1.

Pelaez vs Auditor General Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovincesThe VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Pelaez argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether

the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative. 2. Disomangcop vs DPWH Power of Judicial Review - Requisites Disomangcop and Dimalotang were district engineers of the 1st Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM. They are assailing the validity of RA 8999 & DO 119. RA 8999 created an engineering district in Lanao and DO 119 created an engineering district in Marawi. Disomangcop and Dimalotang argued that the creation of those engineering districts undermines the autonomy of ARMM hence the said RA and DO should be declared inoperative and unconstitutional. Disomangcop and Dimalotang sought to enjoin Datumanong as well as the Secretary of DBM from enforcing and releasing funds pursuant to the law. The SolGen argued that the petitioners lack legal standing and that the said RA is constitutional pursuant to the undiminished power of Congress to enact laws for ARMM. In all, Sol-Gen attacks the institution of the case. ISSUE: Whether or not Disomangcop and Dimalotang have legal standing. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Disomangcop and Dimalotang and the SC held the said RA and DO to be inoperative. The SC noted that Disomangcop and Dimalotang do have the legal standing to initiate the case. Also, Disomangcop and Dimalotang were able to show the requisites of judicial review in order for a court of justice to take cognizance of this case. Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of judicial power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity. Fifth, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. In sum, the following are the requisites for the exercise of judicial power 1. There must be an actual controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power/review. 2. The question before the court must be ripe for judicial adjudication.

3. The constitutional question (question of constitutionality) must be raised by the proper party. Proper party must have the standing to challenge (locus standi). 4. The constitutional question (question of constitutionality) must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. 5. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota (controversy which has begun) of the case. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 3. Sogod vs Rosal 4. Samson vs Aguirre 5. Alvarez vs Guingona Municipal Corporation LGU Requirement Income Inclusion of IRAs In April 1993, HB 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the HOR. In May 1993, a Senate bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate. In January 1994, the HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720). Now Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that the Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97 included the IRA which should not be. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR. 2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGUs income. HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only

conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well). 2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs average annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds. To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations. 6. Pasig City vs COMELEC Facts: Upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed an ordinance creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996. Meanwhile, the City of Pasig similarly issued an ordinance creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997. Immediately upon learning of such ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta filed two (2) Petitions with the Commission on Elections calling its attention to a pending case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for the settlement of boundary disputes. The Municipality of Cainta claimed that the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled plebiscite should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court. The COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of Cainta and ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the boundary dispute involving the two municipalities. However, the COMELEC ruled differently in the other petition, dismissing the same for being moot since the creation of Barangay Napico was already ratified and approved by the majority of the votes

cast in the plebiscite. Hence, these two (2) petitions by the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta. Issue: WON City of Pasig should await for the decision in the boundary dispute case before it should allow for a plebiscite segregating Karangalan and Napico as independent barangays? YES. WON the plebiscite conducted in favor of Brgy. Napico is null and void? YES. Held: A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility. The Court also would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays. Furthermore, the Court did not agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The Supreme Court, therefore, ruled that the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and Municipality of Cainta by the RTC of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside. 7. San Juaqin vs Silva 8. Tobias vs Abalos Facts: Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong. With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect. Issues:

WON RA 7675 is in: 1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule". 2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250 and reappropriating the legislative districts. Ruling: Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress. Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative district. In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit. 9. Kapalong vs Moya Facts: Pres. Garcia created the Municipality of Santo Tomas from portions of the Municipality of Kapalong. Sto. Tomas now asserts jurisdiction over eight barrios of Kapalong. Sto. Tomas then filed a complaint against Kapalong for settlement of the municipal boundary dispute. Issue: WON Santo Tomas legally exists. NO. As ruled in the Pelaez case, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action, and as such, Judge Moya should have dismissed the case, since further proceedings would be pointless. The Rules of Court expressly provides that only "entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. 10. Cawaling vs COMELEC FACTS: 16 Aug 2000: Pres. Estrada signed into law RA 8806: An Act

Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon16 Dec 2000: COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in the municipalities 17 Dec 2000: Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon Cawaling filed this petition for certiorari, which challenged the law on the ff grounds: 1. The plebiscite was conducted beyond the 120-day period from the approval of RA 8806, violating Sec. 54 of the LGC; 2. It violates Sec. 450 (a) of the LGC which requires that only a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city; 3. It contains two subjects: Creation of the City of Sorsogon and the abolition of the two municipalities. ISSUE: WON RA 8806 violated the Constitution and the LGC. NO. RATIO: - The phrase A municipality or a cluster is not a criterion but just one of the modes by which a city may be created. Sec. 10 Art. X of the Constitution allows the merger of LGUs to create a province, city, municipality, or barangay in accordance with LGC standards. - The creation of an entirely new LGU through a division or a merger of existing LGUs is recognized under the Consti so long as it complies with the standards set by the LGC. - In response to Cawalings argument that there is no compelling reason merge the two municipalities, the Court stated that it could not pass upon the wisdom of RA 8806; - The word approval in Sec. 54 of RA 8806, which should be read together with Sec. 65 thereof, could only mean effectivity as used and contemplated in Sec. 10 of the Code. - The law was first published in 25 Aug 2000 issue of TODAY. The publication of the law was completed on 1 Sept 2000, which should be the reckoning point in determining the 120day period within which to conduct the plebiscite. - COMELEC: Since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law, it could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect.

- As to the failure of the COMELEC to conduct an intensive info campaign, the Court said that no proof was presented by the petitioner to substantiate his claim. There is the presumption that COMELEC regularly performed its duty under the law in conducting the plebiscite. 11. Mariano vs COMELEC Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen. ISSUES: 1. Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions 2. Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution 3. Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law HELD/RULING: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that: Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds

was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself. Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. 1. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that: Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati. Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

1. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.

12. Nueva Era vs Marcos 13. Miranda vs Aguirre Miranda v. Aguirre Facts: In 1994, RA 7720 converting the municipality of Santiago to an independent component city was signed into law and thereafter ratified in a plebiscite. Four years later, RA 8528 which amended RA 7720 was enacted, changing the status of Santiago from an ICC to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 8528 because it does not provide for submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Issues: 1. WON petitioners have standing. YES. Rule: constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement Miranda was mayor when he filed the petition, his rights would have been greatly affected. Other petitioners are residents and voters of Santiago. 1. WON petition involves a political question. NO. PQ: concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure, Justiciable issue: implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right Case at bar=justiciable. WON petitioners have right to a plebiscite is a legal question. WON laws passed by Congress comply with the requirements of the Consti pose questions that this court alone can decide. 1. WON the change involved any creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries. YES. 2. WON a plebiscite is necessary considering the change was a mere reclassification from ICC to CC. YES. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs involve a common denominator material

change in the political and economic rights of the 14. Jimenez vs Bas FACTS: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of then Pres. Quirino pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Sinacaban laid claim to several barrios based on the technical description in EO 258. The Municipality of Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on an agreement with Sinacaban which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the earlier resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void since the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the RTC of Oroquieta. Jimenez argued that the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General), then Sinacaban, which was created thru and EO, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim. ISSUES: I. WON Sinacaban has juridical personality. YES. II. WON RA 7160 Sec. 442(d) is invalid since it does not conform to the constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new municipalities. NO. RATIO: I. Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In the case of Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, the SC laid the factors to consider in validating the creation of a municipal corporation: 1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation has not been challenged; 2. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the EO creating the municipality; and 3. the fact that the municipality was later classified as a 5th class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House.

In this case, the following factors are present: 1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided in 1965 and yet the validity of EO 258 creating it had never been questioned. It was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned. 2. The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacabans corporate existence. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, etc. Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental. II. Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. It is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. It applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. The requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, Section 3 of the previous Constitution. It cannot be applied to municipal corporations created before, such as Sinacaban. 15. Ordillo vs COMELEC FACTS: 30 January 1990: People of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to RA 6766.10 The COMELEC results showed that the creation of the Region was approved only by a majority of 5,899 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city mentioned. Sec of Justice: Ifugao can legally constitute the CAR. 8 March 1990: Congress enacted RA 6861 which set the elections in the CAR.

Ordillo: The SC must declare COMELEC Res. No. 2259 as null and void. It must restrain the respondents from implementing AO 160. It must also declare EO 220 constituting the CEB and the CR Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted and duly ratified. There can be no valid CAR in only one province since the Constitution and RA 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit. ISSUE: WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the CAR can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region. NO. RATIO: Art. X Sec. 15 of 1987 Constitution: There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. The term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Even RA 6766 shows that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having 2 sets of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same area. There will be two legislative bodies: the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao.

This must be distinguished from the Abbas case in that it laid the ff rule: What is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as the individual constituent units. 16. League of Cities vs COMELEC Facts: 11th Congress: 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities were enacted. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. 12th Congress: RA 9009 which amended Sec. 450 of the LGC by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million was enacted. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Sen. Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. 13th Congress: JR 29 was re-adopted as JR 1 and was forwarded to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Sen.Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga,

Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law without the Presidents signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the LGC. Issues: 1. WON RA 9009 violates the principle of nonretroactivity. NO Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws. This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively. 2. WON RA 9009 violates Sec 10 Art X of the Constitution. The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the LGC and not in any other law. There is only one LGC. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the LGC all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The criteria prescribed in the LGC govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the LGC violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the LGC to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the LGC required that any municipality

desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the LGC and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. There can be no resort to extrinsic aids like deliberations of Congress if the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the laws four corners. If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law. Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the LGC, did not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009. True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the LGC. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the LGC. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the LGC. 2. WON the Cityhood Laws violate Sec 6Art X of the Constitution. Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the

LGC are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides: Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the just share of local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the LGC, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution. 2. WON the deliberations of unapproved bills by the 11th Congress may be used as basis for those approved by the 12th . NO Congress is not a continuing body. The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent Congresses. The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress become functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be refiled anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills had to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the filing to the approval. The deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses. 17. Narciso vs Mendez EO 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after

almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal district, and later the Municipality of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created LGU. Granting that EO 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of EO 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of EO 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres: 1. EO 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement. 2. Under AO 33, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon. 3. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. 4. Section 442 (d) of the LGC to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442 (d) of the LGC is proffered. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442 (d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested

rights. All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded. Alicia's situation in the instant case is strikingly similar to that of the municipality of San Andres. Alicia was created by virtue of EO 265 in 1949, or ten years ahead of the municipality of San Andres, and therefore had been in existence for all of sixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For instance, under AO 33 above-mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for the province of Bohol. Likewise, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol. Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as the municipality of San Andres, it should likewise benefit from the effects of Sec 442 (d) of the LGC, and should henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality. 18. Candijay vs CA FACTS: The Municipality of Candijay claimed that the barrio of Pagahat is within its territorial jurisdiction and that it is not a part of the Municipality of Alicia. The trial court ruled for Candijay but this was reversed by the CA. The CA found that the plans submitted by the two municipalities are inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between the petitioner and the Muncipality of Mabini. The CA ruled that in cases of equiponderance of evidence, the courts must find for the defendant. The petitioner raised the ff issues before the SC: 1. The CA improperly applied the rule on equiponderance of evidence; 2. The respondent municipality does not have a juridical personality since it was created under a void executive order; and 3. the challenged decision throws them back again to their controversy. ISSUE: WON a municipality, created under a void executive order, can be considered as not having a juridical personality in light of the passage

of the Local Government Code of 1991. NO. RATIO: The petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of the respondent on 19 January 1984 (35 yrs after its creation in 1949) during the proceedings in this case. After presentation of evidence, Candijay asked the trial court to bar the respondent from presenting evidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality. Candijay argued that EO 265 issued by Pres. Quirino is null and void ab initio since Sec. 68 of the RAC constituted an undue delegation of legislative power to the Prez. The Municipality of Alicia was created by EO 265, or ten years ahead of the Municipality of San Andres, and had been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was promulgated. Various governmental acts through the years all indicate the States recognition and acknowledgement of its existence. Alicia must benefit from the effects of Sec. 422 (d) of the LGC and should be considered a regular, de jure municipality. According to Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC, municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with, are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. 19. Camarines Norte vs Quezon 20. Malabang vs Benito FACTS: Petitioner Balindong (municipal mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur), Respondents (Mayor Benito and councilors of Municipality of Balabagan of the same province). Balabagan, (formerly part of Malabang) was created on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios of the Malabang.

Citing Pelaez ruling (that Republic Act 2370 [Barrio Charter Act, approved January 1, 1960], vested power to create barrios in the provincial board, and Section 68 of the Administrative Code, insofar as it gives the President the power to create municipalities, is unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (b) because it offends against Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Constitution, which limits the President's power over local governments to mere supervision), Petitioner sought to nullify E.O. 386 and restrain respondents from performing their official functions. Respondents argued that Pelaez ruling did not apply because, unlike the municipalities involved therein, the municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional (by Pelaez ruling), its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. That as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong. DECISION: Petition granted, Executive Order 386 declared void. Generally, the inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few exceptions may a private person exercise this function of government. But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporation. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct from doing so. A de facto municipal corporation is recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, rests upon the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate validity to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of Section 68 of the Administrative Code, there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. Thus, Executive Order 386 creating the municipality in question is a nullity pursuant to the ruling in Pelaez ruling. This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." Note, the existence of Executive Order 386 is "an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored." The actual existence of a statute, prior to

such a determination, in an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. 21. Kananga vs Ormoc City 22. Sema vs COMELEC