Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Brian Clarkston
Professor Graves
Philosophy 340
26 October 2009
Reality, Symbols: Society: On Baudrillard's Simulacra and Simulation
In the modern era, some in society have begun to question not only the nature of what is
real, but whether or not the objects of human experience are in fact real, that possibly the totality
of our experience may at some point be found to consist of illusion. Certainly, an individual may
often be of the opinion that a larger world, and increased population, serve to increase the
collective while simultaneously decreasing that available to the individual self. It has been said
that the media of late, The Matrix in particular, has led to the belief that our world is but a
simulation. An analysis of Borges and Baudrillard gives credence to this view, both arguing for a
simulated world, and postulating the reasons why. It is my view, however, after experience with
the literature, that though our world is not necessarily one of illusion, the process by which our
world ceased to be pure, unaltered reality is the technology itself that shapes our reality.
Although the concept of a simulated world that will be discussed here had mainly been
the work of Jean Baudrillard, it is first necessary to discuss the prior events which led to his
controversial theory of ontology and metaphysics. Separate from computer simulation, the idea
of a wholly simulated world can be traced back to Alfred Korzybski, a PolishAmerican
philosopherscientist who in 1931 introduced this notion during a lecture at a mathematical
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conference in New Orleans. His view essentially was that the representation of an object is not
the same ontological element as the object itself. His argument, though far less rigorous than
many in metaphysics, is as follows:
A) A map may have structure similar or dissimilar to the original territory.
B) A map is not the territory. (Korzybski)
Korzybski's argument, after first glance appears to be valid; an object (X) cannot logically
be simultaneously in possession of qualities (A) and not (A). Notice that Korzybski's argument is
not strictly confined to paper maps, for in this instance the map of the territory refers to
conceivable representations of the territory. Nonetheless, a paper map exhibits properties similar
to the territory in depicting topology, landmarks, rivers, etc., all the while being dissimilar in
terms of composition. Invariably, other representations exist of the territory, be it in the memory
of a computer or a mind, though in any case, despite any degree of similarity, the representation
is not equivalent to that represented. Since that particular lecture, Korzybski's argument has
come to be known as “the map is not the territory” argument, one which would be later seized
upon by the likes of Borges and Baudrillard to explain the nature of our world.
In the last half century, the Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges has come to be seen as a
figurehead in the Surrealist movement. Focusing on the language itself of fiction, he took notice
of the ideas put forth by Korzybski on simulated reality. In time, his contributions to the subject
would some to be seen as more additive than those originally put forth. Using the extrinsic worth
of simulation, Borges suggested:
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In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographer's Guild
drew a map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, coinciding point for point
with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography
saw the vast Map to be useless and permitted it to decay and fray under the Sun and
winters. (Borges)
It can be seen that, rather than defining simulation only in the present, as done by
Korzybski, that Borges uses his literary wit to tell the process by which the simulated comes to
dominate the real. Of course, such empires and maps are but plot devices, but are well executed
as to evince that out world only becomes illusory depending on the values placed upon
representation by a society.
It is tempting to assume that the embrace of representation can be compared to Marx's
“opiate of the masses”. However, this view would place the blame of delusion upon the
representations themselves, neglecting the valid argument, as later evinced by Baudrillard, that is
society and technology that are at fault for this described loss of reality.
Curiously, the largest contributor to this particular interpretation of existence was not a
philosopher but rather a selfdescribed cultural theorist. Though having academic origins in
translating literature at Sorbonne, the French literary critic Jean Baudrillard was quickly attracted
to the Postmodern notions he worked to translate, including Peter Weiss, Bertold Brech, and
Wilhelm Muhlmann (Turner 1). His studies soon after shifted from literature to sociology. After
studying the work of Borges, Baudrillard began to formulate his on views on the matter of
representation, culminating in his opus magnus Simulacra and Simulation:
Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept.
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Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or substance. It is the
generation of models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no
longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes
the territory – precession of simulacra – that engenders the territory. (“Simulacra” 1)
Rather than simply arguing for the existence of Borges' representation, Baudrillard
instead asserts that not only is the mental world one of simulation, but one of simulacrum – a
“hyperreal” subjective simulation without being a representation of a real world object. In this
sense, Baudrillard argues that representation has been surpassed by simulation, in that the end
products are no longer representative of existing entities but have become entities in and of
themselves, and that the representative had come to precede the represented, that rather than the
subjective mimicking the objective, that the objective has come to mimic the subjective. While
the map and the mirror reflect external reality, something to which hyperreals are intrinsically
independent of.
The simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth – it is the truth which conceals
that there is none. (“Simulacra” 4)
According to Baudrillard, at some point in the distant past, human experience once
concerned the real, though of late the real has come to be superseded by the representative.
However, because of the hyperreal, not even this is the case anymore. In semiotics and
postmodern philosophy, hyperreality has come to represent the 'inability of consciousness to
distinguish between reality and fantasy, especially in technologically advanced postmodern
cultures.' (Hyperreality def. 1). At first glance, the existence of the hyperreal may be interpreted
by some as invalidating any guiltiness that our species may have for allowing the subjective
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world to become this Surrealist one of representation, though Baudrillard later explains that this
is not the case.
Concerning hyperreality, it evident that its effects are not ubiquitous, in that there exist
those persons who resist, doubt, or otherwise ignore the substitution of the real with the
simulated. Invariably, those naturally operating under a guise of skepticism or empirical rigor
would be either oblivious or immune to the hyperreal. In addition, those not belonging to
sufficiently technologically advanced Western civilizations would not only be unaffected by
hyperreals, but likely unaware of their existence or effects. Granted, one may argue that tribal
deities may be examples of hyperreals, though this is not necessarily the case, as proposed deities
concerning natural affairs are not so much simulated as representative of natural affairs, thus
being outside the scope of Baudrillard's simulacra. Others may be less resistant to hyperreals, for
instance those in modern societies who inevitably mistake fictional entities as real, or those who
respect symbols as entities in and of themselves.
These notions may be found by some to be predominately concerning social psychology,
so it is necessary to illustrate how the use of symbols by society constitutes a scenario with a
metaphysical nature. The polemic attitude of operational ambivalence towards simulation as
argued by Baudrillard is a worthwhile metaphysical examination in that although it focuses not
on realis qua realis, reality in the character of itself, but rather in a sense, realis qua hominem, the
nature of humanity in the character of reality. This however is not to suggest subjective
materialism a la Berkeley's esse est percipi, for though Baudrillard's simulacra deals with
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existence that is not independent of human mind, it by no means postulates that what exists is
only that which is perceived. Simulacra and Simulation merely analyzes the nature of the
relationship between society, mind, experience, and reality. Indeed, Douglas Kellner argues that
“Baudrillard seems to be taking theory into the realm of metaphysics, but it is a specific
type of metaphysics deeply inspired by the pataphysics developed by Alfred Jarry in
“What is Pataphysics” as “the science of the realm beyond metaphysics.... It will study
the laws which govern exceptions and will explain the universe supplementary to this
one; or, less ambitiously, it will describe a universe which one can see must see
perhaps instead of the traditional one....””
Upon a closer examination of Baudrillard's work, I was reminded of Nietzche's work in
ethics on the transvaluation of values: rather than Nietzche's ethical counterparts, Baudrillard's
metaphysics is arrived at by documentation and analysis of the modes of action present, which
will be summarized after an observation of the extent of representation.
At this point, Borges and Baudrillard have argued for the existence of simulation, but
have not yet argued for its extent. An 'ad infinitum' approach can best be described by Bateson:
We say that the map is difference from the territory, but what is the territory.
Operationally, somebody went out with a retina or a measuring stick and made
representations which were then put on paper. What is on the paper map is a
representation of what was in the retinal representation of the man who made the map,
and as you push the question back, what you find is an infinite regress, an infinite series
of maps. Always, the process of representation will filter it out so that the mental world is
a series of maps, ad infinitum. (Bateson)
Observe any office worker and note the extent to which they might take the modern
xerographic process for granted: not even a century ago; copies of documents had to be either
printed by hand or engraved on the plate of a printing press. Modern technology in this sense
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eases the act of creating a copy, but is it also possible that technology has led to the subjective
world becoming a copy of a copy of a copy of the objective, as Bateson suggests? To that
question, some comfort may be found by a summary of Baudrillard's analysis of the simulacra.
At this point and level of description, the concept of the simulacra may lack credence
given to it for being more speculative than descriptive. Baudrillard, like Nietzsche, now proceeds
to document the modes of his theory evolving over time, as follows:
Three types of simulacra:
1. First order: Characterized by the premodern period, in which simulated images are
clearly placeholders of real objects.
2. Second order: During the Industrial Revolution, a time in which the distinction
between image and reality is blurred, due to the mass production of identical copies of
objects. The ability of these copies to threaten the real by imitation is noted.
3. Third order: The Postmodern age, at which time the simulacrum precedes the
original. Reality and representation cannot be distinguished. Our perception is only
simulacrum.
Though Baudrillard may attempt to entice readers into concurring with his views by use
of exaggeration, I find it rather specious for him to argue that in the present, reality and
representation are indistinguishable. Rather than engaging in hyperbole, his argument would
have likely been better conveyed by merely proposing that in the postmodern age there exists
decreased recognition of the discrepancies between the real and the representative, as reproduced
copies possess less distinguishing characteristics than similar objects produced in their own
right.
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If Baudrillard's conceptualization of the precession of simulacrum is to be believed, this
yields a very sobering summary of the past, present, and future of our perceptions. For what
reasons were images as placeholders sufficient? What caused this change? If we concur with
Baudrillard, then what does he expect of the future? According to Baudrillard, if the evolution of
existence continues with its current nature:
The end of history is, alas, also the end of the dustbins of history. There are no longer
any dustbins for disposing of old ideologies, old regimes, old values. Where are we
going to throw Marxism, which actually created the dustbins of history? (Yet there is
some justice here since the very people who invented them have fallen in.) Conclusion: if
there are no more dustbins of history, this is because History itself has become a dustbin.
It has become its own dustbin, just as the planet itself has become a dustbin.
(Baudrillard)
Clearly, some discussion is necessary to decipher this rather daft statement on the part of
Baudrillard. It seems he is engaging in hyperbole to emphatically warn against the effects of the
proliferation of symbols independent of meaning independent of society.
Despite what mistakes the human race may have made, can apathy truly culminate in the
end of existence itself? If this end of subjectivity is in fact drawing closer, at what point will it
be too late for action? To this Baudrillard defines this most critical of points:
The transition from signs which disseminate reality to signs that disseminate that there is
nothing, marks the decisive turning point. The first implies a theology of truth and
secrecy (to which the notion of ideology still belongs). The second inaugurates an age of
simulacra and simulation, in which there is no longer any God to recognize his own, nor
any judgment to separate truth from false, the real from its artificial resurrection, since
everything is already dead and risen in advance. (Hegarty)
Here Baudrillard argues that, if simulacra are allowed to precess, then there will be left no
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recognition between that which led to humanity (what Baudrillard recognizes as “God” but need
not be), and the state that humanity will find itself in. After this critical point, there is left no
distinction between truth and false, for any epistemological rigor ceases to exist when signs and
symbols are given more importance than that which is real.
Despite the myriads of signs and symbols present in the current social and technological
state humanity finds itself in, it seems unlikely that Baudrillard's critical point has already
arrived. After all, even with the briefest of meditations on metaphysics, it would be extremely
difficult to argue that there is already nothing left to the subjective world, be it real or
representative. Since the perception of nothing has yet to arrive, then at the very least it seems
possible that the human race may still have some degree of control over its eventual fate.
However if our species' habits are to change, an understanding of how any why simulacra
precession occurs must be obtained. On simulacra and simulation, Baudrillard arrives at the
following:
1. In modern society, signs and symbols have replaced all reality and meaning.
2. What we experience is not reality itself, but rather a simulation of reality.
3. The perceived reality is due to signs from culture and media.
4. Society has lost touch with the real world upon which our simulation is based, by
overreliance on the simulacra.
From this perspective, it seems humanity has a few options to counteract the simulacra.
Though there is little control over perspective to be had, sans chemical influence, society may
feasibly learn to control itself, by mediating cultural and media signs and their influence on
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perceived reality. However, these lacking abilities of distinction must have some cause, some
origin, which Baudrillard identifies as the following:
Origins of the lack of distinction:
• The Media: Goods that are needed and goods for which a purpose is from
commerce can no longer be distinguished.
• Exchange value: A discrepancy originates between the monetary value and the
functional value of an object.
• Globalization: Produced goods become separated from the natural resources and
labor which led to their creation.
• Urbanization: Human beings become separated from the natural world in which
we were created.
• Language and ideology: Rhetorical objectives obscure rather than reveal reality
when used by powerful groups promoting their respective special interests.
If these are to be the case, if these are in fact the origins of our simulacra quagmire, then
at least there is a basis from which to counteract its effects. In that case, the following may aid in
solutions:
Possible solutions:
• The Media: place greater emphasis upon wants and needs, the difference thereof;
take note on the utility of an object proportional to its aesthetics.
• Exchange value: In the battle between form and function, place greater value on
the function of an object.
• Globalization: Maintain a global economy focusing on fostering local autonomy.
Reduce shipping needs by distributing production.
• Urbanization: Spend a greater amount of time on urban planning, in the process
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designing cities to be both more efficient and more natural. For those that can, a life
in the suburbs or rural areas may prove worthwhile.
• Language and ideology: Perhaps the most difficult element to counteract, though
some preliminary measures should be viable. Improve educational standards such
that a greater proportion of society can treat rhetoric with skepticism, slowing the
progression of special interests.
Though these possible solutions are far from ironclad, they stand to serve some relief.
Rather than incessant regard to the proliferation of signs and symbols, that serving only form,
placing greater reverence to function. Rather than one's purchases replicating those of others, the
colloquial “keeping up with the Jones's”, make choices based on what matters to oneself.
With regard to production, there are some circumstances where distributed production is
simply not possible, an example being semiconductor fabrication plants, which often require
initial investments in the billions of dollars. It is conceivable that other situations exist which
require large economies of scale. Yes, shipment of raw materials will be necessary where they
are not available locally. Despite this, it is conceivable that shipment of raw materials, say, rolls
of steel, would be more efficient than shipment of an automobile, the finished product. Also,
decreasing the separation between producer and consumer might prove to be advantageous in
slowing Beaudillard's feared precession of simulacra.
Regardless, the effect of simulated reality on the populace has begun to appear.
Baudrillard sees the use of universalization to be in stark contrast between the Enlightenment and
the modern era.
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In the Enlightenment, universalization was viewed as unlimited growth and forward
progress. Today, by contrast, universalization is viewed as forward escape.
(Baudrillard )
In that case, it may be possible to prevent forward escape, which I interpret as
symbolizing the eventual end of the human race, ending, to borrow from T.S. Elliot, “not with a
bang but with a whimper”, depending on our future choices.
In the interests of epistemic and metaphysical integrity, it is necessary to discuss
criticisms of Baudrillard's work, namely those put forth by Anthony King. In A Critique of
Baudrillard's Hyperreality, King first reviews Descartes' 'malicious demon' passage in
Meditations, concluding with the Cogito. King then draws parallels between Baudrillard's
simulacra and dualism a la Descartes:
This irrevocable subjectobject dualism is critical insofar as the analysis of hyperreality
is concerned because it is this premiss that human cognition is founded on one particular
type of sensory experience which is shared by both Baudrillard and Descartes.” (King 9)
King then proceeds to reconcile Descartes' demon with Bateson's representation ad
infinitum by recognizing that deception arises when we experience only representations for
which external verification is impossible.
I find it worthwhile to now notice that by arguing against Baudrillard by means of
verificationism, King is effectively endorsing logical positivism by utilizing one of its central
tenets. Specious though Baudrillard's arguments may be, King's criticisms are mitigated by
noting certain criticisms of verificationism. In Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism,
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Christopher Norris notes that verificationism is selfrefuting in that its proposition is neither
empirically verifiable nor tautologous (212).
Meanwhile, King suggests that the theoretical validity of hyperreality is weakened in that
it is both undercut by linguistic machinations and rehabilitated to foster an improved
understanding of postmodernism (15).
The integrity of Baudrillard's arguments notwithstanding, does a denial of hyperrealism
spell a defeat for all of Baudrillard's previously discussed arguments? Even King does not think
this to be the case:
“...Instead of regarding the notion of hyperreality as a (failed) critical concept by which
to understand recent social and cultural transformations, we can... interpret
Baudrillard's hyperreality as part of these wider changes” (King 15).
Ideological adversaries though they may be, if Baudrillard and King agree that
hyperreality plays a role in continuing change, what lessons are to be learned? Interesting though
Baudrillard's many hyperbole's may be, I believe that what should be gained is both a modest
version of his causal analysis of the precession of simulacra as well as his given details on the
origins of the lack of distinction. In this case my proposed solutions still hold.
One example common to the arguments of both Baudrillard and King is that of television.
In an analysis of Baudrillard's arguments, King states:
“For Baudrillard, the technological development of the television marks a fundamental
ontological transformation in culture; television culture is of a different order from that
of all previous societies... by claiming that it captures the real, the television effectively
obliterates the real. It asks the viewers to accept the screen image as the truth, as the
direct and unmediated reality and therefore demands that the actual reality... is not
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relevant that this... does not exist outside the television image ” (45).
Though it had yet to influence society in Baudrillard's time, I am tempted to include
additional forms of electronic technology, including the internet, along with Baudrillard's origins
on the lack of distinction. I concede that, contrary to any alarmist positions on the matter,
technology is not destroying our reality, but is merely playing a pivotal role in shaping its
development. As far as technology goes, it is my view that both the production of technology and
the content therein should be taken with a grain of salt.
If the media, commerce, globalization, urbanization, and rhetoric are to blame, then it
would seemingly be prudent to keep a watchful eye on the state of technology, careful to prevent
the precession of simulacra. In that regard then, the goal for technology should not then be the
continual development of new technology simply as a proxy to progress. Technological progress
should be measured by societies not in the form of creation itself, but to the extent by which
technology can become more efficient, solving existing human problems, rather than creating
new problems, which at times seemed to be the case during the last century; for instance the
development of nuclear weapons.
With that in mind, progress should be measured in the form of how mankind can itself
become more efficient: the availability of convenience without detriment to the environment or
each other. Baudrillard's conceptualization of simulacra serve as both a metaphysical study of
existence as well as an ethical framework, though it is agreed that his conclusions play a role in
larger transformations. Nevertheless, by differentiation between object and representation, we
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can better understand the way in which we perceive the world.
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Works Cited
Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.
Baudrillard, Jean. The Illusion of the End. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.
Borges, A Universal History of Infamy (translated by Norman Thomas de Giovanni), London:
Penguin Books, 1975.
Hegarty, Paul. Jean Baudrillard. London: Continuum, 2004.
"Hyperreal." Collins English Dictionary. 6th ed. 2003. Web. 11 Feb. 2009.
Kellner, Douglas. “Entry on Jean Baudrillard”. UCLA.
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/.
King, Anthony. “A critique of Baudrillard's hyperreality.” Philosophy Social Criticism 24.6
(1998): 4766.
Korzybski, Alfred. "A NonAristotelian System and its Necessity for Rigour in Mathematics and
Physics." 1931 American Mathematical Society. New Orleans, LA. 28 Dec 1931.
Norris, Christopher. Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism. London: Routledge, 2000.
Turner, Chris. The Intelligence of Evil. Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2005.