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M I C H A E L J . M A H O N E Y , PH .D.
A N D R E M A R Q U I S , PH .D.
No matter how stable they are, dynamic systems are always under-
going perturbations (literally, “agitations” or “deviations”) that
reflect the complex interplay of internal self-organizing activities
and their ongoing exchanges with their local environments. So long
as these perturbations do not exceed the “balancing” capacities of
the system, it moves onward (through space and time) at the same
average level of organizational complexity that would have been
predicted by the second law of thermodynamics. But the perturba-
tions can get out of hand as a result of both inside and outside
dynamics. If the perturbations exceed a certain threshold (the
bifurcation point), a whole new level of principles is required to
account for the processes that emerge [Mahoney, 1991, p. 418].
Dewey (1934) made this point much more plainly and poetically more
than half a century earlier:
Life itself consists of phases in which the organism falls out of step
with the march of surrounding things and then recovers unison with
it—either through effort or by some happy chance. And, in a
growing life, the recovery is never mere return to a prior state, for
it is enriched by the state of disparity and resistance through which
it has successfully passed. . . . Life grows when a temporary falling
out is a transition to a more extensive balance of the energies of the
organism with those of the conditions under which it lives. . . . [If]
life continues and if in continuing it expands, there is a transforma-
tion of them into differentiated aspects of a higher powered and
more significant life. The marvel of organic, of vital, adaptation
through expansion (instead of by contraction and passive accom-
modation) actually takes place. Here in germ are balance and
harmony attained through rhythm. Equilibrium comes about not
mechanically and inertly but out of, and because of, tension [1934,
pp. 535–536].
means that the “system as a whole thus shifts to a new, higher order, more
complex structural form whose parts are governed by a new set of
functional properties and characterized by a new set of statistical parame-
ters” (Brent, 1978, p. 380). What emerges, when circumstances permit,
is a transformation in the identity and functioning of the system. When
the system manages to wrestle order out of the disorder into which it was
thrown, the emerging system tends to be both more complex and more
capable. This is not to say that its increasing complexity does not involve
vulnerabilities, or that disorder is always followed by successful devel-
opmental reorganization. But the picture is full of more hope and poten-
tial than has been portrayed by pathology-based models of human
dysfunction.
Integral constructivism offers a view of disorder that respects the role
of ever-present cascades of disorganization in the living system’s dy-
namic and lifelong development. The resilience and resourcefulness of
the human system is much greater than is generally appreciated. More-
over, “growing pains”—ranging from mild discomfort to intense suffer-
ing—are more central to our development than most like to admit. From
the perspective of integral constructivism, allegedly strategic interven-
tions that seek to suppress quickly the pain of systemic disorganization
often carry a significant risk.
Besides depathologizing disorder, an important contribution of com-
plexity studies to the conceptualization and practice of psychotherapy is
an appreciation for what are called “phase transitions” and the dynamics
of development. Phase transitions are those places in development where
a system suddenly changes course. Although therapists may not be able
to use the technical terminology of chaos and the sciences of complexity
to help patients conceptualize what they are experiencing and how it
reflects natural processes, we can use developmental metaphors that
convey some of that same message. Physical metaphors that invoke
bodily experiences are often helpful in reassuring patients: “growing
pains,” “molting,” and the like. Metaphors of journeying are also useful,
and patients can be encouraged to construct a description of where they
have been and where they now are. One of our patients, for example, was
very experienced in white water canoeing. When an unexpected life
event destabilized her, she described her transition into chaos in terms
of what she was familiar with: a slowly moving stream suddenly
becoming a torrent of unexpected rapids where she had little control and
was desperately struggling just to stay upright and off the rocks. This
INTEGRAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 799
metaphor helped her to regain some sense of familiarity with what she
was experiencing, and she felt reassured by realizing that—like river
rapids—the rapids in her psychological life were not likely to last forever,
and that they were likely to be followed by calm waters and opportunities
to rest.
Life challenges may lead to possibilities for learning and develop-
ment, but possibilities necessarily involve risks, and some risks result in
disaster or chronic dysfunction. People can easily become “stuck” in
disorder. Ordering processes can vary from flexibly stable to rigidly
over- or understabilizing. Psychological disorders tend to fall at the
extremes of this constructed dimension. Anxious hypervigilance and
hopeless disengagement reflect the extremes of the tension between fear
and hope, and impulse control disorders reflect the dynamics of oscillat-
ing among such extremes. Disorder, in the sense of diminished psycho-
logical functioning and well-being, becomes a lifestyle for these unfor-
tunate people, and they struggle for years—and sometimes lifetimes—in
the same painful patterns. This is where the empathic attunement and
flexible collaboration of the therapist is most important, and we shall
address these therapeutic strategies after we present an overview of
constructive metatheory.
Constructivism: An Outline
The verb “to construct” comes from the Latin construere, which means
to arrange or give structure. The ongoing nature of structuring (organiz-
ing) processes is the developmental heart of constructivism. Although it
can trace a legacy far back into written and oral history, constructivism
is a term that is just now making its way into the vocabulary of psychol-
ogy. It does not appear, as yet, in most dictionaries of psychology. If one
looks at the psychological literature over the past quarter-century, how-
ever, it is being used with increasing frequency. “Constructive” and
“constructivist” are being used, for example, to describe developing
perspectives in domains ranging from biology and brain science to
cognitive-behavioral, humanistic, and psychoanalytic psychotherapies.
There is considerable diversity in expressions of constructivism,
which is why we term it here a metatheory—a family of theories. The
family resemblance appears to be reflected, however, in a consensual
emphasis on five principle assertions about human experience and
development:
800 MICHAEL J. MAHONEY AND ANDRE MARQUIS
These themes suggest a view of the person that is “integral,” in the sense
of embracing many of the apparent dualities that have traditionally
dominated psychology and philosophy (Wilber, 2000a).
Among the earliest recorded proponents of some form of constructiv-
ism are the Buddha, Lao Tzu, and Heraclitus. The Buddha emphasized
the role of minds and thinking in the creation and maintenance of our
experience of reality. Lao Tzu and Heraclitus believed that opposites
coexist and, in fact, lead to and mutually define one another. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the major western proponents of
constructivism were Vico, Kant, and Vaihinger. Vico said that human
knowing involves an imaginative construction of order in experience,
and that knowledge must be understood as a process of construction that
takes place in social contexts. He maintained that our thinking expresses
metaphors of the body, and he suggested that fantasy, imagination,
mythology, and etymology are important resources for understanding
ourselves.
Kant emphasized the power of patterns in our thinking, and he
regarded ideas as regulative principles. Although these patterns place
INTEGRAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 801
limits on our knowing, Kant did not view us as prisoners of our minds.
He believed in both freedom and an autonomous will, and he related these
to an ethics of action. Kant believed that we participate in the construction
of a universal lawfulness, and that integrity and good will are essential
to that process.
In The Philosophy of “As If,” Vaihinger argued that the primary
purpose of mind and mental processes is not to portray or mirror reality,
but to serve individuals in their navigations through life circumstances.
Vaihinger’s principle of “functional fictions” would later form a corner-
stone of Adler’s theory of individual psychology.
Later developments in constructivism included Bartlett’s (1932) clas-
sic work on reconstructive processes in memory. At about the same time,
Piaget began his series of influential studies on children’s cognitive
development. Drawing on the dynamic view of learning described by
Herbart (1776–1841), Piaget described knowing as a quest for a dynamic
balance between what is familiar and what is novel. This balancing act
is accomplished by the coordination of processes of assimilation and
accommodation. Piaget emphasized that we organize our worlds by
organizing ourselves, and this theme of self-organization pervades con-
structive views of human experience.
A powerful theoretical presentation of constructivism was offered by
Hayek (1952), who showed that “much that we believe to know about
the external world is, in fact, knowledge about ourselves” (pp. 6–7)—that
is, knowledge about our patterns of organizing ourselves and our worlds.
Another major event in the emergence of constructivism was the publi-
cation of Kelly’s (1955) theory of “constructive alternativism,” better
known as “personal construct theory,” which emphasized both possibil-
ity and pattern in the self-organization of personality. He went on to
elaborate an original theory of personality built around the concept of
constructs. For Kelly, constructs (organizing processes) were dichoto-
mous (either/or) in structure and exhibited dynamic (ever-changing)
aspects (e.g., in their permeability and relative tightness and looseness).
Kelly translated his theory into a novel approach to psychotherapy in
which the role of the therapist is to challenge skillfully the patient’s ways
of construing self, others, the world, and their possible relationships.
Kelly’s work has stimulated substantial research on personality and
psychotherapy.
Constructive influences continued to increase throughout the second
half of the twentieth century, and it is the focus of numerous books
802 MICHAEL J. MAHONEY AND ANDRE MARQUIS
1
Journal of Constructivist Psychology and Constructivism in the Human Sciences
(Web site, http://orgs.unt.edu/constructivism/society.htm; e-mail, constructivism1@
hotmail.com).
INTEGRAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 803
principles and the past traumas they replicate, but also and more impor-
tantly, their expectations as to how their therapists will react and respond
in such situations. These endeavors simultaneously mend the cracks in
the bond. However, before a disrupted bond can be mended, it must first
be established.
Intersubjective Consolidation
What the eye sees better the heart feels more deeply. We not only
increase the likelihood of our being moved; we also run the risks
that being moved entail. For we are moved somewhere, and that
somewhere is further into life, closer to those we live with. They
come to matter more. Seeing better increases our vulnerability to
being recruited to the welfare of another. It is our recruitability, as
much as our knowledge of what to do once drawn, that makes us of
value in our caring for another’s development. . . . And why is it
so important to be recruitable? The answer is that a person’s life
depends . . . on whether he or she moves someone in this way [pp.
16–17, italics added].
change . . . some things are always left in the dark. One might say
that one of the contexts of our actions is always the context of
ignorance of contexts. And yet, act we must [Hoffman, cited in
Moore, 1999, p. 122].
Conclusion
REFERENCES
Anderson, W. T. (1990), Reality Isn’t What It Used To Be. San Francisco: Harper & Row.
_______ (1997), The Future of the Self. New York: Tarcher & Putnam.
Atwood, G. E. & Stolorow, R. D. (1984), Structures of Subjectivity. Hillsdale, NJ: The
Analytic Press.
Bacal, H. A. & Newman, K. M. (1990), Theories of Object Relations. New York:
Columbia University Press.
812 MICHAEL J. MAHONEY AND ANDRE MARQUIS
Constructivism
Box 311280
Denton, TX 76203
constructivism1@hotmail.com