Professional Documents
Culture Documents
iV
(1)
2
maximize Lisxis
iV
sS
(2)
Subject to
xis + xjs ( )Rij 1 for all i, j V and s S. (3)
Using Equation (1), the idle spectrum units can be allo-
cated, as fairly as possible, achieving maximum spectrum
utilization, and reflecting the priority, while using Equation
(2), we can eliminate unnecessary spectrum handoffs.
IV. MODIFIED GAME THEORY APPROACH
Due to the computational complexities involved with the
original game theory, a modification to the method was sug-
gested [7]. We describe the algorithm for the MGT in this
section by deploying it to the problem of spectrum allocations.
a) Convert the maximization problem into minimization
problem as follows:
Objectives
minimize U = -1 wi ln xis
sS
_
(
\
|
\
!
|
iV
_ (4)
minimize H = -1 Lisxis
iV
sS
.
(5)
b) Normalize U and H as
Un =
U U
*
Uw U
*
,
Hn =
H H
*
Hw H
*
(6)
where U
*
is the optimal value when only U is minimized, H
*
is the optimal value when only H is minimized, U
w
is the
value of U when only H is minimized, and H
w
is the value of
H when only U is minimized.
c) Compute the normalized super-criterion as
Sn = (1Un)(1 Hn)
. (7)
d) Formulate a Pareto optimal objective function FC as fol-
lows:
FC = (Un)
q
+ (Hn)
q
{ }
1 q
(8)
where q 2.
e) Then the multi-objective problem is encapsulated into a
single objective problem as
Objective
Minimize F(X) = FC Sn (9)
Subject to
U
*
U Uw
(10)
H
*
H Hw
(11)
xis + xjs ( )Rij 1 for all i, j V and s S. (12)
V. COMPUTATION OF MGT
In Section IV, we convert the multi-objective problem
into a nonlinear single-objective problem with a single design
vector. However it is still not easy to solve this by using the
nonlinear programming in reasonable time. Moreover, prior to
solving the MGT, we should determine U
w
,
and H
w
.
Finding optimal <H
*
, U
w
> can be done easily using the
algorithm in Table I with the complexity of O(N
2
M), where N
and M are the number of sensors and the number of idle spec-
trum units, respectively. In Step 1, allocate idle spectrum units
to sensors according to array L. In Step 2, negotiate the spec-
trum ownership not to interfere with each other and towards
improving U
w
. Since U
w
acts as an upper bound of U during
the procedure of MGT, it is also important to improve U
w
in
order to obtain better U while not deteriorate H
*
.
TABLE I
THE ALGORITHM FOR DETERMINING OPTIMAL UW AND H
*
.
1. Initialization for each iV and sS
x
is
= L
is
2. Negotiation for each i, jV and sS {
if ((x
is
+ x
js
)R
ij
> 1)
Negotiate(i, j, s) }
3. U
w
and H
*
Compute U
w
and H
*
using Equations (4) and (5).
Subroutine Negotiate(a, b, p) {
x
is
= 1, x
js
= 0
Compute U and store it in temp
1
.
x
is
= 0, x
js
= 1
Compute U and store it in temp
2
.
if temp
1
< temp
2
x
is
= 1, x
js
= 0
}
TABLE II
THE COOPERATIVE GAME-BASED ALGORITHM WITHOUT TRANSMISSION
POWER CONTROL.
1. Initialization For the minimum F(X),
- (X) = F(X)
- U
*
=
iv
w
i
|S|, H
*
=
iv
sS
L
is
For finding <U
*
, H
w
>,
- (X) = -1
iv
w
i
ln(
sS
x
is
).
For all,
- min(X) =
- Assign all idle spectrum units to sensors.
2. Winner selec-
tion on each
spectrum
for each sS {
for each iV {
for each j ( i) V {
x
js
= 0 }
x
is
= 1
Compute (X).
if ((X) < min(X)) {
min(X) = (X)
winner = i }
x
is
= 0; }
Assign spectrum unit s to winner. }
3. U
*
and H
w
For finding <U
*
, H
w
>, U
*
= (X) and H
w
= -1
iv
sS
x
is
L
is
.
On the contrary, it is difficult to determine optimal F(X)
and <U
*
, H
w
> in reasonable time
1
. Therefore we adopt a coo p-
erative game to find minimum F(X) and <U
*
, H
w
> approxi-
mately in reasonable time. The cooperative game-based algo-
rithm can be described separately whether each sensor can
control its transmission power or not. Table II describes the
algorithm where none of sensors can control their transmission
power; Table III describes the algorithm where each sensor
has an ability to control its transmission power. The time
complexities of both algorithms are O(N
2
M), where N and M
are the number of sensors and the number of idle spectrum
1 The problem of determining <U
*
, H
w
> is similar with the graph coloring problem.
3
bands, respectively. However, in this algorithm, it is impossi-
ble to improve H
w
without deteriorating U
*
. Thus we only
compute H
w
from the results of U
*
.
In both the algorithms, as described in the Step 1, we only
use their lower bounds in order to avoid computing the opti-
mal U
*
and H
*
in every steps of coalition and negotiation.
Nevertheless, we observe that the obtained solutions (i.e., <U,
H>) are satisfactory.
If we assume that none of sensors can control their trans-
mission power, then it means that every spectrum unit can be
occupied by only one sensor. Thus, we select a winner among
all the competitors for each spectrum unit while improving the
objective: minimum F(X) or maximum proportional fairness.
TABLE III
THE COOPERATIVE GAME-BASED ALGORITHM WITH TRANSMISSION POWER
CONTROL.
1. Initialization For the minimum F(X),
- (X) = F(X)
- U
*
=
iv
w
i
|S|, H
*
=
iv
sS
L
is
For finding <U
*
, H
w
>,
- (X) = -1
iv
w
i
ln(
sS
x
is
).
For all,
- Assign all idle spectrum units to sensors.
- negotiated[i] = 0 for all iV.
2. Forming coali-
tions
Copy X to Y.
Sort iV in accordance with w
i
and arrange the
index k=1, , |V| from the largest to smallest.
for k=1, , |V| {
if (!nogotiated[k]) {
min(Y) =
for each j ( i) V {
if (!negotiated[j]) {
Negotiate(k, j, Y) and compute (Y).
if ((Y) < min(Y)) {
min(Y) = (Y)
coalition[k] = j } } }
negotiated[k] = 1
negotiated[coalition[k]] = 1 } }
3. Negotiation in
each coalition
for each i V {
Negotiate(i, coalition[i], X) }
if X satisfies equation (12) goto Step 4; else
goto Step 2.
4. U
*
and H
w
For finding <U
*
, H
w
>, U
*
= (X) and H
w
= -1
iv
sS
x
is
L
is
.
Subroutine Negotiate(a, b, Z) {
for each sS {
if ((z
as
+ z
bs
)R
ij
> 1)
z
as
= 1, z
bs
= 0
Compute (Z) and store it in
1
(Z).
z
as
= 0, z
bs
= 1
Compute (Z) and store it in
2
(Z).
if (
1
(Z) <
2
(Z))
z
as
= 1, z
bs
= 0 } }
If each sensor can control its transmission power so that it
does not interfere with other sensors beyond its targeted range,
then we can form a coalition at first (Step 2). The sequence of
forming coalition depends on the weight of each sensor. It
means that a sensor having the largest weight finds its coali-
tion partner first. Then the sensor negotiates the spectrum
ownership with its coalition partner for improving the main
objective (Step 3). These processes will continue until the
constraint in Equation (12) is not violated.
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
Ideally evaluating the qualities of MGT solutions - <U,
H> and U
*
, which are determined by the cooperative game -
should be compared with the optimal solutions, i.e., the opti-
mal U
*
and H
*
. We can find optimal H
*
easily but it is impos-
sible to extract the optimal U
*
in a reasonable time. Thus, we
compare U and U
*
determined by the cooperative game with a
crude upper bound obtained by LP-relaxation. In order to find
the upper bound, the nonlinear programming for optimal U
*
should be approximated in a linear form. Then we use GLPK
[19] to solve the approximated linear program.
For the experiment, we generate random topologies 40
sensors, and define <source, destination> pairs randomly. The
main experimental parameters are listed in Table IV.
TABLE IV
MAIN EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS.
Experimental parameter Value
Topology size (N) 40 sensors
Number of idle spectrum
units
271
Transmission power
control
With or without
P
hold
0.1
Weight
Assign a random weight between 0.1 and
100 on each sensor
Q 2
P
hold
: probability that each sensor holds a spectrum unit at its previous transmission phase.
TABLE V
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS.
<-U
*
, -H
w
> <-U
w
, -H
*
> <-U, -H>
LP bound
of -U
*
WO/T.P.
<3784.31,
26>
<4133.67,
274>
<4080.36,
272>
8982.25
W/T.P.
<7679.41,
152>
<6220.94,
684>
<7622.12,
678>
8982.25
WO/T.P.: without transmission power control
W/T.P.: with transmission power control
Table V lists the results as a tuple of U and H. The col-
umn titled as <-U
*
, -H
w
> shows the results when we optimize
only U using the algorithms in Tables II and III. The column
<-U
w
, -H
*
> shows the results when we optimize only H using
the algorithm in Table 1. The column <-U, -H> shows the
results of MGT using the algorithms in Tables II and III. The
last column lists the results of LP-relaxation. The results show
that the improvement obtained in one objective penalizes the
other, where the result of MGT becomes balanced between the
different objectives. In addition, the solutions of U are very
close to the LP bound of U with a factor of approximately 2
for without transmission power control, where it is less than
1 for with transmission power control.
In order to show that the spectrum bands are allocated
fairly in accordance with the weights, we need to count the
number of assigned spectrum units at each sensor according to
the three proposed algorithms. The results are shown in Figure
2. Figure 2(a) shows the results without transmission power
4
control, while Figure 2(b) shows the results with transmission
power control. Figure 2(a) shows that the MGT with the coop-
erative game allocates the spectrum bands fairly according to
the sensors weight. However, in Figure 2(b), we see that the
number of assigned spectrum units does not correspond with
their respective weights in some sensors. This is due to the
fact that these sensors interfere with fewer sensors than other
sensors. Therefore, such sensors have been allowed to occupy
more spectrum units than others, irrespective of their weights.
(a) Without transmission power control.
(b) With transmission power control
Figure 2. The number of assigned spectrum units at each sensor in
accordance with the algorithms.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we use the MGT to allocate spectrum bands
in resource-constrained wireless sensor network: (1) as fairly
as possible, (2) achieving maximum spectrum utilization, (3)
reflecting the priority, and (4) with infrequent spectrum
handoff. We adopt a cooperative game-based algorithm with
the complexity of O(N
2
M) to solve the MGT in a reasonable
time. The experimental results of MGT are well balanced be-
tween the two objectives: maximizing the proportional fair-
ness and minimizing the number of spectrum handoffs. We
also compare the solutions of MGT with LP bounds, and ob-
serve that the algorithm provides near optimal solutions.
Although the proposed scheme operates in a centralized
manner, it may also be feasible to allocate spectrum bands in a
distributive manner by combining with a non-cooperative
game algorithm. Since the non-cooperative game algorithm
operates on a resource-constrained sensor, it should be imple-
mented as less computationally complex as possible with low
message overhead, which may become part of our future re-
search work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This work was carried out during the tenure of an ERCIM
Alain Benesoussan Fellowship Programme.
REFERENCES
[1] Zhao, Q., and Sadler, B.: A survey of Dynamic Spectrum Access. IEEE
Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 79, no. 3, pp. 79-89 (2007).
[2] Haykin, S.: Cognitive Radio: Brain-Empowered Wireless Communica-
tions. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 23, no.
2 (2005).
[3] OMNET++ 3.3, http://www.omnetpp.org.
[4] Katzela, I., and Naghshineh, M.: Channel Assignment Schemes for
Cellular Mobile Telecommunication Systems: A Comprehensive Sur-
vey. IEEE Personal Communications, vol. 3, pp. 10-31 (1996).
[5] Gao, S., Qian, L., Vaman, D., and Qu, Q.: Energy Efficient Adaptive
Modulation in Wireless Cognitive Radio Sensor Networks. Proc. IEEE
ICC (2007).
[6] Geirhofer, S., Tong, L., and Sadler, B.: A Measurement-based Model for
Dynamic Spectrum Access. Proc. IEEE MILCOM (2006).
[7] Sunar, M., Kahraman, R.: A Comparative Study of Multiobjective Op-
timization Methods in Structural Design. Turk J. Engin. Environ. Sci.,
vol. 25 (2001).
[8] Han, Z., Ji, Z., and Liu, R.: Fair Multiuser Channel Allocation for
OFDMA Networks Using Nash Bargaining Solutions and Coalitions.
IEEE Trans. on Communications, vol. 53, no. 8, pp. 1366-1376 (2005).
[9] Pioro, M., and Medhi, D.: Routing, Flow, and Capacity Design in
Communication and Computer Networks. Morgan Kaufmann (2004).
[10] Cao, L., and Zheng, H.: Distributed Spectrum Allocation via Local
Bargaining. Proc. IEEE SECON (2005).
[11] Etkin, R., Parekh, A., and Tse, D.: Spectrum Sharing for Unlicensed
Bands. Proc. IEEE DySPAN (2005).
[12] Huang, J., Berry, R., and Honig, M.: Auction-based Spectrum Sharing.
ACM/Springer Mobile Networks and Apps., pp. 405-418 (2006).
[13] Ji, Z., and Liu, K.: Collusion-Resistant Dynamic Spectrum Allocation
for Wireless Networks via Pricing. Proc. IEEE DySPAN (2007).
[14] Zhao, Q., Tong, and L., Swami, A.: Decentralized Cognitive MAC for
Dynamic Spectrum Access. Proc. IEEE Symposium on New Frontier in
Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (2005).
[15] Geirhofer, S., Tong, L., and Sadler, B.: Dynamic Spectrum Access in
WLAN Channels: Empirical Model and Its Stochastic Analysis. Proc.
International Workshop on Technology and Policy for Accessing Spec-
trum (2006).
[16] Weiss, T., and Jondral, F.: Spectrum Pooling: An Innovative Strategy
for Enhancement of Spectrum Efficiency. IEEE Communication Maga-
zine, vol. 42, pp. 8-14 (2004).
[17] Berthold, U., Jondral, F.: Guidelines for Designing OFDM Overlay
Systems. Proc. IEEE Symposium on New Frontier in Dynamic Spectrum
Access Networks (2005).
[18] Tang, H.: Some Physical Layer Issues of Wide-band Cognitive Radio
Systems. Proc. IEEE Symposium on New Frontier in Dynamic Spectrum
Access Networks (2005).
[19] GLPK: GNU Li n e a r Pr o g r a mmi n g To o l k i t ,
http://www.gnu.org/software/glpk.
5