Power-system digital back-up protection

F.C. Chan, B.Sc, Ph.D., D.I.C., C.Eng., M.I.E.E., and B.J. Cory, D.Sc. (Eng.), A.C.G.I., C.Eng., F.I.E.E., Sen. Mem. I.E.E.E.
Indexing terms: Power system protection, Digital control, Circuit breakers and circuit breaking, Fault location

Abstract: The purpose of power-system back-up protection is to disconnect faulty primary equipment not isolated by the main protection and associated circuit breakers. Conventional back-up techniques are difficult to apply in a large power system and heavy reliance on main protection is required. In this paper, both substation-based and centrally co-ordinated back-up protection methods, using microprocessors and minicomputers, are described. In a power system with a reliable communication network between substations, a fault-directing method is proposed to perform centralised digital back-up protection. If the communication network is not available, a substation-based back-up method is suggested. Both methods can reduce back-up fault-clearance time with correct discrimination, high reliability and cost effectiveness.

Introduction

In power systems, there are many different types of protective relay designed to satisfy various requirements for fault identification. As complete reliability is not possible, failures of the protection systems, or the associated circuit breakers which control the faulty apparatus or circuits, must be considered. To safeguard against these failures, some form of back-up scheme is required to supplement the normally faster operation of the main protection system. Conventional local back-up techniques can cater for either main protection failure or circuit breaker failure, but not both. Although these two kinds of function can be incorporated into a remote back-up scheme, a minimum of circuit isolation is generally difficult to achieve. For example, a basic IDMTL relay, apart from its own role in primary protection, can perform local back-up for the primary relay and remote back-up for the relay and circuit breaker of the adjacent substation. However, an IDMTL relay has difficulty in providing proper discrimination under all infeed conditions. Similarly, zones 2 and 3 of a distance relay can provide local back-up and remote back-up, yet the latter is affected by reach variations. With the recent advances in digital computer technology, it is now feasible to achieve a complete digital back-up protection scheme with moderate cost, reliability and satisfactory discrimination properties. At present, digital techniques available for power system protection can be broadly classified into three areas: (a) The central computer approach: in which one computer is used to perform protection for a whole power system. In a 1970 CIGRE paper [1], Ungrad and Glavitsch proposed centrally co-ordinated back-up protection using a central computer, to obtain reactive-power-flow information from various points in the power system, and to compute from this information on the location of the fault. Later, Edgley also investigated the use of a central computer for back-up protection [2] using fault-current directional flow data from all circuit terminations to identify the faulty circuit by a table look-up method. For both cases, a powerful central processor unit is required. (b) The dedicated approach: in which a single processor or computer is used to perform a specific protection function for a circuit or equipment [3]. Much modern digital relaying development has been devoted to transmission-line protection
Paper 2188C (Pll, P9), first received 18th February and in revised form 12th July 1982 Dr. Cory is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Imperial College of Science & Technology, Exhibition Road; London. SW7 2BTy England. Dr. Chan was on study leave from the'China Light & Power Co. Ltd., Hong Kong, where he is now employed 306 0143-7046/82/060306 + 09 $01.50/0

and, in particular, to improving the speed of response to faults on high-voltage long transmission lines. (c) The integrated approach: in which a single computer or system in a substation is used to perform multiple protection tasks [3]. The application of digital computers to the protective relaying field was first suggested by Rockefeller in 1968, to perform multiple relaying functions [4]. Later, various multiple tasks structures and systems were also suggested. The difficulty, perhaps, is related to the speed response and the the required reliability. Owing to delays in communication and general lack of security, the centralised approach is really only suited to area back-up applications. On the other hand, the dedicated processor approach aims at achieving fast fault detection and is most suited to main protection. The integrated, approach, however, is more appropriate for the economic performance of multiple tasks, although the fault response time is somewhat slower than for dedicated relays. This method can be used within a substation for back-up protection, where a slower response than the main protection is required for discrimination; although, for security, it is recommended that duplicate main and back-up protection is required. This paper develops novel schemes using the integrated computer approach for local back-up in a substation, and centralised computer methods for remote back-up purposes.
2 Basic considerations

An ideal protection system should arrange for the circuit breaker(s) nearest to the fault to operate first for isolation. Only if a stuck breaker condition arises should adjacent breakers be tripped to remove the fault from the system. However, if the primary or main protection relays do not operate during a fault, the nearest circuit breaker must be tripped by other means. This is the role of the local protection fail system, but the extent of this system will depend upon the consequence of the loss of supply. In high-voltage systems, such consequences are serious enough to warrant the installation of both local and remote back-up schemes. To minimise primary protection relay failure, duplication techniques are employed in which protection schemes are designed based on different principles and/or supplied by different manufacturers, so that unusual faults which may cause failure of one scheme will be less likely to affect the other. However, by duplicating the primary protection system, the probability of a failure to operate is reduced, but there is an increase in the possibility of false tripping. Because of the difficulty in designing, both technically and economically, an analogue relay to perform suitable primary relay back-up protection, heavy reliance on main
IEEPROC, Vol. 129, Pt. C, No. 6, NOVEMBER 1982

protection has been the practice in the past. At present, the provision of primary relay back-up protection to cater for relay failure on a substation basis by microprocessor or minicomputer is feasible and can be economically achieved. This form of local back-up protection is highly desirable,
substation

because fault clearance can be made more discriminative by tripping the circuit breaker closest to the fault, even following a primary relay failure. An integrated cornputerised scheme can be devised to achieve this desired condition[5,6].

substation 1

fault ' CB2 "

substation 2

next acceptable

i p

Fig. 1 Digital back-up protection methods DR = directional relay PRBP = primary-relay back-up protection PR = primary relay CBBP = circuit-breaker back-up protection CB = circuit breaker F c = fault clearance RBU = remote back-up IEEPROC, Vol. 129, Pt. C, No. 6, NOVEMBER 1982
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As an alternative, a centralised computer can be utilised, provided that a reliable communication network is available. Coded transmission can reduce the signal error. As interference is a function of transmission time, the interference effect can be minimised by an appropriate filtering network allowing for a time delay (say 10 ms). This small time delay will not degrade significantly this fast back-up protection. After information has been sent back to the central computer, fault location can be performed. If the fault location can be quickly determined, a trip signal can be sent to the appropriate circuit breaker closest to the fault. A 'fault-directing method' is detailed in this paper for fast fault location [7, 8]Fig. 1 illustrates the various forms of back-up protection on a flow chart. Both primary-relay back-up protection and centralised back-up protection aim to achieve ideal fault clearance, and shorter back-up fault clearance, in general, is achieved. One important aspect of centralised back-up protection is its ability to isolate the fault, in case of a catastrophic failure of a complete substation, e.g. owing to an earthquake.
3 Substation digital back-up protection system

3.1

System structure

Implementation of the substation digital back-up protection system, on a laboratory scale, was carried out with a 16-bit minicomputer (NOVA-1210) and a microprocessor (National Semiconductor IMP-16C) having memories and cycle times of 12K, 1.35 /is and 2.5 K, 7.5 JUS, respectively. The dataacquisition system could handle up to 16 analogue channels and 4 x 16-bit word digital channels. These enabled a doublebusbar substation configuration to be simulated. A sampling rate of 8 samples per cycle was chosen to give simplicity in running the back-up protection algorithms [9,10].
HV network primary I relay _J

voltage current

CB status ISstatus

PR status

data
acquisition interface IMP-16C >

I data collection

|
system information

data base

The major difference between primary and back-up protection is the time necessary for discrimination before the back-up protection can operate. With this time available, a back-up protection system can be designed to look after a whole substation, not just a single circuit, thus producing economy of equipment. Fig. 2 shows how the proposed digital back-up protection system can be arranged to isolate the faulty circuits that have not been disconnected by the primary protection and the associated circuit breaker. The system consists of two parts: the circuit-breaker back-up protection and the primary-relay back-up protection.

j
CBBP ! PRBP switching interface

U-l event I
loggers tripcontrol event printout backup monitoring alarm signal background program

NOVA-1210

Fig. 3
double busbar substation

Program configuration

analogue inputs

digital inputs

data acquisition
circuit breaker back-up protection

data base

Fig. 3 shows the basic program structure developed for the back-up protection system. The major protection functions were performed by the circuit-breaker back-up protection (CBBP) program in the IMP-16C microprocessor and the primary-relay back-up protection (PRBP) program in the Nova-1210 minicomputer. Two levels of program execution were adopted in the IMP-16C, as shown in Fig. 4. The datacollection program was started on interrupts from the realtime clock at the beginning of the sampling interval. After the CBBP program, the microprocessor returned to its background program. In the Nova-1210 minicomputer, three levels of program execution were used. The first level consisted of the basic data-communication program, the fault sensor, the event loggers and the trip program. The second level was the heart of the PRBP program and the third level consisted of the real-time operating system and the event printout program. 3.2 Circuit-breaker back-up protection A conventional back-up scheme was adopted for digital implementation. The breaker back-up timer was initiated upon the receipt of: (a) the primary-relay trip signal, (b) a current level detected by a current sensor and (c) the circuit breaker in the closed position. The condition (c) can be considered as an optional safegard measure. After a predetermined time, if (a) and (b) conditions were still present, back-up breaker tripping (as determined by the associated isolator positions) was performed on appropriate adjacent circuit breakers. To suit operating requirements, the CBBP program was divided into four parts: (i) data grouping, (ii) timer and fault detector, (iii) zone determination and (iv) trip initiation
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primary relay back-up protection background and Monitoring program

circuit breaker control

to other substation

Fig. 2
308

Digital back-up protection system

programs. Software timers of the parallel type were required to enhance the system reliably and simply [ 6 , 8 ] .
sampling interval I clock | interrupt IMP-16C

various protected circuits in the substation. A fault calculation algorithm is then applied to identify the fault and to make a trip decision. The following Subsections discuss the fundamental requirements for each stage of this development. 3.3.1 Starting: Overcurrent detection was employed for starting the primary-relay back-up protection program. The instantaneous value of the current in each phase was compared with a preset value during data acquisition, following analogue to digital conversion. A magnitude bit was generated to signify and identify an overcurrent condition on those circuits. The overcurrent setting was not critical in affecting the starting of the PRBP, but the setting should be greater than the maximum load current and less than the minimum fault current. Should the minimum available fault current be below the maximum load current, an undervoltage detector can be incorporated. As two primary cycles of analogue data were sorted in the data base, it was easy to detect an undervoltage condition by comparing the newly collected voltage data to that collected one cycle previously. 3.3.2 Fault detection system: Basically, the PRBP program has two forms of fault identification: (i) a busbar fault, where the input quantities need a large number of current inputs (ii) a circuit fault, where the input quantities are either 3-phase voltage and currents (distance) or two 3-phase currents (differential). Busbar fault detection is arranged to have a higher priority than a circuit fault, so after starting the PRBP program, the busbar fault condition was first examined, followed by checking of each circuit in a logical sequence. In case an additional busbar fault occurred during circuit checking, the PRBP executed its busbar protection algorithm to initiate tripping action and return to circuit checking afterwards. The circuits to be checked can be reduced by the directional data logic summation extension method [5,8] and the powerflow-direction determination. Furthermore, the total number of circuits the system can handle depends on the available back-up time and the program-execution speed. In general, faster processing speed gives shorter protection calculation times; hence, more circuits can be accommodated in the PRBP program. 3.3.3 Protection algorithm: In digital relaying there are various kinds of protection algorithms having different characteristics of program-execution time, fault-detection time and degree of accuracy. The sampling rate, the data window and the arithmetic complexity of the program are factors which govern the response characteristics of the protection program. From the data processing point of view, digital relaying alorithms can be divided into two categories: (i) those working with a data window of a whole fundamental cycle (ii) those working with only a portion of the fundamental cycle. For the one-cycle data window method, a change in operating conditions takes more time to reach a new value than with a short data window. However, this latter method needs more time to settle down to its correct value. In considering the back-up protection application, fault detection is not required within 20 ms after fault inception. Therefore, the more accurate algorithm using whole cycle detection is preferred and a Fourier method is chosen for detection. (The inability
309

time

NOVA-1210

Fig. 4

Multilevel structure in processors

3.3 Primary-re lay back-up protection (PRBP) PRBP is the most important function performed by the proposed digital protection system. The operating time of the PRBP system should be in the range of 50 to 60 ms, so that the total fault-clearance time, when the primary relay fails, is well below the remote back-up time setting of 200 ms, or even lower if possible. A substation normally consists of transformers, switchgear, busbar and outgoing feeders. For plant situated locally, in which the protected zone is well defined by CTs positioned at both ends, unit protection using differential principles was employed. For those outgoing feeders or feeder transformers connected to remote substations, where single end-fault detection was required, an impedance measurement method (distance protection) was adopted. In the PRBP scheme, back-up coverage for every piece of apparatus was not provided and the back-up function concentrated on major primary main protection. Thus for basbar, transformer or generator protection, a general differential scheme was chosen with individual features incorporated (e.g. inrush magnetising current restraint function for transformer protection). These techniques greatly simplified the system structure, as the protection algorithm and data-acquisition system had only to deal with differential and distance protection [5]. As the PRBP has the same function as the primary relays, it is important to provide a high degree of security. Thus, to allow tripping to occur, three conditions needed to be fulfilled: (i) the starter had operated (ii) the directional data logic summation method or its extension had identified the fault [5, 8] (iii) the differential current had exceeded the setting or the impedance value had fallen below the zone setting. For the busbar protection to initiate tripping, all three conditions must be satisfied. For transformer or feeder protection tripping, if condition (ii) cannot be fulfilled, then condition (iii) has to be satisfied twice in succession. In this integrated multipurpose protection approach, the digital system needs a starting device. After the fault starter operates, the next step is to locate the faulty part among the
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of a Fourier method to handle large X/R ratios providing high DC offsets can be improved by using linear couplers.) For busbar protection, the directional data logic summation has to be satisfied, together with the summated current greater than the fault setting IFIX- For distance protection, the impedance was calculated by extracting the fundamental component (Fourier coefficient) as: V = A sin cot + B cos cot I = E sin cot + Fcos cot Z = - = R + jX {BE-AF)\ so that R=(AE + BF)/\E2 + F2) and X = (E2 + F2). In this system, calculation of all six phase (3 phase-toearth and 3 phase-to-phase) impedances was performed and a quadrilateral zone characteristic was identified. For transformer or generator protection, the ratio of the two end current transformer measurements was scaled before A/D conversion; thus direct summation was possible after data acquisition. Both load bias and harmonic bias could be provided to suit any stability requirement.
3.4 Experimental results

Table 2: Data transfer and protection algorithm operating times, ms Protection algorithms Distance protection Differential protection Busbar protection (per phase) Prearrangement or fault-data collection address 0.20 0.45 0.70 Data transfer and precalculation 0.70 0.60 0.45 Protection Total calculation

6.20 1.40 0.10

7.10 2.45 1.25

in Table 2. With these computational speeds a fault-detection time for back-up protection of 50 to 60 ms was achieved for a double-busbar substation with up to 15 circuits.

Centralised back-up protection

The PRBP program was set up in a Nova-1210 minicomputer; the utilisation of its 12 K memory is indicated in Table 1. The CBBP program consisted of 1 K memory in the IMP16C, the remaining 1.5 K being used for data-base storage. Both programs were tested in a laboratory double-busbar substation model with transmission lines represented by discrete elements of resistance and reactance. Various faults were simulated including stuck circuit breaker, generator fault, transformer fault, transmission-line fault, busbar fault and simultaneous faults. Both programs reacted satisfactorily and no maloperations were recorded. The respective protection-algorithm execution time is shown
Table 1: Program location in Nova-1210 Address Function Percentage of total 12 K memory, % 2.13 0.53 0.35 0.35 0.35 1.07 1.07 4.26 002000-005777 fault-data collection for (i) distance protection (ii) unit protection (iii) BBZ protection (2nd level programs) protection algorithms fault-data collection prearrangement programs data transfer fault-identification table event logging zone checking 4.17 2.13 8.53 14.83 007000-011777 8.60 4.20 12.80 0.53 4.20 4.20 3.87 12.80 8.53

The centralised back-up protection method was first proposed in 1970 by Ungard and Glavitsch, using reactive-powerflow information from various substations to perform fault location [1]. Later, a table look-up method by Edgley [2] and the discriminative logic approach by Matsuoka and Tsuboi [11] were also developed. All these schemes use a central computer and, in particular, a reliable communication system is required for the back-up protection scheme. With advances in modern power-system-control techniques, it is possible to incorporate the back-up protection scheme into the computer hierarchical communication arrangement. With the application of the 'fault-directing method' in the central computer, back-up protection for an area of powersystem network can be achieved.
4.1 System structure

000000-000377 000400-001777

common data storage (1st level programs) data transfer event logger fault-data collection data collection trip program fault sensor

012000-014777

Fig. 5 A shows a typical power-system control computer hierarchical communication structure; Fig. 5B is the corresponding area separation of the power-system network. In this structure, the central computer can provide both back-up protection for the tie lines interconnecting the various areas and for system splitting or islanding in the ' case of a permanent uncleared fault in an area. In each area, the area computer performs centralised back-up protection for its own power-system network. The area computer will normally be a minicomputer or microprocessor depending on the size of the power system network. To implement the 'fault-directing method', each circuitbreaker relay measuring point is equipped with a directional overcurrent relay pointing outwards from the substation. Operation of the relay is communicated to the area computer and interrogated by it for determination of the fault location. As the fault-directing method (FDM) is a fast-fault-location method, it divides the power-system network into two basic interconnecting elements, the 'centre' and the 'link'. For FDM used in an area computer, the centre can be a busbar, or a portion of a busbar (having at least two connecting terminals); the link can be a transmission line or a teed circuit (having a circuit breaker at each line end). For FDM used in the central computer, the centre will be the area and the link will be the tie line. Fig. 6 shows these various possible configurations.
4.2 Fault-directing method

015000-016777 017000-027210

graphic data storage (3rd level program) background operating system and event printout program 36.27

4.2.1 Fault location program: The fault-directing program in the area or central computer consists of a number of 'centre' routines and a number of 'link' routines corresponding to the actual power-system structure. The program excution allows a 'jump' to be made from a 'centre' routine to a 'link' routine
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and back again, in such a way that a fault can be rapidly located. A jump from 'centre' routine to 'link' routine is made when the directional relay in the centre pointing towards the link has operated. A jump from a 'link' routine to a 'centre' routine is made when no fault is found in the link. For a link fault, the fault will be identified in the 'link' routine, whereas, for a centre fault, the number of entries to the 'centre' routine is used for fault determination. This produces a straightforward method without any use of the cumbersome table look-up technique. A flow chart for FDM is shown in Fig. 7. The program operation depends on the number of faults simultaneously presented, the number of directional relays operated and the type of faults located. Typical fault-identification time is 90jus for a Nova minicomputer (1.35jus cycle time) on a system size as shown in Fig. 8.

4.2.2 Program illustration: The power-system network, shown in Fig. 8, consists of 24 lines interconnected between 11 substations, where a total of 64 directional relays are situated. Suppose there are three simultaneous faults on lines L and X and on busbar S8, and the directional relays have operated as shown in Fig. 8 by the symbols. The program starts, first, with an orderly checking of the operated directional relays (in this case, a numerical order has been arranged). The checking is done in groups corresponding to all the directional relays in a substation. Hence, a centre routine of substation S2 was started because the operated directional relay 8 was found and a jump to 'link' / was made. Since no fault was found in 'link' J, a jump to 'centre' substation S10 routine was then followed. After the directional relay 58 was found, the 'link' L routine was called and a fault was thus located, because both ends of the link showed relay operation in opposite directions. After locating the first fault, the program was restarted by group checking of directional relays. Next the 'centre' routine S3 was started because directional relay 14 was found, and so the 'link' V routine, 'centre' S4 routine and finally 'link' X routine were entered in sequence and the second fault was located. To locate the fault on the teed circuit X, directional relays 16, 19 and 21 where all interrogated and found to have operated. Similarly, the directional relay 30 led to the substation 57 and the program restarted after no fault in 'link' H was found. Similar processes took place on the 'links' /, F and G. As the 'centre' program had been entered four times without any outgoing fault being located, a fault in substation 58 was determined. The program also includes flagging of the directional relays which have operated for fault-directing and reset purposes. For a flagged relay signal, no further test is made and it is treated as if the relay had not operated. The program stops when all operated directional relays have been flagged.
4.3 Trip decision algorithm

S=substation

Fig. 5A Power-system-control computer hierarchical communication structure

To provide a secure and reliable centralised back-up protection, failure of the directional relay or communication

I -e- -xi

-X-

two-terminal centre

v.

two-terminal link

-*-H three-terminal link multiterminal centre power \ system ! network /

e- I

link fault centre fault -0-directional relay

-e-directional relay Fig. 6 Basic elements in the fault-directing method a Elements, b Faults

Fig. 5B

Power-system-network area separation

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;;
initialise testing
i

group checking of substation directional relay numerical order

I flowchart repeats as before

Fig. 7

Flow chart for the fault-directing method

T
Fig. 8 312 Fault-directing method for fault location in a typical power-system network

--directional relay operated

IEEPROC, Vol. 129, Pt. C, No. 6, NOVEMBER 1982

Case number
1

Directional relay End End 1 2

1 1

End 3

FDM result
F
LL LL

Table 3 : Trip decision table Main protection Total Trip send End End result End End End 1 2 3 1 2
0 0 F
LL LL

Remarks End 3 pure FDM identification transfer trip 'single DR failure # substation entry nonzero, channel failure at other substation # substation entry equal to zero, channel failure at # substation single DR maloperate possible wrong signal

X X X

X X

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14

1 1 1 0* 1 # 0 1 # 0 1 0 0 0
1

1 1 0* 1 0 1 # 0 1 # 0 1 0 0
1 1

NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF
F
LL LL LL

1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0

0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0

IL IL

X X X

F F NF NF NF NF NF NF
F
LL LL IL

pure FDM identification transfer trip transfer trip single DR failure single channel failure single DR maloperate possible wrong signal

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
23 24 25

1 1 1 1 1 0* 1 1
1 1 0

1 1 1 1 0 1 0* 0
0 0 0

1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0*
0 0 0

NF NF

1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1

0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0

X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X

LL LL

z zz

NF NF NF

LL LL LL

LL LL LL

NF NF NF

F = fault NF = nonfault

1 = operate 0 = nonoperate X = trip send

FDM = fault directing method DR = directional relay

CBzcircuit breaker MPzmain protection DR=directional relay

CB

substation data
MP DR

data received

central computer
DR

background program

fault occurrence directional relay power flow DIR send main protection operate transfer trip from central computer
i

time,ms
20

CB

MP

FDM transfer 3U program trip 1 imer

DR operate

dQta

60 80
"- -

, -

3 J

stop no fault

initiate BU timer

100 , 120 140

CBoperT . CBopen -.

DR reset DR reset data^

back-up action BU CB identified BU CB tripping

160 180 200

-m

initiate FDM program stop #normalfault\ Iclearence /

back-up fault clearence

220

further timer

initiation

Fig. 9 Timing control and fault-clearance chart for centralised backup protection CB = circuit breaker MP = main protection DR = directional relay IEEPROC, Vol. 129, Pt. C, No. 6, NOVEMBER 1982
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channel has to be tolerated in the back-up scheme. Redundant information is therefore required to provide such fault tolerance, and for this purpose it is proposed that the main protection signaKis sent back to the central computer over a separate communication channel. With this primary-relay information, together with the FDM fault identification, a single directional relay failure or single communicationchannel failure will not affect the back-up protection function. This is illustrated in Table 3 (cases 4 to 9, 20 to 23) where, in the case of wrong directional relay or main protection information, no tripping action is initiated. The transfer trip facilities in this centralised back-up scheme can also be utilised for distance protection signalling. For a single circuit condition, a permissive underreaching transfer scheme can be obtained, as illustrated in cases 2 and 3 in Table 3. Furthermore, the scheme is also capable of providing teed-circuit protection (cases 1519), and it can be considered as an improvement over the conventional multiended protection signalling scheme.
4.4 Timing characteristic

Fig. 9 illustrates the timing control and corresponding fault clearance excution necessary [7]. The function of this centralised back-up scheme can be listed as follows: 4.4.1 Main-protection back-up: For a breaker operating time of 40 ms, main-protection fault-clearance time is equal to 80 ms. In the case of main-protection failure, a total faultclearance time of 100 ms can be achieved. If this back-up scheme is used with two main protections as a two-out-ofthree scheme, an increase in both security and reliability can be achieved. Furthermore, the PRBP program can be modified to allow an external start initiation for faster fault measurement. 4.4.2 Circuit-breaker protection back-up: The centralised back-up protection utilises local breaker back-up facilities and in case of both circuit-breaker and back-up protection failure, a fault-clearance time of 220ms can still be achieved.
5 Conclusions

In terms of power-system equipment, the substationbased system can give good back-up protection performance of local power plant such as busbars, transformers and circuit breakers, whereas the centralised back-up scheme is best applied to transmission-line back-up protection. Application of these two back-up schemes simultaneously, each with their individual merits, would form in combination a highly reliable back-up protection system. Laboratory experimental results of these two schemes have shown the advantages offered by each. The treatment of CBBP in the substation-based system was found to be effective, particularly when parallel software timer techniques were applied. The PRBP scheme offers a new way of providing back-up protection. In centralised back-up protection, tolerance of single communication channel or directional relay failure has been provided, and the fault-identification process has not shown to be affected. To cater for computer failure, a standby computer will be needed, as with other computer-based schemes. Digital back-up protection techniques can offer a substantial improvement over conventional techniques, with the possibility of providing a better protection performance to the future power-system network.
6 Acknowledgments

This work was undertaken at the Imperial College with SERC funds for the purchase of computer equipment. F.C. Chan would like to thank the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the UK for the financial support and the China Light and Power Co. Ltd., Hong Kong, for granting him study leave.
7 References

This paper has described two newly developed digital techniques for power-system back-up protection. Both of these schemes can give a faster back-up fault-clearance time not achievable by conventional techniques. In the substationbased system, primary-relay failure can be readily handled. On the other hand, the centralised back-up protection offers a much larger coverage of the power-system network, as complete substation failure can still be detected. The cost of the centralised back-up protection scheme is expensive, dependent on the cost of the communication system; but this can be reduced by sharing it with other power-systemcontrol and data-acquisition functions. On the other hand, the provision of a reliable communication system is becoming more important for fast power control and the centralised approach would be applicable to this philosophy.

1 UNGRAD, H., and GLAVITSCH, H.: 'Centrally co-ordinated back-up protection and system security monitoring as constituents of an integrated system for the automation of power transmission'. CIGRE, Paper 34-03, 1970 2 EDGLEY, R.K.: 'A central computer for power-system back-up protection', Electr. Rev., 14th March 1975, pp. 321-324 3 CORY, B.J., DROMEY, G., and MURRAY, B.E.: 'Digital systems for protection'. CIGRE, Paper 34-08, August 1976 4 ROCKEFELLER, G.D.: 'Fault protection with a digital computer', IEEE Trans., 1969, PAS-88, pp. 438-464 5 CHAN, F.C, and CORY, B.J.: 'Substation digital back-up protection system', IEE Conf. Publ. 185, 1980, pp. 102-106 6 CHAN, F.C: 'A power system back-up protection and its implementation'. 14th UPEC, Loughborough, 1979 7 CHAN, F.C: 'Fault-directing method for power system centralized back-up protection'. IEE Conf. Publ. 185, 1980, pp. 107-111 8 CHAN, F.C: 'Power system digital back-up protection'. PhD. Thesis, Imperial College, London, 1979 9 CHAN, F.C: 'Protection of substations using microprocessors design considerations'. 13th UPEC, Edinburgh, 1978 10 CHAN, F.C: 'Digital back-up protection, system hardware and software'. Power system report, Imperial College, 1979 11 MATSUOKA, T., and TSUBOI, A.: 'The discriminative logic of fault elements for a centralized back-up protection in power circuits'. IFAC Symposium, Melbourne, Feb. 1977

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