issues is normative. They concern what,
if any, normative implications ER has. Among these is the question of
what it would mean to live one’s life in light of the “abysmal thought”.6
The third family of issues is epistemological. They concern the peculiar
1
Gay Science [hereafter, GS] §341.
2
Ecce Homo [hereafter, EH] §3: TSZ-6.
3
GS §341.
4
Will to Power [hereafter, WP] §862.
5
The prevailing consensus would seem to be the latter. See Magnus (1978), Nehamas
(1985), Long (1987), and Clark (1990) for defenses of a non-cosmological interpretation.
6
Extended inquiries into these normative issues include Magnus (1978), Nehamas (1985),
Clark (1990), Reginster (2006), and Hatab (2005).
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epistemic situation that ER gives rise to and the question of whether we


are forced into skepticism about its truth.7 The final family of issues are
metaphysical. These are questions about what ER—understood as a thesis
about the nature of the world—would require the world to be like. Among
them are the following: What is the relation between individuals in different
stages of recurrence? What must the passage of time be like in order to
accommodate recurrence?8
As should be evident, these issues cannot be neatly pried apart. Ques-
tions about the possibility of free action in the face of eternal recurrence are,
for example, partly normative and partly metaphysical. Furthermore, when
surveying the literature on ER, it is common to see arguments proceed from
normative, epistemological, or metaphysical issues to interpretive conclu-
sions.9 Despite these intersections, my discussion will be primarily focused
upon the metaphysical issues raised by ER. In particular, I have two aims:
The first is to consider the tenability of ER as a metaphysical thesis in light
of recent commentators’ objections to it. The second is to examine how, if at
all, we might develop a metaphysics of time and persistence that naturally
accommodates the central commitments of Nietzsche’s ER. Here, I will pro-
ceed by focusing on his remarks directly regarding ER. Only in concluding
will I address the much more difficult issue of how a metaphysics of ER can
be made consonant with Nietzsche’s broader philosophical commitments.
The implications of these projects remain considerable: If I am successful
in showing that arguments against the metaphysical coherence of ER fail, I
will undermine a common interpretative strategy: concluding that ER must
be a mere heuristic since it is an untenable metaphysical hypothesis. In
addition, I will argue that the most natural interpretation of Nietzsche’s
7
For discussion of skepticism and ER, see Kain (1983) and Loeb (2006).
8
Arguably the most popular metaphysical issue regarding ER is the importance and
efficacy of Nietzsche unpublished statistical arguments for ER. I discuss these in Section
Four. For discussion, the locus classicus on this issue is Simmel (1907), who argues that
Nietzsche’s arguments are unsuccessful. See also Danto (1965), Soll (1973), Zuboff (1973),
and Magnus (1978).
9
For example, Magnus (1978) and Clark (1990) produce metaphysical arguments against
ER in defense of their preferred non-cosmological interpretations.
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remarks regarding ER casts Nietzsche as a proponent of provocative and


interesting view regarding the “reality of tense”.
The discussion will run as follows: In Section One, I outline the central
commitments of ER and survey a dilemma that arises in understanding the
metaphysics of ER. I then consider a response to this dilemma and argue
that it is unsatisfactory. In Section Three, I distinguish a number of views
about the metaphysics of time and tense, and sketch a metaphysics of time
that both captures the central commitments of ER and avoids the dilemma
posed earlier. I then address some objections to this proposed metaphysics.
In Section Four, I conclude by briefly noting the interpretive challenges
that this face-value account of ER faces once we consider his more general
commitments.

2 The Case against Recurrence


In this section, I consider some features of ER as well as some metaphysical
objections to it. These features will be introduced roughly at first and then
clarified as objections to ER are examined.
The first feature of ER is what I will call the perpetuity requirement.
This requirement, alluded to in Nietzsche’s remark above, holds that recur-
rence, however it is to be understood, extends infinitely “backwards” and
“forwards”. As he remarks in The Will to Power, your life “has already
repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game ad infinitum.”10 For our
purposes, we can call each instance of recurrence an “epoch” and take the
perpetuity requirement to be the following: any satisfactory metaphysics of
ER must hold that, in addition to our own epoch, countless epochs precede
it and countless epochs follow it.11 So understood, neither our epoch nor any
other is the first or last of the series of recurrences. Although this perpetuity
requirement, characterized roughly, is an uncontroversial feature of ER, we
will soon see that is not obvious how the demands of infinite “backward”
10
WP §1066.
11
This terminology owes to Lewis (1986) who employs worlds of “eternal recurrence” to
examine a number of issues in the metaphysics of modality.
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and “forward” repetition are best understood.


The second feature of ER concerns the relation between the plurality
of epochs. It holds that there is some relation of “uniformity” between
them. According to the uniformity requirement, every epoch is “the same
succession and sequence”. Intuitively, the uniformity requirement holds that
there is no deviation in the events that make up each epoch. There are,
therefore, no alterations to the course of history. Everything—down to the
most minute details—repeats itself. And, while this uniformity is easy to
grasp intuitively, many of principal metaphysical problems raised by ER
concern precisely how this uniformity is understood.
Perhaps the most natural way to understand the uniformity require-
ment is as follows: every epoch is qualitatively indiscernible from every
other epoch. According to this qualitative conception of uniformity, epochs
are related by perfect resemblance; each epoch is an exact duplicate of ev-
ery other epoch. So, while epochs are alike in terms of their qualitative
properties, they differ numerically from one another.
If the qualitative conception of uniformity is accepted, a familiar argu-
ment against ER can be offered. This argument turns on the Principle of
the Identity of Indiscernibles (hereafter, PII), according to which any ob-
jects that share all their qualitative properties are identical.12 The argument
runs as follows: Given the qualitative conception of uniformity, epochs are
qualitatively indiscernible, and, since PII requires qualitatively indiscernible
objects to be identical, epochs are identical. But, if there is only a single
epoch, ER is false, since the perpetuity requirement cannot be satisfied.13
As an attempt to show ER to be metaphysically impossible, this argu-
ment is not convincing. While some have argued for PII way of the Principle
of Sufficient Reason or, more recently, the implausibility of a multitude of co-
located qualitatively indiscernible objects, these arguments are by no means
12
The qualification that the properties be qualitative prevents the principle from being
trivial: if some qualitatively indiscernible objects, a and b, also shared their non-qualitative
properties, the logic of identity alone entails their identity, since both instantiate being
identical to a and being identical to b.
13
As I consider in Section Five, this last inference also turns on certain heavy metaphysical
assumptions.
6

decisive.14 In addition, arguments owing to Black (1953) and Adams (1979)


suggest that there is very good reason to reject PII in order to accommodate
certain metaphysical possibilities. So, given the highly controversial status
of PII, those who take it to refute ER overestimate its dialectical force.15
Although the qualitative conception of uniformity is not refuted by mere
appeal to PII, a number of commentators have argued that the qualitative
conception of uniformity is, for independent reasons, unsatisfactory. The
source of the problem, as we’ll soon see, is that qualitative indiscernibility
is alleged to fall short of a further demand on ER: the concern requirement.
According to the concern requirement, you must be appropriately con-
cerned for the welfare of “yourself” in other epochs. Put differently: ER
must account for how and why you care for “yourself” in other epochs, since
failure to do so would leave ER without the apparent normative significance
Nietzsche affords it. Admittedly, this requirement is far from precise. In
large measure, this is because it is an open question of how exactly ER is to
have its alleged normative implications. But, in any case, if ER is to have
the implications Nietzsche envisions, something like the concern requirement
must be satisfied.
There are a number of ways we might attempt to clarify the concern
requirement, but, in each case, complications proliferate. We might, for
example, point out that while we care about our own persistence into the
future, we would not care in a comparable fashion about an individual that is
distinct yet qualitatively indiscernible from us. As should be clear, however,
this presupposes that identity is “what matters” in a way that Parfit (1984)
and others have notably challenged.
Perhaps a better analogy arises in considering a debate regarding modal
metaphysics. According to counterpart theory, individuals have their de re
modal properties in virtue of standing in relations of qualitative resemblance
to various individuals.16 So, for example, Kit is possibly a goldfish if there
14
Leibniz is most famously associated with arguments for PII based on the Principle of
Sufficient Reason. See Della Rocca (2005) for discussion of arguments for PII based on
co-location.
15
For example, Magnus (1978) suggests that PII suffices to show that ER is untenable.
16
See Lewis (1986) for discussion.
7

is some individual that qualitatively resembles Kit to a suitable degree and


instantiates the property being a goldfish. Against a counterpart-theoretic
treatment of de re modality, Kripke (1972) and others have argued that, in
evaluating modal claims, we are not concerned with how someone very simi-
lar to us is, but, instead, with how we ourselves could have been. Again, the
worry is that the relevant measure of concern is undermined by the meta-
physical theory in question, but, again, this is to presuppose that identity
is “what matters”.
Regardless of the merits of the present example, it should be clear that
the concern requirement is primarily intended to show that, in some way,
individuals must be tied together across epochs by some connection of nor-
mative significance. I leave it open, however, whether this must be identity
or mere resemblance.
According to the following objections, the qualitative conception of uni-
formity is incompatible with the concern requirement. The first objection
to the qualitative conception of uniformity owes to Soll (1973):

I want to suggest that only if the recurrences of one’s life were


linked to one’s present life as different states of consciousness are
united in one consciousness should one have any personal concern
about the prospect of one’s present pleasures or pains recurring.
If I am concerned about the possibility of suffering pain later
in this life, it is because those future states of consciousness in
which I might suffer pain are united with my present state of con-
sciousness. And this unity depends, at least in part and in some
complex manner, upon there being linkages of memory among
these states of consciousness. Since I am not connected to my
recurrence in another cycle by being united with him in one con-
sciousness through links of memory, I am not identical to him in
the sense necessary for me to view his suffering pain tantamount
to my suffering further pain. Only by inappropriately construing
the suffering of some future recurrence on the model of suffering
later in this life does the question of the eternal recurrence of
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one’s pain weigh upon one with “the greatest stress”.17

This objection holds, in keeping with the concern requirement, that the
normative significance of ER is a function of our concern for “ourselves” in
other epochs. But, if we are merely qualitatively indiscernible from “our-
selves” in other epochs, this relation of indiscernibility does not provide
adequate grounds for concern. As a result, something stronger than the
qualitative conception of uniformity is needed for ER to satisfy the concern
requirement. To establish this, Soll argues that something like continuity
of consciousness or perhaps numerical identity is required for the concern
requirement to be satisfied. But, given the numerical distinctness of indi-
viduals across epochs as well as the lack of causal connections between these
individuals, Soll holds that there is no way to ground the needed concern
for individuals across epochs.18
Viewed solely as argument to show that individuals cannot be “appropri-
ately” concerned for individuals in other epochs, Soll’s argument is unsatis-
factory. It simply assumes that either identity or continuity of consciousness
is what grounds the “appropriate” level of concern for individuals, but these
assumptions are highly controversial. One could, for example, accept the
Simple View of personal identity and hold that, although there is no psy-
chological or physical criterion for personal identity, individuals are, as a
matter of brute fact, identical across epochs.19 Alternatively, if personal
identity were to be understood in terms of psychological dispositions like
desires, personality, or behaviour rather than continuity of consciousness,
17
Soll (1967: 340).
18
For an endorsement of Soll’s argument, see Clark (1990: 267): “[Soll’s] argument may
require slight modification because some will find it as reasonable to have a special concern
for the destiny and suffering of the person qualitatively identical to myself in the next cycle
as to have such concern for the person I would be after an operation or an accident that
removed all memory connection to my present self. But if there is not continuity of
consciousness in the latter case, there is a kind of continuity. It still makes sense to think
of my present life as in some (perhaps limited) kind of continuity with my life after the
memory loss. In the case of eternal recurrence, on the other hand, no continuity exists.
There is neither continuity of consciousness nor any kind of continuity or traceability
through time and space.”
19
See Partfit (1984: 209).
9

the common dispositions of individuals in different epochs could be taken to


ground their concern for one another.20
Viewed as problem for understanding Nietzsche’s conception of ER, Soll’s
point is more serious. Nietzsche’s remarks suggest that the connection
between individuals within various epochs is of unambiguous importance
whereas qualitatively indiscernibility seems to carry no obvious or immediate
normative importance. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s remarks seem to suggest
that it is not mere qualitative indiscernibility, but, instead, literal iden-
tity that explains why the concern requirement is satisfied. The animals of
Zarathustra stress this apparent identity of individuals across epochs in the
following passage:

Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally,
and we ourselves, too; and that we have already existed an eter-
nal number of times, and all things with us I myself belong to
the causes of the eternal recurrence. I come again with this sun,
with this earth, with this eagle, with this serpentnot to a new
life or a better life or a similar life: I come back to this same,
identical life.21

Given this passage and its focus upon one and the same individual com-
ing back to “this same, identical life”, there is reason to believe that Ni-
etzsche holds numerical identity rather than qualitative indiscernibility to
ground the concern for individuals across epochs.
A second objection to the qualitative conception of uniformity is put
forward by Magnus (1978) and also suggested by Simmel (1920). This argu-
ment proceeds as a thought-experiment: Suppose that, instead of eternally
recurring epochs, the demon told you that there were instead an infinite ar-
20
Among the prevailing views in contemporary metaphysics, the denial of numerical iden-
tity as a prerequisite for the relevant kind of concern is commonplace. For example,
both stage theory and perdurantism—two of the leading contenders—reject the view that
our persistence across times requires the numerical identity of a single object located at
distinct times. See Sider (2001) for discussion.
21
Thus Spoke Zarathustra [hereafter, TSZ] III: 13
10

ray of simultaneously occurring epochs that are qualitatively indiscernible.


Magnus (1978) puts the objection as follows:

One can imagine, let us suppose, a universe precisely like ours,


a counterpart universe in which all objects, events, persons, and
relations are indiscernibly like our own. What are we to say of
“the space” occupied by this duplicate universe, this counterpart
world? It must be the same as ours, must it not? Or consider
the “n” number of right hands which may be said to occupy
“the same” space as the right hand with which I now write, but
which my perceptive and apperceptive faculties are too gross to
discern. Is it necessarily contradictory to say in both cases—
duplicate world or hands—that two or more identical objects
occupy precisely the same space at the same time? If it is con-
tradictory, and I believe it is, it is probaly also contradictory to
say that two or more “recurring” identical entities occupy the
same time (and space).22

This objection is well understood as reductio: If the qualitative conception


of uniformity is correct, our concern for “ourselves” in other epochs is a
function of our qualitative indiscernibility. But, if there were myriad ver-
sions of “ourselves” that exist simultaneously but were also qualitatively
indiscernible from us, we would have no concern for them, so the qualitative
conception of uniformity cannot satisfactorily explain how the concern re-
quirement gets met. Without this concern, ER is not significant in the way
in which Nietzsche envisions, so we must reject the qualitative conception
of uniformity.
22
Magnus (1978: 108-109). The same argument is considered in Clark (1990): ”Suppose
the demon, instead of announcing eternal recurrence, proclaims that there now exist an
infinite number of duplicates of our solar system and therefore an infinite number of in-
dividuals qualitatively identical to myself. Although this might arouse much amazement
and even interest, few people would perceive the existence of such duplicates as adding
infinitely to the suffering or joy of their own lives. But how is there any stronger basis for
such perception in the case of eternal recurrence? .... If this is correct, a clear concep-
tion of the lack of connection involved in eternal recurrence would remove the practical
significance it would seem to have on a personal level.”
11

I take this argument to succeed where Soll’s argument fails. Intuitively,


we need not have a profound concern for individuals that are simultaneous
and qualitatively indiscernible with us. But, if qualitatively indiscernibility
does not succeed in grounding concern here, then qualitative conception of
uniformity cannot explain how the concern requirement is met within the
framework of ER. Furthermore, qualitative indiscernibility seems a rather
peculiar requirement anyways. Suppose, for example, that each epoch dif-
fers from the last by virtue of a single electron moving an infinitesimally
small distance further from the center of the universe.23 Since individuals
in different epochs would discernible with respect to their distance from this
electron, they would fail to be qualitatively indiscernible. But this difference
in properties is unlikely to strike us as having any significance for whether
they are appropriate objects of concern. In this way, it seems quite odd
that qualitatively indiscernibility rather than some interdeterminate mea-
sure of qualitative similarity would ground our concern for individuals in
other epochs. For this reason, and given Nietzsche’s emphasis on the recur-
rence of we ourselves—understood as requiring numerical identity—there is
good reason to reject the qualitative conception of uniformity.
A dilemma now arises in our efforts to accommodate the uniformity and
concern requirements. In light of Nietzsche’s remarks and the objections
just considered, the qualitative conception of uniformity ought to be re-
jected. We must therefore hold that something over and above qualitative
indiscernibility must unite individuals across epochs. This relation must
then be a non-qualitative relation, but the only plausible non-qualitative
candidate is that of identity. And, if we adopt this identity conception of
uniformity, epochs are uniform by virtue of being one and the same. But, as
the argument from PII seems to show, it will not do to claim that epochs are
identical to one another: if there is only one epoch, then there is no eternal
recurrence. There is merely a single occurrence. As a result, the identity
conception of uniformity forces us to abandon the perpetuity requirement.
23
This proposal would, of course, butt heads with the uniformity requirement as well as the
proposal in Nehamas (1985) that the essences of individuals are so wildly interconnected
that each individual’s essence necessitates every other individual’s essence.
12

This, then, is the dilemma: neither qualitative relations nor non-qualitative


relations seem suitable for explaining uniformity and, at the same time,
satisfying the requirements of perpetuity and concern.24
The dilemma just surveyed presumes that there is only one way to ex-
plain the uniformity of epochs. It holds that epochs are either merely qual-
itatively indiscernible or numerically identical. There is, however, a third
view about uniformity that requires us to distinguish between the relation
that unites material objects like persons, serpents, and specks of sand across
across epochs and the relation that holds between the times at which differ-
ent epochs take place.25 On the mixed view, individuals or material objects
like you and I are numerically identical across epochs.26 We are one and the
same throughout the myriad cycles of eternal recurrence. In contrast, the
temporal regions at which you and I recur are distinct from one another.
On such a view, there is an objective ordering of an infinitely extending
temporal region, and, at regular intervals within this ordering, you and I
pass into and fade out of existence.
To better make sense of this proposal, it will be helpful to introduce a
distinction between certain views about the ontology of space and time.27
According to substantivalists, spatial and temporal regions are not depen-
24
The acceptance of literal identity across epochs does a nice job of alleviating another
problem regarding ER. According to what we might call the Doppelganger Problem, if
you are distinct from every individual in the epochs that precede you and your actions
must perfectly comport with the actions of these agents, then your acts are, in some
sense, “determined” by the actions of someone qualitatively indiscernible yet distinct from
yourself (i.e., your doppelgangers). But, since ER requires something like an affirmation of
one’s own actions, the notion—endorsed by the qualitative conception—that individuals
in other epochs are mere doppelgangers is highly problematic.
25
Given Nietzsche’s opposition to an ontology of matter and the acceptance of a meta-
physics of forces, my talk of “material objects” should be taken loosely. All such talk of
material objects would, on the present view, be recast in terms of the complex of forces.
26
Here, we must set aside Nietzsche’s claim that “there is nothing identical as such”. (GS
§111)
27
Othodoxy now holds space and time are not distinct entities, but rather a single unified
entity, spacetime. Here, I treat space and time in keeping with Netizsche’s pre-Einsteinean
physics.
13

dent upon material objects.28 Their existence is sui generis and independent
of the existence of the objects that occupy them. According to relationalists,
spatial and temporal regions are dependent upon material objects. Spatial
and temporal regions are therefore merely complexes of relations that hold
between objects. For this reason, relationalists hold that space and time
depend for their existence upon the existence of objects.29
On the mixed view, substantivalism is an extremely natural assump-
tion.30 Not only does it allow for the desired objective distinction between
temporal regions—a distinction that is not reducible to facts about objects—
it also allows for a fairly intuitive conception of ER: Imagine the sum of
spatial and temporal regions as an enormous “container” for objects. These
objects come into being and pass away over the course of an epoch, but,
in subsequent epochs—differentiated by occurring at numerically different
times—they merely reappear within the container and behave just as they
did previously. In this way, the distinctness of temporal regions allows for
the existence of distinct epochs, but the identity of objects also provides an
account of how the concern requirement is met. You care about “yourself”
in future epochs because you yourself will come into being and pass away
over and over again.
This mixed conception of uniformity is a plausible solution to the dilemma
above. For example, Clark (1990) remarks that, in explaining how epochs
are to be distinguished, “Only a difference in temporal position fits the bill—
28
One might worry here that substantivalism is in immediate conflict with Nietzsche’s
claim that “there are no eternally enduring substances”. (GS §109) It is worth noting,
however, that such a claim stands in opposition to a metaphysics of substantial matter
rather than space or time.
29
One might defend the interpretation of Nietzsche as a relationalist on the strength of
his remark that “the world... does not exist as a world ‘in-itself’; it is essentially a world
of relations.” (WP §625). See also Richardson (1996: 105).) Here, I incline to take
Nietzsche’s talk of “the world” to denote the totality of putative objects, which, given his
power ontology, emerges as a vast complex of relations embedded with the container of
space and time.
30
The question of whether relationalism can accommodate ER is, I believe, an open one.
For our purposes, substantivalism proves useful, since the distinctness of temporal regions
is “built into” the metaphysics.
14

the recurrence of my life must be part of an earlier or later cycle of cosmic


history than my present life (which is, of course, also a recurrence).”31 An
important question about this metaphysics for ER is whether it might rea-
sonably be viewed as the one Nietzsche intends. On this score—and almost
any other concerning Nietzsche’s metaphysics—there are layers upon layers
of complications regarding both his perspectivism and the extent to which
his power ontology can be reconciled with our superficial talk of material
“objects.”32 Here, I will set these broader issues aside and note that a cru-
cial commitment for the present proposal is that Nietzsche’s view of ER
comports roughly with substantivalism. And, when drawing on Nietzsche’s
remarks surrounding ER, there is reason for optimism. For example, his
discussion of statistical arguments for eternal recurrence suggest a realism
about the reality of space and time:

The total amount of energy is limited, not “infinite”: let us be-


ware of such excesses in concepts! Consequently, the number of
states, combinations, changes, and transformations of this en-
ergy is tremendously great and practically immeasurable, but in
any case finite and not infinite. But the time through which this
total energy works is infinite. That means the energy is forever
the same and forever active. An infinity has already passed away
before this present moment. That means that all possible trans-
formations must already have taken place. Consequently, the
present transformation is a repetition, and thus also that which
gave rise to it, and that which arises from it, and so backward
and forward again! Insofar as the totality of states of energy
always recurs, everything has happened innumerable times.33
31
Clark (1990: 267).
32
For example, “We are operating only with things that do not exist – with lines, surfaces,
bodies, atoms, divisible times, and divisible spaces.” (GS §112). Here, it is interesting to
note that, if Nietzsche’s denial concerns the divisibility of time and space, then he would
seem to be affirming the opposing thesis that time and space are indivisible and, therefore,
real.
33
Nietzsches werke in Drei Brande XII: 51.
15

For Nietzsche, time is said to be infinite and plays the role of a container
“through which this total energy works”. This suggests a background con-
ception of time along substantivalist lines, where we can deduce features
about the recurrence of energy-states from metaphysically independent facts
about the objective temporal order. Given these remarks, I take it that the
we are not out of place in developing a metaphysics of ER along substantival-
ist lines even while Nietzsche’s ultimate metaphysical commitments remain
contentious.
Although the mixed conception of uniformity provides a prima facie
satisfactory treatment of ER, I contend that it is an inadequate interpreta-
tion. The problem faced by the mixed view arises when we recall the initial
thought-experiment:

This life as you now live and have lived it, you will have to live
once more and innumerable times more; and there will be noth-
ing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and
sight an everything unutterably small or great in your life will
have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence—
even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even
this moment and I myself.34

We saw earlier that the qualitative conception of uniformity is inadequate,


since Nietzsche’s remarks demand that one and the very same individual
like you or I recurs. This requirement, along with the objections surveyed
above, pushed us towards the mixed view. But, here, Nietzsche claims that
not only individuals like ourselves but even “this moment” and other tempo-
ral regions must recur. If we are to take this passage seriously, we are forced
to treat talk of individuals and times with parity: their recurrence must be
explained in the same fashion. And, since the recurrence of times, under-
stood in the same fashion as the recurrence of objects—straightforwardly
rules out the individuation of epochs in terms of an objective temporal or-
dering, the mixed view is unsatisfactory. Nietzsche’s conception of ER draws
no ontological distinction between the recurrence of times and individuals,
34
GS §341.
16

so another response to the dilemma above is needed. In the next section,


I outline a metaphysics of time and tense that accepts the same treatment
of the recurrence of times and individuals and that also allows to overcome
the dilemma poster earlier.35

3 Why So Tense About Eternal Recurrence?


My defense of an alternative metaphysics for ER requires focus upon two
issues in the metaphysics of time. The first concern the “reality of tense”;
the second concerns the reality of non-present times.
Debates about the “reality of tense” can be conducted in many ways.
Here, we can understand the debate to concern whether tensed properties
like being past, being present, and being future are reducible to tenseless
properties like being five minutes prior to and being thirty-three years after.
So understood, question about the reality of tense turn on whether there is
a metaphysically primitive distinction between the present and non-present
times. For example, is there some fundamental property had only by present
things that separates them—albeit briefly—from the past and future things?
Those who believe in a fundamental distinction that privileges the present
accept what we can call a privileged view of time. In contrast, those who
think that there is no fundamental distinction opt for a unprivileged view of
time.36
A primary virtue of the privileged theory is that it captures the intu-
ition that the present enjoys special ontological significance. This intuition
can, however, be captured in other ways. This brings us to the second is-
35
An interesting interpretive consequence of the present proposal is that it furnishes us
with a natural explanation for why Nietzsche’s statistical arguments remained unpub-
lished: even if Nietzsche believed them to be sound, the conclusion they purport to es-
tablish is not consonant with a view of ER that accommodates the numerical identity of
times across epochs.
36
The debate over the fundamentality of tensed properties is connected yet importantly
distinct from the debate over whether a semantic theory can be given that does away with
any primitively tensed notions. Unfortunately, both issues sometimes travel under the
name of the “A-Theory/B-Theory Debate”. For more on these issues, see Sider (2001)
and Zimmerman (2006).
17

sue that we will focus upon: the reality of non-present times. According
to presentists, the present is metaphysically significant since the only time
that exists is the present time. Understood atemporally, presentism holds
there are no past or future times and, therefore, no past or future entities
like dinosaurs or the 2050 World Series Champions. On such a view, the
present is privileged by being coextensive with the domain of all entities. On
the contrasting view, eternalism, past, present, and future times all exist.
Presently existing entities are, therefore, a mere subset of all the entities that
exist, since, in some atemporal sense, both dinosaurs and the 2050 World
Series Champions exist. They simply fail to exist now.
Of the above described views, two natural package deals emerge: privi-
leged presentism and unprivileged eternalism. For the privileged presentist,
the metaphysical importance of tense is explained by noting that only in
virtue of being present can something exist. For the unprivileged eternalist,
the temporal features of reality can all be explained in terms of the various
relations that hold between past, present, and future individuals.
In addition to these views, two other heterodox views remain. The first
view, unprivileged presentism, borders on triviality or incoherence. It holds
that there is no fundamental distinction that the present enjoys, but denies
that non-present entities exist. The second view, privileged eternalism, is
more interesting.37 On this view, past, present, and future entities exist,
but presently existing entities are held to instantiate a fundamental property,
being present, that distinguishes them from past or future entities.
What I want to now suggest is that the metaphysics of ER is best un-
derstood as one according to which privileged eternalism is true. I take this
proposal to square with the central features of ER Nietzsche outlines in the
passages surveyed above. In particular, it succeeds in capturing the require-
ment that temporal regions and individuals recur in the same fashion. Such
a view is also forced upon us by the dilemma considered above. Earlier,
we saw the qualitative conception of uniformity to fail. Here, I will argue
37
There is some issue over which philosophers actually endorse such a view. Perhaps
the only uncontroversial proponent is Smith (1993). See Zimmerman (2006) for further
discussion.
18

that the non-qualitative conception can be salvaged by appeal to privileged


eternalism.
To see how privileged eternalist view sustains ER, it will be helpful to
contrast it with the mixed view considered above. On that view, extra
ontology was proposed as a solution to problems with ER. Specifically, ob-
jectively distinct temporal regions were posited to “house” the multitude
of epochs. We saw, however, that this proposal was unsatisfactory, since
Nietzsche’s remarks regarding ER suggest that both objects and tempo-
ral regions must themselves recur. Given this requirement, ER cannot be
accommodated by expanding our ontological commitments (i.e., increasing
the domain of objects or temporal regions). Instead, primitive ideology—
metaphysically basic distinctions—are needed to explain ER, and, in the
form of privileged eternalism, the passage of time involves exactly this: a
primitive distinction that demarcates the present temporal region from other
temporal regions. This distinction is constantly “moving” and, in this way,
an account of “becoming” and the passage of time can be accounted for. In
light of the dilemma above, it is natural to help ourselves to the ideologi-
cal resources of privileged eternalism—specifically, the primitive property of
being present—to make sense of ER.
The first step in developing a privileged eternalist view of ER is to grasp
one horn of the dilemma surveyed earlier: we should accept the identity
conception of uniformity. Rather than taking ER to require a recurring
world to be a stretched out like a infinite chain of paper dolls, the world
is identified with what commonsense would take to be “the universe”—the
sum of the spatial and temporal regions between, say, the Big Bang and a
looming Big Crunch. Compared to the mixed view, this delivers a rather
modest ontology, since the mixed view would be required to duplicate the
universe infinitely many times over.
The second step is to notice an errant assumption in the argument from
PII considered earlier. This assumption should be clear from our discussion
of the reality of tense above. That earlier argument purported to show
that ER was impossible if the world was not “stretched out” by having
numerically distinct temporal regions for each epoch. Here, however, we
19

need to distinguish between ontology and ideology. Most notably, if there


is but one “universe”, there might still be myriad recurrences provided that
the distribution of the primitive property, being present, follows a certain
pattern. Specifically, ER can take place within a single universe, if being
present is instantiated infinitely many times by each and every temporal
region of that universe. Adopting the familiar metaphor of the “moving
spotlight”, ER can be understood as follows: after having shone on the
entire universe in sequence, the spotlight returns to the beginning of the
univesre and begins to shine on the entire univesre once more.38 By positing
a primitive property of being present, the privileged eternalist can hold that
every moment and every individual has been and will be illuminated ad
infinitum.
On this view, the perpetuity requirement is met, not by positing distinct
temporal regions in the form of infinitely many universes, but by holding a
primitive temporal property to cycle through the temporal regions of a single
universe over and over again. As Nietzsche puts it, “the eternal hourglass of
existence is turned upside down again and again.” The concern requirement
is met by virtue of individuals being identical to themselves “across” epochs,
since there is but a single universe that encompasses all of us and no mere
doppelgangers. The uniformity requirement is met in a similar vein: we are
both identical with and qualitatively indiscernible from individuals in other
epochs, since there are no other “epochs” (i.e., entities or temporal regions
distinct from ourselves and our fellow universe-mates).
On the present view of ER, the spotlight of the present “moves” through-
out temporal regions. Taken at face value, this talk of a “moving present”
would seem to require a commitment to a kind of higher-order temporal
dimension. Such a view is, however, likely to strike many as unattractive.
It will be helpful, then, to note that recent commentators on the moving
spotlight view have defended privileged views from this charge by taking
on a commitment to conceptually primitive tense operators, which, once
accepted, obviate the need to provide an analysis of the “moving” of the
38
For more on the ”moving spotlight”, see Sider (2001: 17-21).
20

present.39 Here, our present view of ER ought to follow suit and grant
that the distinction between present and non-present times is conceptually
primitive and that no appeal to higher-order temporal dimensions is needed.
A notable virtue of the present view of ER is that it makes good on
Nietzsche’s repeated remarks that time is, in some respect, “cyclical”. Notice
that, on the competing mixed view, time is not itself cyclical, but, instead,
material objects exhibit a bizarre kind of regularity. On the present view,
however, the cyclical character of time is a function of the spotlight of the
present shining over the entire temporal region of the universe ad infinitum.
In this respect, better sense can be made of a salient feature of Nietzsche’s
talk regarding ER.
I have suggested that we can understand ER in terms of a single “uni-
verse” that exhibits a peculiar pattern of instantiation with respect to a
fundamental property, being present. I have indicated that such a view
accommodates the perpetuity, concern, and uniformity requirements. In
the next section, I consider the interpretive consequences for the view just
sketched and the broader question of whether it might comport with Niet-
zsche’s broader metaphysical commitments.

4 Conclusion
In considering the metaphysics and interpretation of ER, Long (1987) states:

The vision of eternal recurrence is precisely the experience of


Being as Becoming without end. Quite simply, there is no lan-
guage which can capture this as an idea. Not only is the truth
of the eternal recurrence outside the domain of the public, as we
have seen, but the very meaning of eternal recurrence cannot be
expressed in language.40

Long’s passage typifies a natural strategy for reconciling ER with other Ni-
etzschean commitments: A broader commitment that is borne out in the
39
For discussion, see Sider (2001).
40
Long (1987: 440).
21

Nietzschean corpus—here, a certain interpretation of his perspectivism—


is granted interpretive primacy over Nietzsche’s apparently intelligible re-
marks on ER. This outcome is, in some respects, highly understandable.
Nietzsche’s remarks regarding perspectivism and his rejection of “Being”
in favour of “Becoming”, upon quite natural interpretations, threaten to
reduce ER and any other putative metaphysical hypothesis to “mere” inter-
pretations. On such interpretations, there is little interest to paying detailed
attention to the metaphysical peculiarities of ER, since it cannot reasonably
be taken as thesis about something like an “objective world”.
For those who incline to give Nietzsche’s perspectivism a central role
in interpreting his metaphysics—one that deflates the possibility of any ro-
bust metaphysical hypotheses—the preceding is liable to be of only limited
interest. In contrast, for those who incline to take his talk of “the hard-
est, most terrible insight into reality” at face-value, the picture of ER that
emerges is likely to be very different. Here, my aim has only been to consider
what Nietzsche’s immediate remarks suggest as the default metaphysics of
ER. And, as we have seen, the resulting view of ER—a brand of privileged
eternalism—is a provocative thesis when set against the backdrop of present
orthodoxies regarding time and tense.

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