FelicityTan AHoleintheWall:SpanishImmigrationtheEU

Felicity Tan HI 423 Final Paper 1 May 2009 Prof Helena Toth

A Hole in the Wall: Spanish Immigration in the EU

From the Rome Treaty, to the Single European Act, to Maastrict and Schengen, the European Union has sought to allow free movement between its member states, including that of people. One corollary effect of these liberal immigration policies is an unwelcome shift toward a European labor bloc that is isolated from the global labor market, where movement is restricted to EU nationals within Fortress Europe. That is, the liberal policies within the EU necessitate a restrictive policy for non-EU laborers, whose presence is crucial to the vitality of European economy. As a result, these internal liberties and external restraints that are effectively leading to a separated labor bloc are themselves creating massive leaks in the fortress walls from the outside, rather than a steady, healthy and legal flow. An analysis of the transformation of Spanish immigration patterns and policies since joining the EU will demonstrate that until a better solution is reached, only by approaching immigration issues with policies that acknowledge the need for immigrants and their rights, and that do not threaten national jurisdictions, can Europe circumvent an emergent Fortress Europe while exercising the most control over immigration and fulfilling its labor needs. International cooperation, rather than conglomeration unfit for the socioeconomic experience of individual nations, is, at least in the case of Spain, the best compromise thus far.

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From backwater to forefront The development of Spains national immigration policy, or its Ley de Extranjera, coincides with the development of immigration policy at the EU level.1 Before acquiring full membership into the European Union, Spain was pressured to adopt existing trends in EU migration policy into the Ley because of fears that as the soft underbelly of the EU, Spain would leave the rest of the union vulnerable to masses of migrants.2 The Spanish government thus implemented a law in 1985 that provided temporary work visas to non-EU laborers only after the offer of employment. The provisions of this Ley Orgnica were also geared exclusively toward legal migrants already in the country. Spains induction into the European Union had itself induced in Spain an economic boom, which is largely attributed to the rise in incoming migrant labor coinciding with membership. That is, Spain had become a threshold into the EU. Prior to 1986, Spain did not have a significant immigration history, having been for the most part a labor exporter to northern Europe. Its entry into the union attracted return migration as well as some settlement from nationals of other EU states.3 Now also a gateway to the Europe, Spain evolved from its traditional role as a sending country to a transit country for migrants headed north, and increasingly, a destination.4 Before 1986, Spains foreign-

2Ibid.,67.

1RyanNewton,SpanishImmigrationPolicysinceTampere(Ph.Ddiss.,ColumbiaUniversity,2004),2.

andTheSchengenAgreement:JeuxSansFrontires,TheEconomist,16June1990,5657. 3LauraHuntoon,ImmigrationtoSpain:ImplicationsforaUnifiedEuropeanUnionImmigrationPolicy, InternationalMigrationReview32.n2(1998):423450,4. 4NievesOrtegaPrez,Spain:ForgingandImmigrationPolicy,MigrationInformationSource, <http://migrationinformation.org/profiles>,February2003.

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born population stood at 2 percent.5 Today Spain has the worlds highest rate of immigration at 9.9 percent.6 Spain soon realized that far from being a labor population with temporary work visas, immigrants were not readily returning home, some even taking advantage of favorable laws that put them on the path toward Spanish citizenship.7 In 1998, only 57,000 of its citizens were foreign-born; by 2008, however, that number rose to 10 million, out of Spains 45 million citizens.8 Almost overnight, Spain evolved from an ethnically defined nation to a civic one.9 Recognizing that their presence was a structural phenomenon, the government amended the Ley Orgnica in 1996 to include immigrants rights and access to education and services, but only to those living in Spain legally.10 The Ley Orgnicas restrictive policies, however, remained unchanged. The difficulties in legally obtaining as well as renewing permits forced large numbers of immigrants to fall back into irregular status, or left them with no proper documentation at all. Clandestinos, or illegal immigrants, had thus also become part of Spains social fabric. Spain continued to develop its policies following the patterns of its foreign labor presence.11 In 2000, the government adopted the 1996 amendment into law, applying it to accommodate clandestinos as well. The Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Integration, better known as 4/2000, did not differentiate between 5Spainlovesimmigration,butfindsimmigrantsachallenge,TheGlobeandMail,8Marcxh2008,p.53.
6Ibid.

andObservanceoflawkeytoimmigrantsintegration,BBCWorldwideMonitoring,tr.Spanish,ABCNews22 October2007. 7Newton,Ibid.,7. NB:NaturalizationinSpainincludescitizenshipbybirth,heritageorlongtermlegalresidency.Nationalsof formerSpanishcolonieslegallyresidinginSpainfortwoyearsmayalsonaturalize. 8Spainlovesimmigration,Ibid. 9Ibid. 10Prez,Ibid. 11Huntoon,Ibid.

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immigrants of legal and illegal status, and protected the undocumented from deportation. The laws focus on integration set the precedent for Plan Greco in 2001, in which the government aimed to ensure peaceful coexistence with native Spaniards by assimilating foreign residents and their families into their new communities.12 Running until 2004, Plan Greco acknowledged that immigration was a desirable phenomenon for Spain.13 The welcoming environment and lax policies of 4/2000 acted as a supermagnet for cheap labor, turning Spain into an economic powerhouse. As of 2007, Spain was the best-performing major economy in the European Union with an average growth rate of 3.1 percent since 2002, and has created half the new jobs in the Euro Zone since that year.14 Economist Eric Chaney argued that the Spanish model of immigration policy invigorates slow-growth societies like Western Europe, because open and flexible labor markets in a world where populations are more mobile and economies are globalizingattract people who want to work.15 Spain is today the worlds second destination for migration, behind only the United States.16 Immigrants serve as fillers in the Spanish labor market. Following a decade of unemployment before entering the European Union, Spain experienced a period of job creation and rising productivity that was favorable to the growth of migration.17 Immigrants supplied labor for low-wage and semi-skilled jobs abandoned by native laborers as Spaniards adapted to the knowledge-based economy Spain had begun to

12Prez,Ibid. 13Ibid.
15Ibid. 16Huntoon,Ibid.,9. 17Ibid.,11.

14HowSpainThrivesonImmigration,BusinessWeek,9May2007.

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evolve into upon entering the realm of the developed world.18 Furthermore, the demographic changes in the native population due to low fertility rates and a general aging of the population made the arrival of the young, unskilled immigrant population desirable.19 Their contribution to the labor market [weaves] vitality into the Euro Zone, so much so that if Spain were to attack the underground economy that largely runs on undocumented labor, it would threaten its national productivity and booming economic performance.20 A cheaper and more flexible workforce compared to the native population, immigrants, both legal and illegal, have become statistically important to Spains prospering national GDP, which at purchasing power parity the economic standard for measuring welfare and living standards is ranked eighth highest in the world.21

A Hole in the Wall The incoming flow of migrants as Spains Ley de Extranjera evolved resulted in the revitalization of the Spanish economy; however, it also invited an influx of undocumented immigrants into Spain and the rest of the European Union. The restrictive provisions of the Ley Orgnica effectively constrained channels to legal migration, whereby only slightly more than half of immigrant applications were accepted, leaving many migrants forced to enter Spain and the EU illegally.22 Migrants, in general, use illegal channels to enter the EU because of the high cost of visa applications, or they had 18Huntoon,Ibid.,7. 19Ibid.,12.
20HowSpainthrives,Ibid.,

andNewton,Ibid.,15. 21Newton,Ibid. andIndexMundi,<http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=0&v=65&l=en>,1January2008. 22Newton,Ibid.,13. andPrez,Ibid.

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their visa denied, or expect to have it denied.23 As part of the weak southern flank of the EU, Spain became the obvious choice to use as a corridor into Europe.24 Furthermore, the 1996 amendment to Ley Orgnica created an environment friendly to migrants, and the adoption of its spirit into the 4/2000 law to extend those benefits to include clandestinos, made Spain even more attractive for migrants. These incentives thus created an effecto llamada, or an invitation to immigrate.25 That is, Spains geographic position as having Europes southernmost borders, its provisions for easier entry and status regularization, as well as its policy of protection from ostracization and expulsion, served as an open invitation to immigration, both legal and illegal. Several attempts to control illegal mass migration proved ineffective. The labor quotas established by the Spanish government in 1993-95 and 1997-99 opened up legal conduits, but the nature of these quotas made positions previously reserved for native laborers vacant even for unemployed migrants already in the country, allowing them to gain legal status after entry.26 Thus, geography, policy and loopholes, combined with the local conditions of source countries, fostered a get-in-first-get-visa-later mentality, opening the floodgates for illegal immigration into Spain. In 2005, the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Moroccos northern tip, 25 kilometers from Spains southern ports, became the point of entry for thousands of migrants seeking a new life in Europe. The following year, the Union was caught in the grips of an immigration crisis when in one day almost 600 Africans were intercepted in various boats off Spains Canary Islands, in addition to 33 boats full of would-be migrants near the coast of Almera,
23ElizabethBombergetal.,TheEuropeanUnion:howdoesitwork?(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),

152153. 24Huntoon,Ibid.,2. 25Newton,Ibid.,9. 26Prez,Ibid.

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stretching the areas resources beyond capacity.27 Conservative estimates place the number of immigrants in Spain at 600,000 in each of 2005 and 2006, where 25 to 35 percent of those are thought to be undocumented.28 Once anyone enters Spain, they enter the rest of the European Union; thus, Spains massive influx of illegal immigrants poses a threat for the rest of the EU from both the outside and within. In 1986, the Commission envisioned in the Single European Act that free movement provisions[should apply] to all people, regardless of their nationality.29 Two years later, it also proposed the abolition of internal borders, which took effect in 1995. Theoretically, while illegal under current EU policy, such loose internal border controls would allow non-EU immigrants in Spain and elsewhere to settle in a third country because it would be easier to escape detection.30 The inability of one country to prevent illegal immigration would thus spill the influx into other EU states, necessitating immigration policy and border controls that applied across the board. So when the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty incorporated into mainstream European law the Schengen Agreements, which allowed EU nationals movement across borders without visas, a common EU push against illegal immigration took a firmer stance.31 The walls of Fortress Europe had begun to take shape. Fortress Europe is a paradigm that allows free movement of goods and people within a borderless space, contained by reinforced frontiers at the periphery, and is closed to new migration. Member states are opting to restrict immigrant membership into that
27ImmigrationinSpain,EuroResidentes,<http://www.euroresidentes.com/blogs/2006/05/immigrationin

spain.html>,19May2006. 28HowSpainthrives,Ibid. 29Newton,Ibid.,2. andHuntoon,Ibid.,2. 30Huntoon,Ibid.,9. 31Ibid.,2. andSpanishDailyaccusesZapateroofdoublestandardsonillegalimmigration,BBCWorldwideMonitoring,tr. Spanish,ABCNews12May2008.

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space by withholding opportunity for citizenship, hesitating to extend even rights of free movement to non- or new EU members.32 But entry based on citizenship is a shift from liberalism to communitarianism [that is] contrary to the original, liberal, goals of the European Union and does not bode well for immigrants, who are an integral part of the EU economy.33 EU discussions on the highest levels have moreover identified immigrants as the problem, leaving implications not only for admission but also their integration and rights.34 Tightening immigration into Spain and the rest of the European Union is thus a step closer to the realization of Fortress Europe, which would decrease the supply of cheap and much-needed labor, and encumber economic growth. Recognizing the need for immigrants among Europes aging population, representatives from EU member states convened in 1999 in Tampere, Finland, to discuss a general framework that would digress from the path to Fortress Europe. Tampere, and the resulting 2002 Seville Conference, acknowledged that the EU should facilitate access of economic migrants into the Union rather than impose obstacles.35 In constructing a more open immigration policy, Tampere proposed the management of migration flows by creating more channels for legal migration and fighting illegal migration by attacking it at its source: trafficking and smuggling as well as substandard economic conditions in the developing world.36 More importantly, it called for consistent control of external borders based on mutual assistance and regional cooperation, including those of third countries bordering the EU.37

32Bomberg,Ibid.,151. 33Newton,Ibid.,2. 34Ibid.,23. 35Ibid.,10. 36Ibid.,4.

37TampereEuropeanCouncilPresidencyConclusions,ArtcilesA.IVandD.62

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A Complex Balancing Act The flexibility of Tamperes guidelines left individual states leeway to accommodate common EU vision into their national agendas, but in Spain, implementing only select conclusions increased tensions between native and immigrant populations. Tampere was adopted into the 4/2000 law; however, after only four months, eighty percent of the law was amended to create 8/2000, doing away with the spirit of integration as well as retracted benefits to only apply to legal migrants. While it allowed negotiation of bilateral agreements with sending countries like Morocco in accordance with Tampere, 8/2000 penalized the immigrant and emphasized immigrant expulsion. Spanish Congressman Joan Puigcercos stressed that with this law, [Spain is] not looking for citizens but cheap labor.38 Some lawmakers criticized 8/2000 and its influence on similar policies proposed in the run-up to Spains 2008 elections for whipping up xenophobia.39 Sure enough, after 8/2000 came into effect, violent incidents broke out between native Spaniards and the immigrant community, especially in Madrids suburbs, where many of them have settled.40* The influx of illegal immigrants to Spain in the period following the implementation of 8/2000 substantiates arguments that Europe will be challenged by illegal immigration for as long as migration policies remain restrictive, as was 8/2000. In 2003, the estimated number of clandestinos living in the Spain range

38Newton,Ibid. 39Spanishdailyaccuses,Ibid. 40HowSpainthrives,Ibid.

*NB:TheseincidentswereminorcomparedtotheantiimmigrantclashesinParisbanlieues.Thisisperhapsdueto

theculturalmakeupoftheimmigrantpopulationinSpain,threefourthsbeingfromLatinAmericaorother locationswithlanguagesandculturessimilartoSpains.HostilitytowardNorthAfricanimmigrants,however, remainshighafterthe2004Atochabombings.

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anywhere between 200,000 and 500,000, while some officials say it could have been twice that.41 But neither does a return to the Tamperes liberal vision resolve the complications of immigration from non-EU countries. Spains current president Jos Luis Zapatero implemented a documents for all policy, controversially regularizing 700,000 immigrants, and putting them on the path to citizenship.42 But all this did was aim to eliminate clandestinos by superficially reducing their numbers rather than effectively curbing illegal immigration itself. As a result, Spain had become an open laboratory that would trigger an avalanche of uncontrolled immigration.43 The European Union has formally rejected Zapateros policy, its leaders accusing him of an inflammatory precedent that would endanger all of Europe.44 Spains efforts in both embracing and rejecting Tamperes provisions for integration and control have so far proved ineffective, but moving away from its spirit of cooperation toward that of complete supranational administration would impinge on national sovereignties. Not only does imposing singular policies into existing legislation pose legal problems, but it also touches directly on sensitive issues of national borders and concerns over civil liberties.45 Singular management of EU frontiers at its periphery also necessitates surrendering border control either to a supranational authority farremoved from the frontlines, or to the whims of a more influential member state. External
41Prez,Ibid.

andSpainsplanstofightillegalimmigrationwithspynetworkscarryechoofFranco,TheIndependent,19 April2003. 42Spainlovesimmigration,Ibid. 43HowSpainthrives,Ibid. andTheCallEffectinSpain,FreeRepublic,<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1657476/posts>,28 June2006. 44TheCallEffect,Ibid. andObservanceoflaw,Ibid. 45Newton,Ibid.,1. andSpanishDailyaccuses,Ibid.

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border control thus compromises national sovereignties by placing jurisdiction outside of the state, sacrificing the varying needs of individual nations. Completely disregarding Tampere, however, would nurture the realization of a Fortress Europe populated by an aging workforce.

Y Ahora Qu? A massive influx of migrant labor has been the root cause of the continued success of the Spanish economy, and Fortress Europe would only cut the supply that is feeding its base.46 Rejecting the ideal of borders closed to new migration has allowed Spains once-dwindling population to increase from 40 million to 45 million since 2000.47 Economic vitality spurred by such a vast labor supply has only stimulated job creation, and while many European countries are deep in pension crises, Spain has leapt ahead on the United Nations Development Index.48 By 2007, Spains per capita income had jumped to 97 percent of the EU average, compared to only 80 percent before 2000.49 Furthermore, tax and social services contributed by the immigrant population exceed by 20 percent the cost of public services they do use, leaving a surplus for the rest of the population.50 According to a 2007 poll, 42 percent of native Spaniards think that immigration is beneficial to their country.51 The benefits of immigration clearly cannot be ignored. Spain is thus learning to better adopt the vision of Tampere to facilitate legal access through its borders and into Europe, despite still having a flawed Ley de 46Spainlovesimmigration,Ibid.
48Spainlovesimmigration,Ibid. 49HowSpainthrives,Ibid. 47SpanishPMtodefyimmigrationbacklash,TheWeekendAustralian,8March2008,p.17.

51Ibid.
50Ibid.

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Extranjera. A more structured annual labor quota was launched beginning 2002. It assesses Spains regional changing labor needs compared to existing supplies in a given year, and only allows visa application while outside the EU. Spain also owes much of its first successes in effectively curbing illegal immigration to inter-European border funds and agencies. To help combat illegal immigration, Spain and other countries affected by extraordinary migration pressure were offered monetary aid from the European External Border Management Fund beginning 2007.52 Spain uses these funds to supplement the efforts of Frontex, which was proposed in Seville as an attempt to boost several Tampere initiatives that languished, such as those in Spain. A border patrol agency that provides training, resources and intelligence to local governments, Frontex became operational in 2005, helping develop common standards and procedures among member states without affecting national legislation. It deploys aid into trouble spots, responding in particular to Spains immigration crisis in the Canaries in 2006. With the help of Frontex, Spains external border control reported in 2007 a 92 percent effectiveness rating, a number based on the count of illegal immigrants arrived and detected versus those repatriated; the number of arrivals through the vulnerable borders in the Canary Islands also decreased by 60 percent that year.53 For now, a cooperative initiative like Frontex seems to be the best solution for Spain and the rest of the European Union to address the illegal immigration crisis. When international police around the EUs periphery contain potential influx before migrants reach national shores, legislation need not be amended to suit supranational directives
52Immigration:EUinvitesSpaintousefundstostopillegalimmigrants,EuropeanSocialPolicy(2006):p.

58665. 53SpanishInteriorMinistryreport,Balancedelaluchacontralainmigracionilegal2007,StatewatchNews Online,<http://statewatch.org/news/2008/feb/03spainimmstats.htm>,January2008.

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and higher, central authorities need not impinge on jurisdiction. National sovereignties thus remain intact. As a result, Spain and Europe are able to capably welcome a migrant workforce that is not only a considerable part of, but also significantly propels, their economies beset by a high-wage, high-skilled and dwindling labor population. But Frontex is young; and as with many programs in the EU, its long-term effectiveness is yet to be measured against the ever-changing world the other half of the equation in migrant patterns. The European Union will still have to wait and see.

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Works Cited Bomberg, Elizabeth, John Peterson and Alexander Stubb. The European Union: How does it work? New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. The Call Effect in Spain, Free Republic. Online posting, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1657476/posts>. 28 June 2006.

European Union. Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, 1999. How Spain thrives on migration. Business Week 9 May 2007. Huntoon, Laura. Immigration to Spain: Implications for a unified European Union immigration policy. International Migration Review 32.n2 (1998): pp428(28). Index Mundi, 2008. <http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=0&v=65&l=en>. Immigration in Spain, Euroresidentes. Online posting, 19 May <http://www.euroresidentes.com/blogs/2006/05/immigration-in-spain.html>. 2006.

Immigration: EU invites Spain to use funds to stop illegal immigration. European Social Policy (2006): p58665. Newton, Ryan. Spanish Immigration Policy since Tampere: Implications for the Development of a European Immigration Policy, 2004. Observance of law key to immigrants integration Spanish Daily. Trans. BBC Worldwide Monitoring 22 October 2007. Prez, Nieves Ortega. Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy. Migration Information Source, February 2003. <http://www.migrationinformation.org/profiles/diplay.cfm?ID=97>. The Schengen Agreement: Jeux Sans Frontires. The Economist 16 June 1990, 56-57. Spains plans to fight illegal immigration with spy networks can carry echo of Franco. The Independent 19 April 2003. Spain loves immigration, but finds the immigrants a challenge. The Globe and Mail 8 March 2008: F3. Spanish daily accuses Zapatero of double standards on illegal immigration. Trans. BBC Worldwide Monitoring 12 May 2008. Spanish Interior Ministry report. Balance de la lucha contra la inmigracion ilegal 2007, Statewatch News Online, 2008. <http://statewatch.org/news/2008/feb/03spain-immstats.htm>. Spanish PM to defy immigration backlash. The Weekend Australian 8 March 2008: p.17