Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Prepared for the symposium “Emotions that matter”, University of Tennessee March 6-7, 2003
by
Jon Elster
Columbia University
I. Introduction
Emotions matter in two ways. They matter because of what
psychologists call their “valence”: they can be intrinsically pleasant or painful,
desirable or undesirable. They also matter because of their “action
tendencies”: they can shape behavior. Often, they matter in the second way
because they matter in the first. The six Frenchmen who killed themselves in
June 1997 after being caught in a roundup on consumers of pedophiliac
material did so (I assume) because they could not stand the unbearably
painful emotion of shame. The same motive must have been at work in two
French women, a mother and her daughter, who killed themselves in 1815
2
after being raped by Prussian soldiers.1 But emotions can also matter without
any immediate consequences for behavior. I personally observed both the
joy of the French when their team won the World Cup in soccer in 1998 and
the despair when it failed to make it through the qualifying rounds in 2002.
The large impact of these events on the “gross national happiness product”
was not mediated by behavior. Conversely, when emotions do matter for
behavior valence need not be part of the causal story. I run away from a bear
because I want to get out of harm’s way, not to alleviate the painful feeling of
being afraid.
In this paper I consider a set of cases in which emotions shape
behavior directly, with valence having a relatively minor role. These are
episodes of transitional justice, briefly defined as trials and purges of
wrongdoers and compensations to victims that occur after the transition from
one political regime to another. In fact, the set of actions I shall consider is
both narrower and broader than those covered by the definition. They are
narrower, in that I shall mainly focus on punitive behavior, and broader in that
I shall include extra-legal as well as legal forms of punishments. In the extra-
legal behavior we see emotions at work in raw form, whereas in the legal
system they often occur transmuted into a demand for justice.
I shall proceed as follows. In Section II I briefly survey the
main cases of transitional justice on which I shall be drawing. In Section III I
sketch the features of emotion that will be most relevant for the empirical
analyses. In Section IV I discuss the main retributive emotions - their
1 H. Houssaye, 1815. La seconde abdication - la terreur blanche, Paris: Perrin 1906, p.494.
Soviet troops in Germany after 1945 displayed the same phenomenon on a large scale
(A.Beevor, The Fall of Berlin, New York: Viking 2002).
3
2 N. Kritz (ed.), Transitional Justice, vols.1-3, Washington DC.: United States Institute of
Peace Press.
4
also take the form of deliberate and public humiliation, by tarring and
feathering collaborators 3, forcing them to drink castor oil in public until it
takes effect4, or cutting the hair of women who engaged in “horizontal
collaboration” with the enemy. 5 In Argentina, official transitional justice was
real but limited. It was supplemented by the National Commission of the
Disappeared, which documented 9,000 persons who had “been
disappeared”. Although the commission itself did not name perpetrators,
someone inside it leaked 1,351 names to the press. The named wrongdoers
could suffer serious consequences in their everyday life. One navy captain
who was well known for his brutal acts “has suffered dozen of attacks in
recent years by strangers on the street or people who say he tortured them
and their relatives”.6
The common feature of extra-legal justice, whether political or
private, is that it tends to be directly motivated by the wish for revenge and
other emotionally induced desires. Legal justice, too, may be rooted in similar
motivations, but in a more complex way.
3 This was a standard treatment of loyalists during and to some extent after the American war of
Independence (C. van Tyne, The Loyalists in the American Revolution, Safety Harbor Florida
2001, pp.61, 241, 295). It also occurred occasionally in the Liberation of France in 1944.
4 H. Woller, Die Abrechnung mit dem Faschismus in Italien 1943 bis 1948, München:
Oldenburg, p.281.
5This is the topic of the path-breaking and myth-breaking work of F. Virgili, La France virile,
Paris: Payot 2000.
Contempt Ostracism,
avoidance
Confess; makerepairs;
Guilt hurt oneself
Table 1
t1 t2 t3 t4
A 3
B 5
Case 1:
Impatience
A 3
B 4
Case 2
Urgency
A 3
B 6
Case 3
Impatience and/or urgency
Table 2
7 I deliberately write “prudential” rather than “rational”. While impatience makes us behave
imprudently, it does not induce irrationality. Urgency, by contrast, does make us behave
irrationally and a fortiori imprudently.
11
In each case, the agent can take one and only one of two
actions, A or B. In case 1, these options are available at the same time, in
cases 2 and 3 at successive times. In case 2, the rewards (whose magnitude
is indicated by the numbers) occur at the same later time, in cases 1 and 3 at
different later times. Suppose that in an unemotional state, the agent chooses
B in all cases, but that in an emotional state he chooses A. In case 1, the
choice of A is due to emotionally induced impatience. In case 2, it is due to
emotionally induced urgency. In case 3, it could be due to either or to the
interaction of the two.
Urgency is not always counterproductive. If the emotion arises
in a situation where waiting could be disastrous, it is clearly adaptive. In the
face of acute physical danger, it is often prudent to take immediate flight. In
other cases, however, urgent emotions arise even when nothing would be lost
and something could be gained by waiting. The proverb “Marry in haste,
repent at leisure” reflects this possibility. The desire for revenge can be so
strong that the agent exposes himself to needless danger by acting
immediately. An adulterous person who is overwhelmed by guilt may seek
immediate relief by confessing to his or her spouse, without pausing to think
whether it might not be better for all parties to break off the adulterous
relationship without revealing it. Japanese kamikaze pilots, who were
presumably in a highly emotional state, had to be trained to abstain from
hitting the first target that presented itself and to wait instead until they could
do maximum damage. As these examples suggest, urgency undermines
prudence by making the agent invest too little in information-gathering.
Impatience is the inability to defer gratification - to prefer an
early, small reward over a larger delayed reward. Although the tendency for
12
while these were still in power. A further category is that of the neutrals, who
were neither wrongdoers, victims, helpers or resisters. After the transition
there emerge agents of transitional justice, or accusers as I shall call them for
brevity. These include the political actors who decide to proceed with
purges, trials and compensation, and the lay elements (jurors, liberation
committees and the like) who may be involved in implementing their
decisions. More broadly, I also include among the accusers those who are
most vocal in demanding justice. Judges and prosecutors, too, if politically
motivated, may fall in this category. Officials in these professions may also
act as wreckers of transitional justice if they try to obstruct or delay the
process. Often, an individual will occupy more than one category: victims
may become resisters or resisters become victims and either may become
accusers. Wrongdoers may become resisters (before the transition) or
wreckers (after the transition). Many but not all wrongdoers benefit from their
wrongdoings.
Ideally, one ought to consider the emotions felt by individuals in
each of these categories towards individuals in each of the others. I shall
mainly limit myself, however, to emotions that target wrongdoers, with some
but not much attention to how they are modulated by the status of the subject
who is experiencing them. The main emotions are: anger, two varieties of
indignation, hatred, and contempt. 8 Although in actual situations these
emotions may fuse with one another in analytically intractable ways, I am
going to treat them, somewhat artificially, as distinct and separate. The
emotions have different cognitive antecedents and induce different action
8The following draws on J. Elster, Alchemies of the Mind, Cambridge University Press 1999,
Ch.II.
14
9 Ernst Fehr (unpublished data) shows that in experiments where individuals are allowed to
punish those who behave unjustly, at some cost to the punishers, “third-party punishments” by
external observers are typically weaker than “second-party punishments” by the victims of the
injustice. Yet even third-party punishments are surprisingly strong.
15
actions. Yet in some cases, such as sadistic torture, we tend to think that a
single action provides sufficient evidence of an evil character. The same
problem arises for contempt and the correlative feeling of shame. As for the
distinction between hatred and contempt, perhaps it can be exemplified by
the different emotions we feel towards someone who positively wants the
destruction of other human beings and towards someone who simply doesn’t
care whether they are destroyed or not. Earlier I used this distinction to
differentiate among action-based emotions, but it can also serve to
distinguish among character-based ones.
To summarize, we react to the chronically bad with hatred, to
the chronically weak with contempt, to the occasionally and intelligibly weak
(about whom we might think “There but for the grace of God go I”) with
anger or with Cartesian indignation, and to the undeservedly fortunate with
Aristotelian indignation. We feel hatred for torturers and denunciators. We
feel contempt for the opportunists who would enter the Nazi or Communist
part to get jobs they could not otherwise obtain. We feel anger towards the
South African lawyers who failed to speak out against apartheid (the vast
majority) or towards the Norwegian sheriffs who joined the National Socialist
party (again a vast majority) because they would lose their job if they didn’t.
We feel Aristotelian indignation towards the beneficiaries of wrongdoing,
such as economic collaborators in German-occupied countries, the white
liberal elite in South Africa under apartheid, or Swiss banks that profited
from the bank accounts of Jews who did not survive the Holocaust. After the
French restorations, many felt the same way towards those who had
purchased émigré properties at bargain-basement prices after they had been
confiscated by the revolutionary authorities.
16
all this needless and unseemly haste there was no serious attempt to
charge or prove that he committed a recognized violation of the laws
of war. 10
10 Cited after R. Taylor, A Trial of Generals, South Bend, Indiana.: Icarus Press, p.163.
19
saying about them was that “ils n’ont rien appris ni rien oublié” (they have
learned nothing and forgotten nothing). Many of them wanted simply to
restore the ancien régime, including feudal dues and the tithe. Others wanted
to get their properties back, and not merely a monetary compensation. Still
others wanted those who had purchased their properties at bargain-basement
prices to fund the indemnification, or perhaps even be punished for their
acts. At the Court the émigrés behaved with unbelievable arrogance, inducing
for instance Maréchal Ney to join Napoleon during the Hundred Days
because of the contempt they displayed for his wife. It seems reasonable to
assume that their memory had been kept artificially alive by their artificial
existence in exile, during which they had little else to do besides thinking and
talking about how they had been mistreated and hoping against hope for
affairs to take a better turn.
Another instance of lingering memory may be cited from the
Liberation of Italy. In one of the first trials after the Law of July 27 1944 that
created the framework for transitional justice, a court in Grosseto condemned
11 fascists to prison for two or three years for their public humiliation of four
antifascists (by forcing them to drink castor oil) more than 20 years earlier.11
In a society that accords great importance to honor, such humiliation would
be resented deeply and remembered strongly. (Strictly speaking, of course,
the sentence was a legal action and not a form of personal revenge, but the
evidence indicates that in such cases the courts largely acted to preempt and
prevent more drastic acts of private reckoning.) More generally, in societies
with strong codes of honor emotions of revenge seem to form an exception
to the rule of a short half-life. Revenge can go on for years and decades until
11 Woller, Die Abrechnung mit dem Faschismus in Italien 1943 bis 1948, p.183.
20
each and every offender has been killed, because the social norm that an
offended person must take revenge make it impossible for the emotion
simply to fade away.
Second, the retributive emotions decay if there is a long delay
between the transition and the trials. In trials in German-occupied countries
after WW II, sentencing was almost invariably more severe in the initial
stages than after two or three years (keeping the crime constant). Another
explanation is also possible, however. Aristotle, observed that “men become
calm when they have spent their anger on someone else. This happened in the
case of Ergophilus: though the people were more irritated against him than
against Callisthenes, they acquitted him because they had condemned
Callisthenes to death the day before” (Rhetoric 1380b 11-13). When the thirst
of the gods had been slaked by the sacrifice of some of the guilty, the others
got off more lightly. This explanation is consistent with the fact that the
demand for retribution in Chile and Argentina shows no signs of dying out.
Because no trials (Chile) or few trials (Argentina) took place in the immediate
aftermath of transition, there is a pent-up popular demand that never has been
satisfied, On this background, one may well wonder how long the patience of
the South African people will endure.
Could there be, as discussed above, a causal link between the
demand for immediate justice and the tendency for emotions to decay with
time? If the actors anticipate that they will feel less strongly in a few years’
time, would they not have an incentive to impose severe punishments while
their emotions are still at peak level? In Belgium, on the basis of the
experience from WW I, “it was believed that after a while, the popular
willingness to impose severe sentences on the collaborators would give place
21
12 L. Huyse and S. Dhondt, La répression des collaborations, Bruxelles: CRISP 1993, p.115.
13 P. Novick , The Resistance versus Vichy, London: Chatto and Windus 196., p.39.
14 Morgenthau Diary (Germany), Washington DC. US Government Printing Office 1967, vol.I,
p.426-27.
15 Ibid., p.664.
22
16G.J. Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 2000,
pp.173, 177.
17 C. Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press 1996.
18A. Sa’adah, Germany’s Second Chance, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
1998, p.54.
23
Followers of Hitler thought Jews evil but Slavs inferior. In transitional justice,
the emotion of contempt corresponds closely to the demand for “civil
degradation”, that is, loss of civil rights. If we accept the Kantian view that
retribution is a form of recognition of the offender as a moral agent, non-
prosecution may also be an expression of contempt. 19 The demand for the
dismissal of tainted individuals from public service may reflect anger or
contempt, depending, as I said, on whether they are condemned for their
actions or their character. Those who joined the Nazi or the Communist party
to keep their job might fall in the former category; those who joined to get a
job in the latter.
After the transition, those who remained neutral may be targeted
for their passivity, and be at the receiving end of contemptuous reactions.
More importantly, the guilt they feel for having done nothing may strengthen
their demand for retribution, as if their post-transition aggression towards the
wrongdoers could magically undo their pre-transition passivity. The tendency
for the neutrals, those in the “gray zone” between collaboration and
resistance, to be especially vindictive seems in fact to be a general
phenomenon. In France, a defense lawyer explained the severity of the first
court sentences by “the fact that many jurors were latecomers to the
resistance and were eager to demonstrate a zealousness which they had not
shown earlier. Later, when the deported came back from Germany, one had
much more thoughtful jurors who [...] did not feel the need to prove
themselves”. 20 The “résistants de septembre”, who suddenly emerged from
19 Claus Offe (personal communication) made this observation in the context of the low level of
prosecution of leaders and agents of the former GDR.
their passivity after the liberation of the territory in August 1944, were often
more zealous in the harassment of women who had had sexual relations with
the Germans.21 In these cases, guilt is transmuted into aggression towards the
wrongdoers. In other cases, guilt may turn into aggression towards the
victims. Commenting on the psychology of the purchasers of confiscated
émigré property after the original owners came back in 1814-15, writes that
“There are some forms of remorse which become twisted and turn into
hatred. The history of the Restoration can be summarized in the famous
saying: ‘Whoever has offended cannot forgive’.”22 .
22 P. de la Gorce, Louis XVIII, Paris: Plon 1926), p.162-63. In his exhaustive treatment of the
subject, A. Gain (La restauration et les biens des émigrés, Nancy: Société d’Impressions
Typographiques 1928, vol.I, p.348) asserts that “it would be more correct to say that the
purchaser, looked down upon and despised by the former owner, envied and ridiculed by his
neighbor, retreated into a defiant isolation vis-à-vis the regime and, until 1830, gladly posed as a
victim”. These motivational nuances are hard to assess.
25
24 I. Deák, “Political justice in Austria and Hungary after World War II’, in J. Elster (ed.),
Retribution and Restitution in the Transition to Democracy, forthcoming from Cambridge
University Press.
26
25 H. Mason , The Purge of the Dutch Quislings, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1952, p.130.
26 Ibid.
For all their earnestness and complexity, opinions of this sort seem to
be lacking in candor. The court creates an ideal law of the GDR,
through the use of techniques and principles resembling those current
in the Federal Republic, solely for the purpose of saying that this
hypothetical construct was ‘really’ the law of the GDR and therefore
its application today is not retroactive. [...] It would seem much more
direct and honest to say: The law of the GDR as it actually existed was
unacceptable and therefore we are applying a new law to these cases.
Perhaps under prevailing interpretations of the Unification Treaty [...]
that acknowledgment could mean the end of these cases, but these
issues nonetheless deserve a more general consideration. 28