<I j

96 MARK SELDEN
mili tary, with the complicit y of the press, whj le continuing to pursue mas
sive bombing of fr aq i neighborhoods, has thrown a cloak of silence over
the ,lir war.
5i
Airpower remains among the major causes of death, destruc_
tion, dislocation, and division in contemporary Iraq in a war that had
taken approximately 6'55,000 li ves by the summer of2006 in the most ;IU
thoritative study to date, published in Th e and created more than
2 million refugees abroad and an equal number displaced internall y (OD(,
in seve n Iraqis are displaced) . Despite the unchallenged ai r supremacy th;1l
the United States has wielded in Iraq since 1<)91 and especially since 2003,
there is no end in sight to U.S. warfare and civil war in Iraq and through
out the region.
5
')
We have shown the decisive impact of the final yea r of World Wa r If in
setting in place the preeminence of st rategic bombing as quintessential to
th e American way of war, one that would characteri ze subsequent major
wars tha t have wreaked yet greater devastation on noncombatant popula
tions. Yet for all the power unleashed by bombers , for all the millions of
vict ims, in the six deC<ldes since 194'5, victory against successive predomi
nantly Asian foes has proved extraordinarily elusi ve for the United States.
5
WERE THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS OF
HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI JUSTIFIED?
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
In principle, the where the incinerated over six
million Jews were no diffe rent from the urban crematoriums our air
force improvised in its attacks by napalm bombs on Tokyo.... Our aims were
different, but our methods were those of mankind's worst enemy.
- Lewis Mumford (19'59)1
On the sixtieth anniversar y of the Dresden bombing, ambassadors from
the United States, Russia, France, and Britain attended a wreath-laying
ceremony. Cl ergy from Covent ry Cathedral in England, destroyed by
German bombing in 1940, presented a cross to D resden's Frauenkirche.
Chancellor Gerhardt Schri)der spoke: "Today we grieve for the vi ctims of
war and the Nazi reign of terror in Dresden in Germany and in Europe."
Despite this attempt at historic reconciliation, however, views
that separate the Germans from the Allies in historica l memory have sur
faced. Outside the anniversary ceremonial site in Dresden, neo-Nazi
demonstrators marched with a slogan charging that the bombing of Dres
den waS :l holocaust perpetrated by the All ies.
2
And, as Robe rt Moell er dis
CUsses in hi s chapter in this volume, the discourse in Germany touched off
by /org Friedrich's Del' Bmnd [The Fire] indicates that, des pite the gather
ing of the Alli ed representatives in Dresden, the memory wa r in Europe is
intensifying.
Nonethel ess, the Alli ed representatives did attend the ceremony at
Dresden. While in Europe the Ge rmans and the Alli es seem to have taken
the first major step toward reconciliation in Europe, in Asia no such steps
yet taken place. Nor is it conceivable in the near futu re that an Amer
ICan president or an American ambassador, offici'llly representing the
United States government, would dedicate a wreath to the victims ofHiro
98
TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA
shima and Nagasaki without provoking angry voices of protest from lhe
public. In the meantime, Japan's prime ministers routinely visit
Yasukuni SlLrine, which houses a museum exhibit that unabashedly glori
fies Japan's involvement in the Pacific \-Var.
Althoug h postwar U.S. - Japanese relations have been founded on their
close-knit alliance, mistrust lurks benea th the surface. American memo
ri es of Pea rl Harbor, reinforced by Japanese brutality in treating POW
s
,
and Japanese memories of Hiroshima, Nagasaki. and the firebombing of
J apa nese cities li e at the core of it. During the Cold \-Va r, thei r common se
curity and economic interests concealed this mistrust, but the resurgenCe
of nati onal ism in Japan :1 fter tbe end of the Cold War and of patrioti c fcvtr
in the post-WI! United States may resurrect it.
l
In June 2007. Japan's defense minister KyuI1la Fumio stated that the
atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were justified because they
prevented the Soviet Union from occupying Japan. This statement
touched flff an instant storm of protest in Japan. The progressive news
papCf Asahi Shimbul1 editorialized that Kyuma\ remarks "were not onl )'
insens iti ve to the feelings of atomic bomb survivors and victims, bu t also
seri ous ly undermine Japan's 'non-nuclear ' stand." With a chorus of protest
mounting not only from the opposition party but also from within thL
Komeito, a coalition partner in the ruling Liberal -Democratic P;l rty,
K)' uma was forced to resign. The new defense minister, Koike Yuriko.
categorically sta ted that the atom ic bombings by tbe United States should
never be condoned.
Across the Pacific, asked about Kyuma's statement, Robert Joseph,
President George \V. Bush's neoconservative appointee as the speci.al cn
\'oy for nonproliferation, justified the atomic bombing as the action l h;lT
ended rhe Pacific W[\r and sa ved not only a million Americans but also
more Japanese. Asked about this opinion, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo
repli ed, "I have not changed my view that we should never forgi ve tht:
atomic bombings." 0 7.awa Ichiro, the head of the Democratic Pa rty, the
major oppos ition party, demanded that the government seek an apology
from the Unitea States for dropping the atomic bornbs.
4
WERE THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS JUSTIFIED? 99
Hiroshima and Nagasaki , Soviet Entry into the War, and Japan's
Surrender
The lite rature on the end of the Pacific \\far has evolved in a truncated
fashion along three d ist inct tracks. American historians have generaUy
been preoccupied with the question of the American decision to drop the
hombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japanese histori a ns h;we focused on
the political process through which Japan came to accept surrender. Least
devel oped has been the Soviet role in ending the war, which been
treated as a sideshow by both American and Japanese historians. It is im
portant, however, that Stalin be brought to center stage, became the Soviet
Union played a crucial role in the American decision to clrop the bomb
and was the focus of Japan's diplomatic and mili tary policy during the last
months oftht: war. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and N agasaki must
he understood in a broader context of inte rnational history by closely ex
amining, first, how the atomi c bombs inHuenced the Japanese decision
making process leading to their acceptance of su rrender, second. how the
Soviet factor influenced President Harry S. Truman's decision to drop the
bombs, and third, how Soviet entry into tbe war inHuenced Japan's deci
sion to surrender.
Looking at the end of the Pacific War from the international perspec
tive, three important conclusions can be drawn. First, there was fierce
competition between Truman and Stalin to force Ja pan to surrender: Tru
man wanted to end the war before the Soviet en try, and Stalin wanted to
join the war before Japan surrendered. The atomic bomb played an im
portant role in this race.
Second, there was a dispute in Japan among top policy makers about
whether and on what terms they should end the war. Both for the p(;ace
party and for the war party, determining the role that the Soviet Uni on
would play had the highest priority during the last months of the wa r. To
the Japanese leaders, the specific defin ition of the kokutai (national pol ity)
built on the emperor system became the most important issue, as both par
ties struggled to come up with acceptable conditions for ending the war.
Rejecting the American demand for unconditional surrender and destruc
tion of the kokutai, the peace party sought Moscow's rnediation to preserve
it. The War party insisted on the need to inAict decisive damage on the ex
pected American in vasion of the homeland in order to gai.n bvorablc
peace terms and considered Soviet ncutra lity essential to wage slIch a bat
II
100 TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA
tic. Both parties thus pinned their hopes for a satisfactory end to the W,lr
on the Soviet Union. Japan's policy, however, was exploited by Stalin to
prolong the war long enough for the Soviet Union to join it.
Third, the widely held vie'vv in the United States that the atomic bomh_
ings were the most decisive factor that led to Japan's surrender must be re
jected. Although the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6 inj ected
urgency :unong Japanese poLicy makers in their attempt to terminate the
\var, it did not res ult in a change in the official policy to achieve this goal
tb rough Soviet mediation. It was only aft er the Soviet entry into the War in
the early hours of August 9 that the Japanese policy makers, for the first
time, confronted the issue of whether or not they should accept the terms
specified hy the Potsdam Proclamation. Although the So\"iet entry, li ke th
,ltomic bomb on H iros hima, did not lead to a prompt decision to surren
der, the Soviet factor played a rar more important role than the atomic
bombings.
The Soviet entry into the war dashed any hope of bargaining for terms
through Moscow's mediation, nuIlifying the policy that the Japanese rulers
had pursued since the middl e of June 1945 and continued even after they
received the Potsdam ultimatum ofJuly 26. Furthermore, in order to pre
serve the imperial house, the Japanese policy makers deci ded to gamble on
the Americans rather than prolong the war and risk the danger of expos
ing Japa n to the expanded influence of the Soviet Union.'
Truman's Dilemma
When Truman assumed the presidency in April 1945, he two dilem
mas with regard to the Pacific \Var. The first was th e danger of Soviet cx.
pansion io As ia. Ln February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, Presiden t
Franklin D_ Roosevelt had been eager to conclude the Yalta Secret Agree
ment, \-vhich gave Stalin a series of rewards, such as concessions to the rail
ways and ports in Manchur ia and occupation of sout hern Sakhalin and the
Kurils held by the Japanese, in return for his pledge to enter the war
against Japan after the defeat of Germany. The U.S. policy makers, both
military and civilian, believed then that Soviet participation in the war
against Japan would be the most important prerequisite for the successful
American in vas ion of Japan's homeland, because this would pin down the
Japanese forces in Manchuria and North China.
However, the political and military situation had drastically changed
WERE THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS JUSTIFIED? 101
since the Yalta Confe rence. By April there eme rged a serious conflict be
tween the Soviet Union and the \Veste rn Allies over Poland and Eastern
Europe. Led by W. Averell Harriman, the American ambassador to
those advisers who had become concerned about Stalin's increas
ingly hostil e attitude toward the \Vcst over Pol and and Eastern Europe
came to advocate abandoning FDR's policy of concili ation with the Soviet
Union. Harriman was soon joined by Josep h Grew, the inAuenti al under
secretary or state, and former Herbert H oover, who were wor
ried about the consequences of Soviet expansion in the Far East after it
entered the war. Navy Secretary James Forrestal and Willi am Lea hy, chi ef
of staff to the president , also joined this group.
By April , the military situation had developed favorably for the Uni ted
States to the extent that the Joi nt Chiefs of Staff no longer considered So
viet entry essential for an invasion of Japan. Nonet hel ess, Army Chief of
Staff General George C. Marshall, supported by Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson, continued to beli eve that Soviet forces would be important to
bringing about Japan's surrender before the initiation of Operation
Olympic, the mass ive im'asion of Kyushu, the southern part of Japan's
homeland, scheduled for November I. Truman wanted to avoid Soviet
participation, as he became increasingly concerned with its consequences
in Asia, but in order to end the war quickly with a minimal cost in Amer
ican lives. Soviet entry would still be necessa ry.('
Truman raced a second dilemma. He was commjtted to the uncond.i
tionaI surrender demand. This was not mere.l y because he wanted to con
tinue FDR's legacy, a nd not merel y because he feared that revising this
demand would run counter to preva iling public opinion, which took a
harsh attitude toward the Japanese emperor, but because he himsc!ffirmly
believed that imposition of unconditional surrl:ncl cr rep resented just retri
hution for the humili ation infli cted on the Americans by Japan's dastardly
attack on Pea rl Harbor. Since May, however, there had been a growing
voice within his administration, led by influential such as G rew,
Stimson, Forrestal , and Lea.hy, among others, in favor of mod ifying- the
unconditional surrender demand by promising the Japanese that they
could maintain th e monarchy under the current This group ar
gued that in order to bring the war to a speedy conclusion, modification of
llnconditional surrender would be necessary because thi s would induce
the Japanese moderate clements ro accept surrender before the country
\\",\S completely destroyed. For G rew, Forrestal, and Lea hy, this recom
102 T S UY O SH I HAS E GAWA
mendation was al so connec ted to their concerns about Sovi et ex pansion in
Truman found himself unable to resolve these dil emmas befo re the
i
Potsdam Confe rence.
O n Jun e 18, the president summoned hi s mili ta ry ad vise rs to the \ Vhite
H ouse. H e wanted to know how many troops woul d be neetl ed to in\"adl;!
Japan, how Illany U.S. cas ualti es would be expected in tll e in vasion , an d
whet he r Soviet entr y int o the war would be ad visable to end the war.
Taken aback by the c;lsualty fi gures (killed and wounded ) g iven by Army
hi ef of St;ltT Geo rge Ma rshall (63,000 out of 190,000 t roops) in t he
Ky us hu operation al one, the president approved onl y Operati on Ol ympic.
(the Ky ushu in vasion scheduled for November I) whil e postponi ng the
tl ecision on Operation Coronet, the invasion of the Kanto Pl ane (Ja pan's
central heartland, \-vhi ch includes Tokyo) in March [946. Alt hough Ad mi
r I'
ral Ernest J. King did not consider Soviet participat ion in the war ncces
sa ry, Ma rshall told the preside nt that the Ameri ca n in va.s ion of Jap:lI1 's
homeland, combined with Soviet entry into the \var, \voul d lead to Japa
ca pitubtion.
At this House conference, Stimson recommended that the
Unit ed St ates revise the unco nditi onal surrender de mand in such a way
that the moderate el ements within t he Japanese government wo ul d accept
surrender befor e the Ame.ri ca n in vas ion ofKyushu. John J. McCloy went
further than Stimson, recommending that the United States send the Japa
nese a stro ng communicati on demanding a full surrender wit h a provis()
t hat Japan would be abl e to c() ntinue to exi st as a nation a nd keep the em
pero r under a constitutional mona rchy. If the Japanese rejected such an of
fe r, t hen the United States should reveal that it possessed the atomir

Two alternati ves had thus been suggested to the pres ide nt: (I ) to wel
come So\i et entr y into the wa r a nd (2) to revi se the unconditional surren
der demand. Tr uman made no decision at that point, except fo r endorsing
I!! Operatio n O lympic. In the meantime, C hurchill from London, and Har
riman and Grew in 0 11 separate occas ions urged Truman to
hasten t he conve ning ofthe Big Three meeting to fores tall fur ther Soviet
expansion in E urope. Each time, Truman demurred , citing his ob
ligati ons to Congress fo r budget but tllC real reason \,vas mat he
wanted to postpone the Potsda m Conference unti l the U nited States tested
the fir st atomic bomb.
W ER E THE AT OM I C B O MBI NGS J UST I F I E D ? 103
Stalin's Dilemma
Stalin also faced a dil emma. In April, the Sovi et government notified the
J:lpanese government that it d id not intend to renew the Soviet-Japanese
Neutrality Pact. The pact , sig ned in April 1941 , sti pulated that lIlIl ess one
party notLfied the other of its intenti on not to renew one year pri or to it s
expiration, the pact would automati cally be rene\oved fo r another fi ve
vcars. Thus despite the fact that the Soviets renounced the pac t in April
'1945, it should ha ve been in fo rce until April 1946. Stalin and t he So\'i et
go\ernment took it fo r g ranted t hat their planned attack on the Ja panese
forces in Manchuria in th e summer of [945 would have to be launched in
\'iolation of the neutrality pac t. Yet if they intended to \'iolate the pact any
way. why did the y renounce it in April, taking the ri sk of si g naling to me
Japanese that they mi ght join the Alli es in the war again st Japan ?
There arc two possible reas() ns. F irst, by renouncing t he pact, t he Sov iet
government dimini shed the impact of the political, if not legal , implica
tions of violating it, thus avoid ing the inevitabl e compa ri son with the Ger
man violation of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggr essio n Pac t. In fact, a ft er the
war. the Sovi et g()ve rnment and Soviet historians consi stent! y took the po
sition that the pact lost it s for ce immediately when renounced.
But if no one but the Japanese cared abollt the violation of the pact and
if the \Vest ern allies and the C hinese would not have comidered Sovi et en
try into the a violati on of the pact-and t hey d id not- why d id the
Soviets bother to renOLll1Ce it r It is possibl e to inter pret thi s as a signal to
the United States that the Sovi et Uni on intended to honor the commit
ment it had made at Yalta to enter the war against Japan. It appea rs that
Stalin considered the Soviet commitment to enter th e war against Japan to
be important leverage with the U nited States. It was all t he more impor
tant for Stalin to reaffi r m t hi s commitment when conAi ct bet ween the
United States and the Soviet Uni on over Poland and Eastern Europe
emerged as a major discord in the G rand AllianceY
\;evertheless, the renunciation of t he neutrality pac t was a ri sky move.
It Was a clea r signal to the Japanese t hat the Soviet Uni on would vcry
likely join the \Vestern Alli es in the wa r against Japan. This mi ght eve n
prompt the Japanese to launch a preem pt ive attack on the Soviet forces in
the Far East befo re preparati ons for wa r were completed . To avoid thi s,
Stalin placed the Far Eastern a rmy on alert status just in case, while the
III
iii Iii
I:
104 TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA
commissar of foreign affairs, Viacheslav Molotov, told the Japanese that
,
despite the Soviet renunciation, the pact itself was in force until it ful fi lled
its term in April 1946. The Japanese, who desperatel y wanted Soviet neu_
trality, gullibly accepted this explanation, and this information was accu_
ratdy conveyed to Stalin by the Soviet ambassador, Iakov Malik.
while, as Stalin later explained, "lulling the Japanese to sleep," Stalin be
gan frantically transporting troops and equipment from Europe to the F;1[
East. This policy, hovveve r, left one major probl em for Stalin and th e So
viet governmmt. Although it satisfied the tactical problem of deceiving
the Japanese into believing that the Soviet Union was to maintain neutral
ity, it created the strategic probl em of how to justify the war against Japan
in violation of the neutrality pact.
In this respect , the Harry Hopkins-Stalin meeting from May 2() to June
6 had major significance. iii Tn the conve rsati ons with the question
about the war in Asia at the thi rd meeting on May 28, Hopkins pl edged
th,l[ th e question of issuing an ultimatum to Japan would be placed on the
agenda of the forthcoming Potsdam Conference. The ultimatum, in
which the Soviet Union would be invited to join, would justify the \'ioLt
tion because the commitment to the Allies would supersede its commi t
ment to the neutrality pact, which the Soviet government had already
renounced. This was simi lar to the logic used by Japan's for eign minister
Matsuoka Yosuke, who, although instrumental in negotiating the neutral
ity pact, had a rgued, after the German attack on the Soviet Union on June
22, ICJ41, that Japan should :lttack the Sm'iet Union in violat ion of the pact
it had just concluded on the grounds that Japan's commitment to the Tri
partite Pact should supersede its commitment to the neutrality pact. The
only difference was that l\latsuoka's argument did not prevail in 1941,
while Stalin did attack Japan in 1945.
Two additional matters of significance were brought up at the H opkim
Stalin meetings. First, Stalin reaffirmed the SO\' iet commitment to enter
the war against Japan and told Hopkins that preparations would be com
pleted by August 8. Although Stalin's statement should not be taken as a
pl ulgc to launch an attack precisely on August 8, as is often asserted. it is
important to note that Stalin continued the policy to maintain the Yalta
framework . His pledge to enter the war against Japan was mea nt to in
duce the U.S. government's continued adherence to the Yalta Agreement.
Second, he supported the U.S. policy to impose unconditional surre..nder
on Japan. To Stalin the destruction of the emperor system would be necC'
WERE THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS JUSTI F IED? 105
s;lry to eradicate the sou rces of Japanese militarism, but also, so long as the
Japanese would resist unconditional surrender, it would serve as a conven
ient pretext to prolong the war long enough for the Soviet Union to join it."
Japan's Dilemma
Bv June, Japan's policy makers came to the conclusion that the W,\[ was
l;st and that now it was time to con template how to end it. The army high
command took the position that the best way to end the war was to wage
a last decisive battle: against the expected American attack in Kyushu
(Kctsu-Go Operation) to secure surrender terms favorabl e for Japan. In
contrast, the peace party considered it necessary to terminate the war
as quickly as possible if Japan were to maintain its national sovereignty
and ter ritOri al integrity without jeopardi zing the kokutai . The most impor
tant change in June in the relations between the peace party and the war
party was the emperor's change of mind from "the one- Iast-battle-before
surrender position" advocated by the war party to "immed iate peace."' ?
It is important to stress two factors in Japan's policy to seek termination
of the war. First, despite differences, both parties agreed on one thing: the
minimal condition for su rrender should be the preservation of the kokutai.
Without it, they were prepared to conti nue the war to the bitte r end. But
oddly, the policy makers never clearly defined what specitlc va lues consti
tuted the kokutai. Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda Soemu later testified,
"Strangely enough, in spite of the fact that numerous arguments on the
eve of surrender took place, concerning the question of 'safeguarding the
National Polity' Ikol(utai l ... , those arguments never included any disCllS
sion as to what was the meaning of the term 'National Polity' or what sort
of conditions were involved in the word 'safeguarding.' ,,1\
Within a small circle around Rear Admiral Takagi Sokichi , who served
as the brain of the peace party, however, two ingredients of this concept
the emperor's political role and the presen'arion of the imperial house
Were clearly delineated. Takagi himself was prepared to jettison the first to
preserve the second as the minimum condition for surrender. This idea
Was abo shared by the high officials within the Foreign Ministry as well as
the former prime minister Konoe Fumimaro. There existed, therefore, a
Very important common ground between the Japanese peace party and
those within the U.S. government who advocated the redefinition of un
conditionalsurrendcr.' 4
107 106 T S U YOS H I HASEG AWA WER E TH E AT OM I C B OMBINGS J US TIFIE D?
Second, despite the diffe rences hetween the wa r pa rty and the pe:\Ce
pa rt y, they agreed on the importance of keeping the Soviet Union neutral,
al beit for diffe rent reasons. For the wa r part y, Soviet neutrality was tb
e
sine qua non without whi ch the entire Ketsu-Go Operati on would be im_
possible. For the peace pa rt y, Soviet mediati on provided the onl y hope to
end the wa r without accepting unconditional surrender, :lnd, as far as tht:
Foreign Ministry and Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori were concerne .. ,
they wi shed to use Mosco,v as a conduit to the Alli es.
l
)
As the military situati on went fr om had to worse, the Soviet Union oc
cupied a mo re and more important posit ion in Japan's foreign and military
poli cy. In June the Foreign Minist ry sent fo rme r prime min iste r Hirota
Koki to Soviet ambassador lakov Malik to explore the poss ibili ty of rene
goti ating the neutrality pact or even elevating Soviet-Ja panese to
a hi gher level of cooperati on. ""/ hile the Japanese wasted precious time
in these futil e negotiati ons, the Soviets expl oited the Japanese
to make sec ret preparati ons for the war against Japan. \Vhen the Hirot a
negotiations fa il ed, the Japanese government , with the tacit appro\';] 1
of the ;l rmy minister and the army chi ef of staff, decided to Sm' iet me
d inti on to end the lI':l r, sendi ng Prince Konoe to as the emperor's
specinl en voy. On July 12, five days before the Potsdam Conference began,
Togo sent a telegram instr uct ing Ambassador Sato Naot<1 ke in j"loscov. ll>
request that the Soviet gO\'ernment mediate fo r the te rmination of the war
and receive Prince Konoe as the empe ror's specia l envoy fo r this pur poSL
Togo wa rned, however, that as long as the Alli es ad hered to uncond itional
surrender, Japan had no choice but to fight the W:H to the bitter endY' T his
telegmm was intercepted by the Ame ri can code-breaking operati on call ed
Magic, and buoyed the hopes of"Stimson, and Forres tal that the
modifi cation of the terms would hasten Japan 's surrende r.
The Potsdam Conference
The Potsdam Conference of the Bi g Three (Truman, Stalin, and
Churchill - late r replaced by Clement Att Ice) was a decisi ve turni ng point
fo r the outcome of the Pacifi c Wa r. The success ful detonati on of t he
atomic bomb in New Mexico on Ju ly 1 () , nne day hefore the opening"[ t he
confe rence, changed the dynami cs of U.S.-Sol'iet rel ations with regard In
the war against Japa n. The atomi c homb provided Truman with the an
swer to the two dil emmas he had bced. First, it gave him the possibili ty oj
ending the wa r before the Soviets entered it. Second, it gave him the pos
sibility of sec uring Japa n's defeat wit hout compromi sing the principle of
d
, I .] 17
uneon \tIona su rren< er.
On Jul y 2, St imson had already given T ruman a d raft proposa l fo r a
joint ultimatum to be issued to Japa n at the Potsdam Confe rence. T hi s
draft contained two crucial points. F irst, it expected the Soviet Uni on to
join the ultimarum. In fact , the Ope rati on Di visi on (OPD) of the U.s.
Army General Staff, whi ch was most responsibl e for writing thi s dra ft for
Stimson, considered that the ultimatum would best be timed to coincide
with Soviet pa rti cipation in the wa r. T he seeond important point of Sti rn
son's draft was that it contained the provi sion in Pa ragra ph 12 that all owed
the Japanese to maintai n "a constiruti on<l l monarch y under the prese nt dy
nasty." In fact, as far as Stimson and the OPD were concerned, thi s provi
sion was the linchpin of the ultimatum, since they bel ieved that thi s
promise would induce the modera te elements in Japan to accept su rrend er
before the scheduled U.S. invasion of the Japanese homela nd. On Jul y 13,
the OPD sent the follovving memo to the Joint Chi efs of Sta ff:
The prima ry intention in issuing the procl amati on is to induce JJ pa n's surn;n
J er and thus a\'oiJ the heavy casualt ies implied in a fi ght to the fi ni sh. It is al
most uni versall y accepted that the basic point on whi ch Jceepta ncc of surrende r
terms will hinge li es in the question of the disposition of the E mperor a nd hi s
dynasty. The refore, from the military point () f vicw it seems necessary to state
unequi vocall y what we intended to do with rega rd to the
Before the final Potsdam Proclam:l ti on was issued on Jul y 26, however,
Truman and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes made twO revisions to
Stimson's draft. First, they rejected Soviet participati on in the join t ulti
matum. In whil e they consulted the Briti sh on the contents of the
Potsdam Proclamation, they compl etel y excluded the Soviet del egation
from any deliberation on the joint ultimatum. Second, they dropped the
passage that allowed the Japanese to mainwin the constitut ional monar
chy. Thus, the final PotSdam Proclamation, signed by Truman, C hurchill ,
and Chiang Kai -she.k, but not by Stalin, failed to include an y clarifi cati ons
about the fat e of the emperor and the imperial houseY)
On his first meeting with Truman on Jul y 17, Stalin had already
demonstrat ed Soviet re:l d incss to cooperate with tbe \ Vestern All ies hy
reaffirming the colllmi t ment to ente r the wa r against Japan by the middle
II
108 TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA
of August, and on the following day he even revealed to Truman that the
Japanese government had requested Soviet mediat ion to end the war,
which he said he would ignore "to lull the Japanese to sleep." What Stalir)
tried to impress upon Truman as a goodwill gestu re was meant to secure
an American invitation to append signature to the joint ultima_
tum, which would se rve as the justification to violate the neut rality pact.
Did Truman welcome pledge to join the wa r' Those who reject
the vie\Y that the Soviet factor played a role in Truman's decisi on to drop
the atomic bomb refer to Truman's own writings as evidence. TrumJ n
wrote in his diary: "He [Stalin ['11 be in the Japan War on August) 5th. F ini
Japs when that comes about." He also vvrote in his memoirs: "There were
many reasons for my going to Potsdam, but the most urgent, to my mi nd,
was to get from Stalin a personal reaffirmation of Russia's entry into the
war against Japan, a matt er which our military chiefs were most anxious
to clinch. This I was able to get from Stalin in the very hrst days of the con
ference." After the first day of the conference, he wrote to hi s wi fe, Bess:
"Stalin goes to war August 15th with no strings on it. T'I1 say that we'll end
the wa r a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won't be killed. That
is the important thing."21l
Despite Truman's words, there is a substantial body of evidence that
Truman and Byrnes decided to drop the atomic bombs to end the wa r bc
fore Soviet entry. As ea rly as July 17, Byrnes told Stimson that he a nd Tru
man had worked out a "ti metable. ":!1 After the war, Byrnes told hi storian
He rbert Feis: "having reached the conclusion that it would be a d isaster
for the United States and China if the Soviet Union ent ered the Pacific
War. This led to the thought that it would be just as wel l, if not better, if
Stal in were not too fully a ware of the potentialities of the :ltomic bomb, for
ot herwi se he might hasten Sovi et entry into the Forrestal wrote:
"Byrnes said he was anxious to get the Japancse affair over with before t ht:
Russians got in with particular reference to Daircn and Port Arthur.""<
Truman, too, indicated the use of the atomic bombs as a means to end
the war before the Soviets entered it. Stimson wrote in the (!i;uy his
meeting with Truman on July 23:
He [Truman[ tolclmc that he had the warning message \\'hi ch we prcpa red on
hi s desk, and had OIcceptcd our Inost rece nt change in it, and that be proposed
to shoot it out as soon a.s he heard the ddi nitc day of' thc operation Ii. e., drop
ping the atomic bombs[. "Ve had '1 bri ef discussion ahollt Stalin's rece nt
WERE THE ATOMIC BOMB INGS JUSTIFIED? 109
and he confirmed what 1 have heard. Rut he told me that the United
States was standing firm and he was appa n:ntly relying grea tl y upc)n the infor
mation as to S- J Ithe atomic bomb projccrl. 24
The following day, when Stimson brought the telegram from his assistant,
George L. Harrison, about the timing of the atomic bomb deployment, the
secretary of war noted in his diary, "I then showed him the telegram which
had come last evening from Harrison giving the dates of the operations.
He said that was just what he wanted, that he was h.1 ghly delighted and
that it gave him his cue for his wa rning lthe Potsdam Proclamati on [. "25
These passages demonstrate that not only Byrnes but also Truman
connected the timing of the Potsdam Proclamation and the timing of
the atomic bomb, with the desire to prevent what they saw as Soviet
expanSioni sm.
Stalin's suspicion about the American motivation was first piqued by a
half-truth that Truman told him about the atomic bomb, describing it
nonchalantly as a "weapon of enormous destructive capacity" without
specifically identifying it as the atomic bomb. Stalin knew then exactly
what Truman was talking about, although the Soviet leader may not have
expected that the United States would use the weapon so soon.
But the issuance of the joint ultimatum, without Stalin's signature and
without any consultation with the Soviet delegation in violation of what
Hopkins had promised in May, was a greater shock to Stalin. On July 26,
Molotov asked Byrnes to delay the issuance of the ultimatum, but Byrnes
rejected this request on the grounds that the procl amation had already been
released to the press. Three days later, Stalin requested through Molotov
that the United States, Britain, and China invite the Sovi et government to
join the joint ultimatum. Truman fl atl y rcf'used. StalLn now realized that
Truman was determined to secure Japan's surrender without the Soviet
Union, The race between Truman and Stalin-and the race between the
atomic bomb and tbe Soviet entry into the war- began in earnest.
When the Potsdam Proclamation was issued, the Japanese government
immediately noticed two things. First, it said nothing about tbe fate of the
emperor and the imperial instituti on. Second, Stalin did not sign it. The
Japanese decided to "ignore" it for the time being, while continuing to
seek Moscow's mediation for endi ng the war. Stalin's failure to get himself
invited to sign the joint ultimatum served to prolong the war, thus ironi
cally working in hi s favor. 2!,
110 TSUY O SHI HASEGAWA
Hiroshima and Soviet Entry into the War
On July 16, one day before the Potsdam Confe rence began, Stal in ask
Yiarsh31 Aleksa nd r Vasil evskii, commande r ()f the Fo r Eastern Front, if it
would he possihl e to move up the date of the Sovi et offensi ve against the
Japanese forces in Manchllria by ten days to August 1. Vasilevskii replied
that "the concentration of the troops and the transportation of essential
war supplies would not allow" a change in the date of attac k. The large_
scal e Manchurian operation, i.n an area four times as la rge as France, had
been carefully prepared, and it was suppc.lsed to be a surprise attack init i
ated simultaneously on all front s. Vas il e\' skii's reluctance to compl y with
Stalin 's request was unoerst.lnci.lbl e, and Stalin. fClr the ti.me being. re
spected the view of hi s commander in chief.
On August 3, however, Vasil evskii proposed to hast en the ,mack by one
or two days befor e the des ignated date of August 1J. It is possibl e to spec
ulate, although no documentary evidence exists to prO\'e it , that thi s sug
gestion WaS prompted by Stalin's request, which he must have made from
Potsdam. On the day that Truman rej ected Stalin's request to Si b'll the
Potsdam Proclamation, Stalin reorganized the Far Eastern front and fo r
mally appointed Vasilevskii (not pseudonym Vasil 'ev until then) as Its
commander. But the Stavka (Sovi et general headqua rte rs) ruled it unwise
to change the date of attack so late in the game when all were carefu ll y
prepared to synchronize the attacks "on the same time on the same day on
all three fronts."27
It was the United States that made the first successful move. On August
0, the B-29 bomber the Enola Gay dropped the atomi c bomb on H i
roshima. Truman. \vho received the news on the USS Aug uJta off New
foundland on his way back to the United States, was overjoyed. H a\ ing ;l
hard t.ime containing his excitement, he juhilantly declared, "This is the
greatest thing in history." In contrast, Stalin, who returned to Moscow on
August '5 to resume hi s fr antic activiti es, retreated from the Kremli n. pre
sumahl y depressed by the news. Stalin must have thought that he had lost
the race, con vinced that the atomic homb would promptly force Ja pl1l to
surrender before the Soviets ent ered the war.
But tbe atomic hombing of Hiroshima did not change Japan's poli cy of
seeking Moscow's mediation, although it certainly injt:cted a sense of ur
gency. On August 7, Togo se nt a telegram to Sato i.n Moscow, instr ucti ng
him to seek an appointment \.vith Molotov as quickl y possihl e to find out
1 1 1
WERE THE ATOMIC BOMB I NGS JUSTIFI E D ?
MoSCO
W
'
s
ans\;ver to Japan's pending request to receive Prince Konoe. Sate>
the commissariat of for eign affairs on that day to make an ap
intlll
ent
with Molotov. This was the first reaction to the outside world
the: Japanese government to the atomi c bombing on Hiroshima.
. This request must have made Stalin reali ze that Japan had not yet surren
dered. He reacted He immediately ordered the military to advance
the date of atwck by forty -eight hours, to midnight of August 9, Far Eastern
time (0 l'.:'vt. of August 8, l"Ioscow time). i'vlolotov finally agreed to meet Saw
and asked the Japanese ambassador to come to his office at '5 1'.1\ 1. on August
8. When this news reached Japan, all policy makers' attenti on was focused
on hoW Molotov would respond to Japan's request for medi ation.
As soon as Sato entered his offi ce at the designated time, Mol otov im
mediately read the Soviet decl aration of war against Japan. The declara
tion swted that hecause Japan rejected the Potsdam Proclamation (it di d
not), which the Alli es had asked the Sovi et government to join (they had
not). the Soviet government woule! find itself in a st.lte of war with Japan
liS of midnight on August 9. Within one hour after Sato received the dec
laration of war, Soviet tanks ;)nd airplanes crossed the Manchurian border.
Stalin managed to join the war in the nick of time. Truman and Byrnes
were disappoint ed by this ne ws.
2M
In contrast to the atomic bomhing on H iroshima, the Soviet entry into
the war prompted Japanese policy makers into immediate ncti on. The
Supreme \\Tar Coun('il or the Bi.g Six meeting, consisting of Prime Min
ister Suzuki Kantaro, Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori, Ar my Minister
Anami Korechika, Na vy Minister Yonai M itsumasa, Army Chi ef of Staff
Umezu Yoshijiro, and Navy Chi efofStaffToyoda Soemu, whi ch had not
been held for two days even after the atomi c hombi.ng of Hiroshima, was
immediately summoned on the morning of August 9. Onl y afte r the Sovi
ets entered tbe war did the Japanese gO\'ernment , for the fir st time, con
front the question of whether it should te rm inate the war on the
conditions stipulated by the Potsdam Proclamation. But if the atomi c
bombing of Hiroshima did not immediatel y lead to Japan's decision to
surrender, neitber did the Sovi er entry into the ,.var. The Big Si x were
hopel essly divided. Only Togo ad vocated acceptance of the Potsdam
terms, with one condition: preservation of the imperial house. But Army
Minister Anami , Army Chi ef of Staff Umezu, and Navy Chief of Staff
Toyoda insisted on attaching three additional conditi ons with regard to
War crimes trials, occupati on, and disarm3ment.
113 112 TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA
It was during the intense debate on the surrender terms among the
Japanese policy makers that for the fir st time they confronted the iSSUt; of
how to defin e the /{Okutai. During the Big Six meeting, Togo attempteJ to
define it as prese rvation of the imperial house. When Prime Mini ster
Suzuki Ka ntaro reported in the ea rly afternoon of August 9 to P ri vy Seal
Marquis Kido Koichi, the emperor's trusted adviser, abollt the stal emate of
the Big Six meeting, he told Kido that the Big Six ma jnriry were in CWor
of four conditions to terminate the war. Although this pos ition was tan ta_
mount to rejecting the Pot sdam terms, Kido at first accepted it, indicating
strongly that Hirohitn also shared thi s view. Pressured by Prince Koone,
former foreign minister Shi gemitsu Prince Takarnatsu, H iro
hito's younger brother, and Takagi Sokichi 's group. Kido finally changed
hi s view :lnd had an important meet ing with the emperor. It was then that
the scena ri o for the "emperor 's sacred decisi on"-the imposition of the
emperor's decisi on to surrender on the military and the nation-was
hatched.
Although there is no record of what Hirohito and Kido talked about ar
this unusually long meet ing that afternoon, it is possible to that
the emperor resisted the narrow definit ion of the as prese r\' ati on of
the imperial house and expanded it to include the emperor's politi cal rule
as defined by the Meiji Constitution. When the Big Six and their seen:
taries were summoned to the imperial conference held from 11:50 P,M. on
\ugust 9 to 2:30 A .M. on August 10, the participants saw on the table a
printecl copy of Togo's proposal to accept the terms with one con
dition, hut this condition was altered to "preservation of the status of [he
emperor within the national laws."
This condition changed again, Jue to the inte rvention of Baron Hi
ranuma Kiichiro, chairman of the Pri vy Council and aD ultranati onali st.
Hiranuma argued that the ko/{utai was the national essence that t ran
scended the national law; hence the condition to be attached for acceptance
of the Potsdam terms shoul d be changed to: "on the understandi ng t bat
the Allied Proclamation would not comprise any demand which would
prejudice the prerogati ves of His tvlaj esty as a Sovereign Ruler. " No one,
including the emperor challenged the prevailing orthodoxy pre
sented by Hiranuma, but this change made it impossibl e for the Unitcd
States to accept Japan's reply. At the end of the conference Hirohito
a nd endorsed Togo's proposal with one condition as amended by Hi
ranum,\. The first "sacred clecision" was made? )
WERE THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS JU S TI F IED ?
The Byrnes Note and the Emperor's Second Intervention
When Japan's conditional acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation was
relayed to Washington, the Truman cabinet was divided on whether the
U.S. government should accept it. Although Stimson, Leahy, and Forres
wi favored acceptance, Byrnes opposed it.
3o
Truman supported Byrnes,
;lnd the Secretary of State composed the Byrnes N ote, which stipulated
,hat the emperor and the Japanese government would he subject to the
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers and that the ultimate form of
government would be determined by the freely expressed will of the Japa
nese people.
The Byrnes Note pro\'oked a counteratt,lck by Japan's war party and
nearly wrecked its surrender decision. Met with Anami's and Hiranuma's
arguments that the Byrnes Note was tantamount to the rejection of the
kok
tltai
, Suzuki wavered . In the cabinet meeting on Aug ust 12, Togo was
the only one who stood firm in favor of accepting the Byrnes Note, while
his important ally Navy Minister Yonai k ept silent. Hard-line staff officers
in the Army General Staff began plotting a coup, with Army Minister
Anami showing sympathy with the plotters. Togo himself was contem
plating resignati on. Japan's decision to surrender .vas in g rave danger of
being overturned.
Two factors intervened to turn the tide toward surrender. First, there
was a concerted effort by the second-ti er players within the peace party
Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu Hisatsune, Deputy Foreign tv1inister iVIat
sumoto Shun' ichi, and Takagi Sokichi's circl e of advisers-to regroup the
peace party leaders and to pressure their supe riors into arrangin)!; a second
imperial conference. Second, Hirohito, assisted by Kido, asserted more ac
tive leadership for accepting the Byrnes N ote. He convened the imperial
household conference to attain unanimity among the imperial family for
his decision, preventing any members of the imperial fami ly from collud
ing with radical army office rs to derail the surrender. Hirohito and Kido
also heavily leaned on wavering Suzuki to stand firm to support the em
peror's decision.
The second imperial conference was held on the morning of August 14,
where Hirohito spoke in favor of unconditionally accepti ng the Byrnes
r\Otc. The army high command, unde r Army Chief of Staff Umezu,
qUickly unified the army to support the emperor's decision, thus isol ating
the coup plotters and Army Mi nister Anami. The coup engineered by the
114 115 T SUYOSHI HA S E GAW A WERE THE ATO MI C BO M BIN GS J US TI F IED ?
staff offi cers in the General Staff managed to occupy the Imperi<:t l
Pal ace, virtuall y holdlng the emperor as a hostage, but wi th(lut the crucial
support of the army hi gh command it fi zzled out. At noon on August IS,
Hi rohito hroadcast the imperi al rescript on the terminati on of the Wa r.
The Pacifi c \Var was nea rl y over, but not compl etel y, ll
Truman, Stalin, and the Kurils
When Truma n received the emperor's unconditi onal accepta nce of the
Byrnes 1\'ote, he said, "T he guns a rc sil enced ," But thi s statement was pre
matu re, because the emperor 's acceptance of surrender prompted Slalm to
speed up the occ upat ion of Manchuria, the northern half of Korea, south
ern Sakhalin, and, more important, to launch the Kuril - Hokkaido opera
ti on. Stalin's obj ecti ve was to compl ete the physical occupation of the
territories promised by the Yalta Agreement , and if possibl e beyond, bt
fClrC J'lpan formally si gned the surrender document s. He accomplished al
most all his obj ect iv es by ruthlcssl y combining military operati ons wirh
skillful dipl omati c maneuvers. Truman acceded to Stalin's demand to oc
cupy the entire- Kuril s, includ ing Shikotan a.nd the Habolll ai g roups that
shoul d have belonged to the Ameri Gl n occupation zone, bu t he adama ntly
rejected Stalin's demands to transform the Supreme Commandership in
Japa n into a joint comma ndershi p headed by MacArthur and
to occupy the northern half of Hokkaido, to crea te a So\'iet occupation
zone in Tokyo.
fierce ma neuvering bet ween the United States and the Soviet
Union o\'er Dair en, Korea, and especially the Kuril s and Hokkai do-a fi
nal act in the dfHma of the ending of the Pacifi c \\Tar, an iss ue th'lt has
largel y been ignored by histori ans-must be pl aced in the COntext of [he
" race" between the Uni ted States and the Soviet Union that preceded it
3
'
The Impact of the Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Entry on Japan 's
Decision to Surrender
'\ lthough chall enged by re vi sioni st hi storians, the sta nda rd Ameri can in
terpretation, suppor ted by the widest of publi c opini on, has been
that the atomic bomhings of Hi roshima and Nagasa ki ended the wa f. This
is simpl y a myth that has littl e rela t.ionshi p to hi stori cal fac ts.
ll
, .
, I
Even after the atomi c attack on H iros hima on August 6, the Japa nese
"' rnment cont inued to seck t he termination of the wa r th rough Moscow's
,
. .
olcdiation, that I S to say, the gove rnment and the em pero r cont mued to ad
here to the policy that they had pu rsued since JUIl e and even after the Pots
darn Proclamation, Nor is there any ev idence to ind ica te tha t the cabinet
rnade a decisi on to accept the Potsdam Proclamation immediatel y afte r the
atomic bomb was dropped on I"';[iroshima, contrary to the contention ad
"anced by some his tori ans. H On August 7, Togo sent an urgent telegram
[0 SaW instructing him to meet Molotov immedi atel y to fi nd out Moscow's
answer to Japan's pending request for mediation to end the wa r.
3
> Ha
sun
Ul11a
Shi geru, the emperor's chi ef aide de camp, who accompani ed the
emperor like his shadow wherever he went, testifi ed that the atomi c bomb
on Hiroshima di d not inAue nce the emperor's view.\('
In contrast, the Soviet in vasion of Manchuri a on August 9 was a great
shock to Japanese policy m akers. It represented the bank ruptcy of the pol
icy to seek an end to the war through Moscow's mediati on, and it punc
tured a gaping bole in the Ketsu-go strategy that the Japanese milita ry had
hoped to impl ement in anti cipa ti on of the Ameri ca n in vasion of Kyusbu.
Only after the Soviet invas ion did the Japanese gove rnment begin di s
cussing seriously the possibility of accepting the Potsdam Procl amati on.
The Supreme War Council, whi ch was not convened fo r two da ys afte r
the atomi c bombing of Hi roshima, was summoned hour s after Soviet
tanks crossed the Manchuri an border.
To be sure, the Soviet ent ry in to the war did not provide a k nockout
punch for Japan's sur re nder either. The Supreme 'vVar Council was hope
lessly divided on the conditi ons to be attac hed for the acce ptance of th e
Potsdam terms , although the Big Six for the first time decided to acce pt
the terminat ion of the war on the basis of t he P otsdam Proclamation. Nev
erthel ess, it was the Sovi et ent r y, not t he atomi c bomb on H iros hi ma, that
immediately led the Big Si x to accept the Potsdam P rocb mat ion, albeit
conditionall y. The news of t he atomic bombing on l\: agasaki reacbed
Tokyo late on the morning of August 9 but had little inAuence on the out
Come of the di scussi on :.H t he Supreme War Council Y
Some historia ns a rgue that because the militar y anti cipated Soviet entry
into the war, while the atomi c bombs were totall y unexpected, the atomic
bombings were more of a This a rgument Glnnot be seri ously C.l1
tertained. Deputy A rmy Chi ef of Staff Kawabe Torashiro's dia ry entri es
117
116 TSUY OS HI HASEGAWA
on August (i and August 9 make it cl eu that he was more shocked by the
Sovi et entry into the war than by the atomic bombing on Hiroshi ma, al
though his postwar statement to the GHQ interrogators gives equ<ll
weight to both. Ari sue Seizo, chi ef of the intelligence divi sion of the gen
eral staff, told the GHQ interrogators: "The Soviet participation in the
war had the most direct impact on Japan's decision to surrender." Ma jor
General Amano Masakazu, chief of the operations department, remarked
that although the a rmy thought tbe Soviet entry was likel y in early aut umn,
it had no way of resisting it if it happened. Na vy chief of Staff Toyoda tes
tifi ed: "I believe the Russian parti cipation in the war against Japan ra ther
than the atomic bombs did more to hasten the surrender."39
The Soviet entry into the war de rail ed the Ketsu-go strategy, for \\ hich
neutrality of the Soviet Union was a sine qua non. The argument ad
vanced by Anami, Umezu, and Kawabe for the last-ditcb defense sud
denly lost conviction. Both Anami and Kawabe ca me to rely on t he
Yamato spirit without any strategic rationale to insi st on continuing the
war, while Umezu, and soon Kawabe, too, qui etly res igned themsel ves to
accepting the emperor's "sacred decision" to end the war.
Finally, the emperor and his advise rs feared that Soviet power might
eve nt ually extend to Japan itself unless tbe war we re stopped immediately.
Prime Minister Suzuki stated on Augus t 13: "If we miss today, the Soviet
Union would take not only Manchuria, Korea, rand I Ka rafuto lSakhalin
Islandl, but also Hokkaido. This would destroy the foundation of Japan.
\Ve must end the war when we can deal with the United States."4U If So
vi et i nAucnce were to extend to the Allied occupation poli cy after Japa n's
defeat, the preservation ofthe monarchy could not be guaranteed . T his is
the reason why the emperor and his ad visers decided ro gambl e on rhc
Americans, whose Potsdam terms left open the possi bilit y of preservi ng
the monarchy.
Paths Not Chosen
American planners assumed that kill ing a massive number of civili ans and
destroying cities would shock Japan into accepting surrender, as in today's
strategy of "shock and awe." This strat egy failed because it was IXlsed on a
false assumption . The Japanese leaders did not ca re about civilians: in fact.
they were more than willing to sacrifice them to preserve what they cher-
WERE THE A TO M IC B O MBINGS JU S TIFIED ?
ished 1110st: the kokutai . That's \-vhy they pin ned their last hope on Mos
co
w
'
s
mediation.
If the United States reall y had been interested in saving the Liv es of
American soldiers, as the atomic bomb defenders argue, Truman and his
advisers could have sought Stalin's signature to the Potsdam Proclamation
and retained the passage that promised the Japanese the possibility of re
taining a constitutional monarchy, as Stimson had proposed in his original
draft. Had they done so, it is possibl e, though not certain, that Japan might
have surrendered befor e the atomic bombings and the Soviet entry int o
the war. It was a conscious politi cal choi ce on the part of Truman and
Byrnes [0 remove these provisions.
Diplomacy and the Soviet invasion, not the atomic bombs, ended the
war. As Michael S. Sherry puts it, "Hi roshima and Nagasaki mocked the
fantasy that they seemed to fulfill. For the atomic bomb, like bombing in
its other forms, had triumphed not as a weapon of shock that obviated a
protracted struggl e, but only as a climax to it."41
Incendiary Bombings and Atomic Bombings
Why did the Ameri ca n policy makers rush to usc the atomic bombs when
other alternatives were availabic ?
In his recent book, historian Michael D. Gordin makes the point that
until it was Llsed, the atomic bomb was perceived by policy makers as an
extension of conventional weapons. They believed that the only diffe rence
was that one atomic bomb could kill exponentially more people than one
incendiary bomb, a difference perceived as merely quantitative, not quali
tative. According to Gordin, that was the reason wby the decision to drop
the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was left to the military without
presidential authorization, exactly in the same manner that the decision to
Cury out air raids on Japanese citi es was left to the commander of the
Army Air Force. more specifi caLl y the commander of the Twenty-fir st
Bomber Command. Curtis LeMay, the architect of strategic bombings on
Japanese cities, st:Jted in his memoirs: "Nothing new about death, nothing
new about deaths caused militarily. \Ve scorched and boiled and baked to
death more people in Tokyo on that night of Ma rch 9- 10 than we nt up in
vapor at Hiroshima and Nagasaki."42
Some historians, the refore, a rgue that the United Stated did not cross a
119
118 TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA
moral divide when it used the atomic bombs, because it had alread\"
crossed it when it used incendiary bombs on citi es. But how did the
States, which was once horrifi ed hy the German st rategic un
Guernica and Rott erdam and the Japanese bombardment of T sianji
n
,
Nanjing, and Chongqing, come to acce pt own strategic hombi ngs on
In 1938 the State Department issued a statement condcmning incli
s
_
criminate aerial bomhing of civilians: "When the methods used in the con
duct of these hostilities take the f()[m of ruthless bombing of unfort ified
localities with the resultant slaughte r of civili an populations, a nd in partic
ular of women and children, public opinion in the United States regarcJs
such methods as barbarous." 'vVhen the war bega n in Europe in 1939,
ident Roosevelt said, "The ruthl ess bombing from the air of ciyili am in
unfortifi ed centers of population during the course of the host iliti es whic h
ha\'e raged in various quarters of the earth during the past few yeMs,
which has resulted in the maiming and in the dea th of thousands of de
fenseless men, women and children has s.ickcned the hea rts of every ci vi
li zed man and woman, and has profoundly shocked the consci ence of
human i ty. "4;
This moral high g round bega n to erode when the Japanese attacked
Pearl Harbor. "The shock of Pea rl Harbor did nOt abruptl y sweep away
moral scruples against annihilation," Sherry argues, howe\er. "What hap
pened instead was a gradual descent into the hell of all-out air wa r, a de
scent made so incrementally that it s flames <lnd shadows were onl y dimly
discerned.",H It was Pres ident Roosevelt himself who first sancti oned a ll
all -out assault on enemy cities by allowing the Army Ai r Force to carry out
1
the Doolittle air raid on Tokyo in 1942. Japanese savagery on battl efi elds
and in trea tment of POWs helped the Americans overcome moral doubts
about destroying cities.
45
Soon civilian deaths in incendiary bombi ngs
were not collateral damage, hut rather civilians became the pr ima ry ta r
gets. In February IY44, when Henr y H , (" Hap") Arnold, commander oi
the Army Air Force, recommended to Roosevelt a strategic bombi ng cam
paign against Japanese cities, creating "uncontrollahle conflagrations," he
added almost as an afterthought that the "urban areas are profitable ta r
gets, not only because they were greatly congested, but becll1se they con
tain numerous war industries. " Military targets became reduced to mer-dl'
secondary obj ectives.
4r
,
In 1942 Alexa nder Kiralfly, a contributor to the New Republic, argued:
WERE THE ATOMIC B OMB INGS J US TI F IED ?
"The natural enemy of every American man, woman and chil d is the
Japanese man, woman and child."47 After the Japanese gove rnment call ed
1I ,l\lmen from fifteen to sixty and all women from sevent een to forty for
the Fifth Air Force's intelli gence officer declared on Jul y 21, 1945,
"The entire population of Japan is a proper target ... T H ERE ARE :-.10
CIVILIANS IN JAPAN," a declaration that predicted U.S. bomhing dur
ing the Korean War, and massac res like those at My Lai and Srehrcni ca.
Yet there was a difference between the atrocities committed on the
ground and those done from the air. Alexande r de Seversky, the author
of Vietol"}1 through Ai,. Power (1942), explained: "The kind of large-scale
demolition which would be looked upon as horrifying vandalism when un
ckrtaken by soldiers on the ground can be passed off as a tech ni cal
preparation or 'softening' Ifor invasi on or occupation I when carried out by
aerial Soon even this rationale di sa ppeared, and annihilation
of cilies from by bombing, targeting civilians, became the primary obj ec
tive in itselL
Behind the justification for indiscriminate killing of Japanese civilians
lurked latent racism. General George Ke nney, commanding MacArthur's
air for ce, maintained that the Japanese were "a low order of humanity,"
prey to "his Mongol liking for looting, arson , massacre and rape." Ad miral
William Halsey, commander of the South Pacifi c Force, compa red the
Germans and the Japanese: "Germans are misl ed, but at least they react like
men. But the Japanese are like animals. ... You have to get used to thei r an
imal stubbornness and tenaci ty. They take to the jungle as if they had been
bred there, and like some beasts you neve r sec them until they arc dead."
Such an enemy had to be exterminated, and strategic bombing was the
ideal method. A navy representative to the first interdepartmental U.S.
government committee that was to study how Japan should be treated after
the war call ed for "the almost total elimi nation of the Japantse a, a race,"
because thi s "was a question of which race was to survive, and white civi
lization was at stake."4') Paul V, McN utt, chairman of the War Manpower
Commission, advocated " the exter mination of the Japanese in toto." The
president's son Elliott Roosevclt did not go as far 35 McN utt, but wanted to
bomb Japan until "half the Japanese civili an populati on" was destroyed.
The U.S. Marine monthly called for the exterminati on of Japa nese "pesti
lence," until "the breeding grounds around the Tokyo were completely
annihilated. " The weekly UI1ited Statej- News wrote in ea rly 1945 that the
120 T SU YOSHI HASEGAW A
proper question was not whether the Japanese should be exterminated, but
rather "whether, in order to win unconditional surrender, the All ies wi ll
have to kill Japan's milli ons to the last man."51J
These views that justified incendiary bombings on Japanese ci ties St:CIl1
to validate C;orclin's argument that there was no qualitative leap from the
use of incendiary bombings to atomic bomhings. The moral thres hold had
already heen crossed, and the usc ofatomic bombs was not considered ,ll1y_
thing nev. that had not been attempted by incendiary bombings. I\s
Sherry aptl)' observes, "The destructiveness of incendiary attacks invitt:J
attention to the bomh's psychologi cal effect and ohliterated any perceptible
moral difference hetween bomhing in its old and new forms.""
The continuity can he used in two ways. Some, like Sherry, Ron:i\d
Schaffer, and John Dower, condemned the incendiary bombings as [ht
major moral descent th.\[ prepared the way for the atomi c bombings. But
to others, the continuity between the two serves t() justify the atomic
attack. Incendiary bombings kill ed mor e people than the atomic bomb
ings; therefore, the argument gocs, the usc of atomic bomhs was not so
terrihle.
Uniqueness of Atomic Weapons
Gordin's a rgument that the atomi c bomb was considered merely;m exten
sion of incendiary bombs is an overstatcment. Scienti sts, milita ry strate
gists, and policy makers all knew the difference: the atomic bomb with irs
enormous destructive capacity-one bomb, one city-transformed W d r
far e. The atomi c bomb was intended to be used precisely for this new at
tribut e: to shock the enem), in a way that incendiari es could nol. More
than anybody else, Ma jor General Lesli e G roves, commander of the Man
hattan Proj ect, and Secretary of 'vVar Stimson clearly understood that the
atomic bomb was no conventional weapon.
In late April, G roves and Stimson presented the first itdl re port on the
atomi c bomb to President Truman. The report revea led: "Within four
months we shall in all probability have completed the mosr terr ible
weapon ever known in human one bomb of which could destroy a
whole city." I t furth er stated: "The world in its present state of moral <ld
vancement compared with its technical development would be event u,dl y
at the mercy of such a weapon. In other words, modern civili zati on migbt
be completely dest royed . " 51 N o one had fear ed that incendiar y bom bs
WERE TH E ATOMIC BOMB INGS JUSTIFIED?
121
,Id
destroy modern civilizati on. It is difficult to argue, therefore, that
\\ot .
Truman did not know the diffe rence between incendiary hombs an d the
rn
ic
bomb. In fact, he wanted to have the Big Three summit postponed
ato
until the first atomic bomb test. Stimson concurred: it was not yet the time
to talk about the atomic bomb with the Soviets, hefore the United States
;,cWally possessed a usahl e \-vea pon, which he called "the royal straight
Hush."" Two pairs could trump lesser hands, but they were ha rell y a "royal
straight flush."
The Target Committee was created within the Manhattan Proj ect on
April 27 and made the decision to usc two bombs. "The logic was,"
Robert S. Norris, a biographer of G roves, notes, "that the first bomb was
necessary to show what it could do, and the second would convince them
that the United States would produce hombs in quantity. This would give
them an excuse to surrender. "54 Needless to say, if the only purpose of us
ing the atomic bomhs was to destroy cities and kill civilians, as incendiary
bombs had heen doing, there was no need for demonstrati on, and the Tar
get Cqmmittee could ha ve chosen to drop them at night. Instead, it made
it clear that the atomic bomb should he dropped during the daytime, aim
ing at the target visually, not directed by radar.
On May 31, the Inter im Committee devoted part of its disc ussion to in
ternational control of the atomi c bomb. Stimson ope ned the meeting by
stressing the importance of the atomi c bomb as "a revoluti onary cha nge in
the relations of man to the universe." The new wea pon could be "a
Frankenstein whi ch would cat us up" or it might secure world peace.
55
Stimson therefore reminded the members of the committee that they
should discuss the impli cati on of the ne\\" "like statesmen and not
like merei)' soldiers anxi ous to win the war at an)' cost." The momentous
importance of the homb was clear to them all.
That was why the I nterim Committee discussed whether the United
States should give a warning or have a demonstrat ion bcfore using the
atomic homh against Japa n. In the end, it decided t hat the bomb should be
used withoLlt pri or warning. Because it was the gene ral practi ce toward
end of the wa.r to warn the Japanese before a fir ebombing, urging civil
laos to evacuate thc cities targeted, the decision to give no wa rnings for the
atomic bomb was meant to maximize the impact of surprise and the num
ber of deaths. Here again, the policy makers were cl ea r! y aware of the dif
ference between the atomi c bomb and incendiary bombs.
When the news of the successful test detonation at Alamogordo was
I
122 TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA
reported to Truman, the pres ident was "evidently very greatl y reinfor ced
over the message," Stimson noted. "The P resident was tremendousl)
pepped up by it and spoke to me of it again and agai n when I saw him. He
said it gave him an entirely new feel ing of conficlence."5f> In hi s
di ary, Truman marveled at t he destructive power of the atomi c bomh,
which "caused the complete disintegration of a steel tower 60 feet high,"
and "knocked over a steel tower 1, mil e away.", 7 Churchill was delighted
to hea r the "ea rth -s haking news." To the prime mjnister, the news meant
that the Allies would no longer need a costly homeland invasi on
Japan. Instead of man-b) -man and ya rd- by-ya rd combat, Churchi ll now
had "t he vision . .. of the end of the whole wa r in one or two violt nt
shocks. " Most important, Churchill concluded that with the possibility of
using the atomic bombs, the United States would no longer need Soviet
participation in the wa r. 's
On Jul y 23, General Carl Spaatz, commander of the Army Strategic Air
Forces, who had left Europe and stopped by \Vashington on the way to his
new command post in Guam, asked General Thomas Handy, Acting
Army Chief of Staff, for a written order to usc the atomi c bombs. Spaat z
recall ed: he gave " not ificati on that I would not drop an atomic bOIn b on
verbal orders-they had to be written-and thj s was accomplished. ""
H ad the atomic bomb been considered merel y an extension of incend iary
bombs, such an order would not have been necessa ry, because the use of in
cendiary bombs was left compl etel y at the di sc reti on of local commanders.
Clearly the atomi c bomb was perceived by scientists and policy makers
as a no\' el weapon with extraordinary destructive capacil y, a Cj LI8 1
itatively different from the incendiary bomb and one that had the pote n
tial of revoluti onizing future wa rfare. And it was precisel y because of this
quality, the policy makers hoped, that it would shock the Japa oese into . IC
cept ing surrender.
Denials and Self-Deceptions
In the ambiguous psychological realm between thinking of the atomic
bomb as the extension of incendi a ry bombs Jnd thi nking of the bomb as a
novel wea pon, policy makers went back and forth, moving inexorablv to
the ultimate use of the bomb, suspending necessa ry moral judgmen t .
Stimson's intervention in reversing the Target Committee's decision ro
sel ect Kyoto as the number-one ta rget is too wel l known to be described in
WERE T HE ATOM I C BOMB INGS JU STiFIED? 123
detail here. Needless to say, the Japa nese and the world should be thank
ful for his courageous effort in sa\' ing thi s magnifi cent a ncient cit y oft em-
Ies. shrines, gardens, and arti stic treasures. But even in hi s heroic act, an
of deception crept into Stimson's thinki ng. To save thi s ancient
city, he directl y appe;ded to Truman and argued that if the United States
dropped the atomic homb on Kyoto, the entire world would equate the ac
tion with Hitler's barbarism.t'll
On May 31 and June 1, the Interim Committee decided that the bomb
must be used on Japan "as soon as poss ible, that it be used on a wa r plant
surrounded by worke rs' homes. and that it be used without pr ior warn
ing."',1 The decision to use it "on a war plant surrounded by workers'
homes" was purposely inserted to quiet the conscience of th(') se who had
misgivings about targeting onl y the civilians. The t ruth is that the Target
Committee had carefull y discussed var ious options, including:
1. use as a tactical weapon to assist in the invasion of Japan,
2. use as a demonstrati on before obse rvers,
3, use as a demonstration aga imt a military ta rget,
4. use against a military target without warning,
5. use against a city with warning, and
6, use against a cit y without warning.
Grm'es advocated the last option. Norris states: "In the course of the war
Americans had gradually ceased to distinguish cl ea rly between what was
military and what was civilian. Military targets were fe w and hard to hit ,
civilian targets were many and easy; and cities were the easiest of al 1. "62 But
the pretense inserted in the Interim Committee's decision, which the Tar
get Committee was fully aware was merely a pretense, contributed to the
self-deception of the president, as we shall see bel ow.
On June 6, Stimson informed the president of the Interim Committee's
decision. The secreta ry of war reported that he had had a hard time trying
to hold the Army Air Force down to "precision bombi ng" rather than
"area bombing. " He was concerned about the continuing area bombings
for two reasons. First, he did not WaJ1 r the United States to receive the rep
Utation of outdoing H itl e r's atrociti es and, second, he feared that the ".l\i r
F .
orce mIght have Japan so thoroughly bombed out that the new weapon
not have a fair background to show its strength." Stimson notes:
Truman laughed and said he understood."63
124 TSUYOSHI HA SEGAWA
Neither Stimson nor Truman seems to be aware of the contradi ction. If
car pet bombings against civilians was comparable to Hitl er's atrocit ies
"vhy wouldn't the use of the atomic bomb on a city that had been left intac;
purposely to demonstrate its destructi ve capac ity be equalJy ba rbaric? And
why did the president laugh about this serious d istinction if he Un.
derstood that what Stimson had just recommended was precisely the ba r.
baric act that might earn the United States a Hitlcrlike reputation ?
After he received Groves's report on the successful detonat ion of the
first atomic bomb in Alamogordo, Truman marveled at its dest ruct ivt
power but ad ded, "This weapon is to be used against Japan between noll'
and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of\Var, Mr. Stimson, to use it that
military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not womell
and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless and fanatic, we the
leaders of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terr ible
bomb on the old capital or the new.... He and I arc in accord. The ta rget
. ,
. ,
will be a purely military one." The Interim Committee's June I decisi on to
I
" I
use the bomb against workers' houses was now el evated in Truman's mind
to a fantasy, as if a bomb that could disintegrate a sixty-foot steel tower
wou ld leave women and children unscathed. And hi s res traint for drop
ping this "new destructivc weapon" was limi ted mcrely to the "old ca pital
or tbe new." It would bc acceptable to drop it on other citi es.('"
In contrast to the president , Stimson and Arnold had no illusi ons. On
July 22, as Arnold reGl l1 ed, "We talked about the killing of women and
children, the destruction of surrounding communiti es, the effect on ot her
nations, a nd the psychol ogical reaction of the Japa nese themselves."")
Stimson and Arnold differed on the impli cations, however. When Mar
shall had told Groves and Arnold back in May that "we shoul d gu,1rd
agai nst too much g ratifi cat ion over our success, because it undoubtedly in
volves a large numhe r of Japanese casualti es," Groves answered thal he
was not thinking so much about those cas ualti es as he was about the men
who had made the Bataan death march. When they got into the hall.
Arnold slapped Groves on the back and said, "I am glad you sa id that- it's
just the \Va y [ feel. " 66
Stimson, however, did not seem to relish the thought of "killing womcn
and children. " Probably more than anyone else in volved in the leadership
of the Manhattan Project, he was aware of the grave consequences of the
atomic weapon and the nucl ea r arms race that was to ensue inevitabl y af
ter the wa r, and the impli cations of the new wcapon for the future of
WERE THE' A TOMI C BOMBINGS JU S TIFIED? 125
. . 'II"atio
n
. He had despe rately tried to end the war quickly, modifying
CI\ I , .
the unconditional surrender demand by promising the Japanese that they
could retain the monarchical system under the current dynas ty. But there
was a strange disconnect between profound understanding of
the illlplications of the bomb and his willingness to use it on Japan. How
should we understand the contradict ion' First of all , Stimson was a faith
ful servant to the pres ident. He knew where the presiden t stood on the use
of the atomic bomb. After he hecame awa re through Magic of Togo's
July \2 telegram to Saw, he rushed to the president and pl eaded to include
the provision modifying the unconditional surrender demand. But learn
ing from Byrnes that the pres ident and the secretary of state had already
worked out a "timetable," which ce rtainly mea nt the timing of the Pots
dam ultimatum before Soviet entry into the wa r, the secreta ry of war
bowed to the president's wish. After Stimson learned of Togo's other
telegram on Jul y 21, he made a last desperate plea to Truman. But met
with Truman's rejection, Stimson signed off. He left Potsda m, and from
then on he never attempted to intervene.
67
Would Stimson have been completely happy ifhe had not had to use the
atomic bomb? He had presided over the most expensive weapons project
to date, which cost $20 billion of taxpayers' money. He was aware of the
pressurc coming from General Groves to use the weapon and, like
e\'(:ryone else, succumbed to the strong inerti al force that was movi ng in
exorably toward the usc of the bomb. Perusing hi s d iary entri es afte r he
left Potsdam for Washington, one sees the secretary of war immersing
himself in the franti c effort to drop the bombs.
6H
And later Stimson, like
Truman, justified hi s decision: "The face of war is the face of death; death
isan inevitable part of eve ry order that a wartime leader gives . . . . But this
deliberate premeditated dest ructi on [t he decision to use the ;Lt omic bomb]
was Our least abhorrent choice. The destructi on of Hiroshima and Na
gasaki put an end to the Japanese war. It stopped the fir e raids, and the
strangling blockade; it ended the ghastl y specter of a clash of great land
armics."69
Many histori ans- Bernstein, Frank, and Gordi n, for instance-argue
that no One in the Truman ad mini str;lt ion believed that one or two atomic
bombs would be suffic ient to persuade Japan to surrender, and when
J;lpan surrendered on August 14 it ca me as a tota l surpri se, iu To he sure,
lVere influential policy makers and military leaders who did not be
h
cve
that one or two atomic bombs would end the war. These include
i '
i
.'
126 TSUYOSHI HASE GA W A
Stimson, Ma rshall , A rnold, Groves, K ing, Leahy, and N imitz. Marshal l
believed that the American inv<)s ion, coupled with the Soviet en try intu
the war, would be necessary. Arnold insisted on the continuati on of CUll_
ventional aerial bombardment to destroy all the citi es in toto, wh il e the
na\'y men advQc,lted the naval blockade, alarmed by the reinforcements of
Japanese forces in Kyushu. Groves believed that additional atomic b()mhs
would be necessary. Stimson, Marshall, Leahy, and Nimitz dou bted that
the homb, alone would lead to Japan's capitubtion.
Neverthel ess, what matters is the position taken by Truman and
Byrnes, and there is enough evidence to indicate that they believed that
one or two atomic bombs would be enough to convince the to
surrender. On August 7, one day after the atomic bomb was dropped on
Hiroshima , Grew w rote a memorandum to Byrnes that "the end of the
Pacific \Va r might corne suddenly and unexpectedly," and recom mended
the names of political advisers to be attached to the Supreme Comma nder
of the Allied Forces.7I [t is likely that this memorandum was wri tten at
Byrnes's original request to Grew to provide him with the names of pol
iti ca l advisers for the occupation headquarters and, if so, Byrnes was
preparing for the American occupation of Japan immediately after the
atomic bombing on Hiroshima.
[n fact, Byrnes's secretary, Walter Brown, wrote in the July 18 entry of
his diary that Byrnes believed that the joint ultimatum without the Soviet
U nion would be issued and that since the "secret weapon will be rcady by
that time," Japan would surrender in two weeks. Furthermore, he wrote
on July 24: "JFH lByrnesl still hoping for time, believing after Ithe1atomic
bomb Japan will surrender and Russia will not get in too much on the kill,
thereby being in a positi on to press for claims against China" 'I F! F() rresra l
wrote: "Byrnes said he was most anxious to get the Japanese affai rs Ol' er
with before the Russians got in. "il [f Byrnes thought that the atomi c
bomhs would fin ish off Japan before the Soviet entry into the wa r, the
president must ha ve ;1150 thought so; Byrnes was the president's closest :lnd
most influenti al ad viser, a nd the two shared living quarters during [he
Potsdam Conference.
Stimson's diary for July 23 indicates that Truman instructed Sti mson to
have a conference with Marshall to find out whether the Russi ans were
needed to end the war. This instruction was given after Truman reque)ted
" more definit e infiJrmation as to the time of operation from H a rrison
WERE THE BOMBINGS JUSTIFIED? 127
lab
out
the availability of atomic bombs for usc against Japan]." The impli
cation seems cl ear: Truman Wished to know whether Ma rshall constdered
it possible to end the w:lr with the atomic bombs but without the Soviets.
Although Marshall's answer was <)mbiguous, Stimson reported to Truman
about Marshall's "feeling that the Russians were not needed. "74 [t is possi
ble to deduce from this that Truman was hopeful, if not absolutely certain,
to be able to end the war with the atomic bombs before t he Soviets entered
the war around August 15. This explains the jubilance and excitement
with which Truman received the news of the dropping of the atomic
bomb on Hiroshima on August ().
[mmediately aft er the United States dropped the second bomb on Na
gasaki, Truman announced in a radio address: "H avin g found the homb
wc have used it. 'vVe have used it agai nst those who at tacked us without
warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and
executed American prisoners of war, and against those who have aban
doned all pretense of obeying international law of warfare."IS Truman's
statement underscores one important moti vation behind the use of the
;\tomic bomb: revenge.
Truman's statement rai ses another important point. Wh ile accllsing the
Japanese of abandoning "all pretense of obeying international law of war
f.1rc," Truman never questioned the legality of the use of the atomic bomb
in light of the existing international law of warfare. H ere in the president's
mind, the continuity between incendiary hombing and atom ic bombing
was taken for granted. [f incendiary bombings were not a violation of in
ternationallaw, it followed that the atomic bombing would not viol ate in
ternmionallaw, either.
But on the same day after he made this radio something impor
tant happened. In response to a letter written by Senator Richard Russell,
who had urged the pres ident to use more atomic bombs 3nd incendiary
bomhs against the Japanese, Truma n wrote:
I know that Japan is a crud anJ uncivili zed nation in warfare, but 1 can"t hring
myself to beli eve [hat, heca use they a re be;lsts, W e should not 011 rselv..:.s art in the
'"me manne r. For m yse lf, I certainl y regret the necess it y of w iping o ut whole
populations beca use of the "pig headedness" o f the k"H:icrs of the nation and" for
Your informati on, I a lll not going to do it unless it is absolutely necessary. I also
h;l\' c a feeling for (he women 'Lnd children in Japan ? !>
128 TSUYOSHI HA SEGAWA
\Vhy this sudden According to the diary of Secretary of Corn.
merce Henry vVallace, at the cabinet meeting on August 10, Tru!11;JfI an
nounced that he had given an order to stop further atomic bambi n"
. 0
without his authorization: "He said the thought of wiping out another
100,000 people was so horrible. H e didn't like the idea of killing ... 'all
these kids.'" Leahy al so not ed in his diary that "informati on from Jap<l n
indicated that 80 percent of the city of Hiroshima had been destroyed and
100,000 peopl e killed."77 It a ppea rs that this report had a sobering effect on
the president. For the first time, Truman reali zed the clear distinction be
tween the atomic bomb and incendiary bombs. The dawn of the nucle:tr
age began at that moment .
Nevertheless, one should not be toO quick to conclude that the self
impmed ban on using more atomic bombs was firmly enshrined in U.S.
policy at this moment. On August 11 , only three days after he wrote
letter to Senator Ru ssell, Truman replied to a prominent Protesta nt leade r:
Nohod y is more disturbed OVer the LISe of Atomic b()mbs than I am but I Wa S
greatl y disturbed by the unwarranted attack by the l apam:sc on Pear l Harbor
and their murder of our prisoners of war. The only language they seem tll un
derstand is the one we have been using to bombard them.
\Vhen YOll h:lve to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast. It is
most rcgrcnable but m:verrheless truc? S
Contradict ing his statement in his letter to Senator Russell , he reverted to
revenge as the moti\'ation for the atomic bombings. The pendulum between
remorse and justificati on continued to the rest of Truman's life. Shortly
before he left office, he replicd to Atomic Energy commissi oner
Mu rray, who did not conside r the use of the atomic bomb on H iroshirnJ
and an immoral act. Truman wrote to Murray: " It [the use of the
atomic bomb] is far WOrse than gas and biological warfare because it affects
the civilian population and murders them by the wholesale.""! Truman's
schizophrenic approach to th e nuclear weapon is a symbolic reAecti on of
the two di amet ri cally opposite U.S. nucl ea r str:ltegies-deterrence and
wa r fighting-that have continued to this day. so
WERE THE ATOMIC BOMB IN GS JUSTIFIED? 129
Proposals Not to Use the Atomic Bomb
[n 1947 Stimson wrote, "At no time, from 194 1 to 1945, did I ever hear it
sUj?:gc::
sted
by the Pres ident, or by any other responsible mcmber of the
'crnment, tbat atomi c energy should not be used in the war.' 81 No cab

1I1
et
Illember may ha ve suggested that the atomic bombs should not be
sed a<Tainst Japan, but a number of inAuential scicntists and government
u. to>
officials did express grave doubt about its use.
The most famous case is thc petition brought hy Leo Szilard and two as
sociates (\Valter Bartky and Harold Urey) to Byrnes, after their effort to
the president was rebuffed. I n May 1945, they traveled to Spartanburg,
South Carolina, to the future sccretary of state's residence to present their
"rgument that U.S. USe of atomic bomb, would prm'oke a dangerous nu
cle,lr arms race with thc Soviet Union. Byrncs scornfully snubbed their
plea. He was "much concerned about the spreaJi.ng of Russian influence
in Europe," and declared, "Our possessing Hnd demonstrating the homb
would make Russia more managcable in Europc."H2 Stunned by this rude
rebuff, Szilard went back to the University of Chicago's Metallurgical
u,boratory, whcre a committcc to study the political and social implica
tions of the use of the atomic bomb produccd what is known as the Franck
Report. This report \\' <1 rned that the use of the atomic bomb in the form of
a surprise attack wou ld destroy all chances f()r international agreement
"on total prevent ion of nucl ear wa rfar e."Kl Oswald K. Brewster, an engi
neer on the gas diffusion project, wrote a letter to Truman stating that
since the threat of Germany was rcmoved, "'vVe must stop this project."
Stimson intercepted hi s letter and brought it to the attention of Marshall
and the president.
Szilard was a scientist and Brewster an engineer involved in the atomic
bomb proj ect with little knowledge of the military or political sit uation in
Japan.

In contrast, Na vy Undersecretary Ralph Ba rd knew more about
the political aspect of the decision to use the atomic bomb. As a member of
the Interim Committee, he had initi all y consented to its June I decision to
Use the atomic bomb aga inst Japan without warning. But he changed his
mind. On Junc 27, Bard sent a recommendati on to Harrison. The navy
undersecretary believed tbat the Japanese wcre looking for the mcans to
the war. If they were givcn information ahout the imminent So
\"et entry into the war and assurances of the preservat ion of the empe ror,
COupled with a warning about use of the atomic bomb, Japan might be
131 130 TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA
persuaded to su rrender. H e advocated a warning t wo or three days before
the first use of the atomic bomb.l!(,
Stimson\ postwar contention that "no responsible memher of t he gO\' _
ernment " suggested that the atomic bomb should not be lI sed is therefr) re
somewhat misleading. Such dissenting views were voiced by Szilarrl
Brewster, Bard, and others, although they were not cabinet. members:
Stimson, Forrestal, and Leahy were quite aware of their views ,lnd may
even have agreed with them, but they also knew that Byrnes, and
all Truman, did not share them. Byrnes, like Groves, was eager to usc the
weapon. And Truman sided with Byrnes.
Alternati ves to the use.: of the atomi c bomb d id exist. Choosing to ex
clude ot her a lternatives and drop it was a conscious decision on the part of
Truman and Byrnes. It woul d be more acc urate to say that no responsible
member of the gove rnment who had misgivings about such use of the
bomb chose to chall enge Truman's decis ion.
Morality of the Atomic Bombing
\Vhen the atomic bombs we re dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. no
nation raised a word of protest. The onl y except ion was the Ja panese go\"
ernment, which on August IO sent a letter of protest through the Swiss
legation to the Unite.:d States government . Thi s lctte r decla red the Ame ri
can use of t he atomic bombs was ;J violati on of Art icles 22 and 23 of rhe
Hague Convention Respecting the.: Law and C ustoms of War on Lanu.
which prohibited the use of cr uel "vcapons, such as poisonous gas, T he
Japanese protest declared. " in the.: name of the Japa nese Imperial Govern
ment as well as in the name of humanit y and civili zation," that " L11 Cuse of
the atomic bombs, which surpass the ind iscriminate cruelty of a ny olher
existing wea pons and proj ectil es" was a crime against humanity. and de
manded that "th e further use C) f such inhumane weapons be immediatel y
The U.S. government did not respond to thi s protest.
to say, the Japanese official s responsible for various atrocities committed
d uring t he wa r were not a champion of "humanity and civi li zation. " Nev
ertheless, ca n we dismiss the argumen t simply because it was rai sed by

II
:1
On August 8, 1945, het ween the atomic bombings of I-jirosh im;1 and
Nagasaki, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and rhe Soviet
Union signed the London Agreement t(l p rosecute wa r crimes. Articl e 2 (b)
WERE THE ATOMIC BO M BIN GS JUST I FIED?
_the Charter annexed to the London Agreement defined war crimes as
ot . 1'ltl'
on5
of the laws or customs of war," w hich include "mu rder, ill
',\",04
rC;Itm
ent
or deport at ion to slave labor or fo r any other purpose of civilian
t ) ulation of or in occupied terri tory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners
or pe rsons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of publi c or pri
,';ltC property, wanton destruction of cit ies , towns or villages, or devasta
tion lIotjustified by military neccj.,ity !emphasis added I." Th us "wanton
de:struction of citi es" just ifi ed "hy military necess it y" W<\$ excl uded from
war crimes. In this way, t he Alli ed Powers specifi cally excluded a rea
bombings from wa r In his concluding report at the N uremberg
Intcrnational Tribunal, prosecutor Telford Taylor declared both Ger man
and Allied bombing legal, hecause "the ai r bombardment of cities and fac
tories has become a recognized part of modern warfa re, as practiced by all
nations," thus nullifying the.: four th H ague Convention of 1907, which for
bade: 'lir bombardment of civi li ans.
S
? At the Internati onal Military Tri
bunal for the Fa r East, the defense lawye rs brought up the atomic
bomhing as a crime committed by the Americans. In hi s sole I11lnority
view, Indian justice Radhabonod Pal condemned the American use of the
atomic bomh as a violati on of internationallaw.
w
But thi s opi_nio n was not
supported by the tribu nal.
In 1951, Japa n gained inde pendence by accepting the San Francisco
Peace Treaty. Article 19 (a) of the treat y st ipul ated that Japa n wa ive all
claims against the Allied Powers "a rising out of the vvar o r out of actions
taken hecause of the existence of a stat e of war." By this cl ause, [he Japa
nese lost all legal rights to prot est against the Ameri can lise of the atomic
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasa ki .
As Ja pan was integrated into the Ameri can g lobal st rategy and Japall's
defense hecame Ci(lSely linked wit h it s security al liance wit h the United
States, the Japanese governmen t stopped raising any words of protest
against the atomi c hombings. I n fact, the letter sent by the Japanese gov
ernment on August 10, 1945, remains t he sole instance of officia l protest.
We now come to the difficult questi on raised in the beginning of this
essay; Can the Japanese legitimately lJuesti on that the atomic bombing
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a justifiable ac ti on? Should the Japan
government's protes t that the atomic bombings violated the existing
International law be dismissed beca use the protesters, who themselves
war crimes, have no right to accuse others of violating i.nterna

132 TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA
Japanese protest of the American decision to drop the atomic hon1b
should nOt be placed in the context of Japan's responsibility for the \Va
r,
but rather in the context of lawful conduct of warfare. Needless to Sil l
Japan must atone for initiating the war of aggression and for
atrocities during the war. But the American atomic bombings of Hi
roshima and Nagasaki should be judged independently in light of intern a
tionaI law that existed at the time. Moreover, the Japanese and the rest of
the world have the right to raise the question of the morality of the action.
It is worth remembe ring that those who were killed in Hi.roshi ma Were
not only 100,000 Japanese, but also 20,000 to 30,000 Koreans, unknown
numbers of Chinese, and some POWs from the United States, Aust ra lia,
the Netherlands, and Britain. At least eleven American were killed
in the POW prison, about 1,300 feet from ground zero in Hiroshi ma. In
Nagasaki at least sixteen Dutch prisoners of war were kill ed by the ,nomic
I
, ,
bomb. For thirty-five years after the war's end, the U,S, government kept
'i
the deaths of the PO\Vs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki secret. At Section 82
of the grave site of the Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery in Missouri,
eight of these el even Hiroshima victims arc li sted, but the site 3mi the
cause of their deaths arc not mentioned.
Eric Markusen and David Kopf inquire about the relationship bet ween
strategic bombings and genocide. H elen Fei n, a scholar on genocide, iden
tifies the foll owing fi ve criteria, on the basis of the United Nations Geno
cide Convention, that spell out "necessary and sufficient conditi ons to
impute genocide."
I. There is J sustained attack, or continuity of attacks, by the perpetra
tor to physically destroy group members.
2. The perpetrator is a collective or organized actor or a commander of
organized actors.
3. Victims are selected because they are members of a coll ect ivity.
4. The \' ictims are defenseless or are kill ed rega rdl ess of whether thel
surrendered or resisted.
5. The destruction of group members is undertaken with intent tn kill,
and murder is s;1l1ctioned by the perpet rators YI
Based on these criteria, Markusen and Kopf come to the cl ear and un
equivocal answer that strategic bombing is genocide. They cire reasons
why this conclusion is important. The first and the most fundaml.".J1WI re<1 '
W ERE THE AT 0 M I C B 0 M B I G S JUS T I FIE D ? 133
n is that "government mass killing has been and continues to be a threat
sO survival of millions of human beings." And yet ou r understanding
threat is rudimentary and inadequate. The authors warn: "Some of
he: leading nations of the world continue to base their national security on
:"ha
t
has appropriately been described as a policy of reta li ato ry genocide
with nuclear weapons. " They further state, "Psychologically normal,
JtOOd' peoplecan and have participated in demonic proj ects. only to
[alit,lrian regimes but also democraci es have been wdl1l1g to directly cn
age in genocidal killing, to support client states that engage in it, and to
the preparations for it. "92 If strategic bombing is genocide, the use of
nuclear weapons against civi lians is also a clear case of genocide.
Unlike Markusen and Kopf, however, who lump togethe r strategic
bombing and atomic bombing, I would make a clear distinction between
[he tWO by singling out atomic bombing as an extreme case of genocide,
much worse than conventional strategic bombing, and a category all its
own. The discussion of whet her strategic bombing and atomic homhing
are genocidal focuses on mass, indiscriminate kiJling of civilian popula
tions, Along this same line of thinking, Michael Walze r, in hi s ju>'! cmd Un
JUSt WOI'S, makes the following remarks:
If killing millions (o r many thousa nds) of men and women was militaril y nec
for their conquest and ove rthrow, then it was morally necessa ry- in or
der not to kill those people--to settle fCl r somelhing less... . If people have a
right not to be forced to fight, the)' also have a ri ght not to be forced to continue
fighting beyond the point when the w:lr might justly be concluded. Beyond that
point, there can he no supreme emergences, no argulllents about military neces
sity, no cost-accounting in human lives. To prtss the war further th:ln that is to
re-commit the crime of aggression. I n the su mmer of 1945, the victOri ous
Aml:ricans owed the l apa nese people an exp e riment in negoti at ions. To use rhe
atomic bomb, to kill and terrorize ci vili ans, without eve n att empting such an
c:xperiment, was a doubl e cr irnc
9
;
argument, however, is faulty. In August I there was no neces
Sity to kill many thousands of people in order to end the war. Other choi ces
Wtrt available, but these alternatives were consciousl\, not chosen.
There is another problem in vVal ",er's argllmcn;. Like the genocide
SCholars Cited abovt', he considered the use of the atomic bombing im-
Illoral b d" '1' 0 h' h
ecause It was ta rgcte agatnst CIVI lans. Dut t e re IS a not cr qllCS
l
134 TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA
tion we should ponder. What if atomic weapons a re targeted at mi lit<l r ,
objects and [s a wa r crime, ifnot genocide' [ am
to think it is. To argue that some conventiona l weapons are as powerful as
nuclear weapons and the ret<:lre to make rlUclear weapons operationa l is to
lower the threshold of the use of nuclear weapons. But usc of nucl e<tf
weapon is properl y a taboo. This taboo was broken in Hiroshima and N:.\ _
gasaki. More than anything else, the immora lit y of the atomic
lies in this fact.
Norman Naimark describes a horrifying spectacle of mass rapes orGer_
man women perpetrated by the Red Army soldiers conquering Gennanl'
at the end of the war in Europe. [n the midst of mayhem, in a street
Berlin, one drunken Soviet ta nk officer grabbed a German child and
threw him into a burning builJing, instantly killing the boy. The accom
panying officer, shocked at the scene, asked his comrade, "Why d id you do
that' Of what was the child gui lty'" To this, the officer ans wered, "Yoll
just shut up, capta in! Do you have children ? Well, they killed mine.'<J.\
\-\Then Marshall cautioned about consequences of civilian casualties,
Groves replied that he was thinking about the Bataan death marc h_ After
dropping the two atomic bombs on Japan, Truman declared that he had
used the atomic bombs "against those who attacked us without warni ng at
Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten anc! executed
American prisoners of wu." \Vhcn an act of revenge is elevated fr om a
drunken soldier to a state pol icy, and the number of victims is multiplied
to 100,000, should we cease to call it a war crime?
6
STRATEGIC BOMBING OF CHONGOI NG BY IMPERIAL
JAPAN ESE ARMY AND NAVAL FORCES
Tetsuo Maeda
In Tokyo, two air raid lawsuits are being heard in the Tokyo District
Court. One is the Lawsuit of the Chongqing Hea\'y Bombings, the other
is the Lawsuit of the Great Tokyo Air Raids. The former was filed by Chi
nese ci\ ili ans against the Japanese government, the latte r by Japanese civil
ians against their own government. [n both cases, victims of ai r raids a rc
addressing the Japanese government's actions and responsibiliti es, and de
manding apologies and compensation.
Already seventy yea rs have elapsed since the beginning of the bombing
of Chongqing, a campaign conducted from 1938 till 1943, while sixty
three years have passed since the born bing of Tokyo in 1945. N evertheless,
these hombing incidents ,lre st ill very much remembered and cont inue to
ev()ke a wide range of a rguments.
The Japanese government has never ful ly or offi ciall y (]dmitted that it
carried out the carpet bombings of Chongqing. In the gove rnment 's com
piled records of warfare, the Chongqing bombings are treated as a right
ful attack employing proper tactics of war and with military objectives,
::Ind civilian casualties are dismissed as "i ncidental damage" acceptable in
acc()rdance with int ernat ionall a\\' .
. When answering the plaintiffs' demand [clr compensation payments, it
IS CXPt'cted that the Japanese government wi ll argue that the aggrieved