Professional Documents
Culture Documents
BRITTANIE A. HOLMES
I. INTRODUCTION
1
Elizabeth L. Earle, Banishing the Thirteenth Juror: An Approach to the
Identification of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1222 (1992).
2
FED. R. EVID. 403.
3
D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the Treatment
of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV. 289, 322
(1989).
2
4
TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2010).
5
TXI at 233.
6
Id. at 233-34.
7
Id. at 234.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 234.
3
13
Id. at 240.
14
Id.
15
TXI Transp. Co., 306 S.W.3d at 241.
16
Id. at 241-42.
17
See id. at 242; TEX. R. EVID. 608(b).
18
TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 243 (Tex. 2010).
19
Id. at 245.
20
Id. (quoting Tex. Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 859, 864 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
21
TXI Transp. Co., 306 S.W.3d at 245.
4
22
See id.; TEX. R. EVID. 403.
23
Id.
24
Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 230 P.3d 583 (Wash. 2010).
25
Id. at 585.
26
Id. at 584.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 585.
30
Id. at 584.
31
Salas, 230 P.3d at 585.
5
great.” 32 The court held that with regard to Salases lost future
earnings, the probative value of his undocumented status was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 33
Therefore, the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence was an
abuse of discretion and may have had a harmful effect on the jury. 34
Salas was granted a new trial. 35
B. Statement of Significance
C. Article Overview
32
Id. at 586-87.
33
Id. at 587.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 245 (Tex. 2010).
37
Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 230 P.3d 583, 587 (Wash. 2010).
6
II. BACKGROUND
38
D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the
Treatment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV.
289, 321 (1989).
7
39
Moss v. Sanger, 12 S.W. 619, 620 (Tex. 1889).
40
Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n. v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 859, 866 (Tex. App. San
Antonio 1990).
41
Id.
42
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948).
43
See e.g., Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1574 (9th Cir. 1996); Dickson v.
Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1988).
44
Ronald L. Carlson et al., Evidence in the Nineties, 21-23 (3d ed. 1991).
45
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond “Top Down” Grand Theories of
Statutory Construction: A “Bottom Up” Interpretive Approach To The Federal
Rules of Evidence, 75 OR. L. REV. 389, 390 (1996).
8
III. ANALYSIS
46
FED. R. EVID., judicial app.
47
See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 629 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1080 (1980).
48
FED. R. EVID. 403.
49
See, supra note 46.
50
See, supra note 46, advisory committee’s note.
9
51
State v. Dennison, 801 P.2d 193, 203 (Wash. 1990).
52
State v. Powell, 893 P.2d 615, 627 (Wash. 1995).
53
Id.
54
See e.g., TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 241-42 (Tex. 2010); Bates
v. State, 587 S.W.2d 121, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Frechin v. Thornton, 326
S.W.2d 122, 126 (Mo. 1959).
55
Foster v. State, 869 So.2d 743, 745 (Fla.App. 2004) (quoting Lawson v. State, 651
So.2d 713, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
56
Ramirez v. State, 802 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
57
Id.
58
Frechin v. Thornton, 326 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Mo. 1959).
59
Harvard Law Review Association, VI. Racial Bias and Prosecutorial Conduct at
Trial, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1588, 1590 (1988).
10
60
Harvard, supra note 57, at 1590.
61
Harvard, supra note 57, at 1590.
62
Harvard, supra note 57, at 1590-91.
63
Harvard, supra note 57, at 1591.
64
Malek v. Federal Ins. Co., 994 F.2d 49, 55 (2nd Cir. 1993).
65
Id.
66
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).
67
Id. at 23.
11
68
State v. Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d 163, 190 (W. Va. 1995).
69
Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n. v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 859, 864 (Tex. App. San
Antonio 1990).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946).
73
FED. R. EVID. 403.
74
State v. Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995).
12
75
D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the
Treatment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV.
289, 321 (1989).
76
United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1993).
77
Id. at 1252-53.
78
Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d at 189.
79
Id.
80
Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n. v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 859, 866 (Tex. App. San
Antonio 1990) (emphasis added).
81
Earle, supra note 1, at 1216.
82
See TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 244 (Tex. 2010); Clemente v.
State, 707 P.2d 818, 829 (Cal. 1985) (holding immigration status, "even if
marginally relevant was highly prejudicial"); Diaz v. State, 743 A.2d 1166,
1184(Del. 1999) (finding that even if a witness's concern about immigration status
was relevant to impeach her, the court still must "determine if the probative value of
that immigration status . . . is outweighed by any unfair prejudice").
13
83
TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 244 (Tex. 2010).
84
See Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n. v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tex. App.
San Antonio 1990) (“While most improper jury arguments can be cured by
objection and instruction to disregard, appeals to racial prejudice are one of the
exceptional kinds of argument that are considered incurable”).
85
Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 230 P.3d 583, 586-87 (Wash. 2010).
86
See, e.g., Hagl v. Jacob Stern & Sons, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 779 (E.D.Pa. l979);
Melendres v. Soales, 306 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Gonzalez v. City of
Franklin, 403 N.W.2d 747 (Wis. 1987).
87
Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n. v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d at 865.
14
88
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
89
See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988); State v. Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d 163
(W. Va. 1995); State v. Crockett, 265 S.E.2d 268 (W.Va. 1979).
90
Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d at 183.
91
Id.
92
See generally Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (holding that a trial
counsel’s performance must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness in
order to be deprived of effective assistance of counsel); State v. Sugg, 456 S.E.2d
469 (W. Va. 1995) (prosecutorial comments must be so egregious and prejudicial
that would manifest injustice from the remarks).
93
See TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 242 (Tex. 2010); State v.
Avendano-Lopez, 904 P.2d 324, 332 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
15
of the motion for mistrial. 103 The Court reasoned that the misconduct
likely did not affect the jury’s verdict because the objection to the
improper question was sustained and Avendano-Lopez was not
permitted to answer, the case against him was very strong, and the
jury was already aware of the defendant’s Hispanic background. 104
Across the spectrum, race has been an especially risky subject.
Stemming from a 1977 conviction from the Fifth Circuit in the case
Russell v. Collins, 105 defense lawyers for James Russell worked on
briefs for submission to the Texas courts, the lower federal courts,
and ultimately the United States Supreme Court. 106 The attorneys
alleged that the county prosecutor in the capital murder trial had
injected the issue of race into the proceedings by asking an all-white
jury if they could imagine the fear of the victim being with the three
“black” suspects. 107 “The comments from Russell's trial exemplify
two different types of remarks challenged in courts during this
century, the explicit and implicit references to color.” 108 With no
standard of defining racism in the judicial system, no court agreed
with the defense counsel’s arguments and Russell was subsequently
executed by lethal injection. 109
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has noticed the negative effect
of racially biased statements as evident in the case of United States v.
Kallin. 110 In Kallin, a witness, whose credibility was not in issue,
testified to the defendant’s dislike of “Mexicans” where the case was
regarding tax evasion. 111 The Court recognized reversible error
103
Id. at 332.
104
Id. at 332-33.
105
Russell v. Collins, 944 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1278
(1991).
106
Earle, supra note 1, at 1212.
107
Earle, supra note 1, at 1212.
108
Earle, supra note 1, at 1212.
109
Earle, supra note 1, at 1212-13.
110
United States v. Kallin, 50 F.3d 689, 696 (9th Cir. 1995).
111
Id.
17
112
Id. at 696 n.7.
113
Id. at 696 n.7 (quoting United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1434 (6th Cir.
1986)).
114
FED. R. EVID. 610.
115
Contemporary Mission Inc. v. Bonded Mailings Inc., 671 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982).
116
Id. at 84.
117
Id.
118
Malek v. Federal Ins. Co., 994 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1993).
18
119
Id. at 54.
120
Id. at 60 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
121
Id. at 59.
122
Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n. v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Tex. App. San
Antonio 1990).
123
Id.
19
concerned his immigration status. 124 Also, during the trial, jurors
heard nearly forty references to Rodriguez’s status, including thirty-
five as an “illegal immigrant” and seven concerning a prior
deportation. 125 There were also thirty-two references to Rodriguez's
misconduct in using a false Social Security number, sixteen
references to Rodriguez's “invalid” or “fraudulently obtained”
commercial driver's license, and seven references that Rodriguez was
a “liar.” 126
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice David Medina
acknowledged TXI’s assertion that Hughes’s continuous reference to
Rodriguez’s citizenship was simply a ploy to disguise their real claim,
which was “that Rodriguez was negligent for driving without a right
to be in this country and that TXI was negligent for hiring an illegal
alien.” 127 The Court held that the trial court erred by admitting the
prejudicial evidence impugning Rodriguez’s character on the basis of
his immigration status. 128 The immigration information was not
relevant to the negligence claim against TXI. 129 Justice Wainwright
concurred in part and dissented in part. He expressed concern
regarding the expert witness called by the Hugheses. 130 That witness
concluded that Rodriguez caused the accident, although there were no
eye witnesses to back up the conclusion. 131 In fact, all five of the
eyewitnesses, whom the expert failed to sufficiently address, testified
that they never saw Rodriguez’s gravel truck in the westbound
lane. 132
124
TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 243 (Tex. 2010).
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 244.
128
Id. at 245.
129
Id. at 242.
130
Id. at 245 (Wainwright, J., dissenting).
131
Id. (Wainwright, J., dissenting).
132
Id. (Wainwright, J., dissenting).
20
133
Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 230 P.3d 583, 584 (Wash. 2010).
134
Id. at 585.
135
Id.
136
State v. Avendano-Lopez, 904 P.2d 324 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
137
Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 177 P.3d 769, 772 (Wast. Ct. App. 2008), overruled
by Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 230 P.3d 583 (Wash. 2010).
21
138
Id.
139
Rosa v. Partners in Progress Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1002 (N.H. 2005).
140
Id.
141
Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 177 P.3d 769, 773 (Wast. Ct. App. 2008), overruled
by Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 230 P.3d 583 (Wash. 2010).
142
Id. at 774.
143
Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 230 P.3d 583, 586 (Wash. 2010).
144
Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. City of Franklin, 403 N.W.2d 747, 760 (Wis. 1987)).
22
145
Salas, 230 P.3d at 586-87.
146
Id. at 587. Justice Jerry Alexander, in dissent, argued that the trial judge's
decision to admit evidence of Salas' immigration status was not manifestly
unreasonable. Id.
147
See e.g., Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 56, 66 (App.
Div. 2005), aff'd sub nom., Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1260
(N.Y. 2006); Barahona v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of N.Y., 816
N.Y.S.2d 851, 852 (Sup. Ct. 2006); Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d
994, 1002 (N.H. 2005).
23
148
State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 684 (1995).
149
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
150
D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the
Treatment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV.
289, 350 (1989).
151
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
152
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
153
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24
This provision broadly refers to “person” and not just a citizen. The
key wording proves that even undocumented immigrants shall have
the same due process rights as any other person living within the U.S.
territory. The key wording further includes all races, genders, and
nationalities. However, the meaning and interpretation of the
provision are obviously not always a priority when it comes to the
intentional solicitation of a biased judgment in court. Thus, it is up
the state and federal courts to ensure that absolutely no person is
deprived of their due process rights. If someone is possibly convicted
or biased based on their ethnicity, religious beliefs, or nationality,
then the court has simply failed us all. No one should be purposely
subjected to unfair prejudicial evidence.
154
Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n. v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Tex. App. San
Antonio 1990).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and
Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261, 336 (1997).
25
IV. CONCLUSION
158
Melinda Smith, Criminal Defense Attorneys and Noncitizen Clients:
Understanding Immigrants, Basic Immigration Law and How Recent Changes in
Those Laws May Effect Your Criminal Cases, 33 AKRON L. REV. 163, 169 (1999).
159
Saito, supra note 152, at 336.
26