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Decoding India’s
Pakistan. More substantively, however, States. India clearly is aligning itself
he argued that the Indian decision was with the United States, but as a partner
linked fundamentally to issues of tech- rather than a client; it also sees the Unit-
nology transfer. The Europeans, he con- ed States as one of several key strategic
tended, ‘were willing to bend over back- partners, rather than the only ally that
MMRCA Decision
wards in terms of technology transfer, counts.’ Carrying this logic to its conclu-
in terms of industrial work share and sion, Moss concluded that the MMRCA
in terms of other regulatory issues, and decision epitomised ‘India’s strategy,’
they really needed this (sale)…. For the which ‘above all, is to spread the risk.’
US contractors, it would have been gra- While all these explanations sound
vy, but for the Europeans, it’s survival credible, they are mistaken. The Indian
through the end of the decade.” Air Force’s (IAF) decision regarding the
The IAF gave primacy herculean American efforts to consum-
mate the civilian nuclear cooperation
after various wars and nuclear tests.’
Arguing that ‘there is a belief that in a
Other analysts echoed this reasoning.
Some conjectured that India’s decision
final shortlist — the ‘down-select’ in
Indian procurement parlance — was
to technical aspects agreement — India’s selection of two crisis situation, particularly if it was an was driven by the presumed Ameri- made entirely on technical grounds. No
European platforms, the Eurofighter India-Pakistan crisis, the US could pull can reluctance ‘to see key AESA (active political, strategic, or financial consid-
over everything else and the Rafale, as the finalists for the the plug on parts, munitions, aircraft — electronically scanned array) radar and erations intervened in any way: in ret-
multirole component of its air force led precisely at the moment you need them other avionics and electronic warfare rospect, this may have been exactly the
many American observers to conclude most,’ he inferred that India’s rejection technology made available at the level problem, but the exclusion of these fac-
Ashley J. Tellis that the country had settled for an air- of the F-16IN and the F/A-18E/F was a India wanted,’ whereas others won- tors was a necessary consequence of the
plane, not a relationship. product of bad ‘memories,’ which run dered whether the International Traf- ‘two-step’ procurement procedure ad-
India’s rejection of the F-16IN Several analysts have attempted to ‘deep in this part of the world.’ fic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which opted in the MMRCA competition. This
Super Viper and the F/A-18E/F Super explain why the Indian decision turned Other commentators offered alterna- restrict exports of sensitive US technol- procedure led to the rejection of the
Hornet in its hotly contested medium out the way it did. Bruce Riedel, a for- tive explanations. Richard Aboulafia, an ogy and are enforced by the US State American contenders but it also dem- Take a First Step…
multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA) mer official in the Clinton administra- internationally respected aviation ana- Department, were to blame. onstrates that the acquisition process The technical reasons for the IAF’s re-
competition has disappointed many tion has been reported by the Wash- lyst at the Teal Group speculated that Another hypothesis offered for the worked largely as intended, at least at jection of the F-16IN and the F/A-18E/F
in the United States. Because there ington Post as concluding that India India’s exclusion of the American plat- Indian decision was straightforwardly a bureaucratic level. Whether it serves are not hard to appreciate. Although it
were great expectations that New Delhi rejected the American contenders be- forms was evidence of the continuing political. As Trefor Moss argued in a India’s larger national security interests, was unlikely that the F-16IN Super Viper
would leverage this fly-off to cement its cause of the ‘perception’ that the United tensions in the US-India strategic part- widely read analysis, ‘Why India Chose however, still remains an open question, stood a serious chance in the MMRCA
strategic partnership with Washington States was ‘an unreliable arms supplier nership and a subtle protest against the to Disappoint the US,’ ‘by opting for a one that Indians should debate in the competition because of the perception
— particularly in the aftermath of the because of past embargoes imposed current US policy of continuing to arm European aircraft, India is not seeking months and years ahead. that a similar version was deployed by
ity between the US fighters and their Similarly, the questions about technol- an outcome that was only reinforced by
European rivals. Again, the merits of ogy transfer too were not an issue in the an acquisition procedure that permit-
these assessments can be disputed, but case of the MMRCA down-select; tech- ted the user to disregard costs, technol-
the fact that such a judgment obtained nology transfer, offsets, and costs will be ogy transfer, offsets, and production line
made it virtually impossible for Indian critical considerations when the Indian management when selecting the con-
political leaders to contest the IAF’s government has to choose between the testants that made it past the crucial
conclusions, which flowed inexorably Eurofighter and the Rafale, but they first post. While India ought to review
from the methodology underlying the were of no relevance in the processes the merits of this procurement process
two-step selection process. leading up to the rejection of the Ameri- for the future, the United States should
Second, the myriad public claims can fighters. In fact, the ministry of de- at least take some solace from the fact
about why the IAF finally decided to fence’s Technical Oversight Committee that the exclusion of its airplanes from
settle for an all-European shortlist are and its Technical Offsets Evaluation this race does not portend anything in-
highly suspect. There is simply no evi- Committee are only just now complet- jurious for the long-term health of its
dence to suggest that the decision to ing their assessments of some of these strategic partnership with India.
exclude the F-16IN and F/A-18E/F from issues. To be sure, defence cooperation be-
the down-select was motivated by In- Third, the decision in the MMRCA tween the United States and India pres-
dian suspicions about the reliability of down-select was fundamentally a prod- ently is challenged by a variety of factors
the United States as a supplier. While uct of a particular acquisition proce- in both countries. Some of these are
such concerns dominated Indian cal- dure, which by privileging technological transient, while some of these are struc-
culations in the past, they have abated considerations at the expense of cost tural, with the weightier impediments
dramatically in recent years. The evi- and other relevant constraints pro- lying, on balance, in New Delhi rather
dence of increasing Indian purchases of duces distortions that lead to the mis- than in Washington.
major weapon systems from the United allocation of defence resources. But it It is to these hindrances that Indian
States only proves the point: since the was not a repudiation of the US-Indian and American leaders ought to focus
Bush years, India has purchased its en- strategic partnership or a hedge against their attention. This is important be-
tire long-range maritime patrol aircraft, overdependence on the United States cause the current threats to the bur-
very heavy lift transport aircraft, and as a geopolitical partner. It is likely that geoning defence partnership derive less
advanced special operations tactical many IAF officers had strong admira- from abortive military sales and more
transport aircraft fleets from American tion for the Eurofighter and the Rafale from the lack of vision, focus and de-
vendors at an outlay of over USD Eight based on their encounters with each termination to create the strategic af-
billion thus far — a figure that is certain aircraft during past bilateral exercises filiation that serves common interests.
to increase as additional platforms are with the United Kingdom and France As both sides work toward remedying
procured beyond that committed to in respectively. If these preferences finally these lacunae, atleast they need not
the original order. proved determinative, it was only be- worry that the one unconsummated de-
US companies are also favoured to cause the two Eurocanards came closer fence deal involving the MMRCA means
win the attack helicopter, the ultra-light than their American competitors to the anything more than what any open
howitzer, and the anti-tank guided mis- IAF’s vision of what constituted a desir- competition inevitably entails — you
sile competitions that are now nearing able multirole fighter that was expected win some, you lose some, but the game
completion, all of which only prove the to remain in Indian service until at least goes on.;
point that Indian perceptions of the the year 2040. (The writer, a well-known analyst is a senior
reliability of the United States as a sup- The IAF’s yearning for an airplane that associate at the Carnegie Endowment for In-
plier have changed dramatically in the was nimble, sophisticated, and longer- ternational Peace, Washington, D.C.)
new political environment and when lived — rather than any political con- The views expressed here are those of the au-
the superiority of specific US defence siderations about hedging — produced thor and do not necessarily reflect FORCE
technologies is deemed uncontestable. a decision that favoured the Europeans, editorial policy.