One of Boeing’s cornerstone goals for the 777, "Day One Service Readiness", is being

accomplished by conducting extensive testing and integration throughout the program. Boeing is
using this testing program to work out all the bugs before delivery. The 500,000 square foot,
$110 million Integrated Aircraft Systems Laboratory (IASL) is the newest addition to Boeing’s
testing facilities, containing over $250 million of test equipment. The IASL is yet another
example of the philosophy shift from "doing" toward "planning" in the 777 effort. Systems that
in the past had not be tested together until the first flight are integrated and tested in the IASL.
"Aircraft Zero" or the "777 without the skin", as the integrated systems were called, had been
"flown" for many hours before the first flight over Seattle. This testing is useful in moving
development work forward to allow early ETOPS certification.

The 777 has the most extensive in-flight test program of any previous Boeing model. Nine
airplanes will be used with engines from all three manufacturers. Before the test program is
completed, the 777’s will fly nearly 7,000 hours in more than 4,900 flights. The flight testing for
each engine configuration will last about one year with customer involvement of flight and
ground crews in the latter stages of the test programs. All of the 777’s involved in testing will
carry large amounts of instrumentation and data recording equipment and will return to the
factory after completion of testing for retrofitting before delivery to the airlines. One of the
pleasant surprises that resulted from the flight testing was the lower than expected aerodynamic
drag of the fuselage. The reduction in drag saves about 15-20 minutes on a typical flight between
Seattle and London.

The full scale failure test of the wings on the #2 production airplane is quite impressive. Each
wing was subjected to 500,000 pounds of force and the wing tips deflected 24 feet before failing
at 154% of maximum flight loads, well above the 150% target. The applied force represents a
factor of safety of 1.5 times the loads experienced during a 2.5 g dive maneuver. The right wing
failed 0.020 seconds before the left wing. Over 2000 individual strain gauges were used to
instrument the plane with 500 miles of cables relaying the data.

How to Change Course

Changing course of such a large operation is a complicated task. What makes the task more
daunting is the need to continue to deliver aircraft designed under the old system while
installation of the new one occurs. Phil Condit explained the "Stampede Theory of Management"
in a talk to the Haas School of Business at Berkeley. He pointed out that during a conversation
with Arthur Young of Hewlett Packard fame, Mr. Young introduced him to the theory. The
analogy is that getting a successful company to move forward quickly is akin to getting a
stampede started, and once the stampede is going full speed, any change of direction must be
made gradually and from someone running alongside. Standing in front of the stampede and
pointing out a completely new direction will get you run over, and introducing change too fast
will result in the stampede not being able to make the corner. An important lesson that Boeing
learned is not to make too many changes at the same time.
Did It Work
Did all these changes substantially change the design/build process for commercial jet aircraft at
Boeing? Yes! Was it a change for the better? Yes! Were the changes enough to maintain the
market share that Boeing currently enjoys? The answer to the last question is difficult to answer
now since the changes are not complete and their effects will not be known until well into the
21st century. During the research for this case study, United Airlines had taken delivery of the
first 777 on schedule on May 17, 1995 in Seattle, Washington. "The Working Together concept
was very dynamic," said United 777 Program Manager Gordon McKinzie. "Working closely
with Boeing, we helped resolve hundreds of design elements". "The result is that the 777 is the
exact plane we wanted, and we're proud to have been part of it." Boeing President Phil Condit
commented regarding United Airlines: "Their input to the design process has clearly resulted in
the right airplane, for the right market, at the right time." Condit notes that since the program was
launched, the 777 has captured more than 75 percent of its market.

The goal for the 777 program was to reduce the "noncomformance events" (parts that don’t fit)
by 50%; the actual reduction was 75-80%.

An unanticipated benefit of working together was an education of the customer regarding the
complexity of the design/build process of airliners. Phil Condit explains that by being involved
in the process they understood that "some of their previous demands were difficult to accomplish
and they compromised the product". Customer involvement worked much better than expected
and they quickly became an integral part of the process.

Future Work
To complete this case study, more research will have to be completed. As previously mentioned,
a business perspective will add substantially to the content of the case study. Knowledge Based
Engineering (KBE) use will be more widespread, not just at Boeing or aerospace firms but
throughout industry. KBE applications at Boeing is another area that requires more research.
Although KBE was used sparingly on the 777, Boeing is currently expanding its use in future
programs like the Next Generation 737 transports. Much of the manufacturing work on the 777
and future airplanes will be done by entities other than Boeing all over the world. These
partnerships are a crucial part of the success of building a huge product like a commercial
aircraft. Managing those partnerships with the different corporate cultures and the process of
transferring large amounts of design data amongst the partners is a research project within itself.