Is Radical Atheism a Good Name for Deconstruction?

Ernesto Laclau
diacritics, Volume 38, Numbers 1-2, Spring-Summer 2008, pp. 180-189 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/dia.0.0057

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IS RADICAL ATHEISM A GOOD NAME FOR DECONSTRUCTION?

ERNESTO LACLAU
I want, first, to thank Diacritics for the invitation to answer the criticisms of my work contained in the very insightful and intelligent book by Martin Hgglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life. I will go in a moment to those criticisms, but let me first say a few words about the main argumentative line around which Hgglunds theses are structured. Some of the categories that are central to Hgglunds projecttrace, spacing, autoimmunityare well known to readers of Derrida, but othersdesire, survivalare less so; it is on the latter that Hgglunds analytical effort is concentrated. As he asserts: my main approach is analytical rather than exegetical. I not only seek to explicate what Derrida is saying; I seek to develop his arguments, fortify his logic, and pursue its implications [11]. The central thesis around which his whole analysis revolves is that, unlike traditional atheism, which asserts that human reality is penetrated by a lack of being that oneunsuccessfullytries to transcend, radical atheism puts into question the search for immortality and asserts, on the contrary, a search for survival that fully accepts our own mortality and contingency. It is here that the Derridean category of the trace would become constitutive of all experience and that time, conceived as an ultratranscendental horizon, becomes its inherent correlate. Spacing would thus assert the becomingspace of time and the becoming time of space. The consequence is the radical finitude of survival. The radical finitude of survival is not a lack of being that it is desirable to overcome. Rather, the finitude of survival opens the chance for everything that is desired and the threat of everything that is feared [12]. Trace, difference, spacing are alternative terms to designate this infinitude of radical finitude on which radical atheism rests. The contrast that Hgglund establishes between deconstruction and negative theology is particularly significant. Referring to the works of Kevin Hart and Jean-Luc Marion, Hgglund argues that [t]he respective reasons why God and diffrance are described as without being are . . . diametrically opposite. The God of negative theology is described as without being insofar as being is understood as a category of finitude. . . . In contrast, diffrance articulates the negative infinity of time. No moment is given in itself but is superseded by another moment in its very event and can never be consummated in a positive infinity. The negative infinity of time is an infinite finitude, since it entails that finitude cannot ever be eliminated or overcome [3]. Hgglunds book is structured around a set of theses that try to specify Derridas viewpoint vis--vis those of other thinkers. Against Kant, for whom God is an absolute instance not submitted to either space or time, Derrida asserts the unconditional as the spacing of time that undermines the very Idea of a sovereign instance [10]. In a similar way, the Derridean critique of Husserls analysis of internal time-consciousness points toward a view of temporality whose radicalism avoids any notion of a transcendental preconstitution. The critique of the ethicist, Levinasian-oriented readings of deconstruction

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tries to show the impossibility of subsuming the latter under the formers approach to alterity. Finally, a similar critique is addressed to the various attempts at a religious retrieval of deconstruction. On most of these points, I find myself in agreement with Hgglund. My disagreements start not where Hgglund tries to differentiate his own understanding of deconstruction from alternative approaches, but where he attempts to formulate that understanding in positive terms. His whole intellectual endeavor rests on the opposition between a desire for immortality as an absolute goal and a constitutive and irreducible mortality which would both limit and structure all possible meaningful desire. The question is: how to conceive of this opposition? Any dual alternative, from a deconstructive perspective, cannot be dealt with simply by opting for either of the poles that it, at face value, asserts. Deconstruction involves contamination of what would otherwise be an exclusive alternative. The alternative is, however, presented by Hgglund as an exclusive one. Either we have uncontaminated immortality or, alternatively, a mortality reduced to its ontic, evental nature, whose being is reduced to a simple negation of eternity. This does not look very much like a deconstructive operation but, rather, like a dialectical reversal. The only content of the mortal would consist in the pure and simple negation of immortality. Needless to say, this operation leaves the category of immortality intact, as that which is excluded. The conceptual content of mortality is reduced to being the pure and simple reversal of immortality. This is a profoundly non-Derridean operation, in which contaminating logics play no role. The opposition between traditional and radical atheism that structures Hgglunds argument is based on this theoretical move, which, I think, distorts the very aim of the deconstructive intervention. Of course, Hgglund is right in asserting that deconstruction involves rejecting any appeal to an absolute ground beyond the logic of diffrance. Where I find his argument wanting, however, is in the way he specifies what this logic is about. He does not interruptas a true deconstructionist shouldthe alternative mortality/immortality, but just sticks to it, merely choosing between one of the two poles. His intellectual projectwhich I still see as very much valuablewould require, in my view, a drastic reformulation. This general difficulty can be perceived even more clearly if we consider two categories, which, although playing, according to Hgglund, a central role in Derridas theorization, were not sufficiently elaborated by him: survival and desire. Let us start with survival. Hgglund sustainsand the same assertion is repeated in different contexts throughout his bookthat [t]he finitude of survival is not a lack of being that it is desirable to overcome. Rather, Derrida makes clear that whatever is desired is finite in its essence. Even the most intense enjoyment is haunted by the imminence of death, but without such finitude there would be nothing to enjoy in the first place. There is thus an incurable autoimmunity at the heart of every experience, since whatever one wants to affirm is constituted by the fact that it will be negated. There is no way out of this double bind because the threat of loss is not extrinsic to what is desired; it is intrinsic to its being as such. [34] Now, there are two sides to this assertion. On the one hand, survival is presented as internally affected by autoimmunity as a result of the inherent possibility of death (which means that it amounts to a naked assertion of bare life). In that sense, there would be no internal discrimination between different types of survival. On the other hand, to assert that the most intense enjoyment is haunted by the imminence of death introduces a new categoryenjoymentthat cannot be deduced from survival, even if one accepted the argument that survival (as haunted by death) is a precondition of every enjoyment. And here we already have a source of contamination that complicates the argument. Is the

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threat of deathdeath as a threatthe only way in which death can relate to enjoyment? Accepting that death is opposed to survival, but also that the content of enjoyment is not merely provided by the notion of survival, can it not happen that, to some extent, enjoyment could be linked to death rather than to survival? (There is also the question, to which I will return presently, of the connection between death and immortality.) Hgglund recognizes that in Derridas work there is no fully developed theory of desire, but he thinks that such a theory is nonetheless a fundamental piece of the whole deconstructive intellectual project and that, as a result, it requires a precise formulation. The reason is that radical atheism, as conceived by Hgglund, requires a strict separation between the desire for life and the desire for immortality. The desire to live on after death is not a desire for immortality, since to live on is to remain subjected to temporal finitude. The desire for survival cannot aim at transcending time, since the given time is the only chance for survival. There is thus an internal contradiction in the so-called desire for immortality. If one were not attached to mortal life, there would be no fear of death and no desire to live on. But for the same reason, the idea of immortality cannot even hypothetically appease the fear of death or satisfy the desire to live on. On the contrary, the state of immortality would annihilate every form of survival, since it would annihilate the time of mortal life. [2] So what about mortality? Here Hgglund is unambiguous: What I want to stress is that this argument presupposes that being is essentially temporal (to be = to happen) and that it is inherently valuable that something happens (the worst = that nothing happens). In other words, it presupposes that temporal finitude is the condition for everything that is desirable [32]. The desirable has here assumed the status of being as such, because it has become identical with temporality, which has become now, in turn, the only terrain in which being as such is constituted. (Discussing the question of the ontological options of a discourse meaningfully aiming at being qua being exceeds the aims of this response.) The basic question is now the following: to what extent do we find in Derridaand in the new argumentative developments to be found in Hgglundsomething amounting to an elaborated theory of desire? The answer is that we dont even remotely find anything of the kind. If we put together Derridas scattered references to desire and Hgglunds attempts at building out of them some kind of coherent construct, we arrive at a theoretical structure that looks more or less like this: (1) temporality and mortality go together and they constitute life as such; (2) desire is desire for life, and as the latter is internally threatened (autoimmunity) by death, the desire for life is the same thing as the desire for survival; (3) immortality would be the negation of temporality/mortalitythat is, of life; (4) the desire for immortality would be equivalent to the desire for death; ergo, it would be radically undesirable; (5) the search for an unattainable eternity that has been at the root of most religious and theological conceptions is not only the search for a chimera but also the search for something that is intrinsically undesirable. Why is this theoretical sequence fundamentally unsatisfactory? Basically because it does not propose any theory of desire as it is actually structured, but only a philosophical argument about the logical implications of a search for eternity. The very status of the argument is ambiguous. What does it mean to say that something is undesirable? It sounds like an ethical injunction, in which case Hgglunds reasoning would be dangerously bordering on the normativism that hequite rightlytries to avoid. So let us not follow that path. The only other option is that, independently of any injunction, undesirability is grounded in an allusion to the way in which human desire operates. But to that effect, it is clearly insufficient to say that the desire for immortality is equivalent to the

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desire for deathunless it is shown that there is something intrinsically contradictory in a desire for death. This is, anyway, an argumentative line that at no point Hgglund pursues. These difficulties and ambiguities are particularly apparent if we consider the way in which Hgglund deals with the psychoanalytic approach that, unlike deconstruction, offers an elaborate notion of desire. Referring to Lacanian theory, Hgglund asserts: While Lacan clearly recognizes that there is no fullness of being, he holds that we desire to reach such fullness and that our mortal being is a lack of being. . . . Even though Lacan often describes the lacking fullness in terms that may seem to invoke a lost object (such as the Thing), it is important to understand that the desired fullness cannot be equated with any object whatsoever. What is desired under the heading of the Thing is a state of absolute fullness to which no object can ever be adequate. The lack of such fullness is for Lacan the cause of desire, since it is precisely because desire cannot be fulfilled that there is desire. [192] Here Lacan has to introduce the drive as a different register, in which there would not be metonymical displacement from one object to the next but investment in a particular object. This movement from desire to drive, however, does not put into question the status of the object as the object of lack: The difference is that desire rejects all objects as inadequate in comparison to the Thing that would satisfy it once and for all, whereas the drive satisfies itself with a substitute. It is clear from this schema, however, that the lack of fullness is not called into question but is located at the root of both desire and drive. The object of the drive is explicitly posited as an object of lack, from which the subject can derive satisfaction only by regarding it as the incarnation of fullness [193]. The conclusions of this analysis are clear. The psychoanalytic conception of desire would share with traditional atheism two basic theoretical premises: that the fullness of being is unachievable and that it is, however, eminently desirableit is, indeed, what structures the very nature of human desire. So it is a new version of the classical teleologism that finds its epitome in Kants regulative Idea. Is this assimilation, however, really warranted? Let us say, to start with, that a psychoanalytically oriented theoretician would disagree so little with Hgglunds equation of immortality with death that the search for the fullness of being has been called the death drive. Freud is quite explicit in this respect: we cannot escape a suspicion that we may have come upon the track of a universal attribute of instincts, and perhaps of organic life in general, which has not hitherto been clearly recognized or at least not explicitly stressed. It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life. [Freud 36] And again: Let us suppose, then, that all organic instincts are conservative, are acquired historically and tend towards the restoration of an earlier state of things. It follows that the phenomena of organic development must be attributed to external disturbing and diverting influences. The elementary living entity would from its very beginning have had no wish to change; if conditions remained the same, it

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would do no more than constantly repeat the same course of life. . . . If we are to take as a truth that knows of no exception that everything living dies for internal reasonsbecomes inorganic once againthen we shall be compelled to say that the aim of all life is death and, looking backwards, that inanimate things existed before living ones. [3738] So if Hgglund would like to criticize the psychoanalytic notion of desire he would have a far more difficult task than to merely assert the equivalence between immortality and death; he would have to deny the existence of such a thing as the death drivea task that he fortunately does not take up and one in which Derrida, most certainly, would not have accompanied him. There are, however, two aspects that would require, from this perspective, a particular emphasis. The first is that the death drive does not involve any teleology of the regulative Idea type. It is not linked to any successive approach to an ideal perfection. Freud himself dissociated his analysis from the normativist account under which Hgglund attempts to subsume it: It may be difficult, too, for many of us, to abandon the belief that there is an instinct towards perfection at work in human beings, which has brought them to their present high level of intellectual achievement and ethical sublimation and which may be expected to watch over their development into supermen. I have no faith, however, in the existence of any such internal instinct and I cannot see how this benevolent illusion is to be preserved. The present development of human beings requires, as it seems to me, no different explanation from that of animals. What appears in a minority of human individuals as an untiring impulsion towards further perfection can easily be understood as a result of the instinctual repression upon which is based all that is most precious in human civilization. No substitutive or reactive formations and no sublimations will suffice to remove the repressed instincts persisting tension; and it is the difference in amount between the pleasure of satisfaction which is demanded and that which is actually achieved that provides the driving factor which will permit of no halting at any position attained, but, in the poets words, ungebandigt immer vorwarts dringt. [Freud 42] This is a good point at which to begin the deconstruction of the stark opposition mortality/immortality. What the Freudian intervention claims is that the death drive, far from being opposed to human desire, enters into the constitution of any desireexcept that the related notion of a fullness that is achievable has now nothing to do with any unachievable immortality. Freud asserted that the unconscious is timeless, but it should be clear that this timelessness is not one linked to any transcendent instance. The opposite is rather the case: because there is no transcendence, the object in which desire is invested can only be a temporal one, which, however, incarnates, in a certain historical context, the closure inherent in a certain horizon of representation. That the constitutive lack to which Hgglund refers is also at the root of religious and semi-religious discourses postulating an unachievable transcendence is only too true, but this does not mean that they are the only possible destiny of the dyad lack/desire. It is the task of a deconstructive reading to show the variety of routes that open out of this dyad, instead of fixing it, in an essentialist way, to a transcendent instance. Hgglund writes: Derrida articulates the negative infinity of time as an irreducible condition for being in general. We can describe it as an infinite finitude in order to spell out that finitude never can be consummated in a positive infinity. Each finitude is always transcended by another finitude, which in turn is transcended by another finitude, and so

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on. Such temporal finitude entails all sorts of extermination and erasure, but it cannot come to a final apocalyptic end. Or rather: the end of finitude would be the worst, since it would destroy everything [4546]. I find myself in one hundred percent agreement with Hgglunds statement, except that it says too little. I do not know from it anything concerning those exterminations and erasures to which he refers or, more generally, the logic of the movement from one finitude to the next. That this logic does not involve for himas it does not for meany kind of dialectical or teleological process, I take for granted. It is not programmed, as Derrida would put it. The problem is that without further specifications the very notion of finitude (as a positive category) becomes ambiguous and without direction. The only possibility emerging out of it is to say that any succession of finitudes is not inscribed in any positive infinity. But this is not to say too much. What for Hgglund is the conclusion of the analysis is for me only the starting point. This point can be further clarified by making reference to a text of mine where apparently I am making the same point as Hgglund, but where the differences in formulation involve a change in the theoretical perspective. The passage comes from a polemic with Slavoj iek, where I answer that my contention that the Thing as such is never touched and is substituted by radical investment in a plurality of subsequent objects does not involve the Kantian notion of an infinite approach to the thing in itself because the successive investments are not structured in a teleologically oriented series. I assert in that text: For a subject within a hegemonic configuration, that configuration is everything there is; it is not a moment within an endless approach to an Ideal. For that reason, ieks references to Kant are entirely misplaced. For Kant the regulative role of the Idea does result in an infinite approach towards the noumenal world, but nothing of the kind happens in the case of a hegemonic identification. Infinite approach to what? The alternative that iek presents . . . collapses once a radical investment has been made in a partial object (once the object has been elevated to the dignity of the Thing). And this object, albeit always partial, could involve radical change or global social transformation, but even when this is the case, the moment of radical investment will necessarily be present. At no point will the Thing as such be touched directly without its representation through an object. [23435] Apparently, I am making the same point as Hgglund: like him, I am denying that historical life can be grounded in any achievable fullness of being; like him, I am also denying that the impossibility of achieving such fullness would lead to an infinite approximation which would retain the latter as a desirable Ideal; like him, finally, I do not think that there is anything beyond the infinite succession of finitudes. The main disagreement comes from the fact that, unlike Hgglund, I specify a mechanisminvestmentthrough which finitudes as such are constituted, while his notion of finitude proceeds through purely empirical, common sense allusions, and at the conceptual level it is barren, because it only manages to think its logical antithesis with infinitude. To proceed the way I suggest requires, as I said, the deconstruction of the category of infinitude, showing that many of its internal dimensions are not necessarily linked to the ontological objects to which they were traditionally attached. To do the oppositeto maintain intact the classical notion of infinitude and to simply oppose to it finitude as its logical reverseis to remain within the field of the most traditional metaphysics. To close this point, let us go back for a moment to Lacanian theory. The notion of radical investment is associated with that of the object a. Hgglund makes several allusions to it and my linking of it to the notion of hegemony that I have formulated. He

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makes particular reference to the use I have made of Lacanian categories in connection with the work of Joan Copjec. It is worth reproducing here a couple of quotations from her work, because they touch all the main dimensions of the issue we are discussing. In relation to the destructive impulses inherent in the death drive, Copjec says: (1) that there is no single, complete drive, only partial drives and thus no realisable will to destruction; and (2) the second paradox of the drive, which states that the drive inhibits, as part of its activity, the achievement of its aim. So some inherent obstaclethe object of the drivesimultaneously brakes the drive and breaks it up, curbs it, thus preventing it from reaching its aim and divides it up into partial drives [34]. These partial objects are the objects a. The second quotation runs as follows: The development of the concept of Vorstellungrepresentanz [ideational representative in Freuds English translation] appears, then, to sever the Ding-component of the Nebenmensch complex into two parts, into das Ding and Vorstellungrepresentanz, although das Ding is no longer conceivable as a noumenal object and is retained only by the description of Vorstellungrepresentanz as partial. It is clear from the theory that when this partial object arrives on the scene it blocks the path to the old conception of das Ding, which is now only a retrospective illusion. . . . The traitorous delegate and the partial object act not as evidence of a body of a Thing existing elsewhere, but as evidence of the fact that the body and satisfaction have lost the support of the organic body and the noumenal thing. [37] Here we have all the necessary preconditions to answer Hgglunds objections. Firstly, the Thing is not an actual object but a retrospective illusionif you want, the presence of an absence. Secondly, because of that it is not an ideal eitherthat is, it is not a noumenon, the point of arrival of a teleologically constructed series. Thirdly, the Vorstellung repraesentanzwhat Copjec calls the traitorous delegatehas occupied the totality of the series. There is not, on the one hand, the Thing and, on the other, its vicar, the ideational representative, because the ideational representative is everything there is. The only distinction between entities is that they have differential cathectic investments, but there is no ground where these uneven cathexes would find any ultimate source. So the only thing we have is a contingent succession of differential investments. Here is where we find the infinitude of finitude that Hgglund was asking for. If he has not realized it, and so presented a distorted view of psychoanalysis, it is because, in his mind, the opposite correlate of a constitutive lack can only be infinitude conceived as transcendence, and thus he has been unable to operate deconstructively within classical oppositions. The assertion of the infinitude of finitude is one with which I would certainly concur, but it is a rather minor point which, I think, would be accepted by many contemporary philosophers who are quite alien to the deconstructive tradition. We could here, perhaps, introduce a philosophical distinction in order to clarify the issues at stake: that between the contingent and the accidental. The accidental is just an internal ontic distinction within the entity as such: it is just the negative correlate of the essence. With contingency, the situation is altogether different: contingent is that being whose essence does not involve its existence, so contingency cuts across the distinction essence/accident: the essence is as contingent as the accident. But in that case there is a facticity in contingency that is not merely empiricity. Heideggers notion of Dasein as being thrown into the world captures well this dimension of contingency. In that case there is an ineradicable dimension of lack in contingency. To come back to the issue that we are discussing: the infinitude of finitude is not just an empirical succession of ontic states; these are temporal materializations of a constitutive lack.

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There is, finally, a reference I want to make to the way in which, in the last part of his book, Hgglund discusses my work. He makes there a spirited defense of my approach, which I have appreciated and found convincing, but he also makes a central criticism in relation to what he sees as my dependence on the Lacanian theory of desire. Let me say, in the first place, that my theorization of the political, centered on the category of hegemony, long precedes my knowledge in depth of Lacanian theory. The latter is largely the result of my intellectual association with Joan Copjec, at the time (200004) when we were both teaching at SUNY-Buffalo and organized a series of graduate seminars on Rhetoric, Psychoanalysis, and Politics. It was at that time that I started perceiving the structural similarities between my post-Gramscian approach to politics and the logic of the object a as developed by Lacan. Hgglund is clearly critical of this Lacanian orientation of my work, where he sees a departure from my former promising deconstructive leanings. Anyway, having already expressed my reservations about the way Hgglund reads the psychoanalytic tradition, let me move to what he sees as a major contradiction in my approach. Let me quote in extenso the crucial passage in which Hgglunds criticism is formulated. The structural contradiction in Laclaus theory should now be apparent. On the one hand, he maintains that political engagement requires a radical investment that identifies the object of engagement with the idea of fullness. On the other hand, the democratic society that Laclau advocates actually precludes such a radical investment. To make a radical investment in the foundations of a society, one cannot believe that these foundations are contingent and finite, whereas democracy explicitly presents its foundations as contingent and finite. As Laclau puts it: the only democratic society is one which permanently shows the contingency of its own foundations. [200] This quotation shows, in nuce, everything Hgglund does not understand of my approach to politics. Firstly, he speaks of a radical investment in the foundations of a society, while my argument is that society has no ultimate foundation, so that the idea of radical investment has to be dissociated from the notion of such a foundation. Secondly, he grounds his argument in a traditional metaphysical idea of fullness which is precisely what the argument that I have tried to elaborate puts into question. Thirdly, if democracy believes that foundations are contingent and finite, its main task is to say what a contingent and finite foundation is, which is what my whole approach tries to clarify, while that of Hgglund does not even try to answer his own question. It is reduced to a purely empty assertion according to which foundations are contingent and finite, but one does not know any longer what a foundation is or, indeed, what is finitude and contingency. There is no point in going through the argument that Hgglund elaborates in the next few pages. So let us concentrate on the three points mentioned in the previous paragraph and answer each of them. 1. At no point have I asserted that radical investment take place at the level of the foundations of society. If that was the case there would be a logic of the ground that would precede and determine the working of hegemonic logicswhile the latter is for me the terrain in which any contingent grounding takes place. So the assertion of a radical investment in the foundations of a society is something that is totally alien to my approach, as anybody minimally aware of the main lines of my work would know. What radical investment means is the process by which a certain signifier, through an equivalent relation with other signifiers, manages to construct an equivalential chain. To refer to an example that I have used several times: in the Solidarnosc movement in Poland,

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the symbols and demands were at the beginning only the demands of a group of workers in Gdansk, but, given that these symbols and demands took place in a terrain in which several other demands were equally frustrated, they became the symbols of a wider social movementthat is, people made a radical investment in them and thus gave them a certain centrality. But there was no question of any preceding foundation, it was the contingent creation of a space that was, given its contingency, subjected to further disruptions. The radicality was, thus, a contingent radicality that gave a certain centrality to particular demands in a given context. But, within that context, the investment was radical in the sense that it could not be changed at will for a whole historical period. 2. Fullness means that, within a certain social space, some signifiers assume a role of general representation. The symbols of an emancipatory struggle, in a certain context, assume the representation of something wider than any particular demand and are to that extent quite indeterminate. Sometimes, when a certain oppressive regime has been overthrown, people live for some time under the illusion that what has been overthrown is oppression in general, and the limits within which the signifiers of liberation operate are thus indeterminate. This indeterminacy, which is certainly contingent, is what gives its content to fullness, but this is not the metaphysical fullness of which Hgglund is thinking. 3. I think that the preceding arguments make clear what the contingency of radical democracy is about. If what we called radical democracy were simply the assertion of pure contingency, we would have no democracy but mere nihilism. Any democracy takes place in a context in which certain values are uncompromisingly affirmedare the object of a radical investmentbut the contingency of those values is equally affirmed. What is essentially wrong is to create an absolute chasm between the substantive values of democracy that are the object of a radical investment in a certain context and the radical contingency inherent in democratic politics. Is there, however, not a logical contradiction between these two requirements? There is, and because of that reason it can be politically negotiated but not logically solved. The name of the space in which the negotiation of that contradiction takes place has a name: autoimmunity. As Hgglund is well aware, there is no square circle through which the incompatible dimensions of an autoimmune whole can be brought together. What I would add is that the impossibility of their logically being brought together finds its correlate/reverse in their need to be brought together as an actual fact. This is the point at which, in my work, I have insisted that the points of identification which lead to this non-logical-being-put-together requires us to escape the strictly conceptual sphere and to enter a nominal one. This latter sphere is, however, unthinkable without bringing to the fore an arsenal of categories in which identification and lack occupy a pride of place. This is the way in which the infinitude of finitude is constructed. Let us end by making a few remarks concerning the issues at stake in this exchange. Hgglund has made what I think is a rather substantial contribution to the various ways in which deconstruction allows us to approach the question of the discursive construction of identities. In actual fact, I think his analysis reaches what we could call the zero degree of deconstruction, the point in which deconstructive logics show their internal potential and cannot be assimilated to any of the various discoursesethicist, religious, and so forthwhich have tried to hegemonize it. The limit of this project, as I have tried to show in this response, comes at the moment at which deconstruction claims to be a selfdetermined operation, one that does not allow for any contamination of its own internal dimensions.

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WORKS CITED Copjec, Joan. Imagine Theres No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 2003. Freud, Sigmund. Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Vol. 18 (192022). London: Vintage, 2001. Hgglund, Martin. Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Hart, Kevin. The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology, and Philosophy. New York: Fordham UP, 2000. Laclau, Ernesto. On Populist Reason. London, Verso, 2005. Marion, Jean-Luc. God without Being. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982. ________ . The Idol and Distance. New York: Fordham UP, 1991.

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