S O M E R E F L E C T I O N S ON SPINOZA'S T H E O R Y

OF S U B S T A N C E

FREYA MATHEWS

In this paper I propose to offer relatively novel interpretations of four

main aspects of Spinoza's theory of substance. The paper will
accordingly unfold in four sections. In the first I shall specify the
essence of substance, and show how this essence is manifested under the
attribute of extension. In the second I shall argue that this same essence
can be manifested under the attribute of thought. It will then be possible
to explain how a single mode is manifested under two different
attributes, and how the 'essence' of the idea is reflected in the ideaturn.
The third section deals with the thesis that to be thinking and extended
is to be perceived - - the thesis, in other words, that the attributes of
thought and extension are phenomenal. Lastly, in the fourth section, I
attempt to elucidate Spinoza's necessitarianism, and the status of
actuality in his theory of substance.

I~
Spinoza defines substance as "that which is in itself and conceived
through itself" (Ethics, I, Def.III*). Through this definition he captures
all that went into the Cartesian concept of substance, viz. that a
substance is that which can exist by itself, independently of any other
thing. But Spinoza stretches the concept beyond this notion of
ontological independence: substance is not only that which can exist
independently of anything else, it is also that which can be conceived
independently of anything else. What can this mean? It must mean that
substance can be conceived in, anachronistically speaking, a priori
terms. Descartes had assumed that our acquaintance with bodies and
minds was sufficient simply for us to see that they were mutually
ontologically independent. He assumed, in other words, that our
acquaintance with actual substances reveals to us that they are 'in
themselves'.
Spinoza is more ambitious. He wants his theory to be rich enough to
 FREYA MATHEWS

dictate in a priori fashion what sorts of things will qualify as substances.

This is what he means by saying that substance is not only 'in itself' but
'conceived through itself': we can conceive in a priori fashion that which
is in itself. In conceiving substance in this a priori fashion we are
simultaneously discovering a priori reasons for substance taking the
form that it does. Spinoza is therefore, unlike Descartes, seeking to
explain why those things which he identifies as substances qualify as
such.
On the present interpretation then, we conceive substance a priori, as
suggested by Def. 1II. But Def. IV, which reads 'By attribute, I mean that
which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance',
suggests that weperceive substance, a posteriori, through its attributes.
To conceive substance 'through itself' is to construct certain a priori
conditions which anything which qualifies as a substance must satisfy.
Since we cannot conceive of the attributes of substance - - thought and
extension - - in this fashion, substance cannot be said to be conceived
through its attributes.
All that Spinoza has to build on, in the construction of an a pi'iori
conception of substance, is the definition of substance as that which is
ontologically independent. Using only this definition, and a strong
version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Spinoza argues, in Part I
of the Ethics, that substance necessarily exists (Prop. VII), that
substance is 'absolutely infinite" i.e. possesses an infinite number of
attributes, each of which is infinite after its kind (Prop.X1), and that
only this absolutely infinite substance exists i.e. substance is one
(Prop.X1V). This substance is, furthermore, not only infinite, but
indivisible (Prop.Xll, XIlI). In short, Spinoza argues that anything
which satisfies the definition of substance will necessarily exhibit certain
formal properties viz. unity, infinitude, indivisibility and self-
realizability. These properties, taken together, anticipate a property
which Spinoza himself does not explicitly invoke, viz. the property of
plenitude.
Substance, then, is whatever satisfies these a priori conditions, or
embodies this formal essence. These formal properties will be 'expressed'
through the attributes of substance,J where the attributes themselves
can only be known a posteriori, through acquaintance. That is to say,
while we can predict that any attribute substance may possess must
express those formal properties, we cannot prefigure the attributes
otherwise than in this formal fashion; we cannot anticipate their
empirical form. Our discovery of this empirical form must await
acquaintance: whatever is presented to us in experience which satisfies
 SPINOZA'S THEORY OF SUBSTANCE

the prescribed a priori or formal conditions will be recognized by us as

an attribute of substance. Spinoza posits attributes in addition to those
with which we are acquainted, but we cannot form any conception of
these others beyond the requirement that they satisfy the formal
conditions.
The attributes thus are as they are because they express the logically
predetermined nature of substance: the nature of substance is conceived
through itself-- it is conceptually independent of its attributes, though
it known, a posteriori, through them.
Although Spinoza designates, as the two attributes known a
posteriori to us, thought and extension, he often substitutes 'extended
substance' for 'extension'. (See, for example, the Note to I, Prop.XV.)
By 'extended substance', I take him to mean space, or at any rate a
physical plenum. It is clear that space satisfies the formal or a priori
properties of substance. Space, or specifically Euclidean space, clearly
exemplifies unity, infinity and indivisibility. (See Note to Prop.XV
again.)
Bodies are, for Spinoza, part of this plenum - - where their'parthood'
here does not imply that they can be separated or divided off from the
rest of the plenum, but rather that they are continuous with it. Simple
bodies are not discrete chunks of substance, but are distinguished from
one another, and from the plenum with which they are continuous, only
by their qualitative state. (This plenum theory of matter is discussed by
Spinoza in I, Prop.XV, Note, and II, Prop.XIII, Lemma 1).2
The theory then is that, under the attribute of extension, substance
manifests itself as a physical plenum, viz. space, of which bodies are
local mutations or agitations. 'Bodies are distinguished from one
another in respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not
in respect of substance', says Spinoza (ii, Prop.XIII, Lemma I). As a
theory of the material universe, this theory is sharply at variance with its
corpuscular contemporaries, and strikingly anticipates a 20th century
cosmology, viz. geometrodynamics. From the viewpoint of this
relativistic, post-Einsteinian theory, spacetime is no longer merely the
disembodied arena for physical existence: it is itself the sum total of
physical existence, a concrete plenum, of which all other physical
entities or processes are modifications i.e. they consist of nothing but
the local curavature of spacetime. (This curvature can be so extreme, or
convoluted, that it can produce local 'densifications' in the 'fabric" of
spacetime, where these local knots or regions of density in spacetime
produce the same effects we traditionally ascribe to matter.) Spinoza's
theory however is geometric without being dynamic: motion is
 FREYA MATHEWS

introduced by axiom in an ad hoc, absent-minded manner in Part II.

(Prop.XIII,, Axiom I, II.) Nonetheless, in the ontological priority it
accords to space, it is a startling adumbration of this recent (but so far
unsuccessful) p r o g r a m )
One would expect, given the print-out of the essence of substance
afforded by Spinoza's theory, that one would be able simply to look and
see whether the attributes nominated by Spinoza do indeed express the
predicted essence. I have argued in the present section that this essence,
viz. plenitude, is indeed, unmistakeably, manifested under the attribute
of extension - - in the shape of space. But is this same essence manifested
under the attribute of thought? Whatever would constitute a plenitude
of thought? It is to this question that I now wish to turn.

II.
ls the very essence, viz. plenitude, that is manifested under the attribute
of extension, also manifested under the attribute of thought? Two
possible interpretations for the expression "a plenitude of thought"
suggest themselves.
P' Plenitude is manifested as a kind of great, global idea, an ideal
representation of the physical plenum. The language used to
describe the universe under the attribute of extension is identical
with that used to describe its ideal depiction under the attribute
of thought: universe and ideal snapshot of universe satisfy, in
different media, the same description. Idea stands to ideatum as
mental portrait to sitter.
P" Plenitude in thought is realized, not through a mental
representation of a physical plenum, but through a kind of
mental plenum, or fullness of thinking or consciousness itself.
What such a "fullness of thinking" consists in, I shall for the moment
leave obscure. P' and P" are interpretations of the thesis that the essence
of substance is manifested under the attribute of thought. A thesis
which has also to be accommodated is that the modes of substance are
manifested not only under the attribute of extension, but also under
that of thought. It is a corollary of this latter thesis that each mode
appears both as idea and as ideatum, and that if the essence of substance
in general is identifiable, then it should in principle be possible for
intellect to match up ideae with corresponding ideata. To speak of the
essence of modes is, I think, misleading, though Spinoza does it
frequently. But I suspect all he is really doing on these occasions is
indulging in a medieval fa~on de parler. A truer rendering of modes
 SPINOZA'S THEORY OF SUBSTANCE

would represent them not as discrete, essence-bearing atoms located in

a matrix, but as local deformations of a medium. This medium, viewed
through different lenses, presents different aspects (attributes). The
difficulty, in identifying modes across attributes, is not in identifying
the same individual essence under different attributes, but in recognizing
the same deformation of the medium in its different manifestations.
I have suggested that modes of extension are to be understood,
geometrodynamically, as bodies formed by space locally folding or
curving into itself. This folding or curving is an internal limitation or
bounding - - 'modification' - - of pure extension. How are modes of
thought to be understood? Are they just mental pictures of such local
involutions of the physical medium (space), or is the ideal medium
(consciousness) itself internally bounded in an analogous way?
In Part II of the Ethics, Spinoza outlines his theory of mind. Modes
of thought are construed by him as minds: the term 'idea 'refers, not to
mental entities or ideas in the ordinary sense, but to minds. To every
body there corresponds a mind, and the mind is the 'reflection' of the
body: the mind is the idea of which the body is the ideaturn. Spinoza
thus embraces an animism at least as exotic as that of Leibniz. (See II
Note to Prop.XIII.) As in the monadology, the minds that, according to
Spinoza, are associated with objects like sticks and stones, are not
conscious: simple bodies have simple minds, and the more simple the
mind, the more dim and unconscious it is. Minds are not literally
attached to bodies, of course, because minds are not in space, and do
not interact with bodies. The mind is rather the 'reflection', within the
order of ideae, of a body which belongs to the order of ideata. This
reflection is not a result of an ad hoc or divinely ordained pre-established
harmony; it follows straightforwardly from the fact that idea and
ideatum are just manifestations of the very same mode of substance:
'The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and
connection of things' (II, Prop.VII) because '...substance thinking and
substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended
now through one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of
extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though
expressed in two ways.' (Note to Prop.VII.)
There is a strong temptation, in reading Spinoza, to be blind to the
animism, and to substitute some kind of platonist interpretation of the
ideae instead. It is tempting, in other words, to read the ideae as being
ideas in the ordinary sense, mental representations of external objects,
but mental representations which have been lifted out of their mental
matrix, and made to float free, in the manner of Platonic Ideas. Actually,
 FREYA MATHEWS

it's hard to decide which is the crazier: attributing minds to inanimate

objects or positing ideas independent of minds. It is only our particular
cultural prejudice which judges animism to be primitive and platonism
to be sophisticated. But questions of craziness aside, it is surely to
misread Spinoza to permit a platonist interpretation. The kind of ideas,
or mental representations, of external objects, that are entertained by
us, are not the ideae of which those objects are the ideata. On the
contrary, those mental representations belong to our mind, where the
human mind is the idea of which the human body is the ideatum. (See
II, Prop.XIII.) The true ideae of those external objects are the - -
externally imperceptible - - minds which logically attach to them.
The only instance of an idea which is truly accessible to us is our own
mind, which is, as I have said, the idea of the human body. Our minds
are complex and systematic - - and so conscious - - because our bodies,
or our nervous systems, are complex and systematic. The human body,
as a mode of extension, is affected by other modes, and the imprint of
these other modes is reflected in the idea of the body, viz. the mind, as a
mental representation of an order of external causes or material objects.
(See II, Props. XIV, XV, XVI.) As Spinoza says, '...the ideas, which we
have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our own
body than the nature of external bodies' (II, Prop.XVI, Corollary II).
But at the same time, in 'perceiving' our own bodies we are perceiving
the impressions made by other bodies on ours, and hence we form
mediate perceptions or ideas of those external bodies. In this way we
acquire a mental representation of an external world.
The physical universe as a whole qualifies as an ideatum to which
there corresponds an idea, viz. the intellect of God. Just as our bodies
are (non-detachable) (functionally unified) parts of substance under the
attribute of extension, so our minds are embedded in/continuous with
infinite intellect. (II, Prop. III, XX.)
It follows from the idea-ideatum parallelism that there are no ideae of
nonexistent objects. This is why Spinoza can say that everything which
can be ideated is realized. But this does not exclude the possibility of
our inventing ideas/images/concepts/ of nonexistent objects, such as
unicorns. Our power accurately to reflect the 'order of external causes'
is limited: such limitation is manifested not only in the incompleteness
of our perceptions and of our conceptualization of the external world,
but in confusion. The inadequacy of our ideas of external objects gives
rise not only to confusion, but to imagination - - the 'jumbling' of
perceptual data. Our ideas of imaginary objects may thus be
uninstantiable: an adequate idea of the object in question is not really
 SPINOZA'S THEORY OF SUBSTANCE

possible. (See Section IV.) But even uninstantiated ideas are not'false',
because allthe contents of consciousness - - not only percepts and ideas
of imagination, but desires, emotions, volitions and other psychic states
as well - - reflect a true aspect or state of our bodies. (See II,
Prop.XXXII, XXXV.)
The present contents of consciousness do not necessarily amount to
an adequate idea of the body, because they may not include a knowledge
of the order of causes which brought the body into being. An adequate
idea of a body includes a reflection not only of the body itself but the
whole order of causes which brought the parts of the body into
functional unity. (See II, Prop.XXVII, Note to Prop.XXVII.)
Every idea, then, is a mind, which may contain not only mental
representations of external objects, but psychological states such as
desires, moods and emotions. All these contents of consciousness reflect
states of the body of which the mind is the idea. But what can it mean to
say that desires, emotions and moods reflect states of the body - - and
hence too states of the external world? Maybe this is not as obscure as it
seems. It is perfectly straightforward to say of some psychological states
that they reflect somatic states: some psychological and somatic states
are even assigned the same name-tags e.g. agitation, calm, tension,
distress. Other psychological states can easily be visualized as having
certain 'shapes'. Anger, for example, may be represented as a kind of
turbulence, strain and suppressed expansion ('bursting' with anger).
The emotion can therefore be regarded as reflecting a state of the body,
and even a state of the external world at large. Hatred has a felt 'shape'
too - - it is experienced as a kind of psychic contraction onto an inner
object, viz. the representation of the object of our hatred. It is as if, in
this particular state of mind, we suffer a tightening, a dark, inward flow
of feeling, as though down the sides of a funnel, or down a narrowing
tunnel, closing in on the object of our intense emotion. The contractive
experience of hatred is presumably accompanied by inner bodily
convulsions and clenchings, and can be said to reflect them. Anxiety is
experienced as constriction, being held in or tied down, closed in,
oppressed. Pleasure, in particular sexual pleasure, is, in contrast, a
dilative experience. It is felt as a psychic expansion, a yielding of inner
barriers - - and this phenomenological 'shape' of pleasure is, too,
accompanied by a relaxation of inner physical controls and a general
'opening up' and free flow within the body.
The notion that certain psychological states have felt 'shapes' suggests
a formal respect in which idea and ideata might agree: modes are
individuated by means of a certain property which is manifested, under
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the attribute of extension, as geometrical shape, and under the attribute

of thought, as the 'shape' which characterizes psychological states.
Matching up geometrical shapes with psychological 'shapes' would
enable us to match the manifestation of a given mode under one
attribute with its manifestation under the other. However, the imprecise,
almost metaphorical sense in which psychological states may be said to
exhibit shapes provides only an intuitive clue to the nature of this
formal match. But while this intuitive clue underdetermines the
matching of manifestations under the two attributes at the level of
modes, it is sufficient to enable us to identify the manifestations, under
the two attributes respectively, of substance as a whole. For the formal
property or essence of substance as a whole is plenitude. Given the
unmistakeably dilative 'shape' of love, what experience would better
satisfy the mysterious description, 'fullness of consciousness', that was
cited in P" as the manifestation of plenitude under the attribute of
thought? Love is typically characterized in terms of fullness, overflow,
cups that run over. Plenitude, we could surmise, would be realized
under the attribute of thought in a state of pure or perfect love. And this
is just what Spinoza says! The highest state of consciousness is 'the
intellectual love of God" The highest state of consciousness is that
attained by mind when it achieves perfect self-realization. Desire, for
Spinoza, is the manifestation in conscious beings of the impetus, present
in all objects, towards self-preservation and greater self-realization.
(See III, Prop.VI, Definition of the Emotions I, Explanation.) Pleasure
is the satisfaction of desire, because it 'is the transition of a man from a
lesser to a greater perfection [self-realization]'. (Definitions of the
Emotions II.) Love 'is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external
cause'. (Def. of the Emotions VI.) Hence the greatest pleasure, and
therefore the greatest self-realizatin of mind, should attend the greatest
love. And the greatest love is presumably that which attaches to the
greatest object, viz. the universe as a whole. Hence, in loving the
universe as a whole, the mind achieves perfect self-realization. It is in
the 'fullness' of love that plenitude - - the essence of substance - - is
manifested under the attribute of thought.
But this is moving too fast. Let us linger a little on the significance of
Spinoza's doctrine of the intellectual love of God, or the 'third kind of
knowledge'. The first kind of knowledge ('opinion'), is, according to
Spinoza, commonsense, empirical knowledge. The second kind
('reason') approximates to the kind of abstract, theoretical or conceptual
knowledge that we would call 'science'. The third kind ('intuition') is not
representative knowledge in a straightforward sense, but involves a

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kind of immediate intuitive and adequate grasp of the connections

between things, and of the scheme of things entire. (For an outline of
the three kinds of knowledge, see II, Prop.XXXIX, Note II.) There are
intimations, in Spinoza's remarks on the third kind of knowledge, of a
contemplative or mystical apprehension of reality. In its transcendence
of perception and theory, this kind of knowledge seems to require the
knower to reflect, in the contours of his or her very being, the shape of
the external world. This is a far cry from any kind of rationalistic
understanding. But it does chime with mystic testimony to the effect
that there is a physical a n d / o r psychic state in which the self feels the
distinction between itself and the external world dissolve. This sense of
oneness presumably proceeds from the fact that, in this state, the
psychophysical patterns of one's own being are felt to superimpose on
those of reality. It is interesting that Spinoza, like the mystics,
characterizes this state of consciousness as a kind of love.
Pure love (i.e. love without a particular external object short of the
universe as a whole) has the same continuous, unbounded, unbroken
'shape' as the physical plenum (space). (Shades again of the mystic
'oceanic feeling', a state of undifferentiated, flowing consciousness, in
which the subject feels melted into the universe at large.) It makes sense
to speak of consciousness, in such a state, as reflecting, in its very being,
the plenitude of the material world - - where this 'reflection' is manifestly
not a perceptual or conceptual representation of the external plenum.
The state of consciousness constitutive of pure love is, as I have been
at pains to point out, entirely different from that in which consciousness
is audience to its own private screening of images (concepts) of the
external world. For consciousness in the state of pure love there is no
audience and no picture show, but just this felt pulse or flow, which has
no representative or propositional content, but nevertheless can be said
to reflect, in its own being, the outflow of external space.
Returning then to the question of what it is for the infinite idea/mind
of substance to express the essence of substance, it is clear now which of
interpretations P' and P" I favour. I reject the Platonic interpretation,
P'. Rather, plenitude is manifested, under the attribute of thought, as a
kind of fullness of consciousness, where the state of consciousness
which best satisfies this requirement of fullness is that of pure love.
We finite beings can never attain this divine state, of course, but our
aspirations towards plenitude, which is to say, towards greater and
greater reality or self-realization, may be realizable on a more modest
scale. (Notice what the doctrine of "conatus'-- the impetus towards
self-preservation and greater self-realization on the part of all beings - -

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amounts to. Spinoza says that conatus - - or in conscious beings, desire

- is the 'essence' of all beings/modes. But conatus, being the urge
-

towards greater and greater reality, is the urge towards plenitude, where
plenitude is the essence of substance. In this way, all the modes
participate in the essence of substance, without fully realizing it in
themselves. Since modes are merely modifications of substance, it is
fitting that their 'essence' should conform to, or participate in, that of
substance in this manner. This agreement between the 'essence' of the
modes and the essence of substance is independent evidence for the
argument of Section I, viz. that plenitude is the essence of substance.
Our aspiration to a state of mind expressive of plenitude cannot be
realized in any degree however without a simultaneous realization of a
corresponding state of body. If we w~sh to change ourselves, we can set
to work either on the body, in which case we can be sure that
psychological 'effects' (i.e. reflections) will follow, or on the psyche, in
which case we can be sure that physical 'effects' will follow.
Pure love, however, would seem to reflect the contours of an
expanding but empty space - - substance unmodified. An adequate idea
of the universe as a whole would seem to have to reflect not only the
global shape of space, but the local pits and seams and knots that make
up the material particulars within it. W h a t does infinite intellect really
perceive: substance in its infinite aspect, unmodified, or substance
infinitely modified? Natura naturans or natura naturata? Is substance
in its unmodified or absolute aspect actual, or even actualisable, or is it
only the modes of substance which enjoy the status of actuality?
These questions disturb a whole nest of obscurities in Spinoza's
theory. Until they are clarified, we cannot hope to understand the
nature either of substance in general or of the modes in particular. I
postpone this question of actuality till Section IV however, as there is
an implication of the thesis that the attributes express the essence of
substance that has not yet been brought into the light.

IIl.
In the two preceding sections I have affirmed and developed the view
that the essence of substance is manifested or expressed through the
attributes. In Section I I specified the essence that is so manifested or
expressed, and I identified space as an entity which unmistakeably
manifests this essence. In Section II I tried to show how this same
essence may be manifested under the attribute of thought. I also tried to
make sense of the thesis that the essence of a mode is manifested under
two different attributes, where this thesis transforms into that which

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posits a one-to-one correspondence between ideae and ideata. I

suggested that a mode of substance which is recognizable under the
attribute of extension as an object of a certain shape, might in principle
be recognizable under the attribute of thought as a state of consciousness
of a certain'shape'. In the present section I want to investigate a further
implication of the thesis that the attributes are perceived by the intellect
as constituting the essence of substance. The implication is that the
attributes only exist for the intellect, somewhat as Lockean secondary
qualities only exist 'in the mind'; that to be extended-or-thinking is to be
perceived. This thesis, that the attributes are (in Kantian terminology)
phenomenal, is indeed implicit in Spinoza's definition of attribute, and
I shall try to show that it makes sense.
If the attributes are, as Definition IV states, that 'which the intellect
perceives as constituting the essence of substance', then there would
seem to be a distinction between how substance is in itself and how it
appears to intellect. It may then be that the attributes are, like the
Lockean secondary qualities, grounded in the nature of substance, but
not realized independently of perceivers.
The prima facie objection to this interpretation is that it locates
intellect on the outside of substance, where substance is of course
supp'osed to constitute the all-encompassing scheme of things. But if
thought or consciousness is built into the nature of substance, as
Spinoza insists, how then can it be said that substance appears to itself
(i.e. to consciousness) under the attribute of thought (i.e. of
consciousness)? This is patently circular: if consciousness were
phenomenal, which is to say, were a mere appearance of substance to
consciousness, then consciousness would have to be realized in order
for substance to appear to it under the attribute of consciousness. In
other words, consciousness would in this case be the necessary condition
for the realization of consciousness!
This circularity dissolves at a deeper level of interpretation of
Spinoza's theory of modes. To facilitate this interpretation, I shall have
to make some further use of the Kantian noumenon/phenomenon
distinction. The present thesis is that a give idea and its correlative
ideatum are both appearances grounded in what is, noumenally
speaking, one and the same mode. The noumenal nature of this mode is
such that it not only is as it is in itself, it also appears to itself. The way it
appears to itself is through consciousness. An analogy which might
illuminate this idea is the analogy with the physicalist conception of
consciousness: the physicalist takes the brain as the 'noumenar base of
consciousness, but although the brain may be described in purely

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physiological ('noumenal'), nonphenomenological terms, it is neverthe-

less integral to its physiological ('noumenal') nature that it appears to
itself i.e. that it manifests itself to itself; it manifests itself to itself
phenomenologically, through consciousness. If we substitute 'mode'
for 'brain' as the noumenal base of consciousness, then I think we are
onto the track of Spinoza's conception of the relation of mode to
consciousness. Consciousness is the way a mode appears to itself from
within: the mode appears to itself as pure consciousness. All modes are
thus consciousnesses. But qua consciousness, a mode can also perceive
other modes. Other modes appear to it as bodies. It appears to them as a
body. Thus each mode has dual aspect: how it appears (to itself) from
within: as consciousness; and how it appears (to others) from without:
as body. A given mode thus apprehends itself, from within, under the
attribute of thought, and apprehends other modes, from without, under
the attribute of extension.
The fact that the attributes of thought and extension are phenomenal
in this sense however does not imply that they are contingent to the
nature of reality. For the noumenal nature of modes is such that they
necessarily appear to themselves. Consciousness is built into substance.
Thus although the appearance/reality distinction can be draw within
the Spinozist framework, it does not follow that intellect is located
outside the real world, is a mere spectator of an independently
constituted reality. Intellect has its base in the very essence of substance
itself.
It is worth noting, too, that a peculiarity of consciousness is that it
can perceive its own external manifestation. That is to say, a given
mode not only appears to itself from within through consciousness;
through consciousness it is also able to perceive the way it appears from
an external point of view, i.e. as body. If this were not the case, then
substance as a whole would not be conceivable under both the attributes
of thought and extension; for while substance as a whole could appear
to itself from within, through consciousness, no external point of view
would be definable from which substance could appear under the
attribute of extension. However, since modes are capable both of
appearing to themselves, through consciousness, and of perceiving
their own external manifestation, in material form, substance as a
whole is presumably capable of doing the same.

IV.
Let us now return to the questions that were seeking the light at the end
of Section II. I had there been attempting to demonstrate how the same

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mode could be recognized under the seemingly categorically exclusive

attributes of thought and extension. The question of whether all modes
are actual then arose. This question was extended into that of the status
of actuality in general in the Spinozist scheme of things.
It would be a mistake to assume uncritically that when Spinoza says
that infinite substance necessarily exists, he means that it is actual.
Spinoza's necessitarianism is, on the face of it, equivocal. It encompasses
the thesis that '(f)rom the necessity of the divine nature must follow an
infinite number of things in infinite ways', (I, Prop.XVI) and that
'(n)othing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to
exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine
nature'. (I, Prop.XXIX.) But on the other hand, this necessitarianism is
seen as consistent with the thesis that there may be unactualized
individuals: 'we may have true ideas of non-existent modifications; for,
although they may have no actual existence apart from the conceiving
intellect, yet their essence is so involved in something external to
themselves that they may through it be conceived'. (I, Prop.VIII, Note
II.)
We can accept that the modes that do exist follow necessarily from
the essence of substance. And we can appreciate that if for every idea
(mind) there exists an ideatum (object), then every idea is realized. We
can also take into account that the translation of 'idea" as 'idea' or
'thought' rather than as 'mind' is misleading: it misleads us into thinking
that Spinoza is saying that every idea that we can conceive of must be
realized. This is plainly not what Spinoza means to say: we are perfectly
capable, says Spinoza, of imagining unactualized individuals. (Spinoza
himself does not help matters however by using "idea' to refer both to
minds and to ideas in the ordinary sense.)
Before we can really assess Spinoza's necessitarianism however, we
have to get to grips with his theory of possibility. (See I, Prop.XXXII,
Note I.) According to Spinoza, 'the order and connection of ideas is the
same as the order and connection of things'. (II, Prop.VII.) The 'order
of causes' is a manifestation of the same underlying order of which the
'order of ideas' is another manifestation. The causal order is
consequently also a logical order - - a logical unfolding of the essence of
substance. To be logically possible is therefore, from Spinoza's point of
view, to be causally possible. An individual may be conceivable however
without being causally possible, because in general we have inadequate
ideas of individuals. (See, for example, II, Prop.XXIX, Corollary.) An
adequate idea of an individual includes a knowledge of the order of
causes that produced it. It is clear, in the light of this, why an adequate

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idea is always an idea of an individual which is causally possible. Since

for Spinoza all causally possible individuals necessarily exist, it follows
that all adequate ideas are realized. But many of the ideas which we
entertain in imagination are inadequate. It is therefore permissible to
say that not all ideas of individuals are realized.
This line of interpretation, which resolves the apparent contradiction
within Spinoza's necessitarianism, is right, I think, as far as it goes. But
Spinoza is way ahead. If we want to do justice to his theory of actuality,
we have to take the following passages into account. I feel obliged to
quote these passages at length, because I think the key to Spinoza's
theory of actuality is to be found, albeit darkly, in them.
II, Prop.VII.
'The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do exist, must be
comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the
formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in
the attributes of God.'
In an explanatory note, Spinoza tries to illustrate this proposition:
'The nature of a circle is such that if any number of straightlines
intersect within it, the rectangles formed by their segments will be
equal to one another; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained
in a circle. Yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except
insofar as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these
rectangles be said to exist, except insofar as they are
comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that, from
this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas of
these two not only exist, insofar as they are contained in the idea
of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of those
rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the remaining
ideas of the remaining rectangles.'
In Prop.IX, Spinoza introduces cause as a determinant of actuality:
Prop. IX. 'The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused by
God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered
as affected by another idea of a thing actually existing, of
which he is the cause, insofar as he is affected by a third idea,
and so on to infinity.'
Proof 'The idea of an individual thing actually existing is an
individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes;
thus it is caused by God, insofar only as he is a thinking thing.

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But not insofar as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only

insofar as he is affected by a third, and so on to infinity.'
In these propositions, Spinoza seems to be saying that the reality of
substance is antecedent to its actuality - - that substance exists, just as
the circle exists, and really contains all possible modes, just as the circle
contains all possible rectangles. And while substance together with all
its modes really exists, he seems to say, some of these modes are
furthermore actual.
What can this mean? Actuality, on Spinoza's view, seems to be bound
up with finite or 'conditioned' existence - - that is to say, with modes,
where each mode is 'conditioned' in that it follows from a particular
order of causes: 'that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence,
cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for
whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is
infinite and eternal. It must therefore follow from some attribure of
God, insofar as the said attribute is considered as in some way
modified...' (I, Prop.XXVII, Proof.) In the Note to I, Prop.XXIX,
Spinoza distinguishes between natura naturans and natura naturata.
The former is nature/substance viewed as active, and seems to consist
of substance or its attributes in their absolute, unmodified aspect. The
latter is nature/substance viewed as passive, and consists of the
modifications of substance.
One way of interpreting all these cryptic dicta is as follows: Substance
can be seen either in its infinite aspect, as unmodified, or in its finite
aspect, as modified. Substance-as-a-whole appears to itself in its infinite,
unmodified aspect. This can be understood in the light of the circle
analogy: if the circle could see itself, what it would see would simply be a
circle. It would not see any rectangles, because the complete infinite set
of rectangles constitutes a circle. From the point of view of the circle
itself, the individual rectangles smooth out, so to speak, and only the
outline of the circle remains. But seen from inside, from the viewpoint
of the rectangles themselves, the totality of rectangles cannot be seen: at
least one rectangle, namely the one which furnishes the viewpoint in
question, will be missing, and the gap left even by one rectangle is
sufficient to break up the configuratin from a perfect circle to a
composite of rectangles. So it is with substance: from the viewpoint of
itself-as-a-whole, it appears smooth, unmodified, while from the
viewpoint of a mode, it appears in its finite aspect, as a composite of
modes.
In other words, in the infinite totality of modes, the 'gaps' between
individuals are all filled in, and the result is a continuum: a 'smooth' or

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continuous, unmodified, infinite substance. Since substance-as-a-whole

perceives this infinite totality of modes, it appears to itself in its
unmodified aspect. But from the finite perspective of a particular mode,
substance appears as an incomplete and discontinuous (gappy)
aggregate of modes. Substance is seen, in other words, in its finite,
modified aspect.
Within this schema, actuality may turn out to be indexical: from the
viewpoint of a particular mode, certain other modes 'stand out' against
the background of the potentially 'smoothed-out' substance. It is these
modes which may be said to be actual relative to the mode in question.
But which modes will stand out in this fashion? Spinoza's remarks to
the effect that a finite mode is to be considered actual insofar as it is
'conditioned'by other modes, suggests that the modes which will stand
out from the viewpoint of a given mode will be those which belong to
the order of causes to which the mode in question belongs. Such an
order of causes, which may be visualized as a tree rather than as a chain,
may be of infinite extent, and the causal connectedness of any two
events which belong to it may be indefinitely remote. Nevertheless, all
the members of this causal tree are mutually causally accessible, and so,
according to the present interpretation, they all qualify as actual relative
to one another. Nowhere does Spinoza state that there is only one order
of causes. It is quite consistent with all that he says to posit an infinite
number oof them. In this case, the individuals which are actual relative
to a mode located in a causal tree, Tl, will not be identical with those
that are actual relative to a mode in a different causal tree, T2.
This indexical interpretation of actuality resolves two of the more
intractable enigmas in Spinoza's theory: in the first place, it ties actuality
to finite or conditioned existence, in accordance with Spinoza's apparent
intentions, while leaving substance in its infinite or absolute aspect
transcendentally real ('supra-actual'). In the second place it shows how
all logico-causally possible modes may be transcendentally 'realized'(in
the manner of the rectangles in the circle) without being actualized.
Interpretational virtues aside, how plausible, really, is such a theory
of actuality? Just the most plausible theory of actuality I think there is!
Theories of actuality have always been thin on the ground. The problem
of actuality did not become acute however until David Lewis invented
modal realism, and a criterion of actuality was needed to distinguish
(real) actual particulars or worlds from (real) possible particulars or
worlds. It was Lewis himself who proposed the most appealing criterion,
and that criterion was, of course, indexicality: a world, w, is actual from
the point of view of an individual, i, iffi ~ I (w), where I (w) is the domain

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of w. 5 Spinoza's theory of actuality seems to outreach, and at the same

time to explain, the Lewis variant of the indexicality thesis: from
Spinoza's point of view, everything that is real belongs to the (one and
only) world. This world may, however, include disjoint 'orders of
causes', or causal trees. This view is somewhat at variance with the
ordinary assumption, which I think underlies Lewis' view, that a world
is a closed causal system, or embodies a single causal tree. Correlative
with this assumption is the view that worlds are causally disjoint, so
that, to an individual in world Wl, the contents of worlds, w 2, ..., Wn are
causally inaccessible.
Causal disjointness is, I think, a necessary condition for worldhood:
there can be no causal interaction between worlds. But it is not a
sufficient condition: I can see no a priori reason why disjoint causal
trees m a y not coexist within a world. Causal connectivity may, on the
other hand, be both a necessary and a sufficient condition for actuality:
if an event Et is a causal antecendent, or descendent, of an event E2, or
even if E1 is a descendent of an event E0 which is an antecedent of E2,
then E1 may be said to be actual relative to E2.
How plausible is the claim that, though I exist in the same world as an
individual, X, this individual is not actual from my point of view,
because it is not, has never been and never will be causally connected
with me? Consider the following example of a world in which this could
be the case. Suppose we have a gravitational or unified field theory
which seems to match the actual universe but which also dictates that
the expansion of the universe from its initial singularity was such that
the resultant space had a foamlike structure. That is to say, trapped
within our space are other spaces. There is not even one-way access to
these spaces, as there is to the spaces hypothesized to lie on 'the other
side' of black holes. Yet these spaces may be 'universes' in their own
right, with denizens just as real, as alive and kicking, as ourselves. H o w
are we to regard these'universes', cut off from ours just as effectively as
are the possible worlds posited by David Lewis? Is there any point in
describing them as actual, when there is no chance, even in principle, of
reaching them or being reached by them? They are realities absolutely
sealed off from ours and as such indistinguishable from worlds which
are real but non-actual.
UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE
PARKVILLE, VICTORIA 3052
AUSTRALIA

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All quotations from the Ethics are taken from Works of Spinoza, trans, by
R.H.M. Elwes, Dover, New York, 1951; Vol.ll.

NOTES

J In his recent book, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics, Cambridge University Press,

1984, J o n a t h o n Bennett argues that the attributes express, as opposed to
constitute, the essence of substance. That is, the attributes are that which the
intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance, as opposed to that
which constitutes the essence thereof. On this point then I am in agreement with
Bennett. However, Bennett argues that the essence of substance is inaccessible to
intellect. 1 claim, in contrast, that Spinoza tells us exactly what it is. This
identification of the formal or a priori essence of substance is of the utmost
importance for my subsequent interpretation of Spinoza's theory of substance.
2 Bennett, again, has put forward a similar interpretation of Spinoza's theory of
substance, viz that substance manifests itself, under the attribute of extension, as
space.
I have not engaged with Bennett's presentation of these views in the text because
my own versions of them were formulated in the context of a different
interpretation of Spinoza's theory. 1 have thought it best to advance this
interpretation whole, in the way that I developed it before seeing Bennett's work
on the subject.
The originator of the geometrodynamic theory was W.K. Clifford, 'On the Space
Theory of Matter', Lectures and Essays, ed. Stephen and Pollock, 1879. The
theory was developed and put into mathematical form by J.A. Wheeler,
Geometrodynamics, Academic Press, New York, 1962. A contemporary
philosophical treatment can be found in J.C. Graves, The Conceptual
Foundations of Contemporary Relativity Theory, M IT Press, 197 I.
4 Contemporary theoretical physicist, David Bohm, has proposed a comparable
presentday cosmology. In Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1980, Bohm advocates a holistic as opposed to an analytical
approach to physical existence. He hypothesizes that there is a -- possibly
infinitely complex - - 'implicate' order which is not simply superimposed like a
grid onto reality, but is 'enfolded' into it. This enfolded, implicate order is not, as
such, accessible to observers. It appears as the 'smoothed out' background
against which our experiments or our measuring instruments 'relevate' certain
singular, local orders of phenomena. It is through these local 'explicate' orders
that the vast underlying implicate order as a whole i.e. the 'holomovement', is
manifested to observers. Those aspects of the holomovement which we are
capable of relevating are just those that result from the causal interaction of
ourselves or our measuring instruments with the holomovement. That is to say,
they are those aspects which are causally accessible to us.
Bohm illustrates his idea of the relation of the explicate to the implicate order
by way of an experiment in which a drop of ink is stirred by a mechanical device
into a very viscous fluid. The drop is thereby stretched out into a thread which is

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diffused throughout the fluid and is visible only as a greyish hue. When the
mechanical device is set to stir in the opposite direction, the ink drop is
reconstituted on the surface of the fluid. Now Bohm invites us to imagine a whole
series of drops stirred or 'enfolded' into the fluid, and the fluid then stirred in the
opposite direction: it would appear to an observer as though a single drop were
forming and moving in a continuous path across the surface. This is Bohm's
analogy for particles. Particles appear to us as discrete, a u t o n o m o u s entities,
ontologically if not causally disconnected from the rest of the universe, their
identities independent of the identities of other entities. Bohm is suggesting that
these apparent entities are really no more than momentary and local precipitations
of the underlying holomovement, neither discrete nor mutually independent, but
rather aspects of the same underlying continuum that are relevated to
consciousness by our causal action on them.
The parallel with my interpretation of Spinoza's theory of actuality is evident.
The locus classicus for Lewis'indexical theory of actuality is his Counterfactuals,
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1973. Ch.4.

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