Portuguese Journal of Social Science Volume 5 Number 3. Intellect Ltd 2006. Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/pjss.5.3.

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Predispositions to discriminatory immigration policies in western Europe: An exploration of political causes

Enric Martnez-Herrera CIDCM Djaouida Moualhi European University Institute

Abstract
We analyze citizens predispositions concerning policies of immigrant selection and models of immigrant accommodation as observed by the 20023 European Social Survey. We focus on some of the EUs major countries, namely: Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, which were chosen because of their different experiences as migration destinations, as well as for the relevance of their immigration policy models and welfare states. On this basis, we compare citizens attitudinal inclinations with the policies actually being implemented, and propose interpretations concerning the degree of consistency between both levels. Firstly, we consider attitudes and policies in respect of the discrimination faced by immigrants according to their country of origin and/or economic resources. Secondly, we analyze the attitudes and policies with regard to assimilationist and multicultural integration models. Finally, we examine the recognition of certain rights to migrants.

Keywords
immigration policies attitudes on immigration multiculturalism

Introduction
Amongst citizens attitudes towards immigration, their predispositions towards immigration policies are the attitudes with the greatest political relevance. It is theoretically plausible that (pre-political) perceptions of the outcomes of immigration in the economy, culture and the daily coexistence of the host society may exert an effect on both party competition and the processes of policy-making and implementation. Still, one can assume that attitudes towards policies translate the more generic perceptions and evaluations citizens have of these phenomena as a whole into more elaborated demands and support for both political proposals and public intervention. Thus, we regard orientations to immigration policies as an intermediate link between citizens basic attitudes towards immigration and the political behaviour they may exert to influence these issues. Nevertheless, paradoxically this is still one of the less known aspects of attitudes towards immigration.1 This is why an important novelty of the module on immigration of the 20023 European Social Survey (ESS) lies in
PJSS 5 (3) 215233 Intellect Ltd 2006 1 See also the 1997 and 2000 Eurobarometers ( Jackson et al. 2001; Thalhammer et al. 2001). Particularly useful at the level of governments and political elites is the work of Wodak (2000), which makes a comparative analysis of politicians discourses on immigration in several European countries.

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The ESS database can be obtained at http://ess.nsd.uib.no. We deliberately chose not to use the term preferences in order to avoid suggesting a firm will that, in the field of immigration policies, is still nonexistent for most of the population in countries with a short experience as host countries. Our hypothesis is that most Spaniards and Italians have not formed carefully thought and stable preferences in this area; yet being still changeable in the face of opinion leaders. For this reason we chose the terms predisposition and inclination. As a consequence, we think that a great deal of responsibility rests with policymakers who ought not to assume preferences as given. Furthermore, in Italy and Spain, the potential influence of opinion leaders with respect to immigration issues appears to be large, not only because of the attitudinal ambiguities and inconsistencies we have found, but also because the public debate has been much less intense and much more superficial than elsewhere.

its question-batteries that are intended to observe orientations towards the two basic elements of immigration policies: immigrants admission and integration (Jowell et al. 2003).2 These questions solely tap predispositions to immigration policies, but not evaluations of actual policies.3 Nonetheless, the information about predispositions in this field can be compared to the policies that governments actually formulate and implement, weighing up to what extent the former may be consistent with the latter. The ESS, promoted by the European Science Foundation and the European Commission, has the explicit aim of establishing a quality standard in both sampling design and the implementation of fieldwork in order to guarantee that the data is of a high and consistent standard that will enable comparisons between countries. Certainly, many countries systematically collect individual and/or household data by means of either statistic institutes or other agencies. Generally, however, this data is not truly comparable (Riba and Cuixart 2003). The ESS aims to overcome these shortcomings through the realization of a survey that will assist comparative research, by, for example, placing greater emphasis on the transcultural equivalence of the questionnaires meanings (European Social Survey 2002). In this article we describe and analyze the results of the ESS with respect to orientations on immigration policies. We have classified these orientations into three groups. In the first section we examine citizens predispositions to the selection criteria used to admit foreigners, paying attention to attitudes towards foreigners in accordance to their Europeanness and the wealth of their countries of origin and the importance that is attributed to different criteria for selecting immigrants according to material considerations. In the second section, we analyze inclinations relative to models of integration policy for resident migrants, observing those, more or less formed and stable, that interviewees express when confronted with typical views of assimilation and multi-cultural policies. In the last section we focus on the recognition or denial of certain rights to migrants, including the right to remain in the host society. We start each section by comparing attitudes to each subject in the selected countries, before going on to explore the degree of coherence between citizens attitudes and the policies implemented by their governments. We explore the correspondence between citizens predispositions and actual governmental immigration policies. We suspect these inclinations can be driven by governmental public diplomacy, and we are concerned that governments often either fail to undertake leadership of public opinion in this regard, what entails a laissez-faire policy, or, what is worse, they may follow dubious, weak signs of citizens attitudes as depicted by mediocre survey analyses. When government and citizens predispositions agree, it seems that everything works democratically as would be expected following either a classic theory of democratic representation or a Schumpeterian model of democracy in which, in order to remain in office, politicians attempt to satisfy the passions of a sufficient majority of the
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electorate (Schumpeter 1942). However, as we shall see, some cases of consistency are the product of policies which, sustained for decades, have shaped those attitudes until they all agree (Zaller 1992). Obviously, nevertheless, discrepancies between government policies and citizens attitudes attract much more attention. In the face of such scenarios, one may suspect that the government behaves as enlightened elites that impose their own criteria upon the population, or that the government lets itself be influenced by pressure groups that represent minorities only. To explore the possible correlations between evidence at the micro- and the macro-level, we focus on some of the European Unions major countries: Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, Portugal and Spain. We have chosen these countries in accordance with the relevance of their experience as immigration destinations and of their empirical models of integration and welfare state. Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden have received large immigration flows for decades, whilst Portugal on the one hand, and Italy and Spain on the other, have only experienced immigration from the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, respectively. The former three countries also have highly developed welfare states albeit different among them when compared to the countries of southern Europe. Furthermore, it is usually contended that Sweden (especially) and the United Kingdom carry out policies of multiculturalist integration, whilst a differentialist policy has prevailed in Germany (Inglis 1997). In turn, Italy (Triandafyllidou 2003), Portugal (Mendoza 2000; Peixoto 2002) and Spain (Aja 2000; Colectivo Io 2000) have not yet defined their models.

Attitudes to admission policies

Admission or refusal of immigrants constitutes one of the basic axes and certainly the most obvious one of any immigration policy although not necessarily in this order. This involves the question of how many, who and how. No doubt, the issue most often debated in the public sphere concerns the quantity. In contrast, the issue of who, which entails a possible application of discriminatory, selective criteria, has hardly been discussed in democracies with short experience as receiving countries. Nonetheless, this is an old issue in settler countries such as Australia, the United States and Israel, as much as in those countries, such as Germany, where a legal tradition of jus sanguinis has prevailed. The immigration policies of these states either ascribed preference or hindered the inflow of immigrants according to considerations such as phenotype (race), language, religion all of which are often presented in terms of nationality and working skills. The problematic nature of these measures lies on the fact that, as they are discriminatory and even racist, they clash with the principle of equality on which contemporary western social and political systems are founded. Hence in some countries these policies have been reformed or revoked (Brubaker 1990; Barry and Goodin 1992; Freeman 1995; Monar 1997; Lustick 1999; Joppke and Rosenhek 2002; Joppke 2005). More
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Source: European Social Survey, questions D6D9 (see the questionnaire in the Appendix).

Figure 1: Attitudes towards admission of migrants depending on their country of origin. recently, the echoes of this debate has reached countries, such as Italy and Spain, with a relatively brief receiving experience, and in which the Islamophobic views of some social thinkers have attracted some media and academic attention. Finally, the how would encompass questions such as whether or not to legalize irregular immigration, and the justification of preferential quota policies for certain countries and for certain working skills profiles; however, we will not deal with these aspects here. The ESS observes citizens attitudes regarding how many and who. A question-battery taps citizens predispositions towards the admission of foreigners who are seeking to live in their country according to the wealth of their origin societies and whether or not these societies are European. The questions are worded in terms of the number of immigrants considered acceptable depending on these characteristics. Figure 1 shows the number of interviewees who are in favour of admitting many or some people coming from each type of country. We compare the figures of each of the six selected countries with the average of twenty-one European countries for which the data was available by the end of October 2004 (weighting the number of cases according to the weight of each countrys population in the total population of the twenty-one countries). As a general rule, people coming from wealthy countries are more warmly welcomed than those coming from poor countries especially if they are European with a rate of support ranging from 43 per cent in Portugal to 79 per cent in Sweden; however, their welcome is no less warm if they come from outside of Europe, with support rates ranging from 4375 per cent. In contrast, the extent of support decreases markedly in almost all the countries when the immigrants originate from European countries that are poorer than the receiving country, with support rates ranging from 39 per cent in Portugal to 87 in Sweden. When the originating
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societies are relatively poorer nonEuropean countries, support declines even further everywhere, especially in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Therefore, it becomes apparent that in almost all the countries examined, and also for the average of the twenty-one countries, support for the arrival of people from affluent countries is greater than that for those from poorer countries. Nevertheless, it is worth noting some further details. Sweden is an exception to this pattern of preference for those from wealthier countries, since it is the only country whose citizens express a preference for people from poorer countries. Conversely, Italian preference for citizens of wealthy countries is more unadorned. Secondly, the fact that Sweden has the most open attitude towards hosting immigrants, whatever their circumstances may be, while Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom are the most reluctant deserves further attention. The attitudes of the Spaniards can be partially attributed to the fact that their country has, for the past two decades, been amongst the highest unemployment rates in the West (although circumstances in 2002, when the survey was conducted, were no longer the same). This rationale, however, does not apply to Portugal, which had the lowest unemployment rates in Europe during the 1980s and 1990s (Mendoza 2000). Furthermore, the Spanish working class demonstrates a rather strong perception of ethnic competence in the markets of labour and housing as well as for public services (Sol and Parella 2003). In fact, previous comparative research has shown the existence of a statistical association between social class and prejudice against immigrants in Europe at large: with the working class showing the largest prejudice (Jackson et al. 2001). Although not surprising, these attitudes are especially curious because of the very limited empathy ability of the Portuguese and the Spanish, particularly if we recall the migratory experience of hundreds of thousands of their compatriots. Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly from the point of view of the European integration process, the limited relevance of belonging to a European country, regardless of its economic situation, attracts our attention (McLaren 2001). This is at odds with the process of European integration, with the insistence of most of the political elites and the main opinion makers to foster a sense of common belonging and with the European feeling expressed in surveys by the populations of some countries. In particular, Italians and Portuguese do not notice any difference whatsoever between citizens from wealthy European or wealthy nonEuropean countries (see Vala, Pereira and Ramos in this volume). Although with a difference of only 5 per cent, the countries in which European immigrants are most preferred are Germany and the United Kingdom, while governments and opinion leaders as much as citizens in the latter have adopted a Euro-sceptic stance, while southern Europeans tend to exhibit the most intense European feelings (Heath et al. 1999; Dez Medrano 2003).
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Source: European Social Survey 20022003, questions D13, D16 and D17 (see the questionnaire in the Appendix).

Figure 2: Importance attached by citizens to selection criteria. Figure 2 displays the citizens inclination towards the application of several more specific selection criteria. Here they are asked to assess, on a scale of 010, the importance that, in their opinion, some of the potential criteria ought to have. The criteria upon which most importance is attached, with a score of 7.5 on the average of the twenty-one European countries, is the immigrants disposition to adopt the way of life in the country however this ought to be understood. The next most important criteria is having work-skills that are needed in the country, with a mean of 6.7 for this set of countries, thus suggesting a utilitarian perception of the immigrant as a factor of production. We have also considered those from countries with a Christian background, which seems to be one of the less important criteria: scoring 3.5 on average. However, here some remarkable differences across countries are also noticeable. The countries whose citizens attach more importance to the immigrants disposition to adopt to the way of life in the country are Germany and Sweden, whilst those in which fewer citizens do so are the south-western European countries although differences are rather small. The criterion of work-skills yields a larger variance, for while the Portuguese and Germans score 7.5 and 7.0, respectively, the Swedes score 4.9. Finally, Italians attach more importance to the immigrants background as a Christian with a score of 4.5 while the Swedes take the opposite view with a score of 2.3. A first lesson that can be drawn from this is that the vast majority of Europeans are likely to prefer immigrants who are prepared to adopt the way of life in the country; however, this is a rather ambiguous lesson, as the meaning of this indicator is not clear enough. One may wonder whether interviewees understand the wording of this question as if they
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would expect immigrants to assimilate to their culture, or the less demanding if they would wish immigrants to accept the basic laws of the receiving societies, such as their constitutions, respect for human rights including, where applicable, gender equality and so forth. In this sense, it would be quite odd if in Sweden a country that is generally regarded to be closest to the ideal-type model of multiculturalism, in which the state has developed integration policies that favour the participation of different cultures public opinion was in favour of an assimilationist model, in which minority ethnic groups were forced to adopt the core values of the host country understood as an ethno-cultural nation (Smolicz 1981, 1988). Moreover, it would be no less of a paradox should German public opinion appear to be in favour of immigrants adopting the mainstream culture, while German governments have implemented a differentialist model (Inglis 1997; Wihtol de Wenden 1999). Admittedly, however, there is also room for interpreting that there is a gap between public policy and citizens inclinations. Second, the emphasis given to the immigrants working utility suggests a restriction by which entry and stay would tend to be allowed only to those people who are considered useful for the countrys economy. Certainly, this would entail a serious exception to the material translation of the moral and constitutional values of freedom and equality upon which open societies are grounded: the application of discriminatory criteria according to material interests (Barry and Goodin 1992). Public opinion favourable to selective immigration according to work-skills agrees with governmental policies that have been implemented in Germany and the United Kingdom for several decades (OCDE-Sopemi 2004). In Spain and Italy there is a certain discrepancy noticeable between the rulers and ruled, where the governments give quotas priorities to workers with low qualifications and who are destined to work in agriculture, construction, catering and household service is not in agreement with the importance that citizens attach to high educational achievement (data not shown). A similar pattern of inconsistency may be seen in Portugal, where the laissez-faire policy particularly favours unskilled and largely precarious work (Mendoza 2000; Corkill 2001). Thirdly, there is a noticeable inconsistency in Italy and Spain between the limited importance that is attached by the population to religion and the actual admission policies that favour people from countries such as the Philippines, with Roman Catholic traditions. The Spanish state grants citizenship to Filipinos after they have resided in the country for 2 years; Moroccans, who are mainly Muslim, do not obtain citizenship until they have lived in Spain for 10 years and this despite the fact that northern Morocco was a much more recent Spanish colony (cf. Joppke and Rosenhek 2002).4 Italy, in turn, grants a very large quota to Filipinos, although irregular immigration coming from this country is quite scarce. This asymmetry is remarkable as long as this quota and the number of irregular Filipino migrants are compared with those from countries such
Predispositions to discriminatory immigration policies in western Europe . . .

The Philippines was administrated by the United States from 1898 (sic) following its victory over Spain. In turn, Spains protectorate of Northern Morocco came to an end in 1956. It should also be noted that, unlike most SpanishAmericans, only a small minority of Filipinos less than half a million out of a population of approximately 80 million are fluent Spanish-speakers after nation-building policies based on Tagalog and a very strong leverage of English from the times of US administration (1898-1946).

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as Albania, Morocco and Tunisia (OCDE-Sopemi 2003; Triandafyllidou 2003). According to the Italian government, the general rationale for granting immigration quotas to specific countries is that they commit to accept the repatriation of unwanted irregular migrants. This suggests that, despite the nominal secular character of the states concerned, the Roman Catholic Church has a strong influence either direct or indirect on their immigration policies.

Inclinations towards models of integration

Immigration policy does not only consist of admitting or rejecting the admittance of immigrants, but also of what happens thereafter: how are they inserted into the society (Casey 1998). It is here that the polysemic term integration emerges (Sol et al. 2002; Zapata 2001). This ranges between a meaning of assimilation, in which immigrants give up their original cultures to adopt the dominant culture of the host society; a differential model, in which separated spheres are allowed to cultural groups that are different from the dominant group; and a multicultural meaning in which immigrants can retain and develop their different cultural backgrounds without being segregated from the mainstream. In this section, we explore whether western Europeans are more likely to adopt an assimilationist or multicultural stance, and thereby grasp their own predisposition to accept religious and customary diversity. Let us briefly define each of these concepts. The assimilation model expects minorities to adapt completely to the host society and its political system through a process of individual change, in which immigrants give up their different cultural backgrounds in order to adopt the hegemonic group culture. The differentialist model seeks to avoid ethnic conflict by keeping interactions between the majoritarian society and ethnic minorities to a minimum; accordingly the former are segregated from the mainstream. At the same time, however, it may allow or even foster the development of parallel institutions that, to an extent, look after the educational, health and/or cultural needs of these minorities. In turn, the multiculturalist model seeks to allow the individuals and groups with different cultural background to fully join the host society without losing their peculiarities or be denied full participation into the whole society. To obtain full participation, which is considered essential in order to avoid inter-ethnic conflict, it may be necessary to modify the state institutions to a substantial extent in order that they may serve not only the social majority, but also those belonging to different cultural milieus. According to the descriptive results in Figure 3, half of the Europeans (51 per cent of the population of 21 countries) agree with the statement that it is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions, which suggests an assimilationist tendency. In fact, only Portugal (70 per cent) and Spain (55 per cent) stand out above the average while, at the opposite end of the scale, Sweden (36 per cent) and Germany (39 per cent) display the least assimilationist tendencies. By contrast, when
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Source: European Social Survey 20022003, questions D40 and D41 (see the questionnaire in the Appendix).

Figure 3: Citizens assimilation versus multiculturalism. confronted with the statement that it is better for a country if there is a variety of people with different religions, which is closer to the multiculturalist model ideal-type, only a minority of Europeans (39 per cent of 21 countries) agreed. The higher rate of agreement can be seen in the United Kingdom (51 per cent), which is by far the most open country, while the lowest rates are found in Italy (24 per cent) and Portugal (18 per cent). It is worth noting the agreements and differences within these patterns of public opinion and the immigration policies that are developed by governments in the 6 selected countries. The Swedish integration policy is usually considered to be the closest to a multiculturalist model ideal-type in Europe, as it seeks to allow freedom of cultural choice (Inglis 1997; Wihtol de Wenden 1999; Gustafson 2002). British policy is also normally regarded to be multiculturalist, although the concept of diversity involved is based on the struggle against racism rather than on the setting of conditions for the good organization of cultural groups (Wihtol de Wenden 1999). By contrast, German policy is considered to be differentialist (Ignis 1997), while the governments of Italy, Portugal and Spain have not yet clearly defined which model if any they prefer (Aja 2000; Colectivo Io 2000; Triandafyllidou 2003). It could be argued that, since they demonstrate a de facto laissez-faire pattern, these integration policies tend to be assimilationist and hinder the preservation and development of immigrant cultures. Although we saw that Swedes tend to consider that the admittance of immigrants ready to adopt the Swedish way of life should be eased, only a minority believed that it would be better for Sweden if almost everyone shared the same customs and traditions. This further suggests that the former statement is understood to be referring to the political and legal systems, but not to other aspects of social life. These attitudes are consistent
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It is also ironic that Spain was actually a multilingual and plurinational state before the wave of immigration started, as nation-building cultural homogenizing efforts in the nineteenth and twentieth century failed. However, the different Spanish nationalisms (Basque, Catalan and Spanish) still tend to hold homogenizing pretensions for their imagined communities (Martnez-Herrera 2002).

with the governmental multiculturalist model, given that the Swedish state seeks to foster the participation of different cultures while demanding respect for human rights (e.g., gender equality), for Swedish democracy, and even for the individual freedom of cultural choice (Ignis 1997; Gustafson 2002). The attitudes of Germans are similar to those of the Swedes as they also seem to come to terms with the existence of different customs and traditions while preferring that immigrants adopt the German way of life; however, the differential integration policy that tolerates the formation of segregated cultural communities whilst providing them with only a limited degree of governmental support seems hardly consistent with that of apparent toleration of cultural diversity. German integration policies have led to the emergence of segregated communities that do not help the foreigners and natives to live together. The large Turkish minority have long been considered to be guest workers, who have no right to acquire German citizenship (Ignis 1997; Wihtol de Wenden 1999; Minkenberg 2003). This situation may have fostered the perception that immigrants are not integrated. Moreover, this policy can be accounted as a consequence of the German way to build the political community, which is historically defined as being based on an alleged homogeneous and distinctive culture (Brubaker 1990). In any event, if it is true that Germans are becoming more open to cultural diversity, then this would be in line with the reforms of the law on citizenship and naturalization that were introduced in 1999 and enforced in 2000. By introducing the principle of jus soli, this legislative change eases the naturalization both of those foreigners who have been settled in Germany for many years, and especially, their children (OCDE-Sopemi 2001). As for the United Kingdom, there seems to be less consistency between the government and public opinion with regards multiculturalism. While a large majority of British people appear to be favourable to the presence of different religions in their country, the government applies principles of non-discrimination based on race which hinders the recognition of religious differences, in particular those of non-coloured Muslims (Wihtol de Wenden, 1999). South-western societies are not noted for their consistency either. Only one-third of Spaniards, one-quarter of Italians and onefifth of Portuguese express an open predisposition towards religious diversity. In these cases, a historically rooted prejudice against whichever religious difference might be intervening (cf. Minkenberg 2004). In the case of Spain, alongside the general prejudice against any form of heresy that was kept alive during the long Franco dictatorship, an age-old Spanish prejudice against Islam seems also to be alive.5 The constitutions of Italy and Spain hold that both states are secular and non-denominational. In furtherance of this, the Spanish government in 1980 signed a treaty with Morocco through which the Spanish administration would teach Moroccan students in Arabic in primary and secondary schools. In reality, only some municipalities with marginal
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powers on education and very few schools have made any such arrangements (for the record, out of the educational curriculum). Moreover, departing from a general recognition of religious and ideological freedom, article 16 of the Spanish constitution states that: Public powers warrant the right of the parents to choose a religious and moral upbringing in accordance to their own beliefs, and in 1996 the government and representatives of the Evangelic Christian, Jewish and Muslim faiths agreed that lessons on those religions would be taught to the respective students in public schools. Today, Roman Catholicism remains the only religion taught in public schools (Aja 2000). Italian multiculturalism barely differs from its Spanish equivalent. It can be traced back to particular voluntary initiatives by certain schools rather than being the result of any national policy. Additionally, despite the fact that the constitution declares that the state is secular, the vast majority of Italian state school classrooms have a crucifix on their walls. Last but not least, we should recall the argument outlined above that in Italy and Spain there is a noticeable inconsistency between the relatively lesser importance (albeit greater than in other countries) that is attached by the population to religion and the actual policies that favour immigrants from predominantly Catholic countries.

Attitudes to immigrants rights

Additionally, the ESS observes the attitudes with respect to certain rights of the immigrants, particularly regarding the possibility of staying in the host country even if this might not be useful for the citizens interests. The social desirability of the conditional repatriation of immigrants is plausibly related to the negative perceptions of immigrants originating in less affluent countries (see Guiraudon and Joppke 2001). The important thing here is to examine to what extent foreigners settled in the country are recognized as having the same rights as nationals. Figure 4 shows some western Europeans attitudes towards equal rights and expulsion. To begin with, two-thirds of Europeans (66 per cent) agree with the statement that people who have come to live to their country ought to have the same rights as nationals. The rate is 80 per cent in Portugal and 86 per cent in Sweden, but falls to 59 per cent in Germany. Nonetheless, almost half of the Europeans (47 per cent) agree with the sentiment that when immigrants experience a long period of unemployment, they should be expelled from the country. Thus, those vaguely stated equal rights are conditioned in a manner that profoundly undermines that ideal equality. Those more in favour of expelling the unemployed are, paradoxically, the Portuguese (58 per cent), followed by the British (53 per cent), while only a small minority of Spaniards (24 per cent) and Swedes (11 per cent) hold such a view. The fact that the Portuguese stand out as being amongst the most favourable towards a general recognition of equal rights and also as the most likely to seek the repatriation of unemployed immigrants is particularly interesting, since it illustrates the attitudinal inconsistency many citizens may share across
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Source: European Social Survey 20022003, questions D21, D22 and D24 (see the questionnaire in the Appendix).

Figure 4: Citizens agreement with rights and expulsion.

countries with a limited experience of immigration. Serious research on public opinion is aware of the problem of non-attitudes that often emerges in surveys and can generate unreliable findings (Converse 1964; Benedicto 1993; Dalton 1996). Respondents may be inconsistent and volatile across different questions and surveys, a result of both badly designed questionnaires and the interviewees lack of a thought out and real opinion on the themes of the study. In this sense, the limitations of sophisticated public debate on immigration issues in countries with a comparatively recent experience of immigration may well be what are behind the existence of inconsistent attitudes. Some studies have highlighted a stream of opinion, according to which many immigrants take abusive advantage of the welfare state (OCDESopemi 2004). However, the fact that Sweden is not only the country with the most developed welfare state and the one from which the largest amount of foreign residents (mostly refugees) benefit, but it is also the country with the smallest proportion of citizens wishing to expel unemployed migrants, makes us wonder about the validity of such a perception; this is even more true when we recall that many refugees are prohibited from working in Sweden. At any rate, the perception that immigrants abuse of welfare arrangements should not be explained with a straightforward account based on the actual relationships between immigrants and the welfare state, but rather on the ways such relationships are depicted by political elites in the messages they send to citizens. In this sense, we would rather highlight the fact that the Swedish government has made a sustained and serious effort to explain its policy to the public, while the
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governments of other countries tend to follow public opinion as given, without making any serious effort on public diplomacy. The consistency of equalitarian beliefs is also called into question by a third indicator. A majority of Europeans (53 per cent of 21 countries) flirt with the idea of expelling those immigrants who commit any offence against the law. Of the six major western countries, the highest proportion of people who think this are in Italy, with 70 per cent favouring expulsion under these circumstances. The most consistent country, once more, is Sweden, where only 21 per cent state that they would support such a measure. By and large, therefore, the right to stay in the country like any other citizen, even if having committed an offence (not necessarily a crime), is not yet well understood in most European countries.

Concluding remarks
Among western countries, there are many differences with respect to attitudes towards immigration policies. The Swedes appear to be much more open towards to immigrants than any other nationality in Europe. In particular, this attitude is noticeable with respect to the arrival of foreigners who wish to settle in the country. Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom are more reluctant to accept immigrants than the European average. As for the recognition of equal rights for both immigrants and citizens, Sweden appears once more to be the most favourable country, followed in this case by Portugal and Spain, while Germany is the most reluctant to grant such equality. Italians express the strongest support for the repatriation of immigrants who have been involved in any sort of legal offence, whilst the Portuguese are likely to call for the repatriation of unemployed immigrants. Generally speaking, therefore, the right to stay in the country like any other citizen is conditioned in such a manner that deeply undermines the ideal equality most western Europeans ideally like to attach themselves to. This suggests that the right to stay in the country even after having committed an offence is not yet well understood, with the result that many citizens hold inconsistent views on topics they have not carefully reflected on. A major current issue in theoretical debates concerns the subject of discriminatory immigration policies. Most western Europeans show more support for people coming from rich than from poor countries. The single exception to this is supplied, once again, by Sweden, whose citizens seem to favour people from poorer countries. One thing that western Europeans have in common is a (rather vague) view that immigrants ought to be ready to adopt the way of life in the host country. It is not clear, however, whether by this expression they mean that immigrants ought to show respect for the law and the basic arrangements of the host countrys political systems as well as for a respect for human rights or an attachment to the core values of an ethno-culturally understood nation. Yet, one surprising finding is that western European citizens do not demonstrate a significantly different attitude with respect to whether immigrants are from
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Europe or from outside Europe. This calls into question the relevance of the extent of European identification many express in the Eurobarometer and other surveys, at least with respect to the freedom of movement of European citizens. Additionally, this is not consistent with the European policies that are promoted by most involved governments. In the Italian and Spanish cases, the inconsistency between the limited importance attached by the population to religion and governmental admission policies that favour immigrants from predominantly Catholic countries is also noticeable. A third subject is the policy of immigrant integration. Here we find variations both between countries and in the governmentcitizenry relationships within countries. Only a minority of Swedes hold the opinion that almost everyone in the country ought to share the same customs and traditions. These attitudes are fairly consistent with their governments multiculturalist model. German attitudes seem to be close to those of the Swedes, as they also seem to accept the existence of different costumes and traditions; yet their governments differentialist policy, which tolerates the formation of segregated cultural communities but without supporting them on an equal footing with mainstream society, does not seem to fully agree with the apparent multicultural predisposition. As for the British, the congruence between the government and the citizens does not seem stronger. While a large majority of British appear to be favourable to the presence of different religions in the country, their government applies principles of non-discrimination that is based upon race, and which hinders recognition of religious differences that do not correlate with the phenotype, in particular, Muslims. By contrast, only a minority of Portuguese, Italians and Spaniards express an open predisposition towards religious diversity; nevertheless, the constitutional laws of both Spain and Italy declare that both states are secular. The Spanish government has even signed a treaty with Morocco for the teaching of Arabic language in schools, and an agreement with representatives of the Evangelical Christians, Jewish and Muslim faiths for their recognition on an equal footing with Roman Catholicism. In reality, however, no Arabic lessons are available, and only Catholicism is taught in state funded schools. The situation in Italy is very similar to that in Spain. Finally, we attempt to understand the relationship between actual immigration policies and the predispositions of the respective citizens. Swedish politicians behave as an enlightened elite that imposes its own criteria on immigration policies according to what they believe to be in the best interests of both their country and its foreign residents. Thus, the consistency with mass attitudes is the product of decades sustaining their traditionally comparatively generous asylum policies together with an effort to explain them to the population. By contrast, as far as the countries of south-western Europe are concerned, we have reasons to suggest that most of the political class behave as Schumpeterian politicians in this policy area. Driven by a concern to win elections, they obsessively follow
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any small clue that the opinion polls may provide, no matter they be red herrings. Leaving aside the obvious moral problems this behaviour might entail, we would like to point out another problem, which, if we are right, will be a window of opportunity for different politics and policies. In the domains of selective and integration policies, we are inclined to believe that the attitudes of Italians, Portuguese and Spaniards are actually nonattitudes. Not only have we found a number of attitudinal ambiguities and inconsistencies, but the public debate has been much less intense and much more superficial than in societies with longer experience as host countries. Hence, we suspect that they have not yet formed thoughtful and firm preferences in this area; instead, their views are volatile, and easily changed when confronted with the messages of opinion leaders. As a consequence, in this domain preferences ought not to be assumed as given, meaning that a large degree of responsibility falls to the policymakers and opinion leaders. Appendix D6. To what extent do you think [Countrys name] should allow people from the richer countries in Europe to come and live here? D7. And how about people from the poorer countries in Europe? D8. To what extent do you think [Country] should allow people from the richer countries outside Europe to come and live here? D9. How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe? 1 2 3 4 9 Allow many to come and live here Allow some Allow a few Allow none Dont Know/No Answer

Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [Country] should be able to come and live here. How important should it be for them to . . . D13. . . . come from a Christian background? D16. . . . have work skills that [Country] needs? D17. . . . be committed to the way of life in [Country]? These scales range from 0 Extremely unimportant up to 10 Extremely important. Please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. D21. If people who have come to live and work here are unemployed for a long period, they should be made to leave.
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D22. People who have come to live here should be given the same rights as everyone else. D24. If people who have come to live here commit any crime, they should be made to leave. 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 Agree strongly Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Disagree strongly Refusal Dont know No answer

Please tell me to how much you agree or disagree with each of these statements. D40. It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions. D41. It is better for a country if there are a variety of different religions. 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 Agree strongly Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Disagree strongly Refusal Dont know No answer

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Suggested citation
Martnez-Herrera, E., & Moualhi, D., (2006), Predispositions to discriminatory immigration policies in western Europe: An exploration of political causes, Portuguese Journal of Social Science 5: 3, pp. 215233, doi: 10.1386/ pjss.5.3.215/1

Contributor details
Enric Martnez-Herrera is a M. Garca-Pelayo Fellow at the Centro de Estudios Polticos y Constitucionales (Madrid). PhD in Political and Social Sciences (European University Institute, Florence), diploma in Social Science data analysis (University of Essex), MA in Political Science (University Pompeu Fabra). His research, which is mainly concerned with nationalism, multiculturalism and political violence, has been published in journals such as European Journal of Political Research as well as edited books. Contact: Enric Martnez-Herrera, Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), 0145 Tydings Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 E-mail: emartinez@cepc.es Djaouida Moualhi is a researcher in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute (Florence). MA in social anthropology from the Autonomous University of Barcelona. She has worked in secondary education in Algeria and in social intervention and applied social research in Spain. She is currently completing her doctoral dissertation on female NorthAfrican migrants in Italy and Spain. Contact: Djaouida Moualhi, Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Florence. E-mail: djaouida.moualhi@eui.eu Note: Djaouida Moualhi is currently not at the European University Institute, Florence, so please forward any communication to Enric Martnez-Herrera (above).

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