Motion To Release 2 - Loles

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : CASE NO.: 3:10 CR 237 (MRK)
:
v. :
:
GREGORY P. LOLES : July 25, 2011
GOVERNMENTS REPLY MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANTS MOTION
FOR REVIEW AND MODIFICATION OF ORDER OF DETENTION
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3142(e) and (f), and 3143, the
Government hereby requests that the defendant continue to be detained prior to trial. However,
the Government submits that the defendant should receive appropriate and adequate medical care
while in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons and/or the United States Marshal and his designee.
I. ELIGIBILITY OF CASE
This case is eligible for pretrial detention and pre-sentence detention because this Court
simply can not find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or
pose a danger to the financial safety of the community if released pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3142.
See 18 U.S.C. 3143.
The defendant in this case poses a serious risk that he will flee. The evidence gathered
by the Government in this case has established that the defendant has, in the past, had access to a
tremendous amount of money from abroad, more specifically over $14 million from an entity
located in Greece. The defendant speaks a foreign language (Greek), has conducted business
abroad and in fact a number of witnesses have indicated that he has done so. The defendant has
traveled overseas extensively, has relatives in Greece, and even has an ownership stake in an
apartment in Greece. Extraditing the defendant from Greece may prove to be difficult given the
Case 3:10-cr-00237-MRK Document 39 Filed 07/25/11 Page 1 of 18
fact that the counts to which he is expected to enter a plea of guilty include securities fraud and
money laundering.
II. REASON FOR DETENTION
The court should detain defendant because there are currently no conditions of release
which will reasonably assure the defendants appearance as required pursuant to the Bail Reform
Act and because the defendant can not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is not
likely to flee or pose a danger to the financial safety of the community if released. See 18 U.S.C.
3143.
III. VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
The defendant was charged in a 32-count indictment with violations of mail fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341; wire fraud in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. 1343; securities fraud
in violation of violation of Title 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78ff and Title 17 Code of Federal
Regulations Section 240.10b-5; and money laundering, in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. 1957
and 1956(a)(1)(B). The defendant has agreed to plead guilty to four counts of the thirty-two
counts charged in the Indictment. Specifically, the defendant has agreed to plead guilty to one
count of mail fraud, one count of wire fraud, one count of securities fraud, and one count of
money laundering.
As alleged in the Indictment, the defendant, knowingly and willfully devised and
intended to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money and property by means
of false and fraudulent pretenses representations and promises. In the executing scheme to
defraud he used the mails, interstate wires, sold fraudulent securities, and laundering the
proceeds to conceal and disguise the source and ownership of the funds.
2
Defendant resided in Connecticut and owned and operated Apeiron Capital Management,
Inc. (Apeiron Capital). The defendant controlled bank accounts at certain financial institutions
including among others, accounts at Citibank in the names of Apeiron Capital, Knightsbridge
Holdings, Farnbacher Loles, Farnbacher Loles Motorsports, Farnbacher Loles Racing, and
Farnbacher Loles Street Performance.
Apeiron Capital was an investment adviser and broker dealer registered with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from 1995 through 1998, at which point the
registrations were cancelled. The defendant continued to operate Apeiron as an unregistered
investment adviser and falsely represented Apeiron to be a registered investment management
firm. Apeiron was not registered as an investment company, investment adviser, broker dealer,
or in any other capacity with the SEC, with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) or its predecessor entity the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),
and it was not licensed by the State of Connecticut.
The defendant was the majority owner and managing member of Farnbacher Loles Motor
Sports, Farnbacher Loles Racing, Farnbacher Loles Street Performance, and various other
Farnbacher Loles businesses (collectively Farnbacher Loles). Farnbacher Loles, with its
principal place of business in Danbury, Connecticut, was engaged in the business of professional
race team operations and servicing high-performance automobiles. Farnbacher Loles managed,
operated, and competed in various automobile races and high performance motor-sports events
held throughout North America and elsewhere, and provided service and maintenance for
customers who owned high-end performance automobiles.
3
The defendant operated as an unregistered investment adviser by, among other ways,
falsely and fraudulently representing himself to be a registered investment adviser and
representing Apeiron to be a registered investment management firm.
The defendant falsely represented to numerous victim-investors, including individuals
who were his friends and were parishioners of a Church in Orange, Connecticut (the Church or
S.B.C.) that he would act as their investment adviser and invest their funds through Apeiron in
various securities including in what he described as Arbitrage Bonds. The defendant falsely
represented to victim-investors that he would invest their funds in Arbitrage Bonds which would
purportedly pay a safe and steady return. In truth and in fact, the Arbitrage Bonds did not exist.
The defendant was selected to serve on the board of the Churchs Endowment Fund, and
falsely represented that he would use his knowledge and expertise as an investment adviser to
manage the Churchs investment funds, including the Endowment Fund and the Building Fund
by investing in, among other things, the above-described Arbitrage Bonds.
The defendant falsely represented to the victim-investors, including the Churchs
Endowment Fund Board and other members of the Church, that he could achieve and was
achieving a consistent and positive return on the investment funds, including through his
investment in the Arbitrage Bonds.
The defendant solicited investments from investors he met through the Church and others
he met through his Farnbacher Loles racing business, and made false and fraudulent
representations to victim-investors including, among other things, that:
a. He had invested the Churchs Endowment Fund in Arbitrage Bonds;
b. He worked with and had relationships with brokers from major investment
firms, known to the Grand Jury, who invested funds for him;
4
c. He managed approximately $240 million that was comprised in part of
money from Greek shipping companies and his wifes family money; and
d. He was a fund manager for five or six wealthy Greek families.
The defendant took investors funds based on false and fraudulent pretenses, including
funds from the Churchs Endowment Fund and Building Fund, as well as individual victim-
investors funds that had previously been invested in IRAs, 401(k)s, and represented the
proceeds of life insurance payments.
The defendant falsely represented to certain other investors that he would invest their
money in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) that were scheduled to occur in the near future and
into which he had the opportunity to invest.
The defendant entered into investment contracts and falsely represented to clients of
Farnbacher Loles that, in exchange for an advance of funds, he would pay them an interest rate
on their funds and provide them collateral (i.e., a secured interest) in the form of a bill of sale
with buyback option for a sport racing automoblie, when as he well knew, the promise of
collateral was fraudulent because he had made the same representations to others and the
collateral was already encumbered.
The defendant caused numerous victim-investors to invest more than $10 million with
him and Apeiron. The defendant failed to invest the money as represented, and instead diverted
investors funds for his own personal use and benefit, including to pay personal expenses such as
credit card bills, and to distribute large amounts of the funds to Farnbacher Loles.
In order to create the appearance of legitimacy, the defendant provided investors
documents including fraudulent account statements that contained false and fraudulent
5
representations, including among others, false transactions, false prices for the fictitious
securities, and false balances.
The defendant sought to lull investors into believing that their investment funds had been
invested as represented and prevented and forestalled the discovery of the true use of investors
funds by, among other ways, issuing periodic payments to the investors purportedly representing
interest on their investments or partial return of capital, when in truth and in fact, there were no
actual investments, and the defendant used portions of other victim-investors funds to make
such payments.
The defendant took victim-investor funds and transfer them to Farnbacher Loles accounts
to conceal the true source of funds, and similarly would and did transfer funds to an account he
controlled in the name of Knightsbridge Holdings to disguise the nature and source of the funds
and to make it appear that checks drawn on the Knightsbridge Holding account were actually
proceeds from the Arbitrage Bonds.
The statutory maximum penalty for each count to which the defendant has agreed to
plead guilty is twenty (20) years and a fine, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3571(d) of twice the gross
gain or loss, which is currently estimated as high as approximately $17 million.
1

The Government calculates defendants possible sentencing range, using the 2010
version of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, to roughly a level 30. This calculation is
only an estimate for the benefit of the Court to determine his possible risk of flight and presumes
the sentencing court would find each of the below listed specific offense characteristics and role
1
The Government currently estimates the loss to the victims to be approximately
$8.7 million.
6
in the offense enhancements to be applicable, while noting additional factors may also be
relevant.
Specifically, the defendant's base offense level under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1 is 7. The offense
level should be increased by 20 based on a loss between $7,000,000 and $20,000,000 pursuant to
U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1)(K). The offense level could further be increased by 2 levels pursuant to
U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) for 10 or more victims. The offense level could also be increased by
2 levels because the defendant represented himself to be working on behalf of a religious
organization 2B1.1(b)(8), the offense level could also be increased by 2 levels because the
defendant abused a position of public or private trust pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B1.3. This would
place the defendant in a sentencing range of 97 - 121 months. Regardless of the eventual
Guidelines determination the defendant is facing a significant amount of time. This factor
weighs heavily in support of detention.
IV. LEGAL DISCUSSION AND BASIS FOR DETENTION
Under 18 U.S.C. 3143(a)(1), a court shall order that a person who has been found
guilty of an offense and who is awaiting imposition or execution of sentence . . . be detained,
unless the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or
pose a danger to the community (emphasis added). In United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d
309, 320 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit held that 3143 creates a presumption in favor of
detention. The court stated:
[W]e are mindful that Congress has itself weighted the procedural balance quite
decidedly in favor of the government. As already noted, 18 U.S.C. 3143(a)(1)
creates a presumption in favor of detention; it places the burden on the defendant to
defeat that presumption; and it requires the defendant to carry that burden by clear
and convincing evidence, not by a mere preponderance. Only if a defendant clears
these high procedural hurdles is he entitled to release pending sentencing.
7

389 F.3d at 320 (emphases added). The Second Circuit explained that to secure release on bail
after a guilty verdict, a defendant must rebut this presumption with clear and convincing
evidence that he is not a risk of flight or a danger to any person or the community. Id. at 319.
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides that a court should order a defendant detained if
no conditions or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person
as required. 18 U.S.C. 3142(e). Among the factors that a district court must take into account
in conducting this inquiry are: (i) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, 18
U.S.C. 3142(g)(1); (ii) the weight of the evidence against the person, 18 U.S.C.
3142(g)(2); (iii) the history and characteristics of the person, 18 U.S.C. 3142(g)(3); and (iv)
the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or community that would be posed by the
persons release. 18 U.S.C. 3142(g)(4). Included in the history and characteristics of a
person are, inter alia, his character, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of
residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, and record concerning appearance at
court proceedings. 18 U.S.C. 3142(g)(3)(A). See United States v. Hollender, 162 F. Supp.2d
261, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (detaining defendant on the basis of risk of flight where defendant had
been indicted of over 30 counts of fraud and faced a total of 121-151 months of imprisonment).
A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Crimes Charged
The defendant is a U.S. citizen who poses a serious risk of flight and for which there are
no conditions of release which will reasonably assure his appearance as required. Based on the
nature and circumstances of the crimes charged, the defendant should be detained.
8
1. The Defendant has had Access to a Tremendous Amount of Cash
The defendant has demonstrated the ability to acquire tremendous amounts of cash in
short periods of time from both domestic and foreign contacts. His ability to raise money
domestically is reflected in the crimes charged. However, as set forth in the attachment, the
defendant has also received deposits totaling over $14 million dollars from abroad. Specifically
from a Panamanian company that was created by a friend of the defendant who is believed to
have lived in Greece prior to his passing away and then he continued to receive wire transfers
from the individuals son. (Exhibits A & B). His foreign contact is believed to have created an
entity in the Channel Islands, which engaged in importation of certain medical devices. Cash
was sent to the defendant where it was parked to avoid detection. Loles used this money to
further the Ponzi scheme and to support his car racing business. Clearly the defendant is an
individual who can procure significant amounts of money from his foreign associates. Thus, he
potentially has access to funds he can use to support himself, thereby rendering him a significant
flight risk. See Hollender, 162 F. Supp.2d at 264. This factor alone is sufficient to detain the
defendant.
B. The Weight of the Evidence is Substantial as is the Potential Punishment
The Government asserts that the weight of the evidence against the defendant is
overwhelming as demonstrated by his anticipated guilty. The Government has collected
documents and witness statements proving that the defendant has made multiple misstatements
to numerous investors. These misstatements are repeated in the literature distributed by the
defendant. In short, the Governments case is strong and thus, the overwhelming amount of
evidence militates strongly in favor of detention. Moreover, the fact that the defendant lied to
9
his friends and colleagues in executing the fraud militates heavily in favor of detention as he may
well lie to the Court to secure an opportunity to flee.
Furthermore, the potential punishment facing the defendant is also a significant factor to
consider. As courts in this circuit have held, the severity of the punishment facing the defendant
is a relevant factor which bears upon the risk of flight. See United States v. Davidson, No. 92-
CR-35, 1992 WL 144641, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 18, 1992). Here the defendant faces not only a
significant statutory maximum but also under the Sentencing Guidelines, the defendant could
face a sentencing range of 97-121 months or more in prison and a fine in the millions of dollars.
This factor also weighs in support of detention.
C. Personal History and Characteristics
The defendant ties to the community are slight. He is divorced and his three grown
children live outside Connecticut. Due to the nature of his offenses, he has, for all intents and
purposes, cut all significant ties, and burned all bridges with the members of his community.
Both his religious community and his business contacts were victimized by his crimes. He
simply has no reason to stay in Connecticut or even the United States.
To the contrary, witnesses have indicated that he has extended family in Greece. His
step-mother owns a duel apartment building in Greece (two adjacent apartments) such that when
she dies, Loles will accept responsibility and ownership of the apartment. Furthermore, a review
of defendants travel has revealed that the defendant has had extensive foreign travel, including
the following: Malta (1990), Italy (1988, 1991), France (1987), The United Kingdom (1990,
1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2007), Spain (2001), The Dominican Republic (2001, 2008),
Greece (1998, 2000, 2008), Germany (2001, 2004, 2008). (Exhibit C).
10
Additionally, the circumstances of the crime occurring over an extended period of time
reflect upon the characteristics of the person. This is not a one time mistake, or a momentary
lapse of judgment. This crime was perpetrated over years and years. The defendant took money
from friends, widows, his parish priest, and the church itself. Moreover, he did not use the
money in an attempt to help others or to make ends meet. In contrast, he used the funds to
support a race car hobby in which he enjoyed racing sport racing vehicles (Porsches) and
traveling around the country and the world going to races. Victims investment funds were
diverted to cover thousands of dollars personal and business of credit card bills. In short, his
personal characteristics would militate in favor of detention.
D. Danger to the Community
Based on the significant evidence the Government has gathered in this matter, it is
obvious that the defendant has been engaged in illegal conduct for a significant length of time.
Were the defendant to be released on conditions, there is a significant likelihood that his illegal
conduct would continue; at a minimum in order for the defendant to support himself by spending
the fraudulently obtained proceeds. This illegal conduct about which the Government is
concerned, includes the continued mail fraud, wire fraud and money laundering in violation of
Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 1341, 1343, and 1956. Thus, this defendant poses a real economic
threat to the community.
The legislative history of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 makes clear that Congress
intended that the safety of any other person or the community language in Section 3142 was
expected to be given a broad construction. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1983),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3195 (The reference to safety of any other person is
11
intended to cover the situation in which the safety of a particular identifiable individual, perhaps
a victim or witness, is of concern, while the language referring to the safety of the community
refers to the danger that the defendant might engage in criminal activity to the detriment of the
community. The Committee intends that the concern about safety be given a broader
construction than merely danger of harm involving physical violence.) (emphasis added). This
broad construction is equally applicable in the post conviction pre-sentencing phase as well.
Courts have appropriately construed the statute to find that protection of the community from
economic harm is a valid objective of bail conditions. See United States v. Schenberger, 498 F.
Supp. 2d 738, 742 (D.N.J. 2007) (holding that [a] danger to the community does not only
include physical harm or violent behavior and citing the Senate Committee Report language
reproduced above); United States v. Persaud, No. 05 Cr. 368, 2007 WL 1074906, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2007) (concurring with the Magistrate Judge that economic harm qualifies as
a danger within the contemplation of the Bail Reform Act); United States v. LeClercq, No. 07-
80050-cr, 2007 WL 4365601, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2007) (finding that a large bond was
necessary to, among other things, protect the community from additional economic harm);
United States v. Gentry, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1032 (D. Ariz. 2006) (in a fraud and money
laundering case, in determining whether pretrial detention was appropriate, the court held that
danger to the community under Section 3142(g) may be assessed in terms other than the use of
force or violence ... [including] economic danger to the community).
It is well settled that the principle that economic harm may be considered as relevant in
considering possible danger to the community in the post-conviction context pursuant to 18
U.S.C. 3143. See United States v. Reynolds, 956 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir. 1992)
12
(post-conviction for mail fraud and witness tampering, the court held that danger may, at least
in some cases, encompass pecuniary or economic harm.); United States v. Provenzano, 605
F.2d 85, 95 (3rd Cir. 1979) (in a pre-1984 Bail Reform Act case, post-conviction, the Court
rejected an application for bail finding that danger to the community is not limited to harms
involving violence). See, e.g., United States v. Zaragoza, No. Cr-08-0083 (PJH), 2008 WL
686825, at * 3 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 11, 2008) (citing the principle regarding pecuniary or economic
harm from Reynolds in the context of a pretrial detention analysis).
Accordingly, economic danger to the community can provide a basis for detention under
the Bail Reform Act. United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1393 (3d Cir. 1985); see also
United States v. Reynolds, 956 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Vance, 851 F.2d
166 (6th Cir. 1988) (discussing detention in a post-conviction context). As the court noted in
United States v. Harris, The danger against which a court must safeguard encompasses much
more than the risk of physical violence. . . . Often it is economic or pecuniary interests of a
community rather than physical ones which are most susceptible to repeated danger by a released
defendant. 920 F. Supp. 132, 133 (D. Nev. 1996). Cf. United States v. Masters, 730 F. Supp.
686, 689 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (finding in a case of bail pending appeal Court believes it must also
consider the danger of a person who continues to participate in possibly fraudulent schemes. ...)
Most recently in the much publicized case of United States v. Madoff, the Second Circuit
articulated that economic danger to the community is a basis for detention under the Bail Reform
Act. United States v. Madoff, 316 Fed. Appx. 58, 59-60 (2d. Cir. 2009). In enacting the Bail
Reform Act, Congress was concerned not only with potential harm to victims or witnesses, but
with the safety of the community as a whole. United States v. Dono, 275 Fed. Appx. 35, 38
13
(2d. Cir. 2008). As the court noted in Madoff, danger may, at least in some cases, encompass
pecuniary or economic harm. Madoff, 316 Fed. Appx. at 60.
Turning to this matter, the defendant appears to have no current legitimate source of
income and no ties to the community, the Government contends that were he to be released on
conditions, he could further deplete any remaining available assets of his victim-clients and this
would be economic harm to the community. The Government further asserts that were the
defendant to be released on conditions he could easily engage in some type of fraud and he did
for nearly a decade.
V. THE DEFENDANT CAN RECEIVE ADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE IN PRISON
The defendant claims that his spinal disk problems and related pain have become
exacerbated while he has been detained at the Wyatt Detention Center, and that he has received
insufficient treatment for his condition. The Second Circuit has explained that exceptions to
prison confinement will only occur in extreme situations. Sapia v. United States, 433 F.3d 212,
219 (2d Cir. 2005). This rules out most illnesses and other physical conditions. For example,
the Second Circuit has found that in the sentencing context a heart condition by itself is not
necessarily a reason to depart downwardly under the Guidelines. United States v. Napoli, 179
F.3d 1, 18 (2d Cir. 1999). In accord with other Circuits, the Second Circuit has found that a
qualifying impairment is one that cannot be adequately cared for in the prison system. United
States v. Garcia, 45 Fed. Appx. 21, 22-3; 2002 WL 1990335, 1 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United
States v. Martinez, 207 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796, 806
(2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Altman, 48 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 1995).
14
Thus, the critical question is not whether defendant has some medical problems or
difficulties, he no doubt should receive regular appropriate medical treatment and care the
inquiry is rather, whether his medical problem can be treated in prison. See, e.g., United States
v. Sherman, 53 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing footnote that quotes the Department of
Justice, A Judicial Guide to the Bureau of Prisons -- There are virtually no medical problems
that the Bureau's health care delivery system cannot respond to adequately, either within its
institutions or on a contract consultant basis . . . .). Indeed, the Bureau of Prisons currently
cares for thousands of inmates with such serious medical conditions as hypertension, carotid
artery disease, arteriosclerotic heart disease, cardiac arrhythmia, and/or congestive heart failure.
United States v. Cutler, 520 F. 3d 136, 172 (2d. Cir. 2008). The Cutler court, addressing
allegations that a prisoner did not receive adequate treatment in prison for his heart condition,
noted the lack of evidence for the claim, and added that if there is evidence to support the
finding that the BOP is incapable of providing prompt response to inmates emergency medical
needs, . . . it is in the best interest of a humane society that any such evidence be disclosed. Id.
at 175.
2

The Government asserts that defendant should get appropriate medical treatment.
However, by virtue of the fact that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3143, the defendant must be detained,
2
A decision to detain the defendant does not necessarily end the inquiry of whether the
defendants medical condition can be addressed while he is in custody. In the event the Bureau
of Prisons concludes, after adequate investigation, that he cannot receive adequate medical
attention, or that his condition has deteriorated beyond the Bureau of Prisons expertise, the
Bureau of Prisons can remedy the situation. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) (Bureau of Prisons
may move the district court to reduce the term of imprisonment for extraordinary and compelling
reasons, including needed medical care as set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(D)). Thus, a
decision to remand the defendant at this time does not prevent a release from Wyatt to the
Marshals custody for treatment in light of additional compelling medical information.
15
he does not now get the luxury of choosing a doctor, or team of doctors, to examine and treat his
back. The Government is certainly not unsympathetic to his physical ailments and the
corresponding pain he may be feeling and believes that the Bureau of Prisons, the United States
Marshal or the Marshals designee (Wyatt) should make sure that he is cared for appropriately.
However, with incarceration and detention come some realities regarding medical options and
the reality is that he can be treated by the detention centers medical staff.
In this regard, the defendant has completely failed to meet his burden of demonstrating
that his physical condition cannot be adequately addressed by the Bureau of Prisons or the
medical staff of the facility where he is currently housed. He simply cannot establish that his
medical condition is an extreme situation warranting a release from custody. Nothing
submitted at this point by the defendant establishes that he cannot receive adequate medical
treatment at the current facility.
Finally, the Government has not yet been able to determine to position of the United
States Marshals Service with regard to this matter and respectfully suggests that it may be
appropriate for the Court to consider the position of the United States Marshal for the District of
Connecticut prior to granting any modification of the defendants current detention order.
16
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, the Government respectfully moves this Court to keep the
defendant detained as there are no combination of conditions that could assure his appearance as
required and there is no evidence that his medical needs cannot be met by the Bureau of Prisons
or the facility at which he is currently held.
Respectfully submitted,
DEIRDRE M. DALY
ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
/s/ Michael S. McGarry
MICHAEL S. McGARRY
ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY
Federal Bar No. CT 25713
157 Church Street, 23
rd
Floor
New Haven, CT 06510
Tel.: (203) 821-3700
Fax: (203) 773-5378
michael.mcgarry@usdoj.gov
17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 25, 2011, a copy of the foregoing GOVERNMENT'S
REPLY MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW AND
MODIFICATION OF ORDER OF DETENTION was filed electronically and served by mail on
anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all
parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept
electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing
through the Court's CM/ECF System.
/s/Michael S. McGarry
MICHAEL S. MCGARRY
ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY
18

Exhibit A
Case 3:10-cr-00237-MRK Document 39-1 Filed 07/25/11 Page 1 of 2
I ransaction No. 11
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ATHENS GREECE
,,,OA:
ORIGINATOR TO BENEFICIARY If\lFO
IRFBIMILSURY HOLDING S L TDACM 299608
039
BANK TO BANK
Debit: oo18 Credit: 3023
No Dbauth: N
Verify ID: RepairlD:
Bene charge: DEBIT, Bene amt: O.OOIUSD
ORIGINATING BANK PAYING BANK
0239
' Rrv A TE BANK LIMITED
LECONFIELD HOUSE, CURZON STREET

Exhibit B

Exhibit C
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, 2 ',MAR 1 9 ~ O ,
.' 110402 ... .

Motion To Release 2 - Loles

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Motion To Release 2 - Loles

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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