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UISSION NO.
FlO WN 7 AUG 1'45
COpy NO. !
t
i
,
HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH ,AIR FORCE
APO 114
HE/,nrUi.RTERS
1\'mTIEI'H AIR
I,PO 234
T,\CTIC1>l.. MISSION REPffiT
Field Order No. 15 loliuion 110. 317
Target: Toyola:1110 (90.21-1
6
53)
7 J,ugust 1945
Table of
Tactical Narrative
Lnnex A _ Operations.
Part I _ Navigation Track Chart and Report.
Part II _ llean Points of Impact
Part III - Banbing.
Part IV _ Flight Engineering Cbart end Report
Part V - Radar.
Purt VI - Gunnery
Part VII _ Air-Sea Rescue Ch.art
Part VIII _ VII Fighter cocmand Consolidated
Misaion Report.
Annex B - \,eather
Ptlrt 1 _ tieather SUJIml,ry.
Part II _ Chart _ Forecast 'o;,eother vs.
Observed \ieathe
r
Part 11 I _ Prognost ic M3 p
Part IV _ Synoptic M9.p.
knnex C _ CommUnications
Part 1 _ Radar Counter Measures
Part 11 Radio
0 - Intelligence
Part 1 Enemy Air Oppos it i on
Part 11 Enemy i .. ntiaircraft.
Part 111 _ Strike b.ttack Report
....
..1!2..
1
7
6
10
11
12
14
15
16
17
20
"
22
23
24
25
26
28
3
0
31
31
33
knnex E _ Conaolidated Statistical Summary
l..nnex F .. Twent ieth 1t.ir Force Field order
l..nnex G Distribution List
. ..... . .
41
51
55
Prepared By:
i\-2 Section
Twentieth Force
1I1l!!!!!
, , , , I , ,
SECRET
,By Auth. of the CG
20th Air Force
...,-,..
61U45 f).v -'
Date InHiels
: , , , : : , , :
UA1:lTERS
TRENI'lETH AIR FORCE
APO 2)4
SUBJECT, Report of Attack Against the Toyokswa Hsvel Ar"enal on
Honshu on 7 AUBust, 1945.
TO
1653)
Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Force, iFO 2)4.
San Francis(Q Califcrnia
1. IDEm'lF!CATION OF REPORT:
a. Target Attacked, The Toy,,}an'8 Na'V81 k'seNil (Tl'lrget 90.21-
near Toyohashi on the Island of Honshu.
b. Force AttackinR: A noroal effort of 1 Group each.
1ng of 3 squadrons. frCl!l the 56th, 7Jrd. 3l3th and 3l4th BombardJ:::ent
Wings were to attack the target.
c. Directj'l": Field Order t-'u!"'ber 15. Headquarters Twentieth
Air Force, dated 6 August 1945. directed the attack against this target.
2. I'ISSION PLANN!lC:
a. Selection of Target:
(1) Targets Considered: The targets considered were those
that had heen singled out ferr dayligM precision attacks when weather
would permit such strikes. The target selected had to be limited tc I
for attack hy a force equivalent to a single wing due to the fact that
this mission immediately followed a maximum effort night strike.
(2) Target Selected and Reasons: The ToyokBwa l'aval l..r-
seMI (Target 90.21-1653) was selected for attack on the basis of a
favorable weather prediction for the Nagoya Area.
(3) Secondary Visual and Radar Target: The Yokcsuka Air-
craft Factory and Research Center at Yokosuka (Target 90.17-1392) was
selected in the event that weather conditions would prevent visual boob-
i08.
b. Importance of Target: The Toyokawa l>8val Arsenel. located
in the Toyo River Valley about 37 miles southeast of Nagoya castle and
4.5 miles north of Toyohashi. is the Nuwber 1 producer of neval
ition and 1 of the 10 lllBjor neval arsenals in Japan. Its products in-
clude lI'Schine guns, antiaircraft weapons. rifles, aircraft csnnon and
ammunition. It covers an Brea of 20,200,000 square feet with 18 per cent
of that area consisting of built-up structures. The principal buildings
ere of stoel construction haVing ssw-tooth t"pe of roofs.
c. Time Factars:
(1) Selection of D.Day: D-Dey wes selected on the basis
of 8 ta",orable _esther forecast presented for tbe area in .hicb the target
... located.
- 1 -
Ii I. l' !!.!. I
(2) Selection of' Tsrset Time: Tar-Set time wes selected to
enable the 8-29's to assemble at lwo Jima and rende2'vOU4 with friendly
t'1&
ht
ere. and still hit the tarset as early as possible in the morning.
d. Munitions and Fuel Loading:
(1) Selection of Banbs and f\lze;s:
(a) f'unitiolftl:
1. All Groupa Vlere to carry the general
purpose bomb, fuzed with 1/10 and 1/100 second delay nose aDd non_dolay
tail. The 314th Wins was to be the only ning that would USe the 1/10
second delay nOSe t'uze due to the unavailability of the 1/100 second
delay nose to be used by the other ';1i08s.
,l. The banbs selected 1'Iere based on the tect
thet the terget covers a laree area and is made up of both storage snd
roanuracturing installations. The buildings in the production section
are smll in plan arees and are dispersed. Throughout the target these
buildings are principally roof and short span conatruction not
subject to spreading collapse. The SOO-pound bomb 'l':"as selected for the
reason that the multiple number of direct hits obtainable would have the
best chance of inflicting maximum damage to these structures as .. ell as
to their contents. This size bomb was expected to prove most effective
against the storage area, since individual buildings are protected by
revetments and could only be destroyed by a direct hit nithin tbe revet-
ment. This could best be 8ccanplished by exposing the area to a large
number of bomb hits.
.1. The 1/100 second delay nose fUZe ';'las selected as
it Would bomb burst 6 to 10 feet beneath the roof, thereby causing
damage to structures and building contents. The 1/10 second delay nOSe
fuze \')'as selected as the best alternate fuze to be used by the 3l4tb
The non-delay tail fuze selected to give ground level burst
to near miss bombs.
(2) Bomb Loading:
(8) B:!sed on safety factors, banb l06d estimates far
this mission Uere a potential capacity of 12,000 pounds each for each
Group o!' 4 hings and an expected average of the same number of pounds
per aircraft.
(b)
by the total distance
The potential capacities were primarily governed
to be travelled.
(3) Ammunitlon 108din2: Ammunition loading nBs to be acc-
ording to the Tactical Doctrine for daylight precision attacks.
(4) Gasoline Loadingl Fuel reserve data indicated that the
58th, 73rd, and 3l3th lHng aircraft uould require a total fuel l06d of
7100 gallons and the 3l4th ':ang load per plane \70uld be 73CO gallons ..
e. Flisht Planning:
(1) Route:
llmIb. Reason tor Choice
Blse to 1_0 J"it118
uSSIlbly Area Number 1
Tactical Doctrine
Iuo J'irna to &se Tactical Doctrine.
(2) Navigationsl and Radar Factors:
This dead reckoning point selected
to miss the flak defenses 8t HamaaAtau.
Tactical Doctrine
This easily identified point Of lend
near the city of Morosaki wae selected
for the initial point.
Thhl easily identified point of land
in NBgoys Bay just east of ... teuzeM
was selected for the departure point.
FleeeSellJbly off the ecest of
J'eJ;l811
to
to
343530N - 1363830E
to
344
1
30N - IJ658JOE (IP)
Target
to
3452N - 13750E
to
(b) In tha event that the secondary target bad to be
bcmbed it is easily identified by radar since it is located on the coast
or the arroobead shaped peninsula at 3503N _ 13916E. The secondary vis_
ual and radar target is excellent for direct synchronous radar bombiDd
since it is located on a coastal projection on Tokyo Bay and resoh'es as
e single radar return. The coast and its distinctive shape "ere expected
to aid in target identification.
(]) Assembly Points: The only radar check points are 1'1""0
Jima. Kita, and f'inami Iuo. These 3 islands "'ere to be used as assembly
areas and. radar could be utilized to position the aircraft in the event
that cloud cover existed over the area.
(a) The target is a large arsenal complex uhich can
be identified as a single radar return. The straight approach from the
departure point to the target has 2 or 3 good radar check pointa that
could be used to kill drift and for target identificationA The targEt
was Selected prim:lrily for its visual references, although the radar
operator could be of assistance to the bombardier throughout the run.
(4) Fleassemb1y Areas: 'I\1o areas "ere assigned for rEass...
embly, one at 3325N - 13600 and another at 340SN - 13620. The
was expected to be excellent for radar assembly since it Tlould utilize
a distinctive southern tip of lam and "ould also be an excellent point
for radar wind runs. The latter l7as chosen be-:ause tha coastal features
could be easily identified by radar operators.
(5) Departure Point: The departure point I 345330N -
1363890E, was to be a good coastal check point on Ise Wano By making
this turn aircraft \1ould have a straiaht course fran the departuro point
through the initial point to the target
entif1ed
(6 )
southern
Initial Point: The initial point ..as to be easily id-
point of the Morosaki peninsula.
f. Banbing Factors: (For details or mean points of impect, see
ADn8Z A, Bart II).
(1) Each of the Groups of the 4 178S called upon for
- J -
3 Sq.... drons "hich would make this effort the cQ.ui"elent of a. norllSl
Single \:Oing attock. It wos planned for 130 eiTcraft to borrb tho target
each with an avcrage of 14.500 pounds (wsed on overall pcrtormance fig-
urca) far a gross tonnage of 930 tons. or the 930 tone. 88 per cent,
or 818 tons, ware expccted to be released on the primary target. Per_
Tioue experience indicated that 50 per cent. or 409 tons. would tall
Within 1000 feet of the 2 assigned mean points of impDct, On the baah
or this tonnage on the target area cOIllplete deatruction 'Il'culd be effected.
(2) Altitude and axis of attack aelected nere dopendEnt
upon the roller-ing I; factora: (1) uind direction and veloeity, (2) pos_
ition of the SuIl at time of attack, (3) flak conditions at the targEt,
and (4) selection of easily identified initial points, both by vieual
end radar means. The foll(Xl'ing pertinent bgnbing infol'r:l8tion uall select-
ed on basis or the heretofore .l!lentiom,d considcrstiona: banbing altitude.
15.000 and 17.000 feet; axis of attack. 68 degrees truel length of run.
27 miles; time of run. 5 minutes and 15 to 1;0 seconds and. drif"t, 2 to
21 degrees right.
(3) Vean Points of Impact: The 2 points or
selected, 1 in the area and the other in the nest aroe of the south
section of the plent. included ell of the 3 unit3 in the south section end
a considereble portion of the northern starep:e area uithin a probably cir-
cular error of 1500 feet.
(4) Secoooary Targets: Because of Naval Arsenal
r-as not considered a good radar target, the secondary target at Yokosuka
o:;oas designated as radar and secondary visual. This target i3
approxizr,ately 135 miles fran the primary and there 'l78S even the possibility
that in the event that clouds obscured the primary. the secondary,,::,ould be
open for visual b::lmbing. In the event ,isuel banbing uas not possible at
the Secondary target it nas considered a good radar target.
g. Defensive Tactics:
(1) Fighter Escort: 'fuo D-roups of 1>.'0 Jima based fighters
uere to provide the follocring escort:
(a) One Group riSS to rendezvous \lith B-29's at the
departure point at 070100Z at 17,000 feet to escort the bambers through
the primary visual target
(b) The second group ;'Ias to arrive at 3.503N-13906E
(uhich 'l7as to be the initial for the visual target) at
21,000 feet at 060130Z. fly in th area until OSJIJIOZ to escort the banaeI'S.
If no bombers appeared. they "ere then to g.J into the e:.ea and
strafe.
(2) Flak: are 22 heavy Slln3 in the Toyohashi ares,
and aircraft 'l7ere exper.ted t? be 'tiithin I'a'lge of 12 of thesa on
planned approach to the TillS ras cO;}:lidered a \/eok ':'P.f('),'.8 and cnly
meager frek nBs anticipated. The d0':7n-\7ind axis of attack roas fran
the nest. The route to the initial point ;'las expected to bring aircr3ft
barely within range of the 18 heavy guns at Ujiyamada. bombs
nay, aircraft r-ere to break auay to the northenst and around the M.l:l8rl'8tsu
defenses to land's end. The base altitudes specified, 1.5,000 and 17.000
teet, were expected to be beY0nd the optimum range of the flak effective-
DeliS. In the eveot that the secondary target was attacked, tbe B 29's
would be \'Iithin range at 10 guns at Hiratsuka and approxi.m!!ltelY 106 gun! at
Yokoeuka. Fat' thia reason, a ireraft were instructed to increase thEir
alt.it.ude by 4000 teet if the secondary were attacked.
- 4 -
l!.11l11
(3) All squadrons .. ere to be equipped to barregll jam
;nemy gun-laying radars in the 72 to 84 and 1'30 to 210 lIlegscyclc region:l.
jamming W81S to be employed against gun_laying 51goola epp18ril18 out-
IUde the barrage. Search for enemy radars fran 20 to 3000 megscyclf.1S
to be continued.
(4) Fnemy Air Opposition:
(0) It 1'18S anticipated thet 20 to 30 enemy fi6htcrs
might offer opposition in the erea. A poslSible 5 to 10 edd-
tional interceptors ":'Iere expected to pick up the 8-29 stream and pace
it in the bay area lSouth of Nagoya. In the Tokyo area a poelSible 40 to
50 fighters nere expected to intercept the 8-29's if there UJl8ble
to bc:rr.b and proceeded to Yokosukn.
(b) On the basis of the above considerations, 2 groupa
ot tighter escorts were to be used as above.
h. Air-Sca Rescue: The Navy was given detai1e of this mission
and provided the air-see rescue facilities sha;.n on the chart in Annex A,
Part VH. noich also the facilities provided by the 'I'rentietb li.ir
Force.
3. FXEC1J!'ION OF T.'1E ),m;S!ON:
o. Take-off:
(1) Aircraft of the main bOmbing force took off as follCGa:
E.i!:Jg Aircratt
First
Take-off
Last Take-off
Airborne
58th 32
061750
Z
061819Z
73rd 31
061810Z
061625Z
313th 35
061754
Z
061828Z
314th
...li.
061740Z
061899
Z
Totel 131'"
061740Z
06182&
"'This total does
One a ircraft of
assembly point.
not include 4 Super Dumbo arrl
the 313th 'f.ing nas to serve as
It carried a full bomb load.
1 :Jind Run Aircraft.
a "l7eather ship at the
(2) A total of 104 fighters of the VII Fighter Comr.'md
were airborne fran It'lo Jima at 062212Z.
b. Route Out: Long range navigation roes accomplished by in1iv-
idua1 aircraft to the formation assembly point. No navigation difficul-
ties were reported and no eircraft failed to bomb the pri.m3ry target
because of navigational error.
c. Assemblies: The fighter Group reached the PO\;lt a
few minutes before the 8-29'f'. The 3 fighter squadrons flC\ a ...
16
f
ooo. 11,000 and 19,000 feet and the lead bombers roere to the
target eDd 10 miles beyond. This escort continued until the last bombS%'
bad gone over the target.
d. Targets:
(1) Primary: Redar was used 8S an aid for navigation and
tor ..1m determination in the target area. C,ood visibility permitted
.s.aua1 bcDbing. WiDd in the target area was trora 100 d(grees at 15 knots
.&11 124 aircran ballbins bit the primary target, dropPUl8 a tote1 of
..,-3 t_ at bcabe trc:. 070113Z to 010139Z a<t eltitu4ea raD6iDB trmll
16.000 to 23.600 teet.
- 5 -
l!IAl!I%
(2) Tarset or OoTlortunlty; One aireraft. "'hich also bcmbed
tho prinBry tarset. dropped 3.5 tons of banbs on Futamota at 0701)2Z
1'rCID 15.500 reat.
(3) Fishters; Of the 104 fighters that were echeduled to
eecort. 97 reached the torset toreo.
e. Remainder 0( Fprce: Seven aircraft
1'. Route &8ck: The returns to basea were as briEfed.
with the 8:J:ception or 7 8-29's that landed at lwo Jilm.
g. LanHOS: Aircraft of
the main farcll landed in llhOlJere et
beses
os tollows:
'iring Firgt Lending
lnl'lt Ln""ns
58th
0707352
07083520
73rd 070707Z
070B22Z
313tb 0707l2Z
07082J.iZ
314th O]0729Z
0708092
Total 070707Z
070835"
h. Loss and to Aircraft:
(1) One B.29 of the 313th ':ling '\'fas hit by flak over the
target and the 11 cre'li members ll'ere forced to bail out over luo Jir.l8
because the damage prevented control of the aircraft. 11 men uere
rescued.
(2) Tl<enty-one B-29'S ..-rere damaged by flak.
(3) One fighter was lost enroute to the target. The pilot
parachuted safely and uas picked up by an Air-Sea Rescue vessel.
1.
bettleen the
Execution Versus Planning.: There were
planning am execution of this mission.
no major differeo:es
4. RESUl'IS OF THE t.4.ISSION: (For detailed specialist's reports of
this mission. see annexes that folla;'l this narrative).
8. No damage assessment is available on this target e.t the
nriting of this reportl hO',7aver, strike attack photography indicated
that of the 3256 bcmbs"dropped, 1290 (39.7 per cent) hit 1000
feet of the mean point of impact.
. .---j
J M." L
iN. :F. 'n'lINIl\U 'j
Lieutenant GenO'sl, A.,
Commanding
- 6 -
A
OP1RATIOJ6
Part I ~ Nl.vigstion Track Chart end Report
Part II _ ~ n Points of Impact
Part III _ Bombing
Part IV _ night Engineering Chart end Report
Part V _ Radar
Part VI _ Gunnery
Part VII _ Air-Sea Rescue Chart
Part VIII _ VII Fighter Camt:lcd Cc;nsolidate:i Kissior:!
Report
Mission No. 311
7 August 1945
PART I _
t 1. Lone ranse I18Vigstioll was accomplished by individual aircraft
l' 0 the f'Ollm!Ition asaembly points. The tBrget attacked 'IllS Toyokewa
14!1"
\
\
SECIll
OATE_ A
\
- _. - -3!1
________
______ 313'"
--J<--l<-\ 31411'1
MISSION 317
314111 WING
rAKEOFF 061740Z
061e09l
LANDFALL 0700482
070059;"
TARGET 0101l3Z
LAND's END
070136Z
01072U' --
LAHOtN6 0108081.
070l4ll
070150l
07071n
0708242
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PART L f\:AVIGATI N TRA
LANDING
MISSiON 317
3131" WING
TAKEOFF
0618Z82
LANDFALL 070055Z
0701032-
TARGET 070126Z
0701392
LANO'S END
0
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----,---
MISSION 317
MISSION 317
I
58t" WING
73,,, WING
Toll. 0617501
TAKEOFF
061810Z
\ KEOFF 0618251
LANDFALL
0701121
LANDFALL
070108!
I 070124!
0701181
010123Z
010126 Z
TARGET
TARGET
070131r
1
0701341
07013ZZ
LAND's END
070148Z
LANds END
I
LANDING
010735Z
LANDING
07010T!
20--
010835Z
0708221
."'
MEAN POINTS OF IMPACT
ISSION NO.317
MPI
WINGS
58"'. a 313lh.
73rd. a 314th.
saAil r
4. The ba:::Jbing eccuracy good., ";lith 39.7 per cent at all
bambs being released 1000 feet ot the mean points of impect.
The clear t':eether the greatest fector oontributing to the succeSs
of this mission.
2. 11Ie weather in the target area was CAVU and all forlll8tioml made
"bUIll runs. The Ired bO!llbar4iers of' the f'ormatioml that banbed lete
hed to use ref'erenDe point bombiOB proc.edure to sight on the terget ae
the aimi08 point wee obscured by dense ::moke.
by 3 squadrons each
exDeIIently planned. The averege
Canpreesibility for- the f'oree
PART III _ BOMBTh'C
1. The ToyoJl;Bns Neval Arsenel "as attacked
tha 58th, 73rd. 313th, and 314th lIi088.
3. The miesion nes
drif't reported 2 degreee left.
26 minutes.
-u-
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1. N!l.rrative of tho Mission as Fl(l\l'1Q:
e. Cruise to the '{ainlend: Individusl clilnbs were IWde 1mDIlIH-
Qtely after take-ott to eltitude:J between 5.000 to 9.000 felt, T:hcre
the ioitiel eruise was flOO'Il. AsseJllblies were IIlBdc otf the coost of
J"epan.
nn
b. Bomb Run:
average altitude o ~
BaDbing was
17.000 teet.
conducted by squadron formations et
c. Return to Be.se: Fleturns to the beacs r.cre conducted by in_
dividual circraft t:'lthout difficulty. MinimUlD fuel nes used by e1r-
planes cruising at 14,000 to 16,000 feet end descending 200 feet per
minute into the traffic pattErn. Maximum range speeds ee speeified by
thie headqU3rtera g3ve the best fuel conauroption.
2. Car.lllnts: Of the aircraft airborne, 5 per cent landed at Ir.o
J'iz:tt. Only aircraft of the 3l4th ~ i 1 l B loaded a banb bey tenk. II the
target at Toyokal't"s had been closed in and the tormt iOIlS proceeded on
to the secondary target in the Yokosulal orES, a large percentage of
the 58th, 1)r4 and 313th ':ling. planes 'l'!ould have had to land at 1';10
lima tor fuel,
). IXhibi ts;
a. For hiatorical reeard. see ehart that prece:!ea this p3g&.
b.
Statistical
For further
Summary,
information, see Annex E. Consolidated
- " -
PART V _ RAOA....R
1. Egu1unent Pcrf'ormarce of' AN/AN-I' ,
0
0 0 0
4,
No. f J ~ rounds 1'irEd
'0
canb!lt: None
5. No. of rounds used for teat
firing; 12.260
6. Guns Looded: 58th iang
7}rd ,",ing 313th .ins 314tb .ing
Hot Cold
Hot Cold
7. V81functicns: CAL. .50 M.G.
Timing off
Link Jams - (2)
Bo?ster ! o ~ o t o r
8. Total preentage of' equipnent operetive:
c.r.c.
100%
CAL 50 M.G.
9. Remarks: There r.S13 no gunnu-y activity on this mission.
JIMA
er.... 11..." on uetll.1t:r
ot !'MaU.ttl u.r ,.wee IIU"
.... 11lC c.aD-CIt1' laAdlttc
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0706101.
.
MISSION NO 311
DATE 1 AUG '45
....I'f SEA RESCUE
---
ow
. ....
J
SUBMARINE
SURFACE VESSEL
NAVY CUMBO
SUPER OUMBO
K Y
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Af>q'l
1945
,w
PART ::lZlI
13S-
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01'"
..
TO BE
..-
'0--1--1
STATION DURING ENTlRl MISSION.
2. ALL DUWOS AND SU R DUMBOS WERE TO BE
S.F'ROItI TIME INOlCATtO TO RETURN PASSAGE
IKE AlRCRF T. I
I
I
1",=::-"-,,, ,..-
-
OI<lN.llW,lIo
.,._-
PART vn I COISOUp,;.TID MISSIOll REPCRT.
JID\DQ.tJ:..,FrTEi\S VII FICHl rn I.J.:F
Oft"ic(l ot" the Ccmoonding Gencra1
Iwo Jima
10 liuguat 1945
1. a. Unita and Targets: 15th Fighter Group - Iaec;rt B-298 tr(DDP t
l.Ji!1goya krE.lll snd
th,oee to landa
e"".
S06th Fighhr Group- Chotu (p), Sog=l
(5), and Ji.tillu.gi
(Ut) airtiE.1da.
2. 8. Type of l..:is5ionl Escort of B-295 over regays or Toky("
..Ii. FightEr Strike by one group in event the baDbers e.rE. not at their IP.
b. De.te of Missiac: 7 August 1945
c. Field Ord.er 1\0. 161.
d. VII Fighter Ccrnmarui Mission No. 257. VIR Mission roo 48.
3.
e. Croup
15th Ftr Op
506th rtr Gp
Totels
b. A/c schedulEd 52
52
104
e. A/C returned early
2
0
2
d.
A/C over target area 45"
52
97
e. Ale lost
1
0
1
f.
Ale oanpleting mission 45
52
97
o
Tlo lost alc off
0740
0812
h.
Time RV ;./nav bombers
0800
oe35
i.
Time over DP 1055
1125
j.
Time of landfall 1055
1125
k. Time over target
area 1100-1145
1140-1225---
1.
Time at RP
1150
1240
ro
Time landed last u/e 1515
1549
Dispatched 48 planea, one of which went demn en route to the targEt.
4. a. Friendly aircraft losses Total: 1; Pilots: NOn).
1 P-51 "as lost en route to the target due to a coolant
leek. Filot paracbuted safely and r:as picked up in good condition by en
J..SR surface vessel.
b. Friendly aircraft damaged - Total: NonE.
5. a. Enemy aircraft sighted. Air: None.
Ground: 10.
b. Enemy aircraft losses: None.
e. Erlemy Ground Instal1etioa end Shipping L_SIlea:
15th Fighter alouD None.
- 17 -
bu' 506th Fighter Groyp _ One 200' freighter explOlh:d end left
rnlng, 1 Suser D08 set afire, 3 Sugsr Dogs nera damaged. 11 fiehing
boote. 350' tranlers and 1 30' launcb were damBged. Three steam loco-
motives. 22 1'reight cs.rs, RR station at uagarimatsu, snd the RR yards
and sheds at Matsuda were stra1'ed and damaged. TPo 1'ires nere started
in stOTogo tanks or Tats at an industrial plant 5 01' SekiInoto, ani 1
bUilding roas dmnaged at Salro;;e. '1';:0 rndio stations 'r,()l'e damagc.-d end 20
Pct':er line tooers short circuited and structurally 4emagad io the Saged
valley. oil storage tenks left burning, 2 radar etationa damagEd ond
1 lighthouse destroyed at Noj:'=. Edd.
6. HOrrative: gr'oups nera sshedulc4 for this mission.
One group nas to UICort a of 1\-29s to Toyoka'::8. but if th1l!l tergE't
r.ere closed in, the bombers nere to prceeed to the 8EcOnd
righter group ,,8S to taka up the eacort. If the bachera did not epp03r
over the secondary target, this second fighter group to strike air-
1'ields in the S;; Tokyo area.
The escort phase of the mission nas with the bombers
bitting their primary target. One P-51 of the 15th FightCT Group
lost operationelly on the to the but the pilot nas ru-
cued. The group reached the DP a 1'e;, minutes before the 8-29s. The J
squadrons escort 16.000. 17.000 19,000 feet, the
at altitudes t'r0lll 17.000 to 19.000 1'eet. The lead banh6rll 'r.'ere escorted
to the PT and 10 miles beyond. Then the fighters returned to the DP
escorted the second 01' 8-29s. After the initial run, some of the
B-29s returned to E on a second run. Escort 'r.'as given until the lest
bomber had gone over the target. No enemy .:l ireraft "ere seen or en-
countered. Heavy flak 'r.'as meager inaccura\e. Return to base ....a3" 1I'ithO"J.t
incident.
The 506th Figbter Group errived at the point for rendezvous
with the banber strike 1'orce at 1125 aoo orbitted t.,1 of 0 Shine fer 15
minutes. The hacbers did not appear end the P-S1s continued on their
alternate mission. One squadron maintained high cover and sighted no
enemy eircra1't. The other tuo squadrons investigated Sagami and tslo1.Si
airfields but found no worth,hile targets there; end so they conti:u"'u
south and southr."eat atrafing a variety of targets ofr opportunity
ing po;-;er lines, transformers, railroad facilities and rolling
Small shipping was strafed at lands end and one squadron split up
one section strafing the radio station and lighthouse at 0.1
OShima, and the other aection strafing Nojima-saki and nearby ..
damaging a light.house. radar stations and oil storage tanks and fir1:1
a large freighter, All planes of this group returned to base aafeiyc
15th Fighter Group: 11eager inaccurete heavy flak ,ss (0
coootered het'l7cen Mika'IV8 Bay and ToyokaVla.
S06th Fighter Gr ....up; Nleager inaccurate heavy flak "!I:J <':1
countered at Chogo. Hiratsuka snd between end Yokohama.
inaccurate light and medium flak r.as received at Ods'l':sra. !laager lr,-
aCcurate light flak wae obseTved at Shiraharra end Nojirrl1-saki,
8. CgmmupisetioDS;
Loud and clear except for Jap jomming 00 Channel C
1"'"0 to -ire _ 4/10 to 5/10 cumulua basd at 1800' dt.b.
'OJIII at 6000' and tetl tops to 10,000'. Visibility 20 miles bclOE
15.000' aD4 wreatrlcted abOV'e.
.. 115 -
aJaaJ%
lSth Fishter Croup Target Area _ 3/10 cloud covel', bellllll
5.oeo' tOPIl 6000'. Visibility unlimited.
S06th fighter Group Target Area _ 3/10 cumulUIl boiled at
3.000' with tops at 6,000' along cOllst, beeoroing 6/10 to 8/10 covorage
this leval about 50 miles inland. Visibility 10 to 12 miles 10 heze
elO\l? 10.000 and unrestricted above.
10. G. Expended:
o
JL
o
BOO
27,1)0
ROUN!E CJ..LlBrn .50
mars
15th Fighter Group
506th Fighter Group
'Tara!,
b. Gasoline remaining in planes completing mission (gallcns)l
UNITS
AVERAGE P@ Me
.lie 'filTH r:;,x 4/e
.. ITH
FlE3
15th Fighter Group
45th Ftr Sq 100
150 65
47th Ftr Sq 9B
134 53
78th Nr Sq 90
119 49
506th Fighter Group
457th Ftr Sq
86
III 39
458th HI' Sq 71
90 50
462d fir Sq 84
119 59
11. Observations:
a. Airfields:
Atsusi _ Appraximetely 50 durnny and inoperational air-
craft including 2 4/E planes were sighted on the field from 6000
1
,,' I
,- -
-
,
CHICHI JIMA
,
,
," ._1
.... -"' .. \
'-,
f?
,-
>
'.
,-
,
.
,
-"GUAM
I
ANNE<
c
COh'MJNICATION3
Part I - RCM
Part II - Radio
Mission No, 317
7 August 1945
1. Purpo.!!el
e. To OIF enany radar.!!.
b. To conduct a ganeral .!!earch in the 20 to 3000 mc. reglorn.
e. To barrage jam the enemy gun_laying radars in the 72 to e4
me and 190 to 210 me. region;arrJ to spot jam any gun_layina sign:lls
apPearing outside the barrage.
2. Yethod I
a. Ten RCM ob.!!ervers participated and. used the rol:'er;ring equip-
ment to eecomplish the search end j8ll:l1ling: 118 - APr-l. 69 - kFQ._2.
9 _ "RQ-B. 12 _ l..Pr-3. 10 _ i.FR-4. 1 _ i.RR-7. 8 - l..P"'-11. 2 - JJl:.-6 aJd
2 - ;;P"'-24.
b. rach airplane ",as equippEd 1 or more electronic
jamners so tuned that each flight squadron produced it am barrage. The
barrage ':':as supplanented by the use of spot jor.JllEI's.
3. Ruul ts:
a. Thirty-four intercepts ... ere recorded and ere listed at the
end of this section..
b. The barrage "as reported as continuous and strong. The
Shifting of frequency by the enemy radar operators to avoid spot jamt:ling
nas reported.
4. Remarks:
a. The folleming unusual signals 'l':'e1"e intercepted: 47/112/3
8
..-
ia. aU
.._-,...
D
INI'ELLIGEN:::E
Part I - EneJllY Air Oppoaition
l'brt II _ ~ .btiairer.!lft
Part III _ Strike Attack Report
Mission No. 317
7 August 1945
P.\RT I _ F.J:EMY i.IR OPPCSITIOII
..ir OPPOSition 1'las nil on this dsylight effort against
N3val Arsenal on 7 AUBuat. Only 2 enemy eircratt were
(i alld no attacks su.stsined. The 2 enOl'lY s1rcraft seen
0;; but beHeved to be t::?in_engine) ere going in the
OtI:a.te direction I7hen enCCl.lntered nC"'r 18n1'e cod.
tb 2. SQtIe of tbe B-29s roare esca:-ted by 1 Group of P-5l's, f'rCl:l
to 10 oilcs post borIlbs sl7sy.. One \"ling reported P-51a patrolling
r e!'ran IP to target. The P-51's r.hicb straff;d ground targets
no enemy aircraft on the ground Ilssigned sirfidds so they
2 cked ground instollations. On i.taugi airfield. the P-5l's Slrn'
and 48 single_engine and tr.in-engine dummies. Over the
lII. dIe of Tokyo B:1y, they also san a tree balloon 20 fe{jt in d1lIrnoter'
at l5.goo feet, gray r:ith red balls and 1!I bco: 6 to 10 fect SQuera
sUSpended
1. Summary of' Attack:
The prinery target t:'IlS banbed by aircraft of the 4.
folla;vs:
lJ il'-B.
.5
:z:J .:lli ill
Number of' ;'ircraf't
30 2') 32
33
Time Over 'Ihrget
0123Z-0132Z 0126Z-0131Z 0126Z-0139Z 011JZ-01242
Altitude &-aeket
16,000
16.1JO-2J.600 17,700-19,700 17.900-
19.400
lIxis of attack
68
0
_80
0
66
0
_71
0
65
0
-74
0 670_78
0
Unde.rcast
Cl.o.W-2/10 2/10 ChW-4110 c.VU
2. Flak En Route to Target:
En route to the target flak r;as encountered as tabulated
below:
Location
UJi Yamada
Akenogahara
Kushimoto
Tsu
!latsuzaka
Coordinates Remarks
34 51 N - 137 26 E Meager and inaccurate,
heavy and medium
34 30
N _
13645
E MeClgE.I' and inaccurate,
hcovy aOO medium
34 32
N _
136 40 E and
hcevy and medium
33 30
N
135 50 E
Meager and in3ccurete,
he.avy 000 oedium
34 43
N _
136 30 E Meager aDd in:lccurnte.
hc.::1vy end I:Idium
34 35
N _
136 31 E am imccurate,
heavy end medium
34 20
N _
136 35 E V8ser and inaccurate,
heavy
- 31 -
l! I !.IU.:t
3.
Elak
0.= tho
TllrBet:
Titne of'
NumbCT of' Aircraf't
I. ircr:! rt
_Release
in F.ormotion
D:1mogd
RcJf\flr k8
0113
12 5
!.llgcr and
IICotlrate.
0120
hellVY
12 3
L'oeozer and
012
3_0124
accurate. hc.evy
910
0
Meager and '0_
0126_0127
accurate:. heavy
10-9-12 5-1-0
to imccuratc.
0128-0130
hE.1evy.
119-11-11
6-0-0-0
Very accurate
far 1st Sq,dn.
Inoccurate or
nil tor oU::ers.
01
34
9
0
end
accurate
a. J..n analysis of the above figures clearly indic3ted that
the target def'enses could adequately handle only 1 banbing
at a tilne; i.c one Squ.:ldron m1S sufficient to saturate thlll to the
extent thot trailing Squadrons uitbin a 2-minute interval found flak
either nilOr' inaccurate.
b. In all eases flak r,as described as meager. and control
nas either continuously pointed or predicted concentrstions. Most
of the damage was inflicted by 2 predicted concentrations of 10-12
bursts each hitting t"o ll-aircraft for/W.tions.
c. This relo.tively meager defense apparently accomplished
sane of the most effective firif'.g the Japs have demonstrated to date.
4. Flak on Withdra"al: On mcnger and inaccurate,
heavy flak nas observed at Hanamatsu and Shimada.
5. SUITIIlOry of Loss ond D3nage: One airoraft 'l'7as lost to flak on
this mission (severely damaged over the target and crashed at I\1o Jima).
Of 124 airoroft bombing, 21, or 17.0%. sustained flak damage,
J2 -
Borebing .l..ccuracy: Fair
QQ1!.LII!.E1!!lAb
Pi.RT III _ STRIKE M'T.l..CK
40
27
8
16
Percent ot
tatol dropped
7.3rd. 31)th end 314th
Bombs Dropped On Targat; a80
E:anb load: 960:x 500 lb. GP
FUsing: .01 nose. non.delc.y tail
3256
510
2274
1290
902
282
5
2
7
90.21-165)
TOY01Q;:'..I.. loRSE:Nl.L
20 .l.ir F
orca Miss ion ]17. 7 .il.ugust 1945 _ 58th.
Banb Wings
.J(OtBlNID STl.TISTICS ON EOl'IBIN'G ;.CCURl.CY
Banbs dropped
Visi ble b.lrsts
CalcUlated nnd
probablc bursts
.In:lpacts 0-1000' of I.P
.. 1-2000' of AP
.. 2-3000' of 1..P
.. beyond 3000' of AP
ClaSSlf'ic;J;tion of bombing accuracy: Goed
SmlKE i.TTI.eX REPORT 58th BOlI::B ""nn
Time or Attnek: 0701232. to 070132Z
Heading Over Target: 6-,0 True
No. A/C Over Target: 30
First 1'annation over target dropped bombs in pattern around MPI. These
bursts nere observed in S., quarter of area fOb' and NE quarter of area .. B'"
(Ref. - cm Industrial Report 48). Ir.:rnediately after this formation
struck, the entire target area nas obscured by smoke. mDking necessary
the plotting of second and third forrotions by calculation.
The IWjority of bomb bursts of second formation of 11 ::/e t7ere calcU-
lated to be tlithin 1,000' of I<PI. The bombs of the third forlMtion of
9 A/e nere calculated to be more than 3,000' short of !:!PI.
Table of bombing st:J.t ist ics;
Totol number of bombs dropped over tlJr,get 880
Total number of visible bursts plotted
173
Total number of celculnted and probable bursts plotted 707
Total number of bursts within 0-1000'
278 - 31.6% of bursta
1-2000 I
331 - 37.6%
2_3000' None
beyond
3000'
271 - 30.8%
FollO'iJing formations nere plotted:
462 Bcmb Group 657 k./e - 293 banbs
40 Bcmb Group - 548 Ale - 316 banba
444 Banb Group - 982 Ale - 271 bOOlbs
Baaed on 20th :..F Strike Repart No. 135
33 -
RR.l!ll.!l!.l!Il!lJ.
FollOl7ing formatiOns were plotted;
Table of bombing statistics:
bomb bursts of
Bomb Laid: 574 x lil4 )
305 x (Ca:JP B
Fusing: Uh4 - .01 nose. non-
delcy tail.
No. or flits on Target: UnknORn
A1rtorne hem",
" Jlot plotted:
hIe jettisQnOd 78 bombs
bombs not accounted far
Photos re 1
ee ved: Joll prints .from bGllbs away to
series: 301 - 318.
.'I'RlKE AttACK RErOOT 7]rd B01'B '"INC
T
lme of httack: 070126z _ 070131Z
Head ing Over Target: 660 to 710 True
No. 1./C over Target: 29
Bombs dropped on primary target: 544 x w.b4
257 x w.b4 (Canp. B)
Visible bursts plotted: 73
Celculated probable bursts plotte1: 480
Hits within 1000' of 1.P: 150 18.8%
Hits within 2000' of lU?: 233 - 29.25%
Hits 'Kith in 3000' of IJl: 167 - 20.8%
Hits - exact location unkncmn: 278 - 30.9%
1st Squadron 10 Ale 287 x N:64
2nd Squadron 9 Ale 249 x N.64
3rd Squadron 10 hlc 265 x tf.64
Bombs Jettisoned: 30 x yb4
48 x M64 (Cemp. B)
Ba::Jbine iu:curacy: Unkncr.n
N,'LRRf..
- TlVE REPOBT:
. Strike photos fram 7 ale indicate good to excellent results 7.itb
lllBJority of banbs hitting ,>:,ithin target area. Numerous hits observe1.
on C1'tices, machine shops em storage buildings in SE section of targst.
Some additional hits visible in oorracks and housing eree et SEo edge of
target. Bomb pattErns could be for only 2 squadrons since the
second Squadron Over the target did not obtain an)' photos shroing btt"bs
e"'ey or bomb impacts. It is believed he:t'l'ever the majtlrity of benbs frarJ.
this squadron fell within the target area. Huge columns of obscur-
ing all except eastern most portion of target prevented a more complete
assessment of damage.
J
Bomb Load &: Fusing: '03 x 500 1b.
GP. Fused lnst nose. NO tail.
No. of t./e Over Terget: 33 ReediD8 Ovcr Target: 67;0 - 75
0
True
Photos received: 5M31? IV2, 3. 4.5; 2Vl. 2; 3V4-9; 5\12-11; 6V2-7; 7V1-15
S'IRIKE J,'I"I'b.CK REPORT 313th BOMB "II we:
Time of attack: 070126Z - 070139Z
110.
Burste on the Target: 815 Bombing :'ccurecy: Excellent
Totel
_bor banbs dropped over target:
843
Tote1
number
of visible bursts plotted: 28- (Corded 8S jettisoned-
belar)
,._, .IOS_
of cs1culoted probable bursts plotted:
843
-34
llllllIlll!!!l.""
11 JVC droppcl. 276 x 500 lb.
11 './e dropped 273 x 500 lb.
11 ,.;S drop;>cd 292 x 500 lb.
ForIrI3tlon,
Forlll.:)tlonl
FOl"zn:ltlonl
RePort 135. Cont'd.
i;:o.l No. burota within 1000' or I.PI _ 612 - 75%
T
t
al No. bursts n-lth1n 1--2000' of MPI _ 203 -
oolNob
'rotcl No' \Ireta within 2-3000' of MPI - Jlone
bursts more than 3000'f'rcrn. WI - Nene
t'O!lon1"..
..... OZ"rll/ltiontl '\:lore plotted:
l.t
2",
3r.
'l>.
Tho balcoce or bombs airborne but not accounted far abovOI
60 x 500 lb. GP jettisoned
25 x 500 lb. GP dropped all.
bef'ore bCltlb run (28 vl51ble in photQS
and plotted)
Primary Target with 7)rd tang taM:lZ!tion--
no ca.mt.ors.
J.r.RR.r. TIVI: REPCm' I
The target 1708 cOl:lpletely obscured by smoke end no burets
recorded on strike photogrophy. 1.11 bursts reported nbove 'I"l'ere
calculated fran 1't1ir to poor strike photography. l.nolysle of the
success of the mission based upon calculated burets reflects thet
the ,..pI ross uell covered end that an effective pOttErn of bClllbs
nBS placed on the assigned target areD. The smoke billros over
the target to verify the calculated impact arcs.
One of the aircraft rclcescd prematurc!yand bcmbs struck apprax-
imo.tely 16.000
1
shart of the targcta These bombs caused possible
to a railroad and train--these bcmbs fell l'7ithin S small built-up
SrOO
a
There is one cluster of bursts about 14.000
1
short of liIPI .....hich r.e
are unable to ocrount far \lith infarm:ltion available at this timea
S'ffilICE ;,TT1.eX REPORT 3l4th BOMB l'iING
Time of l.tte-ck: 070113Z - 07012420
Bomb Losd: 7)2 x .500 irJ.J1l>4
Heading Over Target: 670. 68
0
76
0
True
NO. life over Target: 33
Fused: al Nose, NO tail
Nq a Bursts on Target I 4.50
Bombing accuracy: EXcellent
REPORT:
Good quality strike photogt'sphy shO':ls excellent results uith
several hits on the i,/P building and additional hits and n....!Jr
misses concentrated on the buildings nithin .!Jppraxlm3tely 1.000'
of the A/P.
Smoke and dust quickly obscur.:d the t3rgct nrf;l1, prt:v",ntins further
accurate assessment,
BaIIIblDB stat1Btics:
_ dropped 732
Y181b1e burste - 264
- 35 -
ISSION 7
2 5ell! B.W.
7 AUGUST 1945
f'lvr\li'AMA NAVAL ARSENAL
90.21-1653
CONFIDENTIAL
VISIBLE BURSTS
o PROBABLE BUlSTS
==CALCULATED BURSTS
. -
STRIKE ATTACK RPT 135
C.J.U.-20AF
I
-
-
-
-
:1T-" .......... _ __
(r:.r!llil __c_.
"'U' c' -eo '" iii C le1;ev
...];,'\ AIr:, ........,.......,;,
to.. or" all ;:'1lta 017''' c'!ll",,lo".
IiItrlke ";ulll+-,. ".
oto..;re.,tla '" ':r frl:
COf'&.l.Ia_.-)
.....wlll"""'
..1- JJo,
,
CONFIDENTIAL
Jm!
E
,
C0N30LlDf,.Tm ST/,TlSTIC:,L SUMMARY
Mission No. 317
7 August 1945
8KoaK'
------
2 eupor dwDbo a1rcraft an('t. 1 wind run aircraft.
I 1 aircraft Bcned all 'Wcathor ship at asecmbly point; carriod ful' bomb load.
S. Iupor 4umbo aircraft.
110RIT
--- --
MISSIOlf
}17
AIRCRAF'l'
PARTIOIPA.TING
'DIll !l\&D on
Ill'1!l _ 7 AlJgll'jt J 94S.
,na: 07 llE'I'OIlIT
__
AD-
mmn or me..,.,
... to
BOlD
DAD 7USt us,
DUB 71llS'r
lIOMBlHG :BOK!lIIG
UIIOJ7
L4ST JlClMBI!I'G COMPL!TI!a
'lUGm OTBRI j,tIlILun un IOJ,. LAlDlJO
6 Aug.
TADGE'l 'l.lllGl:T8 MISSIONS CtIVllJrnoun .l!
33 J
1 32 1)50 Z 1819 Z 7 Aug. 0)35 Z 0335 z 30 _ IIQ JIM&
- jO 2
1911 33
2 31
"
1810 Z 1825 Z
"
0)0) Z 0822Z 29 _ _ _ 3
3
-
3 - __ 3 21
139
1
35
- 35
"
1)54 Z 1828 Z
"
0712 Z 01324 Z
32
- -
- 32
I
3
I
3
111 35
2
33
,
1)40 Z 1809 Z
,
0)29 Z 0809 z
33 - -
-
33
2
-
2 - - - 2 2
6511
136 5
131 6 Aug. 1)40 Z 1626 7 Aug. 0707 Z 0635 Z 124
- - -
l24
I 7 I 7
5
-
5
- - - 5 5
1 I
-
I - I
1 a
2
-
-
-
1 b - -
- - -
2
-
-
- -
-
- - - - -
3
- -
2
- - -
2
IlIll1W1llW. lAILtJIIII
WOR_
MleT_1 '_D 1_"
In SECOHIlAlJ OTB!R
0_
NISSIOJf _ )17
I14T1 7 August 1945
EREMY ACT ION
1I0R_
Ern",. t BOMBI:]) I"""'ED
IVI DcoRIWtT 01'HER
!!!!!