NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE MAURO resettlement purposes, are not covered by the CARP as they are not agricultural lands
T. ALLARDE, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 123,
Kalookan City and SPOUSES RUFINO AND JUANITA MATEO, respondents.
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court assailing the Order, dated April 8, 1992, of Branch 123 of the Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City, in Civil Case No. C-15325, which granted the motion of the
herein private respondents for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and the
Order of August 4, 1992, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts that matter may be culled as follows:
Lots 836 and 839, registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 34624 and No. 34627, respectively, were
acquired by the Republic on April 2, 1938 from Philippine Trust Company. Said lots
form part of the Tala Estate in Bagong Silang, Kalookan City, which, on April 26,
1971, was reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for, among others, the housing programs
of the National Housing Authority.
According to private respondent Rufino Mateo, he had lived in the disputed lots since
his birth in 1928. In 1959, he started farming and working on a six-hectare portion of
said lots, after the death of his father who had cultivated a thirteen-hectare portion of
the same lots.
On September 1, 1983, the National Housing Authority notified the respondent
spouses of the scheduled development of the Tala Estate including the lots in question,
warning them that it would not be responsible for any damage which may be caused to
the crops planted on the said lots.
In 1989, private respondent Rufino Mateo filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform a petition for the award to them of subject disputed lots under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
In January 1992, in pursuance of the implementation of Proclamation No. 843,
petitioner caused the bulldozing of the ricefields of private respondents, damaging the
dikes and irrigations thereon, in the process.
On March 18, 1992, the respondent spouses, relying on their claim that subject lots are
agricultural land within the coverage of the CARP, brought before the respondent
Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from bulldozing further and making constructions
on the lots under controversy. Petitioner traversed such complaint, contending that the
said lots which were previously reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for housing and
within the definition and contemplation of Section 3 (c) of R. A. No. 6657.
On April 8, 1992, the respondent Court issued its assailed Order granting private
respondents’ prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction; opining and ruling thus:
"x x x
The Court, after considering the testimony of herein plaintiff Rufino Mateo as well as
the Agrarian Reform Officer, Danilo San Gil, that the herein plaintiffs have been
occupying the subject property and actual tillers/farmers of the land owned by the
government and registered in the name of, and administered by, the NHA, the land
being an agricultural land and is, therefore, covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
reform Program (CARP), is of the opinion that in order to maintain the status quo of
the subject property that the aforesaid prayer for the issuance of the said writ should
be, as it is hereby, GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, upon the filing by the herein plaintiffs of a bond, in the amount of
P5,000.00 duly approved by this Court, let a writ of preliminary injunction be
immediately issued restraining the defendants herein from bulldozing and making any
constructions on the land farmed and tilled by plaintiffs located in Phase IX, Bagong
Silang, Kalookan City, designated as lot 836 of the Tala Estate and of dispossessing
them of said land, or until further orders by this Court.
SO ORDERED”
Dissatisfied therewith, the petitioner presented a Motion for Reconsideration, pointing
out that the preliminary injunction thus issued is a blatant violation of P.D. No. 1818,
which proscribes the issuance of injunctive writs against the execution or
implementation of government infrastructure projects. But on August 4, 1992, the said
motion was denied by respondent Court’s second Order under attack.
Undaunted, petitioner found its way to this Court via the Petition under consideration,
theorizing that:
I.
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING HIS ORDER OF APRIL 8, 1992
GRANTING RESPONDENT’S SPOUSES’ APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUCNTION AND ISSUING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
DATED APRIL 15, 1992, BECAUSE HE HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ISSUE IT
AND THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO IT.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING HIS ORDER OF AUGUST 4, 1992
DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
ADDENDUM THERETO ON THE FINDING THAT THE GROUNDS RAISED
THEREIN ARE EVIDENCIARY IN NATURE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY
ARE ALL SETTLED LEGAL QUESTIONS.
As a rule, direct recourse to this Court is not allowed unless there are special or
important grounds for the issuance of extra-ordinary writs. In the case of Garcia vs.
Burgos, where pure questions of law were raised, this Court, mindful of P.D. No.
1818, entertained a direct invocation of its jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs,
realizing the serious consequences of delay in essential government projects. So also,
in Republic vs. Silverio, a similar case involving government infrastructure projects,
the Court Took cognizance of an original action for Certiorari against a Regional Trial
Court.
In light of the foregoing, the Court believes, and so holds, that the present case merits
consideration by the Court. To the end that the prosecution and progress of
government projects vital to the national economy be not disrupted or hampered, this
Court should pass upon and resolve the questions of law raised by the petitioner.
The pivotal issues for resolution here are: 1) Whether or not the Compressive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers government lands reserved for specific public
purposes prior to the effectivity of said law; and 2) Whether or not housing, plants and
resettlements are "infrastructure projects" within the contemplation of P.D. No. 1818.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court succinctly held
that lands reserved for, or converted to, non-agricultural uses by government agencies
other than the Department of Agrarian Reform, prior to the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), are
not considered and treated as agricultural lands and therefore, outside the ambit of said
law, on the basis of the following disquisition:
"x x x Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall 'cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands.' As to what constitutes 'agricultural land,' it is referred to as 'lands devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission confirm this limitation. 'Agricultural lands' are only those lands which
are 'arable and suitable agricultural lands' and 'do not include commercial, industrial
and residential lands'
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as 'agricultural lands.' These lots
were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval
of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. x x x"
Thus, since as early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (including the disputed lots) was
reserved, inter alia, under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program
of the National Housing Authority, the same has been categorized as not being devoted
to the agricultural activity contemplated by Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, and is,
therefore, outside the coverage of the CARL. Verily, the assailed Orders of the
respondent Court declaring the lots under controversy as "agricultural land" and
restraining the petitioner from involving the same in its housing project thereon, are
evidently bereft of any sustainable basis.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818, provides:
“SECTION 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any
case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery,
forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public
utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the
transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit
any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or
continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of
such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution,
implementation or operation” (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the aforecited provision of law in point prohibits the Courts of the land from
issuing injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of government
infrastructure projects.
Untenable is private respondents’ contention that the housing and resettlement projects
at stake are not infrastructure projects within the purview of Presidential Decree No.
1818.
As regards the definition of infrastructure projects, the Court stressed in Republic of
the Philippines vs. Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha Construction:
“The term ‘infrastructure projects’ means ‘construction, improvement and
rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication
facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewage systems,
shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital
buildings, and other related construction projects that form part of the government
capital investment.”
Applying the principle ejusdem generis, the Court is of the view, and so holds, that the
government projects involved “(2) For the various plants and installations of the
National Housing Corporation, for its future expansion and for its staff and pilot
housing development,” and “(5) For housing, resettlement sites and other uses
necessary and related to an integrated social and economic development of the entire
estate and environs, x x x.” are “infrastructure projects”. The various plants and
installations, staff and pilot housing development projects, and resettlement sites
related to an integrated social and economic development of the entire estate are
construction projects forming part of the government capital investment, undertaken in
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution for the state to embark upon a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing envisioned to provide at
affordable cost decent housing and basic services to the unprivileged and homeless in
urban centers and resettlement areas.
The questioned Orders of respondent Court (which is bound to follow P.D. No.1818),
enjoining or preventing the implementation of subject housing and resettlement
projects under the administration of the National Housing Authority, are repugnant to
Presidential Decree No. 1818. Well-settled to the point of being elementary is the
doctrine that “before a writ of preliminary injunction may issue, there must be a clear
showing by the complaint of a right to be protected” and that the acts against which the
writ is to be directed infringe such right. Here, it is decisively clear that the private
respondents have no right to the relief sought for.
Premises studiedly viewed in proper perspective, the Court is of the irresistible finding
and conclusion that the respondent Court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
challenged Orders in Civil Case No. C-15325.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Orders, dated April 8, 1992 and
August 4, 1992, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, in Civil
Case No. C-15325 are hereby SET ASIDE; and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by virtue thereof DISSOLVED. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., in the result.
G.R. No. L-105586 December 15, 1993
REMIGIO ISIDRO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH DIVISION) AND NATIVIDAD
GUTIERREZ, respondents.
Joventino A. Cornista for petitioner.
Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for private respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated 27 February 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 26671 ordering petitioner to
vacate the land in question and surrender possession thereof to the private respondent;
and its 21 May 1992 resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit.
The facts which gave rise to this petition are as follows:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of
4.5 hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia,
sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner
Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the abovementioned land, consisting
of one (1) hectare, in order to augment his (petitioner's) income to meet his family's
needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject top the condition that
petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without
paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond.
In 1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from petitioner the return
of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land, claiming
that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond.
A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 4120. Petitioner set up the following defenses: (a) that the complaint
was triggered by his refusal to increase his lease rental; (b) the subject land is a
fishpond and therefore is agricultural land; and (c) that lack of formal demand to
vacate exposes the complaint to dismissal for insufficiency of cause of action. 1
Based on an ocular inspection of the subject land, the trial court found that the land in
question is a fishpond 2 and, thus, in a decision dated 30 May 1991, the said trial court
dismissed the complaint, ruling that the land is agricultural and therefore the dispute
over it is agrarian which is under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of
agrarian relations as provided in Sec. 12(a) of Republic Act No. 946 (now embodied in
the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board). 3
An appeal was filed by private respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Gapan, Nueva Ecija, docketed as Civil Case No. 889. In due course, the RTC rendered
a decision on 5 November 1991 concurring with the findings of the MTC and
affirming in toto the trial court's decision.
The RTC decision held that:
Even conceding for the sake of argument that the defendant-appellee
was allowed by the plaintiff-appellant, through her sister Aniceta
Garcia (her administratrix over the land in question) to occupy and
use the landholding in question on condition that the defendant
would vacate the same upon demand of the owner or plaintiff herein,
without paying any rental either in cash or produce, under these facts
there was a tenurial arrangement, within the meaning of Sec. 3(d) of
RA 6657, thereby placing the dispute involved in this case within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. Perhaps, it would be different if the
defendant was merely a trespasser, without any right whatsoever,
when he entered and occupied the subject landholding. The
defendant, as a matter of fact, was a legal possessor of the land in
question and therefore to determine his rights and obligations over
the said property, the DARAB is the proper forum for such issue. 4
Not satisfied with the decision of the RTC, private respondent appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals and the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26671.
On 27 February 1992, as earlier stated, the respondent Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC, ordering petitioner to vacate the parcel of land in
question and surrender possession thereof to private respondent, and to pay private
respondent the sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. 5
The respondent Court of Appeals ruled that:
The agrarian dispute over which the DAR may have jurisdiction by
virtue of its quasi-judicial power is that which involves tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture. Tenurial arrangement is concerned
with the act or manner of putting into proper order the rights of
holding a piece of agricultural land between the landowner and the
farmer or farmworker.
In the case at bar, there can be no dispute that between the parties
herein there is no tenurial arrangement, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over the land in dispute. Other than his
bare allegation in the Answer with Counterclaim, and his affidavit,
private respondent has not shown prima facie that he is a tenant of
the petitioner. The affidavits of his witnesses Antonio Samin and
Daniel Villareal attest to the fact that they acted as mediators in the
dispute between the parties herein sometime in October 1990, but no
settlement was arrived at, and that the subject land is a fishpond. To
the same effect is the affidavit of Feliciano Garcia. Absent any
prima facie proof that private respondent has a tenancy relationship
with petitioner, the established fact is that private respondent is
possessing the property in dispute by mere tolerance, and when such
possession ceased as such upon demand to vacate by the petitioner,
private respondent became a squatter in said land. We hold that the
Municipal Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija has jurisdiction over
the unlawful detainer case. 6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing decision, but, also as earlier
stated, it was denied in a resolution dated 21 May 1992 7 for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner raises the following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL COURT HAS THE
JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE AND WHETHER THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COULD LEGALLY EJECT THE PETITIONER
CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING:
1. THAT THE SUBJECT IS A FISHPOND AND UNDER THE
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE FISHPONDS ARE CLASSIFIED
AS AGRICULTURAL LANDS;
2. THAT BEING AN AGRICULTURAL LAND THE SAME IS
GOVERNED BY OUR TENANCY LAWS WHERE RULE 70 OF
THE RULES OF COURT CANNOT BE SIMPLY APPLIED; AND
3. THAT UNDER THE RULES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE
DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PERSON WORKING ON
A FISHPOND IS A TENANT OR NOT IS CLEARLY WITHIN
THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB. 8
The petition is devoid of merit. We hold for the private respondent.
It is basic whether or not a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is
determined from the allegations of the complaint. As held in Multinational Village
Homeowners' Association, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, et al.: 9
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the
allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein — a
matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the
jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made
by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the
rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon
the defendant.
In her complaint before the court a quo, private respondent stated that she is the owner
of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, which petitioner
is illegally occupying; that petitioner has taken advantage of the tolerance of her
(private respondent's) sister in allowing him to occupy the land on the condition that
he (petitioner) would vacate the land upon demand. Because of petitioner's refusal to
vacate the land, private respondent's remedy, as owner of said land, was to file an
action for unlawful detainer with the Municipal Trial Court.
In his answer to the complainant, petitioner alleged that the land involved in the
dispute is an agricultural land and hence, the case must be filed with the Court of
Agrarian Relations (not the MTC). Moreover, petitioner contended that it was his
refusal to increase his lease rental (implying tenancy) that prompted the private
respondent to sue him in court. 10
It is well settled jurisprudence that a court does not lose its jurisdiction over an
unlawful detainer case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein
the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. 11 The court
continues to have the authority to hear the evidence for the purpose precisely of
determining whether or not it has jurisdiction. And upon such hearing, if tenancy is
shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 12
The MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint primarily on the ground that the
subject land is agricultural and therefore the question at issue is agrarian. In this
connection, it is well to recall that Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of
Procedure, 13 provides that the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have
primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act
No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian
laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms
and conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under Republic Act No. 6657 and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor or lessee. 14
It is irrefutable in the case at bar that the subject land which used to be an idle,
swampy land was converted by the petitioner into a fishpond. And it is settled that a
fishpond is an agricultural land. An agricultural land refers to the land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in Republic Act No. 6657 15 and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. 16 Republic Act No. 6657
defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of
fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm
products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction
with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or judicial. 17
But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an
agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land
is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant.
The law provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land
being agricultural is only one of
them. 18 The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a
tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously mentioned,
such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided
these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important. 19
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvests between the parties.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a
cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person
establishes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is
he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing
tenancy laws (Caballes v. DAR, et al., G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988). 20
Furthermore, an agricultural lessee as defined in Sec. 116(2) of Republic Act No.
3844, is a person who, by himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another
with the latter's consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in
produce or both. An agricultural lessor, on the other hand, is a natural or judicial
person who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or
grants to another the cultivation and use of his land for a price certain. 21
Based on the statutory definitions of a tenant or a lessee, it is clear that there is no
tenancy or agricultural/leasehold relationship existing between the petitioner and the
private respondent. There was no contract or agreement entered into by the
petitioner with the private respondent nor with the overseer of the private
respondent, for petitioner to cultivate the land for a price certain or to share his
harvests. Petitioner has failed to substantiate his claim that he was paying rent for the
use of the land.
Whether or not private respondent knew of the conversion by petitioner of the idle,
swampy land into a fishpond is immaterial in this case. The fact remains that the
existence of all the requisites of a tenancy relationship was not proven by the
petitioner. And in the absence of a tenancy relationship, the complaint for unlawful
detainer is properly within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, as provided in
Sec. 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Having established that the occupancy and possession by petitioner of the land in
question is by mere tolerance, private respondent had the legal right to demand upon
petitioner to vacate the land. And as correctly ruled by the respondent appellate court:
. . . . His (petitioner's) lawful possession became illegal when the
petitioner (now private respondent) through her sister made a
demand on him to vacate and he refused to comply with such
demand. Such is the ruling in Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA
136, 144, wherein it was held:
While in possession by tolerance is lawful, such
possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate
is made by the owner and the possessor by
tolerance refuses to comply with such demand
(Prieto vs. Reyes, 14 SCRA 432; Yu vs. De Lara,
6 SCRA 786, 788; Amis vs. Aragon, L-4684,
April 28, 1957). A person who occupies the land
of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him (Yu vs.
De Lara, supra)." 22
The present case should be distinguished from the recent case of Bernas vs. The
Honorable Court of Appeals. 23 In the Bernas case, the land occupant (Bernas) had a
production-sharing agreement with the legal possessor (Benigno Bito-on) while the
records in this case fail to show that herein petitioner (Isidro) was sharing the harvest
or paying rent for his use of the land. Moreover, the agreement between the overseer
(Garcia) and herein petitioner was for petitioner to occupy and use the land by mere
tolerance of the owner. Petitioner Isidro failed to refute that Garcia allowed him to use
the land subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate it upon demand. In the
Bernas case, the petitioner (Bernas) was able to establish the existence of an
agricultural tenancy or leasehold relationship between him and the legal possessor.
The evidence in this case, on the other hand, fails to prove that petitioner Isidro, was
an agricultural tenant or lessee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
* Penned by Justice Celso L. Magsino and concurred in by Justices
Serafin E. Camilon and Artemon D. Luna.
1 Rollo, pp. 21-22.
2 Rollo, p. 21.
3 Id., p. 23.
4 Id., pp. 28-29.
5 Rollo, p. 35.
6 Id., pp. 34-35.
7 Rollo, p. 37.
8 Id., p. 6.
9 G.R. No. 98023, October 17, 1991, 203 SCRA 104.
10 Rollo, pp. 20-21.
11 Fortunato de la Cruz, et al. vs. Hon. Crispin V. Bautista, etc., et
al., G.R.
No. L-39695, June 14, 1990, 186 SCRA 517.
12 Lorenzo Ignacio and Magdalena dela Cruz vs. The Hon. Court of
First Instance of Bulacan and Felizardo Lipana, G.R. No. L-27897-
98, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 89.
13 Rules governing the adjudication, arbitration and settlement of
agrarian cases, and the conduct of proceedings before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and
its adjudicators.
14 Sec. 3 (d), Chapter I, Republic Act No. 6657.
15 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
16 Sec. 3 (c), Chapter I, Republic Act No. 6657.
17 Sec. 3 (b), Ibid.
18 Anacleto de Jesus vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R.
No. 72282,
July 24, 1989, 175 SCRA 559.
19 Lea Paz Tuason vs. The Court of Appeals, Sixth Division and
Conrado Miranda, No. L-44817, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA
484.
20 Prudential Bank vs. Hon. Filomeno Gapultos, etc. and Ramon E.
Saura, G.R.
No. 41835, January 19, 1990, 181 SCRA 159.
21 Sec. 116 (3), Republic Act. No. 3844.
22 Rollo, p. 33.
23 G.R. No. 85041, 5 August 1993.
ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, LOLITA T. SUPLICO, ENRIQUE T. SUPLICO, JR.,
and DAVID T. SUPLICO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
FEDERICO ARMADA, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
For review in the instant petition is the 29th November 1991 decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 54,
Bacolod City, in CAR Case No. 109, which has declared private respondent Federico
Armada to be a bona fide agricultural lessee, instead of a mere farm laborer, of Isabel
D. Tupas in Barangay Taloc, Bago City.
Isabel Tupas was the registered owner of a parcel of rice land, designated Lot No. 901-
B-1, with an area of 120,000 square meters (12 hectares), in Taloc, Bago City, under
TCT No. T-26014. On 24 February 1977, she leased her landholding, excluding the
33,438-square-meter portion already tenanted by one Jose Jacinto, for the amount of
P10,000.00 to petitioner Enrique P. Suplico, her brother-in-law, under a contract that
was set to expire on 31 May 1982.
Some time in 1979, Armada started tilling an area of 32,945 square meters, identified
to be Lot No. 901-B-1-D, of the farmland under an agreement with Enrique Suplico.
Armada undertook to till the land while Suplico agreed to provide the farm
implements and work animals. Suplico was to receive from Armada 62 cavans from
the palay harvest per crop yield by way of rental for the use not only of the land but
also of the work animals and a hand tractor. Private respondent resided with his family
in a farmhouse on the land.
When, years later, Suplico threatened to eject Armada from the property, Armada
initiated, on 03 May 1982, an action for damages and injunction against Suplico in the
Court of Agrarian Relations (“CAR”) in Bacolod City. The complaint averred that
Armada was the tenant-farmer of around 2.5 hectares of the property of Isabel Tupas
having been instituted as such tenant in 1979 by her administrator, herein petitioner
Enrique Suplico, to whom he religiously paid the fixed rental of 62 cavans of palay per
crop yield.
An order was issued by the CAR meanwhile restraining Suplico, his agents and
representatives, from harassing, molesting, threatening, and committing acts of
dispossession against, Armada.
In his answer with counterclaim, Suplico interposed the special defense that Armada
was not a tenant-farmer but a seasonal hired farm laborer with a fixed compensation,
and that his services could be terminated anytime before or, at the worst case, upon the
expiration of their contract in May 1982. Suplico added that Armada unlawfully
appropriated for himself the whole produce of the first yield for the crop year 1982-83.
On 14 February 1983, Isabel Tupas, represented by her attorney-in- fact Lolita T.
Suplico (sister of Isabel and the wife of Enrique P. Suplico), intervened in the case.
She alleged that she had no contractual relationship with Armada nor did she impliedly
tolerate his continued possession of the land. She prayed that Armada be ejected from
her landholding. On even date, Isabel Tupas filed a complaint for ejectment against
Armada and his wife, Leticia, in the Municipal Trial Court (“MTC”) of Bago City.
The complaint, however, was dismissed on 15 May 1985 for lack of jurisdiction,
following the certification issued by the Regional Director of the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform, Region VI, Iloilo City, that the case was not proper for trial and
hearing by the MTC on account of the existence of tenancy over the land involved.
On 28 June 1984, the complaint for damages and injunction was referred by the trial
court to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (“MAR”) for a summary determination of
the relationship of the parties, as well as for a certification on whether or not the case
was proper for trial, in accordance with Memorandum Circular No. 29 of the MAR,
implementing P.D. No. 316 in conjunction with P.D. No. 27. The trial of the case
resumed after the MAR Director for Region 6, Iloilo City, had certified that the case
was proper for trial and hearing.
On 28 March 1987, Isabel Tupas donated the whole property to her sister, Lolita T.
Suplico, and her nephews, Enrique Suplico, Jr., and David Suplico. On 17 May 1988,
she moved to be dropped as intervenor and asked that her donees of the property be
instead named as substitutes.
Finally, on 18 January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision declaring private
respondent a bona fide agricultural lessee. The dispositive portion of the decision
stated:
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
“1. Declaring plaintiff FEDERICO ARMADA a bona fide agricultural lessee of the
landholding in question with an area of two and a half (2 1/2) hectares more or less
belonging to the intervenors;
“2. Permanently enjoining the defendant/intervenors from ejecting or removing
plaintiff from his landholding aforementioned situated in sitio Langka, Brgy. Taloc,
Bago City;
“3. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant/intervenors two hundred fifty-four
(254) cavans of palay as back rentals or their money equivalent, less whatever amount
may have been paid or deposited with the court after this date; and
“4. Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims for damages for lack of and/or
insufficiency of evidence.
“So Ordered.”
The contending parties all appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 29 November 1991, affirmed the decision of the court a quo
and considered Armada to be a share tenant.
The instant petition, in main, raises the sole issue of whether or not private respondent
Armada should be held a tenant farmer entitled to security of tenure or a mere hired
farm laborer.
The Court sees no reason to disturb the findings of both courts below. The facts found
by the appellate court, sustaining the court a quo, readily converge towards one
conclusion, and it is that tenancy did exist between the parties.
Firstly, private respondent was in actual possession of the land, and he there resided,
with his family, in a farmhouse just like what a farm tenant normally would. Secondly,
private respondent and his wife were personally doing the farm work of plowing,
planting, weeding and harvesting the area. The occasional and temporary hiring of
persons outside of the immediate household, so long as the tenant himself had control
in the farmwork, was not essentially opposed to the status of tenancy. Thirdly, the
management of the farm was left entirely to private respondent who defrayed the
cultivation expenses. Fourthly, private respondent shared the harvest of the land,
depositing or delivering to petitioner Enrique Suplico the agreed 62 cavans of palay
per crop yield. Jesus Mesias, the licensed ricemiller of Taloc, attested to Suplico's
having received from private respondent the cash value of the rental payments from
“the first crop of 1979 and each crop thereafter up to the first crop of 1983, inclusive.”
The rental payments made thereafter were received by petitioner Lolita Suplico, court
appointed police officers, or the barangay captain.
Parenthetically, during the pendency of this appeal, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
has issued an emancipation patent denominated Transfer Certificate of Title No. EP-
2064 in the name of private respondent over 26,622 square meters of Lot No. 901-B-1-
C-2-B, Bsd-06-002040, of the operation land transfer. In a pleading, dated 01
December 1994, petitioners point to anomalies supposedly attending the issuance of
TCT No. EP-2064. Regrettably, these allegations are matters that should first be
ventilated and tried, not here, but in the proper forum.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., took no part.
Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia and concurred in by Associate Justices
Manuel C. Herrera and Alfredo L. Benipayo.
Presided by Judge Jesus V. Ramos.
Rollo, p. 179.
Exh. 16, Records, p. 661.
Exh. 15-A; Records, p. 660.
TSN, April 22, 1988, p. 26.
Records, p. 1.
Ibid., p. 14.
Ibid., pp. 19-22.
Ibid., pp. 103-107.
Ibid., pp. 226-227.
Exh. S, Records, p. 692.
The Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch LI, Bacolod City, took over
this case from the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations of Bacolod City (Record, p.
168) in accordance with Sec. 1 of Executive Order No. 864 dated January 17, 1983
automatically abolishing Courts of Agrarian Relations in implementation of Sec. 44 of
the Reorganization Act of 1980. Later, on motion of private respondent who was
residing in Bago City, the case was transferred to Branch LIV of the RTC, Bacolod
City. (Records, p. 188.)
P.D. No. 316 prohibited the ejectment of tenant-tillers from their farmholdings
pending the promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
Upon the effectivity of P.D. No. 27, all tenant-farmers of private agricultural lands
primarily devoted to rice and corn production were deemed owners of the land they
were tilling. However, no rules and regulations implementing said decree were
promulgated until the issuance of Executive Order No. 228 and the enactment of
Republic Act No. 6657. The effect was that during said period, the relations between
tenants and landowners were on hold. Thus, agricultural leasehold relationships with
respect to rice and corn lands of less than seven (7) hectares which were not covered
by the operation land transfer were maintained (Barte, LAW ON AGRARIAN
REFORM WITH COMMENTARIES, 1991 ed., p. 63).
REYNALDO BEJASA AND ERLINDA BEJASA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Special Sixteenth Division, ISABEL
CANDELARIA and JAMIE DINGLASAN, respondents.
This is a petition assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro and ordering petitioners
Reynaldo and Erlinda Bejasa (hereinafter referred to as "the Bejasas") to surrender the
possession of the disputed landholdings to respondent Isabel Candelaria ("hereinafter
referred to as Candelaria") and to pay her annual rental from 1986, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and costs.
Inescapably, the appeal involves the determination of a factual issue. Whether a person
is a tenant is a factual question. The factual conclusions of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals are contradictory and we are constrained to review the same.
We state the undisputed incidents.
This case involves two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-58191 and TCT No.
T-59172, measuring 16 hectares and 6 hectares more or less, situated in Barangay Del
Pilar, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. The parcels of land are indisputably owned by Isabel
Candelaria.
On October 20, 1974, Candelaria entered into a three-year lease agreement over the
land with Pio Malabanan (hereinafter referred to as "Malabanan"). In the contract,
Malabanan agreed among other things: "to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to
purchase or procure calamansi, citrus and rambutan seeds or seedlings, to attend and
care for whatever plants are thereon existing, to make the necessary harvest of fruits,
etc."
Sometime in 1973, Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear it.
The Bejasas claim that they planted citrus, calamansi, rambutan and banana trees on
the land and shouldered all expenses of production.
On May 3, 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the land,
modifying their first agreement. As per the agreement, Malabanan was under no
obligation to share the harvests with Candelaria.
Sometime in 1983, Malabanan died.
On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan
(hereinafter referred to as "Jaime) as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of
administration over the disputed land.
On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with
Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime’s wife (hereinafter referred to as "Victoria"). The contract
had a term of one year.
On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in
consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term of
one year. The agreement is below quoted:
"Ako si Victoria Dinglasan bilang tagapamahala ni Isabel
Candelaria ay ipinaaryendo kay Reynaldo Bejasa ang lupang dating
aryendo ni Pio Malabanan sa nasabing Ginang Buhat sa ika-30 ng
Disyembre 1984 hanggang Ika-30 ng Disyembre 1985. Ako ay
tumanggap sa kanya ng pitong libong piso at ito ay daragdagan pa
niya ng walong libong piso (P8,000) dito sa katapusan ng buwan ng
Disyembre 1984.
(signed) (signed)
Reynaldo Bejasa Victoria Dinglasan
"Witness
"(unintelligible)
"(unintelligible)"
During the first week of December 1984, the Bejasas paid Victoria P7,000.00 as
agreed. The balance of P8,000.00 was not fully paid. Only the amount of P4,000.00
was paid on January 11, 1985.
After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victoria’s demand to vacate the land, the
Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use, be
it in the form of rent or a shared harvest.
On April 7, 1987, Candelaria and the Dinglasans again entered into a three-year lease
agreement over the land. The special power of attorney in favor of Jaime was also
renewed by Candelaria on the same date.
On April 30, 1987, Jaime filed a complaint before the Commission on the Settlement
of Land Problems ("COSLAP"), Calapan, Oriental Mindoro seeking ejectment of the
Bejasas.
On May 26, 1987, COSLAP dismissed the complaint.
Sometime in June 1987, Jaime filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court,
Calapan Oriental, Mindoro against the Bejasas for "Recovery of possession with
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages." The case was referred to the
Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR").
On December 28, 1987, the DAR certified that the case was not proper for trial before
the civil courts.
The trial court dismissed Jaime’s complaint, including the Bejasas’ counterclaim for
leasehold, home lot and damages.
On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro a complaint for "confirmation of leasehold and home lot with
recovery of damages." against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan.
On February 20, 1991, after trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the Bejasas. First,
they reasoned that a tenancy relationship was established. This relationship can be
created by and between a "person who furnishes the landholding as owner, civil law
lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor and the person who personally cultivates the
same." Second, as bona-fide tenant-tillers, the Bejasas have security of tenure. The
lower court ruled:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:
"(1) Ordering the defendants to maintain plaintiffs in the peaceful
possession and cultivation of the lands in question and to respect
plaintiff’s security of tenure on the landholdings of Isabel Candelaria
and the home lot presently occupied by them;
"(2) Confirming the leasehold tenancy system between the plaintiffs
as the lawful tenant-tillers and the landholder, Isabel Candelaria,
with the same lease rental of P20,000.00 per calendar year for the
use of the lands in question and thereafter, same landholdings be
placed under the operation land transfer pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6657;
"(3) Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiffs the amount of P115,500.00 representing the sale of
calamansi which were unlawfully gathered by Jaime Dinglasan and
his men for the period July to December, 1987 and which were
supported by receipts and duly proven, with formal written
accounting, plus the sum of P346,500.00 representing the would-be
harvests on citrus, calamansi, rambutan and bananas for the years
1988, 1989 and 1990, with legal rate of interest thereon from the
date of the filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
"(4) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally
the amount of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fee and expenses of
litigation; and
"(5) Authorizing the plaintiffs as tenant-farmers to litigate as pauper
not only in this Court but up to the appellate courts in accordance
with Section 16 of P. D. No. 946.
"SO ORDERED."
On February 20, 1991, respondents filed their notice of appeal.
On February 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the trial
court’s ruling. Reasoning: First, not all requisites necessary for a leasehold tenancy
relationship were met. There was no consent given by the landowner. The consent of
former civil law lessee, Malabanan, was not enough to create a tenancy relationship.
Second, when Malabanan engaged the services of the Bejasas, he only constituted
them as mere overseers and did not make them "permanent tenants". Verily, even
Malabanan knew that his contract with Candelaria prohibited sublease. Third, the
contract ("aryenduhan") between the Bejasas and Victoria, by its very terms, expired
after one year. The contract did not provide for sharing of harvests, means of
production, personal cultivation and the like. Fourth, sharing of harvest was not
proven. The testimony of Reynaldo Bejasa on this point is self-serving. Fifth, the
element of personal cultivation was not proven. Reynaldo Bejasa himself admitted that
he hired laborers to clear and cultivate the land. The Court of Appeals disposed of the
case, thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The interlocutory order
issued on September 5, 1988 is DISSOLVED and the appellees are
hereby ordered to surrender possession of the disputed landholdings
to appellant Isabel Candelaria and pay her the amount of P15,000.00
in annual rents commencing from 1986 plus attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses of P35,000.00 and costs.
"SO ORDERED."
Hence, this appeal filed on March 3, 1993.
The issue raised is whether there is a tenancy relationship in favor of the Bejasas.
The elements of a tenancy relationship are:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests.
After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that there is no
tenancy relationship between the parties.
Malabanan and the Bejasas. True, Malabanan (as Candelaria’s usufructuary) allowed
the Bejasas to stay on and cultivate the land.
However, even if we assume that he had the authority to give consent to the creation of
a tenancy relation, still, no such relation existed.
There was no proof that they shared the harvests.
Reynaldo Bejasa testified that as consideration for the possession of the land, he
agreed to deliver the landowner’s share (1/5 of the harvest) to Malabanan. Only
Reynaldo Bejasa’s word was presented to prove this. Even this is cast into suspicion.
At one time Reynaldo categorically stated that 25% of the harvest went to him, that
25% was for Malabanan and 50% went to the landowner, Candelaria. Later on he
stated that the landowner’s share was merely one fifth.
In Chico v. Court of Appeals, we faulted private respondents for failing to prove
sharing of harvests since "no receipt, or any other evidence was presented." We added
that "Self serving statements ... are inadequate; proof must be adduced."
Candelaria and the Bejasas. Between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria
as landowner never gave her consent.
The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria. They
acknowledge that Candelaria could argue that she did not know of Malabanan’s
arrangement with them. True enough Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the
Bejasas during Malabanan’s lease possessed the land. However, the Bejasas claim that
this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to the Bejasas for
P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in 1983. We do not agree. In a tenancy
agreement, consideration should be in the form of harvest sharing. Even assuming that
Candelaria agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year, such agreement
did not create a tenancy relationship, but a mere civil law lease.
Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as
civil law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that
they did.
Again, there was no agreement as to harvest sharing. The only agreement between
them is the "aryenduhan", which states in no uncertain terms the monetary
consideration to be paid, and the term of the contract.
Not all the elements of tenancy being met, we deny the petition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals of February 9,
1993, in toto.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
RODRIGO ALMUETE and ANA ALMUETE, petitioners, vs. MARCELO
ANDRES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of agricultural land identified as Lot 8449
Pls-967, located at San Vicente, Angadanan, Isabela, measuring approximately 72,587
square meters. Way back on March 25, 1957, this parcel was awarded by the then
National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) to petitioner
Rodrigo Almuete. Since then, Rodrigo Almuete exercised exclusive possession of the
property, cultivating it and planting thereon narra, fruit trees, rice, corn and legumes.
For some twenty-two (22) years, Rodrigo Almuete and his family farmed the subject
property peacefully and exclusively.
However, unknown to Rodrigo Almuete, on August 17, 1979, an Agrarian Reform
Technologist by the name of Leticia Gragasin filed a field investigation and inspection
report stating, among others, that the whereabouts of the original awardee of the
subject property, Rodrigo Almuete, was unknown and that he had “waived all his
rights as a NARRA settler due to his poor health beyond his control and financial
hardship.” Gragasin also stated therein that “the actual occupant of the land is
Marcelo Andres since April 1967 to date.” She recommended to the Director of the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Tuguegarao, Cagayan that the award in favor
of Rodrigo Almuete be cancelled and that the land be awarded to respondent Marcelo
Andres. Consequently, Marcelo Andres was allowed to file his homestead
application. To further support his application, Marcelo Andres represented to the
MAR (now DAR) officials that sometime in 1965, Rodrigo Almuete sold the subject
property to one Victor Masiglat, who gave the former a radiophono set as
consideration therefor. Since Victor Masiglat was disqualified from acquiring the
subject property owing to his also being a NARRA awardee, he transferred the said
property to Marcelo Andres in exchange for one (1) carabao and the sum of Six
Hundred Pesos (P600.00). These successive transfers were not covered by written
contracts between the parties.
On the strength of the MAR Regional Director’s recommendation and Marcelo
Andres’ representations, the latter was granted and issued a homestead patent.
In the meantime, unaware that the NARRA award in his favor had been cancelled and
that a homestead patent had been issued to Marcelo Andres, Rodrigo Almuete and his
family, particularly his daughter Ana Almuete, continued to cultivate and farm the
subject property. In 1982, Rodrigo Almuete built a house in Barangay Fortune, Alicia,
Isabela, where he resided while working as a driver for a rice mill. From time to time,
he would visit the farm to deliver supplies and pay wages to the laborers who worked
therein.
In 1988, the DAR Regional Director recommended the transfer of ownership over the
subject property to Marcelo Andres. On July 7, 1988, the DAR issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-52521 in the name of Marcelo Andres, which
certificate was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Isabela on January 26, 1989.
Shortly thereafter, Marcelo Andres, accompanied by ten (10) other persons armed with
bolos and other bladed implements, entered the subject property, claiming exclusive
right of ownership and possession. They felled the narra trees, converting the same to
lumber, and destroyed the mongos planted by the Almuetes. Marcelo Andres gained
control, and took possession, of approximately half of the subject property.
Rodrigo Almuete wasted no time in complaining to the DAR authorities of Marcelo
Andres’ encroachment into and occupation of the subject property. It was only then
that he learned that the subject property had been titled in the name of Marcelo Andres
and that the award in his favor had been cancelled because he had allegedly abandoned
the subject property. Upon Rodrigo Almuete’s inquiry, the records of the local office
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) showed that he was
still the listed owner of the subject property.
Consequently, Rodrigo Almuete and his daughter, Ana Almuete, filed an action for
reconveyance and recovery of possession against Marcelo Andres with the Regional
Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, docketed as Civil Case No. Br-20-530.
On November 26, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant Marcelo Andres:
(1) declaring plaintiff Rodrigo Almuete owner of the land in question, now covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-52521 in the name of the defendant Marcelo
Andres;
(2) ordering the defendant Marcelo Andres and/or his representatives to vacate the
land in question and deliver the peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
(3) ordering the defendant Marcelo Andres to reconvey at his expense, the title, OCT
No. P-52521, to the plaintiff Rodrigo Almuete; and
(4) ordering the defendant Marcelo Andres to pay to the plaintiffs P13,000.00 by way
of attorney’s fees.
Costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court found that Marcelo Andres did not acquire any right over the subject
property when he supposedly bought it from Victor Masiglat because the latter never
acquired ownership from the original owner, Rodrigo Almuete. Besides, defendant
Marcelo Andres could not present any valid document to prove his acquisition of the
said property. It also found that Rodrigo Almuete did not abandon the subject
property. Rather, Leticia Gragasin of the MAR made obviously false assertions in her
report, knowingly misleading the Regional Director into cancelling the name of
Rodrigo Almuete as an awardee and issuing the homestead patent in the name of
Marcelo Andres. Hence, the cancellation of Rodrigo Almuete’s award and the
issuance of the homestead patent in favor of Marcelo Andres were perpetrated
through fraud.
Marcelo Andres failed to appeal; thus, the trial court’s decision became final and
executory. On February 15, 1994, a writ of execution was issued. Marcelo Andres
filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, but the trial court did not act on it on the
ground that it had no more jurisdiction over the case.
Marcelo Andres filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, stating at
the outset that his counsel had failed to file a timely motion for reconsideration of the
decision or an appeal due to “sheer ignorance of the law.” In his petition, Andres
assailed the trial court’s jurisdiction over the nature as well as the subject matter of the
case. He argued that since the subject property was agricultural land covered by a
homestead patent, exclusive jurisdiction was with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (or DARAB), not with the regular courts. Respondent Andres
also stressed that the original action was for ejectment, which was cognizable by the
municipal trial courts, not by the Regional Trial Courts. Consequently, for want of
jurisdiction, the trial court’s decision was null and void; and cannot be enforced by
writ of execution or any other legal means.
On August 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered the impugned Decision, disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious, the writ of certiorari prayed for is
GRANTED. Judgment is rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No. Br. 20-530 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cauayan, Isabela and declaring the decision rendered
therein, the order granting the motion for execution and the writ of execution issued
NULL and VOID. In the event the writ of execution has been carried out, respondent
Court is ordered to restore petitioner in possession of the land, to cancel whatever new
title may have been issued to private respondents, to reinstate petitioner’s OCT P-
52521, and the restitution of whatever sums collected from petitioner as expenses of
reconveyance or attorney’s fees. Respondent Court is ordered to restore the status quo
before the complaint, the decision and the writ of execution.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the decision. On October 6, 1995, the
Court of Appeals issued the assailed Resolution, denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition for review, ascribing to the Court of Appeals grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when:
I. it gave due course to the Petition for Certiorari of the respondent Marcelo Andres,
dated June 10, 1994, questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Cauayan, Isabela, dated November 26, 1993, clearly seven (7) months after the
decision of the Regional Trial Court;
II. it did not consider and give weight to the contention of petitioners that this case is
not as “Agrarian Dispute,” hence, it does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, but to the Regional Trial
Court;
III. it did not consider and give weight to the fact that private respondent
Marcelo Andres entered into the land allocated to the petitioners by the National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), by the use of guns and
boloes;
IV. in not awarding, recognizing and honoring the vested interest of the
petitioners on that parcel of land identified as Lot 8449, Pls-967-D (identical with Lot
196, Pls-81 of the NARRA) with an area of 72,587 square meters, awarded to them by
the government thru the NARRA.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The action filed by petitioners before the trial court was for recovery of possession
and reconveyance of title. The issue to be resolved was who between petitioner
Rodrigo Almuete and respondent Marcelo Andres has a better right to the subject
property considering that both of them are awardees of the same property. It was thus
a controversy relating to ownership of the farmland, which is beyond the ambit of the
phrase “agrarian dispute.” No juridical tie of landowner and tenant was alleged
between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would so characterize the
relationship as an agrarian dispute. In fact, petitioner and respondent were contending
parties for the ownership of the same parcel of land.
Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. --- The Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
“Agrarian dispute” is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, as:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act
and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant,
or lessor and lessee.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases
involving a tenancy relationship between the parties. The following elements are
indispensable to establish a tenancy relationship (six elements)
(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, gravely erred when it granted the petition for
certiorari and held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action between petitioners and respondent. The action filed by petitioners was
cognizable by the regular courts. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan, Isabela was competent to try and decide Civil Case No. 20-530. Its decision
was, thus, valid and can no longer be disturbed, after having attained finality. Nothing
more can be done with the decision except to enforce it.
Respondent’s contention that the action below was an ejectment suit is untenable.
Basic is the rule that in actions for ejectment, the only issue is possession. This is not
true as regards the case below, which principally involved the question of ownership,
or more accurately, the validity of the homestead patent awarded to petitioner vis-à-vis
that awarded to respondent.
It is true that the caption of the Amended Complaint includes ejectment in the
description of the nature of the suit. However, it is not the caption of the pleading but
the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action. A close perusal of the
Amended Complaint filed before the court a quo indubitably shows that petitioners, as
plaintiffs therein, prayed for the cancellation of the certificate of title in the name of
Marcelo Andres, and that they be declared the absolute owners of the land in dispute.
On a final procedural note, the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the
special civil action for certiorari. A basic requisite for such action to lie is that there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Certiorari is a remedy of last recourse and is a limited form of review. Its principal
function is to keep inferior tribunals within their jurisdiction. Certiorari cannot be
used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Respondent lost that remedy by his
failure to appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 34314 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO
RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO SALAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M.
REYES and FE M. REYES, respondents.
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for petitioners.
Leonardo N. Zulueta for Enrique Reyes, et al. Adolfo S. Azcuna for private
respondents.
Before us is a petition seeking the reversal of the decision rendered by the respondent
Court of Appeals**on March 3, 1987 affirming the judgment of the court a quo dated
April 29, 1986, the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reading as follows;
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by this Court on November 5,
1982 is hereby reconsidered and a new judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that Presidential Decree No. 27 is inapplicable to lands
obtained thru the homestead law,
2. Declaring that the four registered co-owners will cultivate and
operate the farmholding themselves as owners thereof; and
3. Ejecting from the land the so-called tenants, namely; Gabino
Alita, Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, Vicente
Ricalde and Rolando Salamar, as the owners would want to cultivate
the farmholding themselves.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (p. 31, Rollo)
The facts are undisputed. The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of
land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead
patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated at
Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur.
Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but
petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and
appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR for
short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).
On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against
Hon. Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as
Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for the
declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General
Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.
Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses of July 8, 1981.
Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the
defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and
from being issued land transfer certificates to which the defendants filed their
opposition dated August 4, 1982.
On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District,
Branch IV, Pagadian City (now Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch
XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to enjoin
the defendants was denied.
On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which
defendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.
Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision
prompting defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same was denied in its
Order dated June 6, 1986.
On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment
rendered on March 3, 1987, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error thereof, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (p. 34, Rollo)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
The pivotal issue is whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are
covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.
The question certainly calls for a negative answer.
We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of
tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land
they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to
the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be
invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection
of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he
may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is
necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other
needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things
necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself.
They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become
human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the
people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of
this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45)
In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the
homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform
statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
provides:
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the
disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands
of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture,
subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the
rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting
the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the
property in question, reading,
Section 6. Retention Limits. ...
... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of
the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead.'
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
LEONARDA L. MONSANTO, petitioner,
vs.
JESUS AND TERESITA ZERNA AND COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The filing of a criminal action carries with it the civil liability arising from the offense.
However, the trial court cannot adjudge civil matters that are beyond its competence
and powers. Thus, while a court may have authority to pass upon the criminal liability
of the accused, it cannot make any civil awards that relate to the agrarian relationship
of the parties because this matter is beyond its jurisdiction.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
January 12, 2000 Decision1 and the March 16, 2000 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55440. The decretal portion of the challenged
Decision reads as follows:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, for lack of jurisdiction, the assailed
order of September 4, 1996 is hereby RECALLED, SET ASIDE and
DECLARED NULL and VOID. The parties, if they so desire, should refer
their dispute before the agrarian authorities. No pronouncement as to costs."4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
Spouses Jesus and Teresita Zerna (herein private respondents) were charged with
qualified theft in Criminal Case No. 5896, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Lanao del Norte, Branch 6. This case was later re-raffled and transferred to Branch
4 of the same judicial region. The Information against private respondents was
amended on June 8, 1995. It is reproduced hereunder:
"That on or about February 25, 1995, up to the following month of March,
1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, being then the overseers of some banana plants
on the land owned by one Leonarda Monsanto and principally devoted to
coconut trees, and having access to said land as such, with grave abuse of
confidence reposed [i]n them by the said owner, with intent to gain, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, harvest and carry
away coconuts from the premises of the said plantation, which the said
accused then processed into copra with a total value of P6,162.50, belonging
to said Leonarda Monsanto, without her consent and against her will, to the
damage and prejudice of said Leonarda Monsanto in the aforesaid sum of
P6,162.50, Philippine Currency."5
After trial on the merits, the RTC acquitted them of the charge on July 24, 1996. It
held as follows:
"x x x [T]he harvest in the land by the [accused] was done, not for the
purpose of stealing the coconuts or the copra, but more to confirm their claim
that they are tenants of the land. In fact the lack of intent to gain is shown by
the fact that they immediately deposited the proceeds with the barangay
captain and did not even claim a share [in] the proceeds of the copra.
xxx xxx xxx
"In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the [accused] are not tenants of
the land and the cash deposit [from] the proceeds of the copra with the
barangay captain belongs to the private complainant, Leonarda Monsanto.
However, considering the lack of intent of the [accused] to gain, no criminal
liability for theft has been committed by them."6
It then disposed of the case in the following manner:
"WHEREFORE, the criminal case for qualified theft against the [accused]
Jesus Zerna and Teresita Zerna is hereby ordered dismissed and their bail
bond cancelled. The barangay captain of Buru-un, Iligan City is hereby
ordered to deliver the amount of P5,162.50, representing the proceeds [from
the] copra sold by the [accused] to the private complainant, Leonarda
Monsanto."7
The total proceeds of the copra sale alleged in the Information was P6,262.50.
However, the awarded amount was only P5,162.50 which was deposited by private
respondents with the barangay secretary of Buru-un8 on March 2, 1995, after
deducting P340 (harvesting cost) and P760 (labor cost). Thus, petitioner filed a timely
Motion for Reconsideration praying that the remaining sum of P1,100 be returned to
her.9
In its September 4, 1996 Order, the trial court granted the Motion and ordered private
respondents to return the amount of P1,100.10 It ruled thus:
"In his motion for reconsideration, the private prosecutor prays that with
respect to the civil aspect of the case, the accused be made to return the
amount of P1,100.00 which they appropriated for themselves from the gross
proceeds of the stolen property.
"Opposing the said motion, counsel for the accused avers that the amount
P1,100.00 was due to the accused as compensation for their labor and equity
demands that they [be] entitled to it.
"The Court has already adjudged that the accused are not guilty of theft and
therefore, they cannot be considered to have stolen the coconuts. But the
motion has raised another issue.
"Are the accused entitled to the amount of P1,100.00 as compensation for
labor in harvesting the coconuts and processing these into copra?
"The accused plead equity in their favor since [there] appears to be no law
applicable to the incident in question. However, for equity to apply, good
faith must exist.
"From the findings of this Court, the harvesting of the coconuts and
processing of the same into copra were not with the consent of the private
complainant. In fact, if the proper criminal charge were made, which could be
unjust vexation, the accused could have been convicted as their acts certainly
vexed the private complainant by their harvesting the coconuts and selling the
copra. Therefore, without good faith, since the Court found that they did the
acts complained of in an attempt to confirm their tenancy claim, equity was
wanting.
"The accused could not be entitled to compensation for their labor done
without the consent of the private complainant since, obviously, there was no
contract of labor between them for the harvesting of the coconuts and
processing of these into copra.
"Even our laws on quasi-contracts do not allow compensation [for] the
accused.
"Without equity or any law in their favor, the accused are therefore not
entitled to compensation for their vexatious acts."11
After a review of the records and the pleadings of the parties, the CA, on appeal, ruled
that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order private respondents to pay petitioner the
amount of P1,100. Because the dispute involved an agricultural tenancy relationship,
the matter fell within the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). It added that inasmuch as the RTC
had no jurisdiction to rule on the civil aspect of the case ergo, it had no appellate
authority over the matter under a writ of error.
The appellate court thus "recalled, set aside and declared null and void" the September
6, 1996 RTC Order requiring the return of the P1,100 to petitioner.
Hence, this Petition.12
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Court's
consideration:
I
"Is the Regional Trial Court automatically divested of jurisdiction over a
criminal case where an agrarian issue is argued as a defense, no matter how
flimsy?
II
"Does the Court of Appeals have any competence to review an RTC Decision
which ha[s] become FINAL as not appealed from, on the basis of a Notice of
Appeal which was SPECIFICALLY and simply directed against an
adscititious ORDER issued subsequent to that Decision?"13
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue:
DARAB Jurisdiction
Petitioner claims that the RTC was divested of its criminal jurisdiction when the CA
annulled and set aside the September 4, 1996 Order. We disagree.
A careful review of the CA Decision shows that it merely set aside the September 4,
1996 RTC Order directing private respondents to pay P1,100 to petitioner. It did not
annul the July 24, 1996 RTC Decision acquitting private respondents of qualified theft.
Being an acquittal, the judgment became "final immediately after promulgation and
cannot be recalled for correction or amendment."14
The trial court considered the return of the P1,100 as part of the civil aspect of the
criminal case. As petitioner did not consent to the harvesting of the coconuts and the
processing of the same into copra, then there was no basis to award the amount to
private respondents. In the words of the trial court, "[w]ithout equity or any law in
their favor, the accused are therefore not entitled to compensation for their vexatious
acts."15
But what is the RTC's basis for ordering the return of P1,100 after it had already
acquitted private respondents of qualified theft? Does the amount constitute civil
liability? Let us clarify. Civil liability is the liability that may arise from (1) crime, (2)
breach of contract or (3) tortious act. The first is governed by the Revised Penal Code;
the second and the third, by the Civil Code.16
In the case at bar, there is no question that the RTC had criminal jurisdiction to try
private respondents for the crime of qualified theft. In the normal course, it had
authority to determine whether they had committed the crime charged and to adjudge
the corresponding penalty and civil liability arising therefrom.
On September 4, 1996, the RTC issued an Order requiring private respondents to
return the P1,100 to petitioner on the ground that petitioner had not consented to the
harvesting of the coconuts or to their conversion into copra. Such order appears
inconsistent with the trial court's finding that private respondents had not committed
the crime of qualified theft. In People v. Pantig,17 the Court held that where there is no
crime committed, there can be no civil liability that can arise from the criminal action
or as a consequence thereof, as follows:
"Where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that
arising from and as [a] consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant
was acquitted in the criminal case, no civil liability arising from the criminal
charge could be imposed upon him. The liability of the defendant for the
return of the amount so received by him may not be enforced in the criminal
case but in a civil action for the recovery of the said amount."
The foregoing ruling has been modified by the current Rules. Thus, paragraph 2 of
Section 2, Rule 120 of the present Rules of Court provides that "[i]n case the judgment
is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist."
In the present set of facts, however, the RTC did not have jurisdiction to make a
finding on the civil liability of the accused who were acquitted.
Specifically, we believe that the resolution of the issue of who is entitled to the P1,100
falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. EO 22918 vested the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters, as well as to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Department of Agriculture (DA).
Section 13 of EO 129-A,19 on the other hand, created the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), which was specifically tasked with the power
and the function to decide agrarian reform cases. The DARAB, under Section 1,
paragraph (a), Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure, exercises primary
jurisdiction -- both original and appellate -- to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation
of agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. The provision reads as
follows:
"SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657,
Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No 3844 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such
jurisdiction shall extend over but not [be] limited to the following:
'a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in
the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other
agrarian laws.'"
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements --
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise -- over lands devoted to
agriculture, including (1) disputes concerning farm workers' associations; or (2)
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangement.20
In Estates Development Corporation v. CA,21 the essential elements of a tenancy
relationship were listed in this wise:
"For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy
relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold
over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements
to wit: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee 2)
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land 3) there is consent
between the parties to the relationship 4) that the purpose of the relationship
is to bring about agricultural production 5) there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee and 6) the harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee."
Petitioner claims that private respondents were not her tenants, and that they raised the
defense of tenancy in the criminal case merely to escape prosecution for qualified
theft. On the other hand, private respondents assert that they were petitioner's tenants,
as shown by the evidence adduced by the parties before the RTC.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we hold that an agrarian dispute
existed between the parties. First, the subject of the dispute between them was the
taking of coconuts from the property owned by petitioner. Second, private respondents
were the overseers of the property at the time of the taking of the coconuts, as can be
gleaned from the Kasabutan (or Agreement) executed between them on November 25,
1991, which reads thus:
"I, MRS. LEONARDA L. MONSANTO, am the owner of that land located at
Tonggo, Mimbalot, Buru-un, Iligan City. This JESUS [Z]ERNA, whose wife
is TERESITA ZERNA, had requested that he be allowed to oversee Mrs.
Monsanto's Banana plants under the agreement that he (Jesus Zerna) would
be paid for his labor for each banana plant cut in Tonggo."
"When I (Jesus Zerna) no longer want to oversee or wish to stop overseeing,
Mrs. Leonarda Monsanto cannot force me to continue in the same way that I
cannot force Mrs. Monsanto to hire me if my services are no longer
needed."22
Third, petitioner allowed private respondents to plant coconut, coffee, jackfruit and
cacao as shown by the said Agreement, pertinent portions of which are reproduced
hereunder:
"And if I (Jesus Zerna) can plant coconut trees [o]n that land, I will be paid
for them according to their ages. I (Jesus Zerna) am also allowed to plant
coffee, jackfruit and cacao, under the same agreement."23
Finally, a tenurial arrangement exists among herein parties as regards the harvesting of
the agricultural products, as shown by the several remittances made by private
respondents to petitioner. These are substantiated by receipts.24
A tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or
impliedly.25 In the present case, undisputed by petitioner is the existence of the
Kasabutan, which contradicts her contention that private respondents were mere
overseers. In any event, their "being overseers does not foreclose their being also
tenants," as held in Rupa v. Court of Appeals.26 Evidently, the resolution of the
agrarian dispute between the parties is a matter beyond the legal competence of regular
courts.
To repeat, petitioner is claiming the questioned amount of P1,100 as the balance of the
proceeds from the copra sale, which the RTC awarded her. Private respondents
contend that this P1,100 is their compensation, pursuant to their tenurial arrangement
with her. Since this amount is inextricably intertwined with the resolution of the
agrarian dispute between them, we believe that the Court of Appeals did not commit
any reversible error in holding that it was DARAB that had jurisdiction to pass upon
this civil matter.
Second Issue:
Lack of Jurisdiction Not Waived
Petitioner argues that jurisdiction was not raised as an issue in the appeal ergo, the CA
should not have ruled on it.
We disagree. As a general rule, an appeal is limited to a review of the specific legal
issues raised in the petition by the parties. However, even if not raised, an error in
jurisdiction may be taken up.27 Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings -- even on appeal.28 In Del Rosario v. Mendoza,29
we have ruled as follows:
"Indeed there are exceptions to the aforecited rule that no question may be
raised for the first time on appeal. Though not raised below, the issue of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be considered by the reviewing
court, as it may be raised at any stage."
The reason is that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law, not by the
courts or the parties themselves. "Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be
done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that
rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character. x x
x."30
In the present case, the RTC had jurisdiction to decide the criminal case against private
respondents; however, it acted beyond its jurisdiction when it effectively ruled on the
agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties. Private respondents had raised
before it the issue of tenancy by way of defense, and apparently interwoven with the
agrarian dispute, were the acts complained of by petitioner: the harvesting of the
coconuts, their conversion into copra and, later, the sale thereof. Thus, the RTC should
have confined itself to the determination of whether private respondents were guilty of
qualified theft, instead of automatically awarding the proceeds of the copra sale to
petitioner. Such matter, being an offshoot of the agrarian dispute between the parties,
is cognizable exclusively by the DARAB.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
FLORENCIA PARIS, petitioner,
vs.
DIONISIO A. ALFECHE, JUAN L. ALFECHE, MAXIMO N. PADILLA,
DIONISIO Q. MATILOS, Heirs of GREG A. ALFECHE, DIONISIO W.
MATILO, SIMPLICIO L. ADAYA, TEOFILO M. DE GUZMAN, FRANCISCO
B. DINGLE and MARIFE NAVARO, respondents.
Homesteads are not exempt from the operation of the Land Reform Law. The right to
retain seven hectares of land is subject to the condition that the landowner is actually
cultivating that area or will cultivate it upon the effectivity of the said law.
The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the June 4, 1999 Decision of the Court of
Appeals1 (CA), in CA-GR SP No. 45738, which affirmed the ruling of the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The decretal portion of the CA
Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, [there being] no grave abuse of discretion . . . committed by
DARAB, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner."2
The Decision of the DARAB, which was affirmed by the CA, had disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated March 19,
1992 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered:
1. Declaring the private respondents to be full owners of the land
they till pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order
No. 228;
2. Declaring the validity of the Emancipation Patents issued to
private respondents; and
3. Dismissing the case."3
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
"Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Paitan,
Quezon, Bukidnon with an area of 10.6146 hectares, more or less, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8275 and another property with an area of
13.2614 hectares covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-4985, also
located at Paitan, Quezon, Bukidnon; the said parcels are fully tenanted by
private respondents herein who are recipients of Emancipation Patents in their
names pursuant to Operation Land Transfer under P.D. 27 (Annexes 'A', A-1'
to A-18) notwithstanding the fact that neither the tenants nor the Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP) [has] paid a single centavo for the said land.
Petitioner and the tenants have not signed any Land Transfer Production
Agreement. Petitioner and her children have been deprived of their property
without due process of law and without just compensation, especially so that
the tenants have already stopped paying rentals as of December 1988 to the
damage and prejudice of petitioner.
"Petitioner contends that since she is entitled to a retention of seven (7)
hectares under P.D. 27 and/or 5 hectares and 3 hectares each for her children
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the tenants are not
supposed to acquire the subject land and the Emancipation Patents
precipitately issued to them are null and void for being contrary to law.
Petitioner further alleged that she owns the subject property covered by OCT
No. P-4985 as original homestead grantee who still owned the same when
Republic Act No. 6657 was approved, thus she is entitled to retain the area to
the exclusion of her tenants. As regards TCT No. 8275, petitioner has applied
for retention of seven hectares per Letter of Retention attached as Annex 'B',
that the lands subject of the instant petition are covered by Homestead
Patents, and as decided by the Supreme Court in the cases of Patricio vs.
Bayug (112 SCRA 41) and Alita vs. Court of Appeals (170 SCRA 706), the
homesteaders and their heirs have the right to cultivate their homesteads
personally, which is a superior right over that of tenant-farmers.
"Petitioner moved for the cancellation and recall of the Emancipation Patents
issued to private respondents-farmers and to restore to petitioner and her
children the ownership and cultivation of the subject lots plus payment of
back rentals from the time they stopped paying the same until ejected
therefrom.
"Respondents filed their answer dated May 29, 1991 and admitted the
generation and issuance of Emancipation Patents to private respondents as
tenant-farmers thereof and the Supreme Court rulings on the Bayug and Alita
cases relative to homestead patents, but denied the rest of the material
allegations for want of knowledge or information as to the truth relative
thereto. Respondents alleged that when the subject lands were covered under
P.D. 27, the petitioner was repeatedly informed and invited by the DAR
Office at Valencia, Bukidnon to thresh out the matter; that petitioner's right to
retain seven (7) hectares is not absolute since she owns other agricultural
landholdings, thus disqualifying her to retain the area, aside from the fact that
she has other properties sufficient to support her family as shown in the
Certification of the Provincial Assessor's Office listing down the petitioner's
landholdings (Annex '2'). By way of special affirmative defenses, respondents
averred that the criteria set forth under P.D. 27 were observed before the
generation of the Emancipation Patents; that under Executive Order No. 228,
the tenant-farmers under P.D. 27 are deemed full owners of the lands they till
and the lease rentals paid by them should be considered as amortization
payments; that under LOI 474, petitioner who owns more than seven (7)
hectares of lands are not entitled to retention. Respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the case. They likewise prayed that the Emancipation Patents
issued to private respondents and their peaceful possession of their farm lots
be respected.
"The Adjudicator a quo conducted a hearing and afforded the parties their
day in court and the opportunity to present their evidence. On August 13,
1991, the Adjudicator a quo issued an Order for the parties to submit their
respective position papers with evidence to buttress their allegations. On
March 10, 1992, the Adjudicator a quo rendered the decision, thus:
"'WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Adjudicator
declares the following:
1. That all the Emancipation Patents issued to tenants-respondents
shall be canceled and recalled;
2. That the Register of Deeds of Malaybalay, Bukidnon shall cancel
all Emancipation Patents registered under the names of the herein
tenants-respondents; and
3. That back rentals due to the petitioners, which were given to the
LBP as amortizations, shall be given to the said petitioner."'4
On appeal, the DARAB reversed the adjudicator.
Ruling of the Court Appeals
The CA rejected the claim of petitioner. It ruled that she could not retain her
homesteads, since she was not the actual cultivator thereof. It also held that she and
her heirs had not been deprived of their right to retain the area mandated by law,
because the records showed that they had other agricultural landholdings. Finally, it
ruled that she had not been deprived of her properties without just compensation, since
"Section 2 of Executive Order 228 declared that tenant-farmers of agricultural lands
under P.D. 27 are deemed owners of the land they till and the lease rentals paid by
them shall be considered as amortization payments. "5
Hence, this Petition.6
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I Whether or not the original homesteads issued under the public land act
[are] exempted from the operation of land reform.
"II. Granting arguendo that homesteads are not exempt, whether or not the
Emancipation Patents issued to the respondents are valid notwithstanding
lack of payment of just compensation.
"III. On the assumption that homesteads are exempt from land reform and/or
the emancipation patents are illegally issued hence, void, can the respondents
be ejected from the premises in question?"7
 The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious. Respondents are entitled to the lands they till,
subject to the determination and payment of just compensation to petitioner.
First Issue:
Petitioner's Homesteads Not Exempt from Land Reform
Petitioner contends that because the subject properties are covered by homestead
patents, they are exempt from the operation of land reform. In support of her position,
she cites the cases Alita v. CA8 and Patricio v. Bayug,9 in which the Court ruled that
homesteaders had a superior right to cultivate their homesteads as against their tenants.
Petitioner's contention is without legal basis. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, under
which the Emancipation Patents sought to be canceled here were issued to
respondents, applies to all tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice
and corn under a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed
estate or not."10 The law makes no exceptions whatsoever in its coverage. Nowhere
therein does it appear that lots obtained by homestead patents are exempt from its
operation.
The matter is made even clearer by Department Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series
of 1978, which states: "Tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice
and/or corn which have been acquired under the provisions of Commonwealth Act
141, as amended, shall also be covered by Operation Land Transfer." Unquestionably,
petitioner's parcels of land, though obtained by homestead patents under
Commonwealth Act 141, are covered by land reform under PD 27.
Petitioner's claimed entitlement to retain seven (7) hectares is also untenable. PD 27,
which provides the retention limit, states:
"In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7)
hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it."
Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on
the condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will
actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law.
In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is present. As admitted by
petitioner herself, the subject parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is clearly not
cultivating them, nor will she personally cultivate any part thereof. Undoubtedly,
therefore, she has no right to retain any portion of her landholdings.
Even under the current primary law on agrarian reform, Republic Act (RA) No. 6657,
to which the application of PD 27 is suppletory, petitioner's lands are subject to land
reform. The said Act lays down the rights of homestead grantees as follows:
"SECTION 6. Retention Limits.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act,
no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a
viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure,
and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner
exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of
the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least
fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been
covered by PD 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by
them thereunder; Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their
direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of
the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue
to cultivate said homestead." (italics supplied)
Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain
the original homesteads, only for "as long as they continue to cultivate" them. That
parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them
from the operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original
grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform
coverage.
In the present case, as previously pointed out, neither petitioner nor her heirs are
personally cultivating the subject homesteads. The DAR and the CA found that
respondents were the ones who had been cultivating their respective portions of the
disputed properties.
However, petitioner can retain five (5) hectares in accordance with Section 6 of RA
6657, which requires no qualifying condition for the landowner to be entitled to retain
such area. This ruling is in line with Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, from which we quote:
". . . In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their
retention rights, if any, under PD No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled
to the new retention rights provided for by RA No. 6657, which in fact are on
the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree."
Petitioner's heirs, however, are not entitled to awards of three (3) hectares each, since
they are not actually tilling the parcels or directly managing the farm.
Patricio v. Bayug and Alita v. CA
Not Applicable
Petitioner insists that the appellate court ignored the ruling of the Court in Patricio v.
Bayug11 and Alita v. CA.12 She relies on the following pronouncement in Patricio: "We
hold that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the right
of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land acquired
from the State without being encumbered by tenancy relations."13 She also cites the
statement in Alita that the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead
patents like those of the property in question" finds support in the aforecited Section 6
of RA 6657.14 A closer look at these cases shows that they are not applicable to the
issues in the present case.
In Patricio, the owner and his heirs had previously cultivated the homestead, which
was later sold but subsequently reconveyed to the former. After the reconveyance, the
owner's heirs wanted to resume their cultivation of the homestead, but the previous
buyer's tenants did not want to leave it. In Alita, the owner was also desirous of
personally cultivating the homestead; but the tenants, not wanting to relinquish it, were
asserting their own right to continue cultivating it. Thus, under these circumstances,
the Court upheld the right of the homestead owners over that of the tenants.
In the case at bar, petitioner herself has not personally cultivated the parcels of land.
Neither has she or her heirs expressed, at any time, any desire to cultivate them
personally. She is invoking, yet is clearly not intending to ever actually exercise, her
alleged right as homesteader to own and personally cultivate them.
Thus, the rulings in both Patricio and Alita, which are in line with the state objective
of fostering owner cultivatorship15 and of abolishing tenancy,16 would be inapplicable
to the present case. Since petitioner and her heirs have evinced no intention of actually
cultivating the lands or even directly managing the farm, they will undoubtedly
continue to be absentee landlords. Therefore, to blindly and indiscriminately apply the
ruling in the cited cases would be tantamount to encouraging feudalistic practices and
going against the very essence of agrarian reform. This we cannot sanction
Second Issue:
Just Compensation
It is undisputed that the subject parcels were covered by Operation Land Transfer
under PD 27, and that private respondents were identified as beneficiaries. In fact,
Emancipation Patents have already been issued to them.
Petitioner, however, claims that she was not paid just compensation and, thus, prays
for the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to respondents under PD 27.
She contends that "it is illegal for the DAR to take property without full payment of
just compensation[;] until full payment is done the title and ownership remain with the
landholder."17
Petitioner's contention has merit. Section 2 of PD 266 states:
After the tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with the requirements for a
grant of title under Presidential Decree No. 27, an Emancipation Patent
and/or Grant shall be issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform on the
basis of a duly approved survey plan."
On the other hand, paragraphs 8 and 9 of PD 27 reads as follows:
"For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be transferred to the
tenant-farmer pursuant to this Decree, the value of the land shall be
equivalent to two and one-half (2 1/2) times the average harvest of three
normal crop years immediately preceding the promulgation of this Decree;
"The total cost of the land, including interest at the rate of six (6) per centum
per annum, shall be paid by the tenant in fifteen (15) years of fifteen (15)
equal annual amortizations[.]"
Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land they
till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land, including interest, within fifteen
years before the title is transferred to them. Thus, the Court held in Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform:18
"It is true that PD 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmers as
of October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall 'be deemed the owner' of a
portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that 'no title to the
land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had
become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative.' It
was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had
to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement."
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondents complied with the requirement
of full payment of the cost of the parcels of land. As they themselves admitted,19 their
value had not even been determined yet. In the absence of such determination, the
Court cannot rule that just compensation has already been fully paid.
Presidential Decree 27 and subsequently Executive Order (EO) 228, which recognized
the rights acquired by tenant-farmers under PD 27, provide in detail the computation to
be used in arriving at the exact total cost of the parcels of land. Evidently, therefore,
the law recognizes that their exact value, or the just compensation to be given to the
landowner, cannot just be assumed; it must be determined with certainty before the
land titles are transferred.
Although EO 228 provides that the total lease rentals paid for the lands from October
21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment, it does not sanction the assumption
that such rentals are automatically considered as equivalent to just compensation for
the land. The provision significantly designates the lease rentals as advance, not full,
payment. The determination of the exact value of the lands cannot simply be brushed
aside, as it is fundamental to the determination of whether full payment has been
made.
Necessarily, the lease rentals admittedly paid by respondents until December 1988
cannot, at this point, be considered as full settlement of the value of the lands or as just
compensation for them. The value of the subject lands was never determined; thus,
there is no amount that can be used as basis for applying the lease rentals.
Under the circumstances, actual title to the subject lands remains with petitioner.
Clearly then, under PD 27 and EO 228, the application of the process of agrarian
reform to the subject lands is still incomplete.
Considering the passage of RA 6657 before the completion of the application of the
agrarian reform process to the subject lands, the same should now be completed under
the said law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect. This ruling finds
support in Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA,20 wherein the Court stated:
'We cannot see why Sec. 18 of RA 6657 should not apply to rice and corn
lands under PD 27. Section 75 of RA 6657 clearly states that the provisions
of PD 27 and EO 228 shall only have a suppletory effect. Section 7 of the Act
also provides —
SECTION 7. Priorities. — The DAR, in coordination with the
PARC shall plan and program the acquisition and distribution of all
agricultural lands through a period of (10) years from the effectivity
of this Act. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:
Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or
abandoned lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by the owners
for agrarian reform; . . . and all other lands owned by the
government devoted to or suitable for agriculture, which shall be
acquired and distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this
Act, with the implementation to be completed within a period of not
more than four (4) years (emphasis supplied).
This eloquently demonstrates that RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the
properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless. And to
facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the
Act should be adhered to. In Association of Small Landowners of the
Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform this Court applied the provisions
(of) RA 6657 to rice and corn lands when it upheld the constitutionality of the
payment of just compensation for PD 27 lands through the different modes
stated in Sec. 18. "
In determining the amount to be paid petitioner, all lease rentals paid by respondents to
her after October 21, 1972 should be deducted therefrom. This formula is intended to
put into effect the provision of Section 2 of EO 228.
Third Issue:
Tenants Cannot Be Ejected
Petitioner submits that aside from canceling the Emancipation Patents issued to
respondents, the ejectment of the latter from the premises should be ordered by the
Court, in accordance with the doctrine in Patricio.
Petitioner's position is unfounded. As earlier explained, Patricio finds no application to
the case at bar. Thus, there is no justification for ejecting respondents. Besides, Section
22 of RA 6657 expressly states that "actual tenant-tillers in the landholding shall not
be ejected or removed therefrom." Furthermore, there is no reason for ejecting the
tillers with respect to the area of five hectares, which petitioner may choose to retain.
Section 6 of RA 6657 further states:
"The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or
contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner; Provided, however, That in case
the area selected for retention by the land owner is tenanted, the tenant shall
have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the
same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case
the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a
lease holder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case
the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his
right as a lease-holder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must
exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the
landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention "
 In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farm workers on the land
prior to the approval of this Act shall be respected."
The current provision on retention removes the necessity, present under PD 27, of
ejecting actual tillers. Under the current law, landowners who do not personally
cultivate their lands are no longer required to do so in order to qualify for the retention
of an area not exceeding five hectares. Instead, they are now required to maintain the
actual tiller of the area retained, should the latter choose to remain therein.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision of the provincial agrarian
reform adjudicator is REINSTATED with the modification that the lease rentals,
which respondents have already paid to petitioner after October 21, 1972, are to be
considered part of the purchase price for the subject parcels of land.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
LUCRECIO PATRICIO, SEGUNDO DALIGDIG, FRANCISCO DALIGDIG,
FLORENCIO ARELLANO and EPIFANIO DALIGDIG, Petitioners, vs.
ISABELO BAYOG, CONRADA, PEDRO, EMILIO, ALFONSO, DIONISIO and
ARSENIO, all surnamed MENDEZ, and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
AQUINO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
The legal issue in this case is whether the tenants hired by the purchaser of a
homestead planted to coconuts and bananas may be ejected by the homesteader's heirs
who were allowed by the Court of Appeals to repurchase the homestead and who
desire to personally possess and till the land.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
As factual background, it should be stated that in 1934 Policarpio Mendez obtained a
patent and Torrens title for a homestead with an area of about twenty-three hectares
located at Sitio Badiangon, Barrio Dalipuga, Iligan City. He and his wife, Petra
Macaliag and their nine children lived on the land, cleared it and planted coconuts
thereon.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In 1956, Mendez sold the homestead to the spouses Eugenio Lamberang and Ester
Fuentes. In 1958, Mendez and his children filed an action to annul the sale. Lamberang
countered with an ejectment suit. On March 20, 1961, Mendez and his children filed
an action against the Lamberang spouses for the reconveyance of the
homestead.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The three cases reached the Court of Appeals which in a decision dated January 3,
1977 ordered Lamberang to reconvey the homestead to the Mendezes "free of all liens
and encumbrances " upon their payment to Lamberang of P19,411.28 as redemption
price. That judgment became final and executory.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Appeals also held that upon the execution of the deed of reconveyance
and the delivery of the redemption price to the Lamberang spouses, the Mendezes
Would be "entitled to the possession and occupancy" of the homestead. (Mendez vs.
Lamberang, Lamberang vs. Bayug, and Mendez vs. Fuentes-Lamberang CA-G.R. Nos.
50819-81-R.) chanrobles virtual law library
The Mendezes paid the redemption price and the Lamberang spouses reconveyed the
homestead. Pursuant to a writ of possession, a deputy sheriff placed Isabelo Bayog, the
representative of the Mendez family in possession of the homestead after ejecting the
tenants of the Lamberang spouses named Lucrecio Patricio, Florencio Arellano,
Epifanio Daligdig, Francisco Daligdig and Segundo Daligdig, now the petitioners
herein.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
However, the tenants reentered the homestead allegedly upon instruction of
Bernardino O. Nuñez, a trial attorney of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistant.
Hence, the Mendezes filed a motion to declare them and Nuñez in contempt of
court.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Before that contempt incident could be resolved, or on April 10, 1979, the tenants,
represented by Nuñez, filed in the Court of Agrarian Relations at Iligan City a
complaint for damages against the heirs of Policarpio Mendez named Isabelo Bayog
and Conrada, Pedro, Emilio, Alfonso, Dionisio and Arsenio, all surnamed Mendez
(CAR Case No. 92), now private respondents.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
By reason of an agreement between the parties at the hearing on October 22, 1979, the
said tenants vacated the land. They are now not in possession of the land (p. 5,
Rollo).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Agrarian Court in its decision of December 12, 1979 held that the plaintiffs were
"tenants of the landholding in question" and ordered their reinstatement therein. The
lower court directed the Mendezes to pay them their "unrealized shares" in the
coconuts.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Agrarian Court concluded that the plaintiffs became the tenants of the Mendezes
because the Lamberangs, with whom they established a tenancy relationship, were not
illegal possessors of the land, having acquired it through a sale. The court said that
under Section 10 of the Code of Agrarian Reform tenants are entitled to security of
tenure and that under section 36 of that Code, personal cultivation by the landowner is
no longer a ground for terminating tenancy. The Agrarian Court noted that Presidential
Decree No. 152 dated March 13, 1973, which prohibits the employment or use of
share tenants in complying with the requirements regarding entry, occupation and
cultivation of public lands, is not applicable to the case.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The Mendezes appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 8, 1980 reversed the
decision of the Agrarian Court and declared that the Mendezes are "entitled to the
homestead without the gravamen of plaintiffs' tenancies" because the purpose of
granting homesteads is "to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land
destitute citizens for their home and cultivation" (Pascua vs. Talens, 80 Phil. 792,
793). That policy would be defeated " if the buter can install permanents tenants in the
homestead who would even have the right of preemption" (Patricio vs. Bayog, CA-G.
R. No. 10611-CAR ).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The tenants appealed to this Court. They contend (a) that under section 118 of the
Public Land Law, share tenancy may be constituted in homestead after five years from
the grant of the patent because section 119 of the same law does not prohibit any
encumbrance on the homestead after that period and (b) that they cannot be ejected
because they were not parties in any of the cases involving the Mendezes and
Lamberang.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This is a case where two competing interests have to be weighed against each other:
the tenant's right to security of tenure as against the right of the homesteader or his
heirs to own a piece of land for their residence and
livelihood.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We hold that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the
right of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land
acquired from the State without being encumbered by tenancy relations. * chanrobles
virtual law library
This holding is consistent with the intention of the Code of Agrarian Reform to abolish
agricultural share tenancy, "to establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-
size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and "to achieve a dignified existence
for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices" (Sec.
2).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. No
costs.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro and Ericta ,JJ.,
concur.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Escolin J., took no part.
Endnotes:
* The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and
protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land
where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant
what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's
other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things
necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself.
They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become
human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the
people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of
this vital right.chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, a man with a home and a means of subsistence is a lover
of peace and order and will profess affection for his country,
whereas one without a home and in penury is not only a social
parasite but also a dangerous element in the social order. The
Homestead Act at once aims at the promotion of wholesome and
happy citizenship and the wiping out of the germs of social
discontent found everywhere. Considering the social and economic
ends of the Homestead Act, the courts should exercise supreme care
and strict vigilance towards faithful compliance with all its benign
provisions and against the defeat, directly or indirectly, of its highly
conmmendable purposes. And it is my firm conviction that
where, ..., a rich and clever man attempts to wrest a homestead
granted to a poor and ignorant woman, the slightest tokens of
illegality should be enough to move the courts to apply the strong
arm of the law." (Dissent, Moran, J., Kasilag vs. Rodriguez, 69 Phil.
217, 254, 263-264.)
The object and purpose of the homestead law is to encourage
residence upon and the cultivation and improvement of the public
domain. This paramount public purpose should certainly not be
 nullified by the tactics of the courts. (Aquino vs. Director of Lands,
39 Phil. 850, 86 1).chanrobles virtual law library
The statutes of the United States as well as of the various states of
the Union contain provisions for the granting and protection of
homesteads. Their object is to provide a home for each citizen of the
Government, where his family may shelter and live beyond the reach
of financial misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals those feelings
of independence which are essential to the maintenance of free
institutions. Furthermore, the state itself is concerned that the
citizens shall not be divested of a means of support, and reduced to
pauperism.chanrobles virtual law library
The conservation of a family home is the purpose of homestead
laws. The policy of the state is to foster families as the factors of
society, and thus promote general welfare. The sentiment of
patriotism and independence, the spirit of free citizenship, the
feeling of interest in public affairs, are cultivated and fostered more
readily when the citizen lives permanently in his own home, with a
sense of its protection and durability. (Jocson vs. Soriano, 45 Phil.
375, 379.)
ATLAS FERTILIZER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
[G.R. No. 97855. June 19, 1997]
PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF FISHFARM PRODUCERS, INC., petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
Before this Court are consolidated petitions questioning the constitutionality of some
portions of Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law.
Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, Philippine Federation of Fishfarm Producers,
Inc. and petitioner-in-intervention Archie’s Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna are
engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. They assail
Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as well as the implementing
guidelines and procedures contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of
1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform as
unconstitutional.
Petitioners claim that the questioned provisions of CARL violate the Constitution in
the following manner:
1. Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARL extend agrarian reform to
aquaculture lands even as Section 4, Article XIII of the constitution limits agrarian
reform only to agriculture lands.
2. The questioned provisions similarly treat of aquaculture lands and agriculture lands
when they are differently situated, and differently treat aquaculture lands and other
industrial lands, when they are similarly situated in violation of the constitutional
guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.
3. The questioned provisions distort employment benefits and burdens in favor of
aquaculture employees and against other industrial workers even as Section 1 and 3,
Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the State to promote equality in economic and
employment opportunities.
4. The questioned provisions deprive petitioner of its government-induced investments
in aquaculture even as Sections 2 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the
State to respect the freedom of enterprise and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns on investments and to expansion and growth.
The constitutionality of the above-mentioned provisions has been ruled upon in the
case of Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform regarding the inclusion of
land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
The issue now before this Court is the constitutionality of the same above-mentioned
provisions insofar as they include in its coverage lands devoted to the aquaculture
industry, particularly fishponds and prawn farms.
In their first argument, petitioners contend that in the case of Luz Farms, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, this Court has already ruled impliedly that lands
devoted to fishing are not agriculture lands. In aquaculture, fishponds and prawn
farms, the use of land is only incidental to and not the principal factor in productivity
and, hence, as held in “Luz Farms,” they too should be excluded from R.A. 6657 just
as lands devoted to livestock, swine, and poultry have been excluded for the same
reason. They also argue that they are entitled to the full benefit of “Luz Farms” to the
effect that only five percent of the total investment in aquaculture activities, fishponds,
and prawn farms, is in the form of land, and therefore, cannot be classified as
agricultural activity. Further, that in fishponds and prawn farms, there are no farmers,
nor farm workers, who till lands, and no agrarian unrest, and therefore, the
constitutionally intended beneficiaries under Section 4, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution do
not exist in aquaculture.
In their second argument, they contend that R.A. 6657, by including in its coverage,
the raising of fish and aquaculture operations including fishponds and prawn ponds,
treating them as in the same class or classification as agriculture or farming violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution and is, therefore, void. Further, the
Constitutional Commission debates show that the intent of the constitutional framers is
to exclude “industrial” lands, to which category lands devoted to aquaculture,
fishponds, and fish farms belong.
Petitioners also claim that Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 issued by the Secretary
of the Department of Agrarian Reform are, likewise, unconstitutional, as held in “Luz
Farms,” and are therefore void as they implement the assailed provisions of CARL.
The provisions of CARL being assailed as unconstitutional are as follows:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the “raising of fish in the definition of
“Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.” (Underscoring
Supplied)
(b) Section 11 which defines “commercial farms” as private agricultural lands
devoted to fishponds and prawn ponds x x x.” (Underscoring Supplied)
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16 (d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian reform the
authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered
by the comprehensive Agrarian reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section
13-
“x x x (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such
lands are distributed within sixty (60) days at the end of the fiscal year as
compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the
compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities
realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon
proper application, determines a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten percent
(10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other
farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year. x x x”
While the Court will not hesitate to declare a law or an act void when confronted
squarely with constitutional issues, neither will it preempt the Legislative and the
Executive branches of the government in correcting or clarifying, by means of
amendment, said law or act. On February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7881 was
approved by Congress. Provisions of said Act pertinent to the assailed provisions of
CARL are the following:
“Section 1. Section 3, Paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
“Sec. 3. Definitions. -- For the purpose of this Act, unless the context indicates
otherwise:
“(b) Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation
of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such
farm products and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or
juridical.”
Sec. 2. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.--
xxx
xxx xxx
“b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds
shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided, That said prawn farms and
fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program.
“In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell, or commercial farms
deferment or notices of compulsory acquisition, a simple and absolute majority of the
actual regular workers or tenants must consent to the exemption within one (1) year
from the effectivity of this Act. When the workers or tenants do not agree to this
exemption, the fishponds or prawn farms shall be distributed collectively to the
worker-beneficiaries or tenants who shall form a cooperative or association to manage The above-mentioned provisions of R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that fishponds and
the same. prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the
question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot
“In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected to the and academic with the passage of R.A. No. 7881.
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the consent of the farm workers shall no longer
be necessary, however, the provision of Section 32-A hereof on incentives shall WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
apply.”
SO ORDERED.
xxx
xxx xxx Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sec. 3. Section 11, paragraph 1 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Francisco, JJ., on leave.
“Sec. 11. Commercial Farming.-- Commercial Farms, which are private agricultural
lands devoted to salt beds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetable and cut-flower farms, and
cacao, coffee and rubber plantations, shall be subject to immediate compulsory
acquisition and distribution after ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act. In the
case of new farms, the ten-year period shall begin from the first year of commercial
production and operation, as determined by the DAR. During the ten-year period, the
Government shall initiate steps necessary to acquire these lands, upon payment of just
compensation for the land and the improvements thereon, preferably in favor of
organized cooperatives or associations, which shall thereafter manage the said lands
for the workers-beneficiaries.”

Sec. 4. There shall be incorporated after Section 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 a section
to read as follows:

“Sec. 32-A. Incentives.-- Individuals or entities owning or operating fishponds and

prawn farms are hereby mandated to execute within six (6) months from the effectivity
of this Act, an incentive plan with their regular fishpond or prawn farm workers’
organization, if any, whereby seven point five percent (7.5%) of their net profit before
tax from the operation of the fishpond or prawn farms are distributed within sixty
(60) days at the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other pond
workers in such ponds over and above the compensation they currently receive.

“In order to safeguard the right of the regular fishpond or prawn farm workers under
the incentive plan, the books of the fishpond or prawn owners shall be subject to
periodic audit or inspection by certified public accountants chosen by the workers.

“The foregoing provisions shall not apply to agricultural lands subsequently converted
to fishponds or prawn farms provided the size of the land converted does not exceed
the retention limit of the landowner.”