THE GROUPS WORK I did not edit the digests which were sent to me by the members.

I merely copied and pasted your digests based on the documents you sent except the alignments of the paragraphs. The instructions of Atty. Espejo, among others, are the following: For the facts, LIMIT THE SAME WHICH IS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE AND THE RULING. NEVER exceed two NON-LENGTHY paragraphs. For the issues and ruling, use only the issues and rulings RELEVANT TO THE TOPIC, except in cases where the SC reiterated previous cases and revisited doctrine. As a general rule, DO NOT EXCEED ONE PAGE PER DIGEST. Exception: in cases where the SC reiterated previous cases and revisited doctrine. Pages are 8 and by 13. Same fonts (preferably Bookman Old Style, EXCLUSIVELY size 11) will be used by all groups. Always indicate under what rule the case is applicable as well as your name at the top of the page. Include a cover page indicating the group leader and members. Expected Output: One printed-out case digest compilation per group, later to be included in the law school archives for the future use. One soft copy to be emailed to Atty. Espejo for ease in CHECKING COMPLIANCE and POSSIBLE PLAGIARISM. The grade for this project will be included in the computation of our final grade. This means that this project is equivalent to ONE EXAM, our last ditch effort to increase our final grades in Civil Procedure. Although the lowest grade that would be given for this project is 75% as a reward for compliance alone, we can get as high as 100% for this project if we know deep in our hearts that we really worked hard for this. This is a collective effort. If one of us did not properly do what is assigned to him/her or one of us did not take the assigned cases seriously, other members will suffer the consequences. Also, Haj, Tine and I made an agreement not to send their compiled digests to other groups so as to avoid comparing. In that way, we can avoid copying other peoples work. As can be gleaned from the cases below, we can individually determine which cases were merely copied and pasted (i.e. THIS COURT, WE THEREFORE CONCLUDE) from the internet and which cases were not properly made. And since a soft copy of these cases will be emailed to Atty. Espejo, he will find out if there is a violation of his rule against plagiarism. I believe hes referring to his own digests which we were able to acquire when he gave us a copy of his notes. Or maybe, such prohibition would also apply to jurisprudence wherein no acknowledgement or credits were given to the Court. Moreover, our chance of getting a grade as high as 100 % for this project will get slimmer. Before night fall, this compilation will be submitted to one of the group leaders who will collect the digests of each group and put the documents in a CD. Before submission, I will simply arrange the margins and alignment of the digests. However, I will no longer make any revision for this project since the cases were already assigned more than a week ago. Cases were assigned to each members and it is our responsibility to make it right in accordance with the instructions provided by Atty. Espejo. Thank you and God Bless!

RULE 37 (New Trial and Reconsideration) Jarissa G. Guiani ALABAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS September 23, 2005 Facts: Respondent Providio alleged in his petition for probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Late Soledad Provido Elevencionado, the decedent, that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. The RTC rendered a decision allowing the probate of the will of the decedent and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent. Months later, petitioners filed a motion for reopening of the probate proceedings and an opposition of the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs, as nephews and nieces, of the decedent. They alleged that they were denied their day in court during the probate proceedings before the RTC because they were not notified of the probate of the will which constitutes extrinsic fraud. Hence, they prayed for the annulment of the decision of the RTC on the probate proceedings and a new trial should be allowed. Issue: Whether or not the decision rendered by the RTC should be annulled on the ground of extrinsic fraud for lack of notice during probate proceedings. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The non-inclusion of petitioners' names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. According to the Supreme Court, an action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. When it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, fraud is extrinsic. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. Moreover, the requirement of notice shall be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. The will, subject of controversy, shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners were not instituted by the decedent as her heirs that will make them her compulsory or testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. In this case, respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same. Assuming that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the alleged infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice which is required in proceedings in rem. The proceedings for the probate of the will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition, the courts jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate the decedent. Therefore, even if petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate of the will, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing. Thus, contrary to their claim, petitioners were not denied their day in court because they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.

RULE 37 (New Trial and Reconsideration) Hazel Ivory Laud DE LOS SANTOS vs. ELIZALDE February 2, 2007 FACTS: The herein petitioner and and respondents were declared rightful owners of a disputed lot in a previous case decided on April 29, 1996. Both parties, thereafter , filed their separate Notices of Appeal dated June 6, 1996 and May 16, 1996, respectively. Subsequently, the CA issued the June 2, 1998 Notice to File Brief, requiring petitioners and respondent Elizalde to file their briefs within forty-five (45) days from receipt of said notice. The herein petitioners filed this present petition, alleging that the CAs decision dismissing their appeal for failure to file their respective appellants briefs and considered them withdrawn. Petitioners filed a Prayer for Reinstatement of Appeal on June 17, 1999 which was verified solely by petitioner Vicente delos Santos. In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners alleged that: (1) they did not have any knowledge of the promulgation of the assailed Decision of the CA until June 2, 1999 ; (2) they never entered into any amicable settlement with respondents delos Santos; (3) their alleged signatures in the May 27, 1997 Agreement were forged; and (4) they never authorized their former counsel, Atty. Victoriano, to withdraw their appeal. Thus, petitioners prayed that: (1) their Motion for Reconsideration be considered as filed on time; (2) the said Agreement allegedly entered into by petitioners and respondents delos Santos be considered as invalid; (3) the portion of the assailed Decision dismissing their appeal be reconsidered; (4) their appeal be reinstated; and (5) they be granted a period of ninety (90) days within which to file their appellants brief. CA denied the said motion saying that appellants had only until June 8, 1999 to file their Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: W/N CA erred in denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner. RULING: No. The petition must be denied. Petitioners argue that their Motion for Reconsideration was filed on time as the reglementary period for the filing of it should be counted from the time when petitioners themselves obtained a copy of the assailed Decision of the CA on June 2, 1999, and not from the time that their former counsel, Atty. Victoriano, received a copy of said Decision on May 24, 1999. Reglementary period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration--Section 1 of Rule 37, in conjunction with Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, provides for the period within which a Motion for Reconsideration may be filed, to wit: Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration.Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party: The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the fifteen (15)-day period should run from May 24, 1999, when Atty. Victoriano received a copy of the assailed Decision of the CA, and not from June 2, 1999, when petitioners claimed to have been informed of the CA decision.

RULE 37 (New Trial and Reconsideration) Irish Silverio SUMIRAN vs. SPOUSES DAMASO G.R. No. 162518, August 19, 2009 Facts: Due to favorable judgment on defendants part rendered by the RTC of Antipolo, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated Match 4, 2003, stating that he received a duplicate original copy of the decision on February 21, 2003 but the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal dated May 28, 2003, stating instead that he received a copy of the decision dated January 16, 2003 only on March 8, 2003 and of the Order dated May 9, 2003 denying his motion for reconsideration on May 19, 2003 but the RTC denied in giving due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time, emphasizing that the decision was promulgated on February 21, 2003 in the presence of both parties and their counsels and that he had belatedly filed the notice of appeal when he filed it ten (10) days after allegedly receiving the Order of May 9, 2003 on May 19, 2003. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner on June 20, 2003, but the same was denied by the RTC on October 1, 2003. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. However, the CA found the petition unmeritorious and dismissed the same in its Decision dated December 22, 2003. Ruling that petitioner was bound by his judicial admission that he received the Decision of the RTC when it was promulgated on February 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioners period within which to file an appeal had lapsed by the time the Notice of Appeal was filed on May 29, 2003. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated February 20, 2004. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the Notice of Appeal filed by the petitioner was beyond the period within which to file such an appeal. Ruling: No As early as 2005, the Supreme Court categorically declared in Neypes vs. Court of Appeals that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the Court stated: To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

RULE 37 (New Trial or Reconsideration) Kenneth P. Retuya SPS. RAGUDO vs. FABELLA ESTATE TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC. G.R. No. 146823, August 9, 2005 Facts: Tenants of the estate of Don Fabella organized themselves and formed the Fabella Estate Tenants Association (FETA) for acquiring the property and distributing it to its members. Unable to raise the amount to buy the property they applied for a loan from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). As a precondition for the loan, it required all the tenants to become the members of the FETA. Accordingly the tenants join the FETA. However, the petitioners, who were occupying the lot subject of the controversy, did not join. Consequently, the lot was awarded to Mrs. De Guzman a qualified member of FETA. The latter filed a case of recovery of possession in the RTC which ruled in favor of FETA. On appeal, while the case was pending the Ragudos filed with the appellate court a Motion to Admit Certain Documentary Evidence by Way of Partial New Trial. The CA denied the motion contending that it is not a ground for new trial. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in not admitting the documentary evidence? Ruling: It has been repeatedly enunciated that a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. An exception to this where the counsels mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court or when he is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the clients deprivation of his property without due process of law. Clearly, petitioners case does not fall under the exception. Petitioners, in fact, were given a chance to present evidence in court. Hence, its not a ground for new trial.

RULE 37 (New Trial and Reconsideration) Ivy Rose Paz NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005 (EN BANC) Facts: The petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo. In the course of the proceedings both parties filed various motions with the RTC. Among there were :(1)motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2)motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines. The trial court granted the petitioners motion to declare the respondents in default but denied as against the heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons was improper; the Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied; and the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied. On February 12, 1998 the trial court dismissed the petitioners complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners allegedly received the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. On August 4, 1998, the CA denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. ISSUE: Did the CA err in ruling that the petitioners Notice of Appeal was filed out of time? RULING: The SC ruled in favor of the petitioners. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. The petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998, the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration. To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.

RULE 37 (New Trial and Reconsideration) Muhammad Farzieh B. Abutazil SPOUSES QUE VS CA G.R. No. 150739, August 18, 2005 Facts: Respondent Arrieta filed a complaint against the spouses Que and Adela Urian for the annulment of a quit claim over a lot she inherited from her grandfather. After petitioners received the complaint together with the summonses, they hired the services of Atty. Ranot. However, Atty. Ranot failed to file petitioners Answer. Therefore, respondent moved to declare petitioners in default. Only Urian appeared during the hearing of respondents motion and he also manifested that Atty. Ranot was still preparing the Answer. Respondent presented her evidence ex parte, and the case was submitted for judgment. The quit claim was declared null and void. The petitioners moved for reconsideration or a new trial on the ground that there was mistake and fraud as they were allegedly under the impression that their lawyer had prepared and filed the necessary pleading. The trial court dismissed their motion and so did the Court of Appeals when they appealed. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners petition. Ruling: The petition has no merit. Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the court may grant relief from judgment only when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Because they were allegedly under the impression that Atty. Ranot had prepared and filed the necessary pleading, petitioners, in their petition for relief from judgment in the trial court, alleged that judgment was entered against them through mistake or fraud. However, that is not the fraud or mistake contemplated under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. Mistake, under Section 1 of Rule 38, refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. Fraud, on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court. Obviously, petitioners mistaken assumption that Atty. Ranot had attended to his professional duties is neither mistake nor fraud. Moreover, under Section 1, negligence must be excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to disown his counsels conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the courts ruling. In this case, the Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsels negligence and allowed a litigant another chance to present his case based on the following instances: (1) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when the application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require. However, none of these exceptions are present in the case at bar. Therefore, petition must be dismissed for lack of merit.

RULE 37 (New Trial and Reconsideration) Marceliano Monato III PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK vs. ORTIZ G.R. No. L-49223, May 29, 1987 FACTS: The law firm appeared for PCIB gave its address as 3rd Floor, LTR Building. Holding office in the same LTR Building, at the ground floor, Petitioners lawyers failed to appear at the appointed time. Trial Court rendered judgment for the plaintiff. PCIB's lawyers filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the award of damages was exorbitant, and proferred that their nonappearance is due to the failure of one of their associates lawyer failed to submit pending cases prior to the resignation of the latter. Hence, service of the judgment was inefficacious. Respondent submitted that was no need to append an affidavit of merits to its motion for reconsideration, this being required only when the motion for new trial was based on grounds other than excessive award of damages. ISSUE: WON motion for reconsideration should be granted. HELD: No. The motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and the petitioner failed to attach affidavit of merits. While it is true that the address of record of PCIB's counsel is entered as the "3rd Floor, LRT Building," which is different from that of COMMEX, which is on the "Ground Floor, LRT Building," it is equally true that notices served on the latter had been reaching the former and that, in any event, the PCIB lawyers had never protested such service on them "thru COMMEX."Service of the notice of judgment at the Ground Floor, LRT Building, should be deemed as effective service on PCIB's attorneys. The failure of the receiving clerk to deliver the notice to them on the same day, cannot in any sense be deemed to constitute that excusable negligence as would warrant reconsideration under Section 1 [a], Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Succinctly put, clients are bound by their counsel's mistakes It furthermore appears that no other defense has been asserted by PCIB, whether in an affidavit of merit attached to its two (2) motions for reconsideration or otherwise. It would thus really make no sense to set aside the judgment reopen the case and allow PCIB to present evidence of defenses which are inconsequential, and would not at all negate or mitigate its liability. It is true that when fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence is invoked as ground of a motion for new trial, it should "be proved in the manner provided for proof of motions," i.e., by "affidavits or depositions" unless the court should direct that "the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions." It is also required that "affidavits of merits" be attached to the motion. A motion for new trial grounded on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence should thus ordinarily be accompanied by two (2) affidavits: one, setting forth the facts and circumstances alleged to constitute such fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence; and the other, an affidavit of merits, setting forth the particular facts claimed to constitute the movant's meritorious cause of action or defense. The reason for the first is quite obvious: it is to enable the court to determine if the movant's claim of fraud, etc., is not a mere conclusion but is indeed borne out by the relevant facts. The reason for the second is equally evident: it would be useless, a waste of time, to set aside the judgment and reopen the case to allow the movant to adduce evidence when he has no valid cause of action or meritorious defense. Where, therefore, a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, etc., is unaccompanied by either or both affidavits, the motion is pro forma a scrap of paper, as it were, and will not interrupt the running of the period of appeal. But where, as here, the motion for new trial is founded not only on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also on the ground of "award of excessive damages," as to which no affidavit of fraud, etc., or of merits is required, what being required of the movant being to "point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment" demonstrating the invoked ground, the motion cannot be denied as pro forma simply because no affidavit of merits is appended thereto, provided there

be a specification of the findings or conclusions of the judgment alleged to be erroneous because awarding excessive damages. The tenability of the grounds is dependent upon different premises. The untenability of one does not of itself, render the other unmeritorious.

RULE 37 (New Trial and Reconsideration) Francis Mark Layog MARIKINA VALLEY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. FLOJO G.R. No. 110801 December 8, 1995

Facts: Jose Reyes Sytangco instituted a complaint for reconveyance of a piece of land against petitioner Marikina Valley Development Corporation ("Marikina Valley") and Milagros Liamzon. Jose Reyes Sytangco alleged that he entrusted some funds to Milagros Liamzon in order to purchase a property from its former owners. Milagros Liamzon, however, in alleged violation of the trust reposed upon her, purchased the property in her own name and had title to the same registered in her name. Thereafter, she transferred title over that property to petitioner Marikina Valley, a closed corporation owned by the Liamzon family. The trial court ruled in favor of Sytangco. The trial court directed petitioner Marikina Valley to execute a Deed of Conveyance covering the property involved in favor of Sytangco. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. Reyes Sytangco opposed petitioners' motion for reconsideration upon the ground that it was a pro forma one. He contended that the allegations of insufficiency of evidence were couched in very general terms, contrary to the requirements of Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration of Petitioners is pro forma. Held: No. The rule in our jurisdiction is that a party aggrieved by a decision of a trial court may move to set aside the decision and reconsideration thereof may be granted when (a) the judgment had awarded "excessive damages;" (b) there was "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision;" or (c) "the decision was against the law." A motion for reconsideration based on ground (b) or (c) above must point out specifically the findings and conclusions of the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings and conclusions. The movant is also required to point out succinctly why reconsideration is warranted. In Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Court of Industrial Relations, the Supreme Court declared that it is not enough that a motion for reconsideration should state what part of the decision is contrary to law or the evidence; it should also point out why it is so. Failure to explain why will render the motion for reconsideration pro forma. In paragraph (a) of their motion, petitioners claimed that the evidence submitted was insufficient to show that the downpayment for the purchase of the Espaa Street property had in fact come from private respondents' predecessor-ininterest Jose Reyes Sytangco. The trial court had not discussed the presumption of regularity of private transactions invoked by petitioners. In paragraph (b) of their motion, petitioners, building upon their paragraph (a), argued that since the money used to pay the property did not belong to the plaintiff, no constructive trust arose between Jose Reyes Sytangco and Milagros Liamzon. Accordingly, they argue that the Reyes Sytangco spouses would be entitled only to reimbursement of the downpayment and not to reconveyance of the property itself. The trial court had not addressed this argument in its decision.

RULE 37 (New Trial and Reconsideration) Geoffrey P. Navarra Jr. LAMBERTO CASALLA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and MILAGROS S. ESTEVANES G.R. No. 138855, October 29, 2002 FACTS: Private respondent filed two (2) criminal complaints against petitioner for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22). The MTC of Pasig City rendered a decision convicting the accused (petitioner herein) of the crime charged on two (2) counts.Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, petitioner interposed an appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. Dissatisfied with the decision of the court a quo, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration on account of the absence of a notice of hearing and because the issues raised therein have already been passed upon in its decision. Petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, private respondent filed with the RTC a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution which was subsequently opposed by petitioner. Thereafter, the court a quo denied petitioner's second motion for reconsideration and granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ of execution was issued by the court directing public respondent Deputy Sheriff Jose R. Santos to cause the execution of the judgment. Petitioner interposed an appeal via a petition for review with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The appellate court nonetheless promulgated its decision denying the appeal for lack of merit.In its decision, the Court of Appeals noted that the petition before did not contain a statement of material dates showing the timeliness of the petition. It also maintained that the petition was filed out of time, because the motion to reconsider the decision of the trial court did not contain a notice of hearing. Hence, being a mere scrap of paper, it did not interrupt the period for filing the petition before the appellate court, and the period had lapsed before the petition was filed. It also ruled that petitioner's second motion was not only a prohibited pleading but it was also filed out of time. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for review and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. RULING: NO. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court on February 1, 1995. From that date, he had 15 days, or until February 16, 1995, to file a motion for reconsideration. On February 8, 1995, petitioner did file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision. The motion, however, lacked a notice of hearing. Under the present rules, the notice of hearing is expressly made a requirement. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner with the Regional Trial Court did not contain any notice of hearing. It was therefore pro forma; hence, it did not suspend the running of the prescriptive period. This defect was not cured by the filing of a second motion for reconsideration, which is prohibited under the rules.

RULE 38 (Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other proceedings) Jarissa G. Guiani REDEA vs. COURT OF APPEALS February 6, 2007 Facts:

The controversy of this case started when Tancredo filed an action for partition against his older half-brother, Leocadio Redea before the Court of First Instance. The complaint for partition alleges that plaintiff Tancredo and defendant Leocadio are both sons of Maximo who left several pieces of realty when he died. Based on the evidence presented, the RTC partitioned the Maate property, coowned by them, only. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. The RTC gave due course to the notice of appeal and directed the elevation of the records of the case to the CA. The CA issued a resolution directing petitioner, as appellant, to file his appellants brief. However, the CA considered the appeal abandoned and dismissed the same when no appellants brief was filed. Eight months after such resolution, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA again denied. Therefore, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief citing Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court praying that the dismissal resolution should be set aside when he failed to file his appellants brief and grant him a fresh period of forty-five (45) days from notice within which to file his appellants brief. However, the same was denied. Issue: Is the remedy petition for relief available before the Court of Appeals? Ruling: No. It is not available. Under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, petition for relief is of equitable character. It is allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. It may not be availed of# where a party has another adequate remedy available to him, which is either a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision of the lower court, and he is not prevented from filing such motion or taking the appeal. The rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effect of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law is due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure taken by counsel Citing Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court held that, a party who is prevented from taking an appeal from a judgment or final order of a court by reason of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, may file in the same court and in the same case a petition for relief praying that his appeal be given due course. This presupposes that no appeal was taken precisely because of any of the reasons mentioned which prevented him from appealing his case. Hence, a petition for relief under Rule 38 cannot be availed of in the CA, the latter being a court of appellate jurisdiction. Moreover, under the present rules, petitions for relief from a judgment, final order or other proceeding rendered or taken should be filed in and resolved by the court in the same case from which the petition arose. Thus, petition for relief from a judgment, final order or proceeding involved in a case tried by a municipal trial court shall be filed in and decided by the same court in the same case, just like the procedure followed in the present Regional Trial Court The record shows in this case that petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, which the latter granted and thereafter ordered the elevation of the records to the CA. The CA required him, thru his former counsel, to file his appellants brief. However, he failed to do so. Hence, the CA considered his appeal abandoned and dismissed the same accordingly. Furthermore, his motion for reconsideration was also denied for having been filed out of time.

RULE 38 ((Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other proceedings) Hazel Ivory Laud JULIO B. PURCON, JR. vs. MRM PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. No. 182718, September 26, 2008 FACTS: The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner before the NLRC.

Petitioner worked as a seaman for the respondent MRM Philippines, Inc. During his employment with MRM, he suffered hernia for which he was repatriated to the Philippines. When he reported back, he was told by MRM that there was no vacancy for him. NLRC dismissed the complaint for utter of merit. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the CA. CA dismissed the case due to formal infirmities. The he filed petitioner with this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Resolutions of the CA, which dismissed his petition for certiorari. When such petition was denied by SC, he then filed this instant petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38. ISSUE: Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from Our resolution denying his petition for review? RULING: No. A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme Court. In Dela Cruz v. Andres,10 We reiterated Our pronouncement in Mesina v. 11 Meer, that a petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Court explained that under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court which rendered the decision, viz.: Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. (Underscoring supplied) While Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts Procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court.15 It may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA. There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this Court. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available before said Court such as annulment of judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.

RULE 38 (Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other proceedings) Irish Silverio CAYETANO vs. CEGUERRA 13 SCRA 73

Facts: Plaintiff, Catalina Cayetano, instituted a civil case for Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage, against defendants-spouses Ceguerra and Serrano. Summons and copy of the complaint for foreclosure were served on the defendants on December 2, 1960, and on December 15, 1960, within the reglementary period, the defendants filed an Answer in the form of a letter. In spite of the above letteranswer, the defendants were, upon motion of plaintiff declared in default and plaintiff was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte wherein the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. It appears that this decision never became known to appellants-spouses, the same having been returned to the Court, as unclaimed. Under date of April 21, 1961, defendants were served with a copy of a Writ of Execution, dated February 10, 1961, addressed to the Sheriff, commanding the latter to seize the goods and chattels of the defendants-appellants in order to satisfy the judgment. Counsel for defendants presented a Petition for Relief, based on the following grounds: (1) the answer-letter was a substantial compliance with the rules, for it contained facts upon which defendants relied upon as defenses, and if said letter-answer did not conform with the rules, the non-conformity could be considered "an excusable mistake" taking into account that defendants are mere ordinary lay-men not cognizant with the intricacies of the Rules of Court; virtual law library (2) the defendants have substantial and valid defenses, which were contained in the letter-answer; virtual law library (3) that defendants have been deprived of their day in court. Issue: Whether or not the Petition for Relief could be given due course. Ruling: Yes Even if granting, for purposes of argument, that defendants were validly declared in default, still the petition for relief is considered to have been filed on time. A petition for relief may likewise be taken from the order of execution, inasmuch as Sec. 2, Rule 38 Rules of Court, does not only refer to judgments, but also to orders, or any other proceedings (PHHC v. Tiongco & Escasa, L-18891, Nov. 28, 1964). From the time they had actual knowledge of the order of execution, on April 21, 1961, until the filing of the petition for relief, on June 17, 1961, only 57 days had elapsed. Defendants having received a first registry notice on January 13, 1961, but they did not claim the letter, gives rise to the presumption that five (5) days after receipt of the first notice, the defendants were deemed to have receive the letter. However, it cannot justly attribute upon defendants actual knowledge of the decision, because there is no showing that the registry notice itself contained any indication that the registered letter was a copy of the decision, or that the registry notice referred to the case being ventilated.

RULE 38 (Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other proceedings) Ivy Rose Paz LINA vs. COURT OF APPEALS# G.R. No. L-63397, 9 April 1985, 135 SCRA 637 FACTS: On March 31, 1982, private respondent Northern Motors, Inc. filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a case for sum of money with damages. On April 22, 1982, petitioner Alex Lina was served with summons together with a copy of the complaint. On May 8, 1982, when no answer or motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner, Northern Motors, Inc. filed a motion to declare him in default. The motion was set for hearing on May 21, 1982. Mr. Lina filed his opposition to the aforesaid motion inviting attention to the fact that he had filed a motion for extension of time to file responsive pleading within the reglementary period. The CFI was unaware

that on May 5, 1982, the petitioner had sent to it, by registered mail, a motion for extension of twenty days from May 7, 1982, within which to file an answer, and which motion was received by the respondent court only on May 19, 1982. But, the CFI judge issued an order declaring Mr. Lina in default and allowing Northern Motors, Inc. to adduce its evidence ex parte. On May 27, 1982, petitioner filed his answer to the complaint. But CFI rendered its decision in favor of Northern Motors, Inc.This prompted petitioner to file a motion to set aside this decision. On August 25, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying petitioner's motion to set aside decision, prompting the petitioner to file with the CA a petition for certiorari/prohibition, but this petition was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari is proper in a case where judgment by default was rendered without an order of default being furnished petitioner and where meritorious defenses exist, which are for the trial court to evaluate and which evaluation was not done in this case. RULING: NO. The granting of additional time within which to file an answer to a complaint is a matter largely addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. "While trial courts are persuaded, as a matter of policy, to adopt a basically flexible attitude in favor of the defendant in this area of our adjective law, the defense should never be lulled into the belief that whenever trial courts refuse a second request for extension to file an answer, the appellate courts will grant relief (Naga Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 41 SCRA 105)." In the case at bar, it was on May 5, 1982 or 2 days before the expiration of the 15day reglementary period given to defendant to file his responsive pleading when petitioner moved for an extension of 20 days from May 7 within which to file his answer. Upon motion of private respondent and over the objection of petitioner, respondent judge issued an order declaring petitioner in default. Under the Rules of Court, the remedies available to a defendant in the CFI (now RTC) are: a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense; (Sec. 3, Rule 18) b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37; c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41). Petitioner in this case did not avail himself of any of the above remedies. Instead, he went to the appellate court on certiorari/prohibition. Where judgment rendered by the respondent court is the one sought to be annulled, a petition for relief, under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is a remedy in the ordinary course of law, could have been just as plain, adequate and speedy as certiorari. Such a remedy could have been granted by the respondent court. If the respondent court still denies the petition, then petitioner can take an appeal on the order denying the petition, and in the course of such appeal petitioner can also assail the judgment on the merits upon the ground that it is supported by the evidence, or it is contrary to law.

RULE 38 (Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other Proceedings) Geoffrey P. Navarra, Jr. TANCREDO REDEA vs. CA and REDEA G.R. No. 146611, February 6, 2007 Facts: An action for partition filed by petitioner Tancredo against his older halfbrother, herein private respondent Leocadio Redea before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court [RTC]).Subsequently, there being no appellants brief filed within the extended period, the CA issued a resolution considering the appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissing the same. Eight (8) months after the CA issued the resolution, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereof. the CA however denied the motion.

Then, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief anchored on Section 2, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In that pleading, petitioner prays the CA to set aside its dismissal resolution, reinstate his appeal and grant him a fresh period of forty-five (45) days from notice within which to file his appellants brief. However, the CA denied the aforementioned Petition for Relief. But even as the CA stood firm on its stand that a petition for relief from denial of appeal is not among the remedies available before the CA itself, the appellate court, in the same Resolution of November 16, 2000, left the final determination of the question to this Court. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled for the relief he prayed for. RULING: No. A petition for relief may not be availed of where a party has another adequate remedy available to him, which is either a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision of the lower court, and he is not prevented from filing such motion or taking the appeal. The rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effect of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law is due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure taken by counsel. Here, the record shows that petitioner in fact filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, which the latter granted in its order of December 11, 1997 and ordered the elevation of the records to the CA. In turn, the CA, in its resolution of September 28, 1998, required the petitioner, thru his former counsel, Atty. Geminiano Almeda, to file his appellants brief. But petitioner failed to comply. Consequently, in its resolution of March 9, 1999, the CA considered the appellants appeal as ABANDONED and DISMISSED the same. To recapitulate, petitioner is not entitled to relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. He was not prevented from filing his notice of appeal by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, as in fact he filed one. The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel. The Rules allow a petition for relief only when there is no other available remedy, and not when litigants, like the petitioner, lose a remedy by negligence.

RULE 38 (Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other Proceedings) Jarissa G. Guiani TRUST INTERNATIONAL PAPER CORPORATION vs. PELAEZ AUGUST 22, 2006 Facts: Respondent Pelaezs last promotion took place in 1993 when she was appointed as Corporate Cashier by petitioner-corporation. By reason of the corporations substantial business losses, it implemented cost-cutting and streamlining programs to alleviate its financial predicament. One of the positions which was abolished and declared to be redundant was the position of Corporate Cashier held by respondent Pelaez. Hence, she was terminated. However, she found out the creation of the position of Treasury Clerk in petitioner's plantilla which has the same job description and responsibilities as that of Corporate Cashier. This prompted respondent to file a Complaint against petitioner-corporation for illegal dismissal, non-payment/underpayment of salaries, separation pay, retirement benefits, service incentive leave and sick leave benefits, and damages before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner-corporation is guilty of illegal

dismissal and awarded to respondent backwages, separation pay and damages. On appeal before the NLRC however, it affirmed the validity of petitioner's redundancy program. After the denial of her motion for reconsideration, she filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court arguing that grave abuse of discretion was committed by the NLRC in setting aside the Labor Arbiter's Decision despite having been duly supported by the facts and the law which was granted by the CA. Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the CA anchoring its petition on the 'excusable negligence of its counsel Siguion Reyna law firm and the gross negligence of one of its counsel. Issue: Whether or not petitioner-corporations motion for relief from judgment should be granted. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The denial of a petition for relief from judgment can only be assailed before the Supreme Court via a special civil action under Rule 65 and not through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In availing of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to obtain the reversal of the Court of Appeals' Resolutions denying its petition for relief from judgment, petitioner certainly has made use of the wrong remedy. In Mercury Drug Corporation, the Court ruled that a petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence In Sarraga, the petition for relief from judgment was granted due to the attending circumstance where the counsel of record was grossly negligent in defending the cause of the client. On the other hand, in the present case, petitioner is placing the blame on the alleged gross negligence of an attorney who was not even been shown to have participated in the proceedings of the case. In Heirs of Antonio Pael, this Court found that there was a showing of 'badges of fraud displayed by the counsel of the unsuccessful party when he resorted to two clearly inconsistent remedies, namely appeal and motion for new trial. In contrast, the instant case merely illustrates a scenario where a counsel committed a simple and inexcusable negligence to the prejudice of the client. RULE 38 (Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other Proceedings) Hazel Ivory Laud JULIO B. PURCON, JR. vs. MRM PHILIPPINES, INC. FACTS: The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner before the NLRC. Petitioner worked as a seaman for the respondent MRM Philippines, Inc. During his employment with MRM, he suffered hernia for which he was repatriated to the Philippines. When he reported back, he was told by MRM that there was no vacancy for him. NLRC dismissed the complaint for utter of merit. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the CA. CA dismissed the case due to formal infirmities. The he filed petitioner with this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Resolutions of the CA, which dismissed his petition for certiorari. When such petition was denied by SC, he then filed this instant petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38. ISSUE: Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from Our resolution denying his petition for review? RULING: No. A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme Court. In Dela Cruz v. Andres,10 We reiterated Our pronouncement in Mesina v. 11 Meer, that a petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Court explained that under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court which rendered the decision, viz.: Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. (Underscoring supplied) While Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts Procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court. It may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA. There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this Court. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available before said Court such as annulment of judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Irish Silverio EQUATORIAL REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. MAYFAIR THEATER 332 SCRA 139 Facts: The Supreme Court promulgated its decision in Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. and Carmelo and Bauermann, Inc. vs. Mayfair Theater, Inc., whereby the Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioners Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. and Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. is hereby deemed rescinded. Carmelo and Bauermann is ordered to return to Equatorial Realty Development the purchase price. The latter is directed to execute the deeds and documents necessary to return ownership to Carmelo & Bauermann of the disputed lots. Carmelo & Bauermann is ordered to allow Mayfair Theater, Inc. to buy the lots for P11,300,000.00. Respondent thereafter filed with the RTC a motion for writ of execution of the judgment which the latter granted in an order. Equatorial filed a

motion for reconsideration of the order, the recall and/or quashal of the writ of execution and the notice to comply, on the ground that the order of execution did not conform to the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court's decision but was denied. Issue: Whether or not the orders of execution of the trial court inconsistent and at variance with the dispositive portion of the SCs decision. Ruling: Yes A writ of execution must conform to the judgment to be executed and adhere strictly to the very essential particulars. An order of execution, which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof, is a nullity. The writ of execution "may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life, and in fact exceeds it, has pro tanto no validity. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his property without due process of law." In issuing the questioned orders, the trial court exceeded its authority by altering the essential portions of the Supreme Court decision.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Ivy Rose Paz GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA vs. JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL June 30, 2006 Facts: JANCOM won a contract for the MMDAs San Mateo waste management project. A build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contract for the project was signed between Jancom and the Philippine Government. The contract was never signed by President Ramos as it was too close to the end of his term. He endorsed it to President Estrada, but Estrada refused to sign it, thus the BOT contract was not pursued and implemented. Subsequently, Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee published another call for proposals for solid waste management projects for Metro Manila. Jancom filed a petition with the Pasig RTC asking the court to declare as void the resolution of the Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee disregarding the BOT contract with Jancom and the call for bids for a new waste management contract. RTC ruled in favor of JANCOM which prompted MMDA to file with CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order. CA dismissed the petition, and SC affirmed the CAs decision and declared the contract valid and perfected but ineffective and unimplementable pending approval by the President. On November 3, 2002, MMDA forwarded the contract to the Office of the President for appropriate action. However, on June 23, 2003 the RTC issued an Alias Writ of Execution prohibiting and enjoining GMMSWM Committee from implementing its resolution and for calling out for bids for a new contract. The petitioner challenged the RTC via petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the CA. CA denied the petition and ruled that the fact that Jancom contract has been declared unimplementable without the Presidents signature, would not excuse petitioners failure to comply with their undertakings to JANCOM. Issue: Is the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the RTC proper?

Ruling: No. Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. There are instances, however, when an error may be committed in the course of execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These instances call for correction by a superior court, as where: 1) the writ of execution varies the judgment; 2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; 3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; 4) it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court; 5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or 6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority. A writ of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, substantially to every essential particular thereof, it is settled. It may not thus vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor go beyond its terms. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has no validity. In issuing the alias writ of execution, the trial court in effect ordered the enforcement of the contract despite this Courts unequivocal pronouncement that albeit valid and perfected, the contract shall become effective only upon approval by the President. Indubitably, the alias writ of execution varied the tenor of this Courts judgment, went against essential portions and exceeded the terms thereof. The execution directed by the trial court being out of harmony with the judgment, legal implications cannot save it from being found to be fatally defective. RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Kenneth Retuya VALDEZ vs. FINANCIERA MANILA G.R. No. 183387, September 29, 2009 Facts: Petitioner and his wife, Lydia D. Valdez, among others, filed a Complaint for a sum of money against respondent Financiera Manila, Inc. Thereafter, the RTC rendered its Decision finding respondent Financiera liable to plaintiffs. An appeal was then filed with the CA, which affirmed the award of actual damages and remanded the case to the RTC for the determination of the award for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees. Subsequently, Compromise Agreements were entered into among the parties. The said Compromise Agreements were approved. A writ of execution was issued. The plaintiffs however filed a motion for the rescission of the Compromise Agreement on the ground that no payment was expected from respondent Financiera. The motion was denied by the court. Respondent Financiera filed an Urgent Motion for Execution dated November 13, 2006 of the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q-98-35546. Petitioner Valdez, on the other hand, filed a motion for the execution. The RTC of Quezon City, Branch 227 denied respondent Financiera's urgent motion and granted petitioner Valdez's motion for execution. Thereafter, respondent Financiera filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which was eventually denied, prompting it to file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Valdez; hence, the latter now resorts to the present petition and ascribes to the CA. Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals has no jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari filed by respondent.

Ruling: Considering that an appeal was still available as a remedy for the assailed Orders of the RTC, the filing of the petition for certiorari was an attempted substitute for an appeal. Necessarily, it must be noted that the petition for certiorari was filed on August 28, 2007 when the questioned RTC Orders had already attained finality. The Order became final when respondent Financiera received the RTC Order of June 18, 2007 denying the formers motion for reconsideration on June 29, 2007. Instead of filing a notice of appeal within the reglementary period lasting until July 14, 2007, respondent filed a petition for certiorari, way beyond the reglementary period.. Hence, the CA had no jurisdiction to decide the said petition for certiorari.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Muhammad Farzieh B. Abutazil NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION VS ABAYARI Facts: Petitioner, National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation is a GOCC with its own charter has in its employ respondents, mostly rank-in-file who claim they were hired after June 30, 1989. They claim additional benefits as provided by R.A. No. 6758. To implement the law the DBM issued a circular excluding those who were already incumbent as of June 30, 1989 and who were actually receiving the said benefits. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus with the trial court which subsequently granted it. The conflict arose when the DBM sent a letter to petitioner disallowing certain allowances, including those granted by the trial court. Respondents then filed for the execution of the trial courts decision, which it subsequently granted. They sought for the garnishment of petitioners funds under the custody of the Land Bank of the Philippines. Petitioner appealed through certiorari, citing grave abuse of discretion with the Court of Appeals, the latter dismissed the same finding the case lacking in merit. Issue: Whether or not the execution of the judgment is allowed in this case. Ruling: No, a favorable judgment rendered in a special civil action for mandamus is in the nature of a special judgment. As such, it requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money or the sale or delivery of real or personal property the execution of which is governed by Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court39 which states: Execution of Special Judgment.When the judgment requires the performance of any act other than those mentioned in the two preceding sections, a certified copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same

is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment. While the April 17, 2001 Decision of the trial court ordered petitioner to pay the benefits claimed by respondents, it by no means ordered the payment of a specific sum of money and instead merely directed petitioner to extend to respondents the benefits under R.A. No. 6758 and its implementing rules. Being a special judgment, the decision may not be executed in the same way as a judgment for money handed down in an ordinary civil case governed by Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules Court which sanctions garnishment of debts and credits to satisfy a monetary award. Garnishment is proper only when the judgment to be enforced is one for payment of a sum of money. It cannot be employed to implement a special judgment such as that rendered in a special civil action for mandamus.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Marceliano Monato III A & C MINIMART CORPORATION, vs. VILLAREAL, et.al G.R. No. 172268, October 10, 2007 Facts: RTC issued a Writ of Execution requiring petitioner to deposit an amount of rental plus 12% yearly interest, computed from the date of petitioners receipt of the demand letter. Respondents filed a Motion for Recomputation claiming that the computation should include a monthly interest of 3% on the total amount of rental and other charges not paid on time, in accordance with the Contract of Lease. However, RTC denied respondents motion prompting the latter to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, before the Court of Appeals, which ruled in favor of the respondents. In the assailed Decision, the appellate court found that petitioner consigned the rental payments after they fell due and, thus, it ruled that the 3% interest stipulated in the Contract of Lease should be imposed. Petitioner avers that the respondents should have filed with the Court of Appeals an ordinary appeal instead of a special civil action for certiorari, when it questioned the computation made by the Paraaque RTC, Branch 194, of the rentals due the owner of the subject property. ISSUE: What is the proper remedy against the order of execution. HELD: The proper remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: (f) an order of execution; In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. It is explicit from the afore-quoted provision that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution; instead, such order may be challenged by the aggrieved party via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Respondents filed the petition to question the Writ of Execution issued by RTC, which computed the rentals to be paid by the petitioner to whoever is declared the owner of the subject property, without including the 3% penalty interest stipulated in the Lease Contract. Contrary to the position taken by the petitioner, respondents recourse to an appeal would have been unavailing under Section 1, Rule 41, of the

Rules of Court. The filing of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was the proper remedy questioning an order of execution.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Francis Mark Layog PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 73162 October 23, 1989 Ponente: MEDIALDEA, J. Facts: Private respondent Emiliana C. Doblon filed an action against petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank for reformation of instrument and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court. The court rendered a summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Meanwhile, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued M.B. Resolution No. 364, thereby placing Philippine Veterans Bank under receivership. Private respondent Emiliana Doblon filed an ex-parte motion for alias writ of execution which was opposed by the petitioner bank on the ground that the latter is under receivership and that all claims against it cannot be enforced until after liquidation. On the same date, the respondent judge granted the said motion for the writ of execution. Issue: Whether or not the judgment of the Regional Trial Court which awarded damages to private respondent Emiliana Doblon, can be legally enforced against petitioner by execution, after petitioner has been placed under liquidation by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank. Held: No. Petitioner contends that the final judgment in must be satisfied in the liquidation proceedings considering that the assets of petitioner are already in custodia legis of the liquidator, and that the sales at public auction conducted by the respondent sheriff to enforce the writ of execution issued by respondent judge are illegal and void. The rule that once a decision has become final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain exceptions as in cases of special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution; or whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice; or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which would render the execution of the judgment unjust (Lipana v. Development Bank of Rizal, No. L-73884, September 24, 1987). In the instant case, there is no doubt that the decision of the trial court has become final and executory, which fact was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, and by this Court. It is significant to note, however, that respondent judge issued a writ of execution to enforce the judgment against petitioner, after the petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank has already been placed under receivership by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank. The fact that petitioner was placed under receivership is a supervening event that renders a judgment, notwithstanding its finality, unenforceable by attachment or execution.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Geoffrey P. Navarra, Jr. SAMPAGUITA GARMENTS CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION) and EMILIA B. SANTOS G.R. No. 102406 June 17, 1994 FACTS: Sampaguita dismissed Santos. She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal but the labor arbiter sustained the company. However, his decision was reversed by the NLRC, which ordered her reinstatement with back wages from the time of her illegal suspension until her actual reinstatement. Meantime, the petitioner had also filed a criminal action against Santos for the same offense in the Municipal Trial Court of Caloocan City. After trial, she was found guilty and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor as minimum to 4 months of arresto mayor as maximum. This decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. In G.R. No. 89323, this Court dismissed the petition for certiorari against the decision of the NLRC for lack of a showing that it was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. In G.R. No. 100929, this Court saw no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the petitioners conviction by the Municipal Trial Court as affirmed by the Regional Trial Court. The decisions in both cases became final and executory and the corresponding entries of judgment were eventually made. Subsequently, Santos moved for the execution of the NLRC decision. The petitioner opposed, invoking her conviction in the criminal case. However, the NLRC sustained her on the ground that its decision had been affirmed by this Court and had long become final and executory. Sampaguita then came to this Court for relief. ISSUE: whether or not the decision of the NLRC calling for reinstatement and the payment of back wages to petitioner should be enforced. RULING: It is true that once a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed except only for the correction of clerical errors or where supervening events render its execution impossible or unjust. In the latter event, the interested party may ask the court to modify the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the facts. There is no dispute in the case at bar that the decision of the respondent NLRC ordering the private respondents reinstatement with back wages had indeed become final and executory. Even so, we find, in light of the subsequent developments, that the NLRC was not correct in sustaining the implementation of that decision.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Jarissa G. Guiani VALENZONA vs. CA 226 SCRA 36 Facts: A complaint was filed by private respondents for recovery of inheritance, real property with damages against petitioner before the RTC which ruled in favor of the former. Petitioner filed with the court a quo a "Motion for Approval of Defendants' Accounting And Proposal of Partition." The private respondents objected and filed a "Motion and Opposition To Accounting." Hence, the court appointed a Commissioner on Accounting. Thereafter, an Alias Writ of Execution was implemented by the Sheriff which was returned "partially satisfied." Private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a Second Alias Writ of Execution, which the court a quo granted. Petitioner moved to set aside the second alias writ of execution. The trial court denied the said motion and directed the issuance of a third alias writ of execution which was returned unsatisfied. Again, the petitioner moved to quash the third alias writ of execution with a prayer to stay the order denying the motion to set aside third alias writ of execution on the grounds that the writ of execution varies the terms of the judgment and that there has been a change in the situation of the parties which renders the execution inequitable. Issue: Whether or not private respondents' act of forcibly taking possession of the land in question is a fact or circumstance that has changed the situation of the parties thereby making the execution of the judgment inequitable or unjust. Ruling: While the rule is that a stay of execution of a final judgment may be authorized if necessary to accomplish the ends of justice, as for instance, where there has been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable, nevertheless the said rule cannot be invoked when the supposed change in the circumstances of the parties took place while the case was pending, for the reason that there was then no excuse for not bringing to the attention of the court the fact or circumstance that affects the outcome of the case. In this case, the supposed change in the situation of the parties took place while Civil Case No. B-778 (a complaint for recovery of inheritance, real property with damages) was still pending in the court below. Thus, as claimed by petitioner, the private respondents took possession of the property in question on 15 May 1987. The court a quo rendered its decision only on 30 June 1988. However, petitioner did not bring up the matter to the attention of the court. Moreover, Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides, among others, that "Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment or order directing an accounting in an action, shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal." If a judgment or order directing an accounting is not stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of the appeal, with more reason the judgment of the court in the

present case directing an accounting cannot be stayed since it has already become final and executory.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Hazel Ivory Laud GEOLOGISTICS, INC. vs. GATEWAY ELECTRONICS CORPORATION and FIRST LEPANTO TAISHO INSURANCE, CORPORATION FACTS: Petitioner Geologistics, Inc., formerly known as LEP International Philippines, Inc.,a freight forwarding and customs brokerage, instituted an action for the recovery of sum of money against respondent Gateway Electronic Corporation (respondent Gateway) before the RTC.RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and subsequently issued a writ of preliminary attachment on the properties of respondent Gateway. Petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal for the following "good reasons": (1) respondent Gateway was guilty of fraud in contracting its obligations to petitioner; (2) the appeal was interposed to delay the case; (3) respondent Gateway had ceased operations and was in imminent danger of insolvency; and (4) the counter-bond posted by respondent Gateway could be the subject of execution.RTC granted the motion and a writ of execution was implemented. Respondents filed Rule 65 petitions before the Court of Appeals arguing that no good reason existed to justify execution pending appeal especially considering the fact that the case had already been elevated on appeal.CA ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, this present petition. ISSUE: Whether a sufficient ground exists warranting the discretionary execution of the RTC decision. RULING: The rule on execution pending appeal, which is now termed discretionary execution under Rule 39, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, must be strictly construed being an exception to the general rule. Discretionary execution of appealed judgments may be allowed upon concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order. The yardstick remains the presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of exceptional circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer, should the appealed judgment be reversed later. Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule, the existence of good reasons is essential. The Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or give examples of "good reasons" to justify execution. The determination of what is a good reason must, necessarily, be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The grounds cited by the RTC in allowing the discretionary execution of its decision cannot be considered "good reasons." The alleged admission by respondent Gateway of its liability is more apparent than real because the issue of liability is precisely the reason the case was elevated on appeal. The exact amount of respondent Gateways liability to petitioner remains under dispute even if, as

claimed by petitioner, the evidence on record indicates that respondent Gateways obligation is almost a certainty. Precisely the appeal process must be allowed to take its course all the way to the finality of judgment to determine once and for all the incidents of the suit. The fact alone that in the certiorari proceeding, the Court of Appeals also found respondent Gateway to have admitted its liability for a different amount is not automatically considered as a "good reason" to order discretionary execution.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Irish Silverio CITY OF BACOLOD vs. ENRIQUEZ 101 Phil. 644 Facts: The CFI of Occidental Negros favored private respondents herein in its judgment in the case entitled "Jesus Quiatchon, Jose T. Real, Manuel Cabiles & Alfredo T. Schwab vs. Manuel Villanueva, in his capacity as Acting Mayor of the City of Bacolod," which was an action for mandamus to compel the defendant to reinstate the plaintiffs as policeman of said city and to pay them their salaries during the period of their ouster in addition to moral and exemplary damages But before the appeal was perfected, the court, at the instance of the petitioners and over the objection of the defendant, issued an order for the immediate execution of the judgment. Reconsideration of the order having been denied, the City of Bacolod, in conjunction with the defendant, filed this present petition for certiorari to enjoin the respondent Judge from compelling the petitioner Manuel Villanueva to reinstate the respondents policeman and to annul the said order of immediate execution insofar as it would authorize a levy on the properties of the city to satisfy the judgment for the payment of the policemen's salaries during the period of their ouster. Answering the petition, the respondents set up the defense that the issuance of the order complained of is authorized by section 2 of Rule 39 and that, as provided in that same action, petitioner's remedy is to file a bond to stay execution. Issue: Whether or not the order of the CFI for the immediate execution of its judgment can be given due course. Ruling: No Section 2 of Rule 39 allows execution to issue pending appeal. But such execution can only be issued against one who is a party to the action and not against one who, not being a party in the case, has not yet had his day in court (Tayson and Angeles vs. Ycasiano, et al. G.R. L-2283, May 31, 1949; Manza vs. Santiago, etc., G.R. L-7830, April 30, 1955l Angara vs. Gorospe, et al., G.R. L-9230, April 22, 1957). The record shows that the city of Bacolod was not made a party to the case of mandamus filed against its acting mayor. The order of execution is specially directed to the acting mayor and the city treasurer, and not to the city itself but it is the city being made to satisfy that part of the judgment in the case. In authorizing execution before appeal, the said section 2 of Rule 39 requires that such execution be allowed only "upon good reasons to be stated in the special

order." Accordingly, execution should be granted only when these considerations are clearly outweighed by superior circumstances demanding urgency, and the above provision requires a statement of those circumstances as a security for their existence." (1 Moran on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 794, citing Aguilos vs. Barrios, et al., 72 Phil. 285.) Respondent Judges justification in his order for allowing execution pending appeal is untenable as resorted to only for purposes of delay. While the issuance of immediate execution under section 2 of Rule 39 is discretionary with the trial court, that discretion has not been properly exercised in the case at bar.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Ivy Rose Paz INTRAMUROS TENNIS CLUB, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS 341 SCRA 90 FACTS: Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) owns the Victoria Tennis Courts located in Intramuros. In a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), PTA transferred the management of the Victoria Tennis Courts to petitioner Philippine Tennis Association (PHILTA) for a period of 10 years commencing on June 15, 1987. Petitioner Intramuros Tennis Club (ITC) is an affiliate of PHILTA. During the effectivity of the MOA, PTA ordered the surrender of the possession of the courts for PHILTAs alleged violations of the MOA. ITC instituted a case for preliminary injunction, damages, and prayer for temporary restraining order with the RTC of Manila alleging that PTAs demand to vacate was a unilateral pre-termination of the MOA and ITC stands to sustain liabilities because of it. The RTC granted the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction filed by ITC. But, on June 16, 1997, PTA filed a motion to dismiss because the expiration of the MOA ITCs cause of action was rendered moot and academic which the RTC granted. ITC appealed to CA, while the case was pending therewith PTA filed a motion for execution of judgment pending appeal invoking that under Section 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court judgments in actions for injunction are not stayed by appeals. The motion alleged that there was an urgent necessity on the part of PTA to immediately take possession of the tennis courts on the ground of ITCs failure to keep it in good condition. CA granted the execution of judgment pending appeal. In ITCs motion for reconsideration, it argued that CA should have conducted hearings to ascertain if there were good reasons to issue the writ of execution pending appeal. This motion was denied. ITC filed a special civil action for certiorari alleging that CA committed grave abuse of discretion granting the execution of judgment pending appeal. After the filing of this petition PTA filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution with the RTC of Manila but was denied. But when PTA filed with the RTC a Second Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution with Leave of Court it was granted. Thus, a writ of execution was issued ordering petitioners to vacate the premises of the Tennis Courts and to have PTA to possess it ISSUE: Is the order of CA granting the execution of judgment pending appeal proper? RULING: YES. A court may order execution pending appeal subject to the following conditions: (1) there must be a judgment or final order; (2) the trial court must have lost jurisdiction over the case; (3) there must be good reasons to allow execution; and (4) such good reasons must be stated in a special order after due hearing. Undoubtedly, the RTC order dated August 5, 1997 which granted private respondents motion to dismiss and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction is a final order within the contemplation of Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the matter of hearing, CA did not gravely abuse its discretion in granting the

motion for execution pending appeal without a full-blown or trial-type hearing. We have declared that due process basically entails the opportunity to be heard, and we hold that the same principle underlies the provision on hearing in Section 2 of Rule 39. The records of the instant case clearly disclose that petitioners have filed their comment to private respondents motion for execution pending appeal, and their arguments as embodied in said comment did in fact form part of the discussion of respondent court in its assailed resolution. This Court finds that the observation on the deteriorating and unsanitary conditions of the Victoria Tennis Courts which came from tennis players who regularly use the said courts is well within the discretion of the court, and there is no indication it was fabricated simply to procure for PTA the restoration of possession of the Victoria Tennis Courts. Moreover, PHILTA no longer had any legal right to the possession and management of the Victoria Tennis Courts because the lease agreement between PTA and PHILTA had already expired on June 15, 1997. Also, judgments in actions for injunction are not stayed by the pendency of an appeal. This rule has been held to extend to judgments decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction, which are immediately executory. RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Kenneth Retuya RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. LANTIN G.R. No. L-59311, January 31, 1985 Facts: Rufus B. Rodriguez, as President of the World Association of Law Students (WALS), sent two cablegrams overseas through RCPI, one addressed to a Mohammed Elsir Taha in Khartoum, Sudan Socialist Union, and the other to a Diane Merger in Athens, Georgia, United States. The cablegrams were, in turn, relayed to GLOBE for transmission to their foreign destinations.However,both cablegrams went undelivered. Rodriguez filed a complaint for compensatory damages, moral damages, and exemplary damages before the CFI of Rizal against RCPI and GLOBE.The CFI rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.Thereafter, Rodriguez filed a "Motion for Execution Before Expiration of Time to Appeal" relying on Rule 39, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court alleging that the appeal is clearly dilatory and that the lapse of time would make the ultimate judgment illusory and ineffective. An opposition to the motion was filed by RCPI and by GLOBE.A motion for reconsideration of the above order, however, even before the issuance of this order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the respondent Sheriffinsisted on levying on the funds and assets of petitioners RCPI and GLOBE, prompting them to file an "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution. This urgent motion was likewise denied so RCPI and GLOBE filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a restraining order enjoining the lower court from further proceeding with the civil case and from enforcing the writ of execution until further orders. The petitioners filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration,however, their motion for reconsideration was denied by the said court.Hence, a petition for appeal by certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court. Issue: May damages be executed pending appeal? If so, What are they? Ruling: Yes. Considering the nature of the wrongful acts found by the trial court and the amount of damages adjudicated as recoverable, both of which are stated in detail in the decisions and various orders of the trial court and the appellate court, we are constrained to sustain the respondent courts insofar as the award for actual or compensatory damages are concerned but to postpone the execution of the awards for moral and exemplary damages until such time as the merits of the cases now on regular appeal before the Court of Appeals are finally determined. The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on the

outcome of the main case. Unlike actual damages for which the petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as wen as the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court. The existence of the factual bases of these types of damages and their causal relation to the petitioners' act will have to be determined in the light of the assignments of errors on appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after all, while liable for actual damages may not be liable for moral and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Muhammad Farzieh B. Abutazil SPOUSES CURATA VS PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY Facts: This is a very long case about expropriation, petitioners are one of the owners, one of the three groups whose lots where being subjected by the Philippine Ports Authority to expropriation. Conflict arose when there is a disagreement between the appraised value per square meter of the lots. After the Trial Court determined the value of the lots, one of the groups of owners of the lots have moved for the execution of the judgment. Again after a series of cases, petitioners moved for execution pending appeal. Issue: Whether or not execution pending appeal is applicable to expropriation proceedings. Ruling: No, The Court rules that discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 does not apply to eminent domain proceedings. As early as 1919 in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes,100 the Court held: When the Government is plaintiff the judgment will naturally take the form of an order merely requiring the payment of the award as a condition precedent to the transfer of the title, as a personal judgment against the Government could not be realized upon execution. In Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego,101 no less than the eminent Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee explained the rationale behind the doctrine that government funds and properties cannot be seized under a writ of execution, thus: The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. PPAs monies, facilities and assets are government properties. Ergo, they are exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Marceliano Monato III JP LATEX TECHNOLOGY, INC., vs. BALLONS GRANGER BALLOONS, INC. et al. FACTS: Respondent Ballons Ganger filed complaint for rescission and damages, accompanied by an application for the issuance of a writ of replevin, against petitioner JP Latex Technology, Inc.. Upon the petitioners default to file an answer, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of respondent Granger. While the case was pending respondent Granger moved for the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. After it received a copy of the RTC decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. RTC granted the plea for execution "pending appeal." The RTC reconsidered its earlier position and consequently granted the execution "pending appeal" after finding that the equipment under litigation were deteriorating and that petitioner might not have sufficient funds to pay for the damages, thereby leaving respondents with an empty judgment. ISSUE: WON order of execution pending appeal is proper despite the pending and unresolved motion for reconsideration. HELD: No. Aside from being premature, there is no good reason to grant the execution pending appeal. Execution pending appeal or immediate execution, which is now called discretionary execution under Rule 39, Section 2(a), 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is allowed pending appeal of a judgment or final order of the trial court, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. Discretionary execution is allowed only when the period to appeal has commenced but before the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case. The period to appeal where a motion for reconsideration has been filed as in the instant case commences only upon the receipt of a copy of the order disposing of the motion for reconsideration. The pendency of a motion for reconsideration, therefore, prevents the running of the period to appeal. In the instant case, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision. The records of the case show that the motion had not been acted upon by the RTC before it ruled on the motion for execution "pending appeal." That being the case, the pendency of the motion for reconsideration has prevented the period to appeal from even commencing. The period within which a party may move for an execution pending appeal of the trial courts decision has not yet also started. Where there is a pending motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision, an order execution pending appeal is improper and premature. The pendency of the motion for reconsideration legally precludes execution of the RTC decision because the motion serves as the movants vehicle to point out the findings and conclusions of the decision which, in his view, are not supported by law or the evidence and, therefore, gives the trial judge the occasion to reverse himself. In the event that the trial judge finds the motion for reconsideration meritorious, he can of course reverse the decision. In any event, the Court does not find any good reason to justify the execution of the RTC decision pending finality. The RTCs finding that the machinery under litigation was deteriorating is not supported by the evidence on record. Nor is the possibility that petitioner would not be able to pay the judgment award a good reason to order discretionary execution. The good reasons allowing execution pending appeal must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that

will outweigh the injuries or damages to the adverse party if the decision is reversed. RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Francis Mark Layog ARCHINET INTERNATIONAL,INC. and SEOKWHAN PHILIPPINES, INC. and BECCOMAX PROPERTY CORP., G.R. No. 183753 June 19, 2009 Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Facts: Respondent Beccomax engaged the services of respondent Becco Philippines, Inc. (Becco), as general contractor for the construction of a building. In turn, Becco entered into contracts with several sub-contractors, one of which was petitioner Archinet International, Inc. (Archinet). Petitioner Seokwhan Hahn is its Chairman and President. Becco and Archinet entered into a contract for the supply and provision of materials to be used in the interior portions, and additional works on the lobby, the 6th Floor common areas, and the penthouse. However, respondents allegedly failed to make timely payments despite demands. Thus, petitioners filed a complaint for breach of contract, sum of money and damages with an application ex-parte for a writ of preliminary attachment/garnishment. The trial court found in favor of petitioners. Meanwhile petitioners filed a Motion for Discretionary Execution pursuant to Section 2 (a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether or not good there is good reason to allow execution pending appeal. Held: Yes. In Manacop v. Equitable Banking Corporation, we held that discretionary execution of appealed judgments may be allowed upon concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party after the lapse of time be unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have apparently no cause but to delay. Such reasons must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that only a final judgment may be executed. Thus, the existence of good reasons is essential for it is what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. The records show that petitioners submitted documentary evidence in support of its prayer for discretionary execution. Petitioners submitted a warrant of arrest against Chan Shik Kim, President of Becco and Beccomax, to prove that the latter has not returned to the country; a Directors Certificate, showing that Beccos Board of Directors authorized its dissolution; and certified machine copies from the Securities and Exchange Commission of Reports of Becco and Beccomax to demonstrate that the former is in a state of liquidation while the latter is in imminent danger of insolvency. It bears stressing that imminent danger of insolvency of the defeated party has been held to be a good reason to justify discretionary execution. HAHN, vs BECCO AND DEVELOPMENT

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Geoffrey P. Navarra, Jr. COMPAIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS vs. MARTINEZ, sheriff of Occidental Negros, and RICARDO NOLAN February 12, 1915 G.R. No. L-9840 Facts: Marcelo Corteza commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros against Tomas de Leon to recover the sum of P2,175, and interest. In this action an attachment was levied in accordance with the existing procedure upon the 100 hectares of land now in question, and then belonging to De Leon. The Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, upon motion of the interested party, issued a writ of execution based upon the judgment of 1885 against De Leon, and there under the sheriff levied upon the land here in question and sold the same over the protest of the plaintiff company, at public auction. An action to annul this execution sale was commenced forthwith by the plaintiff company. Judgment was entered denying the relief sought, but upon appeal, this court reversed that judgment and annulled the sale and all the proceedings taken by virtue of that execution, upon the ground that the old judgment could not be enforced at that time in that manner Thereafter, Jose F. Martinez, who had acquired for valuable consideration that the judgment of 1889 against De Leon, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance upon that unsatisfied judgment, praying that the said judgment be revived and that the attachment levied in the former action be executed by the sale of the 100 hectares. Defendant De Leon, having defaulted in the defense of this new action, a judgment was entered against him for the sum of P5,663.38, and the costs of the cause. From this judgment no appeal was taken. Martinez, as judgment creditor of De Leon, again caused a levy, by virtue of an execution issued upon this judgment, to be made upon the 100 hectares and, in spite of the plaintiff's renewed claims and protests, caused the land thus levied upon to be sold by the sheriff to satisfy the judgment of August 19, 1911. The present action was thereupon commenced to quiet the plaintiff's title by annuling this second sale. Ruling: The Court of First Instance which tried the action, seeking to enforce the judgment of 1889, held that the judgment or attachment lien against the land in question could no longer be enforced. We are not advised of the reasons of the court for deciding. Whether it was because the lien had been released, or the lapse of so many years, or due to the fact that the land was at the time held by a remote grantee of De Leon, we cannot say. However this may be, the question of a creditor's right to enforce the lien was, as will be seen from the prayer of the complaint and the dispositive part of the judgment, supra, put directly in issue and specifically and definitely decided against him in the new judgment. The only effect of his new judgment was simply to create a personal liability against De Leon. If this were error, it was not jurisdictional and cannot now be attacked. The only remedy open to the creditor was by an appeal. No appeal was taken, consequently, whatever relief the judgment. Under that judgment the plaintiff could have attached and sold any property then belonging to De Leon; but the land in question no longer belonged to him. He had parted with all his right, title and interest therein. The land was no more susceptible to execution under the new judgment than any other property belonging to the plaintiff company. Hence, the sale of that particular parcel of land by virtue of an execution issued to enforce the new judgment was unauthorized by that judgment and was consequently void.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Jarissa G. Guiani FLORENDO vs. ORGANO 90 Phil. 483 Facts: The controversy is an appeal from the Court of First Instance "absolving" the plaintiff from a counterclaim. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute, the main action which was for divorce, had been dismissed. Plaintiff and the defendant are man and wife who have been living apart since 1909. In an action for maintenance and support brought in civil case no. 2853, the Court held that it was for the balance of the proceeds of that judgment and the instalments which fell due thereafter that the counterclaim was interposed. It was alleged that the said judgment had been only partially executed on August 8, l939, leaving P700 unsatisfied, and that none of the subsequent instalments had paid been paid. The total amount demanded was P3,640, embracing all the unpaid allowances down to the date of the filling of the counterclaim, which was October 9, 1943. The trial court held that the counterclaim was res judicata and that the defendant's remedy did not lie in this "expediente". But the court was unexplicit as to where and the defendant should go for relief, or whether, in its opinion, the plaintiff had been discharged from all liability under the unexecuted judgment by prescription or laches, as the plaintiff contended. Issue: What is the appropriate procedure to enforce the judgment in an action for maintenance and support? Ruling: The Court ruled that a simple motion for execution would be the proper step to secure the payment of support and maintenance in arrears. A motion of the character mentioned would afford the judgment creditor a speedy and adequate remedy, and has the advantage of being less cumbersome and complicated than a counterclaim. Moreover, the Court reiterated in various cases that a judgment for support does not prescribe or become dormant. Also instalments not recovered within ten years from the time they became due, prescribe. Be it noted that instalments into which an alimony is derived may lapse by prescription but that the judgment itself does not. The judgment remains in effect indefinitely but unpaid instalments that are more than ten years old are uncollectible. This situation is made possible by the fact that instalment do not fall due at the same time, with the result that while some instalment may prescribe, there always remain others which do not. As instalments become payable one at a time, they prescribe in the same progression, successively as they are allowed to reach the ten-year limitation period without any action being taken to collect them. The instalments included in the judgment rendered by the Court in an appeal before the CA of the action filed date as far back as February 1, 1932, so that some of them were already of more than ten years standing when the dismissed counterclaim was docketed in l943. However, the period of limitation with reference to those instalments was interrupted by the institution of the action for maintenance and support, and that interruption did not cease until the rendition of the Supreme Court's decision in March, 1935. By reason of the interruption the full period of interruption commenced to run anew upon the cessation of the suspension; and computed from that date, the ten-year limitation had not run out when the counterclaim was set up in l943. "When prescription is interrupted by a judicial demand, the full time for the prescription must be reckoned from the cessation of the interruption."

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Hazel Ivory Laud CRESENCIANO TORREFRANCA, ET AL. vs. FILOMENO ALBISO FACTS: In a case of forcible entry and detainer, the court ruled in favor of plaintiffsappellants Torrefranca ordering herein defendant-appelle Albiso to restore possession of a piece of land and pay damages to the plaintiffs. The judgment having remained unsatisfied for more than five years, the plaintiffs, brought the present action to have it revived in the same justice of the peace court. A writ of execution was then asked by the plaintiffs. With that motion still pending determination, the defendant on his part filed a motion for the dismissal of the case, contending that the Court of First Instance, as an appellate court, had no jurisdiction to try it because, according to him, the justice of the peace court itself did not have jurisdiction to entertain an action for the revival of a judgment. The CFI then dismissed the case because of laches on the part of the plaintiffs for their failure to secure a writ of execution within five years. Hence, this present appeal. ISSUE: Whether the action to revive the forcible entry and detainer case for its execution was rightfully dismissed by the CFI on the ground of laches. RULING: No. Rule 39, and Section 6 of that rule provides: SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. This provision, and for that matter the whole of Rule 39, is applicable in inferior courts as Rule 4, which governs the procedure in those courts, expressly declares in its section 19. We see nothing in section 6 of Rule 39 that is inconsistent with Rule 4. The authority of a justice of the peace of court to revive its own judgment being clear, it was error to dismiss plaintiff's action on the theory that such authority did not exist. Holding the plaintiffs guilty of laches for failing to secure a writ of execution within five years from the entry of judgment, the lower court would also, on that ground, deprive them of their right to have the judgment revived. To that we cannot agree. It is clear that section 6 of Rule 39 gives the plaintiffs not only the right to enforce the judgment through the mere motion for execution within five years, but also, after the expiration of that period without the judgment having been satisfied, the right to bring an action for its enforcement within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations. We would be construing the section arbitrarily were we to hold that the right to bring that action is forfeited if the right to move for execution has not been exercised.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Irish Silverio JUCO vs. HEIRS OF TOMAS SIY CHUNG FU G.R. No. 150233, February 16, 2005 Facts: The predecessors-in-interest of herein respondents filed an action for recovery of property with damages before the then CFI of Camarines Sur against Esperanza P. Martinez, mother of herein petitioner. The court decided in favor of plaintiffs prompting Martinez to file a Motion for Reconsideration with motion for contempt assailing the denial of the record on appeal. However, said motion was left unresolved as the records of the case were burned in a fire that razed the Provincial Capitol of Camarines Sur. For repeated failure to appear before the court of respondent, Juco, the sole surviving heir of the deceased defendant Martinez, filed a motion to dismiss the reconstitution case, which was granted by the lower court. Despite the finality of the dismissal of the reconstitution case, respondent filed a complaint for revival of judgment in Civil Case No. 7281. In said petition, they claimed that the decision was actually reconstituted in the dismissed petition for reconstitution and that the same had become final and executory but was denied. The CA on appeal held that the records and the decision in that Civil Case were not reconstituted but made a parallel finding that, notwithstanding the failure of reconstitution, there should be a determination of whether or not the subject decision had become final, thus remanding the case to the lower court which rendered a decision in favor of respondents, ordering the revival of said judgment. Petitioner appealed but was denied ruling that she was guilty of laches and her failure to take action implies lack of interest to enforce her right over the case. Issues: Whether or not the decision in Civil Case No.7281 can be the proper subject of an action for revival of judgment. Ruling: No It is an undisputed fact that when the records of the original case were destroyed in the fire there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of the record on appeal filed by petitioner. A motion for reconsideration has the effect of suspending the statutory period after which an order, decision, or judgment, in connection with which said motion was filed, becomes final. In effect, such motion for reconsideration has prevented the decision from attaining finality. The doctrine of laches cannot operate to lend finality to the decision since petitioners failure to pursue the motion for reconsideration was not due to her negligence or abandonment, but was rather brought upon by the dismissal of the reconstitution case thereby preventing the decision in Civil Case No. 7281 to attain finality and become executory by reason of laches.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Ivy Rose Paz ADELAIDA INFANTE versus ARAN BUILDERS, INC

FACTS: Before the RTC of Muntinlupa City an action for revival of judgment was filed by Aran Builders, Inc against Adelaida Infante. The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by RTC of Makati City in an action for specific performance and damages. Infante filed a motion to dismiss the action for revival of judgment on the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue was improperly laid. This motion was opposed by Aran Builders, Inc. RTC of Muntinlupa dismissed the motion of Infante. It stated that at the time the decision was rendered by RTC of Makati there was still no RTCs in Muntinlupa but with creation of RTCs in Muntinlupa matters involving properties located in this City, and cases involving its residents are all ordered to be litigated before these Courts. This judgment sought to be revived involves the interest, possession, title, and ownership of the parcel of land located in Muntinlupa city and adjudged to Plaintiff. Infantes motion for reconsideration was denied hence, she filed before the CA an instant special civil action for certiorari.CA promulgated its decision in favor of Aran Builders Inc. it held that since the judgment sought to be revived affects title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, it should be filed with the RTC of the place where the real property is located. Hence, Infant filed this petition. ISSUE: Where is the proper venue of the present action for revival of judgment? RULING: Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after the lapse of five (5) years from entry of judgment and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be enforced by action. The Rule does not specify in which court the action for revival of judgment should be filed. Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action. The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment determine whether it is a real action or a personal action from the previous judgment it is undeniable that private respondent has an established interest over the lot in question; and to protect such right or interest, private respondent brought suit to revive the previous judgment. The sole reason for the present action to revive is the enforcement of private respondent's adjudged rights over a piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the category of a real action, for it affects private respondent's interest over real property. The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is located.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Kenneth Retuya

PEA, JR. vs. REGALADO II, SHERIFF IV, RTC of NAGA A.M. No. P-10-2772, February 16, 2010 Facts: Respondent Sheriff IV Achilles Regalado II in implementing the writ of execution issued in relation to People v. Domingo Pea, Jr. and Domingo Francisco (a Criminal Case). Respondent collected from the complainant his payment of the first installment, without issuing official receipts but merely issuing handwritten acknowledgment receipts. On the same day, respondent went to Franciscos house to give her the amount, but the latter was not around. Respondent allegedly went back to Franciscos house the following day and gave her the money. Later on, he collected the two succeeding payments at complainants house and immediately gave the amounts collected to Francisco. Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Ruling: Yes. Sheriffs are officers of the court who serve and execute writs addressed to them by the court, and who prepare and submit returns on their proceedings. As officers of the court, they must discharge their duties with great care and diligence. They have to perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon them and show at all times a high degree of professionalism in the performance of their duties. Despite being exposed to hazards that come with the implementation of the judgment, sheriffs must perform their duties by the book. Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court lays down the procedure to be followed by the sheriff in implementing money judgments. When the judgment obligee is not present at the time the judgment obligor makes the payment, the sheriff is authorized to receive it. However, the money received must be remitted to the clerk of court within the same day or, if not practicable, deposited in a fiduciary account with the nearest government depository bank. Evidently, sheriffs are not permitted to retain the money in their possession beyond the day when the payment was made or to deliver the money collected directly to the judgment obligee. Respondents excuse for not turning over the money to the clerk of court does not persuade us enough to arrive at a contrary finding. He explains that it was practical to directly give the money he collected from complainant to Francisco, whose house is just adjacent to that of the complainant. Firstly, complainant could have directly made the payment to Francisco or her representative. Secondly, considering that the first payment was handed to him by complainant in his office, respondent could have easily turned it over to the clerk of court. Instead, respondent went to Franciscos house to give her the money, presumably as an act of good will.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments)

Muhammad Farzieh B. Abutazil PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC., VS RAMOLETE Facts: Petitioner is the insurer of Private Respondent Nelia Enriquez, whose private jeep collided with the PUJ of respondent Primitava Palmes causing the death of her husband. Primitiva filed a complaint against Nelia for moral, actual and exemplary damages. The trial court ruled in favour of Primitiva. The judgment then became final and executor, however the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied. Nelia was then summoned for examination, where she declared that that the PUJ was covered by Petitioner. Private respondent then moved for garnishment against Perla in favour of the judgment debtor. Petitioner moved for reconsideration claiming the court had the court had acquired no jurisdiction over them, which was subsequently denied. Two years after (the Supreme Court remarked this should have been dismissed) petitioners filed a Certiorari claiming their insurance contract cannot be subjected to garnishment, since petitioner was not a party to the case. Issue: Did the court acquired jurisdiction over Perla in this case. Ruling: Yes, garnishment has been defined as a species of attachment for reaching any property or credits pertaining or payable to a judgment debtor. In legal contemplation, it is a forced novation by the substitution of creditors: the judgment debtor, who is the original creditor of the garnishee is, through service of the writ of garnishment, substituted by the judgment creditor who thereby becomes creditor of the garnishee. Garnishment has also been described as a warning to a person having in his possession property or credits of the judgment debtor, not to pay the money or deliver the property to the latter, but rather to appear and answer the plaintiff's suit. In order that the trial court may validly acquire jurisdiction to bind the person of the garnishee, it is not necessary that summons be served upon him. The garnishee need not be impleaded as a party to the case. All that is necessary for the trial court lawfully to bind the person of the garnishee or any person who has in his possession credits belonging to the judgment debtor is service upon him of the writ of garnishment. Through service of the writ of garnishment, the garnishee becomes a "virtual party" to, or a "forced intervenor" in, the case and the trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction to bind him to compliance with all orders and processes of the trial court with a view to the complete satisfaction of the judgment of the court. In Bautista v. Barredo, 16 the Court, through Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo, held: While it is true that defendant Jose M. Barredo was not a party in Civil Case No. 1636 when it was instituted by appellant against the Philippine Ready Mix Concrete Company, Inc., however, jurisdiction was acquired over him by the court and he became a virtual party to the case when, after final judgment was rendered in said case against the company, the sheriff served upon him a writ of garnishment in behalf of appellant. By means of the citation, the stranger becomes a forced intervenor; and the court, having acquired jurisdiction over him by means of the citation, requires him to pay his debt, not to his former creditor, but to the new creditor, who is creditor in the main litigation.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Marceliano Monato III SPOUSES EMILIO ABINUJAR and MILAGROS M. LANA, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES SANTIAGO RAMIRO and FLORENTINA RAMIRO, respondents. FACTS: Private respondents filed a complaint for ejectment in the MTC against petitioners. However, the parties, assisted by their counsels, executed a compromise agreement which the MTC approved. The order reproduced the agreement that failure on the part of the defendants to pay three (3) consecutive payments, plaintiffs will be entitled to a writ of execution, unless the parties agree to extend the period of entitlement to a writ of execution in writing to be submitted and/or approved by this Honorable Court. Private respondents filed a motion for execution on the ground that petitioners failed to pay the first three installments stipulated in the compromise agreement. Thereafter, a "Sheriffs' Notice to Voluntarily Vacate the Premises" was served on petitioner, which the latter assailed the validity of the issuance ratiocinating that their obligation is monetary in nature and the applicable rule should have been Section 9, Rule 39 and not Section 10, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. ISSUE: WON the applicable rule is Section 9 or Section 10 HELD: The applicable rule is Section 9. When the parties entered into a compromise agreement, the original action for ejectment was set aside and the action was changed to a monetary obligation. A perusal of the compromise agreement signed by the parties and approved by the inferior court merely provided that in case the defendants (petitioners herein) failed to pay three monthly installments, the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) would be entitled to a writ of execution, without specifying what the subject of execution would be. Said agreement did not state that petitioners would be evicted from the premises subject of the suit in case of any default in complying with their obligation thereunder. This was the result of the careless drafting thereof for which only private respondents were to be blamed. As petitioners' obligation under the compromise agreement as approved by the court was monetary in nature, private respondents can avail only of the writ of execution provided in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, and not that provided in Section 10. Section 9, Rule 39 provides that the officer must enforce an execution of a money judgment by levying on all the property, real and personal of every name and nature whatsoever, and which may be disposed of for value, of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution, or on a sufficient amount of such property, if there be sufficient, and selling the same, and paying to the judgment creditor, or his attorney, so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. On the other hand, Section 13, Rule 39 provides that the officer must enforce an execution for the delivery or restitution of property by ousting therefrom the person against whom the judgment is rendered and placing the judgment creditor in possession of such property, and by levying as hereinafter provided upon so much of the property of the judgment debtor as will satisfy the amount of the judgment and costs included in the writ of execution. RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Francis Mark Layog PENTAGON SECURITY and INVESTIGATION AGENCY vs. VICENTE T. JIMENEZ, ET AL G.R. No. 88114 : December 20, 1990 Ponente: PADILLA, J.: Facts: Petitioner, a single proprietorship engaged in security services, was ordered to pay the amount of P157,119.04 representing wages and COLA differentials due

its employees, as computed in a decision of the NLRC. A notice of garnishment was issued against petitioner, addressed to the PC-SUSIA c/o Col. Norberto M. Lina, Camp Crame, EDSA, Q.C. Deputy Sheriff Silvino B. Santos who issued a Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution of Personal Properties (firearms used by the employees if petitioner) against herein petitioner, which personal properties are the licensed firearms in question. Petitioner filed an urgent petition to quash Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution, claiming exemption from execution under Sec. 12, par. (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Labor Arbiter denied the petition. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. The NLRC issued its resolution upholding sale on execution of petitioners properties. Private respondent's comments submit that firearms of a security agency are not exempt from execution under Rule 39, Sec. 12, par. (b) of the Rules of Court. The term "tools and implements" refered to in par. (b) Sec. 12, Rule 39 refers to instruments of husbandry or manual labor needed by an artisan craftsman or laborer to obtain his living. Here petitioner is a business enterprise. It does not use the firearms personally, but they are used by its employees. Not being a natural person, petitioner cannot claim that the firearms are necessary for its livelihood. Private respondent invites the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that there are security guards rendering service without firearms. Petitioner without filing any reply moves for the resolution of the petition. Issue: Whether or not the personal property sold by the sheriff is exempt from execution. Held: No. It would appear that the exemption contemplated by the provision involved is personal, available only to a natural person, such as a dentist's dental chair and electric fan (Belen v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-16412, 30 Nov. 1962). As pointed out by the Solicitor General, if properties used in business are exempt from execution, there can hardly be an instance when a judgment claim can be enforced against the business entity.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Geoffrey P. Navarra, Jr. ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION. [G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004] Facts: The deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching. Emilio Y Taedo, .

thereafter, filed his own Omnibus Motion praying for the dismissal of the complaint, arguing that the ABC had abandoned and waived its right to proceed against the continuing guaranty by its act of resorting to preliminary attachment. Acting on the aforementioned motion, the trial court issued on December 15, 1993 an Order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment on the shares of stocks and ordering the sheriff to return the said stocks to the petitioners. ISSUE: (a) whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy on attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines; RULING: We agree with the petitioners that the petitioner-wife had the right to file the said motion, although she was not a party in Civil Case No. 142729. In Ong v. Tating, we held that the sheriff may attach only those properties of the defendant against whom a writ of attachment has been issued by the court. When the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment and seizes the property of a third person in which the said defendant holds no right or interest, the superior authority of the court which has authorized the execution may be invoked by the aggrieved third person in the same case. Upon application of the third person, the court shall order a summary hearing for the purpose of determining whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of the writ of attachment, more specifically if he has indeed levied on attachment and taken hold of property not belonging to the plaintiff. If so, the court may then order the sheriff to release the property from the erroneous levy and to return the same to the third person. In resolving the motion of the third party, the court does not and cannot pass upon the question of the title to the property with any character of finality. It can treat the matter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. If the claimants proof does not persuade the court of the validity of the title, or right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied by the court. The aggrieved third party may also avail himself of the remedy of terceria by executing an affidavit of his title or right of possession over the property levied on attachment and serving the same to the office making the levy and the adverse party. Such party may also file an action to nullify the levy with damages resulting from the unlawful levy and seizure, which should be a totally separate and distinct action from the former case. The above-mentioned remedies are cumulative and any one of them may be resorted to by one third-party claimant without availing of the other remedies. In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for said relief.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Jarissa G. Guiani CAPA vs. COURT OF APPEALS September 19, 2006 Facts: A complaint for damages and attorneys fees was filed by petitioners against

private respondent and Captain and Mrs. Yhapon before the RTC when petitioners motor banca sank in the waters of Dumaguete City when it collided with the motorized vessel of private respondent, manned by Captain Yhapon. The core of the controversy of this case was when a Motion to Deny Third-Party Claim with Motion to Admit Claim for Damages was filed by petitioners before the CA praying that the third-party claim be denied for being invalid since it was not signed by Raca but by her alleged attorney-in-fact. Raca, after a writ of execution pending appeal was issued to levy on private respondent United Vismins properties, she filed a thirdparty claim alleging ownership over the two vessels which were levied. On the other hand, petitioners filed a Motion to Deny Third-Party Claim with Motion to Admit Claim for Damages praying that the third-party claim be denied for being invalid as it was not signed by Raco but by her alleged attorney-in-fact and that their claim for damages arising from the malicious filing of the third-party claim be admitted by the CA in the same appealed case. Issue: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not act on petitioners' Motion to Deny Third-Party Claim with Motion to Admit Claim for Damages on the ground that the same should have been filed with the RTC. Ruling: The petition lacks merit. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not acting on petitioners motion to Deny Third-Party Claim with Motion to Admit claim for Damages since the invalidity of the affidavit of third-party claim should have been raised at the earliest opportunity which is in the trial court. In this case, while the records of the case were still with the trial court, petitioners could have then moved for the quashal of the same. Thus, they could no longer invoke the jurisdiction of the CA to rule on the same when they in fact had already waived the alleged defect in the affidavit when they sought from the CA the approval of the indemnity bond they posted in the trial court. Also, the CA cannot be compelled to act on petitioners' Motion to Admit Claim for damages as it had no jurisdiction to do so. As provided in Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a third party claimant or any third person may vindicate his claim to his property wrongfully levied by filing a proper action which is distinct and separate from that in which the judgment is being enforced. Such action would have for its object the recovery of the possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third-party claim; and it may be brought against the sheriff, of course, and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded with the sheriff in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor himself.# Such would also be a remedy to a judgment obligee when a frivolous and plainly spurious claim was filed by a third-party claimant, i.e., to file his claim for damages in the same court where the third-party claimant filed his third-party claim or to file a separate action. Thus, petitioners' claim for damages must be filed in the trial court, whether in the same case where a third-party claim has been filed or in a separate action for damages which petitioners may institute.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Hazel Ivory Laud RAMOS vs. PABLO FACTS: Plaintiffs bought a parcel of land from Socorro A. Ramos. Unknown to the plaintiff, when the foregoing deed of sale was executed, it had already an existing

mortgage in favor of Rodrigo Enriquez and that the latter had already filed an action for foreclosure. Said property was foreclosed and later sold to Maria Villadolid. After the death of Socorro, the plaintiffs filed an action against Socorros estate. Pursuant to said decision, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Quezon City levied upon and sold at execution 18 parcels of land which were sold at a lump sum bid price to the Spouses Pablo, one of the defendants who were issued a new cert of title. Such facts having been brought to the knowledge of the heirs of the deceased Socorro A. Ramos, they filed an action in the CFI to declare as null and void the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of spouses Pablo, alleging among other things that the aforementioned transactions or events were in gross violation of plaintiffs' rights as the lump sum sale of the 18 parcels of land was contrary to the provision of Sec. 21, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which requires the separate bidding and individual sale of real estate properties levied upon on execution and of Sec. 27, Rule 39 which requires the statement of the price paid for each distinct lot or parcel. ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS' "REMEDY IS NOT ANOTHER ACTION BUT A MOTION WITH THE COURT OF ORIGIN ATTACKING THE EXECUTION SALE. RULING: There is no question that the action of petitioners in the lower court for annulment does not seek to annul the final decision of the Court of Appeals but only to annul the execution sale and acts done in pursuance thereof. The acts complained of in the present case arose after the Court of Appeals issued its decision and therefore, it is not possible that the matter of execution sale now in question could have been covered or considered in or a part of the decision of the appellate court. The supreme court finds that a separate action for annulment of execution sales is in order. The lower court ruled that plaintiffs' (petitioners') remedy is not another action but a motion attacking the execution sale with the court of origin. Petitioners do not agree because 1) improper remedy was not raised by spouses in their motion to dismiss 2) there is no provision of law limiting an attack on an execution sale only through a motion with the court of origin.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Irish Silverio CAYTON and HEIRS CAYTON vs. ZEONNIX TRADING CORPORATION G.R. No. 169541, October 9, 2009

Facts: The Maoscas executed a deed of real estate mortgage over the house and lot as security for the loan that they obtained from Family Savings Bank (FSB) which was annotated in the TCT. Meanwhile, a levy on attachment was annotated on the same in favor of Zeonnix Trading Corporation pursuant to a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the CFI. Thereafter, a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed between the Maoscas and Caytons over the subject properties. As part of the consideration, the Caytons assumed payment to FSB of the real estate mortgage amortizations on the property and paid the real estate taxes on the property thereon. However, the Caytons failed to register the deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage because the owners duplicate copy of TCT was in the possession of FSB in view of the loan. However, judgment was rendered sentencing defendant to pay plaintiff with interest thereon until fully paid. Subsequently, the Caytons defaulted in the payment to FSB of the monthly amortizations, and the property was extrajudicially foreclosed causing the sale in public auction. The Caytons were declared as the highest bidder. They then filed before the RTC a civil case for quieting of title and/or removal/prevention of cloud on title against respondent claiming that, with the execution of the deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage, all the rights, interests and participation over the property had been transferred to them by the Maoscas, including the right of redemption excluding respondent. Respondent, as judgment creditor of the Maoscas in civil case judgment, offered to redeem the property by tendering payment to the Clerk of Court representing the purchase price of the property and interest that had accrued thereon. It also thereafter tendered payment to cover the real estate taxes paid by the Caytons. Issue: Whether or not respondent can redeem the subject property. Ruling: Yes Under Section 27, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, Caytons are successors in interest of the Maoscas. However, their supposed title or right over the property is unregistered and, as such, the same cannot affect third persons. The unregistered sale of the house and lot to the Caytons by the Maoscas cannot prejudice the right of redemption granted by law in favor of Zeonnix. The levy on attachment of Zeonnix on the subject property was duly recorded on the TCT. Thus, the levy on attachment created a constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registration. The writ of attachment entitled the attaching creditor to exercise the right to redeem the foreclosed properties. A writ of attachment that has been levied on real property or any interest therein belonging to the judgment debtor creates a lien which nothing can destroy but its dissolution

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Ivy Rose Paz GOMEZ vs. GEALONE 203 SCRA 474 [1991] FACTS: Plaintiffs-Apellees filed with the CFI of Sorsogon a complaint to recover a parcel of land from the defendants-appellants, the trial court rendered a decision in

favor of the plaintiffs-appellees. Defendants-appellants appealed the decision to the CA which was dismissed for their failure to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period. The trial courts decision became final and executory and the plaintiffs-appellees filed a motion for its execution which was granted and on 17 April 1973, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Sorsogon delivered the land in dispute to plaintiffs-appellees. The Provincial Sheriff issued a Sheriffs Notice of Public Auction Sale of the properties on June 21, 1973, copy furnished defendant-appellant and the heirs of plaintiff-appellee Dionisio Gomez. Plaintiffs-appellee turned out to be the highest bidder in the auction sale and the Sheriff issued a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale to them, incorporating the statement that the sale is subject to the right of legal redemption within one year from the date of sale. Six months after the lapse of the one-year redemption period the defendantsappellants filed a Motion to Set Aside Execution Sale on the grounds that the value of the properties sold in the auction sale is grossly in excess of the judgment debt and costs and the residential house and the land (on) which the building was constructed is a family home or homestead exempt from execution. Plaintiffsappellees filed their opposition to this motion alleging that the failure to assert or claim the right to the exemption granted under Section 12 (a) of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court within a reasonable time constituted an abandonment or waiver thereof, and that there is no merit to the other contentions of defendants. ISSUE: May a sheriffs sale on execution of properties of a judgment debtor be set aside after the period of redemption had expired on the ground that either the properties are exempt from execution or that their value is grossly in excess of the judgment debt and costs, thereby resulting in an iniquitous transaction amounting to a deprivation of property without due process of law? RULING: NO A "homestead" refers to the dwelling house of the judgment debtor in which he resides and the land necessarily used in connection therewith. It is exempt from execution pursuant to Section 12 of Rule 39 if its value at the time of the execution sale was not more than P3,000.00. In this case, the value of the subject property (P1,830.00) and the declared value of the 12-hectare lot (P1,220.00), the "value" of the claimed homestead was less than P3,000.00 at the time of the execution sale. Unfortunately, however, it was only on 12 December 1974, or nearly six (6) months after the execution of the Final Bill of Sale on 24 June 1974, that appellants filed their motion to set aside the execution sale. They did not object to both the levy on the property and the auction sale thereof. Neither did they oppose the execution of the certificate of sale and the Final Bill of Sale by the Sheriff. In short, they did not assert their right to claim exemption until six (6) months after the lapse of the one-year period to redeem the property. We now rule that claims for exemption from execution of properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented before its sale on execution by the sheriff. This is to comply with the very purpose of execution to put an end to litigation. The price for which the lots were sold in the execution sale was not grossly inadequate. The combined assessed value of the subject properties is P3,050.00. Appellants, however, claim that the total assessed value is P3,790.00. Granting the latter to be correct, and conceding further, for the sake of argument, to the statement of appellants that the assessed value of real property for taxation purposes is 30% of the market value such that the market value then is P12,633.50, still the price for which they were sold at the execution sale P3,522.50 is not grossly inadequate.

RULE 39 (Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments) Kenneth Retuya REFORZADO VS. SPOUSES LOPEZ G.R. No. 148306 February 24, 2010

Facts: Asadministratrix of her fathers estate, Reforzado filed a motion for a writ of possession in the probate court for respondent spouses to turn over the possession of the disputed property. The probate court granted the motion. Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. In the meantime, Reforzado also filed a complaint against respondents for annulment and reconveyance involving the disputed property. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, but such motion was denied by the trial court. Respondents assailed the order via petition for certiorari before the CA. Acting on the petition (regarding the order denying the motion to dismiss), the appellate court ruled in respondents favor and dismissed the annulment case primarily on the ground of res judicata. The appellate court based the ruling on the prior judgment of the CA in the petition for certiorari filed by respondents (regarding the order of the probate court granting the issuance of a writ of possession) which was decided in their favor. Issue: Whether or not the CA acted correctly in ruling in respondentsfavor primarily on the ground of res judicata NO Ruling: The doctrine of res judicata lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows: 1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties and their privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and 2) Any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes or subject matters of the two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may operate as evidence. In speaking of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which corresponds to Section 47 (b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as bar by former judgment; while the second general rule, which is embodied in Section 47 (c) of Rule 39, is known as conclusiveness of judgment. In the case at bar, there is no res judicata since the ruling of the CA in the first petition for certiorari is not a decision on the merits on the ownership of the property, the appellate court in said case having merely resolved the propriety of the probate courts issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner. The appellate court in fact declared in its dispositive portion that herein petitioner had the remedy of filing a separate action for recovery of the property - a recourse she availed of when she filed the complaint for annulment and reconveyance subject of the present petition.

RULES 40 and 41 (Appeal from the Municipal Trial Courts to Regional Trial Courts, Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts) Kenneth Retuya

ASSOCIATION OF INTEGRATED SECURITY FORCE vs. CA - JANO G.R. No. 140150, August 22, 2005 Facts: The Philippine Constabulary) Civil Security Force Command advised respondent PICOP 'to desist from utilizing your Company Guard Force in conducting security activities' for its failure to renew its license to operate. Petitioners, who are members of the labor union of security guards, filed a case in the NLRC against PICOP alleging that they were illegally terminated, and they are entitled to reinstatement, backwages, damages, attorney's fees and other monetary benefits, and that their termination was a result of their having formed a union and that PICOP allegedly deliberately refused to comply with the requirements for the renewal of its security license. The NLRC dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal, backwages, etc. The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, they filed a petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court which was referred to the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the findings of the NLRC. Thereafter, the members of petitioner AISFB-ALU, represented by the latter, filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court challenging the Decision of the court a quo on the grounds that: 1.) the finding of facts of the public respondent is not substantiated by any evidence; 2.) Serious errors of facts and law were committed by the public respondent which would cause grave and/or irreparable damage or injury; 3.) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction was committed by public respondent; 4.) the petition is purely on questions of law. Issues: 1. Whether or not the petition filed by pretitioner under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper? Ruling: General rule is that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of judgment on the merits is appeal. This is true even if the error ascribed to the court is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of facts or of law set out in the decision. Almost two months after receipt of the decision of the court of appeals, petitioner filed its petition for certiorari, hence, petitioner has lost its remedy of appeal under rule 45 rules of court. For civil action of certiorari to commence under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner must be left with 'no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, for petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration the petition must be dismissed for not complying with a condition precedent.

RULE 40 and 41 (Appeals) Muhammad Farzieh B. Abutazil

MANACOP VS EQUITABLE PCI BANK Facts: Respondent Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing, Inc. buildings and their contents were devastated by a fire, thus claims were made against the policies provided by the following insurers PhilFire, Rizal Surety, Tabacalera Insurance Company, First Lepanto, Equitable Insurance and Reliance Insurance. Except for Policy No. 13798 issued by First Lepanto, all the policies provide that, loss, if any, under this policy is payable to Equitable Banking Corporation-Greenhills Branch, as their interest may appear subject to the terms, conditions, clauses and warranties under this policy. The board of Directors filed a motion to intervene, the court granted the same. After the pre-trial and the trial proper, the court rendered its judgment in favour of the intervenors. The insurance providers subsequently made their appropriate motions and appeals. The intervenors then filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Equitable Bank filed for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The CA in its judgment remanded the case to the trial court for determination of who is entitled to the insurance proceeds and lifting the order of garnishment against Lepanto. The intervenors now petitioners subsequently took recourse on Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging among others that the CA erred in giving cognizance to the petition for certiorari of Equitable Bank and Lavine given that the ordinary mode of appeal was available to them. Issues: Whether or not the simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under rule 65 and 41 by two different parties on the same case is proper. Ruling: No. Simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed since one remedy would necessarily cancel out the other. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal. It is elementary that for certiorari to prosper, it is not enough that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; the requirement that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law must likewise be satisfied. It is wellsettled that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits is appeal. This is true even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the trial court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision. Thus, while it may be true that a final order or judgment was rendered under circumstances that would otherwise justify resort to a special civil action under Rule 65, the latter would nonetheless be unavailing if there is an appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Another compelling reason for dismissing CA-G.R. Nos. 70292 and 70298 is that Equitable Bank and Lavine actually engaged in forumshopping.

RULE 40 and 41 (Appeals) Marceliano Monato III SIME DARBY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION et al., vs. NLRC G.R. No. 148021, December 6, 2006 Facts:

Petitioners filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal, before the DOLE, against the respondent company. The labor arbiter issued an order requiring opposing parties to submit their respective memorandum for the resolution of the instant case. The petitioner, without filing the memorandum as ordered by the labor arbiter, filed an Appeal Memorandum with a petition for injunction and/or a temporary restraining order before the NLRC. The labor arbiter rendered his decision in the consolidated cases, dismissing for lack of merit petitioners complaints against the company for illegal lockout, illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. Petitioners appealed the labor arbiters Decision to the NLRC which affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiters decision. It ruled that that the labor arbiter could not have lost jurisdiction over the case when petitioners appealed the Labor Arbiters order since the it was interlocutory in nature and cannot be appealed separately. The CA denied the petition and affirmed the Decision of the NLRC. Petitioners insist that the labor arbiter had lost jurisdictional competence to issue Decision since they have already perfected their appeal, making said Decision void ab initio . Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter lost jurisdiction to issue a decision after a subsequent appeal made by the petitioner. Ruling: No. The labor arbiters order to submit memorandum is interlocutory, hence not appealable. Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: xxx b) An interlocutory order. In this case, an interlocutory order, not being appealable, may be remedied by filing an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 by the aggrieved party. The Order of the labor arbiter partakes the nature of an interlocutory order, or one which refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision of the whole controversy. An interlocutory order is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on the merits for a contrary rule would delay the administration of justice and unduly burden the courts. Order merely terminated formal trial of the consolidated cases, declared that the motion for inspection will be dealt with in the resolution of the case, and ordered the submission of the parties respective memoranda after which the case shall be submitted for resolution. It did not put an end to the issues of illegal lockout, ULP, and illegal dismissal. Moreover, even if petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari, which would have been the proper remedy, the same would still fail. For one, the holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right. Section 4, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC grants a labor arbiter wide latitude to determine, after the submission by the parties of their position papers/memoranda, whether there is need for a formal trial or hearing.

RULES 40 and 41 (Appeals) Francis Mark Layog HEIRS OF TEOFILO GAUDIANO, vs. ONSTANCIO BENEMERITO, G.R. No. 174247, February 21, 2007

Facts: The respondents filed an action for redemption against the petitioners before the RTC. The trial court rendered its decision allowing the respondents to redeem their respective areas of cultivation from the petitioners and directing them to execute the documents necessary to effect the redemption. Petitioners received a copy of the decision. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, they filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Notice of Appeal without the assistance of counsel. They prayed for a 15-day extension claiming that their counsel suffered a stroke and that they needed to engage the services of another counsel who can represent them. Then they filed a Notice of Appeal through their new counsel. However, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed order denying the motion. Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court correctly denied petitioners Motion for an Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal. Ruling: Yes. In the case of Lacsamana vs. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court,# the Supreme Court ruled that in ordinary appeals by mere notice of appeal, as in the instant case, no extension to file a notice of appeal is allowed. The perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. The limitation on the period of appeal is not without reason. They must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable to forestall or avoid unreasonable delays in the administration of justice, to ensure an orderly discharge of judicial business, and to put an end to controversies. Though as a general rule, rules of procedures are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed in very exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations, which are not present in the instant case. Being a prohibited pleading, a motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal is a mere scrap of paper and its filing does not toll the running of the period to appeal. Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal within the period prayed for in their motion for extension but beyond the period to appeal. Sections 2(a) and 3 of Rule 41 clearly provide that decisions of Regional Trial Courts may be appealed by filing a notice of appeal within 15 days from date of receipt of notice of judgment. The filing of a notice of appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory; no extension is allowed. Petitioners reliance on the power of the Court to relax and disregard the application of technical rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice is misplaced. The liberal application of rules of procedure for perfecting appeals is still the exception, and not the rule; and it is only allowed in exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of justice.

RULES 40 and 41 (Appeals) Geoffrey P. Navarra Jr. ROSITA DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE

G.R. No. 102360 March 20, 1996 Facts: Petitioner was one of the bona fide tenant-occupants of an 87 hectare land of Gonzales estate. After RP acquired title to the estate, the President ordered that bigger portions of the estate may be sold to persons other than the bona fide tenant-occupants. It was by this change in policy that prompted the tenantoccupants to file an action to compel the RP to sell the entire estate to them. Private respondent AIA filed a complaint in intervention on the basis of a document entitled "KASUNDUAN NA MAY PAGBIBIGAY KAPANGYARIHAN HINGGIL SA ASYENDA GONZALES." The Kasunduan was actually a document of sale or transfer whereby some tenants conveyed their landholdings in the estate to AIA. Hence, AIA was allowed to intervene. Thereafter, AIA submitted to the lower court a Compromise Agreement it entered into with 13 tenants-occupants, of whom Domingo was one of, of the estate. The trial court approved the Compromise Agreement by issuing a partial decision. A motion for immediate execution of the partial decision was filed and was granted. Meanwhile, some of the 13 tenants who entered into the Compromise Agreement with AIA filed separate proceedings against the latter before the trial courts of Caloocan City to annul the partial decision approving their agreement. All the cases were dismissed. On her part, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 473 but the same was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Issue: Whether or not the partial decision of a compromise agreement entered into by the tenants, of whom Domingo was one of, may be annulled. Ruling: The contention of Domingo is untenable. The Court ruled that a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It is a contract perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. Once an agreement is stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the parties; having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other judgment. Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is immediately executory as there is no appeal from such judgment. The reason for this rule being that when both parties enter into an agreement to end a pending litigation and request that a decision be rendered approving said agreement, it is only natural to presume that such action constitutes an implicit waiver of the right to appeal against said decision. A compromise may however be disturbed and set aside for vices of consent or forgery. Hence, where an aggrieved party alleges mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity in the execution of the compromise embodied in a judgment, an action to annul it should be brought before the Court of Appeals. In the case at bar, petitioner filed an action to annul the compromise judgment with the Regional Trial Court on the ground of forgery. Said case was however dismissed for failure to prosecute. Clearly, petitioner has forfeited her right to challenge the compromise judgment not only because she did not appeal from the order of dismissal but more so because she ventilated her remedy to the wrong court which had undoubtedly no jurisdiction to annul the judgment of a concurrent court. Thus, the Supreme Court has no reason to reverse the assailed decision of respondent court. The partial decision must accordingly be enforced and executed with deliberate dispatch and without further delay. RULES 40 and 41 (Appeals) Jarissa G. Guiani

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS 220 SCRA 726 Facts: A contract was entered into between private respondent Coquial and petitioners Pangasinan Province and Pangasinan Governor Colet for the improvement of 6.492 kilometers of the Urdaneta-Mapandan Road, Phase I and Phase II for a total consideration of P5,169,932.10. It was agreed that upon the 100% completion of Phase I, private respondent should be paid P3,174,083.20. However, petitioners had paid only P1,320,000.00 leaving a balance of P1,854,083.20, which they refused to pay. Private respondent Coquial also claimed that he has also completed 60% of Phase II which costs P1,000,000.00 but petitioners likewise refused to pay and decided not to pursue the project. Hence, private respondent Coquial filed a complaint against petitioner praying for the payment of said amounts including monetary awards for damages and attorney's fees. Thereafter, private respondent filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the balance of P1,854,083.20 which was granted by the trial court. A notice of appeal was thereafter filed by petitioners which was also denied. Issue: WON the decision of the RTC granting the motion for partial summary judgment filed by private respondent is interlocutory. Ruling: The Supreme Court agreed with the contention of the petitioners that the decision of the RTC granting the partial summary judgment is merely interlocutory. Citing the case of Guevarra, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court agreed with the petitioners that a partial summary judgment is merely interlocutory and not a final judgment. Its nature is specifically provided for in Section 4 of Rule 34 of the Rules of Court which provides: If on motion under this rule, judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. The Court further held that Rule 34 contemplates that the appeal from the partial summary judgment shall be taken together with the judgment that may be rendered in the entire case after a trial is conducted on the material facts on which a substantial controversy exists. The trial court and the respondent court erroneously relied on Section 5 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, which pertains to judgments in general. Therefore, since partial summary judgment does not finally dispose of the action, execution thereof shall not issue, conformably with Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

RULES 40 and 41 (Appeals) Hazel Ivory Laud

SAN FERNANDO RURAL BANK, INC. vs. PAMPANGA OMNIBUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and DOMINIC G. AQUINO 520 SCRA 564 Facts: Respondent PODC obtained a loan from petitioner San Fernando Rural bank (SAFER bank). PODC executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank. Upon respondent PODCs failure to pay its loan to petitioner, the latter foreclosed the property and was executed by the sheriff, a Certificate of Sale, registered on June 7, 2001 which stated that "the period of redemption of the property shall expire one (1) year after registration in the Register of Deeds." Respondents successfully redeemed the property but the pet. assailed the same, filing a petition for a writ of possession in the RTC which was granted. After resps motion for recon was denied by the RTC, it filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion by RTC. CA set aside RTCs ruling saying that the December 20, 2002 Order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession was interlocutory and not final; hence, it may be questioned only via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by appeal. Hence, this present petition ISSUE: W/N the Order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession was interlocutory which can be remedied by petition for certiorari or final which can be remedied by appeal. RULING: The Order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession was final. Hence, the remedy was appeal. The CA erred in holding that the Order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession was merely interlocutory. Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters and which do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to question an improvident interlocutory order. On the other hand, a final order is one that disposes of the whole matter or terminates the particular proceedings or action leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. It is one that finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in the lower court. The remedy to question a final order is appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. We agree with petitioners contention that the December 20, 2002 Order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession is final. The remedy of respondents was to appeal to the CA by filing their notice of appeal within the period therefor. The reliance of the CA in City of Manila v. Serrano is misplaced. In that case, the trial court issued the writ of possession in connection with a complaint for expropriation under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Such a writ is interlocutory in nature. On the other hand, an order granting a writ of possession under Act No. 3135, as amended, is of a different species. The latter order is final, hence, appealable. Even if the trial court erred in granting a petition for a writ of possession, such an error is merely an error of judgment correctible by ordinary appeal and not by a petition for a writ of certiorari. Such writ cannot be legally used for any other purpose.

RULES 40 and 41 (Appeals)

Irish Silverio HEIRS OF DORONIO vs. HEIRS OF DORONIO 541 SCRA 479 [2007] Facts: The heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a petition for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered the registration of the subject deed of donation in favor of petitioner and prayed in the petition that an order be issued declaring null and void the registration of the private deed of donation and the TCT be cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the decision in the petition for issuance of TCT to petitioner had already become final as it was not appealed. Determined to remain in their possessed property, respondent filed an action for reconveyance and damages against petitioner but the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the lower court and declared that the donation of the entire property in favor of petitioners predecessors is invalid on the ground that it impairs the legitime of respondents predecessor. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in passing upon the issue of legitime in a Civil Action for Reconveyance and Damages. Ruling: Yes. Issue regarding the impairment of legitime of respondents predecessor must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of estate. An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings require the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

RULES 40 and 41 (Appeals)

Ivy Rose Paz SPOUSES MORALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 126196, January 28, 1998 FACTS: In 1972, Bautista, owner of one whole parcel of land devoted to agriculture subdivided his land. This was duly approved by the Land Registration Commission. He obtained individual transfer certificates of title of the subdivided lots. He likewise obtained a corresponding declaration of property for each lot from the Municipal Assessor which was approved by the Provincial Assessor reclassifying the lots as residential. Thereafter, on 1979 Bautista sold 2 lots to Gregorio Morales and 4 lots to Maria Teresa Morales. Teresa in turn, sold 3 of her purchased lots to three different persons who are likewise plaintiffs in the case. These plaintiffs assert that the defendant surreptitiously took possession of their lots and prepared them for planting, thereby altering its residential outline and appearance. Defendant alleged that the reclassification of the land was not approved by the proper authorities and that he was duly constituted as tenant thereof by the previous owner, Enrique Bautista. The municipal court received evidence on the issue of right of possession and the land's proper classification. However, the MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction finding the land to be agricultural and the fact that tenancy was in issue. On appeal, the RTC Judge found that the (municipal) court had jurisdiction because the land was duly reclassified from agricultural to residential and that tenancy was not involved. He then proceeded to decide the issues on the merits resulting in a judgment favoring plaintiffs' recovery of possession of the lots in litigation. This prompted the defendant-petitioner to appeal by way of certiorari to the CA alleging that the RTC Judge gravely erred its discretion and lacked jurisdiction to decide the case. CA set aside the RTC decision and remanded the case to the MTC for further proceedings. ISSUE: Is the RTC correct in resolving the ejectment suit on its merits? RULING: YES. Under the present Rules which include the 1997 amendments Sec. 8, Rule 40: Appeal from orders dismissing the case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings. We cannot sustain the CA. Under the aforequoted provisions, an RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, should remand a case in the event it reverses a decision of the MTC which ruled on a question of law, provided that there was no trial on the merits. The significance of this second requirement cannot be overemphasized, for it reveals the rationale for remanding the case. A remand is a due process requirement, because it affords the parties an opportunity to present evidence on the merits of the case. Where the parties have presented their respective evidence before the MTC, a remand becomes a useless superfluity, an undue imposition on the time and the dockets of courts. In the case at bar, it is clear that the MTC afforded due process to the parties; it received relevant evidence sufficient to decide the ejectment case on its merits.

RULES 40 and 41 (Appeal from the Municipal Trial Courts to Regional Trial Courts, Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts) Kenneth Retuya LACSAMANA vs. IAC - LLOYD 143 SCRA 643 Facts: In the case at bar, a decision was rendered against petitioners by the Regional Trial Court of Makati Metro Manila, in an appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati Metro Manila. Copy of said decision was received by counsel for petitioners on September 30, 1985. On October 11, 1985, counsel for petitioners filed a motion with respondent Court for 15 days extension or up to October 30, 1985 to file a petition for review on the ground that he needed additional time to finalize the pleading (Petition for Review) in view of his other written pleadings and trial commitments. Together with the filing of the motion for extension petitioners paid the necessary docket fees. Issue: Whether or not petitioners can file a motion for extension of time in a petition for review Ruling: The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an appeal from the final judgment or order of a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review in accordance with Section 22 of BP No. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules, or to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 25 of the Interim Rules. The reason for extending the period for the filing of a record on appeal is also applicable to the filing of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The period for filing a petition for review is fifteen days. If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the movant has only remaining period within which to file a petition for review. Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for review. Petitioners can therefore file a motion for extension of time in a petition for review.

RULES 40 and 41 (Appeals) Muhammad Farzieh B. Abutazil HEIRS OF MAXIMO RIGOSO VS CA Facts: Belen Rigoso filed an action for partition against her husband Maximo Rigoso. After the case was submitted for decision, Maximo died and he was not substituted by his heirs because apparently his lawyer failed to inform the court of his death. Partition is an action which survives. Later judgment was rendered against the defendant, which the lawyer appealed in accordance with rule 41. The wife moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that deceased defendant ceased to have legal personality and that defendants counsel lacked any authority to file the appeal due to his clients death. The CA dismissed the appeal. Issue: Whether or not the appeal is properly made in this case. Ruling: No. Under the rules, it is the duty of the attorney for the deceased defendant to inform the court of his client's death and to furnish the court with the names and residences of the executor, administrator, or legal representative of the deceased. In the case at bar, no such notice of death, nor a motion for substitution of the deceased defendant, was ever made. Hence, the trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of defendant, Maximo Regoso, without the proper manifestation from his counsel. It must be remembered that the fault or negligence was Attorney Javier's alone. Attorney Javier's appeal from the decision of the trial court was correctly dismissed by the appellate court for upon the death of Maximo Regoso, Attorney Javier's authority to represent him also expired. Then notice of appeal, which Attorney Javier filed on behalf of the decedent, was an unauthorized pleading, hence, invalid. However, the validity of the judgment of the trial court was not affected by the defendant's demise for the action survived. The decision is binding and enforceable against the successors-in-interest of the deceased litigant by title subsequent to the commencement of the action [Section 49(b) Rule 39, Rules of Court.

RULES 40 and 41 (Appeals) Marceliano Monato III ATTY. JESUS F. FERNANDEZ, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and CONCEPCION OLIVARES, FACTS: A Complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent Concepcion Olivares against the herein petitioner Jesus Fernandez. dismissed the Complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action. Regional Trial Court reversed the MeTC, ordering Fernandez to pay rental arrearages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs. Petitioner Fernandez received a copy of the RTC decision on 28 June 1994. He filed a motion for reconsideration fourteen (14) days after receipt of the decision. The motion was denied and he had only the remaining one (1) day to file a motion for new trial which day fell on 01 December 1994. Since 30 November 1994 was a holiday, Fernandez had up to 01 December 1994 to file the motion for new trial. Instead of filing a motion for new trial, he filed before the Court of Appeals on 01 December 1994 the motion for extension of time to file petition for review. Thereafter, and pending the resolution of his motion before the Court of Appeals, Fernandez went back to the RTC and filed on 09 December 1994 a motion for new trial. ISSUE: WON the motion for new trial be given due course. HELD: No. The motion for new trial was filed out of time. Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court providing for the period to file a motion for new trial in relation to Rule 41, Section 3 is in point. Rule 37. . . . Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party. Rule 41 . . . . Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. Applying the foregoing, Fernandez's motion for new trial was filed out of time. The fifteen (15)-day period for filing a motion for new trial cannot be extended. As early as the case of Habaluyas v. Japzon, cited in Naguiat v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and reiterated in Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, motions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may no longer be filed before all courts, lower than the Supreme Court. The rule in Habaluyas applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended because the fifteen (15) days period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration with said court is non-extendible. Thus, motions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed only in connection with cases pending before the Supreme Court, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. No such motion may be filed before any lower courts. RULES 40 and 41 (Appeals) Francis Mark Layog ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. ERNESTO REYES and LORNA REYES G.R. No. 111324. July 5, 1996 Ponente: ROMERO, J. Facts: The case springs from a lease agreement executed by petitioner-lessor, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, and private respondent-lessees, spouses

Ernesto and Lorna Reyes over a parcel of land located in Intramuros, Manila. Private respondent lessees were given the right of pre-emption, with first priority to purchase the property if the owner, herein petitioner, offered it for sale. Intending to have a fire wall constructed, private respondents allegedly had the property relocated. As a result, they discovered that the adjacent owner's concrete fence abutted on and encroached upon 30.96 square meters of the leased property. Private respondents requested petitioner to make adjustments in order to correct the encroachment problem. The spouses Reyes claim that despite repeated follow-up, petitioner has failed to take any action on their demand. Private respondent spouses filed an action for specific performance and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The correction or adjustment of the encroached portion of the property constituted their first cause of action. For their second cause of action, the spouses Reyes prayed that petitioner be compelled to sell the leased premises to them at P1,600.00 per square meter, claiming that there was already a contract of sale between the parties. The trial court issued an Order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss insofar as the first cause of action is concerned but granted it for the second cause of action. Private respondent spouses filed a notice of appeal and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. In its decision, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's October 17, 1990 Order but reversed and set aside the Partial Judgment. Issue: Whether or not a record on appeal is necessary to perfect the appeal. Held: No. The case at bar is not one where multiple appeals can be taken or are necessary. The disputes in the case below for specific performance have arisen from the demand to make adjustments on the property where the adjacent owner is alleged to have usurped a part thereof, the exercise of the right of pre-emption and the payment of rental arrearages. A ruling on the issue of encroachment will perforce be determinative of the issue of unpaid rentals. These two points do not arise from two or more causes of action, but from the same cause of action. Hence, this suit does not require multiple appeals. There is no ground for the splitting of appeals in this case, even if it involves an Order granting (and denying) a motion to dismiss and a Partial Judgment granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The subject matter covered in the Order and in the Partial Judgment pertain to the same lessor-lessee relationship, lease contract and parcel of land. Splitting appeals in the instant case would, in effect, be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals. The conclusion is irresistible that since a case has not been made out for multiple appeals, a record on appeal is unnecessary to perfect the appeal.

RULE 42 (Petition for Review from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals) Muhammad Farzieh B. Abutazil PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION vs. MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD Facts: Private Respondent Montague Resources Philippines Corporation was granted their Application for Exploration Permit (EP) covering the same properties as petitioner Pyro Copper Mining Corporation, whose same exploration permit was revoked by the Secretary of Environment Mike Defensor. Subsequent to the granting

of EP of Private Respondent, petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition to the private respondents Application for Exploration Permit, which the MGB dismissed as having been filed out of time and that it failed to include a certificate against forum shopping. Petitioner appealed to the CA for review, Petitioner was given an opportunity to submit Atty. Acsays written authority to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping. Which they failed to do so, thus the CA dismissed the case. Issue: Whether or not a certification against forum shopping not signed by a duly authorized person renders the petition subject to dismissal. Ruling: Section 6(d), Rule 4 in relation to Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that a petition for review shall contain a sworn certification against forum shopping, in which the petitioner shall attest that he has not commenced any other action involving the same issues in this Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before this Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five days therefrom. For failure to comply with this mandate, section 7 of Rule 42 states that this becomes a ground for dismissal. The requirement that petitioner should sign the Certification against Forum Shopping applies even to corporations, the Rules of Court making no distinction between natural and juridical persons. A corporation, however, exercises its powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors. The signatory, therefore, in the case of the corporation should be "a duly authorized director or officer of the corporation" who has knowledge of the matter being certified. If the petitioner is a corporation, a board resolution authorizing a corporate officer to execute the Certification against Forum Shopping is necessary. A certification not signed by a duly authorized person renders the petition subject to dismissal.

RULE 42 (Petition for Review from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals) Marceliano Monato III BABY ARLENE LARANO vs. SPS. ALFREDO CALENDACION and RAFAELA T. CALENDACION FACTS: Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals committed grave error in giving due course to the private respondents' petition for review notwithstanding the fact that said petition contains no verification to the effect that the allegations therein were read and understood by the private respondents and that they are true and correct of their own or personal knowledge or based on authentic records, as required by the rules. Section 3 Rule 42 provides: Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. ISSUE: WON failure to verify the petition warrants the dismissal of the same. HELD: No. Verification is just a formal requirement. The Supreme Court has held in a number of instances that such a deficiency can be excused or dispensed with in meritorious cases, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.

RULE 42 (Petition for Review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals) Francis Mark Layog BARANGAY SANGALANG vs. BARANGAY MAGUIHAN G.R. No. 159792 : December 23, 2009

Ponente: PERALTA, J.: Facts: The controversy has its roots in a barangay jurisdiction dispute between petitioner Barangay Sangalang and respondent Barangay Maguihan, both situated in Lemery, Batangas. The case was lodged before the Sangguniang Bayan, which referred it to a hearing committee. In turn, the committee formed rendered a report to the effect that the properties in dispute belonged to petitioner. The recommendation was subsequently affirmedby the Sangguniang Bayan of Lemery, Batangas. Respondent appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC rendered a Decision ruling in favor of respondent. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the RTC. Aggrieved, petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal. The CA rendered a Decision dismissing the appeal. In dismissing the appeal, the CA ruled that petitioner had availed itself of the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal instead of filing a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Hence, herein petition. Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in stating that the Petitioner should have filed a petition for review rather than a notice for appeal. Held: Yes. By filing a Notice of Appeal assailing the RTC Decision, petitioner has availed itself of the remedy provided for under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which provides for the ordinary mode of appeal. The CA, however, considered petitioner's choice to be the wrong remedy and, forthwith, dismissed the petition. After an examination of relevant laws pertinent to herein petition, this Court finds that the CA was correct in holding that petitioner had availed itself of the wrong remedy. Section 119 of the Local Government Code also provides that the decision of the sanggunian concerned may be appealed to the RTC having jurisdiction over the area in dispute, within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court. It is clear that when the case was appealed to the RTC, the latter took cognizance of the case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction. Hence, any further appeal from the RTC Decision must conform to the provisions of the Rules of Court dealing with said matter. On this score, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. XXXX (b) Petition for review. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42. Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that petitioner has availed itself of the wrong remedy. Since the RTC tried the case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, instead of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The law is clear in this respect. However, to serve the demands of substantial justice and equity, the Supreme Court opts to relax procedural rules and rule upon on the merits of the case.

RULE 42 (Petition for Review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals) Geoffrey P. Navarra, Jr.

SPOUSES EDILLO vs. SPS. DULPINA G.R. No. 188360, January 21, 2010 FACTS: On February 21, 2006, plaintiffs-respondents Spouses Norberto and Desideria Dulpina (plaintiffs-respondents) filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against the defendants-petitioners with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Del Carmen-San Isidro-San Benito, Surigao del Norte (MCTC). On May 23, 2007, the MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint. On June 5, 2007, the plaintiffsrespondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the MCTC denied in its Resolution of June 8, 2007. On July 30, 2007, the plaintiffs-respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the MCTC, which the latter granted. On August 15, 2007, the plaintiffs-respondents filed their Appeal Memorandum with the Regional Trial Court. The RTC decided the appeal on November 7, 2007. It set aside the MCTC judgment and ordered the defendants-petitioners to vacate the subject property and to restore the plaintiffs-respondents to their possession. After the RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration, the defendants-petitioners elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. They argued that the plaintiffs-respondents appeal with the RTC was filed out of time since the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure (RRSP) prohibits the filing of a motion for reconsideration. The CA dismissed the Petition in its Resolution of January 28, 2009 on the ground that it does not contain a statement of the factual background of the case, in violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. RULING: We find for the defendants-petitioners. That there was substantial compliance with the Rules because the background facts can be found within the four corners of the petition and its incorporated annexes, is not a novel ruling for this Court. In the case of Deloso v. Marapao (involving the same deficiency for lack of a specific and separate statement of facts outlining the factual background relied upon), we said: An examination of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals reveals that while it does not contain a separate section on statement of facts, the facts of the case are, in fact, integrated in the petition particularly in the discussion/argument portion. Moreover, the decision of the DARAB which contains the facts of the case was attached to the petition and was even quoted by the appellate court. The petition also sufficiently discusses the errors committed by the DARAB in its assailed decision. There was, therefore, substantial compliance with Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It is settled that liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial justice. Given this precedent, it only remains for us to determine if we can apply a liberal construction of the Rules because a meaningful litigation of the case can ensue given the Petitions prima facie merit.

RULE 43 (Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies)

Jarissa G. Guiani FIRST LEPANTO CERAMIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS October 17, 1994 Facts: Petitioners contended that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed to have superseded Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) because the Code, is in the nature of a substantive act of Congress defining the jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Art. VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution, while the circular is a rule of procedure which this Court promulgated pursuant to its rule-making power under Art. VIII, Section 5(5). Petitioner questions that although the right to appeal granted by Art. 82 of the Code is a substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule of procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what manner the appeal can be brought are only matters of procedure which the Supreme Court has the power to regulate. Issue: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of Board of Investments and, consequently, dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner. Ruling: The Supreme Court denied petitioners motion. Judicial review of the decisions and final orders of the BOI was originally provided for in Article 78 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981. It was subsequently amended by B.P. Blg. 129, Section 9 exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) over the decisions and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. When the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) was promulgated on July 17, 1987, the right to appeal from the decisions and final orders of the BOI to the Supreme Court was again granted. By then, the present Constitution had taken effect which provides in Art. VI, Section 30 that "No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence." Moreover, Article 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders of the BOI, it increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Since it was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it can never be deemed to have amended BP Blg. 129, Section 9. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases appealed to it from the BOI must be deemed to have been conferred by B.P. Blg. 129, Section 9, to be exercised by it in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91. In this case, the Court ruled that there is no reason why decisions and final orders of the BOI must be directly appealed to the Supreme Court. The purpose of Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 is to provide uniform appeals to the Court of Appeals from the decisions and final orders of all quasi-judicial agencies, with the exception only of those issued under the Labor Code and those rendered by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. It is, therefore, regrettable that in the adoption of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, as required by the Constitution, had not been obtained in providing for the appeal of the decisions and final orders of the BOI directly to the Supreme Court.

RULE 43 (Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial

Agencies) Hazel Ivory Laud HILARIO P. SORIANO VS. ZENAIDA A. CABAIS FACTS: Hilario P. Soriano, petitioner, is the President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. (RBSM). On the other hand, Zenaida A. Cabais, respondent, is the comptroller designated by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to oversee the banks operations. the RBSM was closed and placed under receivership by the BSP. Thereupon, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. In the course of the proceedings executed two affidavits stating that: About a week before RBSM declared a bank holiday on January 4, 2000, RBSM on December 27, 1999 and December 29, 1999, paid Forcecollect Professional Solution, Inc. and Surecollect Professional Solution, Inc., entities owned/controlled by Mr. Soriano and other RBSM officers. Petitioner filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a complaint for perjury. The case was forwarded to the Ombudsman which subsequently dismissed the complaint. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. CA dismissed the complaint saying that This is an appeal, by way of petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, of the Ombudsmans resolution dismissing petitioners criminal complaint for perjury against respondent. However, a petition for review before this Court of the Ombudsmans decision will lie only if the proceedings had in that office pertains to purely administrative disciplinary cases, sighting the case of Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470. Hence, this present petition for review. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in invoking its ruling in Fabian v. Desierto. RULING: No. In Fabian, we ruled that appeals from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. This ruling has been repeatedly reiterated in subsequent cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine. Here, petitioners complaint is criminal in nature. In Estrada v. Desierto, we held that the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with this Court, not with the Court of Appeals. In cases when the aggrieved party is questioning the Office of the Ombudsmans finding of lack of probable cause, as in this case, there is likewise the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals. This rule was subsequently restated in Acua v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon where we held that the remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Clearly, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. Even assuming that petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, we would have dismissed it just the same since there is nothing in the records to even suggest that the Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint for perjury against respondent.

RULE 43 (Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies) Irish Silverio ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME vs. NLRC G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998 Facts: Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semimonthly payroll. Respondent was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its VAT to BIR. Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee. Labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed. On appeal, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision prompting petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration which was however denied. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. Issue: Whether or not the SC is the proper forum to review the decision of the NLRC Ruling: No R.A. No. 7902( March 18, 1995) Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise: (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. RULE 44 (ordinary Appealed Cases) Ivy Rose Paz ESTIVA vs. CAWIT 59 Phil. 67 FACTS: In this case there are 116 assignment of errors. As for the briefs, for one appellant, 178 pages, for another appellant, 6 pages, for another appellant, 28

pages, for the fourth appellant, 10 pages, and for the appellees, 256 pages. The stenographic record is 685 pages and numerous exhibits. The issue on appeal is simple, it is to determine if the evidence is sufficient to support the findings of the trial judge leading to the annulment of Exhibits A, B, and C. Exhibit A is the document by which Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Estiva purported to grant to Gonzalo Cawil a broad and absolute power to sell their property, but which the spouses claimed was not their purpose. They claimed that they only granted Mr. Cawil an authority to enter into a contract to secure a loan and not an absolute transfer of property. Exhibit B is the Deed of Sale of the property by Gonzalo Cawil to Alejandro M. Panis for the sum of P17,000. Exhibit C executed on the same day as Exhibit B is the mortgage of the property by Alejandro M. Panis to Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa, a cousin by marriage. The trial court ruled that the testimony presented by the spouses is sufficient and rejected as fallacious much of the testimonies of the defendants. Hence, the defendants filed this appeal. ISSUE: Is the evidence presented sufficient to support the findings of the trial judge leading to the annulment of Exhibits A, B, and C? RULING: YES. We have studied carefully all the record and having done so we are entirely unable to say that a preponderance of the evidence does not support the trial judge in his findings. Accordingly, to save the time of the court we are content to make the decision of the trial judge the decision of the appellate court. Wherefore, deciding the issue in the manner herein before indicated, accepting the findings of fact substantially as made by the trial judge, and noting in the record no reversible or prejudicial error, the result will be the affirmance of the judgment, the costs of this instance to be paid jointly and severally by the appellants. We have read the bill of exceptions, the specified errors, the briefs, and the record, and have listened to the arguments, as indeed it was our duty to do, but we have not done so in a gracious mood, for it has seemed to us that counsel could have lightened the burden thrown upon the court. The Rules of this court do not attempt to limit the number of assigned errors or the length of the briefs. At the same time, counsel could voluntarily assist in the prompt disposition of the business of the court by making only an assignment of the errors alleged to have been committed in the trial court which are prejudicial and reversible, and by plainly and concisely presenting their cases in well ordered briefs to the court. Let it be recalled that the word "brief" is derived from the Latin brevis, and the French briefe, and literally means a short or condensed statement. The purpose of the brief, as all law students and lawyers know, is to present to the court in concise form the points and questions in controversy, and by fair argument on the facts and law of the case to assist the court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion. The brief should be so prepared as to minimize the labor of the court in the examination of the record upon which the appeal is heard and determined. We feel free to insert these observations bluntly presenting the viewpoint of the court for the benefit not particularly of the lawyers in this case but of the Philippine bar in general.

RULE 44 (Ordinary Appealed Cases) Kenneth Retuya ASTA MOSKOWSKY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO DORIA, EDGARDO ALCARAZ and EVANGELINE DORIA G.R. No. 104222 March 3, 1994

Facts: A decision was rendered by the RTC of Pasig on November 16, 1989 in favor of petitioner. Said decision was appealed by private respondents and the records were elevated to the CA. Acting on a motion for extension of time to file appellants' brief filed by the private respondents, the CA in a resolution granted a nonextendible period of ninety (90) days within which to file appellants' brief or until November 1, 1991. On November 4, 1991, the private respondents through counsel filed an "Urgent Motion for a Final Extension of 20 days to File Brief." On even date, the petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that no appellants' brief had yet been filed despite the lapse of the reglementary period on November 1, 1991. On November 25, 1991 the private respondents filed an "Urgent Motion for Five (5) Days to file Brief." On December 3, 1991, they filed a "Motion to Admit Appellants' Brief." In a Resolution dated December 19, 1991, the Respondent Court of Appeals resolved to admit Appellants' Brief. On January 6, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the period within which to submit Appellants' Brief had expired. The CA however denied the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the petition. Issue 1: Was the motion for extension filed on time? Held: Private respondents' former counsel filed on August 2, 1991, an "Urgent ExParte Motion For Extension of Time To File Brief for a period of 90 days counted from August 3, 1991. Said ninety-day period would end on November 1, 1991. November 1 is a regular holiday. Then President Aquino declared November 2, 1991 as a special holiday. The next day, November 3, 1991 turned out to be a Sunday. The next business day was, therefore, November 4, 1991 a Monday. Instead of filing a brief, private respondents this time, through new counsel, filed a motion for a 20-day extension to file a brief on November 4, 1991. The law for pretermission of holidays is that "Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a regular holiday or special day, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day." The abovementioned motion was, therefore, filed on time, i.e., the motion for the extension sought was filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended.

RULE 44 (Ordinary Appealed Cases) Muhammad Farzieh B. Abutazil RIVERA VS CA Facts: The spouses Martinez sold their house and lot to Rivera. Later, they filed a

complaint against Rivera declaring the sale as null and void on the ground that the sale is a mortgage. The court dismissed the complaint. So the ruling of the trial court was that the sale was valid. But on the CA, Martinez spouses prayed that they may be allowed to redeem the property. The CA redeem reversed the Trial Court and allowed the Martinez spouses to redeem the property. Now, Rivera appealed to the CA, contending that Martinez changed the theory of their case because in the original complaint the latter prayed for the annulment of the sale and in the CA they prayed that they be allowed to redeem the property. Issue: Was there a change of theory of the Martinez spouses? Ruling: There was no change of theory. There was no surprise against Rivera or to the CA. The real purpose of the Martinez spouses in asking for the nullity of the contract is to enable them to recover the property from Rivera. Prescinding from those allegations and from the prayer all clearly set out in the complaint, it is fair to conclude that the real purpose in asking for the nullity of the contract of sale is to enable the private respondents to recover or redeem the property they deeded in favor of Mercedes Teehankee Rivera Thus the nature of the contract has been raised as an issue the pleadings. It would be absurd to pray for the nullity of an agreement and stop there There would be a vacuum and the law, like nature, abhors a vacuum. In the CA, they persisted in their claim to entitlement of the right to recover, redeem, or repurchase. This agreement cannot be construed as change of theory: it is persistence, plain and simple. It does not leave any interstice (definition opening, crack) in the entire theory of the case. Consistency in the position of the private respondents runs throughout the presentation of their claim.

From the notes of Atty. Jess Zachael Espejo

RULE 44 (Ordinary Appealed Cases) Marceliano Monato III SPS. JOSEPHINE MENDOZA GO & HENRY GO, vs. LEONARDO YAMANE FACTS: The RTC rendered a decision adverse to the respondent. Respondent received a copy of the RTC Decision on April 8, 1998. He had, therefore, until April

23, 1998, within which to file an appeal. Prior to the latter date, however, he moved that his new counsel be allowed to file a motion for reconsideration on May 30, 1998. It was eventually filed on May 28, 1998, but was denied. Respondent subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal on June 15, 1998 before the Court of Appeals. By this time, the original period to appeal had expired. However, CA gave due course to the appeal and reversed the RTC's Decision. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal filed by respondent beyond the 15-day reglementary period. HELD: The CA is correct in giving due course to the appeal despite failure to file it within the reglementary period. Section 3, Rule 41 provides: Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional; and the lapse of the appeal period of fifteen days deprives a court of the jurisdiction to alter a final judgment. There have been exceptions, however, in which the Court dispensed with technical infirmities and gave due course to tardy appeals. In some of those instances, the presence of any justifying circumstance recognized by law -- such as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence -- properly vested the judge with discretion to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. In other instances, lapsed appeals were allowed in order to serve substantial justice, upon consideration of a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; c) the merits of the case; d) causes not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party that would be favored by the suspension of the rules; e) the failure to show that the review being sought was merely frivolous and dilatory; and f) the fact that the other party would not be unjustly prejudiced. "In Ramos vs. Bagasao, the Court excused the delay of four days in the filing of the notice of appeal because the questioned decision of the trial court had been served upon appellant Ramos at a time when her counsel of record was already dead. The new counsel could only file the appeal four days after the prescribed reglementary period was over. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six days to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for public purposes. In Olacao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, a tardy appeal was accepted considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judicially settled with finality in another case, and a dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee. The Supreme Court believe that a suspension of the Rules is similarly warranted in the present controversy. The Court carefully studied the merits of the case and noted that the review being sought has not been shown to be merely frivolous and dilatory. The Court has come to the conclusion that the Decision of the RTC, must be set aside. It would be far better and more prudent to attain the ends of justice, rather than to dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice in the process. Thus, we would rather excuse a technical lapse and afford respondent a review of the case on appeal.

RULE 44 (Ordinary Appealed Cases) Francis Mark Layog QUEZON CITY vs ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 166408 October 6, 2008 Ponente: REYES, R.T., J. Facts: ABS-CBN was granted the franchise to install and operate radio and television broadcasting stations in the Philippines under R.A. No. 7966. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7966 provides the tax liabilities of ABS-CBN. ABS-CBN had been paying local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City. However, in view of the above provision in R.A. No. 9766 that it shall pay a franchise tax x x x in lieu of all taxes, the corporation developed the opinion that it is not liable to pay the local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City. Consequently, ABS-CBN paid under protest the local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City. ABS-CBN filed a written claim for refund for local franchise tax paid to Quezon

City for 1996 and for the first quarter of 1997. For failure to obtain any response from the Quezon City Treasurer, ABSCBN filed a complaint before the RTC in Quezon City seeking the declaration of nullity of the imposition of local franchise tax by the City Government of Quezon City for being unconstitutional. The RTC rendered judgment declaring as invalid the imposition on and collection from ABS-CBN of local franchise tax paid pursuant to Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, after the enactment of R.A. No. 7966, and ordered the refund of all payments made. Appeal was made to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition of Quezon City and its Treasurer. According to the appellate court, the issues raised were purely legal questions cognizable only by the Supreme Court. Hence, the present recourse. Issue: Whether or not it is proper to appeal to the CA Held: No, because petitioners have raised purely legal issues, namely: 1) Whether appellee, whose franchise expressly provides that its payment of franchise tax shall be in lieu of all taxes in this franchise or earnings thereof, is absolutely excused from paying the franchise tax imposed by appellants; 2) Whether appellants imposition of local franchise tax is a violation of appellees legislative franchise; and 3) Whether one can do away with the requirement on prior written claim for refund. Obviously, these are purely legal questions, cognizable by this Court, to the exclusion of all other courts. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts. Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal taken to the CA under Rule 41 raising only questions of law is erroneous and shall be dismissed, issues of pure law not being within its jurisdiction. Consequently, the dismissal by the CA of petitioners appeal was in order. However, to serve the demands of substantial justice and equity, the Supreme Court opts to relax procedural rules and rule upon on the merits of the case.

RULE 44 (Ordinary Appealed Cases) Geoffrey P. Navarra, Jr. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. DE LA CRUZ G.R. No. 156093 February 2, 2007 The Facts Petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain and expropriation of an easement of right-of-way against respondents as registered owners of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated. Nevertheless, the records show that the commissioners did not afford the parties the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor, nor did they conduct hearings before them. In fact, the commissioners did not issue notices to the parties to attend hearings nor provide the concerned parties the opportunity to argue their respective causes. Upon the submission of the commissioners report, petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing of it nor given any opportunity to file its objections to it. As regards the commissioners

failure to conduct a hearing to give the parties the opportunity to present their respective evidence, as alleged by petitioner, the CA opined that [t]he filing by [petitioner] of a motion for reconsideration accorded it ample opportunity to dispute the findings of the commissioners, so that [petitioner] was as fully heard as there might have been hearing actually taken place. Significantly, petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA November 18, 2002 Decision, but it directly filed a petition for review before us. The Issues: Whether or not the petition for review was proper. The Courts Ruling We find this petition meritorious. It is beyond question that petitions for review may only raise questions of law which must be distinctly set forth; thus, this Court is mandated to only consider purely legal questions in this petition, unless called for by extraordinary circumstances. In this case, petitioner raises the issue of denial of due process because it was allegedly deprived of the opportunity to present its evidence on the just compensation of properties it wanted to expropriate, and the sufficiency of the legal basis or bases for the trial courts Order on the matter of just compensation. Unquestionably, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the proper vehicle to raise the issues in question before this Court. In view of the significance of the issues raised in this petition, because this case involves the expenditure of public funds for a clear public purpose, this Court will overlook the fact that petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA November 18, 2002 Decision, and brush aside this technicality in favor of resolving this case on the merits.

RULE 45 (Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court) Jarissa G. Guiani BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. UY November 2, 2006 Facts: Public Estates Authority (PEA) entered into a Landscaping and Construction Agreement# (LCA) with respondent Uy, doing business under the name and style of Edison Development and Construction. The controversy arose when respondent Uy received from PEA a Letter of Termination# of the LCA which prompted respondent to file for Injunction and Damages with the Paranaque RTC against PEA, petitioner Bases Conversion Development Authority and private petitioners. The trial court issued an order enjoining petitioners from excluding respondent from his contractual obligations under the LCA. Petitioners who were not joined by PEA forthwith filed their Joint Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition# before the CA.

Alleging facts falling under the exceptions on filing a motion for reconsideration, said petition raised the sole issue of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to hear an injunction case against the BCDA and the propriety of the issuance of the TRO in view of the proscription under Section 21 of RA 7227. When the CA ruled that the RTC was the proper venue to hear the injunction case and to issue the TRO, petitioners, without filing a motion for reconsideration, filed before the Supreme Court their Joint Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 on pure questions of law, raising the same sole issue of jurisdiction of the RTC to hear an injunctive case and to issue a TRO against the BCDA. Issue: Whether or not a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent under Rule 45. Ruling: Rule 45 does not require the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of appeals through petitions for review on certiorari. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 45 do not require the filing of a motion for reconsideration as a condition precedent unlike certiorari under Rule 65. It must be noted that while both Rules 45 and 65 are petitions for certiorari, the former is a petition for review while the latter is an original special civil action for certiorari.

RULE 45 (Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court) Hazel Ivory Laud NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA PICOP RESOURCES, INC. VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and PICOP RESOURCES, INC. FACTS: cPetitioner Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PICOP Resources Inc., 'Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL) is the recognized labor union of the rank and file employees in the paper mill and plywood manufacturing plant of respondent Picop Resources, Inc. (PICOP). NAMAPRI-SPFL members engaged in a strike and picketed picketed PICOP's plant and mill upon finding out that PICOP is permanently shuting down its operations. PICOP dismissed the remaining workers and went through with the permanent closure of the paper mill and plywood manufacturing plant. Labor Secretary issued the September 9, 1999 Order, Declaring the temporary shutdown

at the paper and plywood plants of Picop Resources, Inc. legitimate and the temporary lay-off of the affected workers therein likewise legal. Pet moved for the execution of the earlier order. PICOP filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction or Mandatory Injunction with the appellate court which was granted. Pet, then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA decided to grant a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner. Hence, this present appeal. ISSUE: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of its March 7, 2001 and July 4, 2001 Resolutions. RULING: On a procedural matter, respondent PICOP makes much of the unconventional manner by which petitioner styles the instant action as one under Rule 45 which is an appeal by certiorari from a CA decision to the Supreme Court and simultaneously, also a special civil action under Rule 65 based on alleged grave abuse of discretion in a decision of the CA. However, in its Memorandum, NAMAPRISPFL clarified that it was actually a petition under Rule 45. As a general rule, a party cannot file a petition both under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court because said procedural rules pertain to different remedies and have distinct applications. Meanwhile, in Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd., v. CA, we held that the remedy of appeal under Rule 45 and an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Thus, a party should not join both petitions in one pleading. In Mercado v. Court Appeals, we held that 'when a party adopts an improper remedy, as in this case, 'his petition may be dismissed outright.

RULE 45 (Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court) Irish Silverio TIBLE & TIBLE COMPANY, INC., vs. ROYAL SAVINGS AND LOAN G.R. No. 155806, April 8, 2008 Facts: Failure on the part of petitioner to pay the loan it obtained from respondent necessitated the parties to enter into a compromise agreement which further stated that "failure on the part of the defendants to pay any one of the installments as and when the same is due and payable, shall make the whole obligation immediately due and payable and shall entitle the plaintiff to immediately execute without further verbal or written notice to the defendant.

After TTCI defaulted in its monthly payments, RSLA moved for immediate execution of the compromise agreement without furnishing TTCI any copy of such motion which the CFI granted the motion and issued the order. In its ex parte motion RSLA sought the issuance of an alias writ of execution, which was again granted by the. Almost ten years after the supposed public auction sale, the sheriff issued the final deed of sale in favor of RSLA. Aggrieved by these developments, petitioners filed an action for "Annulment of Execution Sale and other related Documents, and/or Reconveyance of Real Property with prayer to Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order with Damages". It dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction and suggested that the complaint be filed in Cavite City instead but was subsequently denied for want of proof when refiled. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but the petition for certiorari was dismissed outright on procedural grounds. Issues: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari. Ruling: No The Supreme Court has invariably upheld dismissals of certiorari petitions erroneously filed, appeal being the correct remedy. It is a very basic rule in jurisprudence that certiorari cannot be availed of when the party has adequate remedy such as an appeal. Where appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion.

RULE 47 (Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions) Ivy Rose Paz COSMIC LUMBER CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS 256 SCRA 168 [1996] FACTS: Cosmic Lumber Corp. executed a Special Power of Attorney appointing Paz G. Villamil-Estrada as its attorney-in-fact to initiate, institute and file any court action for the ejectment of third persons and/or squatters in a parcel of land owned by Cosmic. By virtue of this power of attorney Paz G. Villamil-Estrada instituted an action for the ejectment against Isidro Perez and for recovery of possession before the RTC. On November 27, 2985 Villamil-Estrada entered into a compromise agreement with Perez selling to the latter a portion of this parcel of land for the sum

of P26,640.00. This compromise agreement was approved by the trial court. Although the decision became final and executory it was not executed within the 5year period from date of its finality allegedly due to the failure of Cosmic to produce the owners duplicate copy to Perez. Thus on 25 January 1993 Perez filed a complaint to revive the judgment and it was only when the summons for the revival of judgment was served upon Cosmic that it came to know of the compromise agreement entered into between Paz G. Villamil-Estrada and Isidro Perez. Petitioner filed a complaint for the annulment of the decision of the trial court before the CA on the ground of fraud; however this was dismissed on the basis of its finding that not one of the grounds for annulment, namely, lack of jurisdiction, fraud or illegality was shown to exist. Hence, the petitioner went to the SC. ISSUE: Is the petition to annul the decision of the trial court before the Court of Appeals proper? RULING: YES The Court ruled that Villamil-Estrada exceeded the authority granted to him thru the Special Power of Attorney. The sale ipso jure is consequently void. So is the compromise agreement. This being the case, the judgment based thereon is necessarily void. Antipodal to the opinion expressed by respondent court in resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration, the nullity of the settlement between Villamil-Estrada and Perez impaired the jurisdiction of the trial court to render its decision based on the compromise agreement. Under authority of Sec. 9, par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, a party may now petition the Court of Appeals to annul and set aside judgments of Regional Trial Courts. Thus, the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) shall exercise (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over action for annulment of judgments of the Regional Trial Courts However, certain requisites must first be established before a final and executory judgment can be the subject of an action for annulment. It must either be void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or it has been obtained by fraud. The SC also ruled that there exist an extrinsic fraud in this case. Villamil-Estrada deliberately concealed from petitioner, her principal, that a compromise agreement had been forged with the end result that a portion of petitioners property was sold literally for a song, for P26, 000. Thus completely kept unaware of its agents artifice, petitioner was not accorded even a fighting chance to repudiate the settlement so much so that the judgment based thereon became final and executory.

RULE 47 (Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions) Kenneth Retuya ALEJANDRO BAYOG and JORGE PESAYCO, JR. vs. HON. ANTONIO M. NATINO, ALBERTO MAGDATO G.R. No. 118691 July 5, 1996 Facts: Petitioner Alejandro Bayog and private respondent Alberto Magdato entered into an Agricultural Leasehold Contract over a lot located in Centro Pojo, Bugasong, Antique,with Bayog as the Landowner-Lessor and Magdato as Tenant-Lessee. Soon after, then Pres. Marcos issued a Certificate of Agricultural LeaseholdtoMagdato.

Despite the existence of the Leasehold Contract between the parties, Bayogexecuted a so-called Deed of Equitable Mortgage, with right of redemption within five years, in favor of Santiago Pesayco.Hence, the filing of an Ejectment and/or Abatement of Nuisance with Prayer for Demolition against Bayog.Service of Summons were then made upon Magdato, however, he was only able to file an answer to the complaint 3 days after the reglementary period had passed. As such, the MCTC issued an order holding that since the Answer was filed outside the reglementary period, it could not take cognizance thereof without exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 and claiming authority under Section 5 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs Bayog and Pesayco. Thus, the filing of Magdato of a petition for relief from judgment alleging that that the late filing of his answer was due to mistake or excusable neglect, for he was sick at the time of receipt of the summons and that because of his illiteracy he was unaware of the unextendible period wherein to file an answer.Magdato further asserted that he had good, valid, and strong evidence to counteract Bayog's claim, and if given a chance to be heard, would prove that he was a duly instituted tenant of Bayog, as evidenced by copies of the Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold. Bayog, on the other hand, maintained that a petition for relief from judgment was a prohibited pleading under Section 19 (d) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Moreover, the petition was not accompanied by the affidavit of merit required by Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. As such, relief from judgment cannot be validly claimed by Magdato. Issue: Whether or not an entry of default must be entered if a defendant fails to answer in a case of action for ejectment decided through summary procedure. Ruling: No. The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure does not provide that an answer filed after the reglamentary period should be expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default if a defendant fails to file his answer. The defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even been raised by the defendant in a Motion To Dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed under Sec. 19(a) thereof, which explicitly provides: Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadingsandmotions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule: (a) Motiontodismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information excepton the ground of lack of jurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter, or failure to comply with the preceding section; xxx

RULE 47 (Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions) Muhammad Farzieh B. Abutazil ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL VS COURT OF APPEALS Facts: The Islamic DaWah Council as mortgagee with the mortgagors Freddie and Marconi Da Silva, executed a compromise agreement due to the mortgagors failure to comply with their obligation. Subsequently, the council filed a complaint for quieting of title. While the case was pending the heirs of a certain Jesus Araneta filed a complaint with the Court of Appeals petition to annul the judgment granted by the Trial Court, claiming among others that they were the real owners of the subject property and not the mortgagors. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued

by the Court of Appeals. Thus the Council resorted to the recourse of Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Issue #1: Can a person who is not a party to the judgment, file an action for annulment of judgment. Held #1: A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby. In this present case it is true that the heirs of Araneta are not parties to the foreclosure case. Neither are they principally nor secondarily bound by the judgment rendered therein. However. their petition filed with the Court of Appeals they alleged fraud and connivance perpetuated by and between the Da Silvas and the Council as would adversely affect them. Issue #2: Suppose the judgment had already been fully implemented, can you still file a case for annulment of judgment? executed and

Held #2: In Garchitorena u. Sotelo, supra, the Court affirmed the trial court's annulment of the judgment on foreclosure notwithstanding the fact that ownership of the house and lot subject of the mortgage had passed from the mortgagee who foreclosed the mortgage and purchased the property at public auction to a person who bought the same and finally to another individual in whose name the Torrens certificate of title stood by the time the case reached this Tribunal.

From the notes of Atty. Jess Zachael Espejo