G.R. Nos.

106385-88 May 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO MANDAP, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

At eighteen, Marian Mandap was already a mother of two — three-year old Fernand and five-month old Minerva. The
father of Fernand is April Dimaliwat whom Marian could not marry because of her father's objection. But Minerva's
father happens to be the father also of Marian. With a common father, Marian and Minerva are sisters. There hangs
this sordid tale of perversity, let alone fiendish bestiality.

A few weeks after giving birth to Minerva, Marian charged her own father, Alejandro Mandap, with four (4) counts of
rape committed on 15 January, 21 January, 2 February, and in July 1991, before the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga. 1 The trial court finding the prosecution witnesses credible convicted him as charged aggravated
by relationship. He was sentenced accordingly to reclusion perpetua in each case and to indemnify the victim
P100,000.00 as damages. 2

Marian thus narrates her woes: On 15 January 1991 she was alone in the room. Their house was at Trinidad Village,
Bacolor, Pampanga. Her father, brothers, sisters, and Fernand were in another room. Her mother was cooking in a
neighbor's house. Later, her father told her brothers and sisters to watch television in a neighbor's house. After they
left, her father closed the door, went to the comfort room, called her and told her to enter another room. Believing that
he wanted her to lull and sway her two-year-old sister, she entered the room. There he told her to lie down on the mat.
When she protested, he grabbed her and forced her to lie down. He ordered her to remove her panties but she refused
so he did it himself. He punched her on the right thigh when she refused to spread her legs. He forced his way and
placed himself on top of her. He threatened to hurt her should she resist. He held her hands with one hand at her back
pinned against the mat as he sexually abused her. She felt pain. She wept.

After the rape, which took about thirty (30) minutes, he stood up. She told him he was wicked. He did not respond. She
went to the other room and cried again. Afterwards, he told her to call her brothers and sisters. But she did not tell
anyone about the incident because she was afraid he would kill her. She knew he was capable of doing so as he had
been hurting her and her brothers and sisters since childhood.

On 21 January 1991 at about eleven o'clock in the morning she was washing clothes. Her mother was in Concepcion,
Tarlac, because of the coming fiesta. Her father told her again to enter the room and lie down on the mat. When she
refused, he held her hands and forced her to lie down. He pulled down her panties and told her to spread her legs. She
refused. She turned to her side but he threatened her with harm if she did not lie down straight. She told him that
what he was doing was wrong but he replied that he made her for him. He pushed her legs apart and told her to follow
whatever he said. Then he placed himself on top of her and sexually abused her. She cried and cried. She felt as if her
father was a devil incarnate. He told her that as long as he was alive she would not be able to marry.

Thereafter, he ordered her to finish washing clothes. She locked herself in another room. Again, she did not report the
matter to anyone because she was afraid he would kill her. She was aware all the while that as a soldier her father had
already killed a man. Once he hit her forehead with the butt of an armalite rifle. He would box her and hit her with
plates. But she marked on the calendar the dates when he raped her because she had planned to report the matter
later.

On 2 February 1991 at around ten-thirty in the morning she was rocking her infant sister in the room. Her brothers and
sisters were also inside. Her mother was then washing clothes in a neighbor's house. Then her father came in and told
her brothers and sisters to go to the other room. When they left he locked the door. He grabbed her hands and forced
her once again to lie down on the mat. He threatened to stab her with the blade of the scissors pointed at her thigh.
She lay down and when she refused to spread her legs he boxed her thigh which caused it to stiffen, thus enabling him
to part her legs and rape her. She could do nothing but grieve over her misfortune. Her fear of her father was deeply
embedded in her heart. As a result she became pregnant. Her mother asked her who the father of the child was but
she told her that she would only confess after giving birth. She also marked this third rape incident in her calendar.

In July 1991 at about eleven o'clock in the morning she was lying down on the mat while her sister was sleeping in her
cradle. Her father entered the room and told her to lie down straight. She refused. He punched her on the right waist.
He then removed her panties, lowered his briefs to his knees, laid on top of her, and sexually abused her. Her younger
brother Marvin arrived and witnessed the startling occurrence. But her father approached him and threatened to kill
both of them if he revealed what he saw. If he squealed on him. She had to advise Marvin to keep quiet about the
incident or their father would hurt him.

On 1 October 1991 she gave birth to Minerva. At that time her father was in Capas, Tarlac, thus giving her the
opportunity to report the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation.

Marvin Mandap corroborated substantially Marian's account of the fourth rape and the fact of their father's "reign of
terror." Marvin narrated that one weekday in July 1991 he went home from school to eat his lunch. He was a Grade III
pupil at the Telebastagan Elementary School. He looked for his sister Marian who always prepared his meal. He found
her and their father inside the room. His father was in a kneeling position with his briefs lowered to his knees trying to
spread the legs of Marian who was lying down on the floor. She had no undergarments. She was only wearing a duster
that was raised up to her chest. His father was on top of her in sexual congress. She was crying. He fled when his
father noticed him. He was afraid as his father used to beat them up even with a hammer or anything he could lay his
hands on. In fact his father ran after him and threatened to kill him if he reported the incident to his mother. So Marvin
went back to school without taking his lunch. He did not tell his mother what he saw.

The defense is alibi. According to the accused, on 15 January 1991 he was in Patling, Capas, Tarlac, with Francisco
Estrella, Francisco Flores and Bernie Balintang buying wood and bananas. They stayed there for a while. They
proceeded to Bacolor. The following day he returned to Patling. He went to the mountains to buy puso ng saging. On
21 January 1991, he was again in Patling with the same three companions. Returning to Bacolor on 1 February 1991.
But he immediately left for Patling when he was informed by a sister-in-law that his family was in San Juan, Cauayan,
Tarlac. On 2 February 1991 he was still in Patling where he stayed for another three (3) days before he returned to
Bacolor.

In July 1991 he was home in Bacolor with some evacuees from Patling but went back to Patling and stayed there for a
month because the roads were rough. He disputed the testimony of Marvin that sometime in July 1991 Marvin saw him
on top of Marian. He claimed he could not do that to his own daughter. However Marian filed the rape cases against
him because he had scolded her and her mother when she (Marian) again gave birth without a husband. He is a
Catholic who hears mass every Sunday with a prayer book since 1970 when he attended the cursillo. He denied ever
maltreating his children particularly Marian and Marvin.

After upholding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses the trial court convicted the accused. It rationalized that —

[t]he testimony of Marian Mandap was direct and straightforward. Her narration of the sordid details of
the four (4) occasions that her father raped her was clear and without a hint of fabrication or
contrivance. This is punctuated by the testimony of her younger brother, Marvin, who with exemplary
courage, exposed the despicable and perverted act of their father in raping Marian.

xxx xxx xxx

Granting that Marian is not a woman of impeccable virtue, having sired a son without a husband, the
Court, nevertheless, cannot believe that she would spin a tale of defloration by her own father, risking
public trial, embarrassment and humiliation, unless it was the truth. How about Marvin? What evil
motive has he to lie about the rape unless it was true? Are these two children so evil that they would
like to send their own father to jail for the rest of his life? For a lie, can they risk public scandal, family
shame, humiliation and gossip? In fact, their lack of motive to testify falsely is the best test for the
veracity of the rape especially against their own father. While human experience has shown that
unfounded charges of rape have frequently been filed, yet in the cases at bar, it could not be so in the
absence of ulterior motive. 3

As regards the defenses of accused, the trial court found it too weak to be believed —

. . . He said he cared for them, yet he maltreated them with a hammer, scissors, assault rifle, knife,
plates and other objects he could hold on. He stated that he is (sic) a Catholic and God fearing, yet
they said that he was a devil incarnate. He claimed that he suffered in silence the unfaithfulness of his
wife, yet they said that he raped his own daughter in full view of his son. He testified that he earned
money for them, yet they said that he was a good-for-nothing. He said he loved them, yet they said
that he threatened to kill them.

The Court patiently observed the accused during the trial. He was shifty eyed. All the more when he
was exposed for his lying. Claiming that he always kept a prayer book given during a Cursillo in 1970,
the prayer book was however printed in 1988 — after 18 years! This only shows that the accused has
no scruples. He raped his own daughter and he tries to evade justice by blasphemy. As one jurist said,
there should be a special place in hell for parents such as the accused. 4

Accused-appellant assails the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as replete with material inconsistencies
sufficient to destroy their credibility.

At the outset accused-appellant concedes that his denial is feeble, even contrived. Nevertheless, he asserts that the
proofs of the prosecution are no better. He bewails the trial court's blind acceptance of the victim's recital of the
manner by which she was sexually abused and the marked inconsistencies between her testimony in court and her
narration of the incidents in the Complaint Sheet and Sinumpaang Salaysay.

It cannot be denied that the principal basis of the court a quo in convicting accused-appellant was the direct testimony
of the complaining witness that her father raped her on four (4) occasions. This was corroborated by the victim's
brother who testified having witnessed one occasion when he saw his father on top of her and sexually assaulting her.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, whether Marian and her brother Marvin were possessed with enough credibility
to testify against their father was a question of motive. Being the children of accused-appellant, what possible motive
strong enough could compel them to implicate their own flesh and blood other than the equally forceful compulsion to
seek justice for the beleaguered daughter?

As for the alleged inconsistencies, a careful scrutiny of both the Complaint Sheet and the testimony of the victim
shows that the claimed inconsistencies are at most imaginary which demonstrate accused-appellant's desperate
attempt to extricate himself from a damning situation. It would seem that he expects the hapless object of his lechery
to have the memory of an elephant and the cold precision of a mathematician. This simply cannot be. We have often
said enough that total recall of an incident is not expected of a witness, especially if it is the victim herself who is on
the witness stand. The traumatic effect of the successive rapes in the instant case evidently caused the victim to
become disoriented, preventing her from remembering every single detail of her harrowing experience. 5 Thus, it is
understandable, even anticipated, that there would be minor lapses and inaccuracies when Marian was made to
recount, detail by painful detail, her defilement in the hands of her father. 6 Moreover, it should be noted that the
victim testified more than one (1) year after her first experience with her own father on 21 January 1991.

Accused-appellant likewise calls attention to the victim's delay of nine (9) months in reporting the alleged sexual
assaults to her mother, brothers, sisters or the authorities. The delay was satisfactorily explained by Marian —
Q. What are you afraid of?
A. He told me if I reported the matter to anybody, he will (sic) kill me, sir.
Q. Do you believe that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because whenever he said something, he will (sic) do that, sir.
Q. Was there any past experience when he said something, he will (sic) do that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What incident is (sic) that?
A. Before, he shot somebody, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Did that person die?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Did you personally see your father to make you believe that he is (sic) capable of hurting you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did he do?
A. Before, he hit me with his gun, sir.
Fiscal Aquino:
Make of record, Your Honor, that the witness is weeping.
Q. What . . . part of the gun hit you?
A. The butt of the armalite, sir.
Q. And what part of your body was hit by that?
A. On my forehead, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And how many times did he do that to you?
A. Only once, sir, because of the force, I was thrown away . . . . Sometimes he hit me with a plate or sometimes he
boxed me, sir. 7

Marian also testified during the cross-examination throughout that nine-month period from the first rape incident she
could not leave their house because she was afraid of accused-appellant. 8 It was only in October 1991 when he went
to Capas, Tarlac, that she was able to report the matter to the NBI. 9

As a whole, accused-appellant had to grope for arguments, although vainly, which is usually the case when the totality
of the evidence against an accused is strong. There is thus no cogent reason to overturn the finding of the trial court
on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

One of the vital obligations of parents is to protect their children from any harm. Parents even go to the extent of
sacrificing their own lives, and justifiably so, in order to save their children. But, ill-suited to be a parent, accused-
appellant terrorized his children by inflicting on them brute punishment that they saw the devil in him. Worse, he
treated his daughter as a "sexual object" and claimed "he made her for him." He even had the temerity to forewarn
her that "she cannot marry while he is alive." Since he has moral ascendancy over her she was an easy prey to his
brutish assaults. She could only ask herself why he would do that to her when she was his daughter.

Man is endued with qualities that place him on the highest level among all living creatures. In his relationship with
humans he is guided by a sense of morality. He knows that it is highly immoral for persons so closely related by
marriage or by blood to indulge in sexual intercourse. Incestuous relations are abhorrent to the nature of man, not
only to civilized men but also to semi-civilized and barbarous people. Also, they tend to confuse rights incident to
family relations. Most important of all, science and experience have established beyond cavil that they very often
result in deficient and degenerate offsprings, seriously deteriorating the race. 10 In contrast, lower forms of animals
yield only to biological impulses and are unfettered by social inhibitions when they mate with their own kin. When man
perpetuates his lascivious designs on his own direct blood relative, he descends to a level lower than beasts.
Incestuous rapes are extremely disgusting because —

. . . the man who rapes his own daughter violates not only her purity and her trust but also the mores
of his society which he has scornfully defied. By inflicting his animal greed on her in a disgusting
coercion of incestuous lust, he forfeits all respect as a human being and is justly spurned by all, not
least of all, by the fruit of his own loins whose progeny he has forever stained with his shameful and
shameless lechery. 11

The crime in the instant case is so monstrous that no punishment which this Court or any other human tribunal can
decree, could possibly provide sufficient expiation for the offense. 12

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding the accused-appellant ALEJANDRO MANDAP guilty of rape on four
(4) counts and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua in each case is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
indemnity is fixed at P50,000.00 for each case or a total of P200,000.00.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Quiason, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Brach
139, Makati City, respondents.

BUENA, J.:

This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the Order dated
January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil
Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the
ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial
question.1âwphi1.nêt

The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:

Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish
Church in Cubao, Quezon City. 1

On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four

children, 2 petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192. 3

In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home
and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. 4 Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage 5 under
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a
Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information 6 against them. The case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.

On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings
Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez
Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order 7 dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order
of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998.

In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge
Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. 8 In an Order 9 dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial
Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another Order 10 dated February 23, 1999, denying
his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him by his wife.

Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from the civil case for annulment of
marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing
petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage is
void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's
marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's
marriage is declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his
marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he was never before a
married man.

Petitioner's contentions are untenable.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 11

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a
civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of
the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.

Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only
legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said Decision read:

. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation,
partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the
custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such
cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void
for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his
marriage void.

With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and
void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova 1 cited in Donato vs. Luna 14 where this Court held that:

. . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to
the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits
with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,

vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased
SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom
he married. 1âwphi1.nêt

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil
Case No. Q-93-18632.

During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969,
with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely,
Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter
referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in
1982.

In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He
passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased
from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from
“GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner
Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-
six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from
“MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her
answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.

Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however,
claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of
the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio
because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1)
the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads –

This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN
NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or
transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.

This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:

WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which
was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in
the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
instant petition, contending that:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT
THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF
THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS
GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. 10 In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. 11

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in
this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of
the deceased.

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of
their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office
has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the
law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently
overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the
required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely
met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this
Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.

Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains
that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab
initio.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to
the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime
would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 -

“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...”

In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to
the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions
in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.

The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and
PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a
police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed
money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by
respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent,
not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This
article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147
of the Family Code reads -

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.

xxx

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence
of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.

In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one
party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits”
were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties
of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny
shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass
by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government
Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first
wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that:

“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established
by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband
under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether
as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s share in
the property here in dispute....” And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and equitable solution in this
case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and
her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.” 21

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of
the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.

In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior
and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of
remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain
first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because
the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes
other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid,
no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence,
testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid.
Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage
involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:

[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the
Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of
P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Puno J., on official leave.

[G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000]

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A. – G.R. CV 37897,
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between
private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered private
respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony
on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent
of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty,
herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982,
they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying that
his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got
married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at
the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of
nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took
place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their marriage was
contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario,
Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in
evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated
August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March
29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as
evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact
that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring
his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner
had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.i[1]
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondent’s civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and
void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July
24, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the
appellate court:
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendant’s counsel that ‘no judicial decree is necessary
to establish the invalidity of void marriages.’ It does not say, however, that a second marriage may proceed even
without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting
marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to
determine for himself – for this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage even
before a competent court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to
say the least, and could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code on
marriage.
xxx
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes and
defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount of P15,000.00 to
his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4, 1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
SO ORDERED.ii[2]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting that the Court of
Appeals erred:
I.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONER’S MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS.
III
IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS
RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a
subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this question, we shall go over applicable laws and
pertinent cases to shed light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which we shall discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to private respondent null
and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private respondent and Villanueva. The
appellate court rejected petitioner’s claim that People v. Mendozaiii[3] and People v. Aragoniv[4] are applicable in this
case. For these cases held that where a marriage is void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into
the provisions of law previously obtaining.v[5]
In refusing to consider petitioner’s appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case. Although decided
by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in
the instant case.
xxx
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration
that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .vi[6]
At the outset, we must note that private respondent’s first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979,
respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs significantly from the recent
cases of Bobis v. Bobisvii[7] and Mercado v. Tan,viii[8] both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous
marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code,ix[9] under which a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been
absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by
 the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express
provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,x[10] and People v. Aragon,xi[11] this Court held that no judicial decree is necessary
to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second
marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a third
marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court
acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the
first marriage. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage
is void, and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages. Hence,
there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for the spouses but the court
to judge whether a marriage is void or not.
In Gomez v. Lipana,xii[12] and Consuegra v. Consuegra,xiii[13] however, we recognized the right of the second wife
who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement
insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab
initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of
such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the husband supervened before such declaration, we
upheld the right of the second wife to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity. xiv[14]
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),xv[15] the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We exonerated a
clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was
void, since she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The Court held
that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino
v. Paras.xvi[16]
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),xvii[17] the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel
filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her
previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:xviii[18]
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the
time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage
of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,xix[19] however, the Court found the second marriage void without need of judicial
declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez,
Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code.xx[20] Article 40 of said Code
expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage –
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992)xxi[21] the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous
marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was void since his
first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is that
“for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that
the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.”
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993),xxii[22] the Court held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of
the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44,
48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).xxiii[23]
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v.
Cantero, (1997)xxiv[24] the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage.
The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got
pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since
the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the
effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel.
At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent
being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to
petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for
to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,xxv[25]
the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that
impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give
assent to the appellate court’s finding that despite private respondent’s “deceit and perfidy” in contracting marriage
with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church
ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the
civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful
private respondent’s allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a
marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church
rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate
court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality,
i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure does
not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest
of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In
our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid
marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used
legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding
of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first.
The appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which
undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But
we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what
the CA calls “his own deceit and perfidy.”
On the matter of petitioner’s counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees. Although the appellate court
admitted that they found private respondent acted “duplicitously and craftily” in marrying petitioner, it did not award
moral damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim.xxvi[26]
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present case, but for
another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to
maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a
baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation,
social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the
husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law
absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an
action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation. xxvii[27] There are other
remedies.xxviii[28]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its
Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private
respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of
P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne
Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES,J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and Resolution dated September 28, 20043 reversing
the Resolution dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social Security Commission (SSC)
in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari.

On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona,
Sorsogon.6

More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Sorsogon a petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.

By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication of the
Notice of Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby declared to [sic]
all legal intents and purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.

SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)

Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.10

On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a
retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died.11

Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,00012 by the SSS.

Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits13 which was also granted by the
SSS on April 6, 1998.14

Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested
before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon
contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the
third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for Bailon’s medical
and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of her claims
are spurious.

In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated
February 13, 199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as
husband and wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the necessary court action to
contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally know that Alice is "still very much
alive."16

In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian of
"Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s death,17 he further
attesting in a sworn statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses.

Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries
before the SSS.20

Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the
cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the
refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the denial
of the claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during his lifetime;
and the payment of the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailon’s beneficiaries according to
the order of preference provided under the law, after the amount erroneously paid to respondent has been
collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:

1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by misrepresentation in
declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.

xxxx

x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead," did not
become final. The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.

xxxx

3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad faith, and
is the deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.
 xxxx

In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his
marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit of
reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz [sic]
Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of.21 (Underscoring supplied)

In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000,22 advised respondent that as
Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses, she should return the P12,000
paid to her.

In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,23 the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her
monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her
marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latter’s marriage with Alice was still
subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become final,
her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the validity of the order. It thus requested respondent to
return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly pension she had received from the
SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.

Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the SSS dated
October 12, 1999.24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC, she reiterated her
request for the release of her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared
before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal
intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.

The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000,26 maintained the denial of her claim for
and the discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she was not deprived
of her right to file a petition with the SSC.

Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to her of her
entitlement to monthly pension.

In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount of
P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings "forcibly
and coercively prevented her from spending any amount during Bailon’s wake."28

After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondent’s petition, and the parties filed their respective Position
Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch attesting
that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to
declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have easily located her,
she having stayed at her parents’ residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon was
having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their separation.

By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void and,
therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows, quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the
legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.

Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount of P24,000.00 representing
the death benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999 as well as
P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.

The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising from
the demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as Section 13
of the SS Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this Commission of its
compliance herewith.

SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)

In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.

After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the inevitable conclusion
that the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.

xxxx

There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of
Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member represented in
bad faith. This Commission accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in its Memorandum
dated August 9, 1999,32 revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her
separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.

As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using artifice and by
exerting fraud upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the deceased
member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is void, considering
that the first marriage on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled, invalidated or otherwise
dissolved during the lifetime of the parties thereto. x x x as determined through the investigation
conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not Alice Diaz Bailon.

xxxx

It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a common-law wife of the
deceased member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary, to the latter’s
death benefit. x x x

xxxx

It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse and primary
beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she received
from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle of solutio
indebiti x x x

Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the wake and burial of
Clemente Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her by the SSS as
funeral benefit.33 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration34 having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a
petition for review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).

By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003
Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due her. Held the
CA:

x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the decision of the then
CFI, now RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more importantly, whether
or not the respondents SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the findings of the RTC, and on its
own, declare the latter’s decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar import, can respondents SSS and
Commission validly declare the first marriage subsisting and the second marriage null and void?

xxxx

x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality as the
finding that "the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum," the second
marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent
court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the
reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere does the law
contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly declare the second marriage null and
void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the decision of the RTC declaring one to
be presumptively dead is without basis.

Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the regular courts
under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members. Notwithstanding its
opinion as to the soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due credence to the decision of the
RTC absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x

x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to declare the decision of
the RTC to be without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of fair play and thus its
findings are of doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not given ample opportunity to
present evidence for and her behalf.

xxxx

Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry is
no longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore as the marital
bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the latter’s death. Neither is
there a second marriage to terminate because the second marriage was likewise dissolved by the death of
Clemente Bailon.
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance with
the Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the respondent SSS
has now the authority to review the decision of the RTC and consequently declare the second marriage
null and void.36 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration37 which were both denied for lack of
merit.

Hence, the SSS’ present petition for review on certiorari38 anchored on the following grounds:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION.39

The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the SSC on the prior
and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to determine to
whom, between Alice and respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section 540 of the
Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give respondent due process or ample
opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.

The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are of no moment to
the present controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of the SSC’s finding of
the existence of a prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which Alice has a
better right to the death benefits."41

The petition fails.

That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and contributions,
there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less reverse, decisions
rendered by courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI
Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same, making its own findings with
respect to the validity of Bailon and Alice’s marriage on the one hand and the invalidity of Bailon and
respondent’s marriage on the other.

In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court. The law
does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise of its
authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the
Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of their celebration.42

Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed
to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall
be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of
the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or
contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any
of these exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows
that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage.44
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years45 when Bailon
sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a requirement
then for purposes of remarriage.46

Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:

Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of
the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove
that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also
be shown that it had not ended when the second marriage was contracted. The presumption in favor of the
innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of the legality of his second marriage, will prevail
over the presumption of the continuance of life of the first spouse or of the continuance of the marital
relation with such first spouse.47 (Underscoring supplied)

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the
subsequent marriage.

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article
42 thereof provides:

Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of
the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with
due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of
reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of the
Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee
and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.49

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or
by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the
subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the
spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an
absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.51

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial

declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:

x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of
dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised,
because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct
action for annulment.52 (Underscoring supplied)

Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83,
paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife
having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still
the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as
provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be
brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of
any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse," as expressly provided in Section 2 of the
Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.54 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding.
Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab
initio.56

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s
marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of
Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered
unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

G.R. No. L-18176 October 26, 1966

LAZARO B. RAYRAY, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CHAE KYUNG LEE, defendant-appellee.

Jaime R. Nuevas for plaintiff and appellee.

Rafael Jose for defendant and appellant.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.

Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter's
whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea, summons was served by publication, as
provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that defendant be declared in default, she not having filed
an answer, and that a date be set for the reception of his evidence. Before acting on this motion, the lower court
referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for the
purpose of determining whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. Said officer having found no such
collusion, the case was heard on the merits. In due course, thereafter, decision was rendered dismissing plaintiff's
complaint, without costs, upon the ground: (1) that the court could not nullify a marriage contracted abroad; and (2)
that the facts proven do not warrant the relief prayed for. A reconsideration of this decision having been denied,
plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower
court being in issue in the appeal.

In relation thereto, the court a quo found that it had no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's marriage to
the defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea. Said conclusion is erroneous. In order that a given case
could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must have jurisdiction over (1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2)
the person of the parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res.1

The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, which is within the
jurisdiction of our courts of first instance,2 and, in Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.3

The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in consequence of the filing of the
complaint herein.4 Defendant was placed under the jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by
publication.5

This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects or binds the whole word. The
res in the present case is the relation between said parties, or their marriage tie.6 Jurisdiction over the same depends
upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.7
Plaintiff here is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on
both counts. True that defendant was and — under plaintiff's — theory still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does
not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.
Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double status, in that the status therein involves and affects two persons. One
is married, never in abstract or a vacuum, but, always to somebody else. Hence, a judicial decree on the marriage
status of a person necessarily reflects upon the status of another and the relation between them. The prevailing rule
is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment of marriage, provided, at least,
one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum.8 Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it
follows that the lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the
parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage between the parties herein.

As regards the substantial validity of said marriage, plaintiff testified that he met the defendant in Pusan Korea,
sometime in 1952, where she was operating a nightclub; that they lived together from November 1952 to April 1955;
that they were married in Pusan Korea, on March 15, 1953, as attested to by their marriage certificate Exhibit D; that
before the wedding she obtained the "police clearance" Exhibit A, written in Korean language, and dated February 16,
1953, which was necessary in order that she could contract marriage; that on June 30, 1953, he proceeded to India
and left the defendant, then in advanced stage of pregnancy, in Korea; that in October, 1953, she joined him in India,
bringing with her said Exhibit A, and its translation into English, Exhibit B; that he then noticed that, on February 16,
1958, defendant was already married, according to said Exhibit B; that as he confronted the defendant with the
contents of this document, her reply was that it is not unusual for a Korean girl to marry twice in Korea; that when he
inquired about her status on March 15, 1953, defendant confided to him that she had lived with about two (2)
Americans and a Korean, adding, however, that there was no impediment to her contracting marriage with him; and
that, later on, they were separated and her whereabouts are now unknown to him.

The lower court considered plaintiffs evidence insufficient to establish that defendant was married to another person
prior to March 15, 1953, and we agree with this conclusion. To begin with, Exhibit A is not signed. It merely purports to
bear the seal of the Chief of Pusan National Police. Secondly, the record does not show who prepared it, much less that
he had personal knowledge of the truth of the entry therein concerning defendant's status on February 15, 1953. It
should be noted, that defendant was a native, not of Pusan but of Seoul, Korea. Hence, Exhibit A could, at best, be no
more than hearsay evidence. Again, when plaintiff allegedly confronted the defendant with the contents of Exhibit B,
defendant did not say that she had been married before. Plaintiff declared that she admitted having previously lived
with several other men, adding, however, that she had no impediment, thus, in effect, negating the alleged previous
marriage.

Thirdly, if Exhibit A was obtained on February 16, 1953, in order to establish defendant's qualification to contract
marriage, why is it that the wedding took place, despite the entry in said document to the effect that defendant was
married already? There is no competent evidence to the effect that Korean laws permit bigamy or polygamy.
Moreover, the presumption is that the foreign law is identical to the lex fori, or, in the case at bar, the Philippine Law.9
In fact, the statement, imputed by plaintiff to the defendant, to the effect that, although she had cohabited before with
other men, there was no impediment to her marrying him, clearly suggests that a previous marriage on her part would
have been, in her opinion, a legal obstacle to her marriage with the plaintiffs. Then too, the marriage certificate Exhibit
D contains spaces for the entry of data on whether any of the contracting parties had been previously married;
whether the prior marriage had been dissolved by a decree of divorce; and, if there had been such decree, the date
thereof. Surely, these data would be absolutely irrelevant if polygamy were sanctioned in Korea. And, again, why is it
that Exhibit D states that defendant had had no previous marriage?

Last, but not least, plaintiff cannot possibly secure the relief prayed for unless full faith and credence are given to his
testimony, but we cannot believe him for the records show that he would not hesitate to lie when it suits his purpose.
Thus, for instance, when plaintiff contracted marriage with the defendant, he said that he was single, although, he
admitted, this was a lie, because, sometime in 1940, he married in Baguio, one Adelaida Melecio or Valdez.10 But, then
he would, also, have us believe that his marriage with the latter was illegal or fictitious, because Adelaida and he did
no more than sign, on a small window in the City Hall of Baguio, certain documents the contents of which he did not
read.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
plaintiff-appellant. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J, is on leave.

Footnotes

1
Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca (1918) 37 Phil. 921; Perkins vs. Dizon (1939) 69 Phil. 186; Perkins vs.
Roxas (1941) 72 Phil. 514; Reyes vs. Diaz (1941) 73 Phil. 484; I Moran, Rules of Court (1963 ed.) pp. 32-34.

2
Republic Act 296, Sec. 44(e).

3
Republic Act 409, Sec. 39-A(c) (as added by Republic Act 1401, Sec. 1).

4
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General (1911) 20 Phil. 523; 21 C.J.S. Sec. 82, Courts, p. 122; see also,
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 113, Comment (e).

5
Rule 14, Sec. 17, Rules of Court; Bing Gee vs. Chan Lai Young Gee (1949) (Cal.) 202 P2d 360; Piper vs. Piper
(1907), 91 Pac. 198; Buzzi vs. Buzzi, 205 Pac. 2d 1125 (1949) (Cal.).

6
Goodrich, Jurisdiction to Annul a Marriage, 32 Harvard Law Review, 806, 810; Leelar Conflict of Laws (1959),
p. 305; Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 1512, Vol. 3.
 7
15 C.J.S. Conflict of Laws, sec. 15; I Beale Conflict of Laws (1935), p. 468; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 355; 4
Am. Jur. 2d, Annulment of Marriage, Sec. 60, p. 481; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 115, Anno. 128 ALR
69.

8
4 Am. Jur., Sec. 65 Annulment of Marriage, pp. 484-485.

9
International Harvester Co. vs. Hamburg-American Line, (1918) 42 Phil. 845; Beale, Conflict of Laws, Vol. 3,
Sec. 622A-2; Rabel, Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study, Vol. 4, p. 493.

10
Incidentally, he would not have so lied had he believed that bigamy or polygamy is not forbidden in Korea.

[G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008]

MANUEL G. ALMELOR, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH
254, AND LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It likewise involves a true
intertwining of personalities.[1]

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition for
annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Piñas, Branch 254.
The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.

The Facts

Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at
the Manila Cathedral.[3] Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2)
Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on July 4, 1994.[4] Manuel and Leonida are both
medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.[5]

After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on
the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-
00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.

During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as
medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well with other
people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got married.[6]

Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of
a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh
disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their
children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.[7] Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the
alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on
her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.[8]

Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when
she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet
telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller.[9] She also found several pornographic homosexual
materials in his possession.[10] Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips.
The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.[11] When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took
her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children.[12]

Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia
testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-
time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).[13] She concluded
that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.[14] Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the
marriage and appeared to be incurable.

Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He, however,
maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by Leonida came
as a surprise to him.

Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry. It began when he
refused to heed the memorandum[15] released by Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum ordered him to desist
from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary hospital.[16] Leonida's family owns Christ the King
Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as Manuel's clinic and residence.[17] In other words, he and her family
have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.

Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only
imposed the necessary discipline on the children.

He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to return the love and
affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now that his mother is
in her twilight years.[18] Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of
her very jealous and possessive nature.[19]

This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female friends. He wanted to
avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual
preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his
masculinity.[20]

To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at
Manuel's house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the generally harmonious
relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a husband
and wife relationship. But there was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony.[21]

Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He
denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date,[22] he and Manuel went straight home from a trip to
Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except their driver.[23]

Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own expert witness.
However, no psychiatrist was presented.

RTC Disposition

By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects under the law null
and void from the beginning;

2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of defendant's share
thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose
legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;

3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and

4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:

a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in the Book of
Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and

b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and Manila City to cause the registration
of the said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.

Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.

SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the allegations in the complaint
and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes
(sic).

Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This
is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special contract exclusively only
between a man and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides
ample remedies to correct the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This
is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual
and forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true sexual preference as
a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family.[25]
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment
of judgment with the CA.[26]

Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction; that it had no
jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children.

CA Disposition

On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the
Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Piñas City, in Civil Case No. LP-
00-0132. No costs.[27]
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment
of judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower Court. But the
remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of
judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.

What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an ordinary
appeal.

In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise thereof. "Excess"
assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of
jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.[28]
Issues

Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A
PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY;

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.[29]
Our Ruling

I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice and in
the Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction

Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed.[30] This is to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and mistakes. However, like most
rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[31]

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available
or no longer available through no fault of petitioner.[32] However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,[33] this Court clarified
the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they
should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that while the Rules are
liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed
on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected
out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the
demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.[34] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals. [35] It has,
in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality. [36]

After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to consider his petition
before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower court for annulling his
marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a similar
situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,[37] petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service
Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is
deemed to have already served her six-month suspension during the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is
ordered reinstated without back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:

1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of the Philippines and
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing
the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court.[38] (Underscoring supplied)

The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal.[39]
The CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments
or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review."[40]

This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the Administrative Circular. The
Court stated:

That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only a minor
procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should have
overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the parties concerned. There is,
indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be liberally construed in order to promote their object
and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has
been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a
legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.[41]
(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,[42] petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a
petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this
Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse of discretion in
rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in this
wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict
application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.[43] (Underscoring
supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present petition and
treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or
non-validity of a marriage.

In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,[44] citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not
a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as
not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[45]
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the
case on the merits to attain the ends of justice.[46]

Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His
counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her notice of appeal,
she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for
annulment of judgment rather than pursue an ordinary appeal.

These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of
Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain
exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its
application will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so
require.[47]

The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of
petitioner's former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for his counsel's
grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate his case in a higher
court.

In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[48] this Court explained thus:

It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a
counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. However, where counsel
is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's being held liable for
damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such
ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present
evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always
be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright
incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in court.[49]
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the demands of
justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the sacrosanct institution of
marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of one's
action.[50]
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson
Commercial Buildings, Inc.[51] and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.[52] Said the Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great
hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of
justice. In other words, the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the
purposes of justice require it.[53]
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.

Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought
back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.

The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the supporting grounds relied
upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It went further by citing Republic v.
Molina:[54]
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings,
unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of
some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity.[55]
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What
Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant
among homosexual individuals.[56] She wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable
of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.

But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the
ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is fire. Although
vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish with certainty that defendant is
really a homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced from the totality of the marriage life scenario of herein
parties.

Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own close friends doubted
his true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003). After receiving many
forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard but defendant did not do anything to prove to the
whole world once and for all the truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing
happened after that. There may have been more important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing
cases against and be effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on defendant's denials, plaintiff just the
same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his
act of initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain - even during his
marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even got thicker, reason why
obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became
his innocent and unwilling victims.

Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even small details in the house
(sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit
his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence
presented apparently showing that he had extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate
occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the
homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt
as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the name
of the game in this case; but the simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not
enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the
expense and humiliation of their children and family as a whole.[57]
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he
concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel's
sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and
interpreted it against his sexuality.

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to
annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud,[58] such as concealment of homosexuality.[59] Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid
such fact to his wife.[60] It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent
of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent
to the marriage.

Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation
of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list
of circumstances[61] constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment.

This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations[62] of the Committees on the Civil Code and
Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds for legal separation.
Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of "concealment," while in the article on legal
separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in
Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the
phrase "existing at the time of the marriage" at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion.
[63]

To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid
ground to annul a marriage.[64] Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of
fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.

In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual
identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the
spouses.[65] In Crutcher v. Crutcher,[66] the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which would make the
marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to discharge the duties of a wife, and
would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things, they would cause mental suffering to
the extent of affecting her health.[67]
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly
different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy
heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a
ground to separate from bed and board.

What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven (11) years, which
produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed
to discharge this onus.

The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found in Villanueva v.
Court of Appeals.[68] In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of
his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case,
are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily
married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus -

Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be
married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x

The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him
of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being
harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least,
the proper way to keep himself out of harm's way. x x x

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was
pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee
because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is
bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. x x x

xxxx

x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for
annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since
the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of his
marriage must be upheld.[69]
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account petitioner's
homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.

This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[70] The State and the public have vital interest in the
maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by fabricated evidence.[71] Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.

III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or conjugal
property

Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:

Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 124[72] prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In
a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.

In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the
same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is upheld
valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's share in the property regime is unwarranted. They
remain the joint administrators of the community property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in the
trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, and Nachura, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision2 dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for
the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage
alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not
get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned
that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.4

In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner
freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage;
that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally;
and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely.
Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.6

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but
reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of
Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on the following
assigned errors:

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD,
INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.7

The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent; and
(b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs.

The petition is partly granted.

Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case,
are generally binding on this Court.8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so,
thus –

To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced consent which
supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a
span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the same
marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this
annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his
defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then already
pending against him. Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided
ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the present case
disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x
Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet
secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore,
understandable.

But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.

Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent
to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from
the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the
East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the
New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in
going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.

The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was
allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time,
it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper
way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon
appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor
the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge
about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was
pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not have impregnated the
appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst.
The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. His counsel also
conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the appellee x x x. He also
narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act was
consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.

Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to undermining the
credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on August 29, 1989, a year off
from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.

To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as there is no
controversy regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation of the cross-
examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching
the date in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee and
throw overboard her entire testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date of the death of
the fetus, especially when she herself had presented documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the
date her fetus died.

Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellee’s evidence continues in his argument
that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in December 1987, then she
could not have a premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial, because the 35-
week period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether the appellee’s impression that she had delivered
prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the
light of appellant’s admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to
attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the
appellee into marrying her.

Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the letters allegedly written by him to the
appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant identified the
seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by
the appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under
duress. During the re-direct examination, however, appellant suddenly changed mind and denied authorship of
those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was forced to admit them because he was threatened with harm by
the appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made the admission, where did he find the temerity to
deny his involvement with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can only be motivated by a hindsight
realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the
absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a
marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the
 marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of
the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity,
fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the
appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.9

We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that
attorney’s may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as in the instant
case.

We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis. There is nothing in
the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral damages. In justifying the award, the
Court of Appeals merely said thus:

It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by the appellant as
the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x10

However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of private respondent
detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral damages.

In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:

In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental
anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent
should have taken the witness stand and should have testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for
moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No
other person could have proven such damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely
personal to him.

As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary damages. This is
clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether
or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although
no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before
the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff
must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the
stipulation for liquidated damages.

Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary damages can be
awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages.12 In the instant case, private
respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is not likewise entitled to exemplary
damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with
private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of
basis.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into
matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth
and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude
on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November
2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void.
After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and
through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6
December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored
his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8

As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently
9
lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things,
to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to
petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such
incident occurred. 12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her
friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold);
yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein,
she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an
invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place.15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to
petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry
worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him
when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were
only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she
earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a
famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people
on false pretexts.20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to
attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo
V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondent’s persistent and constant lying

to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust
and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman.
They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs
of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and
invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.25

(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from David’s act of
touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic
School for two (2) years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three
(3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank.
She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet
she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor
at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea
Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares.29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a
diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s
whereabouts.30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget of
P7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed
to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented
is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent
her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,33 together with the
screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him
to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He
postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the
one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one
instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about
almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly
established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities
enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the
Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the
pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification
by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of
due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman
Rota of the Vatican.39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed
the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court
of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the
application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends
herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the
factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had
an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack
thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the
evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to
establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question
remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in
the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of
Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the
Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In
fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the
Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the
Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did
ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity,
still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree
of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a
ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a
ground for the dissolution of a marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of
their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same
class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party’s mental capacity was
not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at
the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the
ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was
classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the
marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages
classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent
freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices
Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined
that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and
voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino
likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee.
Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable
under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."62
At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the
essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns
though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug,
acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed
to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then
Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."67
Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article
36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply

with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this
Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application,
by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court.72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee,
was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical
thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has
developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in
providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At
the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case
perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no
cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent.
There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon
law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code
committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and
as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church
but still existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly
the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from
canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular
progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial
decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind,
have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the
constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and
the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper,
and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that
protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code,
which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While
it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to
protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained
decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only
constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as
a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation,
there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they
promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for
nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in
a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for
his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the
fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of
these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to
her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her
psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from
his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications
from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her
alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the
aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below
considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not
totally honest with petitioner.80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the
cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public
matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the
petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of
collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory
complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially
telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner
using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family
background, among others.81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert
witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things
that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over
again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think,
based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of
performing the basic obligations of her marriage?

A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love
towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on
communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then
when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie,
what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating
stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

xxx

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that
the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and
ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of
stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her
suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological.
That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is
carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having
an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different
women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic
obligations of the marriage?

A- Yes, Ma’am.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also
the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to
lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial
transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the
subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the
methodology utilized by petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs.
Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of
petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom
by petitioner’s expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological
incapacity in its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that
propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her
income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a
world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner,
such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87

Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before
the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she
married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only
confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of
cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of
tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the
record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce
petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from
fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s
inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were
revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person
unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the
marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including
parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she
had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her
psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity
to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential marital
obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere
to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if
the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting
fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would
be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under
Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not
allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own
inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71
of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the
parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential
as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its
attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in
question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90 Such
decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause93 was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s
consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and
wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal
Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the
marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes
in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the
marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the
substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the
integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted
with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an
adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding
matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of
due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical
bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold
sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had
the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion,
the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual
findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by
this Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent’s condition was incurable and
that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their
marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate
stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition is
incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s condition is incurable? It would
seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would
have been easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they
remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.

The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August
1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was
not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the
deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its
formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion
expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be
characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal
rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of
psychological incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that
remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At
least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the
trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a
time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply
retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law
as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The
requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one
that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from
the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no
legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If
we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos,
especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert
witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this
case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial
court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-
case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this
case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently
convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any
lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider
incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent
in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as
exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on
respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and
not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in
love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960

JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.

Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for appellant.
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee.

PADILLA, J.:

In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a
decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the
municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the
penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at
the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day
after they had been married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did
not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed
the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order
requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical
capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result
thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the order of 17
December 1956 with warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required doctor's
certificate would be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence presented
by her husband would be rendered.

After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree annulling the
marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration
of the decree thus entered, upon the ground, among others, that the defendant's impotency has not been
satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been physically examined because she had refused to
be examined; that instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and
compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree sought to be
reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each
other by just alleging impotency of one of them. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife be
subjected to a physical examination. Pending resolution of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the
decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for reconsideration was denied.

The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent. The latter did not answer the
complaint, was absent during the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical examination.

Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with
safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a
condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are
governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to
exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was
decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing
the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have
been satisfactorily established, becase from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she
had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show
indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not
arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to
and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to
be a witness against herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in
favor of potency."2 The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance
with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Dizon, JJ.
concur.

Footnotes

1
Section 1, paragraph 18, Article III of the Constitution.

2
Marciano vs. San Jose, 89 Phil., 62.

[G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004]

DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, respondents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of
his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows
before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.1 The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May
20, 1967.2

The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18, 1968;3 Stephanie Janice born on
September 9, 1969;4 Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;5 and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.6 The conjugal
partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.

Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother.
She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the
Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.

Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist.
Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national
named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left
the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back
and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned
petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on
special occasions.

Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family
Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino
Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be
found in the Philippines.7

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner
 and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed
up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.

On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by
her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even
bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in
handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social
Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.8

After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L.
CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code.

Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of
complete separation of property between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions
of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.

Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of
the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.9

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that –

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.

The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage.10

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.11 Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that
the: (1) respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2)
psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or
incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity
suffered by respondent.

The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent
adverted to by petitioner fall within the term “psychological incapacity?”

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled:

x x x “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be “legitimate.”

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55
of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of
psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.13
 The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive
phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify
as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.14 It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not
exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at
its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.

Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
be equated with psychological incapacity.15 It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity.

At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 5517 of the Family
Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos18 that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of
petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman
Catholic Church.

All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. We cannot deny the grief, frustration and
even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this case, where
neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.19 While we sympathize with
petitioner’s marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be.20

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concur

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