TheBattleofCrete:AReevaluation

CharlesPrestidgeKing*
In the space of 11 short days in late May 1941, Crete marked the zenithoftheThirdReich.Yetitissignificantasmorethanasimple watermark:asthisessayshallargue,thebattleofCreteheldagreat deal of contextual influence over the eventual course of the war. I argue also that Crete serves as an excellent focal point through whichtoobserveavarietyofstrategic,moral,andtacticalrealitiesof the Second World War. Naturally, an attempt at complete description of the battle would be impossible, and this essay can only briefly touch upon some longrunning historical debates and areas of investigation. These include the role of ULTRA, the code breaking system used by Allied High Command; the tension between Winston Churchill, Field Marshall Archibald Wavell and General Sir Bernard Freyberg, and much of the ongoing debate aboutforeknowledge;leadershipdynamicswithinAlliedcommand, and the importance of Creteto the intentionalism vs. functionalism debate.Inlightoftheseongoingdebates,thisessaywillarguefora renewed consideration of Crete by military history, focusing specificallyonitsmoreproblematicelements.

Introduction
Crete,along,thinislandinthecentreoftheEasternMediterranean,has alwaysbeenatargetofmilitaryambition.SincethetimeoftheMinoans, the Achaeans, Dorians, Romans, Arabs, Venetians, and Turks have all fought to control it, and, over time, have again lost it to more formidableopponents.ThepossessionofCrete,however,shouldnotbe considered as just territorial gain, nor can it be imagined as a purely strategic holding the possession of Crete historically coincides with thezenithofitspossessor,anditslosswiththatpowerslapse.1

CharlesPrestidgeKingisinhisthirdyearBachelorofPhilosophy(Arts) degreeattheAustralianNationalUniversity.HeisacurrentresidentofBruce Hall.

*
1D.M.Davin,TheOfficialHistoryofNewZealandintheSecondWorldWar,19391945:Crete (1953)2.

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The particulars of the battle are of some importance to historians examining the relative strengths and competing strategies of Axis and Allied forces in the Mediterranean, and the nature of German early campaign strategy at its zenith. As well as attempting to make some contribution to the above areas of inquiry, I intend to show that Crete maybeusefultothehistorianinassessingtheroleofairborneinfantry within war, the strategic mind of Hitler, the impact of losing Crete to Alliedmorale,andtheutilityofintelligence.2

Those11Days
Beginning on the 20th May, 1941, with the first paratrooper landings near Maleme, the Battle of Crete already mentioned and claimed the livesofsome1751British,Greek,AustralianandNewZealandsoldiers, and that of 2071 German soldiers. Marked by close quarters fighting, confusion,andperhapsaboveallelse,theeverpresentdivebombraids, the seventh Fallschirmjger [Paratrooper Division] and fifth Gebirgsjger [Mountain Division] Divisions of the German Army managed to captureCreteinitsentiretybythe31stMay.ThoseAlliedsoldierswho couldnotevacuateweretakenprisoner.Itisalsoconsideredsomething of a demarcation point for a number of reasons: firstly, it is the last majorbattlebeforetheinvasionoftheSovietUnion;itisalso,savefor the Market side of Operation Market Garden, the largest single deploymentof paratroops in the Second World War. It isalso the first instanceofanislandbeingsuccessfullyinvadedfromtheair,afactthat wouldweighheavyonBritishmorale.3Formany,theBattleofCreteis infactlittlemorethanafullstopinthehistoryoftheSecondWorldWar. AwkwardlysituatedbetweenAxisvictoriesinPoland,France,Norway, andtheBalkansandthevastnessofOperationBarbarossa,Creteisoften littlemorethananepithet,thelastphaseoftheBalkanscampaign,the end of German dominance, and more sombrely, as the grave of the

Churchill,forinstance,devotestwoentirechaptersofhisHistoryoftheSecondWorldWar toit:W.Churchill,TheSecondWorldWar(vol.III,1950).Theywererevisedandaltered manytimes,formanyreasons:toprotectthesecretofULTRApostwar,andmore significantly,toavoiddamagingthereputationandlegacyofkeyfigures,including FreybergandWavell,whocontactedhimpersonally.See:D.Reynolds,TheUltraSecret andChurchillsWarMemoirs(2005)20IntelligenceandNationalSecurity218. 3A.Zapantis,HitlersBalkanCampaignandtheInvasionoftheUSSR(1987)64.

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German paratrooper. Finally, the story of Crete is reduced to three simplewords:AxisPyrrhicvictory. Both the course of the battle and the eventual German success have been remarked upon by many writers, and reasons abound, both positiveandnegative,forthebattlesresult.Scholarlydisputationaside, anyclaimassessingreasonsforvictorycannotignorethebluntrealityof the islands topography. Mountainous, thin and long, with poor harbour sites (meaning that supplies had to come through the vulnerable northern harbours of Retimo, Heraklion, and most importantly, Suda Bay), Crete has always been a difficult island to defend. In May 1941, there were only two fullyfunctioning airfields upon the island at Maleme and Heraklion, with several more under construction. A number of smaller, less accessible airfields existed. Communicationswerehamperedbythelayoutoftheisland,andbythe sparsenessandqualityofitsroadsandrailways.4 Despitethesedifficulties,initialreportsonthesituationwereoptimistic. Letters to Churchill and Michael Savage, the Prime Minister of New Zealandatthetime,showFreybergasunconcernedwiththeprospectof an aerial invasion: I am not in the least anxious about an airborne attack.5 It was, in fact, the prospect of a joint sea and air attack that worrieshimgreatly,andthefinaltoneofreservationinFreybergsletter to General Archibald Wavell, Allied Commander in the Middle East, canbedirectlylinkedtothisfear.AlthoughIdonotwishtoseemover confident, I feel that at least we will give an excellent account of ourselves,andwiththehelpoftheRoyalNavyItrustthatCretewillbe held.6

IntelligenceandtheAirWar
Thisoptimismmayhavebeenjustified.Britishmilitaryintelligencehad until Crete been of modest utility. Yet in the case of Crete, ULTRA revealed the entire plan of Operation Merkur, right down to date and

Davin,aboven1,11. DepartmentofInternalAffairs(Wellington),DocumentsRelatingtoNewZealands ParticipationintheSecondWorldWar19391945(vol.I,1949)293. 6Ibid,297.

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landing positions, if not accurate troop numbers.7 However, after the war, historians debated whether or not this information would have madeanypracticaldifference,8comingasitdidsometwoweeksbefore the first landings on the island.9 The information regarding the use of paratroops in the Balkan region had been available since late March, when Enigma revealed movement orders amongst six JU52 Gruppen, and that 250 transport aircraft had arrived in Greece from Germany. Likewise, the landing patterns and ground tactics of the paratroopers waswellknown,asthestandardGermanparachutistmanual,captured as early as May 1940 had been extensively studied throughout the CommonwealthArmedForces.10 Despite this confidence, British intelligence was already concerned about the possibility of the Germans exploiting Cretes strategically advantageous position for an assault on the Middle East. Extensive discussion surrounded the possibility that Crete may, in fact, be cover foranairborneattackonCyprusandSyria,withthefinalintentionofan attack on Iraq.11 General Kurt Student, head of the Fallschirmjger Division, did, in fact, wish to jump (Sprung nach Kreta, or jump to Crete,isacommonnamefortheinvasion)fromCretetoCyprus,and fromtheretotheSuezCanal.12Theanxietysurroundinganimmediate attackuponCyprusorSyriawassopronouncedthatevenafterEnigma had shown Crete as the next objective (on 27th April), indecision still remainedastowhethertoevendefendCrete.13

F.H.Hinsley,BritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar(1979)419.Mostnumberswere overestimations. 8Ibid,419.Hinsleyspositionisrestatedina1996lecture:F.H.Hinsley,TheInfluenceof ULTRAintheSecondWorldWar(LecturepresentedatCambridgeUniversity, Cambridge,26November2006)at<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ Historical/hinsley.html>at13October2006. 9Ibid,415. 10B.H.LiddellHart,TheOtherSideoftheHill(1948)240.Studentwouldlaterexpressregret forfailingtohaveknowledgeofthis. 11Hinsley,aboven7,411,417.TheChiefsofStaff,aswellasWavell,suspectedacover plan.TheMI14documentdetailingsaidconcernsisincludedinAppendix14ofHinsely, aboven7,573. 12B.H.LiddellHart,TheGermanGeneralsTalk(1979)161. 13Hinsley,aboven7,416.
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Nonetheless, the decision was made. The value of the intelligence surrounding Crete was given by Churchill at some 10 million; the valueoftheislandasastrategicasset,tosaynothingoftheconditionof its inhabitants, would surely have been much greater. Intelligence historianFrancisHinsleybelievestheintelligencetobeofgreatervalue because of the acute shortage of shipping, equipment and troops throughouttheMiddleEasttheatre;14however,acounterargumentcan belogicallysustainedinthatintelligencecannotbeeffectivelyputtouse without the materiel to utilise the advantages rendered by that foreknowledge. The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World Warisalsoscepticalaboutthespeculationthatsurroundedtheissueof intelligence, largely because of the alreadymentioned issue of troop numbers. It is unlikely, Daniel Davin concludes, that the conduct or the outcome of the battle were affected by the fact that the Enigma, whileprovidingfulldetailsoftheGermanplanandadatebeforewhich the attack would not take place, did not indicate the exact size of the assault.15 More cursory explanations may be offered. Churchill points to the Luftwaffe as a primary reason, claiming that the Germans maintained completesuperiorityintheair.16ThefewRoyalAirForcefightersthat initially defended Crete had been removed earlier for logistical reasons.17 Davin emphasises this lack of any air support in his Official History, explaining: one shortage above all was conspicuous to the defenders,thatofaircraft.18TheLuftwaffewascertainlyeffective.Where thelightlyarmedparatroopershaddifficultybreakingAllieddefensive positions,theJu87Stukasrevelledinitandachievednotablesuccess:the Allieshadnothingtomatchit.19DuringCrete,Stukaswouldeventually sink one destroyer and damage a number of cruisers, thus rendering Allied seaborne assistance impossible and in turn, allowing supply convoystocomefrommainlandGreece.Adearthofmenandmaterielin

Ibid,418. Davin,aboven1,420. 16Churchill,aboven2,240. 17SeegenerallyChapter2ofDavin,aboven1. 18Ibid,460. 19FreybergtoWavell,23May1941,DepartmentofInternalAffairs(Wellington),aboven 5,303;FreybergtoWavell,1May1941:Ibid285.

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theregion,hinderedbythesplittingofforcesbetweenNorthAfricaand the Mediterranean proper, also led to difficulties in maintaining any semblanceofnavalpower.

WarumSprungnachKreta?
AsvanCreveldputsit,themostinterestingquestionisnothowCrete wasinvaded,butwhy.20WhilstthereareobviousimpetusesinGerman advances from 19391941, Crete remains a more difficult prospect to adequatelyaddress.WhydidtheGermansinvadeCrete?Or,toputit more precisely, why did Hitler decide upon the Sprung nach Kreta, or jumptoCrete? Ahostofanswersareimmediatelyevident.Thetypicalunderstanding ofthedecisiontoinvadedepictsaHitlerreluctanttopushhistroopstoo much further south: his eyes were firmly focused upon the East,21 and theimportanceofBarbarossatoCrete,andviceversa,mustbestressed. Whilst there may have strategic value in holding the Balkans to Barbarossa, Crete was another matter. With Italian leader Benito Mussolinis failure to capture Greece, Nazi party leadership had decidedtotakeamoreactiveroleinMediterraneanaffairs;theItalians, optimistically, referred to it as action in parallel. In truth, it was anythingbut.OperationMarita,theGermaninvasionofGreece,wasa success, but should never have taken place. In turn, the Balkans campaigndesigned,insofarasithadadesign,toensurethesecurityof the vital southern flank of Barbarossa so that the allimportant push to the east could take place without fear of an invasion from Yugoslavia, anallianceofBalkanstates,orfromtheBritishmovingthroughGreece had heightened German ambitions in the region. Whilst Hitler had never intended to establish a position of importance in the Mediterranean, an attack upon Greece, he said, must drive the British out completely.22 The strategic advantage of holding the main part of theBalkansisreasonablyclear,and,despitethefactthatitwasatleast partlyunintentional,GermanHighCommandandespeciallyHitler waskeentoholdsuchanimportantarea.

M.vanCreveld,HitlersStrategy,19401941:TheBalkanClue(1973)166. I.Kershaw,Hitler,19361945:Nemesis(1999)366. 22Kershaw,aboven21,361.SeealsovanCreveld,aboven20,96ff.

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Crete, however, is another matter. Despite being considered strategically important by both German Supreme Command and by manyindividualGermancommanders,Hitlerwasreluctanttopushtoo farintotheMediterranean.Galledathavingtoremedythesituationleft by the illconceived Italian invasion of Greece,23 stymied by Franco in his plan to take Gibraltar (Operation Felix),24 the Balkan campaign fell into a clearly subordinate position to Barbarossa. The decision to jump, orFhrerOrderNo.28,sitstheninadifficultcontext. HoweverHitlerwasthinking,Creteisanimportantpositiontohold.A natural barrier between Alexandria and the Aegean, the capture of CretewouldpreventtheBritishfromenteringthelatterandthussecure theimportantmaritimeoilroutefromtheRomanianportofConstanta via the Dardanelles to Italy. This, indeed, is a reason given by Hitler himselfinhisspeechtotheReichstagonMay4th.25YettheSprungnach Kreta was never considered an absolute priority, and it appears that pressurefromHermannGringandKurtStudenteventuallyforcedhis hand.26 After talks in Mnichkirchen, Hitler eventually conceded, epigrammatically,thattheconquestofCretewouldmakeagoodwind up [Abschluss] of the Balkan campaign,27 and would perhaps distract theworldfromhiseasternintent,ifonlyforawhile.28 The true persuasion on Grings part came from mentioning the proximity of the three airfields of Crete to the oilfields at Ploesti, in Romaniaavitalsourceofoilforeasterncampaigning.29Ploestiwas,in fact,theabsolutepriority,asHalderwritesinhisKreigstagebuch,andthe reason discussed extensively by Hitler, as documented in his letter to MussolinionNovember20th,1940.30,31Hitlersoverarchingconcernwas
TheformaldemandforGreeksurrenderwasfamouslymetbyasinglewordreply:No! Kershaw,aboven21,348. 25G.Schreiber,B.Stegemann&D.Vogel,GermanyandtheSecondWorldWar(vol.III)(D. McMurry,et.al.trans,1995ed)527. 26Kershaw,aboven21,367;SeealsovanCreveld,aboven20,167168;S.Mitcham,Menof theLuftwaffe(1988)117;andLiddellHart,aboven12,159. 27W.Ansel,HitlerandtheMiddleSea(1972)199. 28Ibid203. 29SeealsoW.Murray,TheLuftwaffe193345(1996)74. 30F.Halder,Kriegstagebuch.TglicheAufzeichnungendesChefsdesGeneralstabesdesHeeres 19391942(19621964)EntrydatedApril24th,1941. 31DocumentedinZapantis,aboven3,213216.
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with Ploesti: he refused to let the veteran 22nd Airborne Division, veterans from the earliest days of campaigning in the Netherlands, to leavetheirguardofPloestitotakepartinOperationMerkur.32

IntentionsandFunctions;Thelimitofairbornetroops
Of all German operations, Operation Barbarossa, Hitlers ideological war, had been the most important for months, if not years. And ideological it became. Hitlers continued inability to separate strategic imperativesfromracialandideologicalconcernsisnevermoreobvious thanintheMediterraneancampaign,withHitlerregardingtheregion, notably excluding Greece, as racially degenerate.33 Plans for the Reich includedaEuropeasfarwestastheUralMountains,usingtheeastern European states as Lebensraum his Europe never included the Mediterranean. As he put it once to his advisors Lasst uns Nordisch bleiben[letusstayNordic].34 TreatingMerkurassuch,theentireaffairmaybetreatedassomething of an argument for intentionalist views of Nazi leadership, as the strategic importance of holding the Mediterranean, and Crete most centrally, appears to have all but lost upon Hitler. Lack of a strategic objective is shown clearly by the fact that, while Fhrer Order No. 28 superficially endows the operation with an offensive purpose (As a baseforairwarfareagainstGreatBritainintheEasternMediterranean we must prepare to occupy the island of Crete),35 Hitler himself describeditasadefensiveholdinginanearlyspeechtotheReichstag and was content to treat it as little more than an obstacle between the Aegean and Alexandria. 36 The relative strategic advantages that Crete affordedforfurtheradvancementintotheregionproximitytoEgypt, Iraq,Syria,andNorthAfrica;controlofshippingwere,itseems,also lostonHitler,despitedesperateattemptsbyNavalHighCommandto convince him to use the fall of Crete as the beginning of intensive

LiddellHart,aboven12,159. Ibid,11. 34Ibid. 35FhrerDirectiveno.28.Forfurtherdiscussion,seealsoW.Warlimont,DieKampffhrung derAchsenmchteimMittelmeerraum[TheMilitaryCommandoftheAxisForcesinthe MediterraneanTheatre](1958)367,200. 36vanCreveld,aboven20,170.

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operations against the English bases and fleet in the eastern Mediterranean.37 Crete also serves as a useful demonstration of the particular role of paratroopers.ThroughnotablesuccessesatEbenEmaelandthroughout theNetherlands,theeliteGermanFallschirmjgerdivisionshadbecome something of an obsession to German High Command.38 However, disagreement remained as to the particular strength of paratroops within a broader strategic framework: there was a tendency to regard thesetroopsasconstitutingthemajorthreat,whereastheyonlyserved asanadvancedguardtothemainbodylandedbytroopcarrierduring succeedingdays.39 The Allies, themselves, were struck by the casualty rates amongst the German paratroopers: as Freyberg states in his letter to Wavell on the 24th May, The fighting has been very fierce and we can definitely say that the muchvaunted parachutists have been heavily defeated. I cannot believe they will be used again for a similar objective.40 Hitler expressly forbade the use of paratroops in taking objectives.41 From a deployment of some 22,000 men, Crete claimed the lives of 2,071 Germansoldiers,left2,594injured,withafurther1,888missingmore than the rest of the entire Balkan campaign, and during a time when casualtiesthroughouttheGermanarmedforceswereunexpectedlylow. 42,43Notably,paratrooperswerenotusedinthecaptureofMalta,barely ayearafterCrete.44

UnsignedMemo,1.6.1941.CitedinvanCreveld,aboven20,170. C.Buckley,GreeceandCrete1941(1952)184. 39ThefailureofGermancaquestomaketheBritishnavalblockadeis,perhaps,another reasonfortheabnormallyhighparatroopercasualties:seegenerallyDavin,aboven1, Chapter4;SeealsoBuckleysdepictionofparatroopersasskirmishers:Buckley,aboven 38,184;andcontentionstotheview,namely:P.LisitskiyUsingAirborneAssaultsand SpecialOperations(2005)14MilitaryThought169170. 40DepartmentofInternalAffairs(Wellington),aboven5,305.Italicsmyown. 41Kershaw,aboven21,367. 42Ibid.Distortedcasualtyfiguresledtoinitialestimatesmuchhigherthanthefinaltotal. 43AsStudentremarked,thewholeFrenchcampaignhadnotcostusasmanylivesasa singlebattlein1870:Buckley,aboven38,303. 44vanCreveld,aboven20,170.SeealsoR.Bennett,ULTRAandMediterraneanStrategy (1989)51.
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TheAftermath
So, after 11 days of hard fighting, Crete was taken. The evacuation of Commonwealth troops continued until the last moments, taking Commonwealth troops to Alexandria and leaving the few left behind with the prospects of becoming prisoners, or continuing the fight as guerrillas.45TheBritishwereleftdismayed,frustratedanddisappointed bythelossofCrete.Asubstantiallossoffacehadoccurred,extending further than a simple bloodied nose:46 failing to hold Crete was a failuretodefendagainstanairborneattackoverastretchofwaterthrice thewidthoftheEnglishChannel.Inthesamemonth,airraidsincreased involumeoverLondon.TheHMSHood,prideoftheRoyalNavy,was sunkbytheGermanbattleshipBismarck.Britainsislandstatus,which Churchill had emphasised in rhetoric for years was becoming less secure.47 Or to put it more bluntly, as Sir Harold Nicolson does, that battlehas,Ifear,dealtaveryseriousblowtoourmorale.48 TherepercussionsofCreteonBritishmorale,bothcivilianandmilitary asdifficultasmoraleistoadequatelyquantifycanbeeasilyseenin twoareas:throughageneralfeelingofdisappointment,whetherinthe capabilitiesofleadershiporotherwise,andthroughareplenishedsense ofinsecurity.IfHitlercouldmakeCretepartofhisReich,itwasthought, then surely he could do the same with Great Britain. At a time when OperationSeaLionwaswidelyexpecteddespiterepeatedpostponement, the threat of invasion, now accompanied by images of divebombing and paratrooper landings, grew markedly closer to home.49 Whilst those 11 days of Crete would stake themselves indissolubly in New Zealands national consciousness (Soldiers never fought better than
Theguerrillamovementcanonlybementionedinpassing.Formore,seeG.C. Kriakopoulos,TheNaziOccupationofCrete,19411945(1995);andG.Psychoundakis,The CretanRunner(1998). 46Seegenerally:DepartmentofInternalAffiars(Wellington),aboven5. 47W.Churchill,notitle(SpeechesintheHouseofCommonsandatSt.JamesPlace, London,June4,18,1940andJune12,1941).Indeed,Estorickconsidersthisdoctrinal relianceupontheseasurroundingBritaintobesomethingofaMaginotcomplex:E. Estorick,MoraleinContemporaryEngland(1944)47AmericanJournalofSociology,464, 467468. 48Entryonthe20thMay,1941:N.Nicolson(ed),H.Nicolson,DiariesandLetters(vol.II, 1967)171. 49Amongstthecivilianpopulace,atleast:seeEstorick,aboven47,468.
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theyfoughtonCrete;andnotleastamongthemthesoldiersoftheNew ZealandDivision),thedamagehadbeendone.50 YetforallthelessempiricalconsequencesofCrete,therearemanymore that can be directly felt in the weeks, months, and years following the battle.AsDavinsaysinhisofficialhistoryofthebattle,justasamove in chess is conditioned by what has gone before and is seen in its full implicationsonlythroughitsconsequences,51thetrueimportanceofthe battle of Crete can be seen only in the effect it has upon later events during the war. Crete would affect the course of the war in North Africa,dissuadeAlliedcommandfromestablishingaSecondFront,and go some way into destroying the Mediterranean Strategy. Its most significantcontribution,however,isthemostbasic:itdelayedOperation Barbarossa. The impact of the Balkan campaign on the beginnings of Barbarossa has been widely commented upon, and only a few things remain as fact. For instance, it is clear that holding Crete meant maintaining a garrison, and preserving it as a site of strategic worth meant devoting precious Luftwaffe resources to it, removing both men and materiel from the war effort in the East. Casualties from the elite Fallschirmjger [Airborne] and Gebirgsjger [Mountain] divisions cannot havehelped.

MerkurandBarbarossa
Mostsignificantly,however,timespentsecuringGreeceincludingthe weeks spent planning Merkur, as well as the 11 days of battle meant timelostfromthebeginningofOperationBarbarossa.Fromthisposition of certainty, however, substantial variance can be found in reports. Conservative accounts, such as that of General Fritz Halder, make relatively modest claims, and stress the loss of equipment and manpower, rather than time. He modestly concludes only that Crete (and indeed, the entire Balkans campaign) diminished overall German strikingpowersforBarbarossa.52Furthermore,anincreasingambition led Hitler to insist that air supremacy must be had over the eastern
50Davin,aboven1,463.Fictionalreportsofthebattlearevaried,butallregardthebattle withreverence:see,forinstance,C.K.Stead,TalkingAboutODwyer(1999). 51Davin,aboven1,1. 52Fromhisdiary.CitedinW.G.McClymont,TheOfficialHistoryofNewZealandinthe SecondWorldWar,19391945:ToGreece(1959)483.

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Mediterranean, requiring extensive, continued deployment (of troops whowerepreviouslyassignedtoBarbarossa)inordertomaintaintroop and aircraft numbers.53 Aircraft losses largely from Crete, and particularlyfromwithintheranksofthevitaltransportJu52Gruppen alsohamperedtheLuftwaffespotencyinthefirstweeksofBarbarossa, and it became incapable of fulfilling the role demanded of it upon invasion.54 OtheraccountsstresstheimportanceoftimelostfromBarbarossasome four to six weeks in all.55 Although the influence of heavy rain in the East during April and May prevents an exact estimate on the delay,56 Britishwartimeleaderswereexultant.ForeignSecretaryAnthonyEden stated, during a speech in Manchester on 23rd October 1941, Greeces brave defence delayed his prearranged attack on Russia for at least sixmostimportantweeks.Whatwouldthosesixweeksofcampaigning weatherbeworthtoHitlernow?57ThiscommentwasrepeatedbyThe Times, on January 10, 1942; and more optimistically by Churchill, who concludes that a delay of five weeks was imposed as the result of our resistance in the Balkans no one can measure exactly what consequences this had before winter set in upon the fortunes of the GermanRussiancampaign.ItisreasonabletobelievethatMoscowwas savedthereby.58 The triumphalist speculations that pervaded British popular discourse were useful in clawing back some measure of public trust in the usefulness of the Greek campaign, but they nevertheless remain just that:speculations.WhileitiscertainlyfairtosaythatCrete,asthefinal

Ibid. R.Edwards,GermanAirborneTroops(1974)51.SeealsoK.Assmann,TheBattlefor Moscow,TurningPointoftheWar(January,1950)ForeignAffairs,309;andW.Maser, Hitler:Legend,Myth,andReality(1973)298. 55McClymont,aboven52,158. 56LiddellHart,aboven10,184185.Zapantiswishestodisputethisrainthesisas somethingofamyth,andprovidesmeteorologicalevidencetoshowthatrainfallwasnot drasticallyaboveaverageintheweeksbeforeBarbarossa:Zapantis,aboven3,146163. Nonetheless,theevidenceseemstosuggestthattheprospectoflosingcrucialmobility wasenoughtodeteranearlyinvasion. 57Zapantis,aboven3,note179,163. 58Churchill,aboven2,316.
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stageoftheBalkanscampaign,delayedBarbarossa,theimplicationsof suchadelaycanandperhapswillneverbeknowncertainly.

Conclusions
Yet,forallofitstroublinguncertainties,forallofitsoddandunplanned qualities, Crete stands fast only as the final total victory for Germany duringtheSecondWorldWar.AsthepowerofGermanywaxedbright in the Blitzkrieg years of 1939 to 1941, and as it later crumbled, Cretes status as a symbol of strength again held true. The swastika flag was finallyloweredonCreteonMay23rd,1945,takingwithitthousandsof German and Allied soldiers, and marking the close of a very peculiar chapterintheSecondWorldWar.

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