International Relations Theory I – 2nd Review Assignment

Name : Andhyta Firselly Utami

Department / NPM : International Relations / 0906550373
Resource : Nicholas Onuf, “Institutions, Intentions, and International Relations”,
Review of International Studies, 28, (City: Publisher, 2002), pp. 211-228

Institutions: Intended or Unintended?

“We students of international affairs need a better theory of institutions.”—Robert Keohane

Nicholas Onuf, probably motivated by that very statement, has successfully brought his reader to
the philosophical dimension by throwing Frederich Hayek’s inquiry that institutions are either
designed, or emerge spontaneously. Insatiable by the dichotomy, Onuf in “Institutions, Intentions, and
International Relations” then suggests a third missing possibility: nature as a template for institutions
that we design for our own purposes.
Realizing that this is not a simple enigma, Onuf tries to fulfill both international relations
scholars and economists’ demand by providing a long discourse upon this problem. In order to deliver
a comprehensive explanation, he systematically includes both liberalist and realist assumptions. This
review is going to analyze Onuf’s arguments by filling in the empty spots with other scholars’ ideas.
It is told that Hayek went back to ancient Greek’s famous debate over nature and convention.
The latter implies that people conceive institutions to suit their needs, thus it should be designed for
everyone’s benefit. The former, instead, says that institutions arise as the accidental consequence of
self-interested human action. This notion leads to two possible positions. Either one believes that
institutions are too important to be left to chance for they limit people’s choices, or one believes that it
is important to leave institutions because they give people the space needed to make rational choices.
Onuf begins the article by supposing that institutions are unintended consequences. To elaborate
this proposition, he uses Hayek, Aristotle, Menger, as well as Lieber’s assessment.
According to Onuf, Aristotelian position holds that nature has a design which people fulfill by
doing what comes naturally—by being social. It favors spontaneous development, although it insists
that there’s no opposition between the nature and a deliberate design. Both are told to be mutually
compatible elements.
On the other hand, given the fact that Hayek is a great liberal economist, it is fair that he uses his
laissez-faire commitments in shaping the idea of planning and freedom. The new rationalism, he holds,
contended that all useful human institutions were and ought to be the deliberate creation of conscious
reason. Hayek bestowed his greatest attention on Hume who shows exactly how conventions arise
without need of promises.
 According to Hayek, ‘peace and security of human society’ naturally depend on the development
of three conventions: (1) stability of possession, (2) transference by consent, and (3) performance of
promises. This gives every society the same start, and then once these three laws are in place, society
will develop additional institutions of no particular character, following its own paths.
Manger, conversely, acknowledges that ‘some social phenomena (institutions and structures) are
the result of agreement of members of society or of legislation’. For him, the task of science is to
explain how this general result is possible without slipping into organic metaphors. Using money, law,
language, and morals as examples, he concludes that institutions are the result of the activation of
individual interests. Henceforth, they are continuously subject to undirected development and
periodically subject to alteration by design.
Noticeably, none of these thinkers actually provide us with a description upon meaning of the
term ‘institution’ itself. Thenceforth, Onuf takes the liberty to use Francis Lieber’s definition, ‘a group
of laws, usages and operations standing in close relation to one another, and forming an independent
whole with a united and distinguishing character of its own’. As stated by Lieber, ‘some institutions
have been instituted or enacted, while others are grown institutions, and many are mixed.’ Both Lieber
and Menger told how institutions come about, but not why they necessarily matter.
From this explanation, the writer can draw a quick conclusion that Nicholas Onuf’s early
hypothesis was not dissimilar with Aristotle’s position, that institutions are inevitably designed,
although the ‘designing process’ itself is already attached as human’s social nature. Menger then
specifically discussed upon the development of these institutions, on how its development happens
under a designed plan yet, still, undirected.
In line with Onuf’s thoughts, Lisa S. Martin in “An Institutionalist View: International
Institutions and State Strategies” argues that it is important to ask how institutions matter and under
what conditions. Because, she said, it promises substantial theoretical, empirical, as well as practical
payoffs, rather than answering the question of why states turn to institutions and what effects these
institutions have on patterns of state behavior. 1
Lisa, focusing more in the international relations study (while Onuf did a mix with that of
economics), provides several definitions of institution from influential IR scholars such as Keohane
and Mearsheimer, and decided to pick the latter: “set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states
should cooperate and compete with one another.” There are, she said, concepts related to international

1
Lisa S. Martin, “An Institutionalist View: International Institutions and State Strategies” in T.V. Paul & John A. Hall, ed., International
Order and the Future of World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.78
institutions i.e. international regimes and international organizations, and these concepts are not to be
misunderstood as international institutions.
Regimes emphasize the normative and often informal nature of institutions. International
organizations are, on the other hand, formal structures that embody and sustain many international
institutions. Although some institutions persist without an organization attached to them, states find
that they work most efficiently in the form of international organizations.
These points are missing in Onuf’s passage. Although he works hard upon giving evidences to
show that institutions are neither natural nor designed, the writer believes it would be better if he
commences his assessment by providing basic, fundamental information about institutions.
Lisa sheds a light upon institutions in a realist view. Realist theories seek for the instrumental
role of institutions from the perspective of states. The interests of states are given, and it is analysts’
quest to answer how institutions can help states achieve their goals. This approach generally goes by
the label of “functionalist” theories of institutions. States as the central actors in world politics are
assumed rational, thus when they face problems like the Prisoners’ Dilemma, their behavior will give
rise to outcomes that leave all unhappy.
According to Keohane, institution may help states overcome collective action and market failure
dilemmas, which is, when states can maintain mutually beneficial agreements. Unfortunately, this
stage is not very easy to achieve, since—in realist theory—states act opportunistically and one is
unable to adequately watch over another. Institutions can handle this obstacle by providing information
about others’ preferences, intentions, behavior, as well as its standards. Unfortunately, other than
collaboration problems, states should also face distributional, coordination, or bargaining problems.
These problems are not seen in the view of liberal institutionalists in John Mearsheimer’s “The
False Promise of International Institution”. The article mentioned the Western institutionalists’ ‘belief’
that institution is always a key means in promoting world peace. Any institution that served a party
well in one particular time should also serve others with the same benefits. This view is later
challenged by Mearsheimer’s realist thoughts.2
Differs from Onuf’s philosophical and Lisa’s theoretical writings, Mearsheimer’s provides us
practical case studies. Since the Cold War is set to be his main stage, the examples he brings on are the
European Community (EC), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as well as the Western European Union (WEU). These institutions are

2
John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise in International Institutions” in International Security, Vol.19, No.3 (Winter, 1994-1994), from
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28199424%2919%3A3%3C5%3ATFPOII%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C, page.7
told to be the successful example of Western institutions. The continuous pattern of institutionalized
cooperation, Keohane said, will determine the avoiding of military conflict after the Cold War.
An interesting cohesiveness then emerges between Onuf, Lisa, and Mearsheimer’s assessment
upon the liberal institutionalism view.
Nicholas Onuf, still focusing on the answer of whether an institution is deliberate or natural,
argues that liberal institutionalism features both spontaneous and calculated institutional development.
Customary international law, movement to freer trade, and emergence of international finance are
instances for the former while codification of international law, the turn to arbitration, and a series of
multilateral conferences are those for the latter assumption.
Lisa, on the other hand, argues that the entire point of institutions is to embody norms and rules,
thus to induce more certainty and predictability in patterns of international interactions. In other words,
the main aim for the liberal institutionalist is to reduce uncertainty in the most effective way. In doing
this, there are two types of distribution that matter in an institution: among the members, and between
the members and non-members.3
In Mearsheimer’s argument, the main blunder caused by liberal institutionalism was their
assumption that the world is divided into realm of security and realm of politics & economy.
Institutions, they argue, is a solution to the latter but not to the former. When there is a ‘mixed interest’
between states, both sides should have equal incentives to either join the institutions or not. By
enhancing an economic cooperation, then the steps to avoid war can be started.4
The writer may then conclude that liberal institutionalism holds a much more optimistic view of human
nature and share the view that growing interdependence will strengthen the institutions of cooperation and open
up greater opportunities for developing mechanisms of world governance.5 As Onuf said, if liberal scholars in
IR are to have a better theory of institutions, then it must take common purpose into account. This means
accounting for organizations as institutions designed for specific purposes, whatever their unintended effects.

3
Lisa S. Martin, Op. Cit, page.78
4
John Mearsheimer, Op.Cit, page.9
5
Paul Wilkinson, International Relations: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), page.19