Beyond the religious and social divide …

Beyond the religious and social divide

The emerging Mindanawon identity

Agnes Brazal

The influx of Christian migrants in the Mindanao archipelago,

especially in the second half of the 20th century, has led to social
instability in the region leading to the emergence of politicized eth-
nic identities – Bangsamoro, Lumads (indigenous peoples) and
Christians – with religion as the primary cultural marker. This es-
say focuses on the religious self-image fostered by these groups and
how the emerging Mindanawon self-designation which is premised
on a tri-people perspective, presents a creative attempt at a con-
struction of a transcendent ethnic identity that hopes to unite
rather than divide. Mindanawon identity is based on geographical
location and stresses the concept of a shared territory. It encour-
ages more the exploration of commonalities and the intertwining of
lineage, cultural practices and problems among the tri-peoples.
While de-emphasizing religion as cultural marker, it regards inter-
religious dialogue as an important means for the creation of a
culture of peace. From a social constructivist perspective, however,
the "fate" of this new ethnic identity will ultimately depend on the
interplay of the historical forces in this archipelago once called
"Land of Promise".

Mindanao, together with the Sulu Islands, is located at the southern part of
the Philippines. It is the second largest island in the country. Before the
Spanish colonizers came in the 16th century, it was home to Islamized
Vol. 2 (2004) 3, 7-26
Agnes Brazal

tribes, non-Muslim tribal communities (Lumads), and Cebuano speaking

indigenous peoples of north and eastern Mindanao. The Cebuano speakers
are now ethnically identified with the Christian migrants who started arriv-
ing in the 1900s.
The arrival of Christian migrants from Luzon and the Visayas has
changed dramatically the demographic profile of Mindanao. At the latter
part of the 19th century 30% of the population were Muslims, 20% Lumads
and 50% Christians.1 By 1990, the census shows that Christians constituted
already about 75% of the population.2 The influx of the migrants led to ex-
ploitation and marginalization of the Muslims and the indigenous peoples
leading to social unrest, the Moro Rebellion in the 1970's and the war in
2000. The conflicts have also led to the creation and promotion of politi-
cized identities.
This essay focuses on the religious self-image fostered by the new poli-
tico-ethnic identities and how the emerging Mindanawon consciousness and
identity represent a creative attempt to transcend the religious and social
divide.

Mindanao: Land of unfulfilled promise

Immigration to Mindanao increased in the early 20th century when the
population of Mindanao, estimated at 500,000 during the last decade of the
Spanish regime increased to 2,2M by 1939. Government resettlement pro-
grammes were a major factor in the upsurge of migration. The resettlement
programme, particularly under the American colonial administration after
1935 hoped not only to tap the resources in Mindanao but also aimed at
"civilizing" both the Muslim and tribal groups of Mindanao.
In the 1950's and 1960's the Philippine government continued to encour-
age migration to Mindanao for the landless tillers of Luzon and Visayas and
former Huk rebels. American, Japanese and Filipino corporations also came
in to establish their agricultural plantations. In the beginning of the 1960's,
around 3,200 migrants were arriving every week in Mindanao. As in other
immigration societies, the migrants congregated within the same ethnic
grouping. They also had little respect for the government in Manila. The

1
R.J. May, The Wild West in the South: A recent political history of Mindanao, in:
Mark Turner / R.J. May / Lulu Respall-Turner (eds.), Mindanao: Land of unfulfilled
promise, New Day Publishers, Quezon City 1992, p. 127.
2
B.R. Rodil, It is time for mutual affirmative action, in: Kalinaw Mindanaw, avail-
able from:
http://www.mindanao.com/kalinaw/peaceproc/mutualaffaxn.htm; Internet, accessed
7 March 2003.

8
 Beyond the religious and social divide …

Muslims and indigenous peoples, however, saw the Manila government as

favouring the interest of the migrants. Development efforts in Mindanao got
concentrated in Christian dominated areas. There were lots of cases where
the Muslims and tribal people or even pre-war settlers were dispossessed of
their lands by the new migrants. The government's failure to respond ade-
quately to the needs of the Muslims resulted in conflicts with groups usually
led by the datus (traditional Muslim leaders) and other members of the
Muslim elite.
The "Land of Promise" turned into a "Wild West" where those with
economic and political means protected themselves by forming private
armies or bribing the police and the military with whom they can identify
ethnically. The impoverished Muslims and others who were not able to
compete with the rest for land and livelihood resorted to banditry.
Millenarian movements emerged, as early as the beginnings of the 20th
century, in response to the social conflicts brought about by the arrival of
immigrants. While some tribal groups avoided conflict by fleeing into the
mountains, others fought in fanatical groups inspired by religious mediums.
In the late 1960's, the Ilaga began as a community self defence group to
protect the Christian migrants, particularly the Ilonggos (Visayan ethnic-lin-
guistic group), who are being targeted for assassination by the Moros
because of disputes on land. The group got out of hand and together with the
non-Muslim tribal Tirurays, who were being forced to pay tribute to the
datus, eventually hunted even innocent Moro civilians. In Cotabato and
Lanao del Norte, they fought with Muslim armed groups, namely the Black-
shirts and the Barracudas. The latter began attacking settlers in Lanao del
Norte in 1971. In a move to retake farmlands of immigrant settlers called
"Operation Bawi" ("Operation Reclaim"), the Barracudas stirred up ordinary
Maranao (Islamized group) who previously lived peacefully with Christian
neighbours to claim their neighbours' farm. Well-known politicians (Chris-
tians and Muslims) in their respective provinces supported these groups.3 A
strong military response on the part of the government led to their contain-
ment and disappearance, and prevented what could have escalated into
genocide.
Lumad areas have also become socially unstable as they have become a
recruiting ground for communist combatants. Intelligence reports suggest

3
Hilario Gomez Jr., The Moro Rebellion and the search for peace: A study on Chris-
tian-Muslim relations in the Philippines, Silsilah Publications, Zamboanga City
2000, pp. 156-173.

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Agnes Brazal

that two thirds of NPA combatants are Lumads.4 The artificial peace that has
been attained by the arrest of the Moro Rebellion in the 1970's and the peace
process with the rebel groups is always threatening to explode again into
violence.
The origin or cause of the conflicts in Mindanao is actually multi-lay-
ered and multi-dimensional. There is the economic competition for scarce
resources as expressed in the landgrabbing cases and "Operation Reclaim";
the political factor, that is manifested in government neglect of the plight of
Muslims and indigenous tribes as well as in the divisions among the Mus-
lims themselves; and the socio-psychological factor such as inter-ethnic
chauvinism and fear of extinction or genocide.
While the media and some political groups have often described the
situation as a "Muslim-Christian" conflict, the peoples involved – both im-
migrants, Muslims and indigenous tribes – are actually from various ethno-
linguistic groups with very little sense of communal identity (we are speak-
ing here of 13 Islamized tribes, around 18 Lumad communities and immi-
grants from various ethno-linguistic groups in Luzon and Visayas). Such
religious labelling also ignores the existence and the plight of the Lumads.
The 2nd half of the 20th century, however, has witnessed the construc-
tion of new politicized identities by the marginalized groups in Mindanao,
an expression of the heightened communal consciousness of these different
ethno-linguistic groups in relation to certain political goals. These opposi-
tional identities and their proponents' discourse also foster directly or indi-
rectly certain religious self-understanding and make use of religion as
cultural marker in varying degrees of intensity.

Moro and Lumad politico-ethnic identities and shifting

religious self-comprehension
Ethnicity has been used in social anthropology to describe social groups
with a shared culture. It may be defined on the basis of language, religion or
nationality, whichever is seen as symbolizing the shared culture.
There exist three main approaches in the study of ethnicity and ethnic
conflict, which may provide us with a background for analyzing the emerg-
ing ethnic identities in Mindanao: the primordialist, instrumentalist and

4
Rick Flores, Mindanawon instead of Tri-people, in: MindaNews (10 December
2002), available from:
http://www.mindanews.com/2002/12/3rd/vws10mincode.html; Internet, accessed 15
February 2003.

10
 Beyond the religious and social divide …

social constructivist model.5 The primordialist approach posits ethnicity as a

fixed characteristic that is grounded in a sense of kinship or degree of re-
latedness. This stems from the belief in having originated from a common
descent or genetic source. This view is unable to account for the rise of new
and transformed identities and regards differences in ethnicity as inherently
conflictual.
The instrumentalist approach regards ethnicity as simply a vehicle util-
ized by individuals, groups or elites to obtain some political end or advan-
tage. It is therefore not radically different from a political affiliation. Critics
of this view would rightfully claim that ethnicity is not something fully
within the choice of an individual and a group. Rather, the formation of a
new ethnic identity interacts with the processes of the larger society.
The constructionist approach, which represents the scholarly consensus,
argues that ethnic groups are neither fixed nor completely flexible. Ethnic
groups are "imagined communities" that is, a product of socio-historical
phenomena.6 Ethnic identities are not fixed features waiting for us to un-
cover. Rather identities change as discourse about ethnic relations change.
Rational purposive choice of individuals or groups still plays a role here, but
not independently of its interaction with the social systems. It is the task of
"mythmakers" to foster an image of communion within the new ethnic
group.
Working from a constructionist perspective, we shall discuss the new
politico-ethnic identities being forged in Mindanao, and the shifting reli-
gious self-comprehension of the peoples as religion gets entangled in the
discourses on ethnicity.

Moro/Bangsamoro identity
Before the late 1960's, the Islamized tribes in the Philippines were not a uni-
fied group. They fought the Spaniards as separate sultanates in a period of
three hundred years and, as in the rest of Southeast Asia, the sultanates also
fought against each other. The beginnings of the formation of a unified
Philippine Muslim identity started when the American colonizers (1899-

5
David Lake / Donald Rothchild, Ethnic fears and global engagement: The interna-
tional spread and management of global conflict, available from:
http://ps.ucdavis.edu/classes/pol129/CHE/lake_rothchild.html; Internet, accessed 20
February 2001.
6
Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of
nationalism (7th edition), Verso, London 1996, p. 7.

11
Agnes Brazal

1946), as part of their pacification campaign, encouraged their consolidation

in a "Moro Province" under more enlightened (i.e. Westernized) leadership.7
"Moro" was the term used by the Spanish invaders to refer to the various
Islamized ethnolinguistic groups in Mindanao. Among Christian Filipinos
"Moro" was understood as a pejorative designation, through the folk theatre
"moro-moro" which depicts Moros as savage and treacherous pirates being
battled and defeated by Christian heroes. In the late 1960's Philippine Mus-
lim nationalists transformed the ethnic slur "Moro" into a politicized collec-
tive identity, representing the natives' continued resistance to foreign domi-
nation.
The term "Bangsamoro" literally means Moro Nation (bangsa) and is a
late 20th century invention. Bangsamoro designates a group of people with a
territory. Two basic trends characterize the Moros' way of asserting their
religious and ethnic identities: the modernist and the fundamentalist
models.8 The modernist one is basically committed to reconstructing Islam
to adapt to modern needs while the fundamentalist one tries to apply "eternal
Islamic truths" to the present situation.

Modernist trend
The modernist model does not view secession or independence from the
Philippine State as integral to preserving the Islamic religious identity.
There are still two subcategories of modernists depending on how they see
their link to the Philippine Republic.
The first type, propounded by intellectuals, most of them lawyers who
know Islamic and Philippine civil law, deems it possible to promote reforms
within the Philippine existing legal system to allow for respect of the Islamic
laws and thus the maintenance of their Muslim identity. This view can be
achieved by distinguishing between the "law of the land" and "personal
law". They also propose reforms in Islamic thought and institutions, which
are oppressive to the masses. For instance they reject the old feudal datu
system, the traditional structure of leadership in the pre-colonial era until the
1900s, which has been preserved in some Philippine Muslim communities.
Devout Muslims of various ages, who witness to their faith in their lives,
also belong to this group. Convinced of the need to "let God be God in this

7
William LaRousse, Walking together: Seeking peace: The local Church of Min-
danao-Sulu journeying, in: Dialogue with the Muslim community (1965-2000),
Claretian Publications, Quezon City 2001, p. 180.
8
George Decasa, The Qur`anic concept of Umma and its function in Philippine Mus-
lim society, Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, Rome 1999, pp. 379-392.

12
 Beyond the religious and social divide …

modern age", they exhibit openness to work with people of other religious
traditions of faith in the one God.
The second type of modernist likewise rejects the secessionist alterna-
tive and the traditional datu system and instead proposes autonomy to the
Bangsamoro within a federal republic. This trend is represented by the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF). For the MNLF, the Bangsamoro terri-
tory consists of the 13 provinces of Mindanao as stipulated in the MNLF-
Philippine agreement signed in Tripoli in 1976. In this territory, the Muslims
can have their own courts guided by Islamic laws. The MNLF also promotes
a more inclusive use of the term "Bangsamoro" by expanding Moro to in-
clude the non-Muslims – Christians and Lumads – in the Moro homeland.
The MNLF vision of the Bangsamoro is one where different religions har-
moniously exist, following their respective laws.

Fundamentalist trend
The fundamentalist trend can also be further categorized into two types: the
revivalist and radical fundamentalist. The revivalist fundamentalist advo-
cates a close adherence to Islamic law as well as a revival of the traditional
structure of leadership among Muslims in the Philippines, the datu and
sultan system of government. The Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization
(BMLO), which has been formed by some datus and sultans of Mindanao is
representative of this aspiration to recover the glorious past. The BMLO
aims at the establishment of a Bangsamoro State (an Islamic government) on
the ancestral lands of the Moros, under the leadership of the datus and
governed by Islamic law. Realizing this vision may entail armed conflict,
parliamentary struggle and diplomatic negotiations.
The radical fundamentalist, represented by the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), differs from the revivalist in that it rejects a return to the datu
system and the sultanate, which it views as un-Islamic. The MILF envisions
an Islamic State patterned after the one established by Muhammad in
Medina which is characterized by strict adherence to the Sharia. The MILF
is a religious movement. It broke away from the MNLF in 1984. It dropped
the term "national" in favour of "Islamic" to symbolize its emphasis on
Islam, in contrast to what it perceived as the more secular and Marxist-
leaning MNLF. Unlike the MNLF which is advocating for autonomy within
the framework of the Philippine Republic, the MILF regards as non-nego-
tiable the full independence of the Bangsamoro Muslims because they
believe that only within an Islamic State can they realize the Qur`anic
teaching of worship of God and right conduct. Salamat Hashim, the MILF

13
Agnes Brazal

founder, regards any Westernization of Islam as opposed to the Qur`an and

the Sunna and considers the modernist Muslims as "unbelievers" or "igno-
rant of Islam".
In an attempt to push forward secession from the Philippine State, the
MILF has propounded myths to support the existence of "totally distinct and
entirely separate" peoples in a typical primordialist approach. One of these
is Hashim's claim that the Bangsamoro nation pre-dates the Philippines and
includes both the Muslims and non-Muslim indigenous peoples. Their
ancestral homeland originally consists of the whole of Mindanao and the
surrounding islands. This is, however, simply a projection of the term
"Bangsamoro" back to pre-colonial Philippines. Bangsamoro, as an ethnic-
ity, neither existed in the pre-colonial, colonial or even post-colonial times
but is a late 20th century construction.9
Another myth is the assertion that the Muslims have never been con-
quered, either by the Spaniards or the Americans, and that the Bangsamoro
homeland had been unjustly annexed to the Philippine State when the latter
gained its independence. While one can understand this as a symbolic ex-
pression for the continued resistance of the Muslims to Spanish and Ameri-
can colonization, this is not accurately based on historical realities. In 1878,
Sultan Jama ul-Azam of Sulu signed a peace treaty with the Spanish gov-
ernment bounding his subjects to the Spanish king while maintaining auton-
omy for Sulu. Datu Utto of Cotabato likewise capitulated to Spain in 1887
and recognized the rule of the king of Spain.10 And together with the Lu-
mads and the Christians, the Muslims were colonized by the Americans.
Because Muslims are now the minority in Mindanao, the MILF is
demanding the complete independence of provinces and municipalities
where the Bangsamoro Muslims constitute the majority, as well as the areas
occupied by non-Muslim Bangsamoro tribes. The non-Muslims (Lumads
and Christians) in the Bangsamoro territories will be protected by the same
rights except that they cannot be the head of state nor take charge of the
propagation of Islamic ideology.11
Although less vocal about their political position, the Tabligh movement
likewise belongs to the radical fundamentalist trend. The movement

9
Thomas McKenna, Muslim rulers and rebels: Everyday politics and armed separa-
tism in the Southern Philippines, University of California Press, Berkeley 1998,
pp. 82-83.
10
Rodil, It is time for mutual affirmative action, p. 4.
11
A.M. Lingga, Salamat Hashim's concept of Bangsamoro State and Government, in:
Dansalan Quarterly 15 (1995) 3-4, 57, cited by Decasa, The Qur`anic concept of
Umma, p. 384.

14
 Beyond the religious and social divide …

preaches a return to Islamic roots and is opposed to folk Islam. Because of

the latter, some Muslims do not welcome the Tabligh preachers in their
mosques. The Tabligh movement also advocates avoidance of contact and
collaboration with Christians, whom they consider unclean. At the height of
the armed conflicts in the 1970's and the 1980's, Catholic Church workers in
Muslim dominated areas like Basilan and Jolo, could travel and mingle
freely with the Muslims. Since the Tabligh's arrival greater restrictions have
existed in travel and there has been less openness on the part of the Muslims
in these areas to relate and dialogue with Christians.12
The radical fundamentalist trend, in its zeal to return to the "Islamic
roots", has disapproved of some religious rituals and well-loved cultural
customs of folk Muslims.13 For example, the radical fundamentalists contest
the traditional death rituals where prayers, the use of incense and ritual ab-
lutions at the grave site were added to the traditional Islamic burial service.
These were viewed by the ustadzes (Islamic teachers) as adulterations rather
than an inculturation of Islamic practice. More strongly disapproved were
the various death commemoration rituals 3, 7, 40, 100 and 365 days after
death, which do have therapeutic functions for those left behind by the
deceased. This practice is common among Islamic and non-Islamic groups
including Christian Filipinos. The ustadzes criticized the long death com-
memorations because they can become very expensive and people can incur
debts as a consequence. The people, on their part, fear that their loved ones
will not be at peace without these death commemorations. Besides, there are
ways the people can reduce the expenses without decreasing the number of
death commemorations.
Common Muslims, who sympathize with the MILF, have cautiously but
firmly resisted these attempts of the Islamic leaders to dictate their under-
standing of Islam while still supporting the armed struggle. Community
imams mediate between the communities and the ulama. For instance, they
stress the need to differentiate the un-Islamic from the anti-Islamic. Tradi-
tional rituals are not necessarily anti-Islamic. They preach to the community
that they must follow the Qur`anic teachings but not the cultural practices in
the Middle East and that the young ustadzes are not able to distinguish
between Islamization and Arabization.
The need to control the behaviour of women is reflected in some of the
reforms advocated by the ustadzes such as the prohibition of emergency
marriages (when the woman is pregnant already), the dayunday (a song

12
La Rousse, Walking together, p. 148.
13
McKenna, Muslim rulers and rebels, pp. 220-226.

15
Agnes Brazal

duel, where a man and one or two women exchange extemporaneous

romantic repartees) and other forms of entertainment.14 Towards the end of
the Moro Rebellion in the 1970's and after the cease-fire, it was not uncom-
mon to find corpses of women floating down the river from "liberated"
areas. People believe these bodies were those of women punished for illicit
sexual relations by the rebel courts. News of these events creates apprehen-
sion among the ordinary Muslims. But in general, the MILF courts have not
strictly implemented the Sharia law because, in their view, the local Mus-
lims are not genuine Muslims and are therefore not yet bound by the stricter
Islamic punishments.
A phenomenon that is also worth mentioning in relation to the funda-
mentalist model of asserting religious and ethnic identity is the "Balik-
Islam" (Return to Islam) Movement. Because of the efforts of the Tabligh
roving missionaries and the Da`wah (call to faith) movement linked to the
worldwide Islamic revival,15 over 100,000 Christians have converted to
Islam. This large-scale conversion, however, occurred after the Mindanao
wars in the 70's and seems to be more of a practical political strategy in the
context of insecurities felt by Christians living in predominantly Muslim
communities.16
Balik-Islam members possess the potential to play a role in movements
that can bridge the gap between Muslims and Christians since they would
have friends on both sides. Unfortunately, the new converts are more zeal-
ous in converting Christians than the Muslims themselves so that they are
even perceived by other Muslims as "opportunistic zealots."

Lumad identity and re-appreciation of indigenous religio-cultural

world-view17
Like the Islamized tribes, the indigenous peoples of Mindanao did not
develop a communal consciousness until the 2nd half of the 20th century.
The collective term "Lumad" is a self-designation which emerged only in
the last 15 years. In the past, they had been called by various names by out-
14
Ibid., p. 329.
15
The international Islamic revival began to be felt in Mindanao in the 1980's when, as
a result of the peace talks with the MNLF, the government shifted its focus from the
Muslim to the communist rebels. This created the atmosphere for the flourishing of
the Islamic renewal and the emergence of a strong ulama. Clerics educated in the
Middle East were no longer engulfed in the armed conflict. They propagated Islamic
populism and advocated for the reform of cultural practices.
16
La Rousse, Walking together, p. 148.
17
B.R. Rodil, Ancestral domain: A central issue in the Lumad struggle for self-deter-
mination in Mindanao, in: Turner et al. (eds.), Mindanao, pp. 233-247.

16
 Beyond the religious and social divide …

siders (e.g. paganos, infideles, "wild tribes", "uncivilized", "tribal minori-

ties", "indigenous cultural communities", "tribal peoples").
The term "Lumad" is actually an acronym of Lumadnong Alyanso Alang
sa Demokrasya – "Indigenous Alliance for Democracy".
The name "Lumad" is a politicized identity constructed and propagated
by members and support groups of Lumad-Mindanao, a coalition of local
and regional all-Lumad groups. This coalition propounds the following
goals: 1) to protect the identity and rights of the Lumad people; 2) to protect
their ancestral domain; 3) to preserve their cultural heritage.
Lumad identity was born in the context of a heightened awareness of the
different tribal groups of their common predicament and aspirations. It is an
identity which emerged during the period of the Marcos dictatorship in the
context of landgrabbing by migrants, intrusions of multinational corpora-
tions into their ancestral domain, poverty, militarization, and government
neglect. They felt left out even in the government's peace agreement with
the MNLF and ceasefire treaty with the MILF. In the Organic Act that
formed the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in 1989, there was a
provision granting privileges and rights (e.g. tribal courts) for indigenous
peoples in the Moroland, but there was no representative from the indige-
nous peoples themselves in the Regional Legislative Assembly.18 On MILF's
inclusion of Lumads in the Bangsamoro identity, the secretary general of
Lumad-Mindanao strongly remarked that they, the Lumads, do not regard
themselves as Bangsa Moro and neither do they claim the lands where Mus-
lims constitute the majority, but the rest of Mindanao is theirs by ancestral
right.
Because of the large presence of immigrant population, the Lumads are
today the majority in only nine towns, whereas they used to inhabit what
now comprises 17 provinces and 14 cities. Living as independent communi-
ties for many years, and at times even in conflict with one another, the
Lumad tribes have realized that their survival rests on being united as a unit,
that is, as Lumads. They want the government to acknowledge their com-
munal ownership of tribal domains and their right to rule their communities
according to tribal laws. They were influential in incorporating provisions
close to this ideal in the 1987 Constitution (Article 12, Section 5 and Article
14, Section 17).

18
Lumads and the peace process – Interview with Ramon Moambing, in: Accord Min-
danao, available from: http://www.c-r.org/accord/min/accord6/moambing.htm; In-
ternet, accessed 10 March 2003.

17
Agnes Brazal

Roman Catholic and Protestant leaders have helped a lot in the organi-
zation of the Lumads. In the first Lumad Mindanao General Assembly in
1983, the majority of those involved in its organization were Church people.
As part of the KADUMA-Lumad (meaning "in partnership with the Lu-
mads") they continue to help in the development of the Lumad identity. We
thus see here a case of religious communities taking up the cudgel to protect
the interest of a marginalized group.
One unprecedented conference organized by the Bishops-Ulama Forum
in 1997, was a dialogue between the Lumads and Christians, participated in
by 57 Lumads (tribal leaders, religious leaders or the latter's representatives)
from 11 of the 18 Lumad ethnolinguistic groups and a small group of Chris-
tians. This activity was sponsored by the Episcopal Commission in Inter-re-
ligious Dialogue. In the Forum the Lumads pointed out the key role played
by both Christians and Muslims in the deterioration of their culture and in
their current state of poverty. Archbishop Fernando Capalla asked forgive-
ness for the wrongs the Church had committed against the Lumads, which
the latter, in turn, appreciated. The conference concluded with a resolve on
the part of the Christians to respect the beliefs of the Lumads and to teach
these in the seminaries. Hopefully, this will help prevent activities that
would destroy what is humanizing in Lumad culture. The Lumads, on their
part, vowed to exert efforts to regenerate their dying culture and to protect
their environment and communities. The BUF, in order to strengthen its
understanding of the Lumad belief system, has also co-sponsored a project,
a series of research training workshops for diocesan personnel (Lumad and
non-Lumad) in Mindanao on Lumad world-views and beliefs.

From Tri-People to Mindanawon identity

While marginalized groups may have a valid need to assert their identities, it
is necessary to rekindle the socio-political imagination of the region to go
beyond the social and religious divide. Some thinkers have pointed out the
need to cast away notions of "separate histories, distinct identities" or, at the
least, to highlight also the other side of the coin – the intertwining of lineage
and cultural practices (e.g. common animistic base of folk Islam and folk
Christianity) among the peoples of Mindanao.19
In line with this, a movement of very recent origin but gaining momen-
tum, refers to inhabitants of Mindanao as Mindanawons. The peoples of

19
Arnold Azurin, Beyond the cult of dissidence in Southern Philippines and wartorn
zones in the global village, University of the Philippines, Quezon City 1996,
pp. 252-253.

18
 Beyond the religious and social divide …

Mindanao did not normally use this designation to refer to themselves. The
term is based on geographical location, which is a normal way of represent-
ing identity for Filipinos. Rather than stressing an oppositional identity,
Mindanawon stresses the concept of a shared territory. This allows seeing
more the things that bind people together rather than their differences. While
it promotes inter-religious dialogue, Mindanawon consciousness also de-
emphasizes religion as a cultural marker.
"Mindanawon" consciousness first originated in what is called the "tri-
people" perspective, that is, that Mindanao is home to three distinct groups
of peoples – the Lumads, Moros and Christians.20 Historically, the term "tri-
people" was aimed at increasing the awareness and appreciation of the
Christians and Moros of the Lumad peoples and culture. The Lumads were
not only victims of landgrabbing by Christian migrants but have also been
enslaved by the Moros. The term "tri-people" was meant to give equal
recognition to the three groups that now populate Mindanao, regardless of
population size. The Mindanao Tri-people's Socio-Cultural Development
Framework (MTSCDF) is the document that contains the collective vision
of the tri-peoples, having been a product of consultations of various groups
since 1991. Other civil society groups like Church institutions eventually
adopted as well the tri-people framework.
Today, MinCoDe (Mindanao Coalition of Development NGOs) which
has promoted the use of a tri-people framework of peace and development
for over 10 years, is refining its strategy by shifting to the term "Mindana-
won". "Tri-people", according to some, tends to divide rather than unite by
stressing the distinctness of the three groups of peoples. Mindanawon con-
sciousness, however, does not gloss over the differences. Rather it is prem-
ised on a tri-people perspective, that is, that Mindanao is a shared territory
of the Lumads, Moros and Christians.
Those who propagate a Mindanawon identity operate on the following
fundamental presuppositions.21 Firstly, as a result of historical and social
forces, Mindanao is now inhabited by three distinct groups: the Lumad
(5%), the Muslims (20%) and the Christian settlers (75%). Secondly, none
of these groups can claim Mindanao as solely theirs, rather, Mindanao
should be considered a shared territory. Thirdly, despite the cultural and
religious differences of the three groups as well as the inherited prejudices
they harbour against each other, they can work together to make Mindanao
"a home of peace and harmony." The basis of unity is equal and mutual ac-

20
Flores, Mindanawon, pp. 1-2.
21
Rodil, It is time for mutual affirmative action, p. 2.

19
Agnes Brazal

ceptance of one another as distinct peoples in one nation, sharing the same
territory. Articulators of Mindanawon consciousness are highlighting myths
of the different groups in Mindanao, which speak of a common origin fol-
lowed by a process of differentiation of peoples, with some living in the
lowland and others on the highland, and then developing to further explain
the assimilation of foreign elements. These myths somehow express the
people's aspiration for both unity and diversity.
In terms of vision, the tri-peoples themselves should fashion this from
the present realities, on the level of communities. This important task should
not be left to the care of the Philippine government nor to the MNLF/MILF
alone. Neither should this ignore the contribution women can make to the
peace process. In the formal peace negotiations, two out of five members of
the government panel are women, whereas on the MILF side, there is no
woman representative at all. But in their respective communities, women are
already playing crucial roles in the peace process (e.g. establishment of
peace zones in Pikit, Cotabato, the Pilgrimage for Peace in Kauswagan and
Lanao and the peace dialogues in Carmen). The inclusion of women's per-
spectives in the official talks may help direct people's attention to the human
face of the conflict and to more practical workable solutions, not because
this is essentially the way they think, but because their social location and
life experience may have provided them with another lens to view the situa-
tion.22

Promoting a culture of peace and dialogue

The promotion of the Mindanawon identity grounded on a tri-people frame-
work requires the creation of a culture of peace and dialogue. Instead of
seeing ethnicity as naturally a cause of tension and conflict, on the contrary,
in the minds of its advocates, ethnicity can function towards creating a peace
culture.23
In 1996, representative peace advocates and educators from the Lumad,
Muslim and Christian settlers formed themselves into a movement called
Kalinaw Mindanaw (Peace Mindanaw) whose vision of a tri-people per-
spective is expressed in a Peace Credo which they produced, ratified and
adopted on this gathering. What follows is an English translation of the
Peace Credo:
22
Mary Ann Arnado, Women's participation in the peace process: Key towards
sustainable authentic peace in Mindanao, in: MindaNews (October 6th, 2002); avail-
able from: http://www.mindanews.com/2002/10/2nd/vws06arnado.html; Internet,
accessed 20 February 2003.
23
Rodil, It is time for mutual affirmative action, p. 13.

20
 Beyond the religious and social divide …

Peace Mindanaw!!!
Lumad, Muslim, Christian
They are different, they can be one
One God
One land
One dream
Peace Mindanaw!!!
This Peace Credo has been translated into 14 local languages and has been
sung in ten different tunes. Since the organization of the Kalinaw Mindanaw
movement, more than 50 seminars on Culture of Peace have been conducted
throughout Mindanao. Educators, NGO workers, students, Church workers,
community and religious leaders including bishops and ulama have partici-
pated in these Culture of Peace seminars. The seminar has three parts. The
first part takes a historical journey that traces the common roots of the tri-
peoples of Mindanao and identifies the origins of biases and prejudices. The
second part focuses on situations of conflicts and peaceful means of resolu-
tion. The third part deepens the people's understanding of the culture of
peace and how this can be promoted.
Trainers' training seminars were also conducted and a module on culture
of peace titled Panagtagbo sa Kalinaw (Convergence in Peace) has been
produced and used extensively even by government institutions. A local
group of Kalinaw Mindanaw in the Mindanao State University-Iligan Insti-
tute of Technology focuses on self transformation seminars. This includes
processing participants' interpersonal conflicts, skills-training in conflict
resolution and the application of these in the conflictive context of Min-
danao.
In relation to religious identity, the promoters of Mindanawon con-
sciousness view inter-religious dialogue as a necessary foundation for the
tri-peoples to live harmoniously with each other. They therefore actively
support the growth in inter-religious dialogue that has occurred in Min-
danao-Sulu in the past three decades.

Context: Growth of inter-religious dialogue in the 1990's

The Bishops-Ulama Forum leads the inter-religious dialogue in Mindanao
today. At present, this is composed of Catholic and Protestant bishops in
Mindanao and the ulama (Muslim religious leaders) from the Ulama League
of the Philippines. Membership of spiritual leaders from the Lumad com-
munities is currently being considered as BUF has adopted a tri-people per-
spective and has expanded its concerns to include the Lumads.

21
Agnes Brazal

The Bishops-Ulama Forum was formed in 1996 to fill the missing ele-
ment in the peace efforts, that is, the lack of attention given to the spiritual
and cultural bases for peace or the faith dimension. The Forum meets quar-
terly to deepen understanding among Christian and Muslim leaders and to
advance the Mindanao peace process. It had held about 13 annual con-
ference dialogues to date.
In 1997, the Diocesan Clergy of Mindanao and Sulu had a historic gath-
ering centred on fostering the culture of peace in Mindanao in its tri-people
context. The gathering was composed of 305 Catholic priests and 11 Muslim
religious leaders. Such a meeting of Christian and Muslim leaders in one
room was the first time in the country, in Asia, and maybe in the world.24
The localization of the peace and development process initiated by the
BUF has taken the form of Imam-Priests' Conferences. In 1998, the first
inter-religious dialogue of priests, pastors and imams was held in the Arch-
diocese of Davao. This was followed by a second dialogue conference in
Tagum in 1999 participated in by 35 imams and 50 priests. These efforts led
to more local level dialogues in Mindanao and Sulu. These local level dia-
logues provided a forum for the priests and imams to get to know each other
personally, address local issues and bring the dialogue to the grassroots
level. For example, through the Ustadz, Priests, Imams Forum (UPIF) in the
Diocese of Kidapawan, a co-ordinated relief distribution was organized for
the Muslim evacuees during the 2000 war. The group also issued an appeal
for peace in the name of the UPIF.
The BUF realizes the importance of schools as venue to promote a
culture of dialogue and peace. In 1998, the BUF organized a conference for
superintendents and administrators of Muslim and Christian schools. Par-
ticipants included 21 Christians, six ulama and one ustadz. The participants
later conducted their own seminars to explore how to integrate peace
modules in the curriculum.
There are citizens' initiatives as well that have been affirmed by the
BUF such as the creation of peace zones in contexts of heightened armed
conflict. Guns, even of military and policemen, are strictly prohibited in
these areas. The zones also have a group of leaders that is tasked with trying
to resolve peacefully any conflict that might arise. Respect for religious
practice of the different groups is maintained. For example, liquor is sold
and pigs are raised only in certain specified areas. The Church, together with
NGOs, local officials and the government's peace commission, provide sup-
port to these peace zones.
24
Rodil, It is time for mutual affirmative action, p. 12.

22
 Beyond the religious and social divide …

William LaRousse's book, "Walking together, seeking peace", has

shown the gradual reception of the Catholic Church in Mindanao-Sulu from
1965-2000 of inter-religious dialogue as an integral part of its identity and
mission. Prior to the 1980s, the term "dialogue" was associated more with
formal gatherings and government negotiations, which the episcopacy felt
was beyond its role.
The 1990's witnessed a growth in the local Church's reception of inter-
religious dialogue.25 This was stimulated by the 1990 Pastoral Letter of the
Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) which acknowl-
edged the struggle for self-determination by both the MNLF and MILF, and
which advocated for a peaceful resolution to the issue, thereby acknowl-
edging itself as a partner in the peace process. Another external stimuli
could have been CBCP's formation of the Episcopal Commission on Inter-
religious Dialogue to promote inter-religious dialogue and support diocesan
efforts already being undertaken. The most important stimulus, however,
was the government's creation of a National Unification Commission (NUC)
in 1992 which started a chain of activities for dialogue between Muslims
and Christians, in which the Mindanao-Sulu Church was a key participant.
Another significant event was the ZAMBASULI (Zamboanga, Basilan, Sulu
Islands) Peace Consultation of 1994, which led to the establishment of desks
for inter-religious dialogue in the different dioceses.
The growing receptivity to inter-religious dialogue in the Mindanao-
Sulu Church is a significant development considering studies, which reveal
the greater hesitancy on the part of Christians to relate with Muslims than
vice versa.26 This, however, continues to be challenged by the intermittent
eruption of armed conflicts, which oftentimes leave behind a legacy of bit-
terness and resentment making the people less open to inter-religious
dialogue.
From the perspective of the network of peace advocates promoting
Mindanawon consciousness, inter-religious dialogue among the tri-peoples
is an integral component in the promotion of a culture of peace. Their goals

25
LaRousse, Walking together, p. 412.
26
See the study by Rosalita Tolibas-Nuñez among Muslims and Christians in General
Santos City and of Hilario Gomez in Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte which
shows that there is more hope of changing Muslim attitude towards national unity
than there is of changing views of Christians whose perception of Muslims is largely
negative. Tolibas-Nuñez, Roots of conflict, pp. 79-81; Hilario Gomez, A Christian
approach to Filipino Muslims, in: Church and Community 10, No. 4 (July-August
1970), pp. 13-22, cited by Tolibas-Nuñez, Roots of conflict, p. 38.

23
Agnes Brazal

thus augur well with the acceptance of inter-religious dialogue as part of the
identity and mission of the Mindanao-Sulu Church.

Federalism: political expression of Mindanawon identity

While the promotion of a culture of peace and dialogue is the socio-cultural
expression of the Mindanawon identity, federalism is the latter's political
expression.27 This Philippine Federal Republic may take the form of five or
six States. One of these can be the Islamic State composed of the predomi-
nantly Muslim provinces (Sulu, Tawi-tawi, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao
and Basilan) and municipalities. The Federal Republic should also see to it
that the right of the indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and to
develop their cultures according to the 1987 Constitution and the Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Republic Act No.
6734) are indeed protected.
This alternative which is gaining more adherents, would require the
MILF to move a step backwards and make as non-negotiable only the estab-
lishment of an Islamic State. There may also be a need for the Sharia to be
reformed by the Muslim communities themselves, to remove provisions dis-
criminatory of women and non-Muslims, in accordance with the spirit of the
earlier Mecca stage of its formation.
This option for federalism does not exclude a support for other peaceful
means of attaining long-lasting peace in Mindanao such as a UN supervised
referendum. This has been proposed by the Mindanao People's Peace
Movement (composed of representatives from the Lumads, Bangsamoro and
Mindanao Settlers and their Descendants) in a recently held meeting in
December 2002.

Conclusion
The influx of migrants in Mindanao, especially in the second half of the 20th
century, has led to social instability in the region creating an atmosphere rife
for the emergence of politicized ethnic identities. Mindanao is now an arena
of struggle for competing politico-ethnic discourses.
What religious self-image has been fostered by the emerging politico-
ethnic identities? The Moro/Bangsamoro identity has fostered two diverse
approaches to the assertion of religious and ethnic identity: the modernist
and the fundamentalist. The modernist is more open to adapting Islam to
changing contexts, and in particular to exploring ways in which this can be

27
Rey Magno Teves, Impasse creaker: An Islamic State within a Federal Philippines?,
in: Intersect (September 1999), pp. 10-13.

24
 Beyond the religious and social divide …

done within the Philippine State. Those propounding a fundamentalist

approach try to recover a particular historical way of living out Islam and
advocate a strict adherence to the Islamic law. While the modernist is more
open to inter-religious dialogue, some radical fundamentalists prohibit
mingling with people of other faiths whom they consider as unclean. The
latter are also opposed to folk Islam and other local customs. There are indi-
cations of resistance from the ordinary Muslims of what they view as the
Arabization of Islam by the radical fundamentalist groups. While the MILF
leaders expect that, in time, the Philippine Muslims will become more
genuinely Islamized, the relatively older community imams hope that the
younger ustadzes will eventually learn how to distinguish between Arabiza-
tion and being true to the spirit of Islam in a way that is open to the local
culture.
The Lumads, on their part, as a result of their increased political con-
sciousness and organization, are challenged to re-discover and re-appreciate
their religious world-view and culture from which they have been alienated.
Christians have actively helped and supported them in their organization and
retrieval of their traditions.
While the development of a collective consciousness beyond their
ethno-linguistic groups is a necessary development to assure the protection
of the political and cultural rights of Muslims and Lumads, there is a need
for the peoples of Mindanao to go beyond the religious and social divide to
prevent further bloodshed in the islands. After more than a decade of pro-
moting a tri-people consciousness, a network of peace advocates has shifted
to propagating a Mindanawon identity, a self-designation based not on a
religious marker but on the peoples' link to the land where they dwell.
Mindanawon consciousness presents a creative attempt at collective
imagining and construction of a new transcendent identity. The term "Min-
danawon" allows the imagination to explore not only the differences but also
the commonalities among the tri-peoples. Overcoming the label "Muslim-
Christian conflict" can alert the people to other dimensions of their problem
such as the intrusion and exploitation of multinational corporations of the
resources of Mindanao, graft and corruption on the part of the government
leaders (whether Christians, Muslims or Lumads), and the class divisions
within the ethnic groups themselves. Mindanawon consciousness also
avoids the politicizing of religion as cultural marker, for the conflict in Min-
danao cannot be reduced to religious differences alone. But inter-religious
dialogue remains to be an important means for the creation of a culture of
peace, and thus it is significant for the Mindanawon proponents as well, that

25
Agnes Brazal

inter-religious dialogue has grown in strides in the past decade and the Min-
danao-Sulu Church, to which most migrants and their descendants belong,
has acknowledged inter-religious dialogue as central to its self-understand-
ing and mission. In relation to this, an important theme that can be the sub-
ject for future dialogue towards developing a Mindanawon identity would be
the tri-peoples' theologies of the land.
The development of a new ethnic identity, however, does not simply
depend on what individuals or a group of intellectuals propound (instru-
mentalist perspective) but also on the interplay of historical forces (social
constructionist). While the Mindanawon alternative is attractive, the inter-
action of this discourse with the different social forces and systems will
shape what will eventually happen to the island once called "Land of
Promise".

Agnes Brazal
Maryhill School of Theology
14th St. Corner Gilmore Avenue
New Manila, 1112
Quezon City/Philippines
abrazal2001@yahoo.com

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