BRIDGING THE GAP OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION, THE POOR VERSUS THE

RICH
 Table of Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1
The Gap...................................................................................................................... 1
Social Stratification.....................................................................................................2
Economic inequality .................................................................................................. 3
Politics and conflict in Kenya .....................................................................................4
References .................................................................................................................6

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Introduction

Money creates class distinctions. Enough money makes wealthy or rich and not enough makes
working class or poor. Though both classes share the same planet they live in different worlds.
The wealthy can afford the best of everything while the poor or working class struggle to keep a
roof overhead and food on the table. While the lower class may consider the upper class to be
undeserving of their wealth the upper class consider them to be their social inferiors. The
misunderstanding between these classes seems to stem from two differing viewpoints that in
some cases are right while in others they are wrong.

Those that have wealth, whether inherited or earned, fear the less fortunate are out to take it from
them. The poor feel the wealthy are holding them back by denying them access to positions of
influence and opportunity. To some extent resentment and fear exist on both sides. How then is
this gap between the classes maintained and how can it be bridged?

The Gap

Aside from the money issue the key to bridging this gap lies in education. The wealthy can
afford the best education possible for their children. With degrees from highly ranked
universities and family influence wielded on their behalf they are almost always assured a well
paying secured future. Their circle of friends comes from the same backgrounds with the same
privileges and the same mindset of entitlement.

Doors of power and influence are opened to the wealthy. They control the political landscape and
shape policy. Too often this policy is solely for their benefit with little that trickles down stream
to the less fortunate. Their moral and ethical standards coincide with their socioeconomic needs
and aspirations. The ruling class, as they have been called, controls the working class and the
poor by economic means. Simply put the lower class is viewed as expendable sources of labor.
This is a moral and ethical distinction based solely on economic need by and for the wealthy.

The working class or blue collar as they are often called have neither the time nor the means to
afford the same level of education as the wealthy, on as large a scale. Grants and scholarships
help level the educational opportunities somewhat but it does not open the same doors as it does

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to the wealthy. Lower class, or the extremely poor, views higher education as something
unattainable to them. From impoverished backgrounds their base needs, that most of us take for
granted, are their immediate concerns. Opportunity and upward mobility are replaced with words
like faith and hope. They do what they must to survive. By innovation and education the lower
class can narrow that gap between the rich and the poor. In time both sides may be able to
overcome their fears and misconception of each other as that gap closes. Until then the status quo
will remain the same.

Social Stratification

Social stratification refers to the hierarchical organization of society; thus caste systems and class
systems are examples of stratification systems albeit based on different criteria or ‘orders’. The
way a society is stratified depends on its general characteristics e.g. its levels of economic and
political development. In general social stratification appears to be the norm among state-level
cultures. Non-state or stateless cultures may also be characterized by some form of stratification
e.g. between elders and youth, shamans and the profane. In the Kenyan context, prior to
colonization many large communities e.g. were ‘stateless’ or decentralized lacking a national
government, feudal aristocracy, well defined frontiers or some of the other trappings associated
with states. Instead the frontiers that mattered were local (for instance between villages).

Some have argued that such ‘stateless’ societies were weakly stratified hence the argument that
many African societies were essentially egalitarian prior to the colonization of the continent and
the introduction of the market economy by the West. Prior to colonization most African societies
were ‘kinship-based’ valuing social harmony over wealth and status. On the other hand,
economically oriented societies are cultures in which status and wealth are prized thus inducing
stratification, competition and conflict. These are for instance essential features of feudal and
capitalist societies. This may be an idealized perspective. However, many pre-colonial societies
experienced frequent internal and external conflict including conflicts over access to resources
such as land.

Moreover while overwhelmingly agrarian, there was substantial evidence of trade between
neighbouring and sometimes distant communities. Some communities were able to develop a
sophisticated trading relationship with the Coast which linked with the Middle East and Asia

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based on ivory, gold and slaves. Hence again these societies could have developed non-agrarian
groups of traders and middle men.

Other communities notably the agro-pastoralists, prominently the Maasai developed proto-states
based on military expansionism for the control of grazing lands. The Maasai pastoral economy
was based on maximising the yield (in terms of cattle) of a given unit of grazing land. This was
achieved without individual tenure system (such as ranches) practiced in the West. It was also
achieved without formal state structures.

Grazing areas were controlled by particular clans or extended families with members deferring to
the Elders thus access to grazing lands is controlled and restricted. The important point to note
here is that even in so-called stateless societies, the exigencies of managing finite common
resources can encourage the development of social hierarchies i.e. for the Maasai the role of
elders, although other institutions e.g. ageset groups were important risk mitigation and social
promotion mechanisms in the political economy of Maasai society.

Many other communities shared features with the communities already mentioned. However it is
obvious that easy generalizations given the diversity of pre-colonial Africa are not possible. We
further observe that the social condition of pre-colonial Africa was far from idyllic. Small scale
armed conflict was frequent as were institutions such as slavery. Thus while the economic and
political forces unleashed by colonization have made Africa much more unequal and in many
respects an insecure place than may have obtained previously, this must be set against the real
situation of pre-colonial Africa.

Economic inequality

Economic inequality can influence the development of institutions and institutions can influence
the development of inequality. These institutions in turn determine public policy, which, because
of the centrality of the state in the development process determine the long term trajectory of
social and economic development. This in a nutshell, is the hypothesis underlying our argument
that economic inequality in Kenya is a result of the functioning of its political and economic
institutions. It has been argued that in land-scarce and labour-abundant conditions; political
economy favours so-called rent extraction and therefore high inequality institutions which

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perpetuate policies that reinforce economic exclusivity. In a labour-scarce and land abundant
settings, the converse holds.

Kenya’s historical inequality can be traced to British colonization (Engermann and Sokoloff,
2005). Colonialism through expropriation, native reserves, hut taxes, compulsory labour,
marketing boards and commodity monopolies, created land scarcity and excess labour. Thus
Kenya became a rent extraction colony. Institutions evolved to support high inequality. These
institutions were not completely dissolved at independence; instead they were co-opted by the
new elite. Thus the political economy of inequality was maintained and ethnicised as opposed to
racialised. Consequently, the heart of political contestation in Kenya is the competition for elite
rents created by high inequality institutions.

The relationship between inequality, class formation and political power has been the underlying
motivating factor in Kenya’s politics since the colonial period. However, there is little empirical
research aimed at disentangling the linkages between class formation, high economic inequality
and Kenya’s political economy. This is despite the fact that inequality, conflict and social
injustice are increasingly characteristic of Kenyan society. At the core of these linkages has been
the development of a political system based on patronage i.e. a neo-patrimonial state. The
institutional organisation of the Kenyan state grants the Executive, more specifically, the
President sweeping powers of patronage. It is argued here that the imperative of political
mobilisation as well as self-serving interest have transformed this custodianship of national
wealth enjoyed by the state into a potent tool of economic exploitation and exclusion for some
and a vehicle for accumulation and social ascendancy for others.

Politics and conflict in Kenya

Politics and conflict in Kenya revolve around two key issues; competition/control over
productive land and ethnic/regional opportunities for economic rent. Thus historically, issues of
economic inequality have centred on access to agricultural land and control of the state, the
means by which the dominating elite can create economic rent. This has been the case since
colonisation when the colonial authority began the process of alienating land from Africans in
favour of supposedly more productive European commercial farmers (Engermann and Sokoloff,
2005). This created a powerful vested interest in colonial Kenya which had disproportionate

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influence on public policy and used it to its advantage. Although much less brazen since
independence, the practice of biasing policy in favour of certain groups has continued post-
independence.

There could be various reasons for this but in an ethnically divided and unequal country such as
Kenya, the basic political problem could be surmised as how to determine policy from among so
many conflicting regional agendas and demands for resources. The solution Kenya’s post-
independence political leaders chose is a political system based on ethnic patronage. Political
parties then become vehicles to funnel the perks of loyalty to ethnic elites as well as sounding
boards for ethnic grievances and aspirations. Thus Kenya’s political parties have been and are
ever increasingly fronts for ethnic political interests. It is implicitly understood by voters that
whichever ethnic alliance succeeds will deliver economic dividends to its regional/ethnic base
and whichever loses will be frozen out. This is because of the underlying structure of
power/economic relations in Kenya. The elite through its control of the means of economic rent
creation (the state) and its distribution consolidates its hold on power and wealth through webs of
reciprocal patron client relations. In other words, the Kenyan elite preside over a system that
appropriates the best economic opportunities through its control over the state and its institutions.

This configuration militates against social cohesion and promotes ethno-regional inequality
(Easterly, Ritzen, & Woolcock, 2006). It also reinforces the vicious circle from high inequality to
power concentration and low institutional quality to poverty. In this regard, an important aspect
of public policy that has been at the centre of controversy at various stages in the country’s
history is that of overall economic policy. The choices with regard to economic policy have often
been motivated by a desire to protect the interest of invested capital and the dominant elite and
this has shaped at crucial stages the response of policymakers to emerging events e.g. the
response of the colonial government to growing unrest in the Native Reserves in the 1940’s and
1950’s which led to a radical shift in rural development policy by the colonial government once
the prevailing system was seen as unviable. In general, economic policy in Kenya can be
construed as supporting the essential interests of the dominant elite. Indeed throughout the
history of post-independence Kenya, a key concern of economic policy has been precisely to
protect these interests in the name of pragmatism and economic stability.

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References

Easterly, W., Ritzen, J. & Woolcock, M. (2006) “Social Cohesion, Institutions & Growth”,
Economics & Politics, V 01.18 No.2, July 2006

Syagga, P. (2005) “Land Ownership and Land Use in Kenya: Policy Prescriptions from an
Inequality Perspective”, Readings in Inequality, Society for International Development
(SID), Nairobi

Engermann, S. & Sokoloff, K. (2005) “Colonialism, Inequality & Long-Run Paths of

Development”, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 11057,
Cambridge MA, USA