THE RUSI JOURNAL

THE WAy FORWARD IN SOMALIA

Nathan Mugisha

Commander of the AMISOM force in Somalia, General Nathan Mugisha, argues that the African Union mission in Somalia has made significant progress toward fulfilling its mandate. But there are problems not least the lack of manpower and materiel which impede its ability to counter the Al-Shabaab insurgency. As fears rise over the push of Al-Qaida into the Horn, more needs to be done to support the Transitional Federal Government and stabilise Somalia.
t the time of writing, AMISOM and government Somali forces are present in thirteen of Mogadishus sixteen districts and have effectively secured more than half of these. In the areas where its soldiers dominate, armed opposition groups have either fled or gone underground, bringing a sense of normality back to the Somali capital. Importantly, about 80 per cent of the citys estimated 2 million population lives in areas under AMISOM (the African Union Mission in Somalia) control. The process of taking this territory from armed opposition groups principally the extremist insurgent group Al-Shabaab through the course of 2010 and the first quarter of 2011 has been costly and difficult, but it has given the joint force invaluable experience that can be put to good use as the mission moves forward. At present, however, the joint force is limited in terms of what it can accomplish by a lack of manpower and materiel support. In order to gain more ground, it needs more support on a range of fronts. Once this is forthcoming, AMISOM and government forces will be in a strong position to exert control over all of Mogadishu and begin improving security throughout the rest of the country.

The Somali Conflict

In February of 2007, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1744 (2007) authorising the African Union to deploy a mission in Somalia with a six-month mandate. The Council

authorised the African Union (AU) mission to take all appropriate measures to support dialogue and reconciliation by assisting with freedom of movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved in a national reconciliation congress involving all stakeholders, including political leaders, clan elders, religious leaders and representatives of civil society. Shortly after the passage of the resolution, Uganda deployed two battalions to Mogadishu in March 2007, followed by Burundi with one battalion in December of the same year. Events on the ground in Somalia quickly proved to be more complex and difficult than perhaps we had initially envisaged. Successive inconclusive international interventions over more than two decades of internal strife have left Somalia in deeper crisis than most imagined. By the time AU forces arrived, the conflict in Somalia had gone through multiple phases, each one more destructive than the last. In the 1980s, an armed insurgency arose against the Somali government of Siyad Barre, leading to its eventual collapse in 1991. Thereafter multiple armed factions vied for power, leaving Somalia increasingly violent and chaotic as it slid into humanitarian crisis and state failure. The international community took action. In the early 1990s, three UN-approved interventions were undertaken: UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II; the US also launched Operation Restore Hope to protect food aid convoys. All were primarily geared towards alleviating

the humanitarian plight of the Somali people following the collapse of the state. The peacekeeping forces were principally tasked with protecting the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance to the population, not enforcing a peace agreement despite international efforts to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table, no peace was forthcoming. With international commitment waning, UNOSOM II withdrew from Somalia in 1995, ushering in a decade of further disintegration as Somali warlords were left to tear the country apart. In 2006, fearing the establishment of a radical, extremist Islamic state on their doorstep, the Ethiopians intervened to depose the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which had taken over much of the country. Politically, the Ethiopians threw their support behind the then Baidoa-based, internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG), itself the product of lengthy negotiations amongst Somalis of all stripes which had begun in Djibouti in 2000. As the UIC resistance collapsed, the government briefly gained control of much of South and Central Somalia and was able to relocate to the Somali capital, Mogadishu. The Ethiopian invasion had the effect of splitting the Islamists. A moderate faction, under the banner of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), opted for negotiations with the TFG, resulting in the Djibouti Agreement of 2008. Hard-line extremists, meanwhile, regrouped in the south and
DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2011.591084

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An armed Al-Shabaab fighter patrols Bakara Market in Mogadishu, an insurgent stronghold which is currently the site of fierce clashes between AMISOM and Al-Shabaab. Photo courtesy of Farah Abdi Warsameh/PA Archive.

launched an insurgency aimed at toppling the government in Mogadishu. By 2007, the African Union had grown increasingly concerned about the situation. Not only had the insurgency become alarmingly brutal, but Ethiopia had also signalled its intention to withdraw its forces. It was clear that the TFG would be toppled without the support of an internationally mandated force. AMISOM was thus created, ostensibly as a peacekeeping force that would pave the way for a proper UN mission amid the absence of Ethiopian troops. Specifically, AMISOM was authorised to undertake seven tasks: 1. 2. Support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders Provide protection to Transitional Federal Institutions and key infrastructure to enable them to carry out their functions Assist in the implementation of the National Security Stabilization Programme

4.

5. 6.

7.

Provide technical assistance and other support to the disarmament and stabilisation efforts Monitor the security situation in areas of operation Facilitate humanitarian operations including repatriation of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Protect AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment, including self-defence.

3.

The UN Security Council mandated 8,000 troops to accomplish these tasks. Under the original concept of operations, the deployment of these troops would be carried out in three phases, beginning with the establishment of a force headquarters in Mogadishu and the securing of the city, followed by expansion and consolidation throughout the country. By any measure, given the history of past interventions, this was an ambitious undertaking that was clearly

under-resourced from the outset. Previous interventions in Somalia had much more in terms of personnel and equipment available to them. For example, UNOSOM II, whose mandate was somewhat similar to AMISOMs, had a strength of 28,000 personnel, including 22,000 troops, and 8,000 logistics and civilian staff. By comparison, between 2006 and 2007, the United States committed more than 160,000 American troops to Iraq when trying to bring that country under control. And those troops were backed by a further 100,000 deployed elsewhere in the region providing rear support. These troops were there to give the Iraqis, in the words of President George W Bush, breathing room to achieve national reconciliation. The deployment translated to one soldier on the ground for every 187 Iraqis. In Somalia, which is about a third larger than Iraq, AMISOM was expected to do much the same job with a ratio of just one soldier for every 1,125 Somalis.

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AMISOM Ground Operations

AMISOM has faced manpower shortages throughout its time in Somalia. So far, only two African Union countries, Burundi and Uganda, have fulfilled their pledges to contribute troops to AMISOM. The first AMISOM troops were deployed to Mogadishu on 6 March 2007, but it took over three years for the mission to reach its originally authorised strength of 8,000 peacekeepers. Ultimately Burundi and Uganda deployed additional forces of their own to fill the gap. In December 2010, the UN Security Council authorised a new AMISOM troop ceiling of 12,000 troops and, following the deployment of an extra battalion from Burundi, the current troop strength now stands at just over 9,000. Burundi and Uganda are expected to deploy the remaining 3,000 over the summer of 2011.

AMISOMs area of influence in Mogadishu, Somalia, as of 6 June 2011. Courtesy of the author/AMISOM.

The process has been costly and difficult

Despite the slow pace of deployment, AMISOM troops working together with Somali government forces have continuously made significant gains against insurgents. Areas under our control have gone from a small sliver of coastal territory to a large swathe of Mogadishu approximately 40 km2 of the city that is home to approximately 80 per cent of the citys population. In July 2010, AU forces began a methodical advance across Mogadishu by establishing a series of new forward combat positions, pushing the insurgents back. AMISOM troops fought their way to new outposts at Dabka Junction, the Parliamentary Building and the former Coca Cola factory in Hodan district, among other areas. By early September, AMISOM held eight new positions in areas of Mogadishu previously under the control of armed opposition groups. By the end of 2010, the number of AMISOM positions had nearly doubled, and now more than two dozen combat outposts dot the city map. Since early 2011, the TFG and its allies the Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca, a Sufibased clan militia opposed to Al-Shabaab, have opened up a new front against the insurgents in the south-central regions
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of Gedo, Bakool and Lower Jubba on the Kenyan border. This coincided with a renewed AMISOM push in the capital designed to force Al-Shabaab out of Bakara Market, by far the largest commercial hub in Mogadishu. The latter operations have so far resulted in the capture of Al-Shabaabs main logistical and operational base located at the former Ministry of Defence building at Gashandigga, the former milk factory as well as the Damanyo military camp and the African Village, giving AMISOM full control of the Hodan district, Terebunka road and the western access routes into the market, in the process inhibiting Al-Shabaabs ability to reinforce its fighters from its base in Dayniile. On the southern edge of the market, AMISOM and TFG forces have overrun former Al-Shabaab command positions on Wadnaha road, a vital city artery, which has for a long time been closed to civilian traffic by the insurgents, who had dug trenches across it. AMISOM has also completely secured Bondere district from where the extremists would shell Villa Somalia, the seat of government. These losses, coupled with AMISOMs seizure of a network of trenches and tunnels used by fighters to infiltrate other parts of the city, constitute a severe blow to the militants. Though

AMISOM has declared Bakara a no-fire zone for mortars and artillery in line with its commitment to minimise harm to civilians and their property, operations have nonetheless rendered Al-Shabaabs continued control of the market untenable, threatening the insurgents remaining presence in the rest of the city, much of which is financed through extortion from Bakaras businesses. Wishing to avoid a battle within the market itself, which would inevitably lead to loss of innocent life and damage to property, AMISOM has left an escape route towards the north-east open to the militants. It remains to be seen whether they will take advantage of the opportunity and spare the people of Mogadishu further suffering. If they do not, then AMISOM will be left with no option other than to force them out. However, any moves to do so will be undertaken with the greatest care to ensure minimal harm to lives and property. Following the AMISOM advance, a new front line now bisects Mogadishu, dividing it along the 26 June and Wadnaha roads. To the north-east lie four districts under the effective control of the insurgents and four others where AMISOM and TFG troops have a presence but are yet to fully secure. The eight districts in the south-western half of the

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city are, by contrast, fully controlled by the Somali government and AMISOM. In addition to this, AU and Somalia government forces have long secured key infrastructure in the capital including the Aden Ade International Airport, the seaport, Villa Somalia, the old university and military academy as well as other strategic sites. The forces have been providing convoy escort of shipping into the port, basic medical support and freshwater to the local communities within their reach, transport support and protection of visiting international delegates, including all UN teams, and support to the fledgling Somali security forces.

across the world. It has sworn allegiance to Al-Qaida and declared on a number of occasions its strong desire to aid Islamic militants bent on waging a global war of terrorism. Al-Shabaabs vocal support of Al-Qaida has drawn a number of hardened foreign fighters to Somalia, a phenomenon that has made the group significantly more ruthless and deadly than others in the country.

It has sworn allegiance to Al-Qaida

In order to understand the link between Al-Shabaab and the global terror network operating under the banner of Al-Qaida, one needs to understand the origins of Al-Shabaab. The group is an offshoot of the Somali Islamic Awakening Movement (IAM), the non-Sufi Islamic faction that emerged in Somalia in the 1960s after southern and northern Somali territories were granted independence from the Italian and British colonies. The IAM was composed of two major orientations, the Salafi-Jihadist and the Ikhwani branches. The followers of the Ikhwani orientation were more political and advocated a non-violent approach to protect the purity of Islam, whereas the Salafi-Jihadists supported the use of violence to establish Islamic states. The most prominent Salafi group in Somalia was Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI), which had ambitions of annexing the regions in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti inhabited by Somalis to create a greater Somalia, and reached its peak in the late 1980s and 1990s. AIAI operated mainly in the southern Gedo region and targeted Ethiopias Ogaden region. The AIAI leadership was composed of, to name but a few, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys (later to be head of UIC and then leader of Hizbul Islam), Sheikh Ali Warsame and Sheikh Hassan Abdullahi Hersi Al Turki (military leader of UIC and later leader of the Ras Kamboni Brigade). When Ethiopia crushed the AIAI in the Gedo region in 1997, a cell of some of its qualified fighters was sent to Afghanistan for training. Some of these were founding figures of Al-Shabaab, such as Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohamed Godane, the late Aden Hashi Ayrow,

Al-Shabaab
Al-Shabaab is the main armed resistance group opposing the TFG and AMISOM forces. Other groups, such as Hizbul Islam, have been defeated, disbanded or subsumed within Al-Shabaab. Hizbul Islam, though once a credible competitor in some parts of the country, was absorbed by Al-Shabaab following several years of rivalry.

Al-Shabaab draws inspiration from the Taliban

Al-Shabaabs proclaimed objectives are the overthrow of the Somali government; the creation of a strict Islamic state governed by a militant interpretation of Sharia Law; and the use of Somalia as a springboard to export its brand of extremism to other countries on the African continent and beyond. As the group declared in an April 2008 announcement, the concept of jihad ... does not recognise fanciful boundaries or so-called international legitimacy. Its deadly reach was demonstrated in 2010 when the group carried out terrorist attacks in Uganda and Kenya, killing seventy-six civilians in Kampala during the final of the football World Cup in July. The group has also threatened similar attacks against countries as far afield as Burundi, the US and Israel. Al-Shabaab draws inspiration from the Taliban and other extremist groups

Ibrahim Haji Jama Miad (who goes by the nom de guerre, Al-Afghani), Sheikh Muktar Robow (nom de guerre, Abu Mansur) and the late Abdullahi Maalin Abu Uteyba. In 2001, following the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States, some of these fighters returned to Somalia with some foreign friends and established themselves in Mogadishu and parts of Lower Jubba, where they began recruiting and training. In 2006, a group of Somali warlords backed by the United States to track down terrorists formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and CounterTerrorism (ARPCT). The warlords attacked Aden Hashi Ayrows home and imprisoned numerous innocent imams. The once-divided Islamic Awakening Movement united under the umbrella of the Union of Islamic Courts. Devoid of their own strong militia, the moderates relied heavily on the well-armed, highly disciplined Al-Shabaab to defeat the ARPCT. Al-Shabaab cut a deal with the moderate Islamists and became the military wing of the new UIC umbrella organisation the moderates were to be the public face. The UIC elected the relatively young Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as its new leader. But Al-Shabaab was never comfortable under the moderate leadership of the UIC, particularly its chairman, Sheikh Sharif. Al-Shabaab deemed Sharif too Westernoriented and, following the Ethiopian invasion of 2006, eventually split from the UIC to pursue its own political and military agenda.

Structure and Personnel

According to information from defectors, Al-Shabaab is organised as a pyramidal, four-layered superstructure: the Shura Council (consultative body), Qiyadah (the top leadership), the Muhajirin (the foreign fighters and Somalis with foreign passports) and the Ansar (the local Somali fighters). The Shura Council is composed of roughly ten men and is the ultimate decision-making authority. Members of this exceptionally secretive body are, by some accounts, more than 70 per cent non-Somali. The Qiyadah consists of as many as a hundred field commanders spread across the country. The Muhajirin,

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who may number up to 600, are camped and trained separately in an effort to contain their activity, as their defection can expose the inner workings of the organisation. The Ansar constitute the vast majority of foot soldiers, but they are almost entirely excluded from the Qiyadah, which is dominated by the Muhajirin and Somalis who have fought in places like Afghanistan, Kashmir and Chechnya. The rank and file of the Ansar also includes young Somali conscripts, mercenaries paid by the battle and inexperienced youths drawn to the organisation for ideological reasons. Additionally, in 2008, Al-Shabaab created a makeshift police force known as Al-Hisbah Forces, who serve as the groups street enforcers among the civilian population. Al-Shabaab also has an elite intelligence unit called Abniyad, which is responsible for the organisations numerous assassinations, most recently in Puntland to the north. The murkiest element of Al-Shabaab is its cohort of foreign fighters. AMISOM intelligence indicates that between 300 and 1,500 foreign fighters have joined Al-Shabaab, whose total strength is somewhere between 8,000 and 12,000 fighters. Most of the foreign fighters come from countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, Sudan, Nigeria, Algeria and Morocco. According to one senior defector, Africans account for half the number of foreign fighters, and about 450 other foreign nationals have come from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Chechnya. In the Shura Council, the highest consultative body, foreign fighters oversee decisions on security and training operations, finance and payroll and the recruitment of suicide bombers. The presence of this foreign element and the inordinate power it wields has been the cause of deep resentment both within Al-Shabaab and in the wider Somali community. Led by Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, a nationalist faction rejects the vision of Somalia as simply another battle in a wider global jihad. They are also discomfited by the extremists tactics, such as the refusal to allow international humanitarian aid agencies access to the population, which they see as needlessly alienating the population. Furthermore, the foreign
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fighters receive preferential treatment and serve as commanders, with little regard for their Somali foot soldiers. They have developed a reputation for brutality, executing their injured Somali subordinates as well as those they deem guilty of insubordination, including those who retreat during battles with AMISOM forces. The nationalists are opposed by an internationalist faction led by Al-Shabaabs former emir, Sheikh Ahmed Abdi Godane, which maintains support for global jihadi agendas and has the deepest ties to Al-Qaida. Accounts from dozens of Al-Shabaab defectors interviewed recently by AMISOM paint a picture of a group mired in internal strife. Its political problems were exacerbated in the aftermath of the failed Ramadan offensive, which left its forces falling back in Mogadishu amid heavy casualties. Various factions within Al-Shabaab began blaming each other over the defeat. Bickering continued for months and then worsened in December, when Hizbul Islams merger with Al-Shabaab created new fissures among the groups Somali political leaders, field commanders, clan elders and foreign fighters. In late 2010, Al-Qaida dispatched a group of Yemeni commanders to reconcile the warring factions and effectively fired Sheikh Godane as emir. However, the Yemenis mission does not appear to have had the desired effect, as their presence is now the cause of further splits.

Though their numbers further swelled following the December 2010 merger with Hizbul Islam, the net effect, from AMISOMs perspective, is that Al-Shabaab, though now larger and ostensibly stronger, is more internally divided than it has ever been and therefore more vulnerable. At the time of writing, the merger with Hizbul Islam has had no measurable effect on the tactical situation in Mogadishu, where fighting is ongoing. Al-Shabaab fighters keep up regular attacks on AMISOM positions along the front line. Some of the attacks are significant, involving dozens of insurgents working together in a co-ordinated fashion that suggests high levels of training and experience. Other attacks amount to little more than harassing fire. None of Al-Shabaabs attacks have managed to dislodge AMISOM forces, however, or even come close to doing so. Al-Shabaab attacks are repulsed, often with significant losses among the militants, while AMISOM forces hold ground and suffer minimal casualties.

Funding and Organisational Challenges

Over the course of its deployment, AMISOM has had to overcome a number of challenges. The unpredictable nature of AMISOM financing was part of the reason it took so long to get to its mandated strength. Operating under the so-called Burundi model, troop deployments were supposed to be self-sustaining, meaning that the burden of transporting, equipping and supplying the forces was borne by the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and their bilateral partners since the AU itself was unable to do so. Uganda and Burundi were heavily dependent on the support of partners to equip battalions prior to deployment and outfit them once deployed. The resulting delays not only hindered AMISOMs ability to fulfil its deployment and expansion plans, but the limited financial and military capabilities of the TCCs also meant that AMISOM deployed without critical air and maritime capabilities. Further, it was initially assumed that the belligerents in the conflict would

Internal dynamics have paralysed Al-Shabaab

These internal dynamics have paralysed Al-Shabaab in the sense that it can neither hope to take new territory nor win mass public support. The overall picture that emerges is therefore one in which a divided Al-Shabaab is facing dwindling political support and waning military strength. But its continuing ability to extort from and terrorise the population sustains it enough to be an enduring threat. It has replenished its ranks by ruthlessly conscripting a new crop of young foot soldiers, and abducting and indoctrinating children as young as eight for service on the front lines.

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sign a peace agreement and accept the peacekeepers as a neutral stabilising force, as occurred in the AU peacekeeping missions in Burundi and Sudan, for example. The Djibouti Agreement of 2008 between the TFG and the ARS was meant to pave the way for the cessation of all armed conflict across the country, but was rejected by the Islamic extremist groups who, following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, increasingly regarded AMISOM as a legitimate target.

AMISOM deployed without critical air and maritime capabilities

In his March 2009 report to the Security Council regarding the situation in Somalia, the UN Secretary General laid out the necessary conditions and resources for a successful UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia: (a) the formation of a government of national unity in Somalia, inclusive beyond those represented in the Djibouti process; (b) the establishment and initial operation of the Joint Security Force in Mogadishu; (c) the implementation of a credible ceasefire; (d) the lifting of illegal checkpoints; (e) active outreach by the parties to groups that remain outside the Djibouti process; (f) consent to the deployment by all the major parties; and (g) adequate pledges of troops and the required military capacities by UN member states. Even with all those conditions fulfilled, he still estimated that the required force strength would exceed 22,000 troops who would need utility and attack helicopters, combat and construction engineers, and a maritime component including logistics ships, a landing ship, inshore patrol boats and frigates. Still, an extraordinary amount of support for AMISOM has come from the international community with the United Nations leading the way. The UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) provides an indispensable lifeline to our forces in Mogadishu by supplying support ranging from armoured vehicles to troop rations. We cannot overstate the importance of this support to our operations. UN Security Council Resolution 1863 of 2009 established a trust fund aimed

at promoting international financial assistance to AMISOM and the TFG. The measure also authorised AMISOM to take over assets belonging to the liquidated UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia and called for a broader UN support package, including equipment and services. The UN General Assembly later approved the first phase of the support package for a total of US $71.6 million, which would focus first on the strengthening of security in Mogadishu, the establishment of the force headquarters for AMISOM, the provision of medical facilities as well as tactical and strategic communications capabilities. In particular, the establishment of AMISOM headquarters and an efficient hospital in Mogadishu were seen as crucial steps in order to ensure the expansion of the AU force from a military mission to an integrated civilian, police and military one. Assistance, in the form of financing for deployment and sustenance in the field as well as training for both AMISOM and Somali troops, has also been received from other bilateral and multilateral donors such as the United States, the European Union and NATO.

aspects of international humanitarian and human rights law. Operationally, AMISOM has also issued clear guidelines on the use of indirect fire weapons (IDF) and has established no-fire zones for artillery and mortars within the city. AMISOM takes seriously its obligation to avoid causing harm to civilians, and minimising civilian harm has become a guiding principle for the planning and conduct of all our operations. We have made sustained efforts to reduce the level of unintentional harm to civilians from IDF and AMISOM troops, and we only use IDF in de-populated areas where there is minimal risk of collateral damage, and where there is a specific target. We do not use IDF in a counter-battery role and have improved the procedures for recording their use, enabling accurate verification of claims. We endeavour to investigate any reports of incidents of civilian casualties via our civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) unit, and we have at times taken action against our soldiers when they have been shown to be culpable.

Tactical Adaptation
AMISOM troops have had to learn and adjust to the realities of waging a counter-insurgency campaign in an urban environment with very limited resources. Many of the soldiers were experienced fighters, having taken part in operations against armed insurgencies in their own countries. However, most of these operations were undertaken in rural areas and over open terrain. Fighting armed insurgent groups in built-up areas of Mogadishu has presented a different set of challenges and the soldiers have had to adapt accordingly. Recognising this early on, AMISOM instituted pre-deployment training. This has included training in Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED), communications, infantry and medical Combat Life Saver First Aid and Fighting in Built-up Areas (FIBUA). Considering that the mission area is home to millions of innocent civilians, and that the insurgent groups operate and fire from within populated areas, the troops have also been trained in the relevant

Al-Shabaab uses IDF amidst civilians

A challenge for AMISOM is Al-Shabaabs use of IDF amidst civilians a tactic designed to provoke a similar response from AMISOM. In a typical scenario, insurgent casualties are extracted from a fire-fight with AMISOM and taken to a civilian area, where fighters set tyres alight to obscure observation; they then fire at AMISOM with IDF to provoke a response. However, since AMISOM does not engage in counter-battery, the insurgents have been known to fire on their own casualties and then claim that AMISOM is responsible for killing civilians. They also fire IDF in support of their ground operations against AMISOM, causing civilian casualties. A further challenge to AMISOM has been the limited fighting capacity of the Somali government forces. This has meant that AMISOM has had to take the lead in the campaign, with the TFG troops in support a reverse of the intended situation. AMISOM has attempted to remedy this through

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provision of training to the Somali soldiers, both at the Al Jazeera training facility in Somalia, and also, with the support of the EU, at the Uganda Peoples Defence Force training base in Bihanga, Uganda. 2,000 Somali soldiers have either completed or are currently undertaking courses at the latter facility and will form the core of a revitalised Somali National Army. However, the disorganisation, poor command, alleged corruption and limited resources of the TFG continue to undermine this effort. Somali troop morale is affected by low and irregular pay though the situation has significantly improved in the first part of 2011. In terms of tactics, the delay in deploying adequate troop numbers and equipment, coupled with the continued infusion of foreign fighters with experience and skills gained from other theatres especially, though not exclusively, in the Middle East, has seen the insurgency become increasingly sophisticated. One of the more remarkable developments has been the use of a network of tunnels and trenches to move Al-Shabaab fighters around undetected. As AMISOM has taken ground from Al-Shabaab, we have uncovered these extensive networks which carve through the walls and floors of deserted buildings, minimising the need for fighters to travel in the street and over open ground during the house-to-house fighting that often characterises the conflict in the capital. The trenches often terminate next to massive stone and concrete pillars which have been further reinforced with sandbags, affording the militants effective protection as they fire on AMISOM and TFG troops. The insurgents are also digging and disguising anti-tank ditches in an effort to prevent AMISOM from using its armour. To counter this, AMISOM tactics have also had to evolve. As we take more ground, troops are implementing a creeping tactic, which involves flanking buildings containing insurgents and smoking out the fighters or forcing them to retreat. AMISOM troops then occupy and consolidate their hold always checking first for booby traps before targeting the next compound,
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all the while using mouse holes to facilitate their movements. The tactic has been particularly effective in Hawal Wadaag and Wardigle districts where AMISOM forces have been occupying new positions on an almost daily basis throughout the spring of 2011.

AMISOM tactics have had to evolve

However, this tactic relies on having enough troop numbers to guarantee that these positions are not retaken by the insurgents. In particular, this requires combat engineers to help clear mines and booby traps, and routes for heavy armour. It also needs aerial capability, especially attack helicopters, to provide protection to troops and to interdict the extremists movement and resupply, as well as an air reconnaissance capability which would allow us to more accurately map out the tunnels and trenches in their territory and plan accordingly. Unfortunately, AMISOM does not have these capabilities. As AMISOM continues to successfully expand the part of Mogadishu under government control, the extremists are increasingly resorting to terrorist tactics. For instance, on 20 February 2011, a suicide car bombing targeted a police training camp in Hamar Weyne and killed at least eleven people, including Abdi Salaan Mohamed, one of the countrys top football players. Countering this threat, AMISOM needs to enhance its information-gathering capabilities and continue to improve on its relationship with the Somali people, whose help in uncovering and disrupting these plots will be ever more critical in the fight to secure the city and the country.

With this in mind, AMISOMs military operations have increasingly adopted a humanitarian component. The TFG and AMISOM gains in Mogadishu have created a safe haven for thousands of Somalis. Many Somalis are voting with their feet by moving in ever larger numbers to government-controlled territory. Life, business and the economy in these areas are slowly improving and AMISOM forces provide security, clean water and medical facilities. Two AMISOM-run hospitals provide free medical care to more than 12,000 people every month. We also supply over 120,000 litres of safe drinking water per day to Somalis living near AMISOM camps.

The key to success is winning public support

The picture in Al-Shabaab-held territory is starkly different. Nearly 400,000 internally displaced Somalis are estimated to be living in the Afgooye Corridor, a strip of land stretching south-west of Mogadishu that is under Al-Shabaab control. Conditions in the corridor have always been bleak for those living there, but matters have worsened dramatically in recent months with the onset of severe drought in Somalia. Al-Shabaab refuses to allow internationally recognised humanitarian aid organisations such as the World Food Programme to stage relief efforts in its territory. Its leadership accuses such groups of being spies and subversives, and in 2010 Al-Shabaab forced four international NGOs to abandon their operations in Somalia. Lack of rainfall and the absence of humanitarian support have left tens of thousands of Somalis in desperate need, all of which has been compounded by Al-Shabaabs extortion. There have also been reports that Al-Shabaab has prevented Somalis trying to move from its territory to areas where they may have better odds of survival. Families carrying household belongings have reportedly been prevented from entering AMISOM areas at Al-Shabaab checkpoints. The Somali people sadly continue to be the real victims of Al-Shabaab.

Winning the Populations Support

Counter-insurgency theorists and practitioners around the world agree that insurgencies cannot be defeated by purely military means. These operations form only a small component of a campaign aiming to defeat a guerrilla force; the key to success is winning public support.

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The group has imposed a reign of terror in areas it controls, imposing its extreme interpretation of Sharia Law and methodically targeting Somali culture by forbidding songs, the chewing of khat and even the shaking of hands. Beheadings, stonings, crossamputations and summary execution have become the hallmarks of their rule. These realities and a variety of other political factors have left average Somalis with an increasingly dim view of Al-Shabaab; less than 20 per cent of Somalis wish to see the opposition forces in power, and two-thirds of those polled say that AMISOM has been effective in improving the situation in Somalia. But political divisions in the government and wrangling among Somali stakeholders have eroded the TFGs ability to take advantage of AMISOMs gains. Under the new prime minister, there has been reform in 2011 a reduced cabinet, increased government revenues from seaport and airport taxes, the reopening and refurbishment of Martini hospital, and the repair of Mogadishus infrastructure. Maintaining and advancing this peace dividend is critical to the success of the military effort since the insurgency in Somalia, as in other places, cannot be solved through purely military means. It is as much a battle for hearts and minds as it is for territory.

Breaking the Stalemate

AMISOM troops, working with Somali security forces, continue to press ahead in Mogadishu by gradually shifting the frontline further north into Al-Shabaabcontrolled neighbourhoods. AMISOM could not operate in Somalia without the existing array of support from the United Nations and bilateral relationships. But an honest assessment reveals that AMISOM cannot significantly change the current situation on the ground unless more soldiers and accompanying resources become available. At the moment AMISOM ground commanders are conducting operations without the benefit of any combat aircraft. We need helicopters to help secure our forces on the ground as they advance. We also need weapon-locating radar systems that would enable us to

more accurately target the insurgents mortar-launching locations. In addition, the whole operation needs superiorcapability support from more advanced militaries, including a maritime capability to patrol Somali brown waters to interdict Al-Shabaabs lines of resupply from the strategic port of Kismaayo in the south. Crucially, AMISOM needs increased troop strength: at current levels, troops may be able to fight deeper into Al-Shabaabcontrolled Mogadishu, but they cannot hold the territory. The Security Councils authorisation of an increase of 4,000 troops will enlarge AMISOM to 12,000 troops the maximum troop strength that can be properly supported by current operational capacity. But it is not enough. Congruent with an AU proposal for an enlarged force, up to 20,000 troops are needed for AMISOM to conduct subsequent operations to push into insurgent-held parts of south-central Somalia after the capital is liberated. A strengthened international mandate with an increased force size would also require a major increase in material support. All of this is necessary to consolidate AMISOMs gains of the past four years in particular those since the summer of 2010 and to fulfil its mandate. As the theatre of operations also expands, it is important that interventions are undertaken to deal with the effects of drought and disease. There are reports of deaths from starvation in parts of the country; poor access to health care, insecurity, malnutrition and lack of medical supplies also means that epidemic diseases such as cholera add to the humanitarian burden. One could be forgiven for thinking that the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse are in full gallop across the country. It behoves the international community to intervene and halt the descent into deeper misery. As per our mandate, AMISOM forces stand ready to facilitate the provision of humanitarian support to the Somali people from any quarter.

AMISOM has expanded the necessary breathing space for the transitional authorities to begin delivering services to the people and institute training programmes to support the Somali security forces and civil service. In the battle for support of the population, AMISOM forces have been active in providing medical and humanitarian support to the populace surrounding their bases, at times even sharing their food rations. While the Security Councils decision to raise troop levels to 12,000 is welcome, and their full deployment in Mogadishu will change the situation in the city for the better, much more is required if Mogadishu and the rest of the country is to be stabilised. The Security Council must seriously consider the AU requests for 20,000 troops as well as the provision of a maritime capability and the establishment of an air force component. AMISOM must be adequately and predictably resourced and given the necessary tools to complete its tasks under an expanded mandate. Further, the Somali National Army must also be assisted to reorganise and develop into a well-led and effective force, capable of delivering security to its people. AMISOMs successes over the past four years have proven that Somalia can be salvaged. What is now required is the commitment and goodwill of all stakeholders to build on these gains. Major General Nathan Mugisha is Force Commander for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). A career officer in the Uganda Peoples Defence Force, he has attended Senior Staff College and National Defence College in Kenya, and is a graduate of the US War College. He has commanded several counter-insurgency campaigns, including the defeat of the Lords Resistance Army rebellion in Nothern Uganda. General Mugisha holds a degree in political science, international relations and diplomacy from Nkumba University, and a post-graduate diploma in international studies from the University of Nairobi.

Conclusion
The AMISOM mission is justifiably proud of what it has achieved despite the shortcomings in funding, manpower and resources. As its capabilities have grown,

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