Book Review: The Utility of Force

Class: Violence and Non-Violence CRS-2231

Instructor: Ismael Muvingi
By Carsten Kaefert (3012875)

Table of Contents
Book Review: The Utility of Force........................................................................................................1
Overview...........................................................................................................................................1
Historical Changes in the Use of Force.............................................................................................2
Nuclear Shock and Cold War........................................................................................................2
New types of conflict....................................................................................................................3
Multinational warfighting........................................................................................................3
Sub-state actors........................................................................................................................4
Misconceptions of Force..................................................................................................................4
Wars are not to be won..................................................................................................................4
Winning people's wills is not auxiliary.........................................................................................5
Violence and the Utility of Force in the 21. Century.........................................................................5
Conclusion.........................................................................................................................................6

Overview
In his 2005 book “The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World” highly

decorated General Sir Rupert Smith tries to present the changes the use of force – read: warfare – has

experienced in the run of history. His work provides a brief overview of the developments prior to

the Second World War, but focuses mainly on the developments afterwards. This text will follow in

fashion and present an outline of the development of warfare since the end of World War II based

upon Smith's account. His construction of war among the people as a successor to the industrial war

will be object of deeper analysis. This will focus on two aspects: The implications of the west's

armies being prepared for the wrong kind of war, as Smith observes it, and the measures he suggests

to give force back it's utility.

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Historical Changes in the Use of Force

Nuclear Shock and Cold War

Smith describes the framework in which military force was executed up to the end of the

Second World War in a very simple sequence: “peace-crisis-war-resolution”.1 This circle, he states,

has since come to an end – together with the whole concept of industrial war.

Smith presents a variety of reasons for that. The most obvious one is the development of the

atomic bomb. It lead the Cold War powers towards a policy of deterrence, called mutually assured

destruction (MAD), which made sure that any direct military conflict between the superpowers

would end in full scale nuclear war, thus rendering it infeasible. 2 This had a multitude of

implications: First of all, in order for MAD to work properly, both sides had to maintain and improve

their conventional, industrial force.3 Thus having a large and well equipped military at hand, they

were able to engage in a number of proxy wars, which due to the aforementioned conditions were not

industrial wars anymore – the wars by the USA in Vietnam and the USSR in Afghanistan can be seen

as examples.

The way, in which these wars were fought, is also strongly affected by the prevalence of MAD.

To prevent a “slippage into a nuclear war”4, as Smith calls it, a regime called Rules of Engagement

(ROE) was conceived during the Cold War. It governs in detail the reaction of a force to actions of

it's adversary, thus limiting an army's ability to adopt to a situation.

1
Smith, Rupert: The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World. London, UK: Penguin Books. 2006. P. 181.
2
cf. ibid. P. 190.
3
cf. ibid. P. 191.
4
Ibid. P. 318.

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New types of conflict

In the era of the World Wars armies were trained to achieve a decisive victory against another

state employing an army of it's own and as well trying to achieve a decisive victory. Things have

changed rapidly since then. After World War II armed conflicts increasingly involved non-state

actors, of which there are basically two types: Multinational alliances or coalitions and sub-state

parties to a conflict.

Multinational warfighting
Soon after the coalition fighting Germany in the Second World war broke apart, both the

superpowers created military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) and thus set the stage for the

Cold War. Another factor contributing to the formation of multinational forces are the United Nations

and their concept of peacekeeping by joint forces.

For the states contributing to such a multinational effort there are several benefits: More

resources can be allocated, legitimacy is felt to come with numbers and risks are spread. 5 But

commanding such a force comes with a specific set of challenges. Most obvious are differences in

language, making translation necessary and thus rendering certain modes of cooperation infeasible.6

This then results challenges at setting the level of fight and deploying the right combination of

forces, which in this form are not necessarily considered in traditional industrial warfare.7

On top of this come varying political responsibilities and accountabilities, as even a national

army in a multinational force is still one states army. Furthermore, even within one multinational

5
Cf.ibid. P. 301.
6
Cf.Ibid. P.317.
7
Cf.ibid.

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force a multitude of ends can be sought and priorities be set. That means within one force there can

be a whole set of conflicts of interest and loyalty, that has to be addressed by the forces commander.8

Sub-state actors
Sub-state actors, may they be guerrillas, terrorists or parties in a civil war, are the most obvious

sign of the transition from industrial warfare to war among the people, which is Smith's central

argument. This is because whether they fight for, against or just within one people, they make the

people the battlefield, which in turn becomes omnipresent.9

This turns weapons systems created for an industrial war mostly ineffective: The opponent will

hide within the population as long as possible and try to keep his activity below the threshold of

applying massive industrial military force.10

Misconceptions of Force
Smith argues that nowadays use of military force largely lacks utility because it is about the

wrong means employed in the wrong way to achieve ever-changing ends that cannot be reached by

them. This is due to some misconceptions about the ability and purpose of force stemming from the

erroneous assumption of industrial war.

Wars are not to be won

Whilst the rhetorics and political backing still present war as a military operation that will

achieve a victory and thus reach the political goal, this has not been true for the past decades and

8
Cf. Ibid.
9
Cf. Ibid. P. 278.
10
Cf. Ibid. P. 282ff.

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most likely will not be in the future. Instead, not longer is a military victory about an opponent's

army the end a nation tries to achieve by war, but a condition is sought to be established.11

Winning people's wills is not auxiliary

As Smith states, military always understood the necessity of winning the opponent's people's

will. Just that this is not something auxiliary to attaining the end sought anymore, but has become the

very end itself.12

Violence and the Utility of Force in the 21. Century

All the issues with the use and utility of force as laid out in the concept of industrial

beforehand make it obvious that there is a need for new guidelines for the employment of military

force. Smith attempts to create these by first narrowing down what an army can do. He lists four

basic capabilities of armed forces: ameliorate, contain, deter or coerce and destroy.13 Policymakers

have to be aware of this restrictions in order to bring force to it's utility.

Once in the field, a set of new behaviors has to be employed. Smith, as a General in the British

forces, obviously argues from the perspective of a major western military power, which in modern

warfare means warring as a part of a multinational force. The commander of such a force, according

to Smith, has to follow three rules, which tend to be softer than rules formulated in previous eras.

She (or he) hast to ensure that “for every endeavour […] there is an objective or purpose in

common”14 for the forces involved, that “there is equity in risk and reward” 15 and to “conduct

command on the basis of goodwill to all allies”16.

11
Cf. Ibid. P. 270.
12
Cf. Ibid. P. 277.
13
Cf. Ibid. P. 320f.
14
Ibid. P. 316.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.

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 He doesn't stop at setting up a framework for multinational forces, but also circumscribes what

it takes to successfully fight a non- or sub-state opponent. Most important in this area seems to be

intelligence – and a change of focus within it's system: Instead of surveying equipment (which was

equivalent to a concentration of soldiers in industrial war) it now has to research people and their

movements – and the right ones at this.17 As the enemy is identified, the military needs to employ the

right amount of force to take him out – mostly meaning lighter weapons and a lower intensity of

force.

Conclusion
Altogether, Smith argues for a thorough reform of the way in which we employ force. The time

of industrial war, of impressive weapons systems, tanks, fighter planes and nuclear submarines is

over, as the time of fighting war among people begins – or is actually blossoming given the amount

of low-level armed conflicts nowadays. Sadly (but hardly surprising, as he spent his life employing

force and improving his nation's skills at it) he focuses only on ways in which force can be employed

more effectively. By focusing only on the “How?” instead of the “If” of force, he fails to address one

urgent question: Has force still utility these days?

17
Cf. Ibid. P.326.

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