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Influencingwithcommittedminorities
S.Sreenivasan,J.Xie
W.Zhang,C.Lim
G.Korniss,B.K.Szymanski
SupportedbyARLNSCTA,ONR
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Neverdoubtthatasmallgroupofthoughtful,
committed,citizens canchangetheworld.
Indeed,itistheonlythingthateverhas.
MargaretMead
Theroleofinflexibleminorities inthebreakingofdemocraticopiniondynamics,
GalamandJacobs,Physica A381,366(2007).(homogeneousmixing/meanfield)
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Q. Can a committed set of minority opinion holders
on a network, reverse the majority opinion?
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Q. Can a committed set of minority opinion holders
on a network, reverse the majority opinion?
B (vaccinations cause autism)
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Q. Can a committed set of minority opinion holders
on a network, reverse the majority opinion?
A (vaccinations do not cause autism)
B (vaccinations cause autism)
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Q. Can a committed set of minority opinion holders
on a network, reverse the majority opinion?
Applications: Influencing public opinion on preventative healthcare,
Eradicating hostile opinions in terrorist states.
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Model of social influence: Binary agreement model
(2-word Naming Game)
Influencing is symmetric in both opinions.
(for ex: in contrast to SIS model)
Difference from epidemic like models:
Difference from voter model:
Presence of intermediate state coarsening & domain formation.
Plausible for studying situations where an individual does not require high personal
investment to change opinion:
Spread of buzz (Uzzi et al, forthcoming)
A converted individual can revert back.
(in contrast to Threshold Model, Bass Model)
Baronchellietal.,PRE (2007).
Castelletal.,EPJB (2009).
Baronchelli,PRE (2011).
Xieetal.,PRE (2011).
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Model of social influence: Binary agreement model
Agents possess one of the following opinions at any given time:
A (vaccinations do not cause autism)
B (vaccinations cause autism)
A B (mixed / not sure)
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Model of social influence: Binary agreement model
Speaker
Listener
A speaker is chosen at random.
A random neighbor of the speaker is chosen as listener.
At each microscopic time step:
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Model of social influence: Binary agreement model
Opinion change:
Speaker
Listener
AA B
A
Case 1: If spoken opinion not on listeners list
A
Speaker voices an opinion from his list
- he adds it
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Model of social influence: Binary agreement model
Opinion change:
Speaker
Listener
A
B
A
Case 2: If spoken opinion is on listeners list
A
Speaker voices an opinion from his list
- both retain only spoken opinion
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Initial condition we care about:
Small fraction p < 0.5 of nodes randomly chosen are committed to opinion A
Remaining fraction (1-p) of nodes have opinion B
Committed nodes are un-influencable i.e. never change opinion
Only absorbing state is the all A consensus state
Q. How long does it take to reach the all A consensus
state as a function of the committed minority fraction p ?
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MeanFieldEquations
B AB AB AB B A
B
A AB AB AB B A
A
n n n n n n
dt
dn
n n n n n n
dt
dn
+ + =
+ + =
Baronchellietal.,PRE (2007).
Castelletal.,EPJB (2009).
Baronchelli,PRE (2011).
eachindividualcaninteractwithallothers(completegraph)
numberofindividualsislarge(N)
n
A
=N
A
/N :densityofindividualswithopinionA
n
B
=N
B
/N :densityofindividualswithopinionB
n
AB
=N
AB
/N :densityofindividualswithmixedopinion(AB)
n
A
+n
B
+n
AB
=1
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MeanFieldEquations
eachindividualcaninteractwithallothers(completegraph)
numberofindividualsislarge
asmallfractionofp individualsarecommittedtotheinitiallyminority
opinionA(committedindividualscanneverchangetheiropinions)
p =N
c
/N:densityofcommittedindividualswithopinionA,p<0.5
n
A
=N
A
/N :densityofindividualswithopinionA,n
A
(0)=0;
n
B
=N
B
/N:densityofindividualswithopinionB,n
B
(0)=1p;
n
AB
=N
AB
/N:densityofindividualswithmixedopinion(AB),
p+n
A
+n
B
+n
AB
=1
B B AB AB AB B A
B
AB A AB AB AB B A
A
pn n n n n n n
dt
dn
pn n n n n n n
dt
dn
+ + =
+ + + =
2
3
Xie etal.,PRE (2011)
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TippingpointinSocialNetworks
p: fraction of agents committed to opinion A
p = 0.05 < p
c
(allAconsensus)
(saddlepoint)
(Bdominated,mixed)
A
n
B
n
A non-absorbing (B-dominated, mixed)
stable fixed point exists;
All trajectories starting from initial
condition
flow to the non-absorbing fixed point
10 . 0 ~
c
p
c
p p > = 2 . 0
B
n
A
n
Only all-A consensus fixed point exists
(allAconsensus)
All trajectories flow to consensus
fixed point.
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For
For steady state soln. is the all A consensus
Results on large complete graphs agree with mean-field results
Sharp transition from B-dominated mixed steady state to consensus
=0.0979steady state soln. is a mixed state
TippingpointinSocialNetworks
10 . 0 ~
c
p
tipping point
fraction of committed agents
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d
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d
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p
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fraction of committed agents fraction of committed agents
ER
(sparse)
FC
tipping point
d
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TippingpointinSocialNetworks
Xie et al. (PRE, 2011)
scale-free
(sparse)
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The meaning of never in finite networks with N >>1 nodes
(using quasi-stationary approx./master-equation approach)
cN
c c
e T p p ~ : , ( <
) log( ~ : N T p p
c c
>
TippingpointinSocialNetworks
Xie et al. (PRE, 2011)
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Social influencing and associated random-walk models:
Asymptotic consensus times on the complete graph
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
10
0
10
2
10
4
10
6
10
8
10
10
10
12
10
14
10
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(a)
N
T
m

/

N


q=0.04
q=0.06
q=0.07
q=0.08
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
N
T
m

/

N
(b)


q=0.08
q=0.09
q=0.10
q=0.12
cN
c c
e T p p ~ : , ( <
Zhang et al. (Chaos, 2011)
) log( ~ : N T p p
c c
>
Time spent in meta-stable state
c
p p <
c
p p >
Time spent in state (n
A
,n
B
)
before consensus
Time spent in meta-stable state
Time spent in state (n
A
,n
B
)
before consensus
TippingpointinSocialNetworks
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Givenknowledgeofthegraphtopology,whatnonrandomcommitted
nodeselectionstrategy,givesthelowestcriticalthreshold?
Howcanwegeneralizeourmodeltounderstandincentive
mechanisms thatdriveopinionspread?
influenceofcommittedminoritiesinthepresenceofdedicated
extremists
"SocialConsensusthroughtheInfluenceofCommitedMinorities",arXiv:1102.3931,
J.Xie,S.Sreenivasan,G.Korniss,W.Zhang,C.Lim,B.K.Szymanski,PRE (inpress,2011).
"SocialInfluencingandAssociatedRandomWalkModels:AsymptoticConsensusTimesonthe
CompleteGraph",arXiv:1103.4659,
W.Zhang,C.Lim,S.Sreenivasan,J.Xie,B.K.Szymanski,G.Korniss,Chaos (inpress,2011).
"TheNamingGameinSocialNetworks:CommunityFormationandConsensusEngineering",
Q.Lu,G.Korniss,andB.K.Szymanski,JournalofEconomicInteractionandCoordination 4,221(2009).
ThankstoQimingLu
SupportedbyDTRA,ARLNSCTA,ONR
Ongoing/Futurework