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`From Molehills Mountains Made: An Examination of Red and Blue State

Cultural Stereotypes
Pamela Ray Koch and Lala Carr Steelman
Cultural Sociology 2009; 3; 165
DOI: 10.1177/1749975508100676

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 Cultural Sociology
Copyright © 2009
BSA Publications Ltd®
Volume 3(1): 165–189
[DOI: 10.1177/1749975508100676]
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC

‘From Molehills Mountains Made: An

Examination of Red and Blue State Cultural
Stereotypes
■ Pamela Ray Koch
Hope College, Michigan, USA

■ Lala Carr Steelman

University of South Carolina, USA

A B S T RACT
Since 2000, in the USA Republican voting states have been called red and the
Democrat ones called blue. We explore whether or not the cultural stereotype
that red states harbour more virtuous constituents than blue states has merit. We
relate the extent to which electoral votes were cast for George Bush during the
2004 election, a variable that we specify as the degree of redness, to a scale of
moral conduct at the state level. This scale is a composite of indicators of socially
disapproved behaviours that conservatives in particular are more concerned
about than are liberals in the USA. The scale is an equally weighted sum of ranks
on 13 aggregated indicators of behaviours. Our scale includes activities that are
most strongly advocated and campaigned against by conservatives and covers sex-
ual behaviour, substance abuse, family breakdown, and crime rates. Data are
extracted from a variety of sources in 2000. We examine the untested presump-
tion that inhabitants of red states are more moral than those in blue states, as
some commonly held stereotypes would lead us to believe. No matter how the
analysis is conducted, we reach the same inescapable conclusion. The red state/
blue state dichotomy just does not pan out empirically.

K E Y WOR D S
blue states / culture war / moral values / red states / stereotypes

165
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166 Cultural Sociology Volume 3 ■ Number 1 ■ March 2009

Introduction

oes the imagery of an American nation split along lines of morality have

D merit? We appraise the stereotype that red states (symbolizing Republican

votes) in general represent more virtuous constituents than blue states
(symbolizing the Democrats). Stereotypes are formulaic mental images in which
traits are assumed, regardless of accuracy, to apply to all members of the group
to which they belong (Judd and Park, 1993). They can be positive or negative
and may at least partly describe people so stereotyped. Effects of stereotypes
potentially cover the gamut from the benign to the destructive. Meanwhile,
sociology is anchored in explaining social phenomena, a feat that cannot be
achieved without analysis of the culture of that society. Culture embodies
norms embraced with respect to what is considered proper and improper
behaviour. Yet there are variations within culture as to the degree to which
norms are believed. Unless challenged or in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary, people may be treated on the basis of what stereotypes, applicable to their
group memberships, signal to others. As long as stereotypes are given some cre-
dence the red versus blue state stereotype might sway political strategies, busi-
ness decisions and even the degree of integration individuals feel in their
respective communities, especially when personal beliefs contrast with those
generally held in their respective communities. More profoundly, should the red
versus blue nation stereotype become conventional wisdom, then states desig-
nated as red or blue might respectively be automatically ceded as conservative
or liberal (Steele and Aronson, 1998). Correspondingly, citizens in states dom-
inated by one political party or another would not be exposed to the full polit-
ical debate compared to their counterparts in states considered competitive.
Although the red/blue state stereotype sometimes is trivialized as a bloated fig-
ment of the chattering class’s imagination or as a source for satire, it could have
important consequences as long as it resides in public memory. Our objective is
to see how the stereotype fares with objective evidence on perceived moral con-
duct. In the 2004 presidential election cycle, incumbent president George Bush
defeated John Kerry. States that voted for the more conservative candidate are
called red (supported Bush) states while those that voted for the more liberal
candidate are called blue (supported Kerry).
It is important to remember that there are at least two versions of the red
state/blue state negative stereotype. Red state residents are presumably humble,
spirited fans for their teams, churchgoers, residents of suburbs or rural areas
and stalwart supporters of vintage American values (Frank, 2004: 20–21). In
contrast, blue state residents are portrayed as showy, drive Volvos, drink lattes,
are more likely to be cosmopolitan city dwellers, but are also less judgemental
of the behaviour of others (Frank, 2004: 20–22). Red state residents lean
Republican and are also stereotyped as solid and hard working people. Blue
state residents lean Democrat and are more likely viewed as secular and elitist
snobs. These stereotypes are purely a function of voting patterns at the state
level, rather than representations of direct evidence about individual voters.

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 From Molehills Mountains Made Koch & Steelman 167

They are obviously overgeneralizations, a key characteristic of stereotypes.

Frank (2004) argues that the media further validate these stereotypes by their
continuing depiction of the blue/red state divide and by implication of the resi-
dents who reside in these states. Here we focus only on what conservatives sus-
pect about blue state voters precisely because the red states tipped the previous
two presidential elections in the USA in favour of the more conservative party.
The conservative angle of the stereotype implies that residents of blue states
are less moral in their conduct than their red state counterparts. For example,
blue state residents may be stereotyped as lax in their behaviours and thus more
likely to engage in socially disapproved behaviours such as substance abuse or
risky sexual behaviour. In contrast, the liberal take on red state residents is that
these citizens lean too far to the right of the political spectrum and are intoler-
ant of others. Red state residents are often portrayed in a negative light as gun-
toting, homophobic, and religious zealots for instance. Both sides of these
stereotypes merit investigation. However, in this article we investigate the first
one reviewed above; specifically, whether the conservative version of the red
state/blue state stereotype in which the latter expresses less traditionally virtu-
ous behaviour has merit.
Colours chosen to depict states are not arbitrary but are instead cultural
reminders of the American flag, an icon that conveys profound symbolic mean-
ing to American citizens. Only since 2000 have the Republican voting states
been called red and the Democrat ones called blue. Recalling previous election
cycles, Reagan’s 1984 landslide victory was likened to an ocean of blue, the
colour of the states voting Republican in that particular election cycle (Patton,
2004). When scrutinizing percentage differences in who voted for Bush or Kerry
in the 50 states, one could easily argue that the red/blue distinction was over-
done. The point spread in most states simply is not large enough to justify such
a drastic red/blue dichotomy. The colour purple probably more accurately
reflects America’s political climate. Still, in most cases, the winner of the major-
ity of a state’s voters receives all electoral votes of that state rather than the pro-
portion of the state’s population that cast ballots for him or her. The election
outcome for the presidency in the USA depends upon electoral college votes and
may yield a highly false impression that a state with, for instance, a 51–49 split
between conservative and liberal voters respectively, is equivalent to a state
with a much wider spread separating the two camps of voters. To the extent
that the red/blue stereotype invigorates the victors, silences the dissenters, or is
exploited for political propaganda, it may have important consequences. An
inaccurate diagnosis of what constituents really want, for example, may prod
politicians to support legislation that does not actually correspond with the
desires of a majority of their constituents.
Whether there is a cultural war over traditional norms going on in the USA
is fiercely debated among contemporary social scientists (Davis and Robinson,
1996; Dimaggio et al., 1996; Fiorina, 2005; Hunter, 1983, 1991, 1994, 1996;
Williams, 1997; Wuthnow, 1988, 1989, 1996). Conclusions vary from a full-
blown civil war over morality to dismissal of it as trivial. Fiorina (2005) attacks

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168 Cultural Sociology Volume 3 ■ Number 1 ■ March 2009

the contention that the USA is embroiled in a civil war over values. He stresses
that states with less than a 10-point spread between candidates potentially
could easily move from one side of the ledger to the other. Nonetheless, the
state colour stereotype still provides fodder for commentary, political strategies
and comedy aimed not only at states but also at the people who populate them.
Simply putting states into the red or blue column is a contemporary stereo-
type based mostly on alleged angst about morality that infiltrated overtly and
obliquely the political dialogue in 2004. We address the simple question of
whether red and blue states differ in terms of traditional morality by analysing
a set of 13 indicators that cover socially disapproved behaviours from the van-
tage point of conservatism. These behaviours embody abortion, divorce, and
non-traditional partnerships and represent some of the hottest ‘hot button’
issues that stir a wide range of reactions, from rage to indifference, and could
reasonably be deemed to be a set of commonly shared moral concerns among
conservatives. Such issues are high priorities for conservative advocacy groups
as is evident from their legislative action agendum. See, for example, the web-
site for James Dobson’s Focus on the Family (Dobson, 2008).
The stereotype of red states is that they are populated with residents that,
because of their strongly held moral values, also support policies that encourage
more traditional values. More marketable candidates in such states would thus
be those who vow to uphold morally compatible platforms with the values of
their constituencies. Conceivably, states that granted electoral votes to Bush are
also those states that, at the aggregate level, are populated with inhabitants less
likely to engage in socially undesirable behaviours. Animated discussions in the
media sometimes challenge such presumptions. One frequently reported statistic
used to counter this supposition is that the divorce rate of Massachusetts, the
home of John Kerry, is the lowest in the nation despite a state-wide tolerant pol-
icy toward same-sex partnerships. Commentators on these cultural issues often
rely on such single indicators to cherry-pick support for one view or the other.
For this very reason, we create an index that includes a plethora of behaviours
that irritate a sufficient number of voters from the conservative side of the equa-
tion to make a difference in how people ultimately vote.
The 2004 election has been depicted as the epitome of the battle over cultural
matters (Fiorina, 2005). States are classified as the red states and the blue states
according to whether their electoral votes were cast to Bush (red) or to Kerry
(blue). Then and now, the state red/blue state jargon has been and is frequently
heard on broadcasts and in the print media. Correspondingly, the Linguistic
Society of America chronicles that the red/blue state dichotomy was the most
commonly used new phrase in 2004 dialogue. Furthermore, the distinction still
occurs with great regularity in political dialogue and comedy routines.
It should be noted that the red and blue dichotomy is not only utilized to
stereotype states but also by the residents who live there in both negative and
positive ways. Absurdly, the entire continent of Europe has been called a blue
state. Fiorina (2005) recently asserted that the state red/blue state dichotomy

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 From Molehills Mountains Made Koch & Steelman 169

based on election results is a gross misrepresentation. Our challenge is to see

whether red and blue states really are as dissimilar in moral conduct as com-
monly held stereotypes suggest.

The Alleged 2004 Culture War

The Cable News Network’s (CNN) coverage of exit polling conducted in tan-
dem with the 2004 election is enlightening (CNN, 2004). Moral values were
cited as their main concern when voting by 22% of respondents. Of these vot-
ers, 80% backed Bush with only 18% backing Kerry. These statistics showed
that a profound number of Americans are indeed concerned about morality and
what they see as a threat to traditional American culture. Election analysts first
homed in on moral values as vital to Bush’s 2004 victory over Kerry since more
voters in the exit polls listed moral concerns as their top priority in voting.
Pundits relied on it so heavily to explain the election outcome that in no small
measure it has become conventional wisdom. Indeed the red and blue state
stereotype persists to this day despite evidence that the election probably did
not hinge on moral values after all (Klinkner, 2006; Lagner and Cohen, 2005).
Colour classifications are based on results from previous election cycles
and polling data. The shades of red and blue are now commonly accepted as
announcing which way a state leans politically. As election results trickled in on
election eve the states were coloured red (Bush) or blue (Kerry), reinforcing
once again the red/blue state dichotomy. Although not completely similar, the
red/blue breakdown remarkably resembled the electoral map in the contested
2000 election with just a few states changing colours. Dichotomizing states as
red or blue may render a misleading impression of the cultural climate in any
given state, especially if one considers that the margin of victory is extraordi-
narily slim, in many states. Given the spreads in close states, for example Ohio
and New Hampshire, perhaps such states should more accurately be called pur-
ple states given the negligible difference between candidates. Nor does the
colouring of the whole state tell anything about red and blue areas within each
state. Under the Electoral College’s mandate, nonetheless, the state is the cru-
cial unit in political battles, as winners, regardless of margins, take all the elec-
toral votes of that state. The only exceptions are the small states of Nebraska
and Maine that apportion electoral votes by congressional district.
We are not claiming that conservatives have a monopoly on moral con-
cerns. Rather, since the conservative candidate won nationally in the election
cycles of 2000 and 2004 and did so in no small measure because of an empha-
sis on a return to ‘family values’, we rely on the conservatives’ general concep-
tualization of what is considered culturally normative. Thus we incorporate
issues typically emphasized from the conservative side of the equation as
socially desirable or not. One highly visible and polarizing cultural issue in the
USA is whether abortion should remain a legal option for women (Adams,

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170 Cultural Sociology Volume 3 ■ Number 1 ■ March 2009

1997; Cook et al., 1992; Guth et al., 1993; Luker, 1984; Mouw and Sobel,
2001; Saletan, 2004; Shaw, 2003). A contribution that sociologists typically
offer is to challenge whether what is believed to be true withstands empirical
scrutiny. Our objective in this article is to check whether American cultural
beliefs withstand empirical scrutiny and whether what is believed about red and
blue states in terms of moral conduct rings true. The red/blue state cultural
dichotomy geographically paints a picture of the nation in which red (more
moral) states are contrasted with blue (less moral) states. The red/blue state
dichotomy is so often used in conjunction with moral values that it may well be
instilled as a cultural legend for those who repeatedly hear it.
Repeated stereotypes may become so ingrained that they establish
blueprints for the future. If politicians deem that moral issues matter most, then
such beliefs might prompt them to vote for measures they presume are con-
stituents’ priorities. Such reactions add consequentiality to the debate over moral
issues. Reactions to expression of moral values potentially affect legislation and
legal decisions about abortion rulings, homosexual rights, freedom of expres-
sion, treatment of criminals, and appointments to the Supreme Court, to men-
tion just a few high profile examples. Since moral values are the number one
concern cited by exit poll voters in 2004 on a forced choice list of issues, and
80% of those who cited it also had a voting preference for President Bush, this
issue seems to be dominated by conservatives. After the election, the religious
right staked their claim to have their voices heard with respect to legislation and
governance. With some bravado these voters used their influence as 78% of indi-
viduals who considered themselves white evangelical or born-again Christians
also mentioned a preference and presumably voted for Bush (CNN, 2004).1

Statement of the Problem

Intentional or not, red states are typecast as representing moral values whereas
the blue states are seen as out of sync with traditional, mainstream values, at
least those that have been politically volatile in recent years. However, the scep-
tic might ask whether there is really such a stark difference in the alleged moral
red states and the not-so-moral blue states. Answers to this question have
remarkable consequences for future political battles. Our objective is simple.
We investigate whether the stereotype of red states as inhabited with more
moral residents has merit. The basic premise tested is to see whether states that
granted their electoral votes to the Republican presidential candidate in 2004
are also those states that, at the aggregate level, are more likely characterized as
stereotypically more moral, at least from the conservative standpoint. If we find
that the stereotype does not match objective indicators, we submit that this
finding represents an important contribution in understanding the tenacity and
authenticity of cultural beliefs.
We see if a genuine as opposed to a mere stereotyped relationship exists
between red and blue states and morality with data collected from various

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 From Molehills Mountains Made Koch & Steelman 171

sources for the year 2000. Scores for each state are the sum of the ranks of the
indicators standardized to a common metric. Each indicator counts the same
toward the scale. To avoid subjectivity, we do not assign weights to moral indi-
cators. Note that we deliberately construct the index in this way precisely
because we want to avoid weighting one ‘vice’ over another. We partition our
discussion of moral virtues into four moral domains: sexuality, substance
abuse, crime and family outcome. The scale is not exhaustive. Note for exam-
ple that we exclude morally evocative issues such as gambling. Gaming is not
officially legal across states and data about it are spotty. To assess the veracity
of the stereotype of a nation divided into red or blue states, we specifically con-
centrate on the moral agendum of the victorious side, especially since these con-
stituents more likely listed values as motivating how they had voted. Our
measures essentially tap into the extent of socially disapproved behaviours at
the state level. A reasonable criticism of our approach is the counter argument
that other indicators should be associated with the red/blue state distinction.
For the sake of consistency our indicators include only culturally disapproved
behaviours. Future research should be conducted on the extent of virtuosity in
red and blue states to check out the other side of that stereotype as well.

Methodology and Data Description

We classify states using a construct of moral indicators to rank them along the
lines of conservatively perceived moral conduct. We construct an index, com-
prised of several reliable sources of the most widely cited moral issues of our
times and those embraced by the winning side. We do not claim that these indi-
cators definitively represent all that is virtuous. Rather, we rely on the very issues
that dominate the moral values landscape and are those promulgated by interest
groups. Moreover, we estimate the model using various combinations within the
index to ascertain whether adding additional information alters the more gen-
eral picture that emerges. From this point forward, the word moral refers to cul-
turally approved behaviours from a conservative standpoint based on objective
indicators for every state. These data are amassed from a variety of sources.
The moral indicators composite we construct is novel. Consequently, ques-
tions about validity will naturally arise. However, we argue that the scale is
robust for a number of reasons. First, the scale taps virtually all of the moral
indicators at the state aggregate level that top the list of contemporary moral
controversies. Moreover, we use measures of behaviour, not attitudes. Second,
it is also noteworthy that the states do not scatter drastically based on redness
or blueness for any of the indicators or domains comprising the overall com-
posite index. Finally, in supplementary analysis we observe that dropping any
one, two or three variables from the index does not substantially reshape the
results. These factors bolster confidence in our general conclusions.
Indicators of the moral index cover four domains: crime, substance use,
sexual activity, and family outcomes. The crime component consists of both

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172 Cultural Sociology Volume 3 ■ Number 1 ■ March 2009

violent and property crime rates. Substance use indicators cover alcohol sales
per capita, drug deaths per 100,000 residents, tobacco sales per capita, and
drug use per 1000 over the age of 12. The sexual domain covers sexually trans-
mitted disease (STD) rates, percentage of births to unwed mothers, percentage
of pregnancies ending in abortion, and number of advertised strip clubs per
100,000 residents over 18 years of age. The family indicators are: divorce
rates,2 number of substantiated child maltreatment cases per 1000 residents
under 18,3 and the percentage of households comprised of unmarried partner
households.4 While our list of moral indicators is not exhaustive, we do encom-
pass major areas of dispute for which state data can be acquired. The average
or mean scores for red states and blue states for each of these indicators are dis-
played as histograms in Figure 1.
Some critics may question the selection and the number of moral issues in
this study. Of course, there may be a plethora of other moral issues such as
poverty or environmental issues construed as moral imperatives more, but not
exclusively, from the liberal side of the ledger. Also the extent to which the indi-
cator taps into moral disgust might be questionable. However, with the indica-
tors that are embodied in our scale, we tested models until we reached a point
of saturation in which adding any of the indicators did little to alter the bottom

Crime Domain Substance Abuse Domain

1000
10000 3713 3298 58 49 55 69
431 402 100
1000
100 10 2.18 2.37
0.7 0.93
10 1
1 0.1
Property Violent Tobacco Alcohol Drug use Drug deaths
crime crime
Average crime rates in red states and blue states Average substance abuse rates appear to be almost
appear to be almost equal with blue states being equal for both red states and blue states. Average
slightly lower for both categories. tobacco use is slightly higher in red states while
alcohol, drug use and drug deaths are slightly
higher in the blue states.

Family Outcome Domain Sexual Domain

1000 1000 377 309
100 4.78 3.94 7.79 6.97 4.93 5.81 100 33 31
10 21
14
1 10
1.81 1.46
0.1
Divorce Child Unmarried 1
abuse partner Strip club Abortion STD Unwed
households births

Average domain rates are very similar. Blue states have
lower rates of divorce and child abuse than red states.
However, blue states have more unmarried partner
households than red states.
Average sexual domain rates appear to be very
similar for both red states and blue states. Average
abortion rates are higher in blue states. However,
strip club rates, STD rates, and percentage of unwed
births are all slightly higher in red states.

Key

Red States Blue States

Figure1 Indicator averages (means) for red states and blue states

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 From Molehills Mountains Made Koch & Steelman 173

line. We extract indicators from multiple sources and then combine them to
form an index. The sources include: the Alan Guttmacher Home Page (2004),
the United States Census (2000), the United States Center for Disease Control
(2004) and its Division of Vital Statistics (2004a, 2004b), the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (2004), the Louisiana and Colorado
departments of vital statistics (Colorado Department of Public Health and
Environment, 2000; Louisiana Office of Public Health, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c),
the Indiana and California judicial branches (California Judicial Council, 2002;
Indiana Judicial Service, 2004), the Oregon Statistical Analysis Center (2004),
the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (2004), the Strip Club
Network (2004), government and Geographic Information Services (SSHL
Data, 2004). All indicators are based on data from the base year 2000.
Contemporaneous data in the election year for all of our indicators were not
available at the time of analysis. Census data are only taken every ten years,
2000 being the latest. Thus, all of our indicators come from the base year of
2000. Although these indicators characterize states in 2000 – four years prior
to the 2004 election – it is unlikely that the voter composition of any state
changed dramatically.
We next rank the states 1 to 50 with 1 representing the most ‘moral’ and
50 the least for every indicator. Following conventional practice, ties are han-
dled by giving the next state the rank value it would have received had a tie not
occurred. For instance, if two states rank 2, then the next state ranks 4. Ranks
for each indicator are then summed for each state to give an overall moral index
number. Mathematically we project states as more moral or less moral based
on this number.5 The large cross tabulation tables showing each state’s rank for
each indicator can be found in Appendices A and B and are organized from the
most moral (lowest overall score) to the least (highest overall score).
The state is the logical unit of analysis in presidential elections owing to the
realities of the Electoral College and the fact that the red versus blue stereotype
has been applied almost exclusively to states. Certainly, state lines are to some
extent arbitrarily drawn, but in the political realm it is logical to analyse the
data at the aggregated state level. Even though residents may live near another
state, the original map coloured black (red state) and white (blue state) shows
that red and blue states are much more likely to be proximate to one other than
states with a different colour. They cluster in corridors of red and blue. Media
markets within states concentrate on local problems and views. Decisions about
local problems such as education, state income taxes and property taxes take
place at the state level. Though imperfect, the state is the logical unit of analy-
sis for our study. While some critics contend that county level analysis could
yield a more precise image, we note that the cultural stereotype is predomi-
nantly applied to states.6 Furthermore, most of the important indicators of
behaviours are simply not available at the county level.
The analysis is straightforward. Based on the degree of redness (the percent-
age voting for the Republican candidate) states are ranked according to expected
morality.7 Then we estimate measurable morality with our index of moral

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174 Cultural Sociology Volume 3 ■ Number 1 ■ March 2009

conduct. To do so we take the highest moral index score (least adherence to tra-
ditional moral values), which is Delaware at 487, and subtract the lowest moral
index score (most adherence to traditional moral values), which is North Dakota
at 140. This subtraction resulted in a range of 347 points between the highest and
lowest scores. We then partition these scores into two categories, more moral and
less moral. We do this by dividing in half the range of index scores for a total of
173. This number is then added to the lowest index number of 140 for a total of
313. The score of 313 is thus set as the cut-off point for those designated as
‘moral’. We purposely conducted a raw state analysis, without correcting for
compositional variations. The relatively high turnout of the last election raises the
probability that voters were representative of the population of their native states.
We compare the prediction success of a state’s moral behaviour based on
whether the state’s electoral votes went to the Republican (conservative) or
Democratic (liberal) candidate in this analysis. We also run a correlation matrix
with raw scores for each of the 13 indicators, the overall moral index score, and
the percentage of the vote that went to the Republican candidate. Following
this analysis, more sophisticated regression equations are estimated as another
barometer of whether the red/blue stereotype is realistic in the USA. The first
regression employs percentage voting for Bush as the dependent variable and
the moral index score as the independent variable. Next we estimate a second
linear regression comparing the percentage of people citing moral values as
their number one issue and the morality index of this state. These regressions
include controls for church attendance, the percentage of rural dwellers, and the
percentage of white population in the state.

NH
VT Maine
Washington
North Minnesota
Montana
Dakota
MA
Oregon Wisconsin
South New York RI
Idaho Michigan
Wyoming Dakota
Pennsylvania CT
NJ
Nevada Nebraska Iowa Ohio
Illinois Indiana DE
West
Utah Colorado Virginia Virginia MD
Kansas Missouri
Kentucky North
California
Carolina
Tennessee
South
New Oklahoma Carolina
Arizona Arkansas
mexico
Alaska Alabama
Georgia
Mississippi
Texas
Louisiana
Florida

LEGEND

Red (Bush) Haiwaii

Blue (Kerry)

Map 1 Election results by state

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 From Molehills Mountains Made Koch & Steelman 175

NH
VT Maine
Washington
North Minnesota
Montana
Dakota
MA
Oregon Wisconsin
South New York RI
Idaho Michigan
Wyoming Dakota
Pennsylvania CT
NJ
Nevada Nebraska Iowa Ohio
Illinois Indiana DE
West
Utah Colorado Virginia Virginia MD
Kansas Missouri
Kentucky North
California
Carolina
Tennessee
South
New Oklahoma Carolina
Arizona Arkansas
mexico
Alaska Alabama
Georgia
Mississippi
Texas
Louisiana
Florida

LEGEND

Red (moral) Haiwaii

Blue (less moral)

Map 2 Actual results based on moral indicators

Results

Map 1 indicates election results by state. If the stereotype is upheld then we

expect the red states to be scored as more moral. Likewise, we expect the blue
states to be less moral if the stereotype has merit. We repaint the map with the
introduction of our scale of moral conduct and then show how corresponding
states are thereafter coloured. Map 2 displays the results of more moral versus
less moral revealed by our moral indicator scale described in the methodology
section. As we can see the map is not tidy. The redrawn map does not indicate
any relationship whatsoever between state colour and composite moral conduct.
Table 1 presents the states in alphabetical order and shows both the colour
predicted if Republican votes equated to more traditional moral conduct and the
morality level we estimate the state to have. As Table 1 further demonstrates, of
the 50 predictions made based on the colour red assumed as more moral, only
25 are supported by the analysis. Sixteen of the red states are actually estimated
to be in the less moral category. Fifteen of the red states are more moral within
the morality index. Conversely, nine of the blue states fall in the more moral cat-
egory and 10 within the less moral sphere. Observe that there are many flips
from the expectations based on the stereotype of red states and morality.
The success rate for the prediction of morality based on 2004 voting results
is what one would expect purely by chance. Our analysis reveals that of the blue
states 47% are more moral according to our index and 53% land in the less
moral category. Of the red states 48% are more moral with 52% registering
as less moral, a virtual dead heat. Percentages of red states and blue states that

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176 Cultural Sociology Volume 3 ■ Number 1 ■ March 2009

Table 1 Analysis results

Moral Bush Moral Moral Bush Moral

Election index votes index Election index votes index
State colour colour rank rank State colour colour rank rank

Alabama Red Blue 6 26 Montana Red Red 15 10

Alaska Red Blue 8 49 Nebraska Red Red 4 5
Arizona Red Blue 22 38 Nevada Red Blue 28 48
Arkansas Red Red 23 14 New Hampshire Blue Red 32 12
California Blue Blue 44 33 New Jersey Blue Red 38 16
Colorado Red Blue 26 25 New Mexico Red Blue 39 46
Connecticut Blue Red 44 22 New York Blue Blue 47 27
Delaware Blue Blue 38 50 North Carolina Red Blue 20 40
Florida Red Blue 26 47 North Dakota Red Red 6 1
Georgia Red Blue 16 38 Ohio Red Blue 28 28
Hawaii Blue Blue 41 31 Oklahoma Red Red 5 18
Idaho Red Red 3 3 Oregon Blue Blue 35 44
Illinois Blue Red 41 21 Pennsylvania Blue Red 32 11
Indiana Red Blue 11 42 Rhode Island Blue Blue 48 34
Iowa Red Red 39 4 South Carolina Red Blue 16 42
Kansas Red Red 8 8 South Dakota Red Red 11 8
Kentucky Red Red 11 17 Tennessee Red Blue 18 41
Louisiana Red Blue 18 45 Texas Red Red 10 23
Maine Blue Red 41 13 Utah Red Red 1 2
Maryland Blue Blue 46 35 Vermont Blue Blue 48 30
Massachusetts Blue Red 50 18 Virginia Red Red 23 6
Michigan Blue Blue 35 37 Washington Blue Red 38 24
Minnesota Blue Red 35 7 West Virginia Red Red 20 14
Mississippi Red Red 11 20 Wisconsin Blue Blue 32 29
Missouri Red Blue 23 32 Wyoming Red Blue 2 36

SUMMATION
Predicted Found Number
Red Blue 16
Red Red 15
Blue Red 9
Blue Blue 10

correspond more to traditional moral values are almost exactly even. It should
be noted that we ended up with 24 states in the red (traditional) and 26 blue
(less traditional behaviour). This division happened because we halved them
into red and blue to take into account the range of differences in moral index
scores. Had we forced the states into the 31–19 electoral scenario (with 31 as
red moral states and 19 blue less moral states), we would have found that blue
states move disproportionately into the more moral category and vice versa for
red states. (Four more blue states would have joined the more moral column
and three more red states, which would have made the percentage of blue states

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 From Molehills Mountains Made Koch & Steelman 177

[68%] higher than the percentage of red states considered moral [58%].) Thus,
our analysis actually provides a more conservative test of the original question
posed at the beginning of the article.
Table 1 also lists the ranks of each state from 1–50 based on percentage of
voters who voted for Bush (1 being the state with the highest percentage) and
the moral behaviour ranking for each state (1 being the most ‘moral’). A glance
at these ranks further buttresses our main finding that there is no relationship
between objective indicators of moral conduct and the outcome of the last pres-
idential election. Although, for example, Idaho, Kansas, and Ohio have the
same rank for morality and vote for Bush (3, 8 and 28 respectively), other states
veer dramatically from their colour-coded expected morality score. Most vary
by at least nine ranks between morality and percentage voting for Bush. For
example, Alaska has the 8th highest percentage for Bush but was ranked 49th
for overall moral conduct. Conversely, Iowa ranked 39th for Bush votes yet
was 4th on the morality scale. Intriguingly, California, Oregon and
Washington, states that are often typecast as the liberal ‘left coast’, fall into the
middle range of moral conduct.
States differ markedly on the components of the index of moral conduct.
Several states that have fewer abortions also have more out-of-wedlock births
and sexually transmitted diseases. At the same time as states ostensibly show
evidence of low abortion rates, this does not mean that similar restraint appears
with respect to premarital and unprotected sexual activity. It should also be
noted that many ranks were quite close. Some states appear virtuous in one
domain, for example with very low marks for items in the sexual domain, but
appear less wholesome in another. Even the state of North Dakota, which ranks
number one for moral conduct, has its shortcomings. Notably, it was in the bot-
tom 20 states for both alcohol and child abuse. In summary, states were strewn
all over the map with respect to our objective indicators of moral conduct. All
things considered, there does not appear to be a vivid cultural and moral divide
in this country, at least one that is identifiable along state lines.
The degree to which two variables are related to each other is measurable
by a correlation coefficient. A glance at the correlations in Table 2 reveals that
few indicators are correlated with each other. Also intriguing is the negative
correlation between strip clubs per capita and the STD rate for that state,
which is significant. The degree of redness (percentage that voted for the 2004
Republican candidate) is in fact negatively correlated with several of our
morality indicators, meaning that the percentage of votes going for the
Republican candidate rose when these behaviours declined, including drug
use, abortions, and unmarried partner households. These correlations run
counter to the relationships one might expect if the stereotype of red state
morality and political leanings were true. Most importantly, when all of the
indicators are collapsed into one morality indicator, there is no correlation
with degree of redness. Overall, the correlation coefficients reveal no pattern
between indicators of moral conduct and whether the state electoral votes
went Democrat or Republican.

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 178

Table 2 Indicator correlations

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O

Child 1 −.08 .02 .12 −.12 .31* .01 .02 −.12 .09 −.01 .07 −.11 .23 .04
abuse (A)
Strip −.08 1 −.29* −.02 −.03 −.14 .07 −.21 −.04 .01 .12 −.29 −.23 −.11 .14
clubs (B)
STD (C) .02 −.29* 1 .17 −.10 −.08 .17 .69* .05 −.25 −.10 .61* .49* .52** .10
Drug .11 −.02 .17 1 .01 .21 −.07 .18 .19 .15 .02 .24 .18 .42** −.11
Deaths (D)
Cultural Sociology Volume 3
■

Alcohol (E) −.12 −.03 −.10 .01 1 .41** .13 .04 .26 .64** .21 −.01 −.07 .29 −.25
Drug use (F) .31* −.14 −.08 .21 .41** 1 −.18 −.06 .37** .60 .07 .06 .01 .32* −.58*
Tobacco (G) .01 .07 .17 −.07 .13 −.18 1 .16 −.32* −.08 .38* −.06 −.22 .18 .24
Unwed .02 −.21 .69** .18 .04 −.06 .16 1 .19 .07 .07 .62* .40** .69** −.11
Number 1

mothers (H)
■

Abortion (I) −.12 −.04 .05 .19 .26 .37** −.32* .19 1 .40** −.11 .39** .05 .40** −.68*
Cohabitation (J) .09 .01 −.25 .15 .64** .60** −.08 .07 .40** 1 .25 −.02 −.05 .39** −.59*
Divorce (K) −.01 .12 −.10 .02 .21 .07 .38* .07 −.11 .25 1 −.04 .10 .29* .15
Violent .07 −.29* .61** .24 −.01 .06 −.06 .62* .39** −.02 −.04 1 .58** .69** −.11
March 2009

crime (L)
Property −.11 −.23 .49** .18 −.07 .01 −.22 .40** .05 −.05 .10 .58** 1 .53** .15

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crime (M)
Moral .23 −.11 .52** .42** .29* .32* .18 .69** .40** .39** .29* .69** .53** 1 −.19
index (N)
Redness (O) .04 .14 .10 −.11 −.25 −.58** .24 −.11 −.68* −.59* .15 −.11 .15 −.19 1
Statistical significance:
*p <.05
**p <.01
 From Molehills Mountains Made Koch & Steelman 179

A linear regression model is a multivariate technique which allows a

researcher to assess whether a variable independent of other variables pre-
dicts a dependent variable. Table 3 illustrates the results of a regression
which uses the moral index value to predict the degree of redness. Table 4
shows the results of a regression which uses the moral index value to pre-
dict the percentage of individuals citing moral values as their primary con-
cern on the exit poll in 2004. As Table 3 indicates, the moral index score is
insignificant when predicting the degree of redness at the .01 level. This
means that the moral index score (i.e. the extent to which virtuous
behaviours are present in a state) is not associated with whether that state’s
electoral votes went to the Democrat or Republican candidate. The percent-
ages of white residents in the state,8 median household income, and church
attendance do predict degree of redness. As the percentage of white resi-
dents, median household income, and church attendance of a state goes up
so does the margin of Republican voting in that state. Notably, given the
regression methodology, these increases are net of the associations of other
variables found in the regression. Table 4 shows that the moral index is not
significant at predicting concern with moral values. In fact, the only variable
that predicts selecting moral values as the number one issue is the percent-
age of individuals who attend church on a weekly basis. Individuals who
attend church at least on a weekly basis are more likely to select moral val-
ues as their number one issue.
Notably, these regressions have only 50 and 35 cases respectively. This
small number of cases makes it difficult to detect slight significant findings.
These results are the same ones available to pundits and special interest groups
from whom stereotypes gain much of their traction. The bottom line is that
there does not appear to be a clear relationship between red versus blue state-
hood and moral conduct of the residents of states. There may be some differ-
ences in overall moral behaviour by states that are not consistently related to
voting patterns. Certainly there are some red states, for example North Dakota

Table 3 Estimates of unstandardized coefficients from linear regression model of degree of

redness using ordinary least squares estimators

Regression Coefficient

Moral index score −.008

Percentage of rural Inhabitants of a state −4.57
Percentage of white residents of a state 16.46*
Median household income .0001*
Church attendance .558***
N 50

Statistical significance:
* <.01
** <.05
*** <.001

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180 Cultural Sociology Volume 3 ■ Number 1 ■ March 2009

Table 4 Estimates of unstandardized coefficients from linear regression model of percent listing
moral values as the most important election priority using ordinary least squares estimators

Regression Coefficient

Moral index score .013

Percentage of rural Inhabitants of a state 9.56
Percentage of white residents of a state 7.65
Median household income .00008
Church attendance .323*
N 36

Statistical significance:
* < .001

and Utah, that trend toward adherence to traditional cultural values.

Conversely, Florida, another red state, is located at the bottom. Even a quick
glance at the map reveals that there are geographic variations of moral conduct
corresponding to our scale. However, the level of moral conduct does not cor-
respond to whether states are ordinarily considered to be blue or red states.
Based on the results, the stereotyped images put forth regarding red versus blue
statehood seem exaggerated.

Discussion and Conclusions

Apparently, there is no link between the morality of a state and the 2004 elec-
tion outcomes, with the caveat that our issues do not cover all moral possi-
bilities. Stereotypes of red states and blue states are inaccurate, with little
basis in objective evidence, at least with respect to the moral issues that com-
mand the most ardent attention. While individuals may vote on moral
grounds, this tendency, ironically, is not reflected in the actual indicators of
conduct in states as some might have expected. Neither is the idea that being
surrounded by misconduct motivates voters one way or the other. Mischief
does not seem to vary from chance across red and blue states. There simply is
no real difference between the political colour of a state and aggregate moral
conduct according to the slew of indicators we examined. Whatever the true
reason individuals vote Democrat or Republican, it does not appear to
emanate from different moral lifestyles.
As with any research there are limitations to our work. First, our
research focuses only on vices. Possibly virtues may be more commonly
found in the red states than the blue states or vice versa. Therefore, other
researchers might for example consider using religiosity and other measures
of socially approved behaviours to see how the stereotype fares with respect
to them. Examples of conformity to American cultural values could include

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 From Molehills Mountains Made Koch & Steelman 181

community service and church related activities. Second, our research deals
with the 2004 election cycle precisely because election analysts cited it as the
pivotal year for the so-called cultural issues voters. Future researchers should
check for changes across election cycles to see whether the red and blue state
breakdown persists. Third, one can see from the reconstructed map based on
hypothetical morality and degree of redness that there may be some associa-
tion with rural residence and moral virtuosity. Durkheim’s (1964) vintage
arguments make sense when interpreting what these aggregated data imply.
In rural areas individuals may be more integrated in their culture because
they cannot escape the watchful eyes of their neighbours who share their
mainstream values. Future research regarding the urban/rural composition of
states and allegiance to traditional moral values, though beyond the scope of
this work, would further animate the veracity of the red and blue state
divide. Fourth, other researchers may look at attitudes to see if the stereo-
typed stark contrast is reflected in beliefs but does not manifest with respect
to behaviours. Apparently, hypocrisy is fashionable. Finally, county level
analysis could yield interesting results.
Several issues deserve consideration. First, church attendance predicts
both the degree of redness in a society and also the percentage of the state
citing moral values as the most important issue facing the country. Social
institutions may thus affect individuals’ cultural beliefs. It is possible that
some social institutions are at least partially responsible for the stereotype
that residents of blue states are less moral, a stereotype undermined by our
analysis. Somewhat surprisingly, church attendance is unrelated to the index
of moral behaviour. Second, breaches of culturally valued behaviours may
raise awareness and even cause alarm over non-compliance with culturally
valued behaviours. However, this hypothesis does not garner much support
from our analysis as the moral index does not predict concern with moral
values, only church attendance does. We submit that a genuine strength of
our approach, while imperfect, is that we rely on indicators of behaviour, not
attitudes. It has long been noted that behaviours and attitudes do not always
correspond with each other (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Future researchers
should investigate whether or not the stereotyped attitudes of red and blue
states are more in line with cultural stereotypes than the objective indicators
of behaviour used in our analysis.
The idea that red states are more moral, at least as reflected by our
morality index, garners no support. Nonetheless, because myths represent
the public’s perception, they can have very serious consequences. Debunking
myths is an important way that sociologists convey knowledge to the pub-
lic at large. Should it become conventional wisdom that one party monopo-
lizes an issue such as morality, such a presumption could not only spell
trouble for the opposition party but also ironically and unrealistically raise
the hopes of those troubled by current cultural trends and the extent to
which their cherished values can realistically be legislated for or adjudicated
as opposed to just feeding political rhetoric. Moreover, oversimplified

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182 Cultural Sociology Volume 3 ■ Number 1 ■ March 2009

stereotypes may yield incorrect perceptions about entire regions that, in

turn, may affect other issues such as the economy. Our research debunks the
stereotype that the red state/blue state distinction unveils anything about
variations in moral conduct across states. To label states as more or less
moral than other states based on our index is wrongheaded. Still, the red
state/blue state dichotomy does just that. Stereotypes may become an
entrenched part of the culture regardless of their truthfulness. If they do so
they may have farther reaching implications than they warrant. The red/blue
state dichotomy is a case in point. Certainly there are moral divisions in this
nation, but the closeness of the 2004 election across and inside many states
actually undermines the notion of a polarized country.

2008 Election Epilogue

The strength of the red state and blue state stereotypes has to a great extent
shaped the battlefield upon which the election has been fought in several of the
past election cycles. The 2008 election cycle, however, appears to have shifted
the political landscape somewhat away from the traditional red and blue break-
downs. In the 2008 election the Democrats won a clean sweep: the Presidency,
the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Howard Dean, the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, was
ridiculed for committing resources to a 50-state strategy instead of the usual
method of cherry-picking the most winnable targets. Democratic nominee
Senator Barack Obama also decided to campaign in typically red states that had
almost invariably gone Republican, at least in the last few presidential election
years. His strategy prevailed in no small measure by backing his opponent
Senator John McCain into an untenable corner where he struggled to flip the
reliably blue state of Pennsylvania to red. This campaign was exemplified by
Obama’s statement following the Iowa primary win: ‘We are not a collection of
red states and blue states, we are the United States of America; and at this
moment, in this election, we are ready to believe that again’ (Obama, 2008).
While the 2008 campaign still settled mostly into a battle over a few
states, some red states switched to blue. This shift is perhaps best exempli-
fied by the rich dividends Barack Obama acquired by winning electoral col-
lege votes in the ordinarily red states of Florida, Virginia, North Carolina
and Ohio, to mention some of the successful shifts. Moreover, across the
USA those candidates that did not necessarily presume that red states would
invariably go Republican or blue states Democrat often beat conventional
wisdom. The economy was the most important issue that motivated voters
in the 2008 election. Voters who selected the economy as their priority con-
cern overwhelmingly voted for Senator Barack Obama. The economy
trumped other issues that were more important to voters in previous elec-
tions such as traditional values that tended to favour Republicans. In fact a
full 65% of exit poll respondents placed the economy as their number one

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 From Molehills Mountains Made Koch & Steelman 183

concern, and moral values did not make the list that they led just four years
ago (CNN, 2008). When it came to candidate qualities voters emphasizing
that the candidate can bring change led the way with 34% and ‘shares my
values’ followed at 30% (CNN, 2008). Our empirical challenge to conven-
tional wisdom about the ‘righteous’ behaviours of blue and red state resi-
dents may or may not presage whether red states will continue to be seen as
those with an abundance of values voters or as winnable for more socially
liberal contenders. In the current and grave economic crisis in the USA,
moral values may not motivate voters as much as other issues. No longer
may voters enjoy the luxury of voting for singular concerns such as abor-
tion or gun ownership, with so many other pressing problems to solve.
Ultimately, the red and blue stereotypes may continue to slacken or may
resurface should other external conditions become less urgent. It is notable
that during the 2008 election demographic changes in many states may also
figure into the labelling of the state as red or blue. The 2008 election brought
eight states ordinarily in the red column into the blue. These states include
Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
and Virginia. Of the eight newly blue states, seven represented the less moral
states from our previous analysis; only one, Virginia, came from our more
moral column. A glance back to Table 1 indicates that only 10 states were
accurately predicted in 2004. Ironically, had we applied the same type of
analysis to the more recent election the idea that red states are inhabited by
people expressing fewer vices would be upheld.
Additionally, while the Electoral College (with the exception of Nebraska)
allocates votes by states, vast differentiation can be found at the county level
within the new blue states. From the election data immediately available it is
apparent that urban areas predominately vote Democrat and rural counties are
more likely to vote Republican. This tendency can be seen especially within the
razor-thin margins in favour of Obama in the newly blue states of North Carolina
and Indiana. We also observe that much of the moral/less moral behaviour differ-
ences congealed on the urban/rural divides. Furthermore, while moral values did
not make the exit polls as an important issue, one cannot deduce that traditional
values (those stereotyped as red state values) no longer matter to voters. By a large
margin, Californian voters in their traditionally blue state rejected same-sex mar-
riage when they voted for Proposition Eight. The passage of this proposition was
heralded by conservative advocates of traditional marriage as a rebuke to the state
courts that had previously decided that same-sex partners had the right to marry.
It also reminds us that values may return to the forefront if economic and other
concerns recede. Only with time and more elections can the viability of these var-
ious possibilities be evaluated. The red/blue division is an oversimplification, a
stereotype that potentially fuels more division than is warranted based on the data
that we have evaluated in this article. Furthermore, as the 2008 elections have
shown, no state is necessarily red/blue politically or morally. Overall, we certainly
support Fiorina’s (2005) declaration that the cultural war supposedly under way
in the USA is overblown.

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184 Cultural Sociology Volume 3 ■ Number 1 ■ March 2009

Notes

1 Exit polls also showed that 59% of Protestants preferred Bush, 52% of Catholic
voters preferred him and only 25% of Jewish respondents did so. Those who
label themselves as Other had a 23% preference for Bush, and 31% of those who
had no religion favoured Bush.
2 Divorce rate data are primarily extracted from the Department of Vital Statistics
from the Center for Disease Control. However, information from California,
Indiana, Louisiana, and Colorado is not reported to this agency. Therefore, the
rates for these states were calculated from information provided by the court
administration reports and state departments of vital statistics.
3 North Dakota rates are for the 1999 year as no 2000 data were available for this
state.
4 Unmarried partner households include both heterosexual and homosexual
unmarried partner households.
5 To select the appropriate moral ranking for each state the lowest rank was sub-
tracted from the highest and then divided by two. The figure was then added to
the lowest index. States which fell below this number were considered more
moral. The states over the number were considered less moral.
6 Individual level analysis may also be interesting if one wants to distinguish red
and blue voters. These individuals may in fact conform to stereotypical views
about those who lean to the conservative or liberal side of the equation.
Aggregated data such as those we evaluate do not unveil anything about individ-
uals within states; nor do they signify anything about individual stereotypes,
which are overgeneralizations by definition.
7 This article focuses on the presidential election of 2004. This is the election that
infused the terms blue and red state even more profoundly into popular culture
than heretofore. Of course many states that are labelled ‘red’ may in fact have
many Democratic senators, congressmen, governors and mayors.
8 It is possible that some white voters may vote on the basis of racial issues which
they then attribute to cultural or moral issues to make their actions seem more
acceptable.

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 Appendix A: States with the Highest Moral Index Score
Unmarried
Violent Property Drug Drug Strip Unwed Child Partner
State Crime Crime Alcohol Deaths Use Tobacco Clubs STD Births Abortion Divorce Abuse Households Sum Rank

North Dakota 1 2 38 13 1 16 6 5 11 3 7 30 7 140 1

Utah 10 39 1 13 10 3 11 3 1 1 30 30 2 154 2
Idaho 9 14 32 1 18 17 18 7 2 5 41 1 18 183 3
Iowa 11 15 14 1 2 31 37 14 8 9 10 44 20 216 4
Nebraska 19 31 24 1 3 29 35 20 7 9 19 13 7 217 5
Virginia 14 10 12 13 5 34 12 31 17 34 26 5 14 227 6
Minnesota 13 20 35 31 24 19 15 12 5 15 4 20 28 241 7
Kansas 27 33 6 5 11 26 31 23 14 9 22 30 5 242 8
South Dakota 4 1 28 19 6 27 48 16 30 2 16 28 17 242 8
Montana 7 21 42 19 34 21 22 8 20 15 2 11 23 245 10
Pennsylvania 28 8 10 19 23 30 27 24 25 31 7 2 22 256 11
New Hampshire 5 3 50 5 33 49 1 2 3 31 44 3 46 275 12
Maine 2 5 30 13 37 24 5 4 21 21 31 39 48 280 13
Arkansas 29 28 4 5 14 38 4 33 40 7 47 34 3 286 14
West Virginia 17 4 2 27 7 44 50 6 23 5 37 49 15 286 14
New Jersey 26 11 22 46 28 9 46 10 13 49 4 4 20 288 16
Kentucky 15 9 4 19 22 50 29 19 21 3 41 46 11 289 17
Massachusetts 30 7 43 5 50 7 9 11 6 42 3 48 32 293 18

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Oklahoma 34 37 3 5 8 43 30 34 31 7 17 40 4 293 18
Mississippi 24 26 18 5 12 39 3 50 50 15 37 10 10 299 20
Illinois 43 25 25 5 31 13 17 37 33 34 7 17 16 303 21
Connecticut 18 13 21 13 38 12 36 21 15 42 1 47 27 304 22
Texas 38 41 26 31 4 11 25 44 19 25 24 14 7 309 23
Washington 25 46 19 31 42 5 2 15 10 36 33 7 42 313 24
From Molehills Mountains Made Koch & Steelman
187
 188

Appendix B: States with the Lowest Moral Index Score

Unmarried
Violent Property Drug Drug Strip Unwed Child Partner
State Crime Crime Alcohol Deaths Use Tobacco Clubs STD Births Abortion Divorce Abuse Households Sum Rank

Colorado 20 27 45 27 48 14 14 28 4 15 32 12 34 320 25
Alabama 31 36 8 31 15 35 13 48 31 15 41 22 1 327 26
New York 39 6 8 38 16 4 24 18 42 50 15 42 31 333 27
Ohio 21 24 15 27 19 40 31 38 35 28 27 6 26 337 28
Wisconsin 6 16 47 19 35 28 42 36 15 14 10 37 36 341 29
Cultural Sociology Volume 3

Vermont 3 12 34 43 47 33 9 1 9 25 49 27 50 342 30
■

Hawaii 8 49 33 1 43 1 43 25 24 36 20 24 38 345 31
Missouri 32 35 26 13 13 46 23 35 35 25 34 9 25 351 32
California 42 18 22 43 41 2 7 30 25 46 10 29 40 355 33
Number 1

Rhode Island 16 19 31 5 45 22 45 22 39 44 4 38 37 367 34

■

Maryland 48 34 16 27 20 10 26 42 35 48 10 19 35 370 35
Wyoming 12 17 40 38 26 36 44 9 12 36 45 26 32 373 36
Michigan 40 23 17 50 36 25 21 39 28 36 22 18 29 384 37
Arizona 37 50 41 38 21 6 33 26 46 21 27 8 43 397 38
March 2009

Georgia 35 40 20 38 30 23 18 47 43 28 20 36 19 397 38
North Carolina 33 43 11 19 32 42 28 45 28 33 34 41 12 401 40
Tennessee 46 38 7 31 25 45 16 43 33 21 46 45 6 402 41

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Indiana 22 22 13 45 27 47 38 27 38 9 48 43 29 408 42
South Carolina 49 42 35 31 9 41 40 41 47 21 17 23 12 408 42
Oregon 23 44 29 49 44 15 41 13 18 36 36 35 44 427 44
Louisiana 44 45 39 48 29 37 34 49 48 9 10 15 24 431 45
New Mexico 47 47 37 38 40 8 7 29 48 28 39 33 45 446 46
Florida 50 48 43 19 17 20 39 32 45 47 39 16 38 453 47
Nevada 36 30 49 19 39 32 49 17 41 45 50 25 47 479 48
Alaska 41 29 46 46 49 18 47 40 27 15 27 50 49 484 49
Delaware 45 32 48 31 46 48 20 46 44 41 24 21 41 487 50
 From Molehills Mountains Made Koch & Steelman 189

Pamela Ray Koch

Pamela Ray Koch is an assistant professor of sociology at Hope College in

Holland, Michigan. She received national recognition for her work on adopted children
and evolutionary psychology. Her main academic interests involve the social psycholog-
ical and cultural components of child discipline and family structure.
Address: Department of Sociology and Social Work, 41 Graves Place, Holland, MI
49422–9000, USA.
Email: kochp@hope.edu

Lala Carr Steelman

Lala Carr Steelman is a professor of sociology and chair of the sociology

department at the University of South Carolina. Her main scholarly interests involve the
family and educational outcomes from a social psychological vantage point and cultural
political issues.
Address: University of South Carolina, Department of Sociology, Sloan College, 911
Pickens St. Columbia, SC 29208, USA.
Email: Steelman@sc.edu

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