Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Justin Vacula
M/C Philosophy
Dr. Reitsma
May 2, 2011
In David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the character of Philo, throughout the
text, levies powerful objections to belief in a god and responds with various rebuttals to theistic claims
seemingly taking the role of the philosophical skeptic who doubts the existence of any gods. Toward
the end of the text, Philo appears to take a cognitive shift and says that he has “so little respect for this
suspension of judgment about the existence of God” because be believes that “proofs do appear on the
whole face of nature” although he seemed to have been suspending or withholding belief in God
throughout the text (Bennett 55). To Philo, 'true religion' is belief in a God without making specific
claims about such god and 'true religion' is not common superstition, absurdity and impiety, and
degenerate morality. I think that some of Philo's views concerning morality and commonly practiced
religion are attractive, but I don't find his reasons displayed toward the end of the text (the “enormous
display of planning” in nature) (54) convincing enough to warrant belief in any sort of god and I don't
feel the need to evoke the terms 'God' or 'true religion' because Philo's conclusion, minus any sort of
Throughout the text and more noticeably in the final part of the text, Philo mentions his disdain
toward 'common superstition' that many religious people embody that is not a part of 'true religion.'
One aspect of 'common superstition,' Philo notes, is seeing divine agency in everything, “The most
careless, the most stupid, thinker sees everywhere a purpose, an intention, a design” (54). 'Common
superstition,' Philo reasons, can't be good for society because “history is so full of accounts of its
pernicious effects on public affairs” while those embracing true religion, Philo notes, are silent, “No
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period of time can be happier or more prosperous than those in which the religious spirit is never
Philo regards absurdity and impiety as characteristics that are not present in 'true religion.' Philo
says that he his “veneration for true religion is matched by [his] abhorrence of common superstitions”
and that he gets “a special pleasure out of pushing superstitions – sometimes into absurdity, sometimes
into impiety. All bigots hate impiety more than they do absurdity, but … they are often equally guilty of
both” (57). Philo does not consider communing with God in order to gain favor as a characteristic of
'true religion,' “Pleas for God's favour are generally understood to be either frivolous observances, or
rapturous ecstasies, or a bigoted credulity, and therefore not to reflect or to encourage moral
seriousness” (58). Instead of adhering to what Philo has previously called 'vulgar superstition,' he
apparently embraces a “philosophical and rational kind” of religion (58) and says that “worship that
goes beyond expressing one's knowledge that God exists – is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even
impious” (61).
Philo believes that morality can be accounted for without appealing to a divine entity and is
opposed to moral degeneracy that has no place in 'true religion.' Philo believes that “the smallest grain
of natural honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct than the most grandly inflated
views suggested by theological theories and systems” (58). “The chief restraints on mankind,” Philo
says, “are the solemnity and importance of the occasion, a concern for one's reputation, and reflection
on the general interests of society” (60). This appraisal of reasons for moral behavior is in stark contrast
to what proponents of 'vulgar superstition' may endorse when they might say that a holy book and
God's commands are required for moral action and without such, one has no good reason to behave
morally. Philo notes that “philosophers, who cultivate reason and reflection, have less need of such
Philo believes that theists who are not either fanatical or superstitious can still be plagued by
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religion, “greatly weakening men's attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity” (59). If
religion becomes the focus of morality, instead of other concerns, Philo reasons, religionists' attention
would be diverted away from morality and raise up “a new and frivolous sort of supposed merit, and
the preposterous way in which it distributes praise and blame” (59). Philo notes that “we needn't go
back in ancient times, or wander to remote places, to find instances of this degeneracy of religion
Philo notes that 'true religion' does not have the pernicious consequences that the 'common
religion' has and that the 'true religion' is rational and on solid philosophical ground much unlike
'vulgar superstitions.' Those who assent to the belief that the cause of the universe probably bears
resemblance to some intelligence that is like a human's, Philo believes, will find solace in this thought
and “will naturally feel somewhat unnerved by the greatness of the object, that is, by the thought of the
cause of the universe” (62). Philo believes that God revealed the truth of divine intelligence in nature
and that the realization of this is “the first and most essential step toward being a sound, believing
Christian” (62).
Philo believes that the foundation of true religion, how one comes to know that a divine
intelligence exists, is found through examination of nature; he states that “a scientist today must indeed
be stubbornly obstinate if he can doubt that there is a supreme intellect” (55). This can be met with
various objections, some of which that Philo raised earlier in the text, that may perhaps be defeaters to
acquiring knowledge of God through looking at the complexity of nature. The fact that something in
nature seems to be intricate and indicative of some sort of crafter does not entail that it indeed was.
Even if such complexity can't be explained, one is not warranted in believing that an intelligent being
must have designed it; lack of explanation does not entail that one is justified in believing that an
Philo notes that 'true religion' can be rational and grounded on philosophy. This sounds
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appealing, but arguments for 'true religion,' besides a version of an argument from design, are not put
forth by Philo in the final part of this text. If we are to use philosophy to arrive at a justified true belief,
we should need more reason that a version of an argument from design that is rather weak. One can,
instead of buying into 'true religion,' be an apatheist, a person who isn't concerned with whether or not
any gods exist, much like people are not concerned or never look into issues such as fatalism, free will,
and causation or come to the conclusion that whether god exists or not has no effect on his/her behavior
(like Philo believes in regards to morality) and ground beliefs on a rational philosophy; belief in a god
Thinkers can draw on philosophy to establish a rational basis for morality, like Philo mentioned,
and live a moral life without belief in any gods, so what makes 'true religion' attractive in this regard?
Theists should want their beliefs to be justified and rational, but they can't possibly adhere to 'true
religion' because, as Philo said, worship that goes beyond just knowing that God exists is superstitious
(61). Atheists, by definition, would not be attracted to 'true religion' because they don't believe in any
gods [unless Philo's version of god really isn't a supernatural being, but rather is something else].
Theists typically believe that God is necessary to account for an objective morality or to give one
reason to be moral at all, but if they can't make claims about the God of 'true religion,' there may be no
attraction.
People may be attracted to “true religion' to distance themselves from fundamentalists and those
with 'vulgar superstitions.' A move like this is quite common because various well-known religious
personalities utter abominable phrases, act in an immoral fashion, and have skewed moral priorities that
a person may detest. A layperson of a particular faith may believe in a god, but will disagree with
others about specifics of the god, conclusions drawn from a holy book, and what actions should be
taken in the public square. When preachers such as Jerry Falwell announced that “pagans, and the
abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays, and the lesbians...” were to blame for September 11, 2001,
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for example, Christians may want to believe that he's not a 'true Christian” and assert that their because
his beliefs are different than those of other believers, he's to be excluded from the 'group' (Falwell 1).
Pernicious comments and theological claims are not only limited to those who are quickly
written off as fundamentalists; noted and well-respected contemporary apologists such as William Lane
Craig argue that God has the authority to take away life and his commands to the Israelites to kill other
tribes in the Old Testament were perfectly moral. One of Craig's comments in a recent response to his
readers was, “So whom does God wrong in commanding the destruction of the Canaanites? Not the
Canaanite adults, for they were corrupt and deserving of judgement. Not the children, for they inherit
eternal life. So who is wronged?” (Craig 4). Religious persons may want to distance themselves from
Craig, but it's difficult to write off people like Craig because he's published various books, is generally
well-respected by theists, and frequently debates atheists. Can 'true religion' redeem a person?
This method of thinking that certain people are not 'really believers' because they disagree with
other believers is not rational because vulgar statements do not disqualify a person from being a
believer in God. 'True religion' can only successfully place one in a different category than others if one
were to say, “I only believe in a god which I can make no claims about,” but one can't honestly
masquerade as a theist under the guise of 'true religion' as espoused by Philo. I would wager that few
people like this exist today, and if they did, they would be nothing more than deists.
'True religion' may be attractive if one feels that belief in a god is warranted or wants to believe
in a god, but does not want to commit oneself to a specific religion. I'm not interested, though, in what
I'd like to believe to be true, but rather am only concerned in that which is justified through reason,
argument, and evidence, so I wouldn't just 'decide' to believe in Philo's version of God. If one were to
believe in a god but think that no claims can be made about it, 'true religion' would be a perfect fit.
Such a person, if dissatisfied with 'vulgar superstition' much like Philo is, can abhor the common
superstitions and venerate in true religion...but what is there really to venerate in other than 'I believe
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that a god exists, I can't make claims about said god, and commonly practiced religion is vulgar
superstition?'
Those who venerate philosophy and rationality, rather than any sort of belief in a supernatural
entity, can reach the same conclusions that Philo reaches about commonly practiced religion and
morality without supposing anything supernatural in the process and can, instead, subscribe to
philosophical naturalism. Such a person can agree with Philo's well-formed arguments against gods
throughout the majority of the text and feel philosophically liberated. If people don't need to believe in
god to be moral, find a community, fit into society, or have a sound philosophy, what is the point of
belief in any gods (and what is the purpose of 'true religion')? Atheists can look at Philo's views,
subtract the supernatural element, and be satisfied. Theists, though, may have a more difficult time
Authors of other texts have rejected 'vulgar superstition' and have proposed their own version of
religion, or rather have used religion as a catch-all phrase to espouse a worldview (yet one that has no
supernatural element). Mark Mathabane in his book Kaffir Boy in America writes, “The best religion, I
concluded, is one that helps people become more loving of their brethren, more understanding, more
tolerant, more caring, more helpful. It manifests itself in deeds, in earnest attempts to lead a virtuous
life, and not in hypocrisy, moral expediency, and power struggles. It certainly is not a prescription
given out each Sunday morning to solve uneasy consciences (Mathabane 254). Mathabane understood
the 'vulgar superstitions' that were elements of Christianity and various religious people and rejected
belief in the supernatural, yet he still persisted in using the phrase religion. Perhaps Philo, even if he
still believed in a supernatural entity, used the term 'true religion' similar to how Mathabane did when
I find Philo's arguments in earlier parts of the text, his naturalistic account of morality, and his
abhorrence of commonly practiced religion to be quite attractive because I agree with many of his
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accounts, but I don't espouse his supernaturalistic view. I find no major quarrel, other than a simple
disagreement about whether a supernatural entity exists with those who would hold Philo's ideas
concerning 'true religion,' but do find much quarrel, as Philo does, with those of 'vulgar superstitions,”
especially those who causes harm to society. If all religious persons were of the 'true religion,' the
world would indeed be a much better place, although certainly not a utopia, one would think, because
religious fervor would not guide one to commit abominable acts, divert one from important moral
Wo r k s C i t e d
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w i t h Wi l l i a m L a n e C r a i g . R e a s o n a b l e F a i t h . We b .
We b .
H u m e , D a v i d . " D i a l o g u e s C o n c e r n i n g N a t u r a l R e l i g i o n . " N o v 2 0 0 7 . We b .
< h t t p : / / w w w. e a r l y m o d e r n t e x t s . c o m / p d f / h u m e d i a l . p d f > .
M a t h a b a n e , M a r k . K a f f i r B o y i n A m e r i c a . N e w Yo r k : M a c m i l l a n , 1 9 8 9 . P r i n t .