EFENSE INSTALLATIO

ON IWO JIMA
I

Classification ch*ng*d to
ED

Maj., Inf.
Custodian
CINCPAC-GINCPOA

BULLETIN NQ. 136-45

10 JUNE 1945

8 JUN1945

Defense Installations

on

I WO JIMA

flaintly

CINCPAC-CINCPOA

FLEET MARINE FORCE

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

3rd, 4th & 5th MARINE DIVISIONS

JICPOA L" 5 0 6 0 7 - 23 THRU 144

 UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

MCH/cc HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

10 June 1945 - Serial DIS-1OO93O

From:
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

To:
Distribution List.

Subject:
CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN No. 136-45.

Defense Installations on Iwo Jima.

Enclosure:
(A) Subject bulletin.

1.
Enclosure (A),
. forwarded herewith,
. need not be reported
_
and when no

longer of value should be destroyed. No report of destruction is necessary.

M. LBpENDRE,

By direction.

Copies ARMY

5 ComGenAAASch Ft Bliss Tex

5 SIORAAFComAldAFSWPA APO 923

2 CO AMS War Dept

1 DistCom APO 960

5 Chief of. Engrs War Dept

1 DistCom APO 961

5 Chief of Ord War Dept

1 DistCom APO 962

2 Chief Sig Off War Dept

2 The-EngrUSAFPOA APO 958

5 ComdtCASch Ft Monroe Va
25 ComGen APO 7

2 ComdtCom&GenStaffSch
25 ComGen APO 27

Ft Leavenworth Kan
25 ComGen APO 77

12 ComGenAAF War Dept

25 ComGen APO 81

2 DirJointTargetGroup AAF
25 ComGen APO 96

Pentagon Bldg Wash DC

25 ComGen APO 98

12 ComGenAGF War Dept

15 CO 4thAimdGrp APO 957

2 ComGen2ndAF Colorado Springs Colo

10 ComGenTEN APO 357

2 ComGen4thAF SF Calif
10 ComGenTAFTEN APO 357

2 ComGenWesDefCom Presidio SF Calif

5 ComGenWPBC APO 244

2 CO AeroChartServAAF War Dept

3 ComGenAGF APO 86 .

2 CO OrdBDCAberdeenProvingGround
3 ComGenAGF APO 244

Aberdeen Md
3 ComGenAGF APO 245

2 ComGenAAFSATAAFTAC Orlando Fla

3 ComGenAGF APO 246

14 MISReadingPanel War Dept

3 ComGenAGF APO 247

2 OPD War Dept

3 ComGenAGF APO 331

1 ChiefPACMIRS Camp Ritchie Md

3 ComGenAGF APO 457

1 CO AimyUnitWestCoast PO Box 651

3 ComGenAGF APO 458

Tracy Calif
5 ComGenCPBC APO 956

3 ComGenSEAC APO 432 NY

10 ComGenCombatTrCom APO 957

3 BGS(I)MainHqALFSEA APO 432 NY

10 ComGenlCorps APO 301

1 CO CPICAirComSEA New. Delhi India

10 ComGenlXCorps APO 309

2 ComEasternAirComSEA APO 671 NY

10 ComGenXCorps APO 310

2 DMIGHQ New Delhi India

10 ComGenXlCorps APO 471

2 ComGenUSAF APO 885 NY

10 ComGenXIVCorps APO 453

1 ComAirComSEA New Delhi India

10 ComGenXXIVCorps APO 235

1 SuptSEATIC APO 885 NY

10 ComGenXXIVCorpsArty APO 235

14 ComGenUSAFCTO APO 879 NY

5 ComGen2273HAAAC APO 958

2 ComGenl4thAF APO 627 NY

5 C02274HSAC APO 956

2 OinCSINTIC APO 879 NY

5 ComGenSPBC APO 502

2 ComGenllthAF APO 980 Seattle Wash

1 CO 45thCABn APO 264

4 ComGenAdvCPAlaskan Dept APO 980

2 ea ArmyIsCom

Seattle Wash
5 CinCAFPac APO 500

2 ComGenNZAHq Wellington NZ
5 CoordinatorATIS APO 500

15 ComGenPOA APO 958

5 OinCCOICGHQSWPA APO 500

2 CO 30thEngrBaseTopoBn APO 957

5 ComAldAF APO 923

2 CO 64thEngrBaseTopoBn APO 246

2 CO AldGeogSecSWPA APO 923

200 ComGenAAFPOA APO 953

10 ComGenFEAF APO 925

20 COEGHQSWPA APO 500

2 ComGenl4thAAComRearEch APO 322

10 ComGenUSAFFE APO 501

2 ComGenl4thAAComFwdEch APO 500

10 ComGenUSASOS APO 707

10 ComAdvAldLandHq APO 925

2 DirNEFIS APO 500

2 CO FwdEchCenBuGHtlSWPA APO 500

2 DirADVANEFIS APO 926

25 ComGenSlX APO 442

50 CinCGHQSWPA APO 500

25 ComGenElGHT APO 343

12 ComGenASF War Dept

10 June 1945 Serial DIS-1OO93O

OinCPICNYd Wash
2
AcornU'raDet Pt Hueneme Calif
CO NavResLab Belief
2
BuAer/
OinCTAIC NAS Anacostia DC
2
BuOrd
ComAirPac
3
CNAOpTra Jacksonville Fla
2 ComNorPac
2
AC/AS (I) AirMinA13USA
2 ComSoPac
Whitehall Via CNO
2 MEIU#1 FPO SF
5
AirMinistry London Via CNO
2 MEIU#4 FPO SF
2
DMI MI 2 Whitehall Via CNO
1 ComBatRonTWO
2
ail MI 15 London Via CNO
1 ComBatDivTWO
2
DNIAdmty Whitehall Via CNO
2 ea ComBatDiv

25
CNO
1 ea CO BB

1
USNLOOSS Via CNO
2 ComCruDesPao

2
ComdtANSCol Wash DC
1 ea ComCruDiv

2
Comll
1 ea CO CA CB CL

2
Coml2
1 ea ComTaskFlot

2
Coml3
1 ea ComDesRon

2
Coml7
1 ea ComDesDiv

2
ComUSNB PtHueneme Calif
1 ea ComCortDiv

2
ComdtNavV/arCol Newport RI
1 ea CO DD

65
ComAiriant
1 ea CO DE PF

2
ComPhibTraPacFPO San Diego Calif
3 Com3rdFleet

1
ComFair Seattle 5 Wash,
3 Com5thFleet

3
CominCh
3 Com7thFleet

2
ComOpTraPac San Diego Calif
1 Coml4

1
ComServLant.
1 DIO 14ND

1
ComSubLant
45 CO SEFIC

2
CO NavalUnitWestCoast
5 OinCAlCCinCPOAAdvHq

3
CO NACIS NAS quonset Pt RI
1 OinCAlCNorPac

2
ComUSNavGrp Navy 169 NT
100 OinCJDU Navy 943

5
ComPhibsPac
100 OinCJDU Navy 3011

150
AdComPhibsPac
1 AtCom Navy 3233

2
OinCRearEchComPhibsPac
1 ea NavylsCom

o/o AdComPhibsPao
1 ea CO NavAdvBase

10
Com3rdPhibFor c/o AdComPhibsPac
1 ea ComNavBase

10
Com5thPhibFor
1 CO NAS Seattle Wash

10
Com7thPhibFor
1 ComdtNOB Navy 3256

5 ea
ComPhibGrp
1 ea ComNOB

2
ComSubPac '
4 AdCominPac

2
ComSubPacSubordCom
2 ea ComMTBRonPac

3
DNINavy Dept Melbourne Australia
2 ComMTBRonsSWPA

3
SNORNethNavyinAustralia 441 St Kilda
2 ea ComSeaFronPac

Rd Melbourne Australia
2 ComServPac

2
ComMarianas
1 ea ComServRonPac

2
ComNavy 3233 2 DirAdBaseComServPac

2
ComNavForces Navy 3256 5 CO InterpRonONE Navy 3256

2
ComSubArea Navy 3254 5 CO InterpRonTWO FPO SF

2
RepComDesPacCentPacFwd

MARINE CORPS

ComGenFMFPao 25 ea ComGenMarDiv

Comd tMarCorps 5 ComGenTraComFMF LeJeune

ComGenlllPhibCorps 5 ComGenTraComFMF Pendleton

ComOenVPhibCorps 5 DirofAviationMarCorps

ComGenMarCorpsSchooIs 2 ea karlsGom

BRITISH

3
COIS BPF 2 Captain EscortForcee

3
COIS EIS 1 ea SenOffMinFlot

1
RAdmCom4thCruRon 1 ea CO BB

1
RAdmComDDs 1 ea CO CL

1
RAdmComFltTrain 1 ea CO DD

1 ea ComDesFlot 1 ea CO DE

1 ea CO FltTrainShip

 Table of Contents

JAPANESE DEFENSIVE PLAN AT IWO JIMA . . . . . 2-6

ILLUSTRATIONS .. 7-119

General Terrain Features 7-16

Beaches ......... 7-10

Terrain Inland * , 11-16

Obstacles and Mines 17-20

Mines 17-18

Trip Wire 19

Anti-Tank Ditches • 20

Caves 21-25

Coast Defense - Artillery 26-39

15 cm CD Guns 26-26

14 cm CD Guns 29-31

12 cm CD Guns 32-33

12 cm (Short) Naval Guns 34-37

8 cm CD Guns 38-39

Antiaircraft and Dual Purpose Batteries 39-64

12 cm DP Guns 39-42

10 cm DP Guns 43-45

7 cm AA Guns 46-48

25 mm AA MG 49-58

13 mm MG 59-60

Searchlights . . . . . . . . 61-64

Blockhouses 65-70

Covered Artillery Emplacements 71-86

120 mm Howitzers 71-74

75 mm (Type 38) Field Guns 75-78

75 mm (Type 90) Field Guns • 78-80

47 mm Ant i-Tank Guns 8I-85

37 mm Anti-Tank Guns 86

Open Artillery Emplacements 87-88

47 mm Anti-Tank Guns 87

37 am Anti-Tank Guns 88

Mortars 89-95

320 mm Spigot Mortars . ­ 89

150 mm Mortars 90-92

81 mm Mortars 93-94

Grenade Launchers . 95

Rockets 96-IOO

200 mm Rocket Launcher 96-98

250 kg Rocket Launcher 99

63 kg Rocket Launcher 100

Pillboxes 101-103

Rifle Pits 104-105

Tanks 106-108

Dummies 109-111

Radar and Radio Station 112

Revetted Vehicles 113

Air Raid Shelters . . . . . . . 114-115

Ammunition Storage '. 116-117

Miscellaneous . . . . . . . 118-119

MAP APPENDIX

Enemy Defense Installations as observed from ground study.

Arcs of Fire for Casemated Coastal Defense Guns on Iwo Jima.

Anti-Aircraft Defenses.

Blockhouses with principal directions of fire indicated.

Covered Artillery with principal directions of fire indicated.

 Japanese Defensive Plan At Iwo Jima

The strategic importance of IWO JIMA. need hardly be emphasized. Its value as

an airbase midway between the MARIANAS and the heart of JAPAN has already been

proved. After the occupation of SAIPAN, the Japs must have known that IWO would be

attacked* The only question was VHEH. The story of their haste in constructing

defenses is told in aerial photographs from 15 June 1944 until D-Day, 19 February

1945.

INCREASE OF FORTIFICATIONS

At the time SAIPAN was invaded, only AA defenses, hasty fire trenches, and pre­

liminary beach defenses had been prepared at IWO JIMA, By September 1944* positions

had been constructed in depth behind the beaches. Company and platoon positions

were then in evidence, and concrete pillboxes and covered artillery emplacements

were under construction. By December, most beach positions were completed and had

been strengthened by the construction of heavy concrete blockhouses. A cross-island

defense line in depth protecting the northern part of the island was springing up

along the high ground north of Airfield No. 1. Additional AA defenses, increased

numbers of covered artillery and coast defense guns, and more and more concrete

positions and minefields on the beaches were noted on each succeeding photographio

softie. By D-Day, key positions had been connected with pillboxes and were protected

by covering fire from artillery, anti-tank guns, and mortars, previously sighted in.

Intelligence prior to the invasion of IWO indicated a formidable garrison force

with many major caliber weapons and extensive tank and personnel obstacles; however,

aerial photographs and maps gave only a limited picture of one of the enemy*s best

defensive weapons, the terrain. An amphibious assault in force was limited to the

east and west beaches of the narrow southern part of the island. These conditions

gave the Japs an advantage in preparing defensive positions for all-around security.

Only small groups were needed to cover very narrow beaches with steep exits along

the northern coast.

COVER AND DISPERSAL

, Captured documents, confirmed by ground study, indicate the enemy's battle

strength was conserved by countermeasures against shelling and bombing. The terrain

was well suited for cover, and caves were so numerous in some sections of the island

that it was impossible to plot them all on a 1:10,000 map. The coarse, loose, vol­

canic ash kept damage from shell fragmentation to a minimum. Ammunition, stores,

and personnel were dispersed in caves and behind protective terrain where naval

gunfire and artillery could not reach them.

CAMOUFLAGE

Camouflage encountered and camouflage discipline during construction, as evalu­

ated from aerial photographs, was excellent. Positions were at all times covered

with materials which blended into the surrounding terrain and vegetation. Spoil

from excavations was planted with grass to obliterate traces of military activity.

Natural vegetation was used to a large extent to conceal well-built positions from

aerial attack. While such practices could not always elude photographic interpre­

tation, nevertheless many positions were not detected until gun fire had blown away

the concealing vegetation. Maximum use was made of IW0*s sparse growth for con­

cealing trenches, rifle pits, machine gun and artillery emplacements. Positions as

large as those housing 120 mm Howitzers were undetected under the protective covering

of trees in their natural state.

COAST DEFENSE

Coast defense artillery ranging from 4.7" (120 mm) to 6M (I55 mm) guns was

initially effective against our ships. All CD guns were casemated in four to six

feet of reinforced concrete. Each emplacement was so positioned in the terrain that

it was normally protected from naval gunfire. A ship taking a CD gun under direct

fire necessarily exposed itself to the gun at which it was firing. Many guns were

so camouflaged that their location was unknown, until they opened fire.

ANTIAIRCRAFT

Antiaircraft batteries were numerous, including 120 mm DP, 100 mm, 75 mm, and

25 mm in triple, twin, and single mounts. The Japs could not satisfactorily conceal

these weapons, but their continued use against aircraft and our personnel ashore

testifies to the sound construction of their emplacements.

EAST BEACH POSITION

The elaborate trench system facing the eastern beaches had been entirely

abandoned. The loose nature of the sand suggests their presence as dummies, al­

though they may have been prepared originally as hasty beach defenses before adequate

concrete positions were built. Well-constructed blockhouses encasing 25 mm machine

cannons to 120 mm short naval guns were the first defenses encountered on and near

the beach. Some concrete pillboxes and sandstone revetted rifle pits gave infantry

protection to the heavier weapons. The ground at the base of Airfield No. 1 was

more suitable for dug in positions, and most of the infantry positions protecting

the east beach were here. The positions were not so much the target for naval gun­

fire, and excellent observation and good fields of fire were afforded here. The

position of Airfield No. 1 limited the depth of these positions to approximately

500 to 700 yards. Supporting fires were delivered from the flanks using the ob­

servation provided by Mt. SUHIBACHI and the high ground over the East Boat Basin

and around Airfield No. 2. The area between the beach and Airfield No. 1 was steep

and impossible for wheeled vehicles* to traverse. Movement of infantrymen and tanks

was impeded by the loose soil with the result that they offered excellent targets

to anti-tank and anti-personnel guns and tactics.

WEST BEACH POSITIONS.

The defenses of the West Beaches were probably more extensive and elaborate

than East Beach defenses.' Airfield No. 1 permitted these defenses to be 700 to 1400

yards deep giving considerably longer fields of fire and permitting a more elaborate

system of dummy positions fronting the actual main positions and designed to draw

our preliminary bombardment. The terrain was much more substantial for caves and

underground shelters, and positions were better protected from our naval gunfire.

SURIBACHI POSITIONS

In the south a cross-island defense line was constructed on the terraced slopes

which guarded the approaches to Mt. SURIBACHI. It consisted of a maze of concrete

pillboxes, bunkers, shelters, and blockhouses which were capable of all-around de­

fense and were mutually supporting. In addition to this elaborate surface organ­

ization, there was an equally elaborate subsurface organization of shelter, passage­

way, living quarters, storage areas, and cave-type firing positions which provided

adequate protection against the heaviest of bombs and shells. The excellent ob­

servation from the heights of SURIBACHI and the high ground around Airfield No. 2

were the feey to controlled artillery and mortar fire,

MAIN DEFENSE BELT

Since landings in strength were limited to the east and west beaches near the

southern end of the island, the enemy prepared his main defense in depth in a cross-

island belt. Beginning in the west at the rocky cliffs to the north of the western

beaches, it stretched east across the island to skirt the southern end of Airfield

No. 2, and terminated in the cliffs which form at the northern end of the eastern

beaches. The center of this belt was 2600 yards deep. It gained its strength from

its depth and its concrete and steel structures, positioned so as to obtain long

fields of fire which were carefully calculated and tied into the overall defense

system. Reliance on caves as a shelter and a fighting position was increas'ed here.

Most of the positions showed excellent engineering and terrain appreciation. Com­

munications were maintained by trenched wire, radios, and a labyrinth of underground

tunnels connecting all areas. One of these tunnels was explored for 800 yards,

and 14 entrances were found; it housed two battalion command posts and was equipped

with lights and telephones. Artillery, including heavy mortars and rockets in and

behind this defense belt, could cover most of the beach area. Positions were pro­

vided with complete preregistration data.

Strong points were established around commanding ground, Conorete-faced caves

and infantry positions in the erosion-made crevices were frequently so close to­

gether that an equally strong defensive position existed only a few yards to the

rear or flank. Contact became so close that safety of our own troops prevented use

of artillery, naval gunfire, or air support in reducing these positions. One bluff,

forming something similar to an amphitheatre, contained two terraces and three tiers

of concrete pillboxes and oaves*

FINAL DEFENSIVE AREA ' • •

North of this cross-island defensive sector, the extremely rough terrain from

the coast to 2000 yards inland created a natural defensive area. The number of

caves and terrain characteristics somewhat compensated for the reduced amounts of

concrete and steel. These features, coupled with the masses of men employed, tended

to make this final defensive area equally as strong as the main defensive positions.

In attacking these positions no Japs were to be seen, all being in caves or crevices

in the rocks and so dispersed as to give an all-around interlocking defense to each

small compartment. Attacking troops frequently were subjected to fire from flanks

and rear more than from their front. It was always very difficult and frequently

impossible to locate exactly where defensive fires originated.

In defending IW0 JIMA, the Japs employed one basic tactic which in a sense was

a departure from the Japanese defensive operations hitherto generally encountered.

This tactic was simply to occupy previously determined D-Day positions and maintain

them, without recourse either to costly rtmain effort" counterattacks or organized

withdrawals. This plan was not only simple in conception but in general was skill­

fully executed and well adapted to the terrain of IW0 JIMA. There were no organized

attempts made to counterattack our beachhead, no large scale night counterattacks,

no "all-out" banzai charge. Instead, the enemy committed a minimum number of troops

to the southern beach area and defended it by delivering heavy volumes of fire from

both SUHIBACHI and the north so that even when the southern area was finally taken,

the bulk of the enemy's forces remained intact and were well entrenched in the most

heavily fortified part of the island. The enemy, by continuing to follow his simple

but basic defensive tactic of occupying a position and refusing to yield until dug

out and killed without counterattacking and without withdrawing, was able to main­

tain organized resistance for over twenty days. There were no tactical withdrawals,

no retrograde or delaying actions in the military sense, though in some instances

isolated withdrawals were made to preserve units and individuals threatened with

inevitable destruction. It is now known that this defense of holding to the end

without counterattack or withdrawal was the express plan conceived by the Commanding

General. It was this simple tactic, coupled with the incredible rocky terrain and

the maximum use the enemy had made of this terrain in constructing fortified posi­

tions which made the capture of IW0 JIMA so difficult*

ANTI-TANK TACTICS

Captured battle plans indicate the enemy's fear of our tanks. Mine fields,

magnetic mines, and explosives carried by hand were employed at the beach where the

loose sand seriously impeded the movement of even full-tracked vehicles. Anti-tank

guns, mainly the high velocity 75 mm and 47 mm, were the principal weapons employed

inland. Many anti-tank guns had one or more supplementary or alternate positions*

These weapons were sited in terrain affording fields of fire covering possible tank

routes from the beach; however, considerable emphasis appears to have been placed on

locating an emplacement where it was protected by an abutting bluff or terrace, which

shielded it from frontal flat trajectory fire.

BLOCKHOUSES AND PILLBOXES

Blockhouses and pillboxes near the beaches on the more open terrain were almost

invariably sited for flanking fire. Wherever possible, a pillbox was behind a natural

mound of sand. It often had only a small fire port which allowed approximately 30°

of traverse; however, there was a sufficient number of mutually supporting pillboxes

to offset the restricted field of fire of each weapon.

Many blockhouses near the beach had sand piled as high as 50 feet in front of

them. A narrow fire lane through the sand revealed the direction of fire, but many

positions were so well protected that they were still firing until reduced by in­

fantry. Pillboxes were protected similarly; infantry commanders often found it

necessary to request main battery fire from naval vessels when secondary battery

fire could not blast the sand from in front of well built positions.

OF TANKS

Relatively few tanks, medium and light, were present on IWO JIMA. The rough

terrain, size of the island, and fixed nature of defenses probably account for the

limited number. Their manner of employment was as an anti-tank weapon. They were

used in support of the main cross-island defense belt either in a revetment or be­

hind protective terrain, camouflaged and stationary. Their 37 mm, 47 mm, and 57 mm

guns fired anti-tank and personnel missions like the many 47 mm guns. Reports in­

dicate small tank units were to be employed to support local counterattacks. There

is little evidence they were so used. The torn up condition of roads and constant

artillery fire may well have prevented any movement.

ARTILLERY

Artillery tactics were characterized by good observation and careful preplanning

of fires. Range stakes were found in the vicinity of landing beaches. The elaborate

casemated structures in which artillery pieces were housed, the cave positions from

which mortars and rockets were fired, operated to limit the number of pieces which

could be brought to bear on a single area. Despite perfect observation, artillery,

rocket, and mortar fires were never massed against us in the same manner in which

we mass artillery fires. Dual purpose guns were used to fire time fire over our

troops*

An artillery group gave coordination to all field artillery and mortar employ­

ment; coast defense and AA artillery were not included in this command. Mortars

had the primary mission of filling in the gaps between the fires of the other guns,

but after the land fighting stage was reached they shifted to control of sector

infantry commanders.

The principal locations of mobile artillery were in the higher ground north of

Airfield No. 2 with forward OPs in prominent elevations along the main defensive

belt. There definitely were more weapons at the disposal of commanders than were

organically assigned to the units. The fixed nature of the defenses permitted

personnel normally used for ammunition carriers and for the movement of mobile

weapons to be employed to man additional weapons added to basic tables of organ­

ization.

MORTARS AND ROCKETS

Although approximately twelve 320 mm spigot mortars were encountered on the

island, their effectiveness is doubtful. Emplacements were well constructed and

concealed but only a few rounds were fired. IWO's terrain was suited for the use

of the many 150 mm, 81 mm and smaller mortars found there. Ammunition was stored

throughout the northern half of the island in caves and hasty firing positions

were utilized at the entrances. The 150 mm mortars were used to fire on landing

beaches. These weapons and the smaller mortars were withdrawn as the situation

demanded.

 Three types of rockets were used as artillery weapons. Several positions were

sighted for firing at ships approaching close to shore. The V-trough launcher was

used for 63 kg and 250 kg aerial bombs with rocket motors providing the propelling

force. A 200 mm rocket was used from a mobile-type launcher and a launcher which is

mounted on a mortar-type bipod. Rockets were dispersed in deep draws over the north­

ern portion of the island and the launchers could be moved to the site of the am­

munition.

* * * * * * * * *

It is evident that little was left undone by the Japs in constructing as for­

midable ground defenses as possible on an island with the size and particular terrain

of IWO JIMA. A study of Japanese defense installations encountered in the field is

presented with photographs and drawings on the following pages.

 4—I 1 1—|—
B C D E A B C
MAP APPENDIX
CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN NO. 136-45

T "• P Q

Y --' U ^ V

Q R

W X Y u ! v w
A B C
WHIRAIWA BA\

F G H

u v rw

• -I (VI //<•--£.

W X Y W \d^$S.
B C
TACHIIWA PT.

AST^BOAT BASIN

IWO JIMA
ENEMY DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS
AS OBSERVED FROM GROUND STUDY

19 FEBRUARY —19 MARCH 1945

THE SPECIAL GRID SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN PURPLE

COLOR. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE USED FOR PIN POINT DESIGNATIONS.

THE ARBITRARY TARGET SQUARE SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS

MAP IN SALMON WITH BLUE LETTERS AND NUMBERS. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE
USED FOR AREA DESIGNATIONS.
THE NUMBERING OF THE IOOO-YARD TARGET AREAS AND LETTERING
OF THE EOO-YARD TARGET SQUARES HAS NO RELATION TO THE NUMBERING
USED IN THE GRID SYSTEM.

V W X PIN-POINT DESIGNATION OF RJ106 IS BC 750-709

R J I 0 6 IS IN TARGET SQUARE 132 A

COAST DEFENSE CASEMATE OR BLOCKHOUSE

A A HEAVY EMPLACEMENT, UNOCCUPIED
A A AUTOMATIC FIRE CONTROL CENTER
MACHINE GUN (6.5-7.7 mm) FIRE CONTROL VISUAL
A A TWIN MOUNT OBSERVATION POST
A A TRIPLE MOUNT OBSERVATION TOWER
A A DUAL PURPOSE PILLBOX
FIELD ARTILLERY-HEAVY PERSONNEL SHELTERS-BELOW GROUND
FIELD ARTILLERY- LIGHT DIRECTION FINDER
COVERED ARTILLERY SEARCHLIGHT
ANTI TANK -MEDIUM SIGNAL TOWER
ANTI TANK -LIGHT AMMUNITION
MORTAR COMMAND POST
ROCKET PROJECTOR, SINGLE BURIED BUILDING
VEHICLE, ARMORED AIRCRAFT REVETMENT

THOUSANDS OF CAVES USED FOR DEFENSIVE

POSITIONS, PERSONNEL , AND STORAGE HAVE
NOT BEEN PLOTTED.
R S­ T
'20,000
SCALE IN YARDS
W X I Y

JICPOA L-50608-54
 - A I B C : D E + A B
MAP APPENDIX
CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN NO 136-45 LJ

S i T -- P

Y -- U V

u !v
I H—I 1—
I D » E

Q I R : S

C D
BAY

P Q R

d ­- u v w

P Q R

B C
TACHIIWA PT

P : Q R

LJ V W

J -­ F
ST^-BOAT BASIN

IWO JIMA

THE SPECIAL GRID SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN PURPLE

COLOR. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE USED FOR PIN POINT DESIGNATIONS.
THE ARBITRARY TARGET SQUARE SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS
MAP IN SALMON WITH BLUE LETTERS AND NUMBERS. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE
USED FOR AREA DESIGNATIONS.
THE NUMBERING OF THE 1000-YARD TARGET AREAS AND LETTERING
OF THE EOO-YARO TARGET SQUARES HAS NO RELATION TO THE NUMBERING
USED IN THE GRID SYSTEM.

PIN-POINT DESIGNATION OF R J I 0 6 IS BC 7 5 0 - 7 0 9
R J I 0 6 IS IN TARGET SQUARE 132 A

BLOCKHOUSES
P Q ; R WITH PRINCIPAL DIRECTIONS OF FIRE INDICATED

Y ­ U V ! W! X Y W ! X
I—I—l

=20,000
SCALE IN YARDS
Y ­ U V
I I 1 I—H I 1 I

JICPOA L-50608-54
 h—•+ 1 h I V 1

B . C D A B C D E
MAP APPENDIX
CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN NO 136-45 LJ

P Q ! R p : Q R

U V W X V W X U V W X Y W X Y U V W

A B C A B C ' D

u Jtr w x U V W X U V W X Y

A B C

U V W

A B C

F G H

Y'M /V W

B I C I D B C
TACHIIWA PT

J " F
ASTs-BOAT BASIN

WO JIMA

THE SPECIAL GRID SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN PURPLE

COLOR. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE USED FOR PIN POINT DESIGNATIONS.
THE ARBITRARY TARGET SQUARE SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS
MAP IN SALMON WITH BLUE LETTERS AND NUMBERS. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE
R S : T THE NUMBERING OF THE IOOO-YARD TARGET AREAS AND LETTERING
OF THE 200-YARO TARGET SQUARES HAS NO RELATION TO THE NUMBERING
USED IN THE GRID SYSTEM.

PIN-POINT DESIGNATION OF RJIO6 IS BC 7 5 0 - 7 0 9

R J I 0 6 IS IN TARGET SQUARE 132 A

ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES

U V W X Y

H «
OBIISHI PT

'20,000
SCALE IN YARDS
Wl X Y X Y - U

JICPOA L-50608-54
 I—»——t—I—I—I—I—I—I

A B C D A B[ Cj D E
MAP APPENDIX
CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN NO. 136-45

* W X U V WX

A B C
ROCK
F G H

n
W X; Y W X Y U V W

A !, M C
RAIWA BAY

R S T

W X Y

F G H

WO JIMA

THE SPECIAL GRID SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN PURPLE

COLOR. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE USED FOR PIN POINT DESIGNATIONS.

THE ARBITRARY TARGET SQUARE SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS

MAP IN SALMON WITH BLUE LETTERS AND NUMBERS THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE
USED FOR AREA DESIGNATIONS.
THE NUMBERING OF THE IOOO-YARD TARGET AREAS AND LETTERING
OF THE 200-YARD TARGET SQUARES HAS NO RELATION TO THE NUMBERING
USED IN THE GRID SYSTEM.

U ! V W ;X PIN-POINT DESIGNATION OF RJIO6 IS BC 7 5 0 - 7 0 9

R J I 0 6 IS IN TARGET SQUARE I32A

B C D A B C D

COVERED ARTILLERY
WITH PRINCIPAL DIRECTIONS OF FIRE INDICATED
Q R S
LEGEND

ALTERNATE POSITION
V W X U V W X
HT SUPPLEMENTARY POSITION

E ­A B C D

J ­F

Q77K

Q ! R S
—-» —
*"
R :S 20,000
SCALE IN YARDS
W I Xi Y X
i—i—i I

JICPOA L-50608-54
r 17'
'T­
IS1 I4I°2O' 21'

CONFIDENTIAL
MAP APPENDIX
CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN NO 136-45

ARCS OF FIRE FOR CASEMATED

COASTAL DEFENSE GUNS
-49' ON 49'

IWO JIMA
PLOTTED FROM GROUND STUDY AND CAPTURED MAP

24°
48'

-47' 47'­

46'

195

45' 45'­

17' 18' 19' 141 20" 21'

JICPOA L-50608-5 5
 Cleared of mines, . t theshoulders and
of road is still mined Extent of field not > nown
flints are. 3•"•*"'tf6 ' s//Us iv/ vc/sficM r) 6 mines removed

Single nbrn nemispnencai

arid bombs reported in
area. 3-/0-45
Underermine
stick mines
252
mines Box,
<f others
253
This area (qpproK 100 yds square w
of rood) onrained 6 Herr, mortar grenod
and 53 icol mines. (-5!Magnetic mints
armed 27-45 See In&drt £ (H Cosi of flares. d caps / ammo
(3) Toot-measure

ry of mined area

.^r
1 nest Tieiqs conrained a i
and (21) Taoe- Measure
ape-neat vre
baHe lit p. fuzes (4! BOA /nines remove c
i3>Shape charge
(I) STjck
tz) s' Duds,
(i) &UA mines
qrenade

// were removed
See Insert '/f- B~- C HIRAIWA BUY uop bomb disper \al area (65 to 70)
area (-9B) bombs 250 Kg dispersei 1 in groups of S.
id £0 on each side groups IS ft. opa

easur&4 ydstich. mines (I) ROW 2 /7( rn mines

250 kg bombs iv ydstick !3) Rows / Hi rn /nrnes
mines «? rows removed. /orf. her we en rows
411 removed.
This field consisted of 4 ros or mines running approxu
parallel to the beach for i distance of over 1000 yar minat, road bl
The mines were 63 kg <nd 250 kg bombs with no 1 was also Clean go of t 6­ Z horn min&s)
'ardsrick mines were lashid length-wise TO the bombs
ur/ed near the surface . The aerial; bombs were place
an overage of 35' Qgarf There were approximately
mines in the field. This area i j^7rd^m9a'5
See Insert 0' I- imr
ed ynK
ines 6 J field located approt
Insert F (i7j Conical <f Anti-
mines Scotterec red pattern not >e measure mines
Pattern of mines
Removedjs) loolb Sombs e)Tonh mines Magnetic
Anti- Tank This oreo conrained 57 Co/, 2) $o kg bomb a
Trench and 19 Hemispherical mines charoe arena cm
2"Terrace wen si
I raws ... to the beach on Horn rninee, ydst cM mines, Tape measure
Terrace. The rows mines \yAnfi-p sonnet,
ZSaparT, Double and si Removed (2*) Ant, a.
horned mines were fovn nvasioni Horned) mine
Some irunm Mfrnp-Hind son
contdbieci scrfetf-pi
Tbe\ Conicalmin?S-w
3 rowi(f'f&rrace) onk £ ro
(2 terracer),' stoy$t*4di it rt
beach and 25'apart ' Hoi
were present for additionc 63'j kgbombs, \yydstic Removed (eto
mines One Depth charge box mine. 5
found- (See insert f'J.3/

/tasty mine fie JLXtll),

This area contained 4 yds tic A f 3 oito mines
in series of 2 with removed. 3 3
horn mines i row ac'ft off
connecfing. a// , a/so rape-measure,

nsert G" rows Tort ap

Pattern of mines
Yard shek mines
do/ mines I claare 60) Kg be •nbs remoireo' 3-i-fS
C) Incendi ary re. voved. 3-3-45 20 ft apart.
This area contain
charge p/aced /
road with 2 yd ttap naz ard pattern
either side of Tape -measvre mines

This area has be&n le rot* of horn

found dps turned upside, down
25 stick mines base as
Depth Charge used. 16 MARCH 45
D plus 25
Mine field c/eared z
no data on pattern or

(19)Smqle horn mines

Removaa mines on
Red deo h If 2 On
Green Sfemovcd
MINE SITUATION MAP
Ci)2 horn oeoch mine
((» US A'oyy gun firs of
(6OJ US mcrfor duds Mined area has bee neutra/jze d of
f/'/ct/on qrenodes,
IS) VS. Novy rocket- </</,
<2) USAircraft duds
also srr?o//er duc/s
Scoftcrev md/scrim natelyt a// are IWO JIMA
stored am me
Compiled by Corps Engineer Section from information
Appro* line
received from 3 d , 4 t h , 5 t h Marine Divisions,
f fi­
(i every
/ / " on beech
2d Sep. Engr. Bn. and 2d Bomb Disposal Co.

wmmmm•1
(4) AP mines ItS . (/'/) fr mines
'3) Jnp flora 11 HI Florns L1

0 500 1000 2000 yds

JICPOA L- 50608-56 CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN NO. 136-45

MAP APPENDIX
 GENERAL TERRAIN FEATURES -Beoches

Amphibious tractor stuck In

loose sand on East Beach.

Deep footprints indicate

loose character of sand

on beaches.

 Beaches

Marston matting on East

Beach essential to

vehicular movement over

the soft sand.

Bogged down Jeep with

chains on East Beach

subsequently damaged

by enemy fire.

8
 Beaches

Wave-cut terrace on East

Beach.

Terrace on East Beach and

amphibious tractor.

 Beaches

Steep gradient of beach com­

bined with looseness of sand

made movement difficult for"

vehicles and troops.

View of terrace Just inland

from Blue Beach #2.

10
 Terrain Inland

Looking west. This Is a

typical area inland along

the West Beach. (TA-163J)

Clumps of vegetation in

the central areas con­

cealed trenches, rifle

pits and MG positions.

 Terrain Inland

Covered artillery posi­

tion housing 47 mm AT

gun firing down runway

of #2 airfield. Type

of terrain in which gun

emplacements were least

vulnerable to naval gun

fire. (TA-183C)

Areas of this sort pro­

vided excellent cover to

the enemy in his attempts

to infiltrate our lines.

(TA-E33M)

12
 Terrain Inland

Approaching Hill 362 show­

ing the natural rugged

terrain which confronted

troops. Since troops

could advance here only

with great difficulty,

this terrain was a decided

asset to the enemy.

(TA-216N)

Looking, west from thi:

area showing sparse

vegetation. (TA-216A)

13
 Terrain Inland

Looking south showing the

rugged terrain approach­

ing Mt. Suribachi.

(TA-132R)

This picture is typical

of cave-infested north­

ern area terrain.

(TA-234D)

14
 Terrain Inland

Rocky outcrops and scrub

vegetation characteristic

of the northern one-third

of the island making move­

ment of troops difficult.

Rocky terrain near north

coast provided the enemy

with natural positions

for MGs and riflemen.

15
 Terrain Inland

- *

View of terrain typical

of that encountered In

vicinity of Hill 382.

(TA-200Y)

Trench cut through reck

leading to gun positions

near East Boat Basin.

(TA-166D)

16
 OBSTACLES AND M I N E S - Mines

Close-up of taried oil

drum with the top cut

open and ready for land-

mine to be emplaced.

Due to the enemy's dis­

rupted schedule caused

by cur bombing prior to

D day, they did not have

time to set up the mine

field in conjunction

with the oil drums.

(TA-180X)

View of West Beach showing

55-gallon oil drums which

were to be used as land

mines. Electrically con­

trolled mines were to be

put into the drums to hin­

der our landing on this

beach

17
 Mines

250 kg bomb burled in

sand as land mine.

These mines were fuzed

with yardstick mines

Placed on top of the

bomb and secured in

Place with fine wire.

Many such mines thus

employed were located

strategically, and

well covered with fire

from AT weapons.

(TA-165 0)

View of the West Beach

showing one-horned coni­

cal land mines. The

entire West Beach was

mined.

18
 Trip Wire

Trip Wire. (TA-201S)

This was the only evidence

of trip wire or barbed wire

being used in this area.

It proved ineffective In

stopping troops from land­

ing or advancing.

(TA-148H)(looking east)

 Anti-Tank Ditches

View of AT trench,

(TA-198H)

View of AT trench,

(TA-198H)

20
 CAVES

Interior view of cave.

This cave had a series

of caves leading off

in different directions

and connecting with

other caves In the near

vicinity. Food, ammu­

nition and .clothing

were found In these

caves indicating troops

had been quartered

there. (TA-199U)

Interior view showing

steps leading out of the

cave which is about forty

feet under ground with

large rooms throughout

for the quartering of

troops. (TA-199U)

21
 Caves

Typical entrance to ex­

tensive cave network,

extending from under­

neath the quarry near

the East Boat Basin

with tunnels leading as

far bs 800 yds. to

Minami Village.

(TA-183W)

Entrance to cave

(TA-198X)

22
 Caves

Interior view of exten­

sive cave•network under

CD gun over East Boat

Basin. (TA-183X)

Entrance to cave.

(TA-216D)

23
 Coves

One of many caves In for­

ward slopes of hills

guarding airfield No. 2.

MGs and small arms fire

was received from these

positions which provided

excellent observation of

the entire East Beach

area. (TA-183H)

Interior view of cave

showing steps leading

down and passageway

leading off to either

side where troops

were quartered.

(TA-198X)

 Caves

Interior view of entrance leading down Into cave. (TA-199UJ

Interior view of passageway In cave. (TA-132C) Entrance to two-story cave. (TA-199U)

25
 COAST DEFENSE - ARTILLERY- 15 cm CD GUNS

155 mm (15 cm) CD gun show-

Ing destruction caused by

naval gun fire. Reinforced

concrete 4 ft. thick. En­

trance to these casemates

Is In the rear connected by-

cave networks which were

used as personnel shelters,

food storage and ammunition

storage. These guns were

set about 15 yds. apart and

had a field of fire cover-

Ing the entire West beaches

and areas out to sea.

(TA-216D)

Ruins of 155 mm (15 cm)

CD gun. (TA-216D)

26
 15 cm CD GUNS

Front view of blockhouse

housing a 155 mm (15 cm)

CD gun. Destruction

caused by naval gun fire,

Entrance Is in rear of

blockhouse with adjoin­

ing caves throughout for

personnel shelter, food

storage and ammunition

storage. (TA-216D)

Rangefinder placed between

two CD guns in same area

used as part of fire con­

trol equipment.

(TA-216D)

27
 15 cm CD GUNS

Rear view of 155 mm (15

cm) CD gun In blockhouse

showing destruction

caused by naval gun fire .

(TA-216D)(SW)

Ruins of casemate contain­

ing 155 mm (15 cm) CD gun,

Two such Installations,

built of reinforced con­

crete with walls over 4

ft. thick and connected

with rangefinder and OP,

were located on the edge

Of a cliff at TA-219A.

28
 14 cm CD GUNS

View of cave entrance

leading from casemated

140 mm (14 cm) CD gun

back. Into the base of

the crater.

(TA-132L)

Breech-block view of one

of the 140 mm (14 cm)

guns at the foot of Suri­

bachl showing destruc­

tion. It is known that

"these guns were silenced

prior to our landing but

ruins of these installa­

tions provided cover for

the enemy and afforded

an opportunity to inflict

casualties on troops ad­

vancing toward Mt. Suri­

bachl. (TA-132K)

29
 14 cm CD GUNS

Front view of one of the

140 mm (14 cm) CD guns

showing destruction

caused by naval gun fire

(TA-132K)

Front view of one of the

140 mm (14 cm) CD guns

casemated at the foot of

Mt. Suribachi. They were

constructed of reinforced

concrete about 4 ft.

thick with tunnels lead­

ing from the rear into

the base of the mountain

and connecting each in­

stallation. These tun­

nels also connected to

personnel shelters, food

storage and ammunition

storage. (TA-132K & L)

30
 14 cm CD GUNS

STAIRS TO AA GUN ON ROOF

ENTRANCE TO ADJOINING ROOM

Plan view of 140 mm (14 cm) CD gun with 30-foot

fire port. This Is one of the four emplacements

found at the base of Mt. Surlbachi. (TA-132 K)

31