" 24 I Risk and Propeny Hlgms

Uniform

.~ "entruster" in the instant case, the '. had good title to the Buick, which I used car. The one to whom the auto was entrusted, Smith, as a used car , is a "merchant who deals in goods of ~, 'kind" within the meaning of the statute. . t h was known by the plaintiff to be a used dealer .... Y < ' ; The question then arises as to i . whether W e swas a buyer in good faith sel when they purchased the car without a certificate of title. ,It has long been held by this court that a certificate of title to an automobile issued under . th 'motor vehicle act is not a e muniment of title which establishes ownership, but is merely intended to protect the public against theft and to facilitate recovery of stolen automobiles and otherwise aid the state in enforcement of its regulation of motor vehicles. . . . This rule was ; , r ". -. . '. not changed with the passage of the
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marina at which he kept his vessel, the River Queen. Without any authorization, Smith sold the vessel to Courtesy Ford. Gallagher sued Courtesy Ford for the vessel. Judgment was entered in favor of Gallagher and an appeal was taken
PER CURIAM:

Commercial Code. Under Sec. 1-201 (15) t h e ' certificate of title of an automobile is not . listed as a "document of title." It was not necesiary for the defendant Smith to deliver the 'certificate of title before he conveyed ownership of the Buick automobile, and the absence of a .certificate does not invalidate the sale or pre vent title from passing. . . . There was no proof that any defendant knew of any limitation of title or should have known
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prior to or at the time of purchase of .the Buick automobile. We find the action of the trial court in sustaining the demurrers was proper. [Judgment affirmed.]
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Plaintiffs sued to recover possession of their 38-foot pleasure motor boat, RIVER QUEEN, which one defendant, a marina operator, had sold to the other defendants. Judgment was entered for plaintiff against the purchasers on the finding that the marina operator had no right to sell the plaintiff's vessel, and against the marina operator in favor of the purchasers who had paid for the boat which they could not keep. The purchasers appeal on the ground that they acquired all rights to RIVER QUEEN under Section 2-403(b) of the Uniform Com mercial Code ... which provides: "(b) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business." We find no error in the District Court's conclusion that ". . . Plaintiffs did not entrust the vessel River Queen to Defendant Smith as a merchant within the meaning of Section 2-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Plaintiffs rented a stall at Defendant Smith's marina to keep this vessel. This defendant operated several busi nesses at this one location. His business of rent ing stalls for vessels was separate and apart from his business as a boat repair. By inference, the Court concluded that the renting of stalls was also separate and apart from his business as a boat merchant. The River Queen was kept at this marina pursuant to [oral] rental contract." [Judgment affirmed.]

Gallagher v Unenrolled Motor Vessel River Queen

(CAS Tex) 475 F2d 117 (1973)

Smith operated a marina and sold and r&o

P8 Jred boats. Gallagher rented a staU at the

QUESTIONS AND CASE

PROBLEMS

1.A buyer purchased furniture on credit and made a number of payments thereafter. When he stopped making payments, the seller claimed the right to repossess the furniture on the theory that it had been sold on approval and that the buyer had never manifested his approval. Was the seller correct? [Gantman v Paul, 203 Pa Super 158, 199 A2d 519]