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89
Book Review
1.
Why does the book have the title it has? The first part, “Foundations,” pro-
vides the explanation.
One of the major concerns in contemporary analytical philosophy of mind
has been to provide an explanation of how consciousness arises in matter. Ac-
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cording to Sheets-Johnstone, however, this question is spurious. The crucial
question is not how consciousness is related to (inorganic) matter, but how
consciousness is grounded in organic and animate forms (pp. 42, 43). On its
most rudimentary level consciousness is a question of responsitivity and ani-
mation (p. 50). Consciousness is basically a dimension of living forms that
move themselves, forms that are animate, and that in their animation engage
with the world (p. 59). Thus, for Sheets-Johnstone the true task is to under-
stand the animate and as she points out, any biological naturalism, as well as
any biological naturalization of consciousness, should consequently start by
studying movement (p. 60).
There is nothing de novo in nature, there is nothing that has absolutely no
antecedents. Everything has a history, and according to Sheets-Johnstone, we
must study that history if we are to understand who and what we are, if we
wish to understand mind and consciousness (p. 403). The problem of con-
sciousness must be approached from a historical or genetic perspective. We
need to understand its origin. Given the emphasis on animation, what we need
is a close and serious investigation of evolution as a history of animate form
(p. 42).
Where should such an evolutionary account of consciousness begin? Ac-
cording to Sheets-Johnstone, in the analysis of surface recognition, sensi-
tivity, and kinesthesia (pp. 58, 75). As she points out, an agent devoid of
kinesthesia belongs to no known natural species. For Sheets-Johnstone, this
even holds true in the case of a bacterium. A bacterium is in possession of
surface sensitivity. It is sensitive to the chemical composition of the environ-
ment, and it is in possession of a chemically-mediated tactile discrimination
of bodies apart from or outside its own body (pp. 59, 68). But it is also in
possession of a rudimentary corporeal consciousness (p. 75). Thus, Sheets-
Johnstone argues that the Socratic imperative ‘know thyself’ is a built-in
biological matrix with deep evolutionary roots (p. xix). In fact, corporeal
awareness is a constituent of animate life, and ultimately the evolution of
consciousness coincides with the evolution of animate forms (p. 77).
The claim that a bacterium is in possession of corporeal consciousness and
perhaps even of a kinesthetic form of self-consciousness is bound to provoke
dissent. Many would be inclined to argue that if one starts to ascribe conscious-
ness and self-consciousness to a bacterium, both terms are being used in so
insipid a fashion that they become literally inane. Many would insist that if
consciousness and self-consciousness are to be found in a bacterium they will
have nothing in common with the type of consciousness and self-conscious-
ness found in human beings. But perhaps these misgivings wouldn’t trouble
Sheets-Johnstone very much. When reading The Primacy of Movement one
gets the impression that she to some extent would welcome dissent. In fact,
judging from her witty and polemic style, she seems to thrive on it.
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Having argued in detail for the evolutionary (and developmental) primacy
of movement, Sheets-Johnstone turns to a more transcendental form of argu-
mentation. Movement is, as she says, the condition of all forms of perception;
there is no perception without movement, and ultimately everything cogni-
tive leads back to movement (p. 137). In the end, movement rather than a
functioning ego, a body-world dyad, or the existential fore-structure of Dasein
must be seen as the transcendental foundation (pp. 232, 252). Our first con-
sciousness is a tactile-kinesthetic consciousness that arises on the ground of
movement, and the constitution of both space and time originates out of self-
movement (pp. 137, 146). As for this primal movement, it is simply there:
“What is already there is movement, movement in and through which the
perceptible world and acting subject come to be constituted, which is to say
movement in and through which we make sense of both the world and our-
selves. That ‘I move’ arises on the ground of our primal animateness is of
equally profound epistemological significance, for it means that movement
is the ground on which transcendental subjectivity – in a broad sense, our
sense-making or constituting faculty – arises.”(p. 138) Echoing some elements
in Husserl’s description of the deepest layers of time-consciousness, and re-
ferring to the work of Landgrebe, Sheets-Johnstone writes that movement
forms the I that moves before the I that moves forms movement, and that the
ability to move oneself is the foundation of any and all constitutive processes;
the ability precedes the possibility of doing anything, that is, it precedes any
‘I can’ (pp. 138, 231–232).1
It is one thing to argue that transcendental subjectivity is necessarily em-
bodied (or to use Sheets-Johnstone’s preferred terminology, animate), and that
bodily movement is of crucial constitutive significance, and indispensable for
both perception and perhaps even temporality. Thus it could be (and has been)
argued that there is an equiprimordiality between movement (kinesthesia) and
temporality (inner time-consciousness). But it is something quite different to
argue that movement per se is the foundation, the ground out of which tran-
scendental subjectivity arises. In fact, I find it difficult to understand how the
latter conclusion could be phenomenologically warranted. It hardly makes
sense to speak indiscriminately of movement as the transcendental founda-
tion. Planets, waves, and avalanches all move, but that kind of movement is
presumably of zero significance in this context. Self-movement and kinesthesia
are much more promising candidates, but the reason is obvious. They already
involve a rudimentary form of consciousness, and in that case an argument to
the effect that they constitute subjectivity would be circular. Perhaps Sheets-
Johnstone’s point is that the kind of corporeal consciousness to be found in
self-movement precedes and founds transcendental subjectivity if by the lat-
ter we understand an ‘I can’, i.e., some active egological principle. But in this
case, the obvious question would be why one would want to define subjec-
tivity in such narrow terms.
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2.
3.
4.
Dan Zahavi
Danish National Research Foundation, Center for Subjectivity Research,
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Notes
References
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Recent Developmental Studies,” Philosophical Psychology 9 (1996): 213–236.
E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie I,
Husserliana III/1–2 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).
E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie,
Husserliana VI (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).
E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie I (1923–24), Husserliana VII (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff,
1956).
E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie II (1923–24), Husserliana VIII (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff,
1959).
E. Husserl, Formale und Transzendentale Logik, Huserliana XVII (Den Haag: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1974).
M. Merleau-Ponty, La structure du comportement (Paris, 1942).
J. Petitot, F.J. Varela, B. Pachoud and J.-M. Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues
in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1999).
J.-P. Sartre, L’être et le néant (Paris: Tel Gallimard, 1943/1976).
A. Tatossian, La phénoménologie des psychoses (Paris: L’art du comprendre, 1997).
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