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Politics and Ontology in Baruch Spinoza: Individuation, Affectivity and the Collective life of the Multitude

Ljuba Castelli Queen Mary, University of London

A thesis submitted for the degree of Phd February 2010

Declaration

I, Ljuba Castelli, confirm that the work presented in the thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other resources, I confirm that this has been indicated in this thesis.

Signature: London,

For that bicycle

Abstract
The thesis examines the linkage between ontology and politics in Spinoza, and considers the extent to which his philosophy discloses novel materialist conceptions of nature, history and society. It explores the distinct paradigm of the individual proposed by Spinoza emerging from his materialist ontology, and the ways in which this impacts effectively upon the constitution of the multitude as a political category. Arguing that Spinozas ontology unveils a more complex process of vital and psychic individuation, I develop a contemporary interpretation of Spinozas writings through Simondons notions of collective being, disparation, emotions and transindividuality. The study of Spinozas ontology in the light of Simondon is crucial for re-considering the central role of affectivity within the genesis and development of human beings. This refers to the redefinition of affectivity as a powerful source of psychic and political individuation, which is the cornerstone of relation, power and transformations. The understanding of Spinozas process of affective and collective individuation constitutes the basis for analysing his political theory. The inquiry focuses to the emergence of the political status of the multitude from this complex process of collective and affective individuation, and considers the extent to which the multitude impacts concretely upon the realm of the political. Specifically, the discussion draws attention to the affective state of the multitude, and the ways in which this produces fundamental relational events, meanings, power and problematic political individuals. The argument then turns to examine the model of democracy proposed by Spinoza and the role of the multitude within the constitution of the democratic body. It sheds light on the pivotal part played by the multitude within the production of democracy, and investigates the interface between affectivity and democracy more broadly.

Acknowledgements
Writing this thesis has been a long and often tortuous path. A number of people have accompanied me in this journey. I am immeasurably indebted to my supervisors Dr. Caroline Williams and Prof. Jeremy Jennings, for their unrelenting commitment, patient guidance, fundamental advice and endless enthusiasm. This project could not have been completed without them. I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Lasse Thomassen, who has supervised chapters I and II. His precious guidance has been crucial in the early stages of this thesis. The department of Politics at Queen Mary, University of London has provided indispensable financial support, administrative assistance and intellectual motivation. I especially beholden to Dr. Monica Nangia, administrative director, Sanam Javed, postgraduate administrator and Jasmine Salucideen, undergraduate administrator. They have been useful in assisting with the final stages of the completion. I also owe a special debt to Prof. Augusto Illuminati, who first taught me that Spinoza was a philosopher full of joy. He has indicated me how to read the labyrinth of the Ethics while I was a BA student in the department of Philosophy at Universitit degli Studi of Urbino. Sincere thanks go to my friends Victoria Briggs, Dr. Simon Choat and Dr. Paul Rekret graduates of the Politics Department of Queen Mary University of London for their fundamental insights. I am particularly grateful to my dear friends Giulia Filippi, Noelia Diaz Vicedo, Hari Marini, Laura Koponen, Enrico Chessa, Dimitrios Athanasakis, Ole Madsen, Federico Perego and Laurent Nowak, for having populated with their joy, laughs and severe admonitions the solitude of this project.

Last but not least, I would thank my family. A special thank to my mother Maria Concetta Castelli for her sacrificial support; and to my father Ethel Castelli, who first taught me that philosophy is love of knowledge, that is, life. This thesis would be far inferior without their unlimited assistance and obstinate love.

Abbreviations and Translations References to Spinozas texts follow the abbreviations shown below: E = Ethics TTP = Theologicus Politicus Tractatus (Theological-Political Treatise) TP = Politicus Tractatus (Political Treatise) EP = Epistles References to the Ethics follow the convections indicated below: prop. = Proposition dem. = Demonstration schol. = Scholium Def. = Definition ax. =axiom Roman numerals before these abbreviations describe the parts of the Ethics. The translation adopted is Spinoza B, (2002), Complete Works, (Idianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company) [trans. S. Shirley].

Contents

Declaration Abstract Acknowledgements Abbreviations and translations Introduction Understanding the social through Spinozas ontology of individuation: New directions in contemporary political theory A detour of politics via Ontology The individual and the collective: Simondon, Spinoza and the question of the affective and political process of individuation Chapter I: Spinoza and his readers: The problem of the absolute Introduction 1. Spinoza in the Enlightenment tradition of thought 2. The Ethics in the circle of Romanticism: A pantheist image of nature 2.1 The Ethics through Goethes eyes: The divinisation of nature 2.2 Jacobis portrait of the Ethics: The dilemma between rationalist and fatalist vision of the reality 3. German Idealism and the rejection of the Ethics

2 4 5 7 12

12 13

18 28 28 34 44 48 55 61

3.1 Schelling and the abyss of Spinozas ontology of the absolute 3.2 Schelling encounters Spinoza 4. Hegel and the ban of the Ethics: The question of the absolute 4.1 Hegel contra Spinoza: Philosophy of the ideal versus ontology of the actual Chapter II: Spinozas ontology of the actual: The power of nature Introduction 1. Spinoza after Marx: Towards a dynamics ontology 1.1 Deleuze encounters Spinoza: The plane of immanence 2. The method of the Ethics: Ontology and geometry 3. Process of production: God, nature and power Conclusions: Towards a philosophy of the individual Chapter III: Spinozas philosophy of individuation: The collective life of the individual Introduction 1. Re-positioning the question of individuation in contemporary thought: Simondon and the ontology of individuation 1.1 Simondons philosophy of individuation: The discovery of the collective 1.2 Ontology and ontogenesis of relation: Vital and psychic process of collective individuation 2. The Ethics: An ontology of individuation

65 67 80 88

99 99 102 107 116 123 133

135 135 138 143 148 160

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2.1 A detour of Spinoza via Simondon 2.2 The autonomy of the affects: From relationality towards transindividuality

169 181

Chapter IV: Tractatus Theologicus-Politicus: The affective tones of the political Introduction 1. The plan of the Theological Political Treatise: Situating the question of affectivity in Spinozas political theory 2. The conceptual persona of the Theological Political Treatise: The affective and collective production of the political 3. The Devotees of the prophet 4. The Subjects of Moses 4.1 Anguish and gift: Time and becoming of the Jewish people 5. The Apostles 5.1 The Good News: Life Conclusions: Towards a life in common Chapter V: Time for democracy: Towards a life in common Introduction 1. The political turn of the multitude: Re-theorising the common today 2. Spinozas political strategy: Democracy, sovereignty and the power of the multitude 3. Citizens of democracy: Sovereign life, common good, affective time Conclusions: Towards a new grammar of democracy 302 275 267 259 256 256 203 206 218 220 238 242 255 196 191 191

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Conclusion: The individual as a powerful problem Bibliography 304 312

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Understanding the anatomy of the social through Spinozas philosophy of individuation: New directions in contemporary political theory

There is an unexplored and abundant political reality alongside the recognised body politic, which articulates various commonalities, new gestures of insurgence and cohesion. It is situated in the zones of intersection between authorised and non authorised places for political praxis and thought such as the state, public and civil spheres, the market and the body of law, and its political strategy is constructed around an alternative paradigm of relation. This does not originate from the poverty and rivalry between groups of society, whose action and thought exceed the fixity of social, political and economic class. Although non identified within consolidated models of society, emerging subjectivities are extremely productive of meaning, identity, knowledge and power, and impact concretely upon the existing political body. These have actualised a fracture between the political and politics, the philosophy of praxis and real action, society and community, consuming gradually our socio-political context. It is to the political cogency of this unrecognised reality that this thesis draws particular attention. The focus is to re-construct a novel materialist paradigm of the political field from the plenitude of actions, thoughts, and relational forces embodied by this other political actuality. In order to re-theorise the anatomy of the social, my aim is to re-locate the centrality of a materialist ontology of individuation within contemporary political theory and philosophy. A materialist thought of individuation, I argue, might provide our search with crucial theoretical instruments for thinking the social as a complex and heterogeneous body, stressing the zones of intersections of reality mentioned above. The study of the theme of individuation is conducted by examining the ontology and politics of seventeenth-century philosopher Baruch Spinoza, and determines through his categories of thought the political stakes of contemporary forms of association. Attention is given to Spinozas affective and political process of individuation, and

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the extent to which his thesis might offer a more extensive account of the material process that lies at the very basis of every community. Concerning the increasing level of complexity of the social body and thereby the inadequacy of our political tools, post-modern thought has raised fecund arguments, from which the present study emerge. These refer to the re-foundation of the paradigm of the political and its inclusion within the ontological field. In order to better situate the fundamental claims of the thesis, I shall pass to discuss, first, the main questions and solutions proposed by post-modern political thought.

A detour of politics via ontology

In order to conceptualise politically these zones of intersection between authorised and non-authorised places and classes for politics, post-modern political thought, variously named post-foundationalist and post structuralist, has claimed an alliance between politics and ontology. Specifically, post-modern political philosophy has sought the support of certain ontological categories of thought, firstly, for understanding the meanings and potentialities introduced within the existing political context by these heterogeneous subjectivities; and secondly, for determining the extent to which these act and think politically. Ontology, as we will discuss below, sheds light on the constitutive elements, tensions and forces, which permeate the equilibrium of the political reality of the present regardless of whether this is presumed as political or not. The discovery of the importance of the linkage between ontology and politics within post-modern political philosophy emerges from a more general debate within certain currents of post-Marxist thought, which has denounced the crisis of the paradigm of materialism and philosophy of praxis. This refers to a more extensive conception of the structure of the material world, and the many ways in which this affects human action and thought. More precisely, the question concerns the re-definition of the

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materialist notion of production and the types of relation derived from this production. Concerning these themes, no one can deny that current debate is largely indebted to the works of Althusser, who first poses the urgency of re-signifying the Marxist paradigm of materialism corrupted by certain orthodox readings. The central problems of these appropriations, Althusser observes, is the vision of the world as a place of mechanical rules and opposing forces, within which social relations are conditioned by the economic mechanism. This generates constantly dominant and dominated individuals, ideas and behaviours, which are moulded by the dialectical logic of conflict and lack. By contrast, Althusser recognises that phenomena of struggle and solidarity proceed through a more complex interaction between the structure and the superstructure, within which a variety of unsuspected and unexpected events such as thought, imagination, desires play a role in the construction of political identities (Althusser, 1976: 126-132; 2005: 89-128). In this light, even ideology, which expresses the power of a social class under a specific economic juncture, unveils, in Althussers re-interpretation, a more problematic mechanism, which does not only produce alienation and exploitation of individuals need and the preservation of the ruling class. Ideology essentially controls individuals through the reinforcement and encouragement of imaginary practises and customs. In order to preserve and further develop the ideological apparatus of the state, the dynamics of the imaginary structure of individuals acquire a strategic role. This refers to the power of creating social relations, common beliefs and collective desires, which indicate a different process of creating political meaning, identity and cohesion (Althusser, 1971: 142-177). Our awareness of the political relevance of these heterogeneous and contingent factors, through which the apparatus of the state is defended, will certainly open new possibilities for a philosophy of praxis or, at the very least, make the sovereign authority of the state less inescapable. Following Althussers preoccupations, post-modern political thought has reconstructed the anatomy of the material world, and considered the many ways in which this transforms individuals. Strictly speaking, if the paradigm of materialism

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has to be re-formulated, it is only through the re-shaping of our knowledge of the material world itself that novel materialistic conceptions of history, society and politics might be articulated. As the world is not a motionless system of physical phenomena that affects human action and thought in multiple ways, its study requires more complex categories of thought. These should determine the mode in which the material forces of production generate political gestures and relations. This renewal of interest in the structure of the sensible world has brought about, as mentioned before, the discovery of ontology as powerful theoretical ground, through which a more complex materialist conception of nature and its system of production might come to light. The post-modern political gesture of resituating politics within ontology for reframing the materialist field and philosophy of praxis has involved not only the refoundation of political discourse, it also has posed the problem of the reconfiguration of the domain of ontology itself. If politics alone can no longer offer defensible materialist premises, because individuals have been split into political and non political areas and opposing classes, ontology, as it has been traditionally considered, is not directly related to materialism either. For the conspicuous part of Western philosophy from Plato onwards, with minor exceptions, ontology has generally been included within the domain of metaphysics. In classical metaphysics, ontological arguments concerned the investigation of the nature of God or Being. Ontology was treated as a subset of metaphysics concerned with the proofs of the existence of God, Being and nature, which investigates the first cause of universe, the generation of matter and the relation between human being, nature and Being. Ontological analysis was mostly understood as a search for the ultimate and impenetrable principles beyond (meta) the universe (physik), which attributes to the material world the status of the lower genera (particularly in neoPlatonic and Scholastic traditions of thought). Given the abstract objects examined by ontology, its categories such as substance, matter, thought, becoming, individuation and essence came to connote mostly transcendent meaning and were thereby adopted as theoretical tools by Idealistic philosophies, which postulate a

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qualitative distinction between matter and thought, nature and Being. This led to the discharge of ontology from any possible association with materialist theories, philosophy of praxis, and, over all, politics. In this respect, the Marxist formulation of historical materialism is exemplary. By contrast, the novelty of the post-modern political move lies precisely in two fundamental retreats, which inaugurate a different approach to political theory, philosophy and society. These refer, firstly, to the retreat of the political from politics, which I have indicated above and will discuss further; secondly, the withdrawal of ontology from metaphysics and thus Idealist appropriations. The recovery of ontology from metaphysical themes involves the affirmation of the autonomy of ontology, and, importantly, its return to the original Ancient Greek meaning rooted within pre-Socratic thought. For pre-Socratic philosophy in particular, ontology is a search through and only within the order of nature, which investigates the unseen potentialities and forces of matter. A naturalistic approach explores the relation and interaction between different forces and elements in nature, through which complex and heterogeneous individuals are developed. This implies the reinstatement of nature, thus matter, as a generative source of production, which gives rise not solely to physical phenomena but also to individuals, changes and potentialities. The importance of this way of thinking ontology, for contemporary political reflections, resides upon its treatment of nature-reality as a powerful organism, which generates beings through relational movements and confluences and not through a mechanism of opposing forces. Whilst for this conception of nature, the prevailing factor rules the entire system conditioning ideas, human relations and desires, the materialist ontology of the origins exemplified by the pre-Socratic form of naturalism opens the way to thinking reality as an heterogeneous and productive body characterised by exchanges of elements, becoming and contingency. Taking into account these themes, the return to ontology within political theory, better a detour of politics via ontology, constructs a novel path toward the

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reconfiguration of the political realm, and also a re-consideration of the many ways in which heterogeneous parts of reality activate political relations, individuals and actions in the absence of conflicts. It provides alternative categories of thought and brings forth the possibility of understanding the political relevance of the contemporary subjectivities lying between political and non political zones, ruling and ruled classes, re-thinking politics beyond boundaries. For post-modern political thought, the idea of society as a mere assemblage of parts derived from the stipulation of contract between self-independent and rational individuals is untenable. Beside the different theoretical positions taken and solutions proposed, thinkers such as Balibar, Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault, Derrida, Nancy, Badiou, Agamben, Negri and Hardt argue that society has to be thought as a complex process, within which elements such as language, body, emotions and life itself ground political relations, subjectivities and strategy and, at the same time, are consistently affected by political institutions such as the state, laws and right. In other words, relations once posited are already political and political bodies, once affirmed, invade immediately the alleged private sphere. Therefore, the inquiry upon the realm of the political cannot avoid the deep analysis of its ontological foundation, which sheds light on the relational movements and forces involved within the production of common meanings, collective desires and actions. More rigorously, the investigation of the political cogency of the powerful subjectivities of the present has to be conducted contemporaneously with the ontological quest, through which alternative avenues for politics and society, in a materialist way, might be disclosed. In order to re-formulate a grammar for the political relations of the present, many important notions have been proposed, each of which insists further on the inescapability of the ontological argument from the political analysis. In this light, a variety of onto-political concepts and thoughtful hypotheses have been put forward such as the multitude, social forms of nomadism, coming and inoperative community, evental movements of fracture and re-composition, bio-power and biopolitics, which have given rise to a constellation of further theoretical positions. Additionally, the linkage between ontology and politics has brought about, on the

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one side, the re-discovery of the political implications of certain ontological categories as immanence, transcendence, multiplicity, actuality and potentiality, each of which connotes a different political scenario. On the other, this detour of politics via ontology has generated the ontologization of certain political notions such as the state, sovereignty, freedom, right and community, giving rise to a more extensive account of the mode through which politics forms and pervades every aspect of human life. It is within this multifaceted and somewhat labyrinthine debate nurtured by post-modern political thought that this thesis takes place. It is precisely situated within the common quest for a novel vocabulary for politics through recourse to a materialist ontology, bringing into the present debate further and alternative issues. The study focuses upon the relevance, political and ontological, of the notion of individuation, and considers the extent to which its usage in political theory and philosophy provides a multisided account of the material conditions, through which biological, political and psychic individuals are generated.

The individual and the collective: Simondon, Spinoza and the question of the affective and political process of individuation

This thesis is constructed around a fundamental problem and great concern, which precisely arises from the post-modern political portrait of the material world as abundant, productive and dynamic, within which both phases of conflict and correspondence form important political behaviours. Given the multifaceted description of reality, the central question that accompanies this project concerns what paradigm of the individual emerges from this conception of the world? More accurately, assuming the contemporary materialist way of thinking politics, nature, history and society, the difficulty entails what is the political and ontological status attributed to the individual within this model of production? Strictly speaking, how do we think the realm of the individual in a materialist way, which might embrace the instances of contingency, multiplicity and dynamism? Without addressing these

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questions, I believe, political and ontological analysis cannot proceed any further. A thought of and upon individuation engages these issues. An inquiry upon the notion of individuation, I argue in the pages below, becomes extremely crucial in this specific cultural and historical juncture, and not only in theory. What is at stake here is literally the re-learning of the individual after the collapse of the influential ethical and political paradigms of Liberalism and Marxism, and thereby from and through these ruins re-building a fresh notion. In other words, if the re-formulation of the realm of the political requires the support of ontological categories, the re-definition of the individual requires more extensive and problematic ontological argument. A theory of individuation aims at the discovery of the fundamental conditions of possibility and uniqueness of an individual, and also establishes the relation of an individual with its milieu, whether natural, political or psychic. The importance of returning to a thought of individuation resides in its political implications. More rigorously, the main objects of a philosophy of individuation are situated in the middle of ontological and political domains. However, thinking about individuation is a very controversial issue, which has generated an intense debate within contemporary thought. Twentieth-century continental philosophy from Merleau-Ponty, Lacan, to the Frankfurt school has been concerned with undermining accepted definitions of individuality such as the I, the self, will and egoism. Accordingly, these formulas have ignored the genesis of the individual and more importantly its relation with the material world. The main limit of the mentioned notions is that these leave constantly unanswered an essential question, that is, what we know of the individual from such definitions? Put differently, what we know of the individual, for example, from the formulas of the I apart from the I itself? These formulas are expressions of a fundamental impasse in the knowledge of the individual, which might generate the reliance of these theories on transcendent principles, religious expedients or obscure forces. This unintelligibility of the individual determines the vision of its political role as qualitative different and prior

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to the social body, within which the meaning of the relation with others is narrowed to ethical and psychological behaviours. As the genesis of the individual is understood prior to its context, the relation with others is conceived not as a constitutive moment of individuation itself but rather as a function which regulates the common life of individuals already formed. This tendency towards a certain obscurity of individualism that has characterised the majority of arguments on individuation has caused the undervaluation of its cogency for the development of new materialist notions of community, relation, and more generally, the philosophy of praxis. In contrast with this traditional account and developing further the twentieth-century continental orientation, our hypotheses are based on the necessity of the conception of individuation today, and the impossibility of its abandonment from contemporary materialist analyses and theories of community. The argument I will develop through this thesis is principally the priority of reinstating the autonomy of the notion of individuation from philosophies of individuality, which implies the dismissal of any a priori formula. This leads to view the theme of individuation as an investigation upon one, and at the same time a multiple process, which generates not only specific historical human beings and society but also more complex phenomena, such as temporality, life, nature and contingency. The understanding of individuation as a process means to recognise how apparent distinct events and individuals, such as political community and psychic gestures, are instead expressions of a heterogeneous confluence of forces, intensities and movements. In this way, the ontology of individuation might contribute to a knowledge of the mechanisms through which factors such as language, knowledge, body, emotions and imagination are equally constitutive sources of individuation. In order to recover the theme of individuation from the fixity of individuality and thus look for alternative explanations, I have discovered powerful arguments in the seventeenth-century philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, which might enrich post-modern political inquiry with thoughtful insights. Spinoza proposes an innovative materialist conception of the individual, which is developed through a quite intricate linkage

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between ontological themes and political analysis. More accurately, in Spinozas theory of the individual the ontological inquiry proceeds contemporaneously with the political reflections. It means that ontological claims found political notions and political theses are instrumental in thinking ontological categories of thought. The understanding of how political conceptions are supported by ontological categories and vice versa in Spinozas philosophy constitutes the basis for delineating his paradigm of materialism and, above all, the meaning of the individual. Taking into account these themes, the thesis explores the ontological and political process of individuation offered by Spinoza, and considers the extent to which his treatment of the theme of individuation introduces novel materialist conceptions of history, politics, nature and society. It is articulated principally in the Ethics and further developed in the political Treatises. In the Ethics, nature, immanence, the absolute, conatus, the physics of the body and the theory of affects ground Spinozas process of vital and psychic individuation; whereas in the political writings the vision of society as the expression of a collective and natural act of desire and not need, the definition of the body politic as a mens una, the equality between natural and civil rights, the powerful category of the multitude and the advocacy for democracy, actualise and further expand the process of individuation commenced in the Ethics. Spinozas inquiry upon the vital and psychic conditions of individuation begins with two crucial denials. These are, firstly, the refusal of transcendence, which is structured through the affirmation of an absolute plane of immanence nuanced by a multiplicity of attributes and modes; and also the parallelism between matter and thought, which introduce elements of contingency and heterogeneity within the plane of immanence. These aspects bring about the discovery of nature as a powerful and abundant order, through which a variety of mixtures of thought, body, movements of speed and slowness and affects come to light. The second denial concerns Spinozas dismissal of the qualitative difference between mind and body, and thereby the rejection of the Cartesian model of the supremacy of the cogito. This leads to the reinstatement of the body as a fundamental source of knowledge, actions, affectivity

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and transformations, through which beings orient themselves within the world. Spinozas vital and psychic process of individuation proceeds from these denials, occupying a strategic position within his ontology and politics. This establishes the convergence between political and ontological themes, through which the problematic status of the individual comes to light. The understanding of Spinozas ontology of individuation is the only condition, through which his political theory of the multitude, the state and democracy might be thought. In order to examine the richness of Spinozas theory of individuation and thus analyse its relation with politics, in this thesis I have adopted an alternative strategy of reading Spinozas philosophy from the Ethics to the political Treatises. Developing further an idea of Balibar (2002: 103-147), I have decided to investigate Spinozas thought through the ontology of individuation of Gilbert Simondon. Many are the reasons that have motivated the recourse to Simondons ontology. These are, partly, the numerous appropriations and critiques of Spinozas philosophy occurred in the history of philosophy and political thought. Since its first appearance, Spinozas ontology and politics have generated a variety of different reactions, each of which has attempted to assimilate his writings to the cultural and political demands of a specific historical period; and when this alliance was theoretically impossible to be established, this has created vehement critique and in some cases even the oblivion of his thought. From the Enlightenment, through Romanticism and Idealism, to the current psychology of the embodiment of the mind, the post-Marxist wave of thought and Liberal political theory, not to mention certain feminist interpretations, Spinoza has played the role of an ideal interlocutor, in some case sympathetic in others critical, with whom each tradition of thought has established a dialogue. For example, Deleuze, as we will see, engages in a continuous conversation with Spinoza, who is arguably the omnipresent personage of Deleuzes philosophical production. In Hegel, in contrast, Spinoza becomes a hostile interlocutor, who delineates the possibility of thinking reality through affirmation and abundance rather than negation; this causes an impasse in Hegels reading of the Ethics, which brought about the condemnation of Spinozism as a form of acosmism. These different encounters with Spinoza present in the history of thought tell us, over

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all, the impossibility of restraining his philosophy within a specific cultural tendency, and also how both his ontology and politics still nurture important theoretical debates. The presence of different portraits of Spinozas thought constitute in itself a sufficient reason for attempting a novel approach, which in our case is represented by the use of Simondons ontology of individuation. Yet, there are further important elements, which make my intervention coherent. These refer to the extreme difficulty of conceptualising definitely Spinozas theories of the body and affectivity, and also the problematic role occupied by these in his politics, particularly in the constitution of the multitude. More accurately, I have become concerned with the absence of a precise definition of the individual within his philosophical writings, and instead its replacement with a complex and endless production of affects, bodily movements and a variety of exchanges of intensity and power. Even these affects, bodies and potentialities are too impossible to be defined singularly, and, strikingly, to be located within both an individual subject and object. Strictly speaking, these are not in the world or in the individual. The complexity and indeterminacy of these themes have led my inquiry to seek the support of Simondons ontology of individuation. The recourse to Simondon has been crucial for determining how in Spinozas thought the absence of a specific formula of the individual does not imply its effacement and thereby the supremacy of an all inclusive Being, nature or higher subject; and most importantly in political theory this does not bring Spinoza to the affirmation of an unknown agency and will behind and beyond a human historical process. The importance of Simondons philosophy of individuation for our investigation resides, first of all, on his central preoccupation with understanding the process of individuation for thinking the individual, which guides his entire quest. For Simondon, the conditions of uniqueness and possibility of an individual are not to be found deductively from the already individualised being to its constitutive process. Rather, the peculiarity of an individual derives from a more general process of individuation, which inheres

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within the vital and psychic process production of nature-Being. It is in this general process that the distinctive features and relevance of an individual emerge. Simondons focus upon the priority of determining the process before the individual leads him to affirm the bond between the forming individual and its milieu, the collective field. The collective field, which is shaped by emerging energies, heterogeneity and information, is the only condition of individuation, without which both individual and the process itself cannot take place. The centrality of the collective being involves the re-focusing of attention to the significance of relation for the development of the individual. Simondon re-defines of the notion of relation, which becomes the source of the process of individuation. He recovers the meaning of relation from psychological, ethical and political categories, which have narrowed its role to the establishment of connection between already formed individualities, to an ontological status. Simondon does not ask how beings relate each other, rather, taken in itself, what is a relation, what new problem and changes are introduced by this within the system? This brings about the discovery of relation as a fundamental element of vital and psychic transformations, which pervades the entire system of production and not only the human being. In other words, there is a process of individuation insofar as there are relational events and movements. This suggests that beings and the collective field are all relational by nature. As emotions are the most powerful mediators of relations, Simondon attributes to these the role of differentiating beings into more problematic psychic individuals. Emotions, Simondon claims, do not pass from one individual to the other, rather these are located precisely in the collective field. These give rise to exchange and subsequent alteration of information, potentials and intensity. From this complex process of collective and psychic individuation, the hecceity of the individual is its being always in the middle between generality and singularity, potentiality and actuality. The individual, Simondon tell us, is profoundly disparate; it is in constant excess of an undifferentiated and individualised mass of power. For this ontological structure of the individual, its role within the development of the process is crucial and manifold. The individual becomes, in Simondons analysis, the theatre and protagonist of the

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process of individuation, who poses and at the same time solves a problem of an excess of heterogeneity within the system. These are the main notions that have accompanied my inquiry upon Spinozas ontology and politics. The study of Spinozas philosophy in the light of Simondon has been decisive particularly for re-considering the theory of affects examined in the Ethics, which has brought about the discovery of the role of affects and passions as the ground of relational phases of psychic and political individuation. The reading of Spinozas theme of affectivity through Simondon has brought to light the great originality of Spinozas philosophy. This refers to the affirmation of the autonomy of the affects from any possible alliance and subjection to the mind, individuality, and more generally to any form of psychic or political deference. The awareness of this process is crucial for understanding Spinozas political thought, and specifically the constitution of the multitude as a proper political category and its role within the realisation of democracy. As aforementioned, Spinozas process of individuation continues within his political thought. It is precisely in this context that the role of affectivity becomes the cornerstone of crucial political gestures and thoughts. This refers to power of activating a process, which signifies the entire political scenario and not only a specific group of individuals. Affectivity sets in motion a series of invasive relational movements, which brings into the existing domain a new order of flowings of time, life, meanings and problems. Put differently, affectivity is the generative source of the production of the common, which lies at the very heart of any forming and existing community. As the expression of affectivity and passions, the multitude becomes the protagonist, now manifest now latent, of Spinozas political quest. Thus, the understanding of the process through which affectivity produces meanings, relations and actions, is the only condition for thinking the multitude in a Spinozist way. The multitude means not solely a composite political individuality alternative to the categories of people, mass and citizen. It is rather a place and, at the same time, constitutive element of the production of the political. The central role given by Spinoza to the affective status of the multitude is essential for considering the

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political stakes of his democratic theory. It is the affective and powerful life in common of the multitude that guides Spinozas inquiry upon democracy; and through which he recognised the impossibility of thinking democracy as a fixed model of state alongside monarchy, aristocracy and tyranny. If democracy according to Spinoza is the greater expression of human living in common, this has to be thought as a pure open plane, which essentially means a heterogeneous, complex and collective body nuanced by a variety of different affects such as love, joy, fear, hate and sorrow. In this light, our awareness of the linkage between the multitude, affects and democracy, I believe, might open unexplored avenues for re-conceptualising democracy today, which should be able to embrace at once all the actual and forming political individuals lying in the interstices of the social domain. In order to develop my reading of Spinozas philosophy through Simondons ontology of individual, I have structured my arguments in the following way. In chapter I, I critically explore how the history of philosophical thought has assimilated and reacted to Spinozas thought, paying close attention to Romanticism and German Idealism. As anticipated, Spinozas ontology of individuation commences with two crucial denials, the one of transcendence and the divide between mind and body, which have generated no little preoccupation in the history of philosophy, particularly in Hegel and Schelling. In this light, I have begun the study of these refusals and the constitution of the plane of immanence by discussing the ways in which the most influential thinkers of the philosophy of transcendence have engaged a dialogue with Spinozas affirmation nature-God as one absolute and multiple system. My aim is not to analyse the philosophical systems of Schelling and Hegel as such, but rather highlight through Schelling and Hegels writings on Spinozas notion of the absolute Being the different implications between an ontology of absolute immanence and one of transcendence for the development of a paradigm of materialism. In chapter II, the focus is consequently upon the analysis of the paradigm of materialism developed by Spinoza in the Ethics. I examine Spinozas conception of reality as a continuous process of production, structured through the notions of the

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absolute, immanence, power and multiplicity. Chapter III analyses Spinozas process of the collective and affective individuation via Simondons philosophy. The attention is given to Spinozas materialist conception of the individual based on the view of the body as openness, the power of the affects and the collective dimension of thought. Chapters IV and V discuss the political implications of Spinozas ontology of individuation for the constitution of the political meaning of the multitude. More accurately, chapter IV addresses to the relation between affectivity and politics in Spinozas political writings, and how affects gives rise to complex political communities, meanings and transformations. Chapter V explores the interface between affectivity and democracy in Spinozas political reflections. It investigates the centrality of affectivity within the formation of the democratic community, and considers the ways in which the multitude becomes the protagonist of the political scene. In chapters IV and V, I adopt a strategy of reading Spinozas political texts through the use of conceptual-affective personae, which allows the emphasis to be placed upon the notion of affectivity as a process of actualisation and transformation of the political. A short conclusion summarizes my arguments and suggests further avenues of research.

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Chapter I Spinoza and his readers: The problem of the absolute

By God I mean an absolutely infinite being, that is, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence. Explication: I say absolutely infinite not infinite in its kind. For if a thing is only infinite in its kind, one may deny that it has infinite attributes. But if a thing is absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence and does not involve any negation belongs to its essence. (E. I, Def. VI)

Introduction

There have been undeniably many great philosophers in the history of philosophy. For many of them, the originality of their ideas has been measured by the power, with which their thesis reached the interest of other philosophers in different historical periods, determining the turn of a new epoch. This is the case of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Marx, and recently Althusser and Deleuze, among others, each of them has been, in one way or in other, a central figure in history, inaugurating new paradigms of thought and undermining existing ones. When a philosophers name becomes an ism (Platonism, Cartesianism or Marxism), it means that his ideas have re-signified profoundly the general understanding of the world, humankind and history, and thereby acclaimed as a truth. The same discourse cannot be made for Baruch Spinoza, whose fortunes in history took a different path. The impact of Spinozas ideas upon the history of Western thought is a distinct one. Certainly his influence had been pervasive amongst his contemporaries and successive philosophers, nevertheless Spinozas conceptions never, even today, become an ism in the way others did. Although every cultural movement has engaged in a fruitful debate with Spinoza, and many thinkers from a

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variety of different intellectual field have praised his thesis, no one has attempted, at least explicitly, to imitate his philosophical system. Yet, almost every thinker from Leibniz, passing through Voltaire, Schelling, Hegel, to Nietzsche, Freud, Althusser and Deleuze have been all scrupulous readers of his writings; and you may find traces of Spinoza even in Marx.1 None of them, nevertheless, looked at him as a potential founding father of a new intellectual era, calling the novel wave of though with his name. Rather, from a broad range of philosophical background thinkers have mostly sought the support of his thesis for corroborating their arguments, claiming some possible alliances. More accurately, the treatment reserved to Spinoza through the history of ideas has been characterised by a tendency towards a forceful inclusion of his philosophy or parts of it within the cultural movement of a specific period. Instead of becoming an ism, it might be said, Spinozas thought comes to express and reinforce the many isms in history, such as Rationalism, Romanticism and Marxism. Spinoza was not the predecessor of any specific epoch; he was, so to speak, a shared heritage of many emerging philosophies. As result, there has been the emergence of a consistent number of different and opposing portraits of Spinoza; such as a rationalist description, which challenges a pantheist or naturalist reading, and also an individualist interpretation contrasting a communitarian definition. Furthermore, when the affinity with Spinoza was conceptually impossible to be established, this has given rise to vehement critique, as it has occurred with Hegel, whose intensity of his reaction this chapter analyses. Concerning these aspects, two fundamental questions immediately arise: why and how does Spinozas philosophy occupy a quite controversial and somewhat ambivalent position within the history of philosophy? It is to these questions that this chapter draws particular attention. The discussion is directed to the analysis not of the importance or influence of Spinozas thought within later historical periods, but rather the problematic elements of his theoretical nucleus, which have caused a variety of different reactions, each of which brings to light the impossibility of locating Spinoza within an established cultural context. Specifically, the focus is addressed to the presence of Spinozas philosophy within the main European
1

Concerning the presence of Spinoza in thinkers such as Nietzsche, Marx and Freud, see Moreau (1996: 423-429).

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intellectual movements of the Enlightenment, Romanticism and German Idealism, and investigates what parts of his thesis have posed crucial problems, raised solutions, or been entirely ignored. In the Enlightenment, Romanticism as well as German Idealism, the Ethics is the major debated writings of Spinoza, within which he founds his ontology. The definitions of God, nature and attributes exposed in the parts I and II of the Ethics represent the most problematic notions, upon which Spinozas ontology and politics are founded. Spinozas theory of God, nature and attributes is a very complex and manifold theme. Spinoza conceives God as an all-inclusive being, which is selfcaused, free, one and absolute infinity; who produces the word immanently, in which his power of acting is on a par with its power of existing. Furthermore, Spinoza claims the equivalence between God and nature, which implies the refusal of the vision of matter as the lower genera. These concepts broadly connote Spinozas form of monism, upon which his paradigm of materialism is grounded and developed. This begins with two crucial denials, which will have vast repercussions in subsequent philosophies. The refusal of transcendence, which involves the dismissal of any higher dimension beyond the world, and any act of creation or emanative process; and also the negation of the ontological divide between God and nature, matter and thought, which leads Spinoza not to affirm a sort of divinization of nature or a materialization of God; but rather, he claims a form of parallelism between the two, through which the structure and the development of the world follows the same rules of God. It follows that Spinozas ontology is fundamentally based and developed in the complete absence of negation, in which every creature and predicates of Being are not conceived as contradictory elements but rather as expressions of a different degree of reality. From these definitions two orders of problems arise. First, Spinozas model of monism raises the question of the constitution of ontology itself. As Spinoza denies any contradiction or negation within Being, the difficulty entails whether this aspect creates a static or dynamic ontology. As Spinoza negates any moment of creation and emanation, the problem is what are the implications of thinking ontology in the

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absence of an opening? Secondly, as Being is already its parts, the question concerns the consistency of these in relation to God. Strictly speaking, singularities are mere projections or rather expression of God. It is the definition of the absolute, as I will examine, that will constitute our key notion for understanding Spinozas complex form of monism. Furthermore, the absolute infinity of God acquires a strategic position within our analysis of the many readers of Ethics during the history of philosophy, from which different portraits of Spinozas monist vision of God derive. In order to examine the complexity of Spinozas ontology, in the first section of the chapter I will give a broader overview of the Enlightenments supposed affinity with the Ethics, pointing out the parts of Ethics somewhat ignored and thereby its implications for the understanding of Spinozas theory of God and nature. The discussion, then, draws particular attention to the portrait of Spinoza emerging during the Romantic tradition of thought. Specifically, the focus is addressed to an analysis of Goethe and Jacobis distinct engagement with the Ethics, and considers the extent to which Spinozas definition of nature as a unique being shaped by contingency and necessity poses significant problems to their respective philosophies. Whilst the former eludes the question of the coexistence of contingent and predetermined elements within nature by attributing to the material world divine features, acclaiming the Ethics as a great example of pantheism, the latter envisages in Spinozas conception of God-nature the affirmation of the ineluctability and obscurity of reason. For this, Jacobi proposes a mortal jump, which is the suspension of judgment for the impossibility of knowing the impenetrable order of nature. The study of Goethe and Jacobis treatment of the Ethics will show us not only the ways in which Spinozas notions of God and nature have been translated into the Romantic language, but also the conceptual impossibility of this translation. It is for this reason that I have opted to examine Goethe and Jacobis positions, among other Romantic readers of the Ethics, such as Lessing or Mendelssohn, because their encounter with Spinoza is more a problematic dialogue rather than an appropriation,

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which raises thoughtful questions about the complexity of Spinozas ontology. This difficult encounter will bring about the discovery of Spinozas alternative paradigm of materialist ontology, which begins with the affirmation of the absolute and immanent nature of God. Given the purpose of this chapter, I will not draw attention to Goethe and Jacobis thought as such, but rather I will offer a selective textual analysis of their writings on Spinoza. Furthermore, Goethe and Jabobis understanding of Spinozas ontology will prepare the terrain for the more controversial reading of Ethics. This refers to the German Idealist interpretation, which occupies the central arguments of the second section of the chapter. In this section, the inquiry is addressed to Schelling and Hegels complex reelaborations of the themes of the Ethics, and the ways in which Spinozas mode of thinking nature as a positive and absolute being haunts the certainty of their philosophical systems. As with Goethe and Jacobi, for the purpose of the chapter, the inquiry is directed not to the discussion of Schelling and Hegels philosophical system themselves, but rather to their reaction to Spinoza. It follows that I will examine their writings on the Ethics, and consider the extent to which Spinoza is a problematic presence within their philosophy. As mentioned above, Spinoza is a controversial figure within Schelling and Hegels philosophy, with whom they inaugurate, in different ways, an extremely intense and constant dialogue. Specifically, Schellings account of Spinozas paradigm of monism is somewhat ambiguous. Schelling is initially attracted by Spinozas affirmation of the one and absolute God, who poses himself through the contingency of nature. For this, Schelling praises the Ethics as an ontology of pure activity, which generates beings from an undifferentiated sources of production. Lately, Schellings enthusiasm for Spinoza will be replaced by his critique of the Ethics as a static system. The relevance of Schellings engagement with Spinoza, for our discourse, concerns not his passage from a Spinozist position to its criticism, but rather the abandonment of Spinozas ontology coincides with the consolidation of Schellings philosophy of transcendence. The Spinozist moment reveals Schellings great difficulty in thinking Spinozas absolute God as coexistence between subject and

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object, which brought him to annihilate both in the source of indifference. In the mature phase, the negation of Spinozas philosophy uncovers Schellings impasse in theorising reality through immanence, which means the absence of negation, and thereby his recourse to contradiction as the only possibility for producing powerful singularities. The encounter, then, between Hegel and Spinoza is central. As anticipated previously, in Hegels view Spinoza is a hostile interlocutor, whose paradigm of thought has to be avoided. As with Schelling, for Hegel the main problem of the Ethics resides on Spinozas denials of transcendence and the distinction between thought and matter. Hegel reiterates more strongly Schellings definition of Spinozas ontology as a static and meaningless order, within which any form of individuality is excluded. For Hegel, as we will analyse, Spinoza negates the world, because he unifies under the absolute Being the production of the variety of different singularities. The centrality of Hegels critique of Spinoza concerns the vehemence, with which he condemns the system of the Ethics, which seems, in some cases, as more a defence of his own philosophy than a systematic exegesis of Spinozas ontology. It is thus through Hegels passionate treatment of Spinoza that the originality of the themes of Ethics will come to light. These refer not only to an impossible mediation between transcendent and immanent thoughts, but also the different implications of theorising the production of the world through dialectical movements of thesis, antithesis and synthesis and the Spinozian one of a pure affirmation, which means through the world itself. Taking into account these aspects, the arguments I will develop through this chapter concern that the absolute is the question par excellence, which determines the ambivalent position of Spinozas thought within the history of philosophy. It is the definition of Substance as absolute infinity, I will argue, that lies at the very basis of the problematic relations of the mentioned philosophers with Spinoza. In Goethe and Jacobi, as anticipated, the absolute is a problem, which causes the reliance on a divinisation of nature and a form of fatalism. For Schelling and particularly Hegel, the absolute Substance, which does not allow negation, becomes the very impasse

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that challenges them with the possibility of thinking the world as affirmative, multiple and productive order. The necessity of returning, particularly, to Schelling and Hegels critique of Spinoza concerns that from their respective impasse the power of Spinozas ontology as paradigm of pure actuality will come to light, and also how his conceptions of God-nature offers thoughtful arguments for anti-idealist philosophies.

1. Spinoza in the Enlightenment tradition of thought

One of the central features that characterises the Enlightenment tradition of thought is undeniably its fierce faith in the capacity and potentialities of human being. This refers to the optimistic conviction of the power of human rationality in determining the mechanism of nature, history and society. For Enlightenment thought, the rational faculty is the very essence of humankind, upon which its intellectual and material progress relies. Hence, this position favoured the abandonment of every obscurantist philosophy, which negates human freedom and self-determination, narrowing the status of individuals to a mere object of God or transcendental Being as the Scholastic philosophy assumed (Israel, 2006: 43-60, 409-544; 2002: 1-23).2 The dismissal of certain Scholastic conceptions of the human being, nature and God coincided, more generally, with the Enlightenments fierce opposition to metaphysics as a defensible branch of knowledge, and its replacement with a scientific method of the investigation of natural phenomena. The increasing belief in the authority of the scientific method gives rise to the development of early materialist theses about nature, ethics and politics, which led to the assimilation of the meaning of materialism with empiricist and rationalist positions (Israel, 2006:

Scholastic philosophy combines the principles of Aristotles philosophy with those of Christian religion. The inquiry is primarily directed to the study of the proofs of the existence of God throughout the usage of Aristotelian metaphysics and logics. It assumes the genesis of the world derived from divine creation and considers nature qualitatively divided in genres and substances, within which matter is considered the lower genera. The Scholastic doctrine attributes to human mind or soul an immaterial essence, which is eternal and superior to the body and, more generally, to the sensible world. The principal exponents of the Scholastic tradition are Duns Scotus (1266-1308), William of Ockham (1288-1348) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). For a more exhaustive description of the central thesis supported by Medieval philosophers, see particularly Spade (1994), Stump (2003), Kretzmann and Srump (1993).

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699-750; 2002: 704-713). Thus, the Enlightenments form of materialism was more concerned with the question of how man can discover and transform the world given its non supernatural origin, rather than what is nature considered in itself, and what forces, elements and potentialities structure its genesis and becoming. materialism, within which Spinoza was included. In this fashion, the new philosophical turn re-draws attention to previous philosophical ideas, which supported anti-metaphysical and religious themes. It is in this intellectual context that the philosophy of Spinoza acquires great importance. Philosophers such as Diderot and Voltaire, for example, envisage in Spinozas thought powerful theoretical arguments, which meet the Enlightenments demands for scientific formulations, rational and empiricist categories of thought and a more atheistic vision of human nature. Specifically, the study of the Ethics was concentrated mostly on Spinozas definitions of God as a self-generating union of necessity and liberty, which the refuses the notions of contingency and freewill within the order of nature, and the formula of the parallelism between matter and thought. Moreover, his theory of mind and passions, the geometrical method adopted in the Ethics, alongside the political discourses about freedom of speech and thought and democracy developed in the Theological Political Treatise determined the Enlightenments engagement with Spinoza, locating his philosophy, without hesitation, within the rationalist tradition of thought (Israel, 2006: 43-60, 135-160; 2002: 157-174, 230-327, 591-598). Spinoza in the Age of Reason Although an accurate investigation of the Ethics was not fully developed during the eighteenth-century, nevertheless the reflections upon Spinozas form of monism bring to light important arguments concerning Spinozas model of materialism and his supposed affinity with Enlightenment philosophy. For the purpose of the chapter, I examine specifically the discussion surrounding the themes of the first and second parts of the Ethics about Substance and nature, which are presented particularly in The Enlightenments analysis of past philosophies was mediated by this paradigm of

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parts I and II of the Ethics. It is from the eighteenth-century peculiar treatment of these notions that the understanding of Spinozas philosophical project from his ontology to politics depends. In the Age of Reason, common to the readers of Ethics (for example Voltaire, Diderot and La Mettrie) is the conviction that Spinozas ontological theses on Substance, attributes, modes and nature aim at the severe negation of the anthropomorphic idea of God, and the reinstatement of the value of nature as a fundamental source of knowledge (Israel, 2006: 3-50, 699-761; Moreau, 1996: 417419). Spinoza constructs his form of monism on the affirmations of Substance as immanent cause of all things and the identity between Gods powers of thinking and acting, within which the divine action entirely corresponds to the laws of nature (E. I, Def. VII, prop. XV, corollary III, prop. XX, prop. XXXIV). As immanent cause of beings, God is a generative source internal and contemporaneous to singularities (E. I, prop. XVIII). It is internal because the thesis of immanence implies the denial of an external Being to the world. It is contemporaneous to singularities because the inclusion of a certain linearity and consequentiality within the production of reality would inevitably re-introduce a transcendent dimension. Furthermore, Spinozas definition of God as necessity implies the understanding of the genesis and becoming of Substance governed by and through an immutable mechanism, which is created by God and common to nature (E. I, prop. XXXIII and scholium). These notions of the necessity and universality of the order of reality leads to the formulation of the similitude between nature and God, upon which Spinozas denial of the divide between matter and thought is founded and developed (E. II, prop. I, II,VII). The recognition of the similar structure of nature and God brings to light Spinozas alternative account of the distinction between the two orders of reality, which is not based on a qualitative difference. If God and nature are parallel one to the other, it means that the distinction between the two does not follow the logic of the division in kind of perfection or essence but rather a difference through modes and combination of levels of reality.

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In the Enlightenments re-formulation of the Ethics, these notions express Spinozas determinist vision of reality, through which his rationalist method of interpreting the laws of nature is predicated. More accurately, Spinozas refusals of contingency and the qualitative difference between God and nature become acclaimed as his philosophical gesture of resolving the problem of the origin of Substance and the related metaphysical redundancies through its effacement into nature. In turn, nature is not conceived as a chaotic place, within which phenomena unpredictably come to light, involving the impossibility of their understanding. By contrast, Spinoza affirms that the emergence of every event and being within the world derives from a precise concatenations of cause and effect, which is entirely intelligible by the human being (E. I, ax. III, IV). Given this determinist structure, the domain of nature becomes recognised as a composite body characterised by a linear process, which expresses the rationality of reality as whole. As nature is characterised by rational concatenations of cause and effect, the analysis of its mechanism proceeds through the distinction between cause and effect, which entails solely the lumen naturalis (rational faculty) possessed by every man (E. I, Appendix). This implies the affirmation of the power of rationality as the exclusive source of knowledge, through which the emancipation of human beings from dogmatic doctrines, and thereby the encouragement of a scientific method might be realised. For the readers of the Enlightenment, these arguments found Spinozas paradigm of materialism. More precisely, the inclusion of the essence of God within the determinist system of nature and the autonomy of reason from theology and metaphysics, Voltaire and La Mettries among others have argued, connote Spinozas materialist thought, from which his atheist convictions derive (Moreau, 1996:417-419; and Israel, 2006: 436512, 640-659; 684-703). It is this rationalist vision of the word that becomes assumed as Spinozas materialist conception, which also determined the Enlightenments appropriation of his philosophy within its intellectual heritage. From this portrait of Spinoza many problems arise. The fundamental difficulty is not the characterisation of Spinozas theory of Substance as a materialist thesis. The

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definitions of God as necessity, self-caused and unique being and the identity between thought and matter have certainly materialist implications. Rather, the question concerns the other notions of the Ethics excluded by eighteenth-century readers of Spinoza, which are constitutive elements of Spinozas model of materialism. I refer to Spinozas definitions of the absolute infinity of Substance, the unaccountability of attributes and modes, power and immanence, each of which is crucial for understanding the meaning given by Spinoza to the material world. The inclusion of these brings about the discovery of the alternative form of materialism proposed by Spinoza, which goes far beyond the rationalist and atheist model acknowledged by Enlightenment thought. The analysis of these reveals the conceptual impossibility of locating the Ethics within the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment philosophy, undermining the alleged affinity between Spinoza and the claims of the Age of Reason. Enlightenment philosophy, we have seen, deduces Spinozas form of materialism from the analysis of Substance solely in its aspects of necessity and nature, which in turn is examined only in its dimension of rational mechanism structured through causes and effects. Following this approach, certainly the notions of necessity and the view of nature as a domain of physical phenomena and mechanical rules would inevitably imply a rationalist vision of the world. However, if we include the theses of the absolute infinity of God expressed by uncountable attributes, whose power of existing is immanently on par with his power of acting, Spinozas meaning of materialism as rationalist and determinist theory is no longer defensible. To be more precise, if Spinozas account of God-Substance-nature was centred only on the affirmations of necessity, the rigid concatenation of causes and effects and the replacement of the theological figure of the Creator with a well-ordered set of physical laws and phenomena, the form of materialism portrayed in the Ethics would rightly correspond to eighteenth-century description of Spinozas ontology as great example of rationalism. In this case, Spinozas materialist conception of nature would undoubtedly indicate a stable and linear system, which can be entirely investigated by human rational faculty.

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However, the problem is that Spinoza poses the necessity of God and the formula of parallelism between thought and matter alongside the notions of immanence, power, the multiplicity of the attributes, and the contingency of the modes. The concepts of immanence and power, which is crucially defined as the very essence of God, inevitably suggest a certain idea of production and dynamism within Substance. More rigorously, Spinoza states that God is an immanent cause of all the things, whose essence is power (E. I, prop. XVIII, XXXIV). Let us focus on these two themes more closely before proceeding further with our discussion. Beside the thesis of the immanence of God, I think, it is its aspect of cause that is crucial. The meaning of cause directly reminds us a specific function of creating something (an event, being or, at the very least, an effect), which gives rise to movements and transformations. In the Ethics, the theme of cause becomes considerably more complicated, because this is connected with the argument of immanence. By definition, we have seen, immanence implies the exclusion of any external dimension to the world. It follows that Spinozas proposition of God as immanent cause of all the things refers necessarily to the vision of reality shaped by a force, a movement of transformation. Given its immanent character, this force has to be thought inherent within reality itself, conferring a form of dynamism to the entire system. Nevertheless, the idea of cause, however immanent, might be related to the act of creating and generating, which would lead to conceive the material world as a result of a phase of creation. In this case, immanence would simply describe the position of God within reality. In order to clarify his argument, Spinoza further enriches the definition of Godnature with the notion of power as the very essence of God. As mentioned above, in the Ethics Spinoza forwards the conception of the equality between the power of acting, thinking and existing, for which these are coextensive and simultaneous one to the other (E. I, prop. XX). For the language of the Ethics, to act means to exist, and this means to think. In this light, the meaning of power sheds light on the problem of the creation emerged with the thesis of God as an immanent cause of all the things. This introduces the condition of production within the immanent system

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of God-nature, which secures the structure of reality from possible return to a condition of creation and emanative states. Specifically, it is through Spinozas claim of the simultaneity between powers that the notion of the immanent cause acquires the meaning of production, which refigures the domain of reality with more complex phases of transformation and becoming. From these primary considerations about the theory of God explained in the Ethics, it seems that the Enlightenment philosophy completely misinterpreted Spinozas arguments, as if it was reading another text. Yet, this is not the case. The themes of necessity, rationality, deterministic order highlighted by eighteenth-century readers occur in Spinozas ontology, occupying a very central position. Therefore, the question arises as how Spinoza combines the determinist vision of reality with the definition of God as power and immanent cause of all the things? More accurately, the problem is how Spinoza thinks the rationality of the Whole shaped by a mechanism of cause and effect, which is also immanently productive? For this, the idea of necessity suggests that phenomena follow a predicable and linear structure, whereas the notion of power examined before brings to light dynamic and unexpected elements within the development of nature. Furthermore, Spinozas claims of the infinity of the attributes and contingency of the modes introduce within the strict determinist concatenation of cause and effect a form of spontaneity and multiplicity, which exceeds the vision of nature as mechanical a system. Ultimately, the formula of parallelism does not mean directly that God is nature or within nature and vice versa, this would imply the materialisation or the divinisation of nature without resolving the problem of the genesis of the material world. Rather, Spinoza states that the order and development of God is the same with that of nature, which implies the maintenance of the distinction between the two dimensions of reality and, at the same time, the similarity of their structures. It follows that from the inclusion of these notions Spinozas vision of reality becomes very complex and manifold. The question, thus, arises as what is at stake in Spinozas model of reality? And importantly, could we still define the Ethics as an example of materialism? If this is the case, the form of

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materialism supported by Spinozas ontology has to be conceived as an alternative model to that of the Enlightenment tradition of thought. In order to examine the meaning given by Spinoza to the material world, we need to re-draw attention to the definition of God as positive and absolute infinity expressed by an infinite number of attributes, which has been, instead, ignored by the readers of the Enlightenment. The definition of the absolute infinity of God, I argue, is crucial for understanding Spinozas account of reality, and thus whether or not this can be recognised as a materialist position. The absolute embraces within one and unique system the aspects of necessity and contingency, univocity and multiplicity, nature and God. In other words, it is through the absolute that we enter the threshold of Spinozas materialist vision of reality. Spinoza in part I of the Ethics declares that God or Substance is an absolutely infinite being constituted by an infinite number of attributes, each of each expresses its essence (E. I, Def. VI). In the explication to this definition, Spinoza is concerned with explaining his use of the term absolute within the notion of Substance. For this, absolute infinity enables Spinoza to posit at the very basis of his ontology the One and the Multiple within a unique plane, within which the position of the attribute is central (E. I, Def. VI, explication). This refers to the role of actualising the essence of God, which, we have seen, is power. By definition, the attribute is a mode of being such as matter and thought, which describes the many ways in which Substance is actualised (E. I, Def. IV, prop. XI). Given the identity between Substance and reality, we might directly affirm that the attribute indicates the multiple dimensions of reality (E. I, prop. IX). Without venturing into the vicissitudes of Spinozas question of the absolute and the attributes, which will be fully examined in the following sections of this chapter, for the objective of this part, the theme of the absolute is fundamental for delineating the anatomy of reality in the Ethics, and the modes in which this is not a model of rationalism or empiricism and yet still materialism. The absolute infinity opens up

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directly to the constitution of reality, disclosing the complex status of matter within Spinozas ontology. As mentioned above, the absolute sets forth a plane, which is actual, multiple and positive. It is actual because the attributes, which express its essence, are defined as actual and real in the Ethics. It is also multiple because infinite are its levels of reality (attributes); and for the literal and ontological meaning that the term absolute suggests, this plane is positive, which implies the denial of contradictory moments internal or external to its domain. The absolute infinity brings about the discovery of the material world as a multisided body, which is nuanced by a variety of interconnections between levels of reality. Each of which produces multiple effects, and these further existences in turn. Taken in itself, the absolute is a powerful concept, which allows Spinozas inquiry to combine within an unique order the instances of necessity and production, univocity and multiplicity. For this, the affirmation of the absolutely infinity of God, which excludes negation, is directly connected with the concept of necessity. More accurately, absolute infinity implies itself the notion of necessity without however expressing rationalistic and deterministic meanings as eighteenth-century readers have assumed. It is the positive dimension of absolute infinity that articulates the aspect of necessity, which gives to the entire system a determinate and somewhat inescapable structure. As aforementioned, although Substance is an all-inclusive and determinate system, this is not static, but instead, multisided and productive. It is for this reason, I think, that the notion of the absolute is the key concept for understanding Spinozas constitution of ontology, which might guide the readers of the Ethics within the labyrinthine development of its propositions without eluding some of the arguments posed by Spinoza. Taking into account these themes, we might raise some conclusions. The analysis of the Enlightenments disregard of the notion of the absolute has allowed our inquiry to discover the effective stakes of Spinozas ontology of immanence. If we re-configure Spinozas proposition of Substance as immanent cause of all the things within the absolute plane examined before, immanence acquire a more

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complicated meaning. This entails Spinozas awareness of immanence not or not solely as a formal expedient for developing an atheist vision of the world, but rather a different constitution of reality itself. It means that Spinoza opposes the thesis of transcendence, and more generally metaphysics, not simply by postulating a paradigm of atheism, instead, re-signifying entirely the domain of nature. This now becomes recognised as a powerful organism. The questions of immanence and the description of nature as living body will have consistent repercussions in successive philosophical traditions, opposing the Enlightenment paradigm of thought. Specifically, thinkers from the intellectual periods of Romanticism and German Idealism will develop a fruitful debate about these aspects of the Ethics. In the age of Romanticism, it is Spinozas treatment of nature as living organism that attracts the attention of philosophers such as Lessing, Jacobi and Goethe. In this philosophical wave of thought, the presence of Spinoza is instrumental in developing different conceptions of nature and humankind, which should replace the eighteenth-century scientific method with a somewhat mystical way of thinking the material world. Strikingly, as we will analyse, Goethe, Jacobi and Lessing read the same propositions of the Ethics, which Voltaire, Diderot and La Mettrie have previously acclaimed as great example of rationalism and atheism, discovering in these instead powerful anti-rationalist categories of thought. In order to investigate the origin of these opposing interpretations of the Ethics, the role of Spinozas philosophy within the intellectual stage of Romanticism is decisive. The importance of returning to Romantic thoughts engagement with Spinoza resides on its treatment of the notions of immanence, nature, the absolute and the formula of parallelism, and its attempt to attuning these notions to Romantic positions. It is to the readers of the Ethics during the phase of Romanticism that I now turn.

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2. The Ethics in the circle of Romanticism: a pantheist image of nature

By the end of the eighteenth century, new philosophical demands grew up and through them a different approach to Spinozas philosophy was established. In particular, Lessing and Goethe, within the circle of Jena, re-opened the debate on Spinoza. While Lessing appreciated the Spinozist lesson on the unity of Substance, Goethe emphasised the theory of parallelism and imagination. Before proceeding further with the analysis of the presence of Spinoza within the philosophical tradition of Romanticism, I shall, firstly, draw attention to its main characteristics, which determined the growth of interest towards the Ethics. Romanticisms inquiry is concerned mainly with the re-definition of the status of nature within philosophy, and the relation of the human being with the material world. Unlike the Enlightenment thought, for the Romantic tradition of thought nature is a place permeated by unpredictable forces, for which human rationality is an inadequate instrument of investigation. For Romantic philosophy, the domain of nature is not an inanimate assemblage of parts, which can be explained through the laws of physics and mathematics. By contrast, it is a living organism, whose power impacts in a myriad of invisible and unsuspected ways upon the formation of human knowledge. Given that nature is not the object of science, it was argued, this has to be thought as form of subject, who produces not only physical phenomena but also thoughts, passions, obscure events and powerful beings, which are shaped by an impenetrable mechanism. This portrait of nature brings about the need to search for alternative categories of thought, through which the richness of expression of the material world might be determined. The central questions that preoccupied Romantic philosophy are how we should conceptualise nature given its non mechanical structure; and also what is the concrete impact of the power of nature upon individuals? These problems involve the resurgence of a certain sentimentalist spirit, the development of an aesthetic approach to the sensible world and a form of mystical vision of the becoming of nature. It was named Sturm und Drang (literally storm and

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stress). As the term suggests, this intellectual wave of thought aspires to conceptualise the powerful impact of the unknown nature upon the human subject, through which the individual is somewhat disoriented and frightened. For Romanticism, the encounter with nature is characterised by a continuous tension of the singular being to penetrate the ultimate cause of reality. The understanding of the universe, the Romantic movement claims, implies the abandonment of all the certitudes (religious, scientific, ethical), which secure human life from possible emotive shocks, and an opening towards sorrow and pleasure, in short, the indefinite force of nature. The experience of the power of the material world, however dramatic, enriches the human beings awareness of his role within nature, through which he recognises himself as an interconnected part of a more universal system (Bowie, 2003: 49-68). In this light, the emerging intellectual movement draws attention to past philosophies, which treated nature as a living body, which greatly exceeds the linear generation of physical phenomena. In order to re-theorise the mechanism of nature, Romantic thinkers look to the Ethics, discovering in its thesis fundamental categories of thought for re-thinking the material world as a powerful subject. The focus is addressed to Spinozas theory of the parallelism between nature and God, the absolute, power and immanence (Beiser, 1987: 16-91). These are the main concepts that shape Romanticisms reading of the Ethics. A novel wave of thought with different claims, reactions and problems emerges and contemporaneously new readers of the Ethics come to light, searching, once again, in Spinozas ontology for possible answers and alliances. At the turn of each new philosophical era the presence of Spinoza re-populates the debate of the period and each time his philosophy seems to express different arguments. If the Enlightenment included the Ethics within its intellectual heritage, now Romantic thought acclaims Spinoza within the circle of its philosophers. In this case, Spinozas philosophy passes from the definition of rationalism and atheism to the title of pantheism. Therefore, our question about the origin of the controversial relation between Spinoza and his readers returns, becoming even more urgent. Furthermore,

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the problem is not only the analysis of the ways in which certain notions of the Ethics have been conjugated with Romantic themes, but also what parts of Spinozas ontology have not been assimilated within the Romantic thought. The investigation of the notions excluded from the Romantic interpretation of the Ethics will indicate the difficulties posed by Spinozas philosophy to these new readers. The impossibility of attuning entirely Spinozas ontology to the Romantic position will bring to light the complexity of his theory of God and nature, and also the ways in which these concepts somewhat challenge the thesis of Romanticism. The position of Spinoza within the intellectual movement of the Romanticism is inaugurated by the reflections made by the philosopher Toland, who re-situates Spinozas ontology within the dispute of the period. In his Letters to Serena (1704) Toland coined the expression of pantheism, in order to describe Spinozas conception of nature and God. Challenging the eighteenth-century portrait of a rationalist Spinoza, Toland claims that Spinozas theory of Substance and nature discloses, instead, a system of spontaneous forces, which goes quite behind a determinist structure (Bowie, 1993:15-28). For Toland, nature is shaped by various elements, which are characterised by a form of intrinsic power. As Spinozas theory of parallelism states the perfect correspondence between God and nature, Toland concludes, nature has to be understood as a living being, within which each element is connected and co-expresses the power of the Whole. This specific view of Spinozas notion of nature will influence significantly the Romantic study of the Ethics, around which the affinity with his philosophy will be constructed (Israel, 2002: 609-612). The event that gives rise to a renaissance of interest in Spinoza was the publication of the Spinoza Letters by Jacobi (1785). The publication of the Letters caused an unexpected controversy. The dispute goes in literature under the name of the Spinozism or The Pantheism Dispute. This was initially concerned with the discussion of the philosophical meaning of Spinozas philosophy, and the relevance of his ontology within Romantic tradition of thought. The focus was upon the definition of the Ethics itself, whether this supported rationalist and atheistic claims

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or rather a divine and dynamic conception of nature and human beings. These themes of the rationalist and subjective vision of nature raised more universal problems, which moved the dispute from a specific debate around the Ethics to a more general discussion on the constitution of philosophy itself. German intellectual life was wholly involved in the controversy of transcendence versus immanence, free will versus determinism, reason versus sentimentalism (Beiser, 1987: 44-48; Della Rocca, 2008: 283-287). Goethe and Jacobis engagement with the Ethics is a critical one within the general pantheist controversy. They read both the Ethics with particular attention to the themes of the absolute, immanence and parallelism, developing two different approaches. Goethe gives full right of citizenship to Spinoza within the Sturm und Drung circle, whereas the latter locates the Ethics within a form of radicalisation of the rationalist thesis of the Enlightenment. For Jacobi, Spinozas philosophy of nature discloses a strict determinist order, which is moved fundamentally by an obscure mechanism. Jacobi will conclude with envisaging a tendency towards a certain fatalism within the Ethics, which leads to the recognition of the limits of human rationality as a source of knowledge. In order to examine the controversial dialogue between these mentioned philosophers with Spinoza, let us analyse their writings about the Ethics in depth. In the section below, I draw attention, first, to Goethes portrait of Spinoza.

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2.1 The Ethics through Goethe s eyes: The divinisation of nature

Goethe is undeniably one of the prominent figures of the Sturm und Drung period. An eclectic and extremely productive thinker, Goethes studies vary from philosophy, literature to science, each of which reflects the general tendency of the Sturm und Drung movement. The central theme that dominates the entirety of Goethes speculation is the question of the re-foundation of the paradigm of nature, upon which new conceptions of the human being, science and history might be predicated. Moving beyond Sturm und Drungs thesis of the astonishing and pervasive force of the sensible world, Goethe is fundamentally persuaded of the unity of nature, which is expressed through the harmonic connections between creatures and the material world. It is in this unity of nature, Goethe affirms, that perfection and beauty lie. The recognition of the harmonic structure of nature leads Goethe to view the material world as a more complex subject, who generates and transforms incessantly beings, phenomena and movements. The understanding of the unity and affinity between beings informs Goethes own inquiry from poetry, philosophy, biology, physics to religion. More rigorously, Goethes form of eclecticism is an open attempt of relocating the diverse branches of knowledge within the unity of nature, through and solely through which the ultimate cause of the universe might come to light. The originality of Goethes intellectual gesture resides in his search for the connections between creatures, which is based on the rigorous combination between experience and theory. Goethe finds untenable the definitions of nature proposed by theology, Romantic and empiricist theories. Theology narrows the status of nature to a mere matter, ascribing the divine status to God. The problems with empiricist and Romantic methods concern that the former stresses the value of the experience and the visible phenomena as source of knowledge, whereas the latter claims the priority of theory and abstraction. As result, both of them, Goethe notes, lose the unity of reality, acquiring a partial awareness of the order of nature. In contrast, Goethe overcomes

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the schism between theory and practice, a priori and a posteriori through the study of every specific phenomenon such as the anatomy of plants or psychological states as perception as consequences of more general process, which is inherent within reality. In this light, the understanding of a singular event will certainly imply the knowledge of the entire mechanism of the universe and vice versa (Steuer, 2002: 160-169). In his theory of colours, Goethe reiterates more strongly his vision of nature, within which the perception of a specific colour derives from more complex mixtures of levels of light (Goethe, 1967: 316-322). For example, the redness of an object is a singularity immerged within a chaotic universe, whose peculiarity is not possible to be easily determined.3 This paradigm of reality as interconnections between singularity and universality, nature and individuals guides Goethes reading of past philosophies. Goethes interest is directed to every philosophical system, which defines nature as a powerful organism structured through a variety of infinite relations between beings and levels of reality. It is precisely in this context that Goethes dialogue with Spinoza takes place. Goethe reads Spinoza Goethes engagement with the Ethics acquires great significance within our inquiry upon the controversial relation between Spinoza and his readers. This refers to the possibility of determining, on the one side, the ways in which Spinozas theory of nature enriches Goethes treatment of the material world as powerful and divine subject. On the other, the encounter between Goethe and Spinoza brings to light how Spinozas definitions of nature, God and singularities greatly exceeds the pantheist formula proposed by Goethe, and more generally, the Sturm und Drung movement, revealing a more problematic conception of the material world. Although Goethes extensive outlook includes a variety of different cultural sources such as Catullus, Voltaire and Euripides, the presence of Spinoza within his works acquires a distinct position. I have discovered in many of his writings such as the
3

For an interesting interpretation of Goethes theory of colours in terms of dynamic confluences of various forces, see Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 161-162).

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Theory of Colours, the Metamorphosis of Plants and poems, the influence, now latent now manifest, of certain Spinozas claims, which delineate the strong impact of the reading of the Ethics upon Goethes own theoretical production (Bell, 1984:153-170). Goethes focus on the Ethics mainly is directed to Spinoza definitions of Substance as union between essence and existence, power and immanence, and also the theory of parallelism, which he attempts to read through the lenses of the Sturm und Drung movement. In order to delineate the ways in which Goethe re-elaborates Spinozas theory of Substance-nature, let us return to these notions exposed in the Ethics. As discussed before, Spinoza in the first part of the Ethics affirms that God is an absolute infinity, which possesses its own essence and existence. Singularities, instead, are distinguished one from the others through their different level of actuality and not by essence, which they share with Substance. Further, Spinoza defines God as the immanent cause of all the events in nature (E. I, prop. XVII). This implies the denial of the religious figure of the Creator and the metaphysical thesis of the transcendent origin of the universe, through which nature becomes recognised as a self-organised and productive system. In the following proposition XIX, he claims the eternity of God and all his attributes. Given the identity between Gods essence and existence and God is an immanent and self-caused Being, Spinoza deduces the eternity of Substance. Spinoza defines towards the end of the part I of the Ethics the essence of God, that is, power (E.I, Prop. XXXIV). As the existence of nature is not preceded by any moment of creation and emanative phase, the generation of all the elements within the world is directly connected to nature itself. This involves the understanding of the material world as extremely productive and dynamic body. In the part II of the Ethics, Spinoza states the correspondence between God and nature (E. II, prop. VII). For this proposition, nature and God are characterised by a similar structure (order) and development (connection). In Goethes re-formulation of the Ethics, these arguments delineate Spinozas paradigm of pantheism. Goethe reads Spinozas form of monism as the divinisation of nature, through which the material world is elevated to the status of powerful and

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living subject. More accurately, Goethe constructs his pantheist portrait of the Ethics on the definition of the one and common essence for all the singularities (modes) embodied by Substance. In this light, Spinozas negation of several essences within reality becomes recognised as the consolidation of the unity of reality, within which each element is harmonically connected one to the other; and also these together express the totality of nature as living organism. Spinozas claims of the immanence and power of God are understood not as his gesture of avoiding the theological argument of the generation of the world from an act of free will, and thus his atheist conclusion, but rather as the reinstatement of the autonomy of nature from religion and, at the same time, Enlightenment discourse. In Goethes eyes, Spinozas definitions of immanence and the power of God reveal the great move of disseminating the properties generally attributed to a transcendent Being (omniscience, generation, eternity etc.) into the world (all is God: pan-theos), which in turn acquires the status of divine subject. Moreover, the theory of the parallelism between matter and thought espoused in part II of the Ethics, further consolidates the pantheistic vision of nature, through which matter is conceived as thinking organism and not as a mere assemblage of physical phenomena. Importantly, the meaning of parallelism comes to signify not the similitude of the two dimensions of reality (thought and extension) but rather the identity between the two, by which the order and connection of ideas is entirely attuned with the order and connection of things. This means that the proposition of God as parallel to nature is translated directly into God is nature, implying the replacement of the formula of parallelism with the notion of identity. In other words, through Goethes reading of the Ethics we are witnessing, I would argue, his attempt to construct a theory of the subject around Spinozas conception of nature. In accordance with the dominant tendency of the Sturm und Drung tradition of thought, which sustains the subjective dimension of the material world, Goethe too aims at conceptualising nature in terms of autonomous subject. If in his philosophy the transformation of nature into an independent subject is fully developed, Goethe cannot apply entirely the same procedure to the Ethics. In order to read in the first part of the Ethics the divinity and individuality of nature, Goethe has inevitably to

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elude or omit some aspects of Spinozas theory of God-nature. It is precisely in this context that his relation with Spinoza becomes critical. Certainly, Goethe is not a scholar of Spinoza. He did not develop a systematic study of the Ethics, instead we find different acknowledgements to Spinoza throughout his writings. However, this does not indicate that the role of Spinozas ontology within Goethes thought is less important. By contrast, the themes of the Ethics are central and, at the same time, problematic within Goethes speculation. As the title Goethe reads Spinoza given to this discussion suggests, the reading of the Ethics does not mean that Goethe becomes a Spinozist either Goethe defines Spinoza as his precursor. Rather, Goethe initiates through the reading of the Ethics a dialogue, within which the figure of Spinoza is not manifest and yet omnipresent.4 Goethes study of the Ethics does not conclude with an appropriation of Spinozas thesis. Although Goethe undeniably attempts to view the Ethics as the affirmation of a pantheist and divine vision of the world, nevertheless his analysis cannot proceed any further in this direction. Goethes Spinozist phase remains anchored on the divinisation of nature, whereas Goethes concern with the constitution of nature as a proper subject coincides with the consolidation of his alliance with the Sturn und Drung philosophy.5 In this fashion, we might discover echoes of the Ethics within Goethes theory of the genesis of plants, which reveals Goethes form of mystical empiricism. Specifically, in the Metamorphosis of Plants, in which Goethe states that every organism shares the same original structure within an eternal becoming, I think, the lesson of the Ethics resonates throughout the thread of the poem (Middlenton,1994: 155). I refer particularly to the notions of the common essence for all singularities, and also the definitions of nature-God as generative and eternal source of production, around which Spinoza sets forth his conception of the unity of reality (Bell, 1984: 147-175).
4

After I looked around the whole world in vain for a means of developing my strange nature, I finally hit upon the Ethics of this man []. Here I found the serenity to calm my passions; a wide and free view over the material and moral world seemed to open before me. Above all, I was fascinated by the boundless disinterestedness that emanated from him. (Bell, 1984: 151). 5 Concerning Goethes theory of the subject, see particularly the critique offered by Deleuze and Guattari (2004b:392-425).

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By contrast, in Goethes celebration of nature as divine subject, the Spinozist element is less influential and yet still present. As the lyric recites
If the eye were not sun-like, How could it ever spy the sun? If Gods own power lay not inside us, How could divinity delight us? If all the things pour out lust for life, The smallest and the bigger stars, Yet all this striving, all this struggle Is eternal peace in God the Lord (Middlenton, 1994: 165)

Beside the lyrical structure of the writing, these verses, in my view, greatly exemplify, on the one side, Goethes assimilation of Spinozas definition of God as immanence, power and the theory of parallelism; on the other, Goethes treatment of nature as a composite, however powerful, individual strongly reflects the Sturm und drang themes, and thereby abandoning Ethics. These arguments raise more crucial questions, which shape the entire relation of Goethe with Spinoza. This refers to why Spinoza cannot be considered entirely a pantheist philosopher. Let us discuss the impossibility of defining Spinoza as pantheist. In order to construct the pantheist portrait of Spinoza, Goethe has to ignore Spinozas definitions of necessity and, importantly, the absolute infinity of God. This implies the omission of the determinist aspect from Spinozas theory of Substance, and crucially, the vision of God-nature as a plane shaped by a variety of infinite attributes and modes, upon which immanence and the formula of parallelism are grounded and developed. By contrast, Spinozas notions of immanence, parallelism and power are detached from the thesis of the absolute infinity and necessity of God, which leads Goethe directly to deify Spinozas theory of nature. In this way, nature becomes God in all but name, reintroducing the metaphysical themes within the Ethics. The exclusion of the notions of the absolute and necessity from the analysis of the Ethics has further and more fundamental implications. These refer to the loss of the multiple and material dimension of reality, which are supported by the absolute and necessary infinity of Substance. Thus, Goethes pantheist account of Spinozas conception of

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nature lacks materiality, which means the exclusion of the actuality and power of the attributes and modes that populate Spinozas vision of the sensible world. Goethes exclusion of the absolute from the study of the Ethics involves the assimilation of Spinozas thesis of nature on the pantheist position, which implies the subjective and metaphysical definition of the material world. For this, the propositions of immanence, power and the formula of parallelism taken in themselves would certainly lead towards the divinisation of nature, and thus its constitution as a form of subject. In turn, if nature has to be thought as a subject, this reintroduces the argument of the free will within the system of reality, which would contradict Spinozas refusal of contingency. By contrast, the theme of the absolute allows Spinoza to overcome the question of the divinisation of nature and thus the problem of the free will. As discussed in the previous section, the definition of the absolute sets in motion a plane, which is plural, inescapable and fundamentally real. The absolute plane of multiple and actual attributes prevents Spinozas conception of nature from supporting any pantheist formula and thus any theory of the subject. This involves the maintenance of the centrality of the material aspect of nature within Spinozas ontology. Taking into account these arguments, we might draw some general conclusions. The analysis of the presence of Spinoza within Goethes philosophy and, more generally the Romantic tradition of thought, has brought to light the complexity of Spinozas theory of nature, which exceeds the paradigm of pantheism. Through Goethes reading of the Ethics, we have learnt that the withdrawal of Spinozas conception of nature-God from the Enlightenment philosophy does not imply the inclusion of the Ethics within any mystical thesis of the subjective meaning of the material world. If Spinoza is certainly not a precursor of rationalist thought, equally he is not a pantheist philosopher. More rigorously, if Goethe thinks of Spinozas account of nature as a pantheist vision of the world, this is possible only by eluding the question of the absolute infinity of God. Absolute infinity gives priority to the actual dimension of nature, bringing to light the materialist character of Spinozas ontology.

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It is Spinozas definition of absolute infinity that opens up to a vision of reality as a multiple plane and not a divine subject, constructing ontology in a materialist way. Without the analysis of Substance-nature as absolute infinity, Spinozas philosophy would constantly lead one to vacillate between a rationalist and pantheistic interpretation. The engagement of the philosopher Jacobi with Spinoza, discussed below, in this regard, exemplifies this continuous oscillation between a rationalist elaboration of Spinozas theory of Substance and a mystical one. It is to this that we will now turn.

2.2 Jacobis portrait of the Ethics: The dilemma between rationalist and fatalist vision of reality

The philosophy of Jacobi reflects the influences of different philosophical movements. He was a contemporary of Goethe and inspired by him, but also he supported the empiricist and rationalist positions inherited through the Enlightenment. Therefore, Jacobis inconstant beliefs between a form of mysticism, rationalism and empiricism leads to rather confused retrospective of his works. Jacobi acquires a certain importance in relation to his Spinoza Letters, which caused the Pantheist controversy as noted above. The work is mainly centred on a series of correspondences between Jacobi himself and Mendelssohn discussing Lessings affirmation of being a Spinozist (Jacobi, 1994:187). The philosophical relevance of these letters concerns the definition Spinozas philosophy itself, whether or not Spinozism should be considered as synonymous with a certain form of rationalism or rather pantheism. As we have seen above, for Goethe, Spinozas ontology unveils the pantheist vision of nature. For him, Spinozas proposition VII on the ontological equality between God and nature is translated into the assertion of the divine and powerful status of the natural order. Jacobi, instead, reiterates the eighteenth-century definition of the Ethics, claiming the rationalist and empiricist character of Spinozas philosophy. In common with the Enlightenment position, Jacobi focuses to the definitions of

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Substance as a self-caused union of necessity and freedom and the theory of parallelism. These are the basis, in Jacobis view, upon which Spinozas strict paradigm of rationalism is founded and developed. The importance of discussing Jabobis reading of the Ethics concerns the distinct role played by Spinoza within Jacobis own thought. The analysis of Spinozas theory of God-nature impacts profoundly on Jacobis philosophical convictions, undermining his beliefs on the power of reason and the authority of the empiricist method. The determinist order of reality proposed by Spinoza, of which Jacobi approves, leads in Jacobis philosophy to the recognition of the limits of human rationality in the acquisition of universal truth. The impossibility of knowing and transforming reality, as we will see, moves Jacobi towards certain fatalistic and mystical positions. More accurately, the reading of Spinozas notion of Substance as necessity confronts Jacobi with the problem of the advantage of the rationalist method for the development of human life. The impenetrable structure of Spinozas nature (as he sees it) brings Jacobi to question the consistency of science (Beiser, 1987: 80-90). It is in this moment that Jacobis philosophy begins to oscillating between rationalist and mystical theses. Taking into account these prerequisites, let us expand on the main aspects of the dilemma posed by the Ethics to Jacobi. As anticipated above, for Jacobi Spinoza is undeniably the greatest rationalist thinker of the history of philosophy. Jacobi is persuaded that Spinozas theory of Substance-nature is entirely pervaded by a determinist mechanism, within which the role of human mind is central for unveiling its laws. Jacobi deduces the rationalist constitution of the Ethics from the strict concatenations between causes and effects affirmed in the Ethics, which is further corroborated by Spinozas affirmation of the identity between thought and extension. Jacobi understands proposition VII of part II of the Ethics as the definition of the rationality of nature. Given that the order and connections of ideas is the same with the order and connection of things and also thought and matter are equally two of the infinite attributes of God, Jacobi concludes that Spinozas vision of the material world is driven by a solid and immutable rationality. The importance of Spinozas ontology, in Jacobis analysis, resides on

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the reinstatement of the primacy of the scientific method and the centrality of empirical investigation for the attainment of knowledge. Following eighteenthcentury logic, he interprets the principle of universal causation espoused in the Ethics as Spinozas affirmation of the autonomy of reason, which in turn corresponds to Jacobis own theory (Jacobi, 1994: 187-188). Up to this point, Jacobis treatment of the Ethics echoes the Enlightenments explanation. Nevertheless, his discourse becomes progressively more indeterminate, when he draws the implications of the paradigm of rationalism embodied by Spinoza for the general foundation of philosophy. It is precisely in this moment that the doubt of Jacobi about the certitude of reason emerges. Jacobi recognises that the determinist philosophy of Spinoza leads directly to the marginal status of the human being and the affirmation of the model of atheism within society, which in turn imply the growth of fatalism as a doctrine. For him, Spinozas denial of contingency within nature means the negation of human freedom (Della Rocca, 2008: 283-288; Beiser, 1987: 83-90). If every phenomenon within the universe is already pre-determined by the immutable laws of nature, Jacobi reflects, what then is the place attributed to human beings? More accurately, for every determinist system, Jacobi observes, human beings do not have any impact upon the becoming of the sensible world. If this is the case, Jacobi questions why do we need science and, more generally, why do we struggle with reasoning? In order to answer these questions, Jacobi has to decide whether the maintenance of a rationalist position is still justifiable, given the necessity of nature. Importantly, it is the reading of the Ethics as a cogent rationalist system that confronts Jacobi with the limits of the mind. It means that Jacobi does not oppose Spinozas vision of nature as a place regulated by a firm principle of causation, which Jacobi himself supports. Differently, Jacobi is more concerned with the concrete consequences of this system upon the general understanding of the value of science and philosophy.

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In the perfect determinist structure of the Ethics, Jacobi envisages the affirmation of a fatalist conception of nature, which delineates Spinozas atheist philosophy. As God is characterised by necessity and he also is inherent within nature, in Jacobis reformulation, this inevitably means the effacement of God within the world, which is in turn dominated by the laws of causation. In this light, the solution proposed by Spinoza is the passive acceptance of the will of the higher reason (Jacobi, 1994: 189). If Spinozas rationalist paradigm ends up necessarily with the fatalist vision of the world, then Jacobis own reflections on the determinist order of nature, which he shares with Spinoza, moves him towards certain mystical positions (Jacobi, 1994: 193). In order to prevent the growth of fatalist and atheist ideas that might emerge from a possible affirmation of Spinozas ontology, Jacobi proposes a salto mortale (literary a mortal jump) (Jacobi, 1994: 189). This refers to the suspension of the rational faculty and the recourse to unconditionally blind faith. Whilst the perseverance of the rational method exemplified by Spinoza produces exclusively fatalist and atheist conceptions but not the attainment of truth, Jacobis encouragement of a certain blind faith towards the becoming of reality would introduce elements of contingency within the material world. This would recover the status of human being from a marginal position to a more central one. For Jacobi, the replacement of the ineluctability of the mechanism of nature with faith and contingency is the only way in which the significance of individual actions and thoughts can be preserved (Della Rocca, 2008: 283-288; Beiser, 1987: 83-92). Concerning Jacobis portrait of Spinoza several questions arise. Although many of the problems derived from Jacobis rationalist account of the Ethics reflect the limits of the Enlightenment definition of the Ethics, Jacobis relation with Spinoza raises a further important theme. This refers to Jabobis preoccupation with the consequences of the Spinozist method of necessity for the re-conceptualisation of philosophy and science. Specifically, Jacobi does not question the validity of the rationalist aspect of the Ethics itself. What is at the stake in Jacobis entire engagement with Spinoza is the risk of the consolidation of Spinozas monist

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philosophy within the nineteenth-century tradition of thought. For Jacobi, the implications of Spinozas ontology are the effacement of the importance of the human being, which is overshadowed by the ineluctable supremacy of reason. Like the Enlightenment philosophy, it is the definition of God as necessity and univocity that lies at the very heart of Spinozas monist thought. Unlike the eighteenth-century reading, this form of monism does not lead to materialist conceptions of history, science and philosophy, but rather to fatalist beliefs and the devaluation of the role of human being within the world. In this light, Jacobi rightly observes that a rationalist vision of reality inevitably loses the material aspect of nature and thus the centrality of human being. It offers an understanding of nature as a static body, within which any possible transformation is entirely avoided. Therefore, Jacobi in his study of Spinoza intuits the ontological problem inherent within every paradigm of rationalism, including his model too, which entails the tendency towards a form of repetition and the absence of production. However, if Jacobi correctly envisages the limits of a rationalist ontology, then the question is whether or not this argument can be applied to Spinozas philosophy too. The problem arises as to how and why Spinoza becomes, in Jacobis reading, a radical rationalist thinker? Does Spinozas theory of Godnature lead solely to a fatalist position? As with Goethe and the Enlightenments appropriation, the definition of the absolute infinity of God, once more, sheds light on the difficulties emerging in the encounter between Jacobi and Spinoza. As with the Enlightenments re-formulation of the Ethics, Jacobi too derives the all-inclusive and absolute nature of God from Spinozas claim of the necessity and self-generation of God. In Jacobis analysis, it is necessity that poses the absolute infinity of God and not vice versa. This inevitably leads him to understand Spinozas theory of Substance as the affirmation of the dominance of an absolute mind upon human life, which in turn implies the loss of the richness of expression of the material world. Following this logic, Spinozas ontology would never be attuned to any materialist position. As we have already discussed, it is the notion of the absolute that drives the entire system of the Ethics,

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which posits the necessity of God. By definition, absolute infinity means the multiplicity and actuality of the plane of reality, which is shaped by uncountable attributes and modes. Spinozas attention to the priority of the absolute brings to light an alternative mode of thinking the necessity of God-nature, which is through a multiple plane. Although Jacobis reading of the Ethics did not proceed further, he implicitly brings about the discovery of the problematic relation between finite beings and the infinite Being within Spinozas thesis of God. The dilemma faced by Jacobi concerning the constitution of philosophy brings to light a more fundamental question. This refers to the problem of the commencement in philosophy, whether or not this occurs in a matter or the Concept. Schelling and Hegel, we will see below, fully articulate these arguments. For Schelling, in his period of the philosophy of Identity, nature is contemporaneous to the Concept, whereas for Hegel Thought is prior to the object. In this dispute, both thinkers will engage with Spinozas theory of Substance-nature, which affirms both reality and thought through the notions of the absolute Being and immanence. In the following section, I draw attention to the ways in which Spinozas notion of the absolute becomes the crucial and somewhat disturbing question within Schelling and Hegels philosophical systems. It is through Schelling and Hegels critique that we might be able to determine the implications of thinking reality through transcendence and immanence.

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3. German Idealism and the rejection of the Ethics

The Romantic movement favoured the growth of interest in philosophers such as Spinoza and Leibniz within the philosophical tradition of German Idealism. German Idealism reinstates the importance of these modern thinkers at their height, pointing out their respective limits and perspectives. Regarding Spinoza, German Idealist philosophy contributes to the establishment of a more rigorous method of analysing the Ethics, focusing upon the foundation of his ontology itself. This implies the recovery of the autonomy of Spinozas philosophy from the appropriations made by the intellectual movements of the Enlightenment and the Sturm und Drung, which have attuned the meaning of the Ethics on rationalist and pantheistic positions. In this sense, the study of Spinozas paradigm of monism brings about the centrality of the notions of immanence and the absolute within Spinozas ontology. The renewal of interest in Spinozas notions of the absolute and immanence derives from a more general discussion within late eighteenth-century German philosophy concerning the re-foundation of the paradigm of philosophy itself. The necessity of re-constructing the domain of philosophy emerges from the growing awareness within German thought of the crisis and failure of the Enlightenment ideas raised by the Romantic movement. German Idealism brings about the urgency of repositioning the importance of the value of reason, nature and the unity of reality within philosophical speculation, which have been corrupted by the radicalisation of eighteenth-century beliefs in scientific naturalism and rational criticism. Whilst the former has caused the growth of materialist conceptions of nature and human being based on the vision of the sensible world as a mere assemblage of physical phenomena and also the refusal of notions such as eternity and freedom, the latter has nurtured the expansion of fatalist and sceptic convictions about the certitude of the rational judgment, as we have seen with Jacobis proposal of the mortal jump (Beiser , 2000: 18-25; 2002: 1-16).

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In order to recover the authority of thought and the status of nature, German Idealism poses the need of re-signify the concept of reality itself. It is through the retheorisation of reality that more solid notions of humankind, matter and knowledge might be established, and thereby alternative philosophical systems. More accurately, German Idealist thought raises the crucial problem of the conceptualisation of the commencement of reality. This involves the search for the principles and conditions that lie at the very basis of the generation of the order of the real. This philosophical gesture aims at the discovery of the system of production of reality, through which the origin and ends of specific historical events, individuals and communities might be revealed. The theme of how reality is produced engages a variety of crucial notions such as the concepts of temporality, the configuration of space, individuality, universality and the attainment of self-consciousness. German Idealist philosophy is precisely concerned with the analysis of these arguments. Given the complexity and indeterminacy of the notions involved within the theme of the commencement of reality, German Idealism finds misleading both the deductive and empiricist methods assumed by the Enlightenment and the pantheist formula adopted by the Romantic wave of thought. By contrast, German Idealist draws attention to metaphysical arguments as powerful sources for re-configuring the meaning and production of reality. The rehabilitation of metaphysics within philosophy brings about the resurgence of concepts such as transcendence, Being, becoming, immanence and absolute as fundamental categories of thought, through which the properties and finalities of the process of production of reality might be uncovered. The rediscovery of metaphysics leads to articulate different and more complex questions, which are concerned with the problems of the relation between nature and thought, the essence of reality, the role of humankind and the final object of the system of production. Strictly speaking, the main preoccupations of German Idealist philosophers is whether the commencement of reality has to be related to nature or rather a higher mind, and the function of human being within the this process. The ways in which each philosopher addressed these problems give rise to

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different intellectual positions, which runs from the transcendental idealism of Kant, ethical idealism of Fichte and the absolute idealism of Schelling and Hegel. Without entering into the vicissitudes of these various forms of Idealism, for the strong connection with the ontology of Spinoza, I shall draw particular attention to the main thesis elaborated within the intellectual movement of absolute idealism. Although some of the themes developed within this movement have been anticipated by authors such as Novails, Schlegel and Holderling, the rigorous systematization of the paradigm of absolute Idealism is undeniably indebted to the works of Schelling and Hegel. Despite their innumerable differences, Schelling and Hegel share the conviction that reality has to be understood as Substance, from which a variety distinct of individualities and modes of beings (such as time and space) are generated. There are not independent existences within the order of real; rather each element is interconnected with the other and its role responds to a specific intent within the process of production (Beiser, 2002: 349-374; Guyer, 2000: 37-55). Moving forward the themes advanced by the Enlightenment philosophy, Schelling and Hegel are convinced that the system of reality is directed by a higher rationality, within which each singularity is the concrete manifestation of this transcendent archetype. For both thinkers, an awareness of the anatomy of this rational Being is the task of philosophy, which has to formulate universal categories of thought able to determine the process and objects of this system. It is in this context that their respective approaches take different directions. If both philosophers develop monist ontologies centred on the absolute essence of reality-Substance, it is the understanding of the absolute itself that marks irremediably the divergence between the two thinkers. For Hegel, as we will see, the absolute is the final result of a process, where the Mind acquires consciousness through a series of dialectical phases. Schelling, particularly in his period of transcendental naturalism, instead, argues that nature is the absolute source of production, through which the I can achieves awareness of its own existence.

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For the manifest references to Spinozas definition of the absolute as a self-caused and unitary Substance, both Schelling and Hegel engage in an intense debate with the model of monism espoused in the Ethics. Both readings of the Ethics are focused upon the interpretation of Spinozas notion of absolute infinity as well as the definitions of immanence and parallelism. These arguments bring Schelling and Hegel to question how Spinoza conceptualises the genesis and development of reality by conceiving the absolute Being as a positive infinity, which embraces all its predicates such as matter and thought. Moving from a Spinozist to a more transcendental phase, Schelling will argue that Spinozas definition of the absolute implies a static and meaningless vision of the world, which in turn produces a certain form of fatalism. Hegel will develop one of the most vehement critiques to the Ethics, defining Spinozas ontology as the negation of the world, a paradigm of acosmism. In order to examine Spinozas form of materialism, I think, an inquiry upon Schelling and Hegels definition of the Ethics as the effacement of the world, become crucial. This enables us to consider the implications of thinking reality transcendentally or immanently, and examine the extent to which Spinozas ontology of the absolute offers philosophical insights for the development of novel materialist discourses. First, let us flesh out the engagement of Schelling with the Ethics.

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3.1 Schelling and the abyss of Spinozas ontology of the absolute

Schelling is one of the most influential thinkers along with Hegel and Fichte within the philosophical tradition of German Idealism. The reputation of Schelling within the history of philosophy has been somewhat limited to a consideration of his model of Idealism as transitional between Fichte and Hegel. Furthermore, Schellings divergent positions have contributed to the growth of a certain suspicion about the consistency of his philosophical project. By contrast, the variety of his ideas raises fecund arguments, which have been discovered recently.6 These refer, among others, to the multisided and powerful role of nature, the identity between Subject and Object and the innovative account of absolute Being, which is understood as an unconditional source of individualities, beings and movements. Schellings multisided form of Idealism might be distinguished into three main phases. These are the period of the Philosophy of Nature, which ascribes to nature the status of an ontological Being, contrasting with rationalist and scientific theories. The second phase is named the Philosophy of Identity, which develops an antisubjectivist account of the notion of absolute reality, and is embedded in the legacy of Spinoza. The third one is usually referred to the writing The Age of the World, which focuses upon the analysis of the opposing forces that determine the becoming of the material world. These phases express the ways in which Schelling responds to the crisis of the eighteenth-century certainty of reason, elaborating distinct philosophical demands. In the phase of the Philosophy of Identity, Schelling is fascinated by Spinozas theory of absolute infinity. Schelling focuses upon Spinozas definition of the
6

Concerning contemporary reading of Schelling, see particularly the recent collected essays edited by Normann and Welchman (2004), Zizek (1996), and Bowie (1993; 2003: 102-139).

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absolute Substance, and specifically the ways in which Spinoza combines contingent existences such as singular subjects, individual thoughts and historical events within one and self-generated Being. However, the encounter with Spinoza becomes more problematic, we will see, particularly when Schelling discusses the status ascribed by Spinoza to finite beings, raising the fundamental question of the differentiation within the absolute. The centrality of Schellings engagement with the Ethics, for our discourse, concerns the solutions and problems posed by Spinoza throughout the development of Schellings philosophy. These entail to the question of thinking the material world as a self-generative body shaped by a variety of actual and heterogeneous elements within an absolute plane, which somewhat challenges Schellings conviction. Furthermore, the presence of Spinoza within Schellings thought corresponds to two distinct philosophical positions. In the period of the Philosophy of Identity and more generally, the Philosophy of Nature, which reflects the assimilation of Spinozas ontology, Schelling comes closer to certain contemporary materialist arguments than Idealist assumptions. In his Spinozist period, Schelling conceives reality as structured from a unitary principle of production, within which thought is not prior and transcendent to the actuality of the universe. Rather, these are considered as two expressions of reality. This suggests that Schelling ascribes to the material world a productive and dynamic status. In contrast, the rejection of Spinozas philosophy coincides with Schellings consolidation of the Idealist thesis. Therefore, an inquiry into the encounter between Schelling and Spinoza might shed light on the model of materialism supported by Spinozas ontology, and the extent to which this impacts effectively upon Schellings thought. In his phase of the Philosophy of Identity, to which I shall draw my attention, Schellings concern is addressed to the question of the relation between the I and the world. Specifically, Schelling questions whether it is the I that poses the object-world or, rather it is the object that poses the I. If thought (the I) constitutes the material world, then the concept produces the actual reality. If it is the world that shapes the awareness of the Subject, this implies the reinstatement of

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nature (the object) as a generative source of knowledge, meaning and individuality. For the young Schelling, both solutions are unacceptable (1978: 15-31). In order to overcome the dualism between the I and the object (the ideal and actual), Schelling proposes an independent principle, which generates both thought and matter. More rigorously, Schelling affirms that the relation between subject and object emerges from a unitary Being, within which thought and extension are its predicates. Schelling calls this unique Being absolute identity (Schelling, 1980: Letter III). Absolute identity, Schelling explains, is a point (a source), from which opposite and varied phenomena are developed within one, dynamic and eternal system. The understanding of the absolute as a pure source of production, Schelling sustains, is the basis, upon which the solution to the problem of the disclosure of Being to the world might be revealed (Schelling, 1980: 110-116). The undifferentiated essence of the absolute is the ground of the all possible forms of individuality and, more generally, differences.7 It is in this moment that Schelling moves away from the Idealist model, which postulates the priority of the Concept transcendent to nature, and moves towards the themes of the Ethics.

3.2 Schelling encounters Spinoza

In contrast with the eighteenth-century interpretation of Spinoza as a rationalist philosopher, Schelling is the first reader of the Ethics to liberate his definition of Substance from the meaning of pure necessity (Schelling, 1988: 53-54; Toscano, 2004: 114-116). He conceives Spinozas theory of Substance as characterised by a more complex mechanism, which includes a variety of aspects such as necessity, eternity and contingency (Schelling, 1980: 63-69). For Schelling, the concept of Being espoused in the Ethics has to be understood as an eternal source of forming potencies, better, a pure activity, within which nature and thought are two dimensions of one system, that is, the absolute.

Concerning Schellings notion of the principle of indifference, see particularly Deleuze (2004: 239241).

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As mentioned, the central preoccupation of Schelling is the foundation of a system, which should embrace contemporaneously the power of the I and the actuality of nature. In order to determine the production of reality without attributing the primacy exclusively to the Subject or the object, Schelling seeks for the support of the Ethics. For the centrality given to the notions of the absolute and the identity between thought and extension, Spinoza is an obvious referent from the past. Schelling discovers in Spinozas definition of the absolute and positive Being a powerful category of thought, which escapes the dualist logic of the I and the Non-I (Bowie, 1993: 15-17). In order to understand the central role played by Spinozas ontology within Schellings period of Identity, we need first to return to Spinozas definition of the absolute, in which he states
By God I mean an absolutely infinite being, that is, Substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence. Explication. I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its kind. For if a thing is only infinite in its kind, one may deny that it has infinite attributes. But if a thing is absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essences and does not involve any negation belongs to its essence. (E.I, Def. VI)

In this definition Spinoza tells us that Substance is an absolute and positive infinity. In the following explanation, Spinoza clarifies that the absolute dimension of Substance derives from the uncountable attributes, by which infinity is formed (for if a thing is only infinite in its kind, one may deny it has infinite attributes). By this definition, attributes are not independent essences or properties of God such as eternity, truth or good; instead, these are modes of Being, which are considered as existences (E. I, Def. IV). It means that absolute infinity is directly related with the dimension of the actual. More accurately, it is actuality itself. In Schellings reading, the absolute becomes recognised as the core of Spinozas paradigm of monism. Schelling conceives the category of the absolute presented in the Ethics as the fundamental principle, which poses the unity of reality under an allinvasive Being. In this way, Spinozas notion of the absolute is viewed as the generative source of production of the universe, which embodies and actualises all

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possible existences. Given his attention to the aspects of inescapability and univocity, thus, Schelling considers Spinozas definition of absolute God solely in its dimension of positive infinity. Importantly, this means that Schelling does not deduce the meaning of Spinozas notion of the absolute from the multiplicity of the attributes, which is affirmed in the explanation to definition VII of part I. As a consequence, the theme of the commencement of reality emerges not from the actuality and heterogeneity of the attributes but instead from a unique and allembracing Being. It is this understanding of the absolute as a unitary principle that shapes entirely Schellings engagement with the Ethics from his initial appreciation to the final rejection. In order to construct his ontology of the absolute, Schelling nuances Being with the features of the Spinozian Substance. In his assimilation of Spinozas theory of Substance, Schelling defines the absolute as a positive and self-caused infinity, the union of the ideal and the actual (Beiser, 2002: 465-564). Following the logic of the Ethics, Schelling recognises that the disclosure of Being is not the move of the I towards its objects, who reflects upon the actuality of the world. By the same token, it is not the world that gives rise to the power of the concept. By contrast, the disclosure of Being is an act of self-disclosure, through which the One, revealing itself, unveils its predicates.8 In his phase of the Philosophy of Identity, the absolute is a point indifferent (neutral) to its predicates, which unifies contrary aspects of reality such as extension and thought. It follows that Subject and object are two modes of expressing Being, which are equally inherent within the system of reality. Given the identity between the predicates of Being, this implies that the action of thinking is directly connected with the material dimension of reality and vice versa. It means that the concept is grounded on the sensible world, which in turn becomes acknowledged as a generative source of meanings. The novelty of Schellings philosophical gesture resides precisely in his account of the absolute. Schelling replaces the regulative role of the absolute with a constitutive and dynamic status. This involves the treatment of the absolute as a pure activity,
8

An illuminating example of Schellings principle of indifference is the image of the volcanoes offered by Deleuze (2004:289).

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which is not transcendent to the I and the object, but rather a more complex system of production. The powerful function ascribed to the absolute undeniably marks out Schellings withdrawal from the Idealist paradigm, for which absolute Being controls and directs the becoming of the world. By contrast, in his Spinozist phase, I would argue, Schelling reaches materialist tones, portraying the idea of the absolute as powerful ground of thoughts, potentialities and bodies. Specifically, Schellings idea of Being as the embodiment of all the determinations of the actual and the ideal to some extent anticipates contemporary materialist ontology concerned with a more extensive and dynamic vision of matter and the becoming of reality. Schelling and the end of the alliance with Spinoza: The rise of nihilism If Schellings non subjective account of Being seems to as advance a materialist thesis, the successive steps towards the constitution of absolute Identity reveal instead a more ambiguous position. This refers to Schellings analysis of the relation between the One and its parts. Having affirmed the principle of neutrality as the commencement of reality, Schelling passes to investigate the ways in which heterogeneous beings emerge from an undifferentiated Being. Specifically, Schelling poses the question of the differentiation of the absolute. Considered in itself, he recognises, the point of indifference does not directly explain the mechanism, through which diverse modes of reality such as thought and matter coexist within one powerful order. In this sense, the notion of unconditional Being indicates solely that the absolute is a pure source of activity, from which the genesis and becoming of reality proceed. This does not describe how the unconditional power of Being produces the world, and especially the status of the ideal and the actual within the absolute. In other words, although the point of indifference depicts the absolute as an extremely dynamic and generative being, this still leaves unresolved the problem of the meaning of the ideal and the actual and how they operate. The awareness of this is crucial for determining the mode in which any form of individuality such as thoughts, bodies, time and space populate the boundless territory of the absolute, and also the extent to which these impact upon the development of reality.

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In order to re-consider the question of the actual and the ideal from an alternative perspective, Schelling re-draws attention the Ethics, focusing particularly upon the theory of parallelism. As mentioned already, by the formula of parallelism Spinoza claims that the order and connection of ideas is the same with the order and connections of things (E. II, prop. VII). For this, Spinoza intends that Substance is formed equally by the power of matter and thought, and these are developed through a similar process. Spinozas notion of parallelism offers to Schelling fecund arguments, upon which the dilemma between the actual and the ideal might be repositioned within a novel ontological paradigm. Schelling, once more, follows the lesson of the Ethics, in attempting to integrate the formula of parallelism within his model of Being. In this case, however, his move will not generate the positive results that occurred at the beginning of the conceptualisation of the point of indifference. It is through this gesture of further adopting the notions of the Ethics that the dialogue between Schelling and Spinoza becomes considerably critical, through which the conceptual impossibility of incorporating Spinozas ontology within Schellings paradigm of the absolute Identity will come to light. The problems encountered by Schelling in his appropriation of the theory of the parallelism prepare the terrain to the definitive rupture with the philosophy of Spinoza and the return to the Idealist tradition. If Schelling has been able to transfer comfortably the definition VI of the absolute infinity from the Ethics to his Philosophy of Identity, the theory of parallelism will not resolve Schellings concern with the actual and the ideal. In contrast, this resignifies entirely Schellings engagement with Spinoza, impacting also upon the definitive systematisation of the ontology of the absolute Identity. More accurately, Schellings difficulty with the paradigm of parallelism is not the understanding of the formula itself, but rather the mode in which Spinoza combines the concept of absolute infinity with the similarity between nature and thought. This confronts and somewhat disorients Schellings convictions of the essence of the absolute and the meaning of Identity.

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Passing from an initial influential position, in this moment, the presence of Spinoza becomes perceived as a problem, which brings about the impasse of Schelling in fully conceptualising the plane of reality proposed in the Ethics. It is in this phase that the two philosophies of the absolute take opposing directions. Whilst Schellings ontology of absolute Identity culminates in a nihilist move, the climax of Spinozas conception of absolute infinity is the affirmation of the multiplicity of the actual. Schelling rightly reads, on the one side, the theory of the parallelism between thought and extension as the recovery of the status of nature from the position of mere object to the constitutive element of Substance, which shapes and further actualises its power. On the other, for Schelling the model of parallelism means the re-signification of thought, which considerably reduces its supremacy upon the material world. As result, the plane of reality is a unitary system, which is nuanced by complex confluences of thought and matter. Therefore, in Schellings view, Spinoza resolves the problem of the actual and ideal in a precise manner, defining these as functions of an all-inclusive being. As anticipated above, Schellings difficulty emerges when he connects this conception of the ontological equality between thought and extension to the preceding definition VI of the absolute infinity. The absolute mediated through the theory of parallelism assumes the meaning of the identity of contraries. In this way, Schelling interprets Spinozas claim of the unity of reality in terms of the identity of opposing dimensions, which in turn means the understanding of the difference between attributes characterised by negation. The importance of this interpretation resides in the implications this has upon Schellings own development of an ontology of the absolute. Bearing in mind this conception of Spinozas plane as identity, Schelling applies Spinozas notions of parallelism and absolute infinity to his unconditional Being. This attempt confronts Schelling with the problem of the cogency of the I and the object in relation to Being. More precisely, if Being means the identity of contraries, the problem raised by Schelling is whether the predicates of reality persevere to exist

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after its gesture of self-disclosure. Put differently, Beings act of self-disclosure is the realisation of the principle of identity, whereas the affirmation of its predicates involves the maintenance of differences and oppositions within the realm of the absolute. Thus, the problem arises as to whether the modes of being and Being can coexist. For Schelling, the actualisation of absolute identity implies directly the annihilation of both the I and the object. It is in this moment that Schellings ontology of Identity enters the threshold of the dark night of the absolute, as Hegel later will comment. This nihilist tension coincides also with his impasse in fully following the arguments of the Ethics. Spinozas theory of Substance presents to Schelling the question of thinking the absolute as affirmation of both the One and its parts, which greatly exceeds the identity of contraries. As we have seen, for Spinoza absolute infinity means the multiplicity of its attributes, which are existences. Therefore, the absolute involves the notion of actuality. The inclusion of the concept of the actual within the realm of the absolute indicates the difference between this model of the absolute with that of Schelling own formulation of absolute identity. If absolute infinity is the actuality of the attributes, this cannot be thought as indifferent or neutral to its predicates. For the Ethics, absolute infinity emerges from the actuality and multiplicity of its predicates. In this light, thought and extension form the cogency of the absolute and not vice versa. It follows that the formula of parallelism presented in part II of the Ethics does not delineate the gesture of disseminating singularities within the absolute but rather its actualisation. In Schelling, instead, the path of Being towards the absolute proceeds through the dissolution of all determinations of thought and nature within the unconditional domain of Being. This inevitably leads him to postulate the primacy of Being over its predicates, which consequently acquire a marginal role.9 Although Schelling definition of the absolute is not transcendent to both nature and thought, nevertheless this is viewed as different to both dimensions. As result, in order to maintain the absolute as identity of contrary terms, Schelling is drawn to
9

For different and thoughtful readings of Schellings form of nihilism as an ontology of pure activity, production and multiplicity, see particularly Toscano (2004: 106-124) and Zikek (1996: 11-91; 2004: 33-41).

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efface thought and extension. Given that the point of indifference is qualitatively different from its predicates, for Schelling, the union of the two sides of reality within one order means precisely the disappearance of subject and object. In this way, Schelling re-formulates Spinozas claim of the correspondence between nature and God as the annihilation of all determinations that reality might assume. Whilst Spinozas notion of the positive absolute depends on the multiplicity of the attributes, Schellings concept of absolute identity poses itself through the negation of its specifications. As he declares,
Hence, if I posit all in the subject, I thus deny all of the object. Absolute causality in me does away with all objective causality as objective for me. In widening the limits of my world, I narrow those of the objective world. If my world as mine no longer had any limits, then all objective causality as such would be annihilated for me. I should be absolute. In criticism, my vocation is to strive for immutable selfhood, unconditional freedom, unlimited activity. Be! Is the supreme demand of criticism. (Schelling, 1980: 192)

In this advocacy of nihilism, Spinoza, certainly, is no longer present. However, Schellings nihilistic gesture raises crucial themes. As anticipated above, in his reading of the Ethics Schelling encounters the problem of the conceptualisation of the absolute as pure actuality, multiplicity and production. Specifically, in the definition of the absolute Spinoza warns his reader that it is the heterogeneity of the attributes that lies at the very heart of absolute infinity. Schelling, we have seen, follows Spinoza on the necessity of posing reality as a unity of the actual and the ideal. For Schelling the disclosure of Being is based on the absolute identity of contraries, through which singular potentialities are differentiated. However, moving forwards Spinozas theory of parallelism, Schelling is drawn to the annihilation of every form of subjectivity. The question arises as whether it is Spinozas definition of the absolute that leads one inevitably to suppress the multiplicity of reality. In other words, the problem is whether or not Schellings form of nihilism derives from his alliance with Spinoza. In the Ethics, we have analysed how the actuality of the attributes poses the absolute infinity of Substance. Thus, this notion of the absolute assigns to the attributes the

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role of constituting Substance as absolute infinity. Given the central status of the attributes, the realisation of the absolute does not entail the loss of the modes of Being. Instead, such realisation corresponds to the further enhancement of the attributes (Macherey, 1997: 71-85; Deleuze, 1992: 41-82). As attributes are existences and not autonomous essences, the absolute is a pure actuality. Importantly, this actuality is not an undifferentiated reality neither is it a uniform identity, but rather an extremely heterogeneous and multiple plane. In this sense, Spinozas claim of the parallelism between nature and God, thought and extension is not the identity and consequent annihilation of these within the all-invasive Being as Schelling suggests. By contrast, this formula of parallelism indicates the multiple ways in which absolute infinity is incessantly nuanced by a variety of heterogeneous beings. Assuming that there is no suppression, even potential, of reality and individualities behind the Ethics, the question still remains, how does Schelling pass from the Spinozian absolute to the model of nihilism? The mains problems of Schellings engagement with Spinoza derive from two fundamental themes, I would argue, which draw Schelling towards the nihilist thesis. These are, firstly, the argument of the commencement of reality, which involves the notion of the disclosure of Being, whether from the concept, matter or selfgeneration; and secondly, the question of the meaning given by Schelling to the concept of difference, which characterises the relation between singularities. Schelling considers Spinozas notion of the absolute from the perspective of positive infinity. This implies the undervaluation of the status of the attributes, upon which the cogency of the absolute relies. In this light, Schelling is persuaded that Spinozas absolute Substance means an all-inclusive Being, which embodies the various determinations of reality. This leads him to conceive Substance greater than its parts, which in turn involves its detachment from the attributes. For Schelling, Spinoza postulates the commencement of reality from a unitary Being, which unifies its predicates within an undifferentiated and positive infinity. Schelling, thus, deduces that the theory of the absolute proposed in the Ethics is the affirmation of the principle of identity. Schellings attention to the aspect of positive infinity has a further implication. This refers to his understanding of the absolute as the disclosure

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of Being to the world, which crucially involves the affirmation of the difference, temporal, spatial and ontological, between this and the attributes. As result, Spinozas theory of Substance will necessarily mean a static system, within which the modes of being such as matter and thought acquire a marginal role. By contrast, if we begin our inquiry upon Spinozas formula of the absolute from the explanation to definition VI, we discover that the absolute is not the disclosure of Being to world; and also the absolute dimension of Substance does not derive from a principle of identity, but instead from the conditions of multiplicity and heterogeneity of its attributes. This allows Spinoza to consider Substance as quadisclosed, which means already unfolded through and within its predicates. To put this in a more Schellingean manner, we might say, in the Ethics it is the absolute God that is scattered in all its attributes and not these in the boundless territory of Substance. The conception of the absolute as already disclosed through its determinations (mode and attributes) indicates a plane nuanced by a variety of thoughts, actions, meanings and bodies, which suggests the idea of Substance as essentially dynamic, multiple and complex. The theme of the centrality of attributes and modes within the realm of absolute infinity leads our discussion to the second difficulty experienced by Schelling in his assimilation of the Ethics. This refers to the ways in which Schelling conceives the difference between attributes, which affects his understanding of Spinozas model of parallelism and also Schellings own nihilist position. Schelling thinks the difference between predicates of Being characterised by opposition. Although singularities equally refer to one and absolute principle, for Schelling these are opposing aspects of reality. In this way, the couples of the actual and the ideal, or the I and the object are contrary terms, which fulfil different functions within the becoming of Being. It is for this reason, in my view, that the self-disclosure of Being, which corresponds to the affirmation of the principle of identity, inevitably implies the annihilation of all its predicates. More accurately, given that singularities are viewed as contrary elements and Being is the identity of contraries, the realisation of the absolute identity implies the effacement of any form of individuality. For the

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attention addressed to Being, in the period of the Philosophy of Identity, Schelling advances nihilist claims, which signal his passage from a certain Spinozianmaterialist discourse towards a more dialectical and transcendental approach. In the mature work of The Age of the World, Schellings return to the Idealist model initiated in the Philosophy of Identity is definitely realised. In this writing Schelling focuses to the genesis, anatomy and becoming of universe. Although Schellings interest is directed not to the meaning of Being, but the forces that govern the world, this expresses the definitive consolidation of his vision of all the modes of reality as contrary elements. In the case of The Age of the world, Schelling envisages the mechanism, from which the world emerges, characterised by opposing phases. It is through this paradigm of difference that Schelling reads the Ethics, especially the theory of parallelism between thought and matter. For him, consequently Spinozas definitions of the attributes and modes, thought and extension proceed through opposing movements, which fragment the unity of absolute reality. In this light, Schelling interprets the formula of parallelism as the dispersion of differences between predicates of Being within the positive infinity of Substance. It follows that Spinozas conception of the absolute developed in the absence of negation through Schellings eyes becomes the dissolution of all determinations of matter and thought within an all-inclusive Being. If this portrait of Spinozas category of the absolute fully meets Schellings search for a solid principle of absolute identity, in the conclusive stages of his intellectual path Spinozas system of reality will be defined as lost in its immobility. Having assumed the dynamics between attributes in the Ethics shaped by opposing elements, the emergence of the philosophical interest in the status of individuality and the becoming of the world draws Schelling necessarily towards the dismissal of Spinozas ontology as the effacement of singularities and the cogency of the world. As we will analyse in more details in chapter II, Spinoza addresses the theme of the difference between attributes and modes of Substance from an alternative perspective. In the Ethics, Spinoza tells us that particularities (attributes and modes) have a common essence, which is the one of Substance. These actualise the essence

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of God-nature. Given that singularities do not differ from one another by opposing essences, Spinoza puts forward the idea of a modal difference. By a modal difference Spinoza mainly means that each being expresses a distinct mode of reality. Singularities are formed through a specific confluence of various levels of reality, which are actual, heterogeneous and fundamentally multiple. This conception of difference allows Spinoza to overcome the problem of the absolute essence of Substance and the heterogeneity of attributes and modes. As particulars are not opposed reciprocally, the affirmation of absolute identity does not imply their effacement, but rather the further expansion of the grade of complexity (multiplicity) of the real. Taking into account these arguments, we might raise some more general reflections upon the encounter between Schelling and Spinoza. In the history of the affirmation of Spinozas philosophy, Schelling represents undeniably a crucial reader of the Ethics. From his praise to the refusal of Spinozas ontology, Schelling brings to light important themes developed through the propositions of the Ethics. Schelling discovers the great complexity and originality of Spinozas plane of reality, which exceeds both the determinist mechanism supposed by the thinkers of the Enlightenment and the subjective account acclaimed within the circle of Romantic philosophers. Schellings engagement with Spinoza brings about the discovery of Spinozas theory of absolute Substance as a complex system, which introduces a new awareness of the meaning and potentialities of reality. Spinoza presents to the young Schelling, concerned with the re-foundation of the paradigm of the absolute identity, an absolute infinity, which does not proceed through a linear mechanism of cause and effect, or an irrational and divine force. It is, instead, an expansive source of production, which grounds and further develops singularities such as attributes and modes. Schelling tells us that definition VI of part I of the Ethics unveils a vision of Being as a pure activity, which articulates an innovative response to the question of the disclosure of Being. The originality of Spinozas philosophical gesture resides in his account of the commencement of reality not as the move of the I or the object but instead the principle of identity. This principle of identity, in Schellings view, unifies contrary predicates of Being, overcoming in this way the dilemma between

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the actual and the ideal. Schelling rightly observes that Spinoza gives equal importance to both sides of reality, which implies a quite different understanding of the meaning and role of thought and matter. Therefore, the notion of absolute infinity offers to Schelling, in the phase of the Philosophy of Identity, fundamental theoretical instruments for constructing his ontology of the absolute. Following the logic of the Ethics, Schelling poses the genesis of reality not from the I or the object, the ideal or the actual, but instead from an independent basis, which embraces its predicates. This leads him to define the disclosure of Being as a self-disclosure, through which its affirmation coincides with the annihilation of all its parts. It is in this moment that Schelling begins moving away from Spinozas ontology and returns to an Idealist model. In order to examine the form of materialist ontology proposed by Spinoza, I think that Schellings progressive withdrawal from the Ethics acquires more significance than his alliance. The impasse of Schelling in fully assimilating Spinozas conception of the absolute indirectly opens up to the alternative meaning given to the notion of actuality by Spinoza. This refers to the constitution of the absolute as a multiple plane, which importantly does not embrace or unify the actual dimension of reality. By contrast, it is the actual itself, within which particulars are the constitutive elements of the absolute. This brings about the discovery of the the material world as a powerful place of transformation, heterogeneity and becoming. Developing further Schellings mature critique of Spinozas ontology, Hegel too will define the ontology espoused in the Ethics as meaningless system. Hegel undeniably represnts one of the most vehement denials of Spinozas philosophy, describing Spinozas notion of the absolute as an abyss. An inquiry into Hegels reading of the Ethics is crucial for determining the ways in which Spinoza introduces problems and alternative solutions within Hegels ontology of transcendence. Furthermore, the focus to Hegels reading of the Ethics might delineate the extent to which Spinozas theory of absolute Substance challenges the certainty of the Hegelian logic of dialectics. It is to this that I now turn.

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4. Hegel and the ban of the Ethics: The question of the absolute

Hegel personifies the main thesis of German Idealism, whose influence has dominated various areas of the history of thought from ontology, logics and epistemology to politics. Hegel systematises and further develops the dominant concerns of the German Idealist tradition of thought, moving forward, for example, the Fichetean theme of the power of the Subject and Schellings interest in the essence of nature. Specifically, Hegels inquiry is addressed to the re-foundation of the ontology of the absolute, which should articulate alternative responses to the questions of the meaning of subject, object, thought, matter and, more generally, the commencement of reality. In order to re-signify the paradigm of absolute Idealism, Hegel proposes the establishment of a system structured through a dialectical process, within which the ontological categories of transcendence, immanence, negation, identity, becoming and individuation acquire new meanings and roles. This refers to the vision of the genesis and development of reality traversed by the inescapable dialectical logic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis (aufgehoben), each of which expresses a specific moment of consciousness of the mind. Hegel locates human history precisely within these states of consciousness, within which the third one (synthesis) integrates and surpasses the first two. Hegels vision of history and human events inaugurates a new course of studying social phenomena of the past, individuality, art and politics, which has been largely assimilated by successive intellectual traditions. Even philosophies emerging as counter systems to the Hegelian model such as Marxist philosophy have adopted at least part of the dialectic method. Given the inheritance of numerous philosophical movements within the Hegelian paradigm, the study of Hegels system has represented an unavoidable step for analysing the origins of many contemporary waves of thought, attributing to his ideas an uncontested central position within the history of philosophy. Furthermore,

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the influence of Hegels arguments has impacted not only on later philosophers such as Marx, Adorno and Habermas but also on the understanding of previous thinkers such as Descartes and, over all, Spinoza. Hegel has offered a very rigorous exegesis of past philosophical models from the Ancient Greek period to the Modern age, whose re-reading has been pivotal for various successive scholars. Related particularly to Spinoza, Hegel launches one of the most fierce campaigns against the illusions of the Ethics, which had had an enormous resonance through the history of ideas (Macherey, 1979: 17-40). Hegels critique has been crucial for the affirmation of Spinozas thesis in many different ways. These refer, on the one hand, to the marginal position of the Ethics within the history of ideas derived from Hegels analysis. On the other, the vehemence of Hegels exegesis has favoured the growth of interest in Spinozas ontology from those philosophies, which were opposing the Idealist paradigm. In this light, Hegels refusal of Spinozas arguments has incidentally brought about the re-discovery of the great modernity of the Ethics especially in recent years. Given the multisided impact of Hegels interpretation of the Ethics, two questions immediately arise as what are the origins of his ban of Spinozas model and why such intensity? In order to examine these questions, a preliminary discussion of the general structure, claims and objectives of Hegels philosophy is essential. This will delineate the conceptual perspective, from which his critique of the Ethics emerges, and also the ways in which Spinoza becomes inevitably the disturbing interlocutor within the development of Hegels paradigm of absolute Idealism.

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Hegels paradigm of absolute Idealism10 Hegels ontological inquiry is characterised by two fundamental elements, around which his entire system is constructed. These are, firstly, a pervasive use of the dialectical logic and, secondly, the category of the absolute. The dialectical method directs the general organisation of his philosophy: the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. Similarly, the Phenomenology of Spirit, which is the introduction to the Science of Logic, follows rigorously the dialectical procedure. The adoption of dialectics responds to Hegels need for the re-foundation of philosophy as an objective and demonstrable science. The importance of Hegels use of the dialectics is that he extends the dialectical method from the epistemological sphere to ontology. In Hegels reformulation, dialectics does not only entail the possibility of developing true judgements, but also a more complex system of production of reality, from which history, art, religion and society derive. This delineates the path of thought towards the attainment of the Absolute Knowledge, within which contradictory terms (thesis and antithesis) are constitutive elements of a higher truth (Burbidge, 1993: 86-100; Forster, 1993: 130 170). In other words, Hegel envisages an ultimate cause beyond singular events, which explains the emergence of every historical phenomenon. It follows that the strategy of the mind is precisely its tension towards the absolute, better to become absolute truth. This implies a quite different understanding of the category of the absolute, which is not considered as the essence of Being or the moment of its disclosure to the world, instead, as the conclusive phase of more complex process. The absolute is the result, not the beginning, of the struggle of the mind for becoming truth. This idea of the absolute is the cornerstone of Hegels paradigm of Idealism (Beiser, 2005: 51-79). It is this conception of the absolute that lies at the very heart of Hegels refusal of Spinozas ontology. Before analysing Hegels
10

Taking into great consideration the complexity of the Phenomenology of Mind and differences between this and the Science of Logic, a discussion on Hegels philosophy as such is not the material of this section, rather our focus will be an analysis of Hegels critique of the Ethics. Hence, I will give a general account of Hegels system, including the main themes of both the Phenomenology of Mind and the Science of Logic.

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engagement with the Ethics, let us discuss in more detail his model of absolute Knowledge. Hegel offers a very innovative genealogy of the ontological and epistemological constitution of the Mind, which is articulated through conceptual phenomena (noumena). These express different degrees of consciousness, through which the Mind-Spirit progresses towards the attainment of self-consciousness: Absolute Knowledge. In this process, the Mind is not assumed as a static category, from which reality proceeds as past and other Idealist models supposed. For Hegel, the Mind is an extremely dynamic and powerful principle, which is the ground of movements, transformations and meanings. More accurately, the various levels of consciousness of the Mind activate new flowings of time, space, individualities and tension, which move forward the system of production of knowledge (Williams, 2001: 27-32). In this sense, Absolute Knowledge means the affirmation of the autonomy of the Mind from apparent constraints, and thereby the recognition of the external world as part of its generative power. In the Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel investigates the phases of consciousness of the Mind, whereas the analysis of Absolute Knowledge is the core of the Science of Logic. Following the thread of the Phenomenology of Mind, the rise of Spirit towards the Absolute Knowledge proceeds through moments of consciousness (broadly Subjective, Objective and Absolute Spirit), within which conceptual events favour the advancement of the Spirit towards self-consciousness. In each stage of consciousness, the Spirit or Mind incorporates and improves on the recognition of the contents of its knowledge, passing from the perception of the self to its certainty (Absolute Knowledge). The conceptual events structured through theoretical figures as the unhappy consciousness and historical societies from Greece to Hegels time delineate a particular equilibrium of the Mind, which is characterised by a diverse confluence of time and space, individualities and meaning. The role of these conceptual personae is the gradual unveiling of the essence of consciousness, through which the reconciliation of the unconscious Spirit with the objects of its knowledge is realised.

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Importantly, the process of consciousness is guided by an immanent reason (Hegel, 1967:115). Hegel gives a very innovative account of the rational mechanism, which traverses the production of knowledge. This refers to the recovery of the conception of the rational system from the Enlightenment tradition of thought, which has narrowed its meaning to a mere series of mechanical rules and predictable phenomena. Although Hegel shares with Enlightenment philosophers the conviction that reality is ordered through rationality and not through obscure forces, this is not a set of mechanical laws. For him, rationality derives not from science but from logic, precisely dialectics. This allows Hegel to consider rationality as an extremely productive and dynamic process, which is formed by expansive movements of transformation, tension and meaning. This understanding of the rational system is the ground of the genesis and becoming of the mind, which governs the passage from one state to the others (Hegel, 1967: 10-46). Following the dialectical system, these moments of consciousness are structured as terms of a syllogism, within which any category (thesis) posits and collapses in its contradiction (antithesis) that in turn seek a further category to generate a new mode of contradiction. The new concept, in this case the phase of consciousness, is more complex and reconciles these opposites by incorporating and expanding these. The dialectical synthesis between thesis and antithesis is the fundamental moment within Hegels Phenomenology. This is not a mere mathematical addition of thesis and antithesis, rather the first two terms of the syllogism are sublated (aufgehoben) into the third one. In this light, the disclosure of Being in its modes (Nature, Thought, State or History) is moulded though and within the opposition of subjective spirit (the unconscious moment) with its objective counterpart (the contents of its knowledge), within which consciousness, initially, discovers the object of its knowing as disagreeing with its constitution. Constituting the dialectical antithesis, the objective spirit is the crucial phase towards the attainment of self-consciousness. The objective spirit plays the pivotal role of revealing the real object of comprehension to the subjective mind,

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through which the latter passes from the condition of self-contemplation towards the meditation upon the objects of reality. This sets in motion a process, through which the subjective spirit begins with searching for the identity between its self-reflective knowledge with that of the Objective Spirit. It is precisely the moment of negation that opens up to the achievement of self-consciousness (aufgehoben). The recognition between the object of knowledge and the mind gives rise to the acquisition of the Absolute Knowledge. This is, thus, conceived as a dialectical synthesis, which succeeds by a sort of struggle between contrary conditions of Being. In this drama of syllogistic personae, nature is the embodiment of the objective knowledge, whose role is fundamental. It is the antithesis of the subjective mind, which opposes the one-sided thought of the mind with the contingency of the world. This is, thus, the negation of thought, through which the subjective mind, transcending its self-reflective consciousness, achieves a more complex state of knowledge. The new degree of knowledge attained by the mind derives from the subjective minds gesture of sublating the actuality of the world in the really created category of thought. Therefore, nature as the medium term is the ground, upon which Absolute Knowledge might be achieved (Hegel, 1967: 46-79). It is in this context that Hegels position becomes considerably controversial. If Hegel seems as giving a central position to nature as the embodiment of the real contents of knowledge, nevertheless this is the medium term of a dialectical triad, which has to be eclipsed within a further dimension. Therefore, two main questions immediately arise. Firstly, what is the very meaning of nature within Hegels model of Idealism? And secondly, given that nature is assumed as the medium term within the dialectical mechanism that has to be incorporated within a further category, the problem arises as regarding which elements of the world of pure actuality might persevere in the domain of the Absolute Knowledge, once it is reached? These themes of the status of nature and its relation to mind have nurtured a myriad of philosophical positions, each of which has proposed thoughtful explanations concerning the value of the Objective Spirit within

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Hegels philosophy. Without venturing into a detailed analysis of the debate upon Hegels philosophy of nature, for the purpose of this chapter, we need to consider the ways in which the notion of nature has been interpreted, and also the difficulties inherent within the dialectical method. Many post-Hegelian thinkers (for example Croce, Gentile, Adorno and Marcuse,) have claimed that objective spirit acquires a crucial position within the path of mind towards Absolute Knowledge, envisaging a powerful materialist component within the Idealist structure of Hegels thought. Given that the actual world holds on to the contents of absolute mind, nature plays a pivotal role within the thread of the Phenomenology. This refers to the attainment of self-consciousness, without which subjective mind would remain merely contemplative. In contrast with this materialist approach, post-modern thought has fiercely rejected the model of nature and, more generally, the ontology of the absolute proposed by Hegel. Developing further both Marx and Nietzsches anti-Idealist discourses, post-modern critique (Althusser, Deleuze, Foucault, Agamben recently) has pointed to the position of negativity given by Hegel to nature. This implies the effacement of the multiple potentialities embodied by the material world. As nature is the negative term within the Hegelian triad, this is not a constitutive element of the Absolute Knowledge; it is merely device of the mind. It simply mediates between self-reflective knowledge and the absolute, disclosing objects to the mind. This function of disclosure reality does not involve the production of knowledge, which inevitably leads to assume the superiority of the Ideal over the actual. This interpretation of Hegels notion of nature as a place of negativity has driven post-modern thought to cast doubts on the entire paradigm of Absolute Knowledge. The critique has been directed to the adoption of the dialectical method for the understanding of reality. The vision of the genesis and becoming of the mind developed through antithetical terms suggests that a certain logic of lack guides the system of reality, within which each element expresses a state of deprivation and dependency from its contrary counterpart and these in turn from the moment of synthesis. More accurately, the problem of Hegelian dialectics is that considered in

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themselves singularities lack autonomy, and need to be sublimated in a higher Being to acquire cogency. In this way, the commencement of reality expresses not the power of the I to produce the world but rather a gesture of poverty, from which the mind begins its journey towards the absolute. The realisation of Absolute Knowledge is thus the result of a series of negative movements, which culminates in the hegemony of the mind over singularities. Hegels concern with dialectics, postmodern thought has argued, introduces a philosophy of the negative, within which reality and any form of subjectivity are not shaped by expansive and powerful movements rather needs and oppositions. 11 Besides the different ways in which Hegels conception of nature has been viewed, these commonly have pointed out that his application of dialectics to the system of reality situates nature in a quite critical position. Furthermore, the dialectical method formed through determinate phases of thesis, antithesis and synthesis suggests the idea of the becoming of reality structured through a fixed process, within which unpredictable and unsuspected events are avoided. Hegels account of reality traversed by a dialectical mechanism implies necessarily the restraint of any possible excess of Being, which might arise from self-reflective consciousness or nature (Deleuze, 2004: 215-245; Badiou, 2005: 161-170). This conception of reality grounds Hegels exegesis of past and contemporary models of monism, which draws him to refute any ontology developed in the absence of negative dimensions. For the centrality given to the category of the absolute as positive infinity, in Hegels study of the history of philosophy Spinoza becomes an antipathetic figure. He reads the Ethics through the paradigm of dialectics, whose analysis will culminate in the ban of Spinozas philosophy as a form of acosmism. Hegels engagement with the Ethics has had strong influence within contemporary readings of Spinoza. Although all the possible refutations and explanations on his portrait of Spinoza are exhausted, there is still a consistent literatures utilising Spinozas philosophy, which relies heavily upon Hegels evaluation of the Ethics,
11

For an accurate analysis of the theory of negativity in the history of philosophy, see Coole (2000).

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particularly in relation to the theory of Substance. These, generally, refer to the shared conviction that Spinozas conception of Substance-nature implies a static vision of the world and the reduction of the role of the individual to the image of the Being.12 In order to re-situate the modernity of Spinozas materialist ontology within contemporary debate, a discussion of the relation between Hegel and Spinoza is of crucial importance. It is to the analysis of Hegel as reader of the Ethics that I now turn.

4.1 Hegels contra Spinoza: philosophy of the ideal versus ontology of the actual

Unlike Schellings engagement with Spinozas ontology of the absolute, the encounter between Hegel and Spinoza is not characterised by an initial praise of the Ethics followed by a retreat. By contrast, Hegels inquiry upon the Ethics is immediately marked out by a vehement refusal of its thesis. Hegels critique of Spinozas paradigm of monism might be grouped into three main aspects. Firstly, it is addressed to Spinozas Substance as an absolute and positive infinity. Hegels dismissal of the model of the absolute espoused in the Ethics brings to light the two modes of conceptualising the genesis and becoming of reality: the one of the commencement (Hegel) with the other of the actual (Spinoza). Whilst for Hegel reality begins with an act of poverty of the mind, from which its path towards the absolute commences, in Spinoza the absolute uncovers the abundance of the world and brings about the discovery of a system moulded through an excess of modes of beings, upon which the production of reality is developed. Secondly, Hegels aim is to refute Spinozas theory of parallelism as the identity of reality under different dimensions as thought and extension. This second critique is a
12

Badious analysis of the Ethics resembles the Hegelian definition of Spinozas ontology as a circular system (Badiou, 2005: 112-120). Although non Hegelian, I have found that even some analytic approaches to the Ethics, for example Curley (1998), concerning the immobility of Substance are, to some extent, rooted in Hegels critique. Ultimately, Yovel insists on the great similarity between Spinozas form of rationalism with that of Hegel, Yovel (1992b: 25-50); Della Rocca (2008) has strongly reiterated the definition of Spinozas ontology as great exponent of the principle of sufficient reason.

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direct consequence of the first one on the absolute. In Hegels view, the positive condition of the absolute infinity of Substance necessarily implies the identity of thought and extension. This examination of the theory of parallelism, as we will see, brings to light two conflicting methods of structuring ontology: as mentioned, Hegels system proceeds through dialectical states, the other through different movements and combinations of thoughts and bodies. Hegels critique of parallelism, then, moves to his third attack, that is, individuality. As result of his view of both the theory of parallelism and the absolute in terms of motionless and meaningless system of reality, the resulting constitution of the individual is, for Hegel, an empty and false category. For him, in the Ethics the status of individuality is entirely restrained by the all-inclusive Substance. In order to examine Hegels account of the Ethics, we need to re-draw attention to its main themes, around which his critique is constructed. As discussed before, Spinozas form of monism begins with his theory of the absolute. The category of the absolute grounds the formula of the parallelism between thought and extension, immanence, power, the multiplicity of attributes and modes and, more generally, the entire system of production of reality. Related particularly to Hegels reading of the Ethics, definition VI occupies a central position. This immediately confronts Hegel with an alternative mode of thinking the anatomy and becoming of reality. For Spinoza, the absolute is a positive and multiple Being, whose move of producing the world corresponds to the world itself. Unlike Hegels paradigm of the Absolute Knowledge, in Spinoza Substance is absolute, because it is not limited and opposed by any other Being such as nature and thought. Even its predicates (attributes) are not conceived as antithetical to Being but are inherent within its essence. More accurately, the multiplicity of the attributes forms the absolute dimension of Substance. In other words, Being is absolute, because it is shaped by an uncountable number of attributes, each of which expresses its power. As we have seen through Schellings reading of the Ethics, this implies the direct connection between the meaning of the absolute with those of multiplicity and actuality.

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Given that absolute infinity is an all-inclusive being, which is not prior or contrary to its parts, Spinoza locates the theme of the commencement of reality within the actuality of world. For him, the genesis of reality is developed through an immanent cause, from which singularities proceed. This leads him to conceive a self-organised system, within which the power of producing is contemporaneous with its products. The vision of reality as self-generated order brings Spinoza to dismiss the model of the superiority of the mind over matter, affirming instead the parallel structure of the two. The formula of parallelism between nature and God states the unity of reality under different dimensions (E. II, Prop. VII). This means that thought and matter are not contrary predicates of Being, but rather different modes of actualising its essence. As matter is not opposing or inferior to thought, considered in itself nature, is perfect (E. II, Def. IV). Hegels critique is mainly grounded on these propositions of the Ethics, which undeniably challenge his model of Absolute Knowledge. Hegels critique of the Ethics: a paradigm of acosmism Hegels study of the Ethics begins with the analysis of the method adopted by Spinoza for explaining his thesis. For Spinoza, the geometrical method better supports the ways in which the becoming of reality proceeds. In the Ethics, a rigorous sequence of geometrical propositions, definitions, axioms and postulates founds Spinozas ontology. Since the very beginning of the inquiry upon the Ethics, Hegel, thus, is confronted with an alternative mode of articulating ontological claims, which greatly differs from his logic. Whilst Hegels ontology follows the rules of Aristotelian syllogism, the Spinozian one adheres to Euclidean principles. 13 As discussed before, in Hegel, the theme of the method does not respond to a mere style of espousing philosophical claims, but rather this is philosophical itself. This allows the rational development of Being into its modes of consciousness. Similarly to Hegel, for Spinoza the method is crucial for the foundation of philosophy. In contrast with Hegel, however, Spinoza considers Aristotelian logic as lacking rigor (EP. 56), hence, he decides in favour of the Euclidean system. The geometrical
13

I will give greater weight to the question of the geometrical method in the following chapter.

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method of the Ethics responds to a precise intent of Spinoza, namely his demand for an alternative conceptual mechanism, which should reflect the actuality, multiplicity and dynamism of reality. For the procedure adopted in geometry, this offers the possibility of establishing a theory of Being and reality through a non fixed structure, which allows for changes, transformation and movements. In the Ethics, each definition, axiom and proposition is a new concept deduced from the previous ones, which greatly exceeds its initial theoretical assumptions, notably without contradicting or sublating them. If we look at the succession of definitions and propositions on the theory of God, for example, from the definition VI of the absolute to proposition XXXIV of the power of God, we might observe a progressive expansion and differentiation of the constitution of Substance, within which each term proceeds necessarily from the previous assumptions and, at the same time, goes beyond them. Spinozas proposition of the essence of God as power, for example, is a new category of thought, which overflows the definition of the absolute infinity of Substance, without searching for the mediation of a contradictory term. This organisation of ontology as a geometrical treatise opens up directly to the first objection of Hegel. Hegel sustains that geometry and, more generally, mathematics do not offer adequate categories of thought. The geometrical method assumes without demonstrating crucial issues such as the definitions of Substance, thought, nature, attribute and infinity (Hegel, 1955: 263). The exposition of fundamental categories as geometrical theorems is fundamentally limited in form:
[] the difficulty which presents is due partly to the limitations of the method in which Spinoza presents his thoughts, and partly to his narrow range of ideas, which causes him in an unsatisfactory way to pass over important points of view and cardinal questions . (Hegel, 1955: 256)

The passage above, in my analysis, signals the beginning of Hegels difficulty in reading the thesis of the Ethics. This refers not to the critique of the geometrical method itself, but rather to the mode in which he responds to Spinozas use of geometry in ontology. Hegel reacts to the complexity of the structure of the Ethics by dismissing entirely its strategy. Hegel seemingly ignores the ways in which

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Spinozas treatment of ontological themes as propositions, axioms and postulates discloses a distinctive plan (Macherey,1997: 43-94). As aforementioned, in the Ethics propositions, definitions and postulates do not assume as indemonstrable truths notions of God, Being, singularities and nature, instead their role is to expand these concepts. Spinoza presents to Hegel an alternative model of conceptualising Being and the becoming of reality, which follows a logic of expansive movements. This crucially articulates important categories of thought such as absolute, immanence and matter in the absence of the dialectical play between thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The question of method, for our discourse, is central. This prepares the terrain to Hegels fundamental critique of the Ethics, which is the paradigm of the absolute proposed by Spinoza. Hegels campaign against the thesis of Spinozas philosophy is mainly centred on the definition of Substance as an absolute and positive being, which is formed by infinite predicates. It is in this context that Spinozas notion of the absolute becomes the philosophical question par excellence. Commenting with the definition VI of the absolute espoused in part I of the Ethics, Hegel draws attention to the positive anatomy of Being that emerges from this definition. He observes that Spinozas account of the absolute supports a different paradigm of reality, which does not require the presence of negative phases and beings for differentiating its essence. In the Ethics, Hegel discovers a theory of Substance, which overcomes the question of the commencement of reality. In Spinoza, Substance is a perfect circle, Hegel explains, which means the absence of any gesture of disclosure (Hegel 1955: 263). As discussed above, the Ethics begins with the actuality of the infinite attributes of Substance, through which Substance passes from the condition of pure virtuality to actuality (Macherey, 1997: 74-84).14 Beside Spinozas disregard for the commencement of reality, I would argue, the main difficulty encountered by Hegel does not refer to the definition of the absolute itself, but rather its resulting explanation. It is the positive status of absolute infinity
14

I follow here Deleuzes general distinction between the virtual and the actual. For Deleuze virtual is not opposed to reality, but simply to the actual (Deleuze, 2004: 208-209; see also Delanda, 2002: 3041).

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that lies at the very basis of Hegels engagement with the Ethics. For Spinoza, the actuality and multiplicity of the attributes form the realm of the absolute. In turn, these are not conceived as external and contraries to Substance, but rather inherent within Being. As every element of reality is part of Substance, Spinoza deduces the positive character of the absolute, within which the function of its predicates is that of expanding and not negating its essence. Hegel reads in Spinozas account of the absolute as positive infinity the affirmation of the principle of identity. More accurately, Hegel understands Spinozas gesture of including the attributes within the domain of the absolute as the identity between Being and its predicates. In this way, Hegel argues that Spinoza deduces the notion of the absolute from the principle of identity, which is an empty category of thought. As he states:
To consider any specific fact as it is in the Absolute, consists here in nothing else than saying about it, while it is now doubtless spoken of as something specific, yet in the Absolute, in the abstract identity A=A, there is no such thing at all, for everything is there all one. (Hegel, 1967: 79)

In Hegels view, the identity between Being and its modes expresses the unconscious moment of spirit. This cannot be assumed, we have seen, as the element of the absolute essence of Being. For this, Hegel concludes that Spinozas conception of Substance merely describes an initial moment of Being, which corresponds to the self-reflective condition. It is in this context that Hegel alters the Ethics or, at least, ignores certain important notions. Spinoza describes Substance unfolding through its attributes and modes (E. I, Prop. XI). Further, he rejects the ontological model of the plurality of essence within reality, which assigns an independent essence to every being. By contrast, Spinoza sustains the multiplicity of existence under a common generative principle, which is the power of God. It follows that attributes and modes have to be thought as pure actuality, which implies the refusal of ideal elements within the constitution of reality (Macherey, 1997: 74-75; Deleuze, 1992: 41-82). Spinozas focus to the actuality of attributes and modes is crucial for determining his ontology of the absolute.

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As Spinoza deduces the positive and absolute infinity of God from the attributes and these are actuality, the notion of the absolute involves a more complex meaning, which greatly exceeds the principle of identity claimed by Hegel. As anticipated above, the absolute is the actuality of the world, which is multiple and contingent. If the absolute means actuality, this immediately implies the denial of the presence of the ideal dimension within the realm of Being, which transcends and directs the becoming of the world. The incompatibility between Hegel and Spinoza on the theme of the absolute becomes more intense, when Spinoza in part II of the Ethics fiercely states the form of parallelism between nature and God. The formula of the parallelism discloses more clearly Spinozas distinctive ontological position, which is the affirmation of immanence and thereby the dismissal of transcendence. This constitutes the core of Hegels ban of the Ethics. From the formula of parallelism, Spinoza tells his reader the order and connection of ideas is the same with the order and connection of things (E.II, Prop. VII). By this, Spinoza does not mean that nature is thought neither thought is nature. Differently, proposition VII involves an innovative account of the relation between matter and thought. Spinoza states that matter is not the object of the mind, and the sensible world is not the source of thought. Both cases would imply a form of spiritualisation of nature and materialisation of thought, which in turn would reestablish the primacy of one element upon the other. By contrast, Spinoza aims to develop an alternative mode of thinking the difference between the two. This refers to the notion of difference based not through genres and essences, which would lead to the constitution of a hierarchic structure of reality. Rather, Spinoza forwards the idea of a modal difference between attributes. Modal difference means that each being expresses a diverse degree of reality, which is a distinct combination of elements. This notion of difference has a direct impact upon the general structure of reality. The theory of parallelism centred the modal differences between attributes resituates thought and matter within the domain of the actual. It involves that both categories mean actuality, which directly implies the denial of the dimension of the

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Ideal from ontology. The becoming of reality or Being, consequently, follows a different path. As we will further examine in chapter II, Spinozas move against Idealism brings about the rediscovery of the notion of immanence as unavoidable condition of actuality. In this light, the centrality given to the notion of actuality and the resulting effacement of the category of the Ideal inevitably sets Spinozas ontology aside from the paradigm of Idealism, which claims the authority of the ideal over the actual. More accurately, Spinozas gesture of re-establishing the cogency of the actual implies not only the dismissal of the ideal, but also the refusal of the validity of transcendence as a defensible principle of reality. In his reading of the Ethics, Hegel fully understands the impossibility of including Spinozas philosophy within the Idealist tradition of thought. Embedded in the logic of the hegemonic status of the transcendental I, Hegel can merely recognise the formula of parallelism as a further argument added by Spinoza for supporting the principle of identity, which forms the category of the absolute. In this way, Hegel is drawn to conceive Spinozas gesture of thinking the absolute not as an actual and multiple plane but the affirmation of the subjective status of Substance. Given the absence of higher and contradictory elements within the domain of Substance, Hegel concludes that the absolute is an empty and static system (Hegel, 1955: 261). In his preface to the Phenomenology, referring to both Spinoza and Schellings systems Hegel defines these conceptions of the absolute as follows (Beiser, 1993: 7):
The need to think of the Absolute as subject, has led men to make use of statements like God is the eternal, the moral order of the world, or love etc. In such prepositions the truth is just barely stated to be the Subject, but not set forth as the process of reflectively mediating itself with itself. In a preposition of that kind we begin with the world God. By itself, this is a meaningless sound, a mere name; the predicate says afterwards what it is, gives it content and meaning: the empty beginning becomes real knowledge only when we thus get to the end of the statement. []. Yet at the same time this acceptance of the Absolute as Subject is merely anticipated, not really affirmed. []. The anticipation that the Absolute is subject is therefore not merely not the realisation of this conception; it even makes realisation impossible. For it makes out the notion to be a static point, while its actual reality is self-movement, self-activity. (Hegel, 1967: 84)

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This extract from the Phenomenology greatly exemplifies, in my view, Hegels impasse in conceptualising Spinozas vision of the absolute as pure actuality. Specifically, Hegels definition of the absolute as result of the principle of the identity brings about the discovery of the limits of his theoretical paradigm in determining the strategy of the Ethics. This refers to the difficulty in thinking reality beyond the dialectical mechanism, which calls for a transcendent principle beyond reality. Spinoza presents to Hegel an ontology of the actual, which opposes the logic of the dialectical divide with a modal difference, the expectation of the absolute synthesis with the concrete abundance and multiplicity of reality. Hegel, I would argue, intuits the challenge that emerges from Spinozas conception of the absolute plane as actuality, which reveals the nonessential value of the notions of transcendence, the ideal and negation. In order to impede a possible rise of Spinozas ontology and thereby the decline of the Idealist thought, Hegel responds to the thesis of the Ethics by ignoring entirely its founding claim, which is the concept of the actual world as productive system of various heterogeneity. Hegel omits the vision of actuality as abundance and excess of movements, tension and transformation. In this context, his critique passes from a denial of the principles of the Ethics to a defence from the disastrous consequences that might derive from the realisation of the ontology of the actual. This refers to the conclusions he draws from Spinozas model of the absolute. For Hegel, the implications of Spinozas theory of absolute Substance, which poses reality in the absence of the negative, means the annihilation of the cogency of the world. As Hegel claims
But if Spinoza is called an atheist for the sole reason that he does not distinguish God from the world, it is a misuse of the term. Spinozism might really just as well or even better have to be termed Acosmism, since according to its teaching it is not the world, finite existence, the universe, that reality and permanency are to be ascribed, but rather to God alone as the substantial. []. The world has no true reality, and all this that we know as the world has been cast into the abyss of the one identity (Hegel, 1955: 281).

Similarly with Schelling, for Hegel Spinozas conception of Substance implies the dissolution of the world and all singular beings within the abyss of the absolute

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identity. More strongly than Schellings critique, Hegel understands the absolute Being explained in the Ethics as the constitution of a theory of the subject, through which the finite existences are emptied of all their meanings and potentials. Hegels verdict on the Ethics is, thus, extremely severe. As stated in the passage above, for Hegel Spinozas ontology of the absolute denotes a paradigm of acosmism, which literally means the non-existence (indicated by the initial a) of the world (cosmos). Taking into account these arguments, we might draw some more general reflections upon the problematic dialogue between Hegel and Spinoza. Through Hegels analysis, impasse and final verdict upon Spinozas theses of Substance and nature, we have discovered the complex anatomy of reality that emerges from the category of the absolute, which opens new avenues for non-Idealist conceptions of matter and thought. The power of Spinozas philosophical gesture resides in the withdrawal of thought from the domain of the ideal to the realm of the actual. In turn, this implies the reinstatement of the autonomy of the meaning of the actual from the ideal. The re-evaluation of the actual does not lead Spinoza to support any rational and empiricist positions, which considers the world ordered though mechanical rules; either this brings Spinoza to transfer the characteristics of the ideal within the actual, becoming a philosophy of the ideal in all but in name. By contrast, Spinoza gives a very complex account of actuality, which becomes a place of transformation, multiplicity, tensions and movements. It is the notion of the absolute as positive and multiple Being that poses the actuality of the world as the only condition of the genesis and becoming of reality. Specifically, the definition of the absolute discloses the conception of the actual as an extremely abundant, multiple and productive plane. The understanding of this view of the actual is crucial for determining the alternative model of materialism proposed by Spinoza, and the extent to which this might offer cogent arguments for contemporary thought. Hegels impasse, I argue, in following the coherence of the arguments of the Ethics fully exemplifies the great modernity of Spinozas materialist ontology. It is for this reason that a return to Hegels critique of Spinoza has been imperative. Hegels campaign against the illusion of the Ethics has brought about the discovery of

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Spinozas ontology of the actual, which poses itself as powerful antagonist of the Idealist tradition of thought. As we will see in the following chapters, Spinoza proposes a model of materialism structured through movements of composition and decomposition of multiple existences, which re-signifies entirely the traditional divide between organic and non organic matter. Specifically, in the next chapter, the question, I investigate, concerns how Spinozas account of the absolute as pure plane of actuality can be thought as a system of production. In other words, having excluded the hegemony of thought and the transcendence of Substance from Spinozas ontology, the problem is the understanding of the ways in which the world, producing itself, generates forces, singularities, thoughts and bodies. It is to a consideration of this theme that I will now turn.

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Chapter II Spinozas ontology of the actual: The power of nature

From the necessity of the divine nature there must follows infinite things in infinite ways. (E. I, prop. XVI)

Introduction

In chapter I, I examined Spinozas ontology of the absolute, and argued that this not a form of rationalism, pantheism and acosmism. It introduces, instead, a more extensive account of the notion of the actual, which re-signifies entirely the meaning of the concrete and, more generally, reality. Spinozas conception of the material world is centred on his denials of transcendence and the commencement of reality. For him, the emergence of reality does not derive from an obscure and transcendent archetype, which suddenly creates the world. This would imply a return to a form of agency and logic of telos. By contrast, Spinoza claims that reality is produced immanently, which means the vision of nature as pure activity and self-organised system. Furthermore, Spinoza enriches the notion of immanence with the concept of power and the formula of parallelism, through which thought is re-positioned within the domain of the actual. In turn, as the embodiment of Substance, the actual expresses the power of thinking, acting and existing. Spinozas thesis of the actuality of world as a powerful and self-generated order raises crucial questions. Firstly, these refer to the concept of actuality itself assumed by Spinoza. The problem is how the vision of the world as activity implies directly the function of producing. Put differently, in chapter I, we have seen, for example, that Schellings move of thinking the absolute as an unconditional source of activity leads him to annihilate the world and all its predicates within the point of indifference. In this way, we have learnt that taken in itself, absolute Being, however

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powerful, is not productive. Similarly, Spinozas ontology of the absolute is constructed around the notion of power as the very essence of Substance. Thus, the problem is how and whether Spinozas thesis of the absolute is directly related to the meaning of production. Secondly, the difficulty presented by Spinozas plane of absolute reality concerns the status of its predicates. Given that nature is an allinclusive being, the question is the extent to which particular beings once produced are not immediately incorporated within the boundless realm of the absolute. This brings us directly to question the meaning attributed to immanence by Spinoza. If immanence implies the constitution of nature as self-organised order, this might suggest the vision of nature as an organism, which is situated above individuals. Therefore, the difficulty is whether the thesis of immanence involves the affirmation of singularities rather than their dispersion. This chapter engages these issues. Specifically, the discussion draws upon the system of production delineated in the Ethics. In order to investigate these problematic aspects of Spinozas ontology, the analysis will be preceded by a discussion regarding his presence within twentiethcentury philosophy, and will consider some of the ways in which this has inaugurated a different method of reading the Ethics and the political Treatises. The reconsideration of certain Spinozas claims about nature, Substance, affectivity and politics offered by twentieth-century thought is central to determining the richness of his system of production of reality and, more generally, his materialist ontology, to which the present study is largely indebted. This refers not to the definition of the materialist foundation of Spinozas ideas but the originality of his model of materialism, which differs greatly from other seventeenth-century materialist conceptions such as the Cartesian and Hobbesian paradigms. By contrast, postmodern investigations have brought about the discovery of the complexity of Spinozas materialism, which is mainly centred on the recovery of the meaning of materiality. Thus, body, contingency and actuality become recognised in Spinozas writings as powerful sources of thoughts, individuals and meanings.

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In this light, in the first section of the chapter, the focus is directed to twentiethcentury philosophys engagement with Spinoza, highlighting the origins and characteristic of its interest in the Ethics and the political Treatises. The attention is given to the ways in which thinkers such as Balibar, Matheron, Tosel, Deleuze, Macherey, Negri and Giancotti, following Althussers metaphor of the detour of Marx via Spinoza, have relocated the importance of Spinoza within contemporary thought. For the centrality given in this chapter to the themes of immanence, power and attributes the discussion draws particularly upon Deleuzes re-interpretation of the Ethics as a plane of immanence. Moving forward Deleuzes arguments, in the second part of the chapter, I investigate Spinozas plane of absolute immanence, and the ways in which this activates a system of production of reality. In order to examine the implications of Spinozas treatment of reality as a plane of immanence, the analysis of the geometrical method is one of fundamental importance. As anticipated in chapter I, this allows Spinoza to overcome the Aristotelian syllogism of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, and establish his theory of reality through a logic of expansive movements. It is for this reason that in the thread of the chapter the re-exposition of the role of the geometrical method within the Ethics is prior to the analysis of the system of production. This constitutes the central prerequisite for determining the development of Spinozas ontology of the actual. Following the geometrical structure of the Ethics, the arguments, I will develop through this chapter, concern that the relevance of Spinozas paradigm of materialism does not only refer to the dismissal of transcendence through the affirmation of the plane of immanence, but more importantly his idea of actuality as a complex process. Spinozas conception of absolute immanence is not only a plane, but a never-ending process of production, which is structured through a multiplicity of phases and, at the same time, a multiplicity of modes of being. In this sense, for Spinoza, nature is an open set nuanced by actuality and potentiality. An inquiry into Spinozas process of production is imperative. This constitutes the basis, upon which Spinozas theory of humankind, ethics and politics are founded and developed.

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Spinozas political reflections and the definition of the individual derive directly from his ontology of production.

1. Spinoza after Marx: Towards a dynamic materialistic ontology

The need for a materialist conception of philosophy, politics and society is not exclusively a demand of the present age. The importance of theorising a materialist philosophy has been generally a common concern in the history of philosophy. This interest mainly emerges from the denial of every philosophy of essence, logos, origin, telos, which would create and orient the world and individual actions. Thus, attention has been drawn to the investigation of the sensible universe through which thoughts, bodies, broadly any physical phenomena is grounded and developed. In this sense, the emergence of materialist explanations of the world and its phenomena run from the Ancient Greek philosophers as Heraclites, Democritus, Epicurus, passing through Bruno, Spinoza, Hume, Leibniz to Marx. As anticipated in the introduction of this work, Althussers preoccupations about the poverty of the twentieth-century paradigm of materialism occupy a central position within the development of contemporary materialist conceptions of philosophy, politics and history. These refer to the need to re-shape the meaning of the material field, and the multiple ways in which this produces thoughts, imaginations, actions and relations.15 The centrality of the sensible world comes to light not as place of mechanical rules or rational order, but rather as constitutive and productive power of existences (Althusser, 2006: 163-105). The focus of materialist philosophy should be addressed, Althusser suggests, upon the analysis of the active connections between the individuals and their milieu, through which infinite mixtures of thoughts and bodies are produced (Althusser, 1976: 126-132).

15

References to Althusser in this chapter do not consider his structuralist reading of Marx. Although the Spinozist components within his thought remain important, this is outside the purpose of the thesis.

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This emerging model of materialism questions the assumptions of a certain Marxist orthodoxy, which has explained the emergence of any form of subjectivity within the repetitive mechanism of the economic structure (the dependence of the superstructure upon the structure); and it also casts doubt on Marxs theory of materialism itself for narrowing the conception of the modes of production and the constitution of human beings to a dialectical correspondence or conflict between structure and superstructure. By contrast, reality progresses throughout a variety of unexpected events developed in the absence of contradiction. The expectation of the class struggle never comes to light, or at least, as Marx imagined. Thus, through the gap between Marxs materialist philosophy and the material world itself, it becomes crucial to articulate alternative questions shaped by, on the one side, the reality of human beings as unique combinations of materiality and imagination; on the other side, the necessity of looking through the structure of universe as a confluence of heterogeneous phenomena and not exclusively as struggles between forces.16 In order to look for different arguments for a materialist philosophy, Althusser suggests the return to Spinoza. Althusser proposes a detour of Marx via Spinoza (Althusser, 1976: 142) for a better understanding of the complexity of society after Marx. Spinoza offers materialist conceptions of reality and individuals, which examine how imaginations, bodies, rationality are combined and especially how they operate concretely. For Althusser, over all, Spinozas philosophy gives a thoughtful account of the role of imagination. The relevance of Spinozas theory of imagination, Althusser indicates, concerns how the sphere of imagination is investigated as aspect of ideology and mystification, and as the productive element of social cohesion (Althusser, 1976: 137).17 Althussers reflections give rise to a resurgence of interest in Spinoza as a materialist philosophy alternative to rationalist, pantheist and empiricist models. Although Althussers analysis of Spinozas philosophy did not go further, however he contributes to the recognition of the

16

Althusser in the later writings (1978-87) would refer to Epicuruss notions of clinamen and atoms, which derive from Heraclitess naturalist ontology, see Althusser (2006: 163-205). 17 On Althussers account of imagination, see particularly Williams (2001: 56-77).

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cogency of Spinozas thesis for the development of twentieth-century discourse

(Montag,

1999: XIII-XXI, 119-123).

The novelty of the twentieth-centurys engagement with Spinoza concerns not only the definition of Spinozas philosophy as form of materialism, which was already asserted by the Enlightenment philosophers. Rather, it is the approach to Spinozas writings that connotes the difference from past interpretations of his philosophy. In contrast with previous studies of Spinoza, which analyse his works separately, twentieth-century philosophy focuses to the continuity between Spinozas texts, which runs from his ontological discourses to the political Treatises. This brings about the discovery of a distinctive strategy, which traverses the entire Spinozas speculation. In Spinoza, ontology supports political theory and vice versa. It means that ontological thesis such as immanence, absolute, thought and matter have a direct impact upon political claims about democracy, sovereignty, civil and natural rights, and these further enrich ontological themes. The novelty of his philosophy resides on an indissoluble linkage between ontology and politics. This linkage between ontology and politics is the cornerstone of Spinozas paradigm of materialism. If Spinozas materialist model is constructed around the connection between ontology and politics, this means the rehabilitation of the authority of the ontological inquiry for developing materialist claims and also its autonomy from metaphysics, which has narrowed its meaning to formal proofs of the existence of Being. By contrast, for Spinoza, ontology becomes a science of the actual, which offers important categories of thought for investigating the richness of expression of the material world. In this way, specific metaphysical notions of immanence, absolute, multiplicity and difference become fundamental instrument for comprehending the anatomy of the world, upon which new conceptions of history, human being and society might be predicted.

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The Spinozist turn: Reading the Ethics in the Twentieth Century By 1960, the presence of Spinoza acquires a central position within the intellectual debate particularly in France. The attention is given to both Spinozas ontology and politics, and the ways in which his thought offers a more extensive account of human being, society and nature. This growth of interest in Spinoza emerges from a more general discontent maturated initially within the French academic atmosphere, which questioned the authority of the philosophies of Descartes, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. French contemporary philosophy contested the reduction of the spontaneity of human subjectivity within a rational structure or transcendental principle, which explains the formation of knowledge in terms of a one-sided relation between subject and object. This implies, on the one hand, the loss of the multiple factors, which generate thoughts such as desire, imagination and also relations. These express a more complex mechanism, which exceeds the fixity of both the Hegelian and the Cartesian structures and, over all, are not rational. On the other, the decrease of the status of the material world under the supremacy of a rational subject involves the dismissal of the multiple ways in which the world and subject are interconnected. Most significantly, the treatment of matter as an object ignores the multiform of the order of nature, which exceeds the divide between organic and non organic forms of life. Nature is an extremely dynamic process, which is traversed intensively by forces, movements and transformations. Our awareness of this, twentieth-century thought claims, is essential for re-thinking humankind, history, politics and society in a materialist way. 18 Without venturing into the disputes surrounding French thought during the twentieth century, for the purpose of this chapter, the importance of its reaction to dominant intellectual systems resides in the significant position ascribed to Spinoza. In order to escape the obscure rationality of the Cartesian paradigm, the messianic expectation of the Hegelian Absolute Knowledge, and also the repetitive movements of his

18

For an accurate account of the question of the subject within contemporary French philosophy, particularly in Althusser, Derrida, Foucault and Lacan, see Williams (2001).

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dialectics, Spinoza becomes a fundamental reference point of the past alongside Nietzsche and Marx. Following Althussers metaphor of the detour of Marx via Spinoza, the emerging readers of the Ethics such as Tosel (1994), Matheron (1988), Macherey (1979), Deleuze (1992, 1998) and Balibar (1995) not to mention the great contributions of Giancotti (1995) and Negri (1998) in Italy have commonly acclaimed Spinoza as a powerful antagonist of Descartes, Hobbes and the Idealist philosophies. Discussing Hegels critique of Spinoza, Macherey, for example, points out that Spinozas theory of Substance developed through positive and absolute infinity, the multiplicity of attributes, immanence and the formula of parallelism constituted a great challenge to Hegels dialectical ontology. As analysed in chapter I, this refers to a different mode of theorising the relations between individuals, the material forces of production, which operates in the absence of conflicts and negative phases (Macherey, 1979: 259-260). Furthermore, for the thinkers mentioned above, the turn to Spinozas philosophy signified the possibility of rescuing Marxist materialism from the negative logic of the dialectic and from certain scientific interpretations (Tosel, 1994; Montag, 1999: XI-XXI). Twentieth-century thought envisages in Spinozas thesis thoughtful conceptions of the world, humankind, affectivity and rationality, which combined with the themes of the political Treatises on the critique of the religious ideology, sovereignty and the role of the mass in politics might further enrich Marxist materialism and its philosophy of praxis. The significance of the twentieth-century philosophical gesture of describing Spinozas thought as a cogent anti-Hegelian model, and also positioning his thesis in the same line with the Western Marxist movement concerns, for our discourse, the affirmation of the autonomy of his thesis from Descartes, Hobbes and, more generally, the seventeenth-century metaphysical tradition. As aforementioned, traditionally, the study of Spinoza tended to ignore the connection of his ontological themes with the political ones. Whilst Spinozas ontology was associated with Cartesian philosophy, his political thought was assimilated to Thomas Hobbes. The inclusion of Spinozas ontological thesis within the Cartesian paradigm derived in

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part from his study of Descartes and the use of Cartesian vocabularies in the Ethics, but also for the strong Cartesian tradition in France, indicated above, to which Spinoza was inevitably associated. On the other hand, the assimilation of Spinozas political theory to that of Hobbes was motivated by the focus of both philosophers upon the notion of the contract as the origin of the civil society. 19 Concerning the affirmation of Spinozas philosophy as ontology of the actual, no one can deny that conspicuous part of recent interpretations are largely indebted to the analysis of the Ethics offered by Deleuze. Deleuze delineates a portrait of Spinoza, which strongly opposes Hegelian and analytic readings, disclosing how Spinozas ideas fully meet the demands of post-modernity. Although Deleuze did not develop a specific study of the political Treatises, nevertheless the power of his reflections reveals the mechanism through which Spinozas notions of immanence, absolute, power, body, thought and multiplicity are political in a materialist way. It is to the dialogue between Deleuze and Spinoza that I now turn. 1.1 Deleuze encounters Spinoza: The plane of immanence

Deleuze occupies a crucial position within twentieth-century philosophy, whose ideas reflect the change of the intellectual climate initiated in France. He takes a fundamental role within the general reaction against Idealist philosophy, existentialist ontology and theories of the subject, indicated above. Deleuzes denial of these established traditions is very incisive, which had a profound impact upon contemporary modes of thinking history, arts and politics. Without attempting to engage in a retrospective of Deleuzes multifaceted philosophical production, which is still a highly controversial issue among scholars, for the purpose of this work, we need to trace, at the very least, the intellectual
19

Spinoza assumes the origin of the body politic from a collective pact between men. For Hobbes, instead, the contract derives from an act of subjection of singular men to the authority of the Leviathan. However, for Negri and Balibar, the model of the social contact represents only a stage within the evolution of Spinozas political thought, which will be replaced by the theory of the consensus espoused in the later Political Treatise, see Balibar (1998) and Negri (1998). These themes of the contract and consensus will be fully investigated in chapters IV and V.

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origins of his form of materialism. These indicate the role of Spinoza within Deleuzes inquiry and consequently some of the ways in which the Ethics supports an alternative materialist strategy, which might be defensible in our contemporary society. In order to delineate Deleuzes engagement with the Ethics, in this section, the discussion draws particular attention to the early phases of his philosophical project, within which the presence of Spinoza acquires a distinct position. One of the fundamental themes that shape the beginning of Deleuzes speculation is a fierce critique of Hegels paradigm of Idealism. The Hegelian dialectical logic was enormously pervasive and dominated the study of the history of philosophy (the interpretations of Marx and Spinoza are exemplary in this regard), psychological and social investigations upon human behaviour, and the mode of thinking the evolution of the historical process. Given the omnipresence of Hegel within social and political theories and also philosophical principles, a reaction to his system meant not solely the opposition to the dominant culture, but also the establishment of a different paradigm of thought. As we have viewed in chapter I, Hegels form of Idealism is constructed around an inescapable dialectical mechanism, within which the mind progresses towards the achievement of Absolute Knowledge. In this process, the progressive acquisition of consciousness proceeds through the conflict between opposing terms such as the subjective and the objective aspects of the mind. In turn, these are sublated in a new category of thought, which incorporates and transcends the two phases. The attainment of the Absolute Knowledge is the ultimate result of a series of negative moments, which celebrates the hegemony of thought over matter, and, more generally, the supremacy of the ideal over the actual. This means that taken in itself, the material world is not a powerful source of concepts and transformations, which are instead prerogatives of the mind. In other words, Hegel reiterates more rigorously the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, which assumes nature as the lower genera and thereby contrary to thought. The Hegelian undervaluation of matter has further and more crucial implication. This refers to the status of the singular within Hegels Idealist structure. This theme of singularity involves the questions of the role of

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contingency, individual practises and thoughts within Hegelian dialectics. Considered in itself, the singular describes a state of lack, which acquires significance only within the higher project of the mind, the acquisition of the Absolute Knowledge. In this fashion, the rejection of Hegels philosophy implied not only the retheorisation of a specific field of knowledge such as ethics, politics and epistemology, but more importantly the refusal of the linearity and fixity of the Hegelian structure. The awareness of this brought to light the very challenge for twentieth-century thought, which was the re-foundation of the domain of philosophy itself. If Hegels model of Idealism has to be challenged, this was only possible through the theorisation of a radically alternative paradigm, which might overcome the limits of his thought. Deleuzes form of anti-Hegelianism constitutes one the most radical gestures of escaping Hegelian dialectics through the foundation of a really new plane of thought. Deleuze recognises that an anti-Hegelian philosophy has to re-draw exclusive attention to the actuality of the world, and recover matter from its status as lower genera. For Deleuze, the reinstatement of the cogency of nature does not mean the return to empiricist and rationalist theories, which rely heavily upon a non-organic vision of the world, and analyse its structure from the human standpoint. By contrast, Deleuzes move against Hegel and his heirs is the re-establishment of an alternative ontology, which re-connects the concept with matter. Deleuze proposes the foundation of an ontology of the actual, which might re-formulate the notions of existence, contingency, thought, difference and the singular. The foundation of this ontology of and upon the world is the basis of Deleuzes form of materialism. It is in this moment that the dialogue between Deleuze and Spinoza commences. Deleuze discovers in Spinoza a powerful antagonist of the Idealist tradition, whose philosophy offers important arguments for avoiding the Hegelian structure. Deleuze is fascinated by the absence of the negative within the entire system of the Ethics, which is developed through the affirmation of nature as a generative source of

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singularities, concepts, bodies and movements. For Deleuze, Spinozas philosophy is a reflection upon the actuality of the world articulated from and within the world itself. The originality of Deleuzes interpretation of Spinoza resides on the recognition of the material dimension of certain ontological concepts such as immanence, attribute, the absolute, power, body and affectivity, and also the ways in which these support a different political practice. The study of the Ethics characterises the early stages of Deleuzes philosophical career, in which he draws attention to the history of philosophy. He analyses respectively Bergson, Nietzsche, Spinoza and lately Leibniz; each of them expresses, in different ways, not only an anti-Hegelian position but also a completely different ontological system. Although Bergson, Nietzsche and Leibniz play equally an important role within the development of Deleuzes thought, his engagement with Spinoza is a distinctive one. Furthermore, this constitutes his doctoral thesis (together with Difference and Repetition), and culminated in the publication of Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (1968) followed by a second study Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (1970). However, Deleuzes inquiry upon the Ethics does not terminate with these two books. Rather, these delineate the beginning of an intense relation between the two philosophers. The figure of Spinoza passes from constituting an academic interest to an omnipresent interlocutor, now manifest now latent, with whom Deleuze inaugurates an intense and continuing dialogue. Even in the period of his collaboration with the psychoanalyst Guattari, the presence of Spinoza is situated somewhat between the two thinkers, raising questions and glimpsing solutions.20 Since Deleuzes explanation of Spinozas ontology has been a fundamental phase within the history of Spinozian philosophy, similarly Spinozas ontological concepts
20

Discussions surrounding Deleuzes engagement with Spinoza have been multisided. The main problem, which still divides to some extent Spinozist and Deleuzian scholars, arises as whether Deleuze forces the arguments of the Ethics in order to affirm his thesis; or rather it is Spinozas ontology that grounds fundamental Deleuzian notions such as difference, immanence, body and affectivity. Concerning these questions, see particularly Hardt (1993: IX-XV, 56-111), Macherey (1998: 117-124), Howie (2002) and Zizek (2004).

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of immanence, power, parallelism, body, difference have significantly been stimulating notions within the development of Deleuzes own philosophy. In What is Philosophy?, for example, which constitutes a sort of culmination of his philosophical milieu, Deleuze firmly renews his tribute to Spinoza, calling him the Christ of philosophers (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 60). Given the centrality of Spinoza within the evolution of Deleuzes materialist ontology and equally the significance of Deleuzes analysis for understanding the materialist strategy underneath the Ethics, a return to his re-exposition of the themes of the Ethics is imperative. Let us, then, flesh out Deleuzes reading of the Ethics. Spinoza through Deleuze: The affirmation of the actuality of the world The importance of Deleuzes reading of Spinoza concerns the exposition of Spinozas concepts of Substance, nature, modes and attribute as a constitutive elements of more complex system, which is fundamentally based on the recognition of the world as living body (Deleuze, 1988: 126-128). The awareness of this strategy expressed in the Ethics, Deleuze suggests, might offer thoughtful theoretical sources for the establishment of a contemporary materialist philosophy, opening novel possibilities for political practice and thought. Deleuzes focus is addressed, on the one side, to the theory of Substance, the role of the attribute, the absolute, the notion of immanence and the theory of parallelism; on the other side the question of body and three kinds of knowledge (imagination, rationality and intuitive science). In his reading of the Ethics, Deleuze returns, not accidentally, to the analysis of the same themes of the absolute, attributes, and the formula of parallelism, which Hegel vehemently condemned. The question of the absolute and the attributes of God, once again, become crucial, in order to examine Spinozas system. Unlike Hegel, Deleuze views Spinozas theory Substance structured through absolute infinity as the foundation of a materialist conception of ontology.

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In order to delineate the complexity of Spinozas form of materialism, Deleuze employs the theory of ontological expressionism. For Deleuze, this drives the entire system of the Ethics, explaining the relation between Being and its parts. Specifically, Deleuze states that Spinozas theory of Substance begins with actual existences through and solely through which, Being becomes real. Thus, there is not in the Ethics, Substance separated from its parts. Neither is Substance simply nature. In contrast, Spinozas notion of God-Nature discloses a self-organised and living system (the essence of God is power), which is constructed around the categories of the absolute, attributes, modes, the formula of the parallelism and immanence. Deleuze calls this system the plane of immanence (Deleuze 1988; 1992).21 Central to Deleuzes inquiry is the role of the attribute, which involves the ontological problem of the differentiation of Substance-nature. In turn, the analysis of theme of difference in Deleuze follows the status attributed by Spinoza to singularities. Deleuze discovers in Spinozas formulation of the attribute a distinct paradigm of difference, which is not structured through opposition between contrary substances. In contrast, Spinoza conceives the difference between attributes, modes and Substance as modal. For Spinoza, beings express different degrees of reality, which entails a distinct composition of movements, matter, thoughts and affectivity. As noted above, the role of the attribute is explained in definition VI of part I on the absolute. Deleuze presents an alternative analysis of the meaning of the absolute, which challenges the Hegelian interpretation. The theme of infinity is central for both Deleuze and Hegel in their respective studies of the Ethics. The chief difference between them emerges precisely from their approach to infinity. We need, then, to briefly return to Hegels definition of Spinozas ontology. In chapter I, we noted that Hegel denounced Spinozas definition of absolute infinity for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is an empty notion, because the absolute is deduced from the principle of identity, which is assumed as the initial phase of the disclosure of Being to the world and not the conclusive state of the realisation of the power of Substance. Secondly, for Hegel the absence of contrary elements within the
21

In a later writing Deleuze would define Spinozas plane of immanence as a plane of consistency (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 280-287).

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realm of the absolute implies a motionless system, which maintains Substance in a self-reflective position. Thirdly, as the absolute is a positive identity, this involves the inclusion of all its predicates within its essence. In Hegels re-reading, this indicates the effacement of the cogency of the world and all singularities within an all-embracing Being. In contrast with the Hegelian logic, Deleuzes approach to the category of absolute infinity follows an alternative strategy. He employs the argument of ontological expressionism as a key-reading for understanding the positive aspect of the absolute. In this way, Deleuze replaces the dialectical method of analysing the Ethics with that of expression.22 This recourse to the thesis of ontological expression is fundamental, and allows Deleuze to overcome the problem of the absence of negative moments within Spinozas absolute Substance. More importantly, it sheds light on the status of attributes and modes in relation to Being. Following the model of expressionism, Deleuze draws attention to every element of the Ethics, which is expressive (attributive) of something, without considering whether or not its status is negative. As Spinoza begins first with ascribing to the attribute the role of expressing the infinity of God (E.I, Def. VI), Deleuze focuses to the relation between Substance and attributes, which is explained in the definition of the absolute. Whilst for Hegel the main limit of Spinozas ontology was the absence of the negative, this becomes in Deleuzes inquiry the very power of the Ethics. Deleuze observes that the positive character of the absolute is constructed around a new ontology of difference. This replaces with the lesson of difference in itself two modes of thinking distinction, the numerical and the one in kinds. For Deleuze, this conception of difference grounds the notion of positive infinity, which resolves the difficulty of the coexistence between generality and singularity, eternity and contingency within the absolute plane.

22

Deleuzes theory of expression is based on a triad, where substance expresses itself, attributes are expressions, and essence is expressed, see Deleuze (1992: 27).

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In the Ethics, difference is understood, Deleuze claims, as modal, through which absolute infinity is actualised in its parts (E. I, prop. XV, Scholium). Put differently, the absolute cannot be distinguished both numerically and qualitatively; it must follow an alternative mechanism of differentiation. From definition VI of the absolute, Spinoza tells the reader that the absolute status of Substance derives from the infinite number of attributes that express its essence. In turn, by definition, attributes are real existences, which delineate modes of Being (E. I, prop. XV, Scholium). Given the centrality of the attributes, Deleuze concludes that the relation between Being and its parts is structured through the rules of the modal difference, which is crucially real. It is real because attributes are existences, which actualise the essence of God. It is also modal because they express a specific level of reality. For Deleuze, Spinozas account of difference has a further implication. The notion of difference is not only descriptive of a particular state of reality, but more significantly it is productive. Attributes, we have seen, express the essence of Being, that is, power. The role of actualising and differentiating Substance is directly connected with the function of producing. In this light, the status of the attribute within the theory of Substance is extremely active (Deleuze, 1992: 41-67).23 This is a crucial move within Deleuzes re-reading of the Ethics. Deluzes recognition of modal difference casts doubt on the entire philosophical tradition from Schelling onwards, which has defined Spinozas absolute as a principle of identity (Deleuze, 1992: 67). Furthermore, it allows Deleuze to overcome the Hegelian impasse in conceptualising Spinozas category of the absolute as one and, at the same time, multiple. In Hegel, we have seen, this difficulty drives him to accuse Spinozas ontology of acosmism (the absence of the world). Deleuze, instead, praises Spinozas discovery of modal difference as the affirmation of the world. Given that the absolute means the multiplicity and actuality of the attributes, and these disseminate the power of Substance within nature, nature is not a dimension of Being, but a more complex and powerful body. If Spinozas account of the absolute

23

Spinozas ontology of the modal difference would impact strongly upon Deleuzes own philosophy, see Hardt (1993: 59-66).

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implies the vision of the world as a living being, this might suggest a return to forms of pantheism and animism, which would in turn reintroduce the question of the subjective status of nature, as we have discussed through Goethes portrait of the Ethics in chapter I. In order to prevent possible interpretations of Spinozas conception of God-nature as a theory of the subject, Deleuze puts forward the argument of the plane of immanence, which is the core of his reading of the Ethics and his own philosophy. Deleuze deduces the notion of the plane of immanence by connecting Spinozas definition of the absolute, the theory of parallelism, power and the notion of difference (Deleuze, 1992: 99-143, 169-186). The implications of thinking Spinozas theory of Substance as a plane of immanence concerns the reconceptualisation of the actual world as self-organised system, which is equally productive of thoughts and actions. It is the plane of immanence, Deleuze fiercely concludes, that lies at the very heart of Spinoza paradigm of materialism (Deleuze, 2001: 26). Deleuzes re-exposition of the themes of the Ethics has many important implications. As aforementioned, his analysis shapes profoundly the general approach to Spinoza, undermining meticulously many commonplaces in the history of philosophy concerning the theoretical edifice of the Ethics. In this light, Deleuzes study produces a rupture within the history of ideas, and inaugurates a new mode of reading the Ethics. Deleuze constructs a different intellectual milieu for Spinoza, which runs from Democritus, Heraclites, Epicurus to Nietzsche and Bergson. Each of them supports an ontology of the actual, which dismisses the authority of thought. In this philosophical tradition envisaged by Deleuze, Spinoza acquires a fundamental role. Spinoza presents a unique plane of reality, which is intensely populated by a variety of bodies, thoughts and forces.24 This is, in Deleuzes view, the great and most difficult lesson of the Ethics, that is, the plane of immanence (Deleuze,1988: 122-130). In his later writing, Deleuze (2001) would argue that our awareness of this plane of immanence is knowledge of life itself.

24

The question of one nature for an infinite number of bodies is the focus of the third chapter, in which I will read Spinozas definition of nature through Simondons categories of pre-individuality and metastability.

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Although Deleuzes account is very suggestive and certainly explores rigorously the system of the Ethics, his reading raises further questions. These emerge from the logic of expressionism adopted for interpreting the Ethics. The problem is that this strategy does not entirely explain the extent to which nature, expressing itself, produces beings. If the method of expression conceives Spinozas notion of the absolute as a multiple and active plane of reality, this is not directly related to the function of producing. Similarly with Schellings engagement with Spinoza, the status of expression implies the understanding of beings and Being as pure activity and difference. The notion of activity, however multiform and dynamic, I would argue, does not contain in itself the power to produce reality. The question of the production of beings is crucial for structuring a materialist conception of ontology. The investigation of the ways in which nature produces itself through the actuality and finitude of beings implies a quite different understanding of the relation between individualities and nature. In order to address these themes, I propose to re-consider the method of the Ethics. Without re-examining the method adopted by Spinoza, our inquiry into the form of materialism supported in the Ethics cannot proceed any further. It is to the method of the Ethics that I now turn 2. The Method of the Ethics: Ontology and geometry

The Ethics is Spinozas masterpiece. It was published together with his works (the Political Treatise, the Letters, the Jewish Grammar and the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect) by the circle of his friends posthumously (1677). The complete title of the Ethics is Ethics. Demonstrated in geometrical order and divided into five parts (Ethica, more geometrico demonstrata, et in quinque partes distincta), which introduces the reader to the method and the structure adopted. Spinoza decides to organise his philosophical system as a treatise of geometry through definitions, propositions, postulates and so on. Although Spinoza had previously adopted the geometrical method (for example in the Short Treatise), only the Ethics is written entirely in geometrical manner

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(Giancotti, 1995: 14-21). Therefore, we might deduce that in the systematisation of the arguments of the Ethics geometry occupies an important position. The question I investigate in this section concerns whether Spinozas use of the geometrical scheme responds to a seventeenth-century tendency; or rather supports a specific strategy. The problem is whether Spinoza needs geometry for conceptualising his materialist ontology. In this light, an inquiry upon the role ascribed by Spinoza to geometry is a fundamental prerequisite for understanding his philosophical project. Spinozas readers from the past and present have amply discussed the geometrical method of the Ethics. In the previous chapter, we have seen, Hegel addressing his first critique to the limitation of the method, which, for him, lacks rigour and consistency (Hegel, 1955: 256). By contrast, the Enlightenment philosophers conceive the exposition of metaphysics in geometrical order as a form of rationalism and thus atheism. Twentieth-century scholars of Spinoza offer divergent explanations of Spinozas use of geometry. For Curley, and, more generally, the analytic interpretations of the Ethics, the geometrical method of the Ethics reveals the strong influence of Descartess philosophy upon Spinoza (1988: 3-10). In this way, the geometrical order of the Ethics delineates a rationalist strategy followed by Spinoza, within which metaphysical claims are obtained through the use of reason. In contrast with these views, Deleuze approaches the Ethics by the middle. Thus, he draws attention to the argumentative parts of the Ethics, which are precisely the scholia (Deleuze, 1988: 122). Deleuze observes that the order of the scholia greatly differ for the one of propositions and definitions, disclosing two conceptual levels within the Ethics. Deleuze, underlines that the structure of the Ethics does not proceed in a linear way from definitions to propositions, which would be further clarified in the scholia. The scholia, instead, follow their own logic and are disjoined from propositions and definitions. He envisages a subterranean content within the Ethics, which expresses the authentic thesis of Spinozas ontology. Deleuze concludes that the radical notions of Spinozas ontology lie secretly in the scholia, which formulate the real constitution of Being as a plane of immanence (Deleuze, 1997: 21-32).

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Similar to Deleuzes arguments, Negri recognizes a theoretical difference between definitions, propositions and scholia. For Negri, however, this corresponds to a systemic caesura, which reflects a crucial intellectual moment within the evolution of Spinozas philosophy. This refers to Spinozas turn from a Platonic position towards a materialist one. In this sense, Spinozas theory of Substance, which is mostly espoused in part I of the Ethics, expresses the persistence of Platonic elements within Spinozas thought, within which his ontology is still a reflection upon reality. Spinozas conceptions of the attributes and modes, which particularly refer to parts III and IV, delineate his passage to a materialistic project, which is concerned with the constitution of reality (Negri, 1998: 22-44). The problems that emerge from these interpretations are that the structure of the Ethics appears as divided, fragmented into several doctrines, each of which follows an independent strategy and objective. Referring to Deleuzes argument concerning the subterranean message of the Ethics, this explanation might lead one to read exoteric and esoteric doctrines in the Ethics. From both approaches, two questions arise immediately. Why Spinoza would have ordered his ontology into different theoretical principles? If this is the case, where does the authentic doctrine of Ethics reside, in scholia or rather in the propositions? These questions involve a more fundamental problem. This concerns how we should read the Ethics, whether from the middle as Deleuze suggests or rather deductively as Curley proposes? In order to address these arguments, I follow a different approach. Taking into great considerations both Deleuzian and analytic views, I propose to read the Ethics as it is. The Ethics is a treatise of geometry. This structure is somewhat ambiguous, which enables one to stress singular parts at the expense of the whole. In this sense, we have seen in chapter I, many thinkers resolutely acclaim Spinoza within their intellectual heritage, reading in the Ethics the demands of the period. From Voltaire, passing through Goethe, Jacobi, Schelling, Hegel to nowadays, the propositions of the Ethics come to support models of naturalism, pantheism, rationalism and acosmism. Although many of these different portraits of

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Spinozas ontology undeniably derive from the complexity of its conceptual nucleus, as I have argued in the previous chapter, perhaps, a further reason might be traced in the difficulty of the geometrical structure itself. If we re-draw attention to the geometrical order of the Ethics, we might come closer to the mechanism through which Spinoza made his claims. In order to follow the development of Spinozas ontology, I think, we should not extrapolate his thesis from the method. The method enables Spinoza to reach certain conclusions and construct new hypothesises. Separating, then, the notions of the Ethics from its structure can lead one easily to ignore or force the consistency of the arguments themselves. In the previous section, we have discussed, Deleuzes recognition of Spinozas ontological system as a plane of immanence, within which attributes and modes express the actuality of Being. However, the problem encountered, in Deleuzes theory of expressionism, concerned that the role of expression is not synonymous with production. The logic of expressionism, rather, indicates that the system is real and powerful through the existences of modes and attributes. In order to examine the question of ontological production, the focus, first of all, has to be addressed to the structure, through within Spinoza poses the immanence of God. Spinoza introduces the theme of the immanence of God-Substance-nature through a geometrical proposition. This means that immanence derives from a demonstration. The immanence of God, therefore, is an outcome of an accurate strategy, which is supported by this geometrical method. Therefore, we should first consider the hypothesis, better the definitions, through which Spinoza affirms immanence. In doing so, we will observe that Spinoza does not consider immanence as an indemonstrable truth; rather immanence proceeds from a precise investigation of nature. This means that crucial notions within the Ethics are supported and demonstrated and not self-reflective. This suggests the idea that the geometrical method is not simply a style of writing, but rather a fundamental mechanism, which supports Spinozas ontology. An awareness of this might shed

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light on the coherence of the plan of the Ethics. In order to examine the meaning of geometry in the thread of the Ethics, I shall draw attention to the main characteristics of the geometrical method itself, and consider how this has been used by Spinozas contemporaries. The plan of the Ethics: Euclidean geometry against Aristotelian syllogism Generally, the focus of the treatise of geometry is not exclusively addressed to the articulation of rational arguments. A treatise of geometry, as will see, is centred mainly on a logical development, which does not aspire to rationalise reality. By contrast, it is a method of investigation, which follows a different mechanism for the acquisition of categories of thought and concepts. This is not the epistemological logic of dialectical syllogism, which proceeds through opposition and reconciliation of terms. Rather, this is articulated through continuous and progressive movements between propositions, definitions, axioms and scholia. In geometry, any proposition is demonstrated step-by-step by definitions and axioms, each of which expresses universal, self-evident properties of triangles, lines and so forth. The demonstration of each proposition follows the deductive logic of mathematics. The geometrical treatise is constituted by a universality, which is modelled upon reality. Universality means that each definition, axiom, proposition is valid, or applicable to any singular phenomenon in any time and space. The method is named also formal. The properties of triangle or quadrate, for example, are always valid for any given triangle in any historical period. The real (modelled upon reality) means that the formulation of laws or principles derives from an investigation upon the elements in nature. Importantly, geometrical laws and propositions do not precede reality, rather principles and laws come out of nature itself. During Spinozas age, a great number of scientists and philosophers, such as Galileo, Copernicus, Kepler, Bacon and Descartes, have been extremely influenced by the axiomatic-deductive method. They, in fact, created their own system of axioms,

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definitions and propositions, following this deductive method. The use of the deductive-axiomatic method in philosophy and science responds to a precise purpose. This refers to the attempt to connect human rationality with the observation of nature. Descartes, for example, adopts the style of the geometrical treatise rather than as a proper method of research. He wrote some parts of his Meditationes in geometrical style. Based on a pure mathematic logic, the Cartesian rationalist method constitutes in this regard a sufficient example. Although Spinoza follows this cultural tendency of the period, however, his usage of the geometrical demonstration is a different one. In contrast with the Cartesian philosophical use of geometry, Spinoza follows the geometrical scheme as method of philosophical investigation. He aspires to develop an ontological system, in which any metaphysical arguments are demonstrable throughout an accurate investigation from and within reality (E. III, Preface). Nature, however, does not follow a linear progression of phenomena, which might be easily rationalised and calculated. As we have noticed with the definition of the absolute and attributes, Being means a multiplicity of elements, which are different and ontologically equal. As the attributes of God (the modes of beings) are infinite, the absolute is not an addition of parts. Given the complexity of reality, the question of the methodology might appear to Spinoza very crucial. The problem concerns, firstly, what method might better support the multiplicity of Being, which traverse the absolute? Secondly, how it is possible to construct materialist arguments based on universality and reality? In other words, the question is what method might fully embrace contingency and generality. In the previous chapter, I have argued that Spinoza does not apply the Aristotelian syllogism intentionally. In several letters, Spinoza criticises Aristotles philosophy for separating God from the world through the establishment of several and unknowable substances (Letter 56). The Aristotelian syllogism, I would argue, might seem, firstly, to reflect his metaphysical structure. However, as we have seen in the Hegelian dialectics, the Aristotelian syllogism is organised through the principle of negation, whereas Spinozas ontology follows the principle of modal difference.

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Therefore, the Aristotelian logic should appear to Spinoza too formal, which does express the dynamic progression of reality. In order to found ontology on actuality and difference, universality and contingency, Spinoza discovers in the method of geometry fecund categories of thought, upon which his philosophy might be constructed (Letter 76). The geometrical method offers to Spinoza the possibility to ground a system, within which each notion (immanence, power, parallelism) proceeds logically from the previous assumptions, without mediating and sublating these. More importantly, by definition the Euclidean geometry does not include contradictory terms, rather it literally composes new theories.25 Translating this method to ontology, this means the constitution of process through expansive movements, within which new concepts enrich the meaning of a previous definition and scholia, expand the contents of the preceding propositions. To return to the Deleuzian arguments of the subterranean doctrines of the Ethics, perhaps, the divergence between scholia and propositions might derive from the logic of the geometrical method, within which attributes, scholia, propositions and axioms occupy specific roles. In this case, the role of scholia is that of expanding complex notions, which would otherwise remain ambiguous. The scholia also prepare the terrain to the successive arguments. It is for this reason that the language might differ from definitions and axioms, proofs and so and so forth. Taking into account these arguments we might raise some preliminary conclusions. Spinoza, I argue, adopts the geomtrical method purposely in order to organise the spontaneous, however, logical (Substance is necessity) becoming of events in nature. As in the Euclidean Elements from one and simplest point a combinations of lines, rhombus etc. emerge, in the Ethics from the general definitions of God, nature, attributes and modes, a variety of thoughts, movements and bodies, intersecting each other, come to light.
25

In his Elements, Euclid begins with the definition of a point through which he constructs progressively, lines, surfaces, semicircles, circles and all possible geometrical figures, such as rhombus and trapezia. (Euclid, 1956: 153-156)

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As the Ethics follows this logical progression, therefore, the attention to the position of every claim is crucial; whether these are definitions or propositions. There is a considerable difference, in fact, in stating something by definition or by proposition. The former is assumed, whereas the latter is deduced. Bearing in mind the logic of the treatise of geometry, we can pass now to examine Spinozas question of immanence, considering what might be its constitutive elements, and the ways in which this plane of immanence unveils a system of production.

3. Process of production: God, nature and power

The question of the ontological production of reality lies at the very heart of every philosophical system. The problems mainly concern, firstly, how Being produces reality and secondly what is the relation between the producer and the products. For example Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Saint Thomas Aquinas, offer well-organised systems, within which reality descends from a transcendental Being or archetypes. These systems solve the ontological problems of Being and nature, positing an a priori condition, through which every phenomenon is determined. In this sense, the difficulty of the foundation of an ontological system of production is somewhat easily explained. The question, however, becomes more complicated when we pass to analyse materialist philosophies, within which reality is assumed itself to be productive. The difficulty concerns how nature, through extensive parts, give rise to thoughts, bodies, imagination, more generally, a variety of heterogeneous events? This is precisely the case of the foundation of Spinozas materialist ontology, which affirms the absolute and necessary equality between the gesture of producing and the one of being produced. This equality of Being and nature, we have seen, had led several philosophers in different historical periods to stress the role of nature as a divine source of production (pantheism), or instead Substance as the negation of the world (Schelling and Hegel). In chapter I, I have discussed, Schelling and Hegels impasse in fully determining Spinozas theory of the all-inclusive Substance, which is not prior to, or greater than its parts. This difficulty had led both philosophers to

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consider Spinozas system as a static order, within which Being annihilates its parts instead of producing them. In contrast with these readings, Deleuze and, more generally, twentieth-century scholars define Spinozas notion of nature-God as a self-productive order, which generates the world immanently. It is this conception of Substance that grounds Spinozas form of materialism (Balibar, 2002; Negri, 1998). The assumption that there is no difference in time and space between the action of production and the objects produced implies necessarily, on the one hand, the refusal of any form of creationism and transcendentalism, and on the other the re-evaluation of the dimension of the actual. However, from these considerations further questions arise. If Spinozas arguments of immanence, the equality between matter and thought and the absolute mean undoubtedly the reinstatement of nature from mere thinghood to ontological being, the problem still remain regarding nature movement from the state of pure activity to a generative source of production. Strictly speaking, how does nature produce immanently the world? Furthermore, given that Spinoza distinguishes between the finitude of the mode (particularities as human being) and the eternity of Substance and attributes, how these two dimensions of reality coexist. In other words, for the rules of immanence and the theory of parallelism, Spinozas notion of Substance excludes different ontological systems (as thought and matter), and it also avoids any supremacy between nature and thought (the cause of all the things is immanent). However, singular modes are finite, whereas Substance and attributes are eternal, thus, the question is how the order and connection of finite beings is the same as the order and connection of Infinity. Twentieth-century philosophers have amply discussed these questions of the relation between Substance, attributes and modes. As mentioned, Deleuze offers very persuasive arguments about the theme of the ontological production of the Ethics. Following the theory of expressionism, Deleuze directly related the function of expressing the power of God to that of producing beings (Deleuze, 1988: 41-82, 201-

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216). Central to Deleuzes strategy is the recognition of the modal difference within the Ethics, which allows him to dismiss the definition of Spinozas ontology as a theory of identity. The refusal of the principle of the identity is crucial for understanding Spinozas formula of the parallelism between nature and thought. Spinoza affirms, that The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things (E. II, prop. VII). The problem of this definition concerns, firstly, how ideas are ordered as bodies. Extension follows the rules of speed and slowness, quantity and duration, whereas ideas follow the rule of eternity and quality (E. I, Prop. XXXI; E. II, ax. I, II, Lem. I). Secondly, the question arises how these two orders are produced immanently. In order to resolve these contradictions, Deleuze argues that Spinozas theory of Substance has the dual aspect of necessity and possibility (Deleuze, 1992: 122-128). Deleuze affirms that from the viewpoint of the absolute necessity of Substance the power of thinking and acting are one and the same, whereas from the viewpoint of nature (natura naturata) the power of thinking and acting is expressed through a variety of combinations of degrees of reality (Deleuze, 1992: 123-128). Therefore, the role of the attribute lies at the very heart of Spinozas system of production, through which the function of expressing the unity of Substance implies an eternal process of differentiation. However, Deleuzes reading of the dual aspects of Substance, in my view, is somewhat ambiguous. Specifically, it is problematic the condition of absolute necessity, within which the functions of acting, thinking and expressing are identical. Deleuze considers only Substance in its aspect of nature as the place in which contingency, difference and potentiality are developed. This distinction between viewpoints might create a circular or reflective system rather than a dynamic progression. Concerning these problems, I think that Macherey might offer an illuminating response, to which I shall draw attention. In contrast with Deleuzes arguments, Macherey instead claims that the problem of understanding the role of Substance, attributes and modes derives from a genetic approach to the relation between these terms (Macherey, 1997: 74). Like

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Deleuze, Machereys focus is to the role of the attribute as source of differentiation, differently he considers the attribute entirely equal to Substance. More precisely, for Macherey Substance is its attributes (Macherey, 1997: 84). In order to understand the ways in which Substance becomes real and manifest to and within nature, Macherey suggests that Substance begins with the plurality of its attributes. It means that the attribute is not derived from Substance or is a proof of the existence of God; rather for Macherey Substance is exactly no more or less than its attributes. Thus, Macherey argues that the attributes, instead of expressing, constitute Substance. This importantly leads to conceive Substance as a concrete Being, which power depends on the plurality of the attributes (E. I, Def. IV, prop. VII, prop. XI, prop. XX). Stressing the identity between Substance and attributes, Macherey escapes from Deleuzes logic of the different viewpoints and orders, and re-affirms the centrality of the attributes themselves. In this sense, Macherey resolves the question of the materialist production of reality in Spinoza through dispersing directly Substance in every existing and thinking thing (Macherey, 1997: 83). As a result, Spinozas question of the ontological production of reality is drawn directly to the actuality of nature and all existing determinations. In this sense, for Macherey there is no Being in the Ethics rather an infinite plurality of existences, which form the realm of Substance (Macherey, 1979: 107-128). The modal difference between attributes and modes is, therefore, the condition of the plurality of all singularities in nature. Although Machereys reading liberates Substance from a perpetual condition of circularity, the question still remains how this pure actuality of Being unveils a form of production. In other words, how does the condition of the actual and multiplicity give rise to a system of production? Specifically, the problem is to unveil the mechanism through which multiplicity and actuality are conditions of production.

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Nature: A multiphasic process of production Concerning these arguments, one would not find a clear and definitive answer in the Ethics. However, we may attempt to read the Ethics from an alternative standpoint, that is, as a process. In order to determine on the one side the connection between Substance, attributes and modes, and on the other side the relation between the concepts of immanence, absolute, difference, power and the parallelism, I think, the notion of process acquires great cogency.26 To be a process means to be an organisation as such, which implies to pay a greater attention to the development of the system, rather than the results of the system itself. Furthermore, the concept of organisation means that a system is dynamic. More significantly, to intend the order as process implies an emphasis upon its elements, which contribute to this dynamism. In order to investigate the conditions upon which Spinozas system of materialist production is grounded and developed, I propose to study the Ethics as an organisation. The analysis of the Ethics as a process enables us to overcome the difficulty between Substance, attributes and modes, notably, without narrowing the centrality of these terms. Following the logic of the process, the connection between Substance, attributes and modes can be understood as phases within a more complex development. Certainly, from both Deleuze and Machereys analyses we might suppose that the differentiation and actualisation of Substance in its attributes discloses a form of process. As mentioned, the problem still remains how both approaches to Spinozas theory of Substance opens directly onto a materialist production of reality. In order to look for alternative explanations, I consider every concept of the Ethics as Substance, attribute, mode, immanence, power and absolute as progressive phases of a process,
26

Concerning the meaning of process, I employ Riemanns notion of process. Riemannian geometry is based on the study of smooth manifolds in an n-dimensional space. The concept of manifold, as Riemann formulated it originally, states that in space every point has a neighbourhood which resembles Euclidean space, but in which the entire structure may be more complicated (Riemann, 1873). On the application of Riemmanians conception to ontology, see Deleuze (2004: 532-538) and De Landa (2002: 11-39).

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which open up to further and new transitions. This might bring to light the mechanism through which nature produces beings, and how these activate the process of production. Taking into account these premises, let us flesh out these phases of production. In the previous section, I have discussed the implications of posing ontology through geometry for the establishment of materialist arguments. As mentioned earlier, the importance of the geometrical method in ontology concerns the possibility of structuring a logical (deductive) and, at the same time, progressive (axiomatic) system. Further, this geometrical scheme is the condition through which Spinoza sets forth his theory of the production of reality. In order to investigate the question of the ontological system of production as process, I shall pass to consider the themes of power, immanence, infinity and the theory of parallelism as the leading hypothesis, through which the plane of immanence becomes a process of production. Following Machereys suggestion of explaining the Ethics by the Ethics (Macherey, 1997: 75), in my view, this requires a re-drawing of attention to the location of notions such as power, immanence, infinity and the theory of parallelism; whether these are propositions or definitions or axioms. Furthermore, as in the Elements, where Euclid constructs from one point a rhomb, equally in the Ethics we should consider the first definition as crucial as all the others. Taking into account these arguments, let us analyse, first, where immanence is located. Spinoza states the immanence of God in proposition XVIII of part I, affirming God is the immanent cause of all the things. This is a proposition, which means that immanence is supported by other propositions and definitions. Importantly, as a proposition, this tells us that immanence is not assumed by Spinoza as given, but rather follows from an expansive movement, which in turn unfolds in a successive one. However, the proposition itself unveils several problematic aspects. Firstly, Spinoza describes the immanence of God as the cause of all the things. Spinoza does not qualify immanence as a condition of the existence of God or the attributes. He simply describes that the action of God is immanent. The status of cause of all things

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means that God generates every existing singularity in nature. However, the question arises how and to what extent this immanent cause of the all things is also reality itself. Further, the argument of the immanence of God as a cause is also a Scholastic thesis.27 Scholastic thinkers such as Saint Thomas Aquinas and Saint Anselm had referred to God as an immanent cause, through which they have explained the relation between God and his creatures. The question immediately arises on what basis Spinozas notion of Substance should differ from the Scholastic one. Looking at the proof of the proposition, Spinoza sends us back mainly to propositions XV, XIV and Def. III. It is precisely in this connection that immanence begins with constituting a form of plane. Definition III states the univocity of Substance, which considered in itself might appear a formal Scholastic proof of the essence of God (Deleuze, 1992: 69-82). However, the definition opens up directly to propositions XIV and XV, in which proposition XIV re-affirms the necessity and univocity of Substance. However, I think that proposition XV is crucial, through which Being passes from an initial condition of univocity, through a plurality of attributes and importantly actuality, to immanence. The importance of these three propositions concerns firstly that the univocity of Substance does not produce the infinity of attributes and modes (finitude); rather this is simply a condition, as the point is condition of varied figures. Secondly, for definition III Substance is already differentiated through the finitude of the modes. Thus, there are already conditions of eternity, reality and univocity, which then cannot be other than immanence itself. Immanence as univocity, reality and multiplicity, avoids the moment of the disclosure of Being to reality, which would imply the return to external or prior state. As mentioned, immanence is a cause, which implies the idea of a certain activity embodied by Being. Following the progressive development of the arguments, this idea of cause brings us to the theme of power, which is explained towards the end of part I of the Ethics.
27

Notably, Scholastic philosophy does not distinguish between imminence and immanence. Imminence refers to reflective conditions, in which creatures reflect the perfection of God, who however remains the creator. Immanence instead implies a form of co-participation between God and his parts. For complete account of the difference between imminence and immanence see Macherey (1997: 73-84) and Deleuze (1992: 69-82).

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Spinoza affirms in proposition XXXIV Gods power is his very essence.28 As with immanence, the notion of power is a proposition, thus power should be considered as a new concept, which expands previous arguments. Spinoza, in this case, indicates that the power of God is a consequence of propositions XI and XVI. These propositions state that Substance is constituted solely through continuous movements of infinite and varied number of existent (actual) attributes. The two propositions are the pivotal elements, which uphold contemporaneously two phases within the development of the system of production. On the one hand, proposition XI is a further phase of the initial dimension of Being as absolute infinity. As we have seen with Deleuze and Macherey, the question of infinity refers to the conception of modal difference, thus the multiplicity of the attributes gives rise to both the moment of actualisation (E. I, prop. XI) and differentiation (E. I, prop. XVI). On the other hand, as phases within a process, the actuality and the variety of the attributes is a transitional dimension within a more complex process, through which the multiplicity of attributes and modes become (Substance is its parts) power themselves. In this fashion, the analysis of Spinozas theory of Substance as a process reveals that the aspects of difference (the Deleuzian approach), and the other actuality and multiplicity (Machereys explanation) are transitional phases within a more composite system of production. If Spinozas theory of Substance is a process, this leads, on the one side, to bypass the logic of expressionism, which would create a sort of circularity between Substance and attributes. On the other, the re-definition of the multiplicity of existences as expansive phases of the essence of Substance unveils the conditions in which reality is productive in itself. Taking into account these arguments, however, there is a further question, which requires our attention. This refers to the mechanism through which the plane of immanence is unfolded directly in the order of power described above. In order to
28

On the question of power, Deleuze affirms that there are two orders of power: one goes from Substance to attributes and the other from the attribute to nature, thus singularities (Deleuze, 1992: 83-95, 99-128).

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address this question, we need to look back to proposition XVI, which affirms the multiplicity of the modes of being. It is through this proposition and the resulting corollaries that the plane of immanence is stretched on the ground of production. This proposition does not only give rise to the differentiation of Being into its modes. More significantly, it is the basis, through which Being as pure immanence and power is developed. As analysed previously, immanence and power are both extensive phases of proposition XVI. Developing Machereys arguments, behind this proposition Spinoza tell us that Substance is the forming multiplicity of existences, through which the constitution of an n-dimensional plane of immanence produces all the particulars and events in nature. Certainly, both Deleuze and Macherey emphasise the role of the multiplicity of attributes and modes as the founding concepts of Spinozas theory of Substance. However, I think that the condition of multiplicity within Spinozas foundation of ontology has to be understood in both aspects of multiplicity of existences and phases of the process of production. As attributes and modes are infinite and different existences, equally the phases of this process are multiple. It means that multiplicity does not pertain exclusively to the constitution of modes and attributes, but it is also the condition of the system of production. The importance of thinking a multi-phasic process of production resides in the implications this has for the foundation of a materialist ontology. It means that the actual is not only the place of varied phenomena. Instead, reality itself proceeds through multiple phases, through which history, societies, political systems and individuals are grounded and developed. In this way, historical process, human beings and societies should be understood as an open set, which proceeds through multiple and transitional combinations of finitude, infinity, materiality and potentialities.29 Taking into account these arguments, we might draw some preliminary conclusions. The inquiry has focused upon the notion of immanence, through which
29

These themes will be further developed in chapters IV and V.

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we have discovered its role as cause. This is a further category of the plurality (infinite attributes and modes) of Being. This has brought about the discovery of immanence as a knot of finitude, infinity and actuality (attributes and mode are existences). Following Deleuzes theory of pure immanence, it means that immanence is not to something rather reality (infinite modes of beings and finite existences) is in immanence (Deleuze 2001:26-27). Reality is in immanence for definition III of the univocity of God, which instead Deleuze considers a formal term. The implications of this notion of pure immanence concern, on the one hand, that reality structured through multiple modes of being is itself an ontological condition, which indicates the denial of every form of creationism, transcendence and telos. On the other, immanence as a cause unveils a dynamic dimension of these varied forms of existences. However, if reality is a dynamic place of differentiation of parts, the question arises how these open up to a system of production. In order to search for the conditions of the production of reality, then, we have drawn attention to the definition of power as the essence of God. Surprisingly, power is not demonstrated from immanence as the cause of all the things, but rather from infinite modes of Being. This tells us that multiplicity is one of the conditions, through which reality becomes acknowledged as an order of production. Taking into account these arguments, nature or reality is precisely shaped by the multiplicity of the phases of the process of production, which are ordered and connected within one and unique plane of immanence. It follows that the theory of parallelism further unfolds these plural phases within one real and cogent order, that is, nature, within which producing and being produced coincide (E.I, Prop. VII, Corollary). Based on these elements, Spinozas process of production discloses an innovative materialist conception of reality, which provides, I would argue, important instruments for comprehending contemporary history, thought, individuals and societies. Spinoza, ideally, tells us the impossibility of structuring any theory of history, anthropology, and politics separately. Following Spinozas process, these are ontologically interconnected one with the others and dependent one on the others.

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Therefore, Spinoza presents the actual as a multi-phasic being which is unfolded and folded through the plane of immanence.30 Spinozas notion of immanence, as we have seen, does not only imply the denial of external or higher dimension, but also it opens up to the constitution of reality as a self-productive organisation, through multiple being (s) and phases. The originality of Spinozas paradigm of materialism, in my view, concerns the description of the material world shaped by unpredictable dimensions, through which multiple potentialities and actualities, finite and infinite beings emerge.

Conclusions: towards a Philosophy of the individual

The chapter has analysed the form of materialism offered by Spinoza and considered how his philosophy can still provide important theoretical sources for contemporary thought and society. Spinoza constructs his paradigm of materialism on a quite different understanding ontology, which brings about the retreat of the moment of the commencement from ontology. Spinoza replaces the phase of the disclosure of an external or prior Being with the conception of nature as a self-organised system structured through an eternal becoming of multiple mixtures of phenomena, bodies, thoughts and forces. The definition of nature as an ontological condition of forming singularities leads Spinoza to locate the process of production of reality within nature itself. Therefore, nature becomes acknowledged as a system of production shaped upon the notions of immanence, absolute, power, finitude and infinity. In order to understand this system of production, I have proposed to read Spinozas main ontological concepts mentioned above as phases of a process, which is articulated through expansive phases. I argued that the originality of Spinoza lies in his conception of reality as a process of production, through which nature comes to light as a plane of immanence. Spinozas constitution of the plane of immanence is grounded and expanded through a quite
30

The notion of phasic being has been employed by Simondon (2007) in order to explain the constitution of Being. I will develop further this argument in the next chapter, within which I explore Spinozas process of individuation through the ontogenetic theory of Simondon.

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complicated notion of multiplicity. The process of production brings to light not only the multiplicity of the modes of beings but also the multiplicity of the conditions of ontological production. The implication of this conception of materialist ontology as multiplicity is that the horizon of the actual is widened from mere connections of events to the infinite possibilities of forms that nature can adopts. In other words, Spinozas notion of nature, I think, unfolds in a never-ending becoming of actualities and potentialities, which precisely are both expressions of multiplicity. These arguments of nature as a phasic and multiple being bring our discussion to the question of the next chapter, which investigates what system of individuation emerges from this conception of Being as multiplicity.

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Chapter III Spinozas philosophy of individuation: The collective life of the individual
The human body is composed of very many individual parts of different nature, each of which is very complex. (E.II, Postulate I)

Introduction

In chapter II, we examined the form of materialism proposed by Spinoza, and argued that his originality resides in its ontology of the actual. This is not only based on the denials of transcendence and the disclosure of Being, but more importantly on the reassessment of the cogency of the material world. In this Ethics, Spinoza recovers the meaning of nature from a mere thinghood to a self-organised plane, which is traversed by movements, thoughts, bodies and potentialities. This account of nature brings about the discovery the material world as a powerful and extremely heterogeneous body. In order to determine the complexity of Spinozas ontology of the actual, I have considered crucial categories of thought such as immanence, power, attributes and modes as constitutive elements of a non-linear process. The attention to the notion of process has brought to light the distinctive mechanism, which traverses the Ethics. This refers to expansive and multiple movements, which actualise and further complicate the plane of reality. In this way, I have claimed that Spinozas ontology of the actual does not solely involve the constitution of a plane of immanence, but more importantly the affirmation of a process of production. Spinoza develops an intricate notion of multiplicity, which indicates the multi-phasic character of the process of production and also the multiplicity of beings. It is in this context that Spinozas form of materialism lies.

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The recovery of nature from a mere mechanical order implies the re-definition of the centrality of the notions of contingency and the singular within a more general becoming of reality. These acquire cogency not in relation to the achievement of a higher and ultimate objective of Being and God but in themselves for being contingent. In Spinozas system of nature, contingent beings are constitutive elements of the process of production, which activate and differentiate the plane of reality. Taking into account these arguments, this chapter explores the paradigm of individuality emerging from Spinozas account of nature as multiple process, and considers the extent to which this might enrich contemporary materialist discourses. The theme of the individual is a controversial argument in the Ethics, which still divides scholars. Common to the readers of the Ethics is the problem of the relation between Being and its parts, which directly questions the status of humankind within the plane of reality. This chapter addresses these issues. Specifically, I examine, firstly, whether there is any theory of individuality in Ethics. If a notion of individuality might be inferred from Spinozas ontology, a second problem arises immediately. This concerns how Spinoza might develop a conception of individuality from a plane of multiplicity? Thirdly, how does multiplicity implicate notions of hecceity and quidditas without at the same time annihilating these aspects? Fourthly, given Spinozas treatment of matter as a source of production, the difficulty is how matter individualises thought, action, passion and imagination? If matter is the principle of individuation, the question here concerns whether Spinozas move supports a certain spiritualisation of matter or a materialisation of thought. Ultimately, what ethics and politics might we draw from Spinozas theory of the individual? In order to address these questions, I think that the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon may shed light on the complexity of Spinozas conception of the individual. Developing further a suggestion of Balibar (2002: 103-147), Simondons philosophy of individuation, I believe, offers thoughtful ontological categories for

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our re-reading of Spinozas theme of individuality. Simondons notions of preindividuality, transindividuality, collective realm, metastability and disparation might translate into contemporary language Spinozas concepts of conatus, multiplicity, body, mind and affectivity.31

Without postulating tempting similarities, parallelism or influences between the two philosophers, however, Spinoza and Simondon base their ontological system on common categories. These focus on a strict monism, a form of materialism, and the significance of imagination and the emotions to the relational nature of human being.32 This shared ontological ground creates, in my view, the conditions through which an investigation of Spinozas theory in the light of Simondon acquires great cogency.

Although the chapter is primarily an inquiry upon Spinozas process of individuation, the use of Simondonian categories requires the analysis of Simondons theory of individuation itself. In the first section, thus, I will give an account of Simondons thesis of individuation, pointing out the main differences between his ontology of individuation, antecedent and contemporary philosophies of individuality.

Proceeding from the analysis of Simondon to Spinoza, in the second section, the discussion will draw particular attention to the role given by Spinoza to nature, relations, conatus and affectivity. The arguments, I will develop through the chapter, concern that the reading of the Ethics through Simondons theory of individuation brings about the discovery of an alternative materialist account of the individual and, more generally, the theme of individuation. I refer precisely to the question of the twofold status of nature in the Ethics as pre-individual mass and collective plane of
31

I use the term translate in both literal and metaphorical meanings. By its literal meaning, I refer to the usage, I will make in the thesis, of Simondons ontological notions as decoding the Scholastic expressions of the Ethics into contemporary language. By its metaphorical sense, I mean the discovery of the modernity of Spinozas process of individuation via Simondon. 32 As Simondon opposes monist philosophies, by a form of monism in Simondons philosophy I mean literally his refusal of different substances such as matter and form.

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heterogeneity, upon which the process of individuation is grounded and developed. Furthermore, reading Spinoza through the lenses of Simondons thought, the themes of conatus, the theory of knowledge, the geometry of affects and the physics of bodies will disclose a unique tendency towards a form of transindividualism. This transindividual force is the basis upon which every model of community (psychic, political and social) is developed. It is in this context that Spinozas materialist conception of the individual resides, through which the hecceity of the human being is located precisely in the middle between universality and particularity, collective being (nature) and individuated individual.

1. Re-positioning the question of individuation in contemporary thought: Simondon and the ontology of individuation

The theme of individuality has been a central concern in the history of philosophy, politics and science. Generally, the focus of an inquiry upon the notion of individuality is addressed to the discovery of the conditions or archetypes, upon which individuals are generated. Related particularly to the human context, the concept of individuality involves the analysis of a variety of interlocked arguments, which greatly exceeds metaphysical disputes. These refer to definitions of life, more precisely the different forms of life such as ethical, biological and political and which between these is proper to the human being, and also the distinctive elements of knowledge, whether this derives from the nature of the individual being or rather social and historical junctures. Moreover, the study of the individual investigates the meaning of the body and how this operates, whether or not this is guided by the mind, the origins and aims of moral principles, and whether these should regulate, follow or restrain the affective disposition of individuals. Ultimately, it considers the extent to which crucial political categories such as the state, civil society and the social class are expressions of individuality, and if this is the case, whether these are artificially or naturally constructed upon the characteristics of the singular human subject; and more importantly, whether or not the creation of these institutions is necessary for the improvement of human conditions.

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Given the indeterminacy of these questions, the problem of the genesis and the principles of individuality has taken myriad of forms and theoretical positions. Thus, the problem of defining the domain of the individual runs from Plato, Aristotle, passing through Saint Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Descartes, Hegel, Marx, to Simondon, Freud and Deleuze more recently. Before discussing further the significance of individuation in contemporary thought, we need to distinguish between a philosophy of individuality and an ontology of individuation. The importance of underlining this distinction resides in the different strategies adopted for determining the fundamental aspects of human beings, each of which delineates a completely different political, ethical and social scenario (Toscano, 2006: 4-16; Combes, 1999: 10-25). Put differently, the ways in which we qualify human nature impact directly upon our awareness of politics, ethics and the material world. Broadly understood, a philosophy of individuality posits individuality prior to its constitutive process. More accurately, it considers the human being as the principle of the process of individuation, from which thought, affectivity, relations, ethical and political gestures follow. This assumes the genesis and development of the individual isolated from its milieu, focusing exclusively upon the study of the structure of the formed human being. Nature is viewed as irrelevant to the formation of individuality, which acquires, instead, a certain importance within the life of an individual already individualised. This plays the role of the object of human knowledge, which might be investigated and modelled in relation to human needs. Given the exclusion of the material world from the genesis of individual beings, in order to discover the peculiar features of human beings, the attention is directed to the analysis of its structure as an independent unit, which already contains in itself the causes of generation and evolution. Taken in itself, the human being is a composite of mind, body and affectivity. As a result, arguments have been characterised by disputes surrounding the question of the priority of one of these elements among the others. In this light, from Plato and Aristotle onwards, a variety

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of different theories and terms have been coined such as the soul, the I, the self and the form, each of which, in one way or another, is entangled within this assumption of the human subject as a self-organised unity. More significantly, this approach has generated a categorisation of the heterogeneous potentialities of an individual being into determinate forms of life such as the biological, intellectual and passionate life, defining only one of these peculiar of humankind. Political and ethical discourses have been constructed around the privileged function assumed to connote the human being, such as rationality, selfishness and sociality. In this sense, in the history of thought many political and ethical conceptions have been erected around the identification of individuality with notions of rationality, egoism and self-mastery, through which concepts of state, knowledge and community have been explained. These aspects are direct consequences of the fundamental limit that characterises a philosophy of individuality, which entails the impossibility of knowing the generative system of the individual and thereby the unintelligibility of the principle of individuation. By contrast, concepts such as rationality and the I define the human being without tracing the mechanism of its generation. In this light, we simply bound the richness of expressions of individuality within a priori formula as matter and form, rather than understanding the reality of an individual. For this impasse of explaining the genesis of the singularities, theories of individuality, on the one side, commonly end up with postulating a transcendental or teleological order as principle of individuation. On the other, given that the constitution and development of beings is detached from its process, the conception of individuality is based on anthropomorphic or at least zoomorphic models. Unlike the philosophy of individuality, the ontology of individuation focuses upon the general process, through which individuals come to light. For an ontology of individuation, it is crucial to determine the conditions of individuation itself, rather than the individual. This implies a more extensive account of the relation between the individual and its generative system. The study of the process of individuation brings about the discovery of the multiple confluences between individuals and the material world. This introduces a different awareness of the ways in which

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phenomena such as of temporality, life, affectivity, movements of speedness and slowness, impact concretely upon the genesis and becoming of the individual, and equally the role of the individual for the actualisation and differentiation of these events. As an ontology of individuation stresses the notion of process, this re-defines the relation between the individual and the environment as part of a more complex system of production. For this, individual follows and inheres with the becoming of one unique order, which unfolds countless modalities of individuality. To consider the question of individuation as a process means to theorise the realm of the individual as a complex reality, which is constantly traversed by transformations and relational exchanges with the material world. In order to re-found the paradigm of contemporary materialism shaped by this dynamic vision of the world and human being, the re-positioning of the theme of individuation is imperative. This need for an ontology of individuation within contemporary philosophical and political debate is instrumental in re-shaping our understanding of the abundance of the material world. The order of the real expresses itself in very complex and creative ways, re-configuring the boundaries of inert matter. Concerning this matter, physics and biology have raised fecund arguments recently, which are attuned to the assumptions of matter and the body as mixtures of transformations and relations (Sagan, 1992: 362-385). These novel theories of physics and biology claim that matter is continuously exposed to transformations, which reveal a unique source of generation between living and non living beings (De Landa, 1992: 136-138; Newell, 1985: V- XVI). The awareness of these aspects must be integrated into future materialist discourses, because the genesis and development of the individual inheres within this structure of nature. Such arguments suggest that is by investigating the unseen operations behind matter, that we might discover the unique features of individuality.

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The recognition of the complexity of nature, the body and individuality has nurtured a rich debate within the social sciences, political theory and philosophy recently. The central concern that occupies contemporary thought is the search for a more extensive paradigm of the individual, which considers its unavoidable linkage with the material world, the potentiality of the body, its affective anatomy and also its relational state. The attention given to these elements has brought into question the inadequacy of consolidated theories of individuality, which have constructed the relation between the individual and its context on the schema of subject-object. Furthermore, contemporary discourse has questioned the validity of certain models, which have assumed human existence is regulated through distinctive functions such as rationality, affectivity, biological and social, splitting somewhat the life of the psyche from those of the body, ethics and politics indicated above. In order to re-configure the domain of the individual, many important notions have been formulated recently, which bring to light the impossibility of thinking the individual as an atomised and rational subject. In this fashion, the focus has been upon the analysis of language, relations, emotions, imagination and the embodiment of the mind as fundamental conditions of the genesis and becoming of an individual subject. The emergence of these conceptions indicates the need for an alternative grammar of the individual, which might elaborate new categories of thought able to express its multiform state. In order to formulate a new vocabulary for the individual of the present, I think, we should re-draw attention to the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon. A return, perhaps simply a turn, to Simondons thesis is crucial for rethinking the constitution of the individual. Simondon replaces the notion of individuality as a rational and independent unit with that of the individual as a problem. Simondons focus is primarily to the analysis of the general process of individuation, through which beings (human being or not) are generated. The attention to this process brings about the discovery of the collective as fundamental sources of individuation, without which the individual would not exist. Taking into account these arguments, let us flesh out the main aspects of Simondons theory of individuation.

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1.1 Simondons philosophy of individuation: The discovery of the collective

Simondon has occupied a somewhat marginal position within twentieth-century Continental thought, whose originality has been recognised recently. Simondons philosophical milieu is very extensive and heterogeneous, passing from biology, psychology, Marxist political theory, science, ontology to phenomenology. Specifically, his philosophy emerges from a combined study of Pre-Socratic ontology, quantum mechanics, cybernetics and Merleau-Pontys phenomenology of perception, with whom he completed his doctorate. The convergence of these different areas culminates in a complex and extremely rich theory of individuation, which however did not reach immediately the interest of a vast intellectual audience. It is Deleuzes discovery of the great originality of Simondons ontology of individuation that contributed to a renewal of interests in Simondon from a group of contemporary theorists including Stiegler, Stengers, Combes and Latour. Simondons ideas reflect the intellectual turn initiated in twentieth-century French academia referred in chapter II, and also the new tendencies maturated in the philosophy of science and the social sciences. As many of his contemporaries, Simondon actively participated in the intellectual campaign against Idealist philosophies, existentialist ontology, Cartesian and empiricist theories of the subject. Furthermore, given his interest particularly in science and psychology, he fiercely opposes consolidated scientific and psychological studies such as the theory of information, cognitivitist models, Gestalt psychology and the psychoanalyst tradition of thought. Central in his critique is the mode in which the genesis and development of the individual has been explained in philosophy, science and psychology, each of which has assumed the individual prior to its generative process. Despite the different perspectives, Simondon envisages a common problem at the outset of many paradigms, which entails the consideration of the individual as the principle of the process of individuation. The focus has been directed to the analysis of the individual as a given reality, upon which the process of individuation depends.

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In Simondons account, this has inverted the terms of the problem, which should not question what is an human being; but rather how he is formed, and what mechanism and forces are involved in his becoming singular. The former hypothesis implies the detachment of the individual from its context, that is, nature. The latter, instead, brings about the discovery of the individual as a part of a more general process of production, within which he is not the founding principle but a constitutive and vital element. Whilst the conception of the individual as incontrovertible truth has generated zoomorphic and anthropomorphic doctrines of individuation, the attention to the generative mechanism of individuation delineates the multiple and unpredicted ways, in which the material world impacts upon the evolution of every being. Importantly, this means the assumption of a unique process of individuation for all singularities, which discloses the common elements and potentials between living beings and also, as we will discuss, the many convergences between these and nonorganic forms of life. In other words, the attention to the process brings to light, on the one side, the powerful role played by nature within the becoming of the individual, which exceeds the biological phases of its constitution. On the other, the centrality of the process reshapes entirely our understanding of the status of the singular being, which becomes recognised as a result of various interactive levels. This account of the genesis and anatomy of the individual has further implications. As the individual is a mixture of heterogeneous elements inherent within nature, the definition of its peculiar character cannot be based on a hylomorphic schema. This reduces the complexity of the individual to the dualism between matter and form, which also considers the world as an inanimate object. For Simondon, many contemporary and past models of individuation heavily rely on the paradigm of hylomorphism, running from the Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy (Saint Thomas Aquinas among other), through Descartes, to Gestalt theory and the Freudian school of thought recently.33 These, in Simondons view, support the division of the individual into substances such as the

33

The hylemorphic definition of beings, derives from Aristotles philosophy. For Aristotle, Substance is the union of matter and form, and beings are a composite of soul and body, Aristotle (1985; 1986). For an accurate account of the question of the principium individuationis in Scholastic philosophy, see Spade (1994).

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mind and the body, the ego and the super ego, vital and psychic forms of life, ascribing to one of these a privileged status. Simondon does not only refute this division, but more significantly, the validity of these categories as a such. In order to re-formulate the paradigm of the individual, Simondons move is radical. He does not propose the re-theorisation of a specific theory or concept, remaining anchored within a particular philosophical tradition. By contrast, he constructs an alternative ontology, which introduces novel conceptions of materiality, subjectivity, life, ethics and politics. The novelty of Simondons philosophical project, first of all, is the different questions that guide his inquiry; and also the new categories of thought, around which he constructs his philosophy. In his ontology of individuation, Simondon uniquely adapts cybernetic theories, particularly influential in his time, Pre-Socratic physics and Merleau-Pontys notions of the body and perceptions. As anticipated, the fundamental concern of Simondon is the unveiling the process of individuation, which is the only possibility for knowing the individual. More importantly, Simondon relocates the genesis and development of the singular human being within the more complex process of production of nature, that is, reality. This has two essential implications. Firstly, the assumption of the inheritance of all singularities within the structure of nature delineates a primordial common mass of undifferentiated energies and movements at the basis of the process of individuation, from which individual thought, body, flowings of time, space, affectivity, humankind and community emerge. Simondon calls this primordial mass the pre-individual. Secondly, this brings about the discovery of the collective realm as the constitutive element of the process of individuation. More accurately, the collective is the exclusive condition of actualisation and further differentiation of beings, which signifies and re-signifies the potentials and degrees of energy embodied by the preindividual mass of power. The collective is concrete, plural and extremely powerful, through and within which the individual emerges and lives. The significance of the collective concerns the recognition of the relational tendency of every form of life, and more importantly the way in which this is generative element of individuation.

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Relation is the cornerstone of an individual, and also the force that drives the entire process of individuation from the biological, psychic and social phases. The centrality given to the notion of relation by Simondon delineates how his ontology contains in itself political and ethical nuances. Although he does not address explicitly political theses, his inquiry indicates the strategy, upon which political theory and praxis might be constructed. As aforementioned, further characteristics of Simondons ontology of individuation are the distinct categories of thought adopted for investigating the process of individuation. Simondon finds untenable traditional formulae of the I, the self, the mind, matter and the body for describing the becoming of nature and thereby the individual. Simondon recovers the notions of allagmatic movements, transduction and information from the domains of cybernetics, the theory of information, biophysics and ontology. In order to re-found the paradigm of relation and thereby its pivotal role within the process of individuation, Simondon employs the allagmatic theory of information and the concept of transduction. These enable Simondon to highlight the process through which exchanges of energies between states of beings gives rise to relational conditions, upon which the collective is formed. In turn, these structure more complex phases of individuation (Combes, 1999: 28-32). In Simondons appropriation, transduction means exchanges and creations of new quantities of energies between beings and states of beings (Mackenzie, 2002). In each of these transductive movements, the quantity of energy exchanged and formed is defined as a disparate degree. The disparate is precisely an excess of heterogeneity and potentials, which emerges from the composition between phases of being and individuals. More accurately, the disparate delineates a certain quantity of power, which exceeds a preceding phase of individuation. In turn, this excess of heterogeneity sets in motion a new moment of individuation.34 The notion of the

34

There is disparation when two twin sets that cannot be entirely superimposed, such as the left retinal image and the right retinal image, which are grasped together as system, allowing for the formation of a single set of a higher degree which integrates their elements thanks to a new dimension (Simondon 2007, quoted in Toscano, 2006: 139).

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disparate is the fundamental category within Simondons ontology, through which he characterises the vital, psychic and social aspects of an individual. The disparate explains the status and role of the individual within the process of individuation (Toscano, 2006: 136-147). 35 These themes of transductive movements and the disparate structure of beings are directed related with Simondons more general re-theorisation of the concept of information. In Simondons theory of individuation, information replaces notions of form, language and communication as sources of meaning, action and, more generally, relations. In his application, information becomes recognised not as transmission of coded messages but as a passage from one state to another. The exchanges of potentials between disparate beings imply a transmission of information, which is productive of a more complex state of individuation. In this sense, information allows a transmission of grades of intensity (Toscano, 2006: 142147; Garelli, 1994: 50-62). These exchanges and excesses of power and heterogeneity maintain the equilibrium of the system constantly in tension. Specifically, Simondon defines the collective field shaped by a metastable equilibrium. Metastability connotes a regime of pure potentiality (a false equilibrium), which calls for the creation of more articulated structures able to actualise the potential energies created in the already constituted order (Simondon, 2007: 31-33). These are the main categories of thought, which guide Simondons ontology of individuation. Furthermore, an understanding of these notions is essential for our inquiry into Spinozas theory of the individual. Taking into account these new elements introduced by Simondon, let us investigate how these effectively operate within the development of an individual.

35

Simondons concept of the disparate will play an important role in Deleuzes theory of individuation (see for example Deleuze, 2004a: 307-329).

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1.2 Ontology and ontogenesis of relation: Vital and psychic processes of collective individuation

Simondons ontology of individuation is espoused in his book Lindividuation psychique et collective la lumire des notion de Forme, Potentiel et Mtastabilit (1989) (The psychic and collective individuation in the light of the notions of Form, Potentiality and Metastability), which constitutes the culmination of his doctoral studies. The inquiry is constructed around the fundamental claim of knowing the individual through individuation rather than individuation through the individual (Simondon, 2007: 12). It is for this reason that Simondons ontology commences with presenting a thesis upon Being. This delineates the path through which Being passes from an undifferentiated position (Simondon will say aphasic, 2007: 13) towards an actualised and heterogeneous dimension. For Simondon, the phases of actualisation and differentiation correspond to moments of individuation, which derive from the excess of heterogeneous potentiality embodied within the metastable equilibrium. Simondons recognition of the phases of individuation as expression of unresolved power delineates his different approach to the question of the commencement of reality. This is not conceived as the disclosure of Being into the world; either the move of the I that reflecting upon itself, discovers nature. It is instead a process of individuation inherent within the material world, through which contingency, heterogeneity and potentials populate the speechless territory of Being. Central to the analysis of the becoming of Being-reality is the theory of ontogenesis. Ontogenesis is a branch of biology, which studies the development of an organism from its earliest stages (its genesis) to maturity.36 Simondon brings the meaning of ontogenesis back to its original Greek signification, that is, literally the birth (genesis) of being (ontos) (Combes, 1999: 10-25; Ansell Pearson, 1999: 90-96). The return of ontogenesis to the domain of ontology discloses the alternative strategy followed by Simondon. This refers to Simondons treatment of every expression of life as an important part of a more complex and common process of individuation. For Simondon, the analysis of the germinal life of beings (to use Asell Pearsons
36

For an accurate account of ontogenesis and phylogeny, see Gould (1977).

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phrase) is crucial within an inquiry upon the dynamics of individuation. This delineates the modes through which the development of any individual enriches the becoming of reality, which introduces unpredicted elements of heterogeneity and contingency. Ontogenesis also brings to light the shared ground from which singularities emerge. It implies the recognition of the relational structure of beings at every stage of individuation. Therefore, Simondons recovery of ontogenesis from biology reveals his intention to study the anatomy of relationality, and the multiple ways in which this is productive of transformations. In this fashion, Simondon distinguishes two fundamental phases of individuation: vital and psychic. These stages do not proceed through a causal progression, dialectical play and evolution towards the better. Each moment is characterised by levels of heterogeneity and potentials, through which transductive movements generate a complex state that in turn exceeds in a new more problematic structure. Importantly, the novel equilibrium formed is not more perfect than the previous one but simply more complicated, which means more heterogeneous and powerful. In this sense, differences between vital and psychic forms of life, organic and non organic beings reside in the degree of potentials remained to be released, which sets forth further problems, movements and transformations (Simondon, 2007: 22-30). In both phases, the process of individuation unfolds through and within a collective field, within which potentials are actualised into novel beings. This collective is both the individual and the environment and at the same time it is more than the individual and the environment. As mentioned above, the collective is a relational condition, which is powerful source of biological, psychic and social meanings, tensions and becoming. Furthermore, the collective delineates the role of an individual within the general process of individuation. This refers to the complication of the collective structure through new problems and solutions. The presence of the individual within the collective means the actualisation of unexpressed degrees of power contained within the metastable equilibrium, and also the emergence of further levels of heterogeneity derived from the disparate status of beings. This

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moves both the individual and the collective toward more complex phases of individuation. For this, the individual, Simondon claims, is an open domain, which is nuanced intensively by a variety of heterogeneous potentiality. Vital process of individuation: The refusal of the inert matter and rehabilitation of the organic We have discussed previously that the role of relation is the cornerstone of Simondons ontology of individuation, which organises the equilibrium of both the individual and collective field. Simondon traces the origins of this spontaneous relational disposition of beings from a non individuated matter, which is common to all individuals and ground of individuation. Simondon defines this undifferentiated mass the pre-individual. This is an unlimited source of heterogeneous potentiality, which accompanies the individual in all his phases of individuation (Barthlmy, 2005: 37-48).37 In order to explain the pre-individual, Simondon sends us back to the Ancient Greek notion of Apeiron (Simondon, 2007: 196-197). The notion of Apeiron was formulated originally by Anaximander in the 6th century BC. He uses the term in his physics, in order to describe the genesis of the world (cosmos). By Apeiron Anaximander means an endless and undetermined natural mass, through which every element (water, air, fire) comes to light. In this sense, the Apeiron is a generating source of production, which inheres within nature. Simondons reference to Anaximander acquires great importance in our search for contemporary model of materialism, within which the re-positioning of the meaning of the individual might be predicated. Firstly, the citation of the Apeiron denotes Simondons fidelity to the conception of nature as productivity itself. Secondly, as the Apeiron is an indeterminate and never-ending quantity of mass, this means, in contemporary language, that nature-matter is becoming, production, and,
37

Concerning Simondons notion of pre-individuality, Massumi defines this as the emergent dimension, which is out of phase (Massumi, 2002a: 208-256). Similarly, Ansell Pearson refers to the pre-individual realm as the ground of potential forms of life, see Ansell Pearson (1999: 90-96).

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consequently, power. Unlike Aristotle and more generally the hylomorphic tradition of thought, considered in itself, the power of matter is entirely intelligible. It is a source of production, through which space, time, history and humankind come to light. The meaning of the Apeiron is crucial for our understanding of Simondons notion of the pre-individual. If the pre-individual reality resembles Anaximanders Apeiron, this leads one to think of the status of the pre-individual as pure intensity and power, which is importantly matter itself. In this light, matter discloses an unconditional force, which traverses even individuated beings. Further, this pre-individual force shapes both the collective and the singular, which means the impossibility of theorising the development of an individual without the becoming of the collective (Simondon, 2007: 196-197). As a main consequence, the notion of the pre-individual involves the re-signification of the world of the organic and the importance of the vital process of individuation. If matter is surrounded by a form of entropy, the organic is structured by this form of potentiality as well. This implies the renewal interest in the organic world not as a place of mechanical and biological functions, instead as a system of transductive exchanges of disparate degrees of energy and metastability. Furthermore, Simondons rehabilitation of the organic and materiality brings to light his dismissal of the definition of inert matter, which directly involves a more extensive account of the relation between living and non living forms of life. The study of organic structure is cogent not because it expresses human characters potentially; rather, for the potentiality and relational transformations that connote its domain. It is for this reason that Simondons ontology of individuation begins with an inquiry into the vital process of individuation. The importance of his arguments, for the purpose of this work, concerns the application of the notions of intensity, exchanges of energy and collective to the vital individual. In order to define the individual, Simondon adopts the physical notion of quantum. In this sense, there is an individual insofar as there is a variation and successive

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propagation of energy between and within quanta. For Simondon, for example, the crystal might be rightly identified as an individual, because it satisfies the instances of intensity, pre-individual mass and collective field in tension (metastable) (Simondon, 2007: 83-84). In this light, the crystal does not connote a mere geometrical form, but instead a dynamic organization, which is open to further individuation. Further, the structure of the crystal as a knot of intensity, disparation, pre-individuality and collective organisation brings into light its relational status (Hottois, 1996: 7-24). This is a very crucial move within the general theory of individuation, which indicates the distinctive paradigm of materialism presented by Simondon. This refers to the reinstatement of the value of biological life. Given its dynamic and powerful structure, a biological reality is not less important than ethical, theoretical and social life; either this acquires meaningful position as expression of political and psychic gestures potentially. Simondon re-focuses attention to biological life as it is. This is powerful, relational and fundamentally plural, which, given its relational level, is somewhat already political. In this way, Simondon rejects not only the mere divide between organic and nonorganic forms of life, but more significantly the uncontested Aristotelian classification of the genres of life into political and biological, for which only the former deserves to be lived and defended.38 Simondon certainly does not explicitly claim that the biological life is political, nevertheless he tell us that it is relational, problematic and thus productive of forces, and new possibilities. It is through these confluences of different movements that the cogency of biological existence lies. Our awareness of the great relevance of every expression of life, I think, has to be included within contemporary materialist discourses concerning the search for a different grammar of the individual.

38

Concerning the Aristotelian categorisation of human life, I follow Agambens critique. He envisages in the Aristotelian model the origin of the division of the unity of life in political and non political, within which solely the latter occupies a privileged status (Agamben, 1998: 15-30). I will return to the political implication derived from this distinction between forms of life in chapter V.

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Psychic and collective process of individuation: The Power of Affects and Emotions Similar to the vital process of individuation, the process of psychic individuation is, first of all, collective articulated through intensity, transduction, the disparate and the pre-individual matter. It is in this context that Simondon gives a very complex account of the status of emotions and affectivity within the psychic process of collective individuation, and also the ways in which these activate novel relational movements, meanings and individuals. In the analysis of the psychic process of individuation, Simondon inaugurates (a not always explicit) dialogue with Freud and Marx. Related particularly to Freud and his heirs, Simondon fiercely rejects the notions of unconscious, within which a knot of unknown conflicting forces and desires orient the individual into the world. More accurately, he accuses the psychoanalytic approach of splitting psychic life into an interiority and exteriority, locating the power of an individual within an obscure and self-organised unit (Simondon, 2007: 97-100). By contrast, Simondon re-situates psychic life in the publicity of the collective. As we have analysed above, in the collective field transductive movements of differentiation and complication give rise to unsuspected individual realities. For Simondon, the psychic process of individuation is equally traversed by these transformations (Simondon, 2007: 98-104). A psychic being emerges and lives within relational conditions, which expose its pre-individual reserve of being to the multiplicity and commonalities of the collective.39 For Simondon, then, there is a process of psychic individuation insofar as an individual perceives, acts or makes other beings.40

39

By reserve of being, Simondon means a quantity of undifferentiated power, which persists within the individuated individual (Simondon, 2007: 106-135). 40 In his Du monde dexistence des objets techniques (1958), Simondon defines as phases of psychic individuation the interaction between the technical objects and the individual. The re-evaluation of the technical objects undeniably indicates, in different ways, the influences of Marxs notion of the General Intellect, and also Heideggers account of Dasein and technique. For a complete analysis of the differences and similarities between Simondon, Marx and Heidegger, see particularly Virno (2004: 34-47, 78-81).

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Simondon claims that the core of psychic life is positioned in the dynamics of emotions and affectivity. As psychic individuation is always in relation, both emotions and affectivity establish practises of participation within the collective domain. To participate involves to share and exchange information. These exchange and alterations of information transform the psychic individual (Massumi, 2002a: 121, 229-230; Manning, 2007: 90-109). Affectivity and emotions, Simondon argues, are precisely transformations, which model the psychic life of the individual within the collective.41 The significance of this claim concerns, that the affective-emotive unit becomes acknowledged as a source of psychic beings as concepts, imagination, memory and spirituality. If emotion and affect structure the psychic realm, it follows that the notions of emotion and affectivity bring into the collective field more complex meanings, which re-organise the metastable structure of psychic beings. It is through affectivity and emotion that being comes to experience the world and others. In this sense, affectivity and emotion do not inhere within an already constituted individual, these are not internal parts of an individual being; rather these are located in the interstices between an individual, the collective context and the pre-individual. Simondon distinguishes between the role of affectivity, emotion and perception within psychic individuation. Furthermore, it is in context that Simondon raises the question of the body. For Simondon, the vision of the body as organised unit is a pure conjecture (Simondon, 2007: 137-149). The body is a mixture of different and relational grades of intensity. Strictly speaking, the body is a plurality of complex relations (perceptive, affective and emotional), which shape the actions and passions of the psychic individuals (Simondon, 2007: 138-143).42

41

Affectivity-emotion [affectivo-motivit] is not solely the repercussion of the result of the action in the internal structure of the individual being; it is a transformation, it plays an active role: it expresses the relation between the two domains of the same subject. Affectivity-emotion modifies the action according to this relation, harmonizing it, making the effort also to harmonize the collective [translation mine] (Simondon, 2007: 106). 42 Simondons description of the body and its inheritance with cognitive activities reflects the influence of the Phenomenology of Perception (1945) of Merleau-Ponty. Exemplary is Simondons reference to the case of the eye, which involves the functions of seeing/observing, (Simondon, 2007: 138).

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The theme of affectivity, in Simondon, is manifold. He replaces the meaning of affectivity as expression of desire (Eros) and fear of death (Thanatos), heritage of certain psychoanalytic discourses, with those of relation and tension. Affects delineate the tension between two forms of heterogeneity the one of the preindividual and the other of the individual. For Simondon, this tension founds spirituality. The treatment of affectivity as source of spirituality casts doubt on an entire tradition of thought, which explains desires and affects as a defence of the individual from the innate fear of death. In Simondons reformulation, spirituality emerges from the domain of affectivity and connotes the problematic relation between the individual and the pre-individual. This refers to the two-fold condition of the singular being, within which he perceives himself perceptibly smaller and contemporaneously inherent within the pre-individual matter. It is in this problematic relation that the desire for eternity, and not of death, comes to light (Simondon 2007: 104-111). If the individual is frightened by the pre-individuated mass, at the same time, this pre-individual mass exists within the individual as a part of his reserve of being. This fluctuating phase brings about a form of recognition between the individual and its pre-individual realm, which gives rise to the emergence of eternity. In the history of philosophy, Simondon observes, many notions have been proposed. The Scholastic and, in different ways, the Cartesian arguments of the immortality of the mind, soul and intellect greatly exemplify the attempt to explain the encounter between the preindividual and the individual (Simondon, 2007: 104-105). It is solely Spinoza, Simondon affirms, who fully understood before his contemporaries the dynamics of the psychic state of eternity (Simondon, 2007: 104). In the proposition sentimus experimurque nos aeternos esse (Nevertheless, we feel and experience that we are eternal, E.V, prop. XXIII, Scholium.), Simondon recognises, Spinoza has given voice to the reality of a crucial phase within the psychic life of beings. Beside the arguments of eternity and what is eternal, Simondons focus is upon the unveiling of the mechanisms, which lie at the very heart of spirituality. Spirituality expresses the problematic status of the individual, which is constantly in the middle

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between the universal and the particular, between the pre-individual and the collective. It is in this context that the process of collective psychic individuation takes place. The collective is crucial for the complete development of psychic individuation. If affectivity defines the relation between the pre-individual mass and the forming individual, it is the power of emotion that moves the individual towards acting, thinking and orienting himself within the world. This process occurs only within and through the collective, which functions as mediator between the pre-individual and the individuated reality. Thus, emotion is a more complex relation, which complicates the order of the real. It is in this moment that Simondon introduces his notion of transindividuality as the founding condition of psychic individuation. The transindividual anatomy of the individual The theme of the transindividual occupies a pivotal role within Simondons inquiry upon the conditions of psychic and collective individuation. The transductive dimension of emotion unveils its tendency towards transindividuality, which encompasses knowledge, affectivity, emotions and the spiritual life of the collective. The fundaments of the transindividual are emotion and affectivity, which operate within the collective, bringing the individual towards further moments of individuation (Simondon, 2007: 106-111). In this sense, the role of the transindividual runs from the pre-individual, through the individual, to the collective and vice versa, without however coinciding with these categories. It structures precisely the relation between the pre-individual and the individual moving the individual from an initial disorienting state between individuality and preindividuality to an encounter with the collective. For Simondon the transindividual force corresponds to phases of psychic individuation, structured through the role of the couple emotions-affectivity. Furthermore, the transindividual operates within the collective itself. As discussed, the structure of individuals is disparate: they are essentially asymmetric. In the

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collective, the action of the transindividual is focused on the integration of these disparate degrees of intensity into more problematic structure, which incorporates potentials and metastabilities that in turn articulate more problematic phase of collective individuation. Simondon distinguishes between interindividuality and transindividuality. Whilst the interindividual relation goes from one individual to another, the transindividual action penetrates individuals.43 It makes individuals resemble a system, and enriches the structure with new potentials and metastabilities. We must emphasise that for Simondon the transindividividual is prior to any ethical or social individual tendency towards the group. It is the action of the transindividual that resolves the excess of potentialities and metabilities of previous phases of individuation. Therefore, in Simondons analysis, the relation between individuals is not explained through the linkage between already formed individuals. Rather, it is the process of individuation via the transindividual that brings forward unexpected assemblages of intensity, pre-individual mass and metastabilities. In other words, during the process of individuation from the vital to the psychic one, pre-individual potentials still greatly exceed the individual being. These preindividual masses of intensity maintain a constant order of asymmetry, which articulates-literally problematises- further moments of individuation. It is in this asymmetry, thus, with its excess of potentialities that the notion of relations lies. The transindividual action structured through the emotive context actualises the relational status (the disparation between emotive states) of emotion throughout the psychic individuation. For this relational nature of emotion, the process of psychic individuation cannot be conceived other than collective, which places the quasiindividual being permanently in the middle of pre-individuality and collective individual. For this account of the individual as constantly exposed, the process of individuation brings about the discovery of the amphibian character of individuality
43

The interindividual relation goes from individual to individual; it does not permeate individuals; the transindividual action is that which makes it, so that individuals exist together as the elements of a system that carries potentials and metastability, [], then the discovery of a structure and a functional organization that integrates and resolves the problematic of incorporated immanence. []. The transindividual does not localise individuals; it makes them coincide; it makes individuals communicate through significations[translation mine] (2007: 191-192).

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(Virno, 2004: 78-80). Individuality is permanently in the middle between generality and particularities, pre-individual force and collective plane. The hecceity of an individual (human being or not) lies precisely on this being permanently in the middle. This leads one to think the quidditas of an individual being as series of complex relations between disparate grades of intensity, which operate in the interstices between vital and the psychic levels. New possibilities for the individual of the present Taking into account Simondons complex theory of individuation, we might raise some conclusions. The importance of Simondons theory concerns his gesture of refounding the paradigm of relation itself. Simondon does not address the question of why individuals enter into relation, either whether or not human nature is relational. Simondons philosophical gesture is the analysis of the ontological status of relation itself. Simondon raises important questions concerning relationality itself, and consequently how it is possible to signify the reality of relation. These guiding questions bring Simondon to reject the anthropomorphic and zoomorphic definitions of relation. The essence of relation brings about the discovery that behind the transformations within the material world there are relational states and movements. In this fashion, the theme of individuation as a process of transformations is a becoming of disparate forms of relation. There is individuation insofar as there are relational events. As the place of transformations, nature is therefore a system of complex and dynamic relations, which individualise and problematise individuals. Our awareness of the material world as a relational framework might improve the contemporary vocabulary of materialist philosophy. In this sense, the arguments, I will develop in this chapter and the following ones, aim to offer a contribution to this grammar. The theme of relation becomes crucial, when Simondon passes to analyse psychic individuation. Since relation is the generative source of psychic life, emotion and affectivity found the psychic life of beings. Simondons arguments of emotion and

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affectivity is based the assumption that these are prior to individuated being. Emotional and affective activities pass through the individual without inhering within them. This means that different emotional states are in truth moments of individuation, without which the process of individuation would not take place. Simondons theory of emotion and affectivity imply a quite different understanding of the relational and emotive constitution of the individual, upon which novel ethical and political theories should be predicated. Theorising the relational and individuating role of emotion sheds light on the vital function of the emotional and affective realm for the genesis and development of the individual being in its political and ethical aspects. Furthermore, Simondons view brings to light the collective dimension of emotion, which pervades every social and political organisation. The consequence of Simondons arguments calls to question theories of the social contract as the basis of civil society; and those ethical and anthropological conjectures, which rely on the definition of the human nature as social and egotistical. Taking into account the main arguments and implications of Simondons philosophy of individuation, the questions, I will now pass to analyse, concern how and to what extent his ontological categories might clarify Spinozas theories of knowledge, conatus, bodies and affects. The question specifically arises as to whether a reading of Ethics through Simondon might enable us to discover important arguments for materialist conceptions of the individual, politics, ethics and history. In the following section, I will examine how an interpretation of Spinoza via Simondons philosophy will raise important theses upon the richness of the expressions of Spinozas geometry of affects, to which contemporary thought should pay greater attention. In order to looking for an adequate language of affectivity able to express its materiality and cogency, the claim I will develop in the section below, is that Spinozas thought through Simondonian lenses offers crucial theoretical resources.

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2. The Ethics: An ontology of individuation

Spinozas theory of the individual is developed from part II to part V of the Ethics. In part II, he delineates the path of mind, through which it acquires progressively the self-knowledge and the knowledge of the world. Spinoza here gives an account of the constitution of both adequate and inadequate ideas, and the role of the body for the attainment of knowledge. The main problem of this second part concerns the status of the body in Spinozas thought. Spinoza describes the body as a complex mixture of multiple parts (literally individuals) (E. II, postulate I), which are transformed continuously. If the body is the ground of self-awareness and knowledge of the world, the question arises what form of knowledge derives from this constitution of the body as plural and complex assemblage. In parts III, Spinoza analyses the constitution of affects and passions and how these might affect the achievement of rationality. It is also in this section that Spinoza explains the theory of imagination and how this affects our selfawareness and the perception of others. In part IV, Spinoza describes the importance of rationality and positive affects as joy and love for the complete development of human nature, within which freedom lies. In order to gain freedom, common values and practises must be exercised, which constitute the ground of the rational faculties. It is in this context that Spinoza affirms Man is God to man(E. IV, prop. XXXV, schol.). Furthermore, in part IV Spinozas denials of the ascetic life and suicide are fiercely predicated (E. IV, prop. XIX, XX, XXI, XXII). The problems of both part III and IV concern the status of affects and role of imagination. The definitions of imagination and affects in the Ethics are somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, Spinoza affirms that imagination and affects produce confuse and partial knowledge. On the other hand, imagination and affects sets forth actions, and mechanisms of recognition of the other, memory or perception. What truly lies at the very basis of imagination?

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The focus of part V of the Ethics addresses the conditions, through which men might attain the Amor Dei Intellectualis (the intellectual love of God). This final section of the Ethics is crucial for the understanding of Spinozas conception of humankind. The complexity of this part does not concern obscure arguments, rather the difficulty concerns what Spinoza means by intellectual love of God. Should the intellectual love of God be understood as knowledge of nature, or rather an uprising of human mind towards Being. One might argue that this love of God expresses the reconciliation of man with Substance without passing through the material world. It is in this part that Spinoza affirms the eternity of human mind (E. V, prop. XXII, XXIII). The difficulty is what Spinoza means by his Nevertheless we feel and experience that we are eternal [italics mine] (E., V, prop. XXIII, schol.). Central for determining the problematics involved within Spinozas theory of the individual indicated above is the theme of affectivity, which functions as a bridge between the parts of the Ethics. Furthermore, Spinozas thesis of affectivity constitutes the basis, upon which his politics and ethics are developed. Thus, the understanding of the role of affects and passions within the Ethics is crucial for examining his political stakes and philosophy of praxis. Taking into account the importance of affectivity, let us flesh out the dynamics of affects and passions and the ways in which these have interpreted. Geometry of Affects and its problems Following the Ethics parts III and IV, Spinoza gives a detailed description of the origins and role of affects and passions, and some of the ways in which these may affect rational life. Moreover, in part III Spinoza explains the theory of conatus, which characterises every creature in the world (E. III, prop. V, VI, VII, VIII). Spinoza distinguishes between passion and action and how these produce a varied typology of affects such as joy, hate, love, sadness, hope and fear (E. III, Def. I, II, III). The difference between passions and affects concerns the quality

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of the action, which derives from the prevalence between passions and affects (E., III prop. I). Accordingly, we are passive when our actions are hetero-directed, and we confuse cause and effect. It means that our actions are not oriented into the world consciously, diminishing the power of acting and increasing the power of suffering. In this case the kind of emotions originated is called passions (E. III, postulate I). Conversely, we are active when we are the adequate cause of our action. In this case, we distinguish causes and effects and our actions within the world are self-determined. The kind of emotions originated is affects, which increase our power of action (E, III, Def. I, II, III). These are the bases, upon which Spinozas conception of affectivity is constructed. Concerning these arguments, many interpretations have been proposed, each of which has attributed to affectivity a different role within the general theory of humankind elaborated by Spinoza. These might be divided into rationalistanalytic reading, which has been challenged recently by a cognitive approach and a political interpretation of the geometry of affects. These contemporary modes of examining claim the centrality of the body, imagination, passions and affects within Spinozas theory of knowledge and politics, envisaging a certain affinity between his philosophy and current theories of the embodiment of the mind and political emancipation. For a rationalist approach, Spinoza provides a rigorous study of the power of the mind and the ways in which this founds and further enriches human nature (Smith, 1997 and 2003; Israel, 2002 and 2006; Curley, 1998). In this way, Spinozas geometry of affects indicates a method for governing passions and increasing the attainment of rationality (James, 1997: 131-150). If the analysis of passions might lead one to read Spinozas tendency towards the suppression or at least the dominance of these, nevertheless the relation of causality between positive affects such as joy and love and rationality remains obscure. If passions of fear, hope and hate prevent the development of human nature, the question

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arises as to how affects of joy and love instead give rise to rationality. Following the rationalist view, both passions and affects restrain the enrichment of the rational faculties, which contrasts with the assumptions of the Ethics. Furthermore, in stressing the importance of reason, the problem is that Spinoza does not offer a clear definition of rationality. He instead describes the effects, which derives from a life under reason. In this sense, parts IV and V offer several examples concerning rational practices, which eventually lead to a responsible form of living in common with others. In this description of rational life, however, Spinoza does not mention the suppression of imagination, or the passage from imagination to rationality. Importantly, the body in both imagination and rationality remains the constant instrument of fruition of ideas and imaginations (E. III, prop. X, XI, XII). The rationalist approach does not further address the question of the body, which cuts through ideas and imaginations. The body is important not only as the linkage between imaginative and rational practices, rather the value of body lies in its structure and potentialities. The body is, for Spinoza, pure multiplicity of actions, thoughts, passions and affects (E. II, prop. XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV), and to this role the rationalist portrait of Spinoza cannot offer adequate explanations. In contrast to this rationalist reading, recent studies have re-situated the relevance of the notions of the body and imagination within Spinozas psychology, ethics and politics. These themes have been assimilated to a certain aspects of cognitive psychology or psychoanalytic thought (Damasio, 2004), Lacanian analysis (Zizek, 2004a: 33-40), Althusserian political theory (Balibar, 1985 and 2002; Montag, 1999; Matheron, 1988; Negri 1998) and even a certain feminist theory (Irigaray 1997, Gatens and Lloyds 1999). Despite the several differences, these explanations of the Ethics share the convictions of the fundamental role the body as the realm of the self-knowledge, the importance of imaginative practises and emotions for the understanding of human social and

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political behaviour. The rediscovery of the importance of these notions contributes to the understanding of the complexity of Spinozas materialist account of the individual. In this fashion, Spinozas propositions of the relation between body and mind and the dependence of the minds faculties on bodys actions and passions have been considered as precursory arguments of certain contemporary theories of the embodiment of thought (Loyds and Gatens, 1999:11-28). Following this view, the body plays the fundamental role of creating, modelling and orienting human actions and thoughts. Further, the body becomes the place, upon which individuals enter into relations with the world. Stressing the importance of the body, passions and affects, the imaginative life acquires great significance for the development of human faculties. Thus, Spinozas notion of human being is a mixture of thought and emotions, which are moulded upon bodys capacities of acting and entering into relations with others. The main implication of this approach concern the reinstatement of the role of the body for the enrichment of knowledge, and the rediscovery of emotions as founding elements of ethical, psychological and political practises. The first kind of knowledge, imagination, is the place, within which these mixtures of thoughts, bodies, actions and passions emerge. In contrast with the rationalist portrait of Spinoza, the theory of imagination encompasses to some extent both rationality and affectivity. In this sense, imagination is not negative or positive per se, rather it has neutral value. This is the realm of forming conditions such as ideas, emotions and relations (Deleuze, 1993: 217-272). Although the stimulating analysis of this cognitive approach has led to the recovery of Spinoza s dynamics of imagination and body, however, I think that two problems still remain unsolved. Firstly, the difficulty arises on the political implications emerging from Spinozas theory of imagination as the ground of psychological habits. Secondly, if Spinozas attention to the dynamics of imagination and the body certainly delineates psychological and cognitive states,

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however these are not based on the definition of the individual as an already constituted unit, but rather as a more complex and multisided structure. If the psychological reading of Spinozas geometry of affects does not further articulate these questions, a post-Althusserian reading offers a more extensive account of the potentiality of the body and also the role of affects and imagination within the formation of political behaviours. A political Reading of the theme of affectivity As discussed in chapter II, the discovery of the political status of Spinozas theory of imagination is largely indebted to the reflections of Althusser (1976), which open the way to the understanding of Spinozas first kind of knowledge as a condition of different forms of political and social interaction. In Spinoza, Althusser sustains, the domain of imagination is two-sided. This is the source of both ideology and social cohesion, to which contemporary Marxist discourses should pay great attention (Althusser, 1976: 137-142). Following Althussers suggestions, thinkers as Balibar, Matheron, Moreau, Macherey, Negri and to some extent Deleuze, view, on the one side, Spinozas descriptions of the imaginative life as generative of common beliefs, knowledge and forms of resistance. On the other, through the analysis of affectivity and imagination Spinoza denounces the dark side of any form of power (political or religious). In order to maintain and gain power, the existing authority sets forth a system surreptitiously, which enhances certain affects within a community such as hope, gratitude and fear (Balibar, 1998: 11-69; 2002: 13-40). In this light, parts III and IV of the Ethics prepare the terrain for the political analysis of the two treatises, bringing to light the connection between ontological and political arguments within a materialist perspective. These approaches to Spinozas theory of imagination fully explore the political implications behind the Ethics, delineating the ontological ground of his political thought and the political relevance of ontological principles. If the imaginative

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practises in the Ethics describe the founding elements of a community in both aspects of manipulation and social cohesion, however the question still remains how human beings can pass from a passive condition (sadness or hate) to an active one. Strictly speaking, the problem arises on what conditions (if any) human beings become joyful and rational beings. Following both readings (cognitive and political) of Spinozas theory of imagination, it seems that the dynamics of affectivity illustrates social, political and psychological behaviours, through which human life is moulded. The affect of joy and love, for example, move the individual towards the recognition of other beings as a fundamental part for the development of individuality. The passions of sadness or fear, instead, separate the individual from others, diminishing its physical and psychological structure (Deleuze, 1992: 217-270). These contemporary readings of Spinoza bring into light the relational nature of affectivity. Affectivity plays the fundamental role of orienting and relating the individual to and within others and the environment (Deleuze, 1992: 201-270). However, affectivity involves at same time passivity, which decreases the power of the individual. Therefore, the question arises as whether there is any causal relation, or passage in the Ethics, between the condition of passivity and activity, and between these two with rationality. Furthermore, assuming the relational status of Spinozas notion of affectivity in both psychological and socio-political aspects, many problems arise. What are the origins of emotions, precisely what truly lies at the very heart of passions, affects and imagination? Following these readings, what definitions of the individual come out form Spinozas parts III and IV of the Ethics? To put this in Simondonian language, through this analysis of imagination, rationality, passions and affects, what can we know of the individual? Considering emotions, imagination and rationality as actions between already formed individuals leads one to read in the Ethics ethical or psychological figures. In this sense, we might encounter the religious individual (fear and

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hope), the lover, the friend, the Hobbesian wolf, and the philosopher. Reading the Ethics, however, no one would find a definitive description of the ways in which affects, passions and imagination impact upon the ethical and psychological life of individuals. Rather, we might discover a variety of affective tones, each of which intensively pervades human life. More accurately, in the Ethics, to a specific affect such as fear or hope does not correspond a distinct psychic and ethical individuality, instead, a multitude of unsuspected affective actions and meanings.44 Concerning these questions, we need to take a fresh approach. I think that on the one side, the relational status of both affectivity and rationality, and on the other the multiple modes of actualisation and differentiation of Being lay on a more complex system, which undeniably impacts on psychological, ethical and political practises. This complex process, which encompasses the multiplicity of Substance, the geometry of affects and rationality, discloses Spinozas process of individuation. It is in this context that the originality of Spinoza lies. As his system of production is developed through multiple phases and modes of Being, Spinozas focus on the individual is fundamentally, I would argue, an inquiry upon the conditions, through which individual beings come to light. It means that Spinozas theory of the individual has to be thought as a process of individuation rather than a philosophy of individuality. Reading Spinozas thought as process of individuation implies a quite different understanding of the relation between Being, the infinite attributes, modes, body, thought and imagination. Moreover, in the Ethics and importantly in the political treatises no one would find an explicit description of individuality or what ought to be a human being (Balibar, 1994: 3-37).45 Assuming Spinozas philosophy, particularly parts III and IV of the Ethics, as a theory of individuality leads one to consider the system of the Ethics fragmented into various, although connected, fields and subfields. As a main consequence,
44 45

In chapter IV, I will give a detailed account of these affective tones. The theme of individuality in Spinozas political thought will be discussed in chapters IV and V.

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we would recognise in the Ethics a doctrine of Substance and attributes, a theory of knowledge, physics, a psychology, an ethics and even a form of religion (part V). The implications of attuning the Ethics to certain individualistic and hylomorphic positions acquire particularly importance concerning Spinozas conceptions of imagination, body, thought and emotions. These have led to explain Spinozas question of affectivity, as we have seen, grounded and developed through already constituted individuals, and also affects and passions themselves have been viewed as varied forms of individuality. Although these elements undeniably occur in the Ethics, these might be conceived as parts of a more complex process of individuation, which is moulded through the actualisation and differentiation of Being into multiplicity, nature, body, and the relational essence of emotions and rationality. In order to delineate Spinozas theme of individuation, I propose to read the Ethics in the light of Simondon, applying to the Ethics the Simondonian concepts of the collective, transindividuality, pre-individual force, metastability and disparation. Simondons philosophy of individuation, I argue, might enable us to follow the advancement of the propositions of the Ethics from the phases of actualisation and differentiation of Being to the individuation and individualisation of Substance-nature through the multiplicity of the real. This might bring about the discovery of certain themes of the Ethics, which otherwise would remain dormant. Thinking Spinozas system of production in this way will shed light on the question of relation, becoming and collective ground, upon which the realm of the individual lies. Taking into account these elements, let us flesh out the phases of Spinozas process of individuation in depth.

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2.1 A detour of Spinoza via Simondon

Proceeding with Simondons position, in the Ethics part II the individuation of Substance begins precisely with the multiplicity of the attributes. The attributes, as we have seen in chapter II, play the pivotal role of actualising and differentiating Being, which give rise to a re-positioning of Substance, attributes and modes within a more complex process. It is in this context that Being passes from a condition a pure force of production (E. I, prop. XXXIV), towards endless phases of individuation. The role of the attribute in the Ethics, I think, introduce to Substance various and different levels of complexity, which corresponds to the pathways of Being towards its individuations into mixtures of thoughts, bodies, movements and intensity. It is precisely the excess of production that gives rise to the process of individuation. The attributes of thought and extension (E. II, prop. I-II) problematize Substance, bringing in multiplicity, actuality and difference. The complexity, which is introduced through the multiplicity of the attributes, is structured through the emergence of elements of duration (history, past, present, future), thoughts, bodies, singularities, emotions and imagination. These elements are the various modes, which affect Substance (E. I, def. V, E. II, def. I, III, IV, V). Strictly speaking, multiplicity poses a problem to and within Substance, that is, the question of heterogeneity. By definition, modes are actual and different existences (E. I Def. V). In order to resolve the problem of the heterogeneous abundance of beings within Substance, Being is drawn to the encounter with nature (E. II, prop. VII). As Substance is immanent and absolute, however, nature cannot be conceived as product of Being. For this, Spinoza claims the parallelism between nature and God, which does not mean that nature is Substance. Concerning this argument, Spinoza in many places of the Ethics points out the difference between God and nature, for example throughout the divide between natura naturans and natura naturata or the distinction between natures quality of duration and Gods

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eternity, finitude and infinity (E. I, prop. XXIX, schol.). Nevertheless, Spinozas plane of immanence implies at the same time the denial of any form of transcendence, thus nature cannot be thought as an object of Substance. Therefore, the question immediately arises as what are the implications for thinking nature as parallel to God? In order to avoid the return to certain pantheist, naturalist and even acosmist explanations of Spinozas formula of parallelism, I think that Simondons philosophy provides fecund arguments for our understanding of Spinozas question of nature as collective individual. Applying Simondons definitions of the collective, in my view, Spinozas theory of parallelism would acquire greater importance. The encounter between God and nature might be conceived as a phase of the process of individuation. Nature emerges from the indeterminate force of Substance as a problem of heterogeneity (the theory of modes) and contemporaneously individuating condition of Being. Nature, thus, is the ground of heterogeneous elements as mixtures of ideas and bodies, events, human specie and societies, which acts as a collective individual that is espoused to further individuation in turn. As nature is parallel to God (E. II, prop. VII), its role is twofold. As Substance, nature expresses on the one side necessity, power, becoming, self-causation, multiplicity and absolute immanence; and on the other side, as the actualisation of Substance, nature displays the characteristics of an individual being as duration, singular bodies and ideas. In other words, Spinozas conception of nature is both source of individuation and individuated being, which is a process of individuation and elements of individuation. The question of relations and otherness are mainly founded and developed, first of all, within nature and these are prior to the constitution of any form of individual being. This implies a quite different understanding of the material

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world. If nature is shaped through relations, then these are a source of transformations within the world itself and correspond to phases of individuation. Spinoza delineates in part II the constitution of different and actual forms of existences, which he calls broadly singularities (res singulares) (E. II, Def. VII). Assuming nature as a knot of relations prior to the individual, two fundamental questions immediately arise. Firstly, what is the essence of these relations? And what are the implications of posing relations prior to the individual for the process of individuation? In order to fully understand and locate the status of relations within Ethics, Simondonian notions of transduction, intensity, metastability and disparation are crucial. Spinoza tells us that every individual being converges upon speed and rest (E. II, ax. I, II, III, lem. I) and it is ordered through a mixture of fluid and hard masses (E. II, postulates I, II). These elements lead one to conceive nature as an organism organised through different grades of movement. Depending on the amount of fluid or solid elements follows different types of movement from speed to slowness and vice versa. The state of rest, in the Ethics, refers to a seeming condition of absence of movement, which veils in truth a tendency towards motion. These movements give rise to relations between different states of being, and these with the forming individuals within nature (E. II, postulates III, IV, V, VI). It is for this reason that Simondons notion of the collective being provides fundamental theoretical instruments for re-configuring the boundaries of Spinozas notion of nature. Nature is a complex system, which encompasses the genesis of the organic world and at the same time the individuation of thought and matter into ideas, bodies, human beings, imaginations and actions. Moreover, nature is power of acting and thinking, an eternal becoming, in one word, a process of individuation. As mentioned, this process of individuation is collective, and lies at the very basis of his philosophy of nature. The relevance of the notion of collective field is founded on its force of individuation, which takes place precisely within the confluences of movements. Movements of speed and slowness permeate the

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collective realm, structuring relations between beings and states of beings. As movements are the ground of relations, it follows that these are not caused by the encounter between two or more bodies. Relations transform the equilibrium of beings, increasing the level of complexity of the system (E. II, Postulate I). These movements reveal the anomalous status of the Spinozian mode. The status of the mode is, my view, disparate, which means in a continuous state of excess of heterogeneity. It is one and more than one. The movements of speed and slowness bring into light the asymmetric structure of the mode, which tends towards the other modes for actualisation.46 Speed and slowness cause relations between disparate beings (Massumi, 2002a: 1-21, 46-52; Deleuze, 1992: 217-238). In the Ethics, Spinoza claims that the more grades of reality a thing has the more perfect it is (E. II, prop. XIV). It is here that the Simondonian categories of the disparate and transduction are crucial. Spinozas proposition has several important consequences. Firstly, the proposition indicates that the grade of perfection means essentially complexity, which derives from the quantity of heterogeneity introduced by beings within the system. Secondly, the reality of an individual thing, its degree of complexity, relies on disparate states of speed, slowness and rest (for example fluid, hard bodies) or as Simondon would say, different quantities of energy unexpressed (E. II, lem. I, II,). These disparate states move the system towards further individuation, which corresponds to more problematic grades of reality. For this, there are exchanges of energy and alteration of the original structure of the individual (transduction) every time movements of speed and slowness traverse beings and states of Being (E. II, ax. II, III). Thirdly, the question of the disparate grades of reality of an individual implies the refusal of any form of hylomorphism within the Ethics. In the Ethics Spinoza does not refer to an individual as a union of matter and form. From his physics to the geometry of affects there is no form that binds matter. There is, instead, an individual as juncture of different levels of relations within the collective.
46

Similarly, Deleuze in his theory of the encounters emphasizes the relational component of Spinozas theory of the individual (Deleuze, 1992: 201-234).

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Looking at Spinozas theory of mind and the physics of bodies, we might be able to understand how the theme of relations through disparate beings lies at the very heart of psychic and vital individuation. The illusion of the body and the exposure of thought In part II of the Ethics, before analysing the physics of the bodies, Spinoza delineates the genesis of ideas. Spinoza affirms that the first idea of mind is the body (E. II, prop. XI). This proposition has led to various interpretations, which have been generally rested on the view of Spinozas theory of knowledge as the embodiment of thought. As discussed previously, Spinozas proposition of the inseparability between mind and body implies the impossibility of developing knowledge, ideas without passing through the body. Spinozas claim of the dependence between mind and body, on the one side, leads to the reinstatement of the importance of the body as source of knowledge, and on the other side to the renewal of attention to the analysis of bodys faculties. It follows that the bodys capacities are not narrowed to the living functions. For Spinoza, instead, the body encapsulates the action of thinking, imagining and orienting oneself into the world. Through the body, individuals come to experience the world, gaining self-consciousness and a conception of otherness (Balibar, 2002: 149-168). The theme of the central role of the body for the development of knowledge raises very important arguments. Beside the problem of Spinozas supposed theory of the embodiment of thought, which will be discussed soon, his theory of knowledge brings into question, on the one side, Descartess model of the I, and on the other the meaning of matter and form. Spinozas proposition of the body as first object of the mind casts doubt on the Cartesian theory of the cogito, which is the founding principle of knowledge and self-consciousness. For Descartes, it is the action of thinking that establishes self-knowledge and orients individuals within the world. The thinking I is the primary condition of existing, which sets forth the idea of God, science and ethics. The action of the

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thinking I thus orders and orients the encounters between individuals and the world (Descartes, 1996: 68-76, 107-116). In contrast with Descartess notion of the cogito, Spinozas move dismisses the supremacy of the I as source of knowledge, postulating the inseparability of thinking and acting, subject and object. However, Spinozas claim does not imply the materialisation of the category of thought or the spiritualisation of the object. It means, instead, that the enrichment of self-consciousness and knowledge of the world cannot be separated from the bodys actions. In other words, there is no thinking I that founds the existing I, as well as, there is no the object that shapes the I. In Spinoza, there is no form of ontological or epistemic priority between thinking, acting and existing. Self-awareness and knowledge of the world proceed through the co-participation of acting, thinking and existing, which are conceived as functioning within individuals simultaneously. This linkage of thinking, acting and existing moves our discussion to a further question raised by Spinozas propositions, the denial of the Aristotelian and Scholastic theory of the mind or soul as principle of the body. As the mind cannot be assumed as a generative principle of knowledge, it cannot be conceived as the hecceity of an individual, or the form that shapes a body. Defining the body as source of knowledge leads one to re-think the status of the body not as mere matter but rather as the ground of thoughts and actions. It follows that the body, and generally matter, is not the Aristotelian undefined brass, which requires a form. Spinozas view of the body and matter brings about the discovery of the bodys capacities to impact upon the faculties of the mind. For this, Spinoza affirms the priority of knowing the body in order to know the mind. Given this view, one might argue that Spinozas thought anticipates contemporary theories of the embodiment of thought. Spinozas gesture of repositioning the centrality of the body within the theory of knowledge certainly may be understood as the strict dependence of mind, ideas and concept upon the

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individual body. Spinoza appears to portray this conception in several propositions of the Ethics. If Spinoza is a precursor of certain forms of cognitivism or psychoanalysis, however the problem concerns how we should define the body in Spinozas philosophy. Although Spinoza stresses the role of the body for the attainment of knowledge, at the same time, it is very difficult to find a precise definition of the body itself.47 Therefore, the question arises as to whether the argument of Spinozas theory of mind as a form of the embodiment of thought is defensible. Theories of embodiment of thought lie on a certain vision of the body as an already constituted unit, whereas in the Ethics the body as a stable organism is absent. In contrast with these contemporary readings of the notions of Ethics, I think that Spinozas philosophy of knowledge, self-consciousness, the body and emotions unveils a quite different strategy, which goes far beyond the tempting argument of the embodiment of thought. The body is, I argue, above all complexity, which is the ground of the development of ideas, imagination, emotions and actions. It is this complexity that gives rise to the individuation of thought into different and individual ideas, actions, imagination etc. This complexity is constituted through a never-ending condition of movement, through which states of being enter into relation. Therefore, Spinozas view of the body is a knot of relations, movements and potentialities, which implies the dismissal of body as an already formed unit. As formed individual, the body is, I would argue, a pure illusion (E. II, prop. XXI). Spinoza is quite clear in this regard, as he says, The idea of any affections of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body (E. II, prop. XXVII), and previously The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the component parts of the human body (E. II, prop. XXIV). If the body is more than a ground of relations, then the question arises how can we think the genesis and development of ideas? Strictly speaking, if the body as constituted unit does not exist in the Ethics, what kind of object can the body
47

Notably, there are definitions of the body in the Ethics, however these do not give a full account of what is the body (E. II, Def. I, ax IV, XIII, postulates I, II, III).

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becomes for the mind? In order to address these important questions, we need to return to Simondons arguments of psychic and collective individuation. It is in this context that Simondons philosophy of individuation becomes decisive for our re-reading of Spinoza. At the very beginning of the part II of the Ethics Spinoza introduces to the theme of the body as primary object of the mind. It is precisely in this context that Spinozas process of psychic individuation reveals its collective ground. Proposition XV of part II of the Ethics says that, The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but composed of very many ideas. In order to explain this proposition, Spinoza sends us back to the body as the primary idea of the mind. The body, Spinoza soon clarifies, is composed of a great number of individuals, which are in a constant condition of altering and exchanging parts with other individuals. Given this open structure of the body, the genesis of ideas does not pass from an already formed mind to a constituted body or from a readymade body to another (Massumi, 2002a: 1-21). The individuation of thought into adequate and inadequate ideas, instead, emerges from a disparate condition, which is constructed through different combinations of speed, rest and slowness. Furthermore, this open structure of the body, through which ideas are shaped, discloses the becoming of ideas in the middle of disparate grades of intensity.48 To locate ideas in the middle of movements means to ground the becoming of thought directly on a collective realm. Furthermore, locating the psychic process of individuation in the middle of states of being moves our argument beyond the dualism between the individual and the world. There is no divide between individuals and the environment. This brings about the affirmation of a complex collective being, which moulds thoughts, ideas and bodies. In Spinoza, the theme of the collective realm is manifold. Spinozas notion of the collective, in my view, is endorsed by nature. As
48

By intensity, here, I mean the distinction of bodies in fluid or hard substances, and the different grade of movements that emerge from these.

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discussed previously, nature upholds the role of individuated being and the place of individuation. The genesis and development of ideas unfold within nature, which is the ground of varied modes of Being as events, thought, matter, duration, movement and space. Moreover, nature is a system of non individuated beings thus pure potentialities, through which the vital and psychic process of individuation comes to light. In order to delineate the emergence of the psychic individual from the collective field, Simondons concepts of pre-individuality and transindividuality have to be fully adopted. As already discussed, Simondon defines pre-individuality as pure power, which resembles Anaximanders Apeiron. I will argue below that Simondons definition of the pre-individual might shed light on Spinozas theory of the common notions. By common notions, Spinoza refers to universal categories of thought (for example Man, Horse, Dog), which are common to all men (E. II, Prop. XXXVIII and corollary). Following Deleuze, the levels of commonality between beings proceed from the physics of bodies to universal concepts (Deleuze, 1992: 217-288). The originality of Spinozas thesis of the universal concerns the transposition of the problem of universal categories of thought from the Aristotelian-Scholastic view of the transcendental Intellect to the order of the real or nature.49 Unlike Aristotle and his heirs, who take the concept out of the actual, for Spinoza instead the common notions inhere with nature. This implies the exposure of thought to the order of contingency par excellence. It means that there are no static ideas of Truth, Humankind, Justice etc, rather an endless becoming of meanings. In other words, these are pure potentialities attached to nature, which signify and re-signify both the collective and the individual in infinite ways as eternal is Substance.

49

For a detailed genealogy of the problem of the universalis in the history of philosophy from Aristotle, passing through Averroes, Avicenna, Spinoza, to nowadays, see Illuminati (2002: 78-80; 1998; chapters 85-98). Illuminati argues that differently from the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition of thought and Cartesian philosophy, Spinoza considers the common notions as inhering within the order of the real. This gives rise to the independence of human mind for the acquisition and the creation of concepts.

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In this sense, the common notions do not solely affirm that individuals agree each other. These are, in truth, an indefinite power, which gives rise to the vital (the common laws of physics) and psychic beings. Spinoza states that the common notions are the basis of the process of reasoning, through which science, art and politics emerge (E. II, prop. XL, schol. I). Spinozas theory of the common notions, I think, might be understood as an endless pre-individual condition, which remains constantly attached to both the collective and the forming individual without inhering within either. Furthermore, as the collective and the individuals never acquire a definitive structure, these would not be differentiated completely and permanently.50 This implies, on the one hand, the re-shaping of the individual realm as an increasingly problematic structure, which is a mixture of individuated and non-individuated parts (common notions and particular ideas). The implications of theorising the question of the individuation of thought in terms of a collective process concern that ideas, actions, bodies and beings becomes individualised entities insofar as they maintain a level of relations. In this light, for example, the individuation of adequate ideas is structured through a non-individuated mass and an individuated being, which is folded within a collective nature. As ideas are grounded within a collective being, the relational condition calls for novel transformations continuously. As modes of thought ideas are essentially asymmetric, this implies a constant tendency towards movements, thus transformation. The collective aspect of nature, we have seen, veils an endless and indefinite force, which is the ground of further and more complex phases of collective individuation. This pre-individual mass founds the collective realm, upon which the mixtures of non-individuated and individuated thoughts come to light. The role of common notions, in both aspects as laws of physics and universal categories of thought, I argue, operates as an individualising and collective power, which espouses the original structure of the individual to a
50

That which is common to all things [] and is equally in the part as in the whole does not constitute the essence of any one particular thing (E. II, prop. XXXVII).

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further moment of individuation. In other words, common notions in the Ethics might be understood as a mass of potentialities, which maintain the system constantly in tension. The Simondonian definition of metastability, I think, fully exemplifies the characteristics of both the collective and individual that comes out from the second part of the Ethics. For this, the potentialities attached to both nature and beings form a false equilibrium (beyond stability and instability), which causes an eternal condition of excess of multiplicity. The psychic individual emerges from the excess of multiplicity within vital being (the complex compositions of fluid and hard substances), and discloses an excess of heterogeneous and disparate elements in turn (false, adequate or inadequate ideas). In order to individuate this new heterogeneous excess of being, the role of nature as collective being becomes crucial. In this phase of individuation, nature configures the psychic forms of life as problematic mould of relations, potentialities and metastability. Embracing the undifferentiated mass of potential psychic individuals (the common notions), nature becomes generative of meanings, which are articulated through relational movements and disparate substances (fluid and hard). As discussed, the relational essence of the collective ground is omnipresent in the Ethics. In the phase of the psychic individuation, however, the relational aspect of the collective acquire a further function. As movements imply relations, relations involve exchanges and alterations of various degrees of information.51 The bodys movements structure ideas (images), which develop relational psychic beings in turn. The individuation of common notions into different ideas underlines a form of transmission of information between emerging ideas and bodies. In Spinoza, the origin of false and true ideas, symbols, as well as science and imagination is based on the continuous exchanges of meanings, which come from the pre-individual mass (E. II, prop. XL, schol. II). It is in these exchanges of information that the psychic individual lies.
51

Spinoza does mention the theory of information. I deduce this from Spinozas distinction between first, second and third kind of knowledge, and the formation of adequate and inadequate ideas.

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The collective process of psychic individuation in the Ethics folds and unfolds contemporaneously into communicative phases, which enrich the level of complexity and heterogeneity of both the individual and the collective (the three kinds of knowledge). It means that the role of communication in the Ethics does not operate, or not only, through already individuated individual. The function of the communicative practises, instead, structure and traverse the genesis of the individuals. Strictly speaking, psychic life is ordered and developed through exchanges and alterations of information (Balibar, 1998: 76-98). Spinoza discusses these themes of psychic individuation particularly from part III to the part V of the Ethics. In part III of the Ethics, Spinozas inquiry is focused upon the role of affectivity within human beings. In my interpretation, this discloses the crucial role of communication for the development psychic and collective individuation. Affectivity is the core of the communicative activity of individuals; its relational role traverses and exceeds singularities, revealing a tendency towards transindividuality (Balibar, 2002: 119-147). Taking into account these arguments, let us flesh out the dynamics of Spinozas theory of affects as a collective process of psychic individuation.

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2.2

The

Autonomy

of

the

affects:

From

relationality

towards

transindividuality52

In part III of the Ethics, Spinozas dictum concerns the necessity of knowing the reality of the human individual and not his representation (E. III, Preface). Spinozas inquiry aims to analyse the material and psychic conditions upon which individual beings are shaped. In this light, Spinoza investigates affects, passions, emotions and actions and how these operate between individuals. The novelty of Spinozas thought of affectivity lies in the central role given to affects and passions for the understanding of human nature. Spinoza investigates actions and passions rather than offer a thesis on what human beings ought to be. Spinozas geometry of affects is very a complex theory, which has led to many different and even opposing interpretations. As discussed previously, these different readings have stressed the political implications of the role affectivity, whereas for other traditions of thought Spinozas theory of affectivity gives an account of the anthropological and ethical aspects of human beings. Moving forwards these arguments, I propose to analyse the geometry of affects as further phases of the process of individuation, through which psychic life is founded and developed. This implies the retreat of emotions from the political or ethical domain, thus its return to the ontological dimension. The re-positioning of the theme of affectivity within ontology reveals the richness of the arguments of Spinoza. In doing so, we might be able to identify the modernity of the materialist paradigm of humankind proposed by Spinoza. Spinozas materialist account of the individual realm does not imply the reduction of the human being to a mere set of mechanical rules. Spinozas claim, as we will see, of human being as part of nature does not involve the loss of the distinguishing characteristics of human nature such as spontaneity, affectivity, spirituality, creativity and a certain form of rationality. For Spinoza, instead,
52

A detailed analysis of affects such as joy, fear and hope will be given in chapter IV, which focuses to the emotive tones of the multitude. For the purpose of this chapter, I will stress the power of individuation expressed by affects and passions.

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these elements lie at the very heart of human individuals. In order to determine this materialist model of the human nature, Simondons reading of emotions, the collective and transindividuality become essential. As discussed above, there is a constant excess of being within the system of the Ethics, which moves metastable individuals towards more problematic phases of individuation. This excess of being is developed from disparate and heterogeneous states of beings, which generate and complicate the system of production. Relations, movements and exchanges of information within the collective plane measure and expand the degree of complexity of Spinozas system of the real. In this fashion, the individuation of the vital individual is articulated through these elements, which determine further states of complexity in turn. The process of psychic individuation proceeds from this complexity, resolving problems of heterogeneity. More accurately, the process of psychic individuation emerges from the creation of an excess of heterogeneity within the vital condition. Before investigating the dynamics of affects and passions, Spinoza begins by defining what are the effects of living under the affects and passions, developing his theory of conatus. Spinoza tells us that affects may increase or decrease the power of acting (E. III, Def. III). If we are an adequate cause of these affections, thus the affect is an action. If we are an inadequate cause of the effects, then affect is defined passion. By adequate cause Spinoza refers to a cause, in which its effects are understood clearly and distinctively. Individuals are active, when they distinguish causes from effects, and importantly they are the causes of the effects. On the contrary, individuals are passive, when they are partial effects of an external cause (E. III, Def. I-II). In the postulates I and II, Spinoza explains that the human body can be affected in many ways, from which its power of acting can be increased or decreased. These varied affections alter the structure of the body however without erasing or decomposing the knots of tensions developed through the phases of individuation of the vital being. In

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postulate II, Spinoza literally refers to a vestige, which has been impressed on the vital being during the encounter of the mind with the body. Proceeding from the definitions of affects, passions and actions, Spinoza then passes to analyse the theory of conatus. By conatus Spinoza defines the striving to exist and persevere into life. This striving to exist and persevere into life is held by every creature in nature. Related particularly to humankind, conatus plays the pivotal the role of orienting and connecting one self to the world (E. III, prop. VI,VII, VIII). To put this in a more Simondonian way, the conatus is a spontaneous force, which structures and transcends the individuation of the vital and the psychic beings. These are the bases, upon which Spinozas geometry of affects is grounded and developed. Spinoza connotes the sphere of affectivity as a mutable condition, in which psychic individuals frequently pass from the state of passivity to activity alternatively. As the domain of affectivity is characterised by an increasing variability, the first kind of knowledge, imagination, primarily encompasses the dynamics of affects. Therefore, imagination is the condition, which activates affects and passions. Concerning affects and passions, Spinoza offers an articulated and exhaustive analysis. The focus of Spinozas inquiry is to the unveiling of the mechanisms in which affects such as joy, love, hate or sorrow impact on the psychic life of individuals. Affects such as joy or love increase our power of acting, whilst passions as fear, hope, sorrow and hate enhance our power of suffering (E. III, prop. XXV, proof). Affects are, thus, positive insofar as they give rise to the development of relations between individuals (Deleuze, 1992: 217-270). The power of acting is greatly intensified by relational practises; conversely, for example, the fear of others brings about the withdrawal of the being from a collective context (E. III, prop. XXIX, XL). Beside the divide between active and passive affects, Spinozas main concern is addressed to the necessity of preserving and improving the relational condition within psychic life. The theme

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of collective being as the source of psychic beings is omnipresent, and in this context becomes more decisive. Taking into account these descriptions of passions and actions, then the question immediately arises as to what is at the stake in Spinozas arguments of passions, affects, power of acting and suffering and otherness? The fundaments of relation: Affects and passions Spinozas thesis of affects and passions unveils the gesture of theorising psychic life in its collective aspect. The inquiry upon the dynamics of affectivity and passions, power of acting and suffering points to the collective status of both affects and passions, and how this collective nature of affectivity lies at the very basis of psychic individuation. In this light, the significance of Spinozas thesis of the role of affectivity does not rely solely on its social role. Spinozas focus to the dynamics of affects and passions is not only addressed to the discussion of which affects (for example fear or joy) structure social behaviour. Although these arguments rightly occur in Spinozas discourse, the claim, I would forward through Simondons philosophy, is that these affects in the Ethics determine psychic moments (joy, love, hate, sorrow, hope etc.) of individuation, which importantly unfold a collective realm. Put differently, joy and sorrow do not pass from one already formed individual to another (for example from the object of pleasure to subject and vice versa), or these do not gather together individuated beings. As Spinoza defines joy or love as actions, thus these are, literally, disparate movements, which unveil grades of intensity.53 Positive affects cause movements (actions), which further activate the disparate status of the mode, which is twofold. The mode, Spinoza tells us, endeavours to affirm and increase its existence.54 Endeavouring connotes on the one side a state of power,

53

He who imagines that what he loves is affected with pleasure or pain will likewise be affected with pleasure or pain, the intensity will vary with intensity of the emotion in the object loved (E. III, prop. XXI). 54 The mind, as far as it can, endeavors to think of those things that increase or assist the bodys power of activity (E. III, prop. XII), and We endeavor to bring about whatever we imagine to be

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which sets forth movements and actions. On the other, endeavouring re-organises the grade of intensity of the original structure of the mode. The asymmetric condition of mode causes a tension towards movements, which re-shape the grade of intensity within the system. It is in this context that love and joy acquire a central position. These operate, through orienting the psychic individual toward the discovery of the collective. The collective being is reinforced of new movements respectively. To consider affectivity as collective phases of individuation means that affects intensify the complexity of the whole as well as of the parts. Affects are precisely in the middle between the singular and the collective dimension. These are movements structured through exchanges and consequent alterations of intensity. The image, Spinoza says, of a loved thing re-organises the psychic equilibrium of the individual (E. III, prop. XXIII). Importantly, Spinoza refers to the affects of joy and love as images and not as objects. These affects re-signify the relation between individual and the world, giving raise to new codes of communication. In each psychic phase of individuation there are exchanges and alterations of information, which are carried out by joy, sorrow, love, hate, hope and fear respectively. As joy and love increase the power of acting and thinking, these affects expand the level of information within the collective ground that becomes more complex in turn. In other words, the power of acting and thinking is the power of communicating, which structures and problematizes the psychic beings. As we have seen, to communicate means to enter in relation with the others and vice versa, which leads to further phases of individuation. In each psychic moment of joy or love, the pre-individual mass (the common notions) enriches different and more complex meanings.55

conductive to pleasure; but we endeavor to remove or destroy whatever we imagine to be opposed to pleasure and conductive to pain [italics mine] (E. III, prop. XXVIII). 55 These different meanings assumed by the pre-individual force will be the core of chapter IV and V.

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However, in part III of the Ethics equally Spinoza gives a full account of passions such as fear, hope, sorrow and hate, which gives rise to the power of suffering. The question immediately arises as to whether we should consider the role of these passions as less individuating or not individuating at all. The problem specifically concerns whether there are in Spinozas thought psychic events that suspend the process of individuation. If we assume the process of individuation under certain circumstances as discontinuous, many contradictions would arise. As mentioned in chapter I, Spinoza defines Substance as absolute necessity, which forms Spinozas paradigm of determinism. If there is a strict determinism within Substance and the process of individuation delineates the modes through which Being becomes individualised, then the question arises how can the process of individuation be suspended? Further, if fear, hope and hate interrupt the development of the process of individuation, further questions emerge. Firstly, in order to maintain the process of individuation, does Spinoza state the necessity of suppressing passions? Secondly, as passions inhere within the necessity of nature (E. III, Preface), equally conatus is an innate force of selfaffirmation within the order of nature as well. Therefore, the conatus (striving to exist) and passions (power of suffering) would eventually contradict each other. Thirdly, if fear, hope and hate preclude the complete advancement of the process of individuation, how do these coincide with Spinozas claim of desire as the very essence human being (E. III, Def. I)? In order to address these questions, I think that passions have to be understood as phases of individuation, as joy and love are. These delineate, in my analysis, different forms of the relation between pre-individuality (common notions), collective (nature) and forming psychic individuals (modes). Depending on the predominance between these three categories of individuation, the equilibrium of psychic beings might be more or less complex. Complexity here refers to the grade of intensity, which traverses the relation between nature and the modes. Spinoza explains that passions of pain or hate are transitions from a state of

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greater perfection (the tendency towards and within the collective) to a condition of less perfection (E. III, Def. III). This means that passions are not considered as privation. Passions are not viewed as a rupture within the process of individuation, rather these are simply different actualisations of the relation between the pre-individual, nature and modes (E. III, prop. XI, schol.).56 Following Spinoza, therefore, we might argue that movements of relations are omnipresent in both psychic conditions (actions and passions). This might suggest that there are tensions (transitions), which are fundamentally, to say with Simondon, transversal to any given psychic individuals without remaining attached to the individual entirely. It means that there is a force, intense and mild alternatively, which re-signifies the psychic life of beings continuously, now joyful beings now painful beings. This force works through the life of individuals. It is what Spinoza calls conatus. The conatus is striving to exist and persevere into life. To exist is power of acting itself. Power of acting, as we have seen, is to enter in relations exchanging and altering quantity of information. The conatus, thus, is a force located precisely through the collective ground and forming individuals, which traverses the triad of pre-individuality, collective realm and the psychic being. From these arguments, a question immediately arises as what does it mean to strive to exist and persevere into life? Conatus and transindividuality As striving to exist and persevere into life, conatus greatly exceeds the singular individuals, moving them towards more complex grades of individuation with and within the collective domain of nature. As striving, conatus cannot merely reside on the singular being or nature. Striving brings to light a state of

56

Nor can we say that pain consists in the privation of greater perfection, for a privation is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an actuality, which therefore can be nothing other than the actuality of the transition to a state of less perfection; that is, the actuality whereby a mans power of activity is diminished or checked (E. III, Def. III, Explication).

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potentiality, which calls for further transformations. These transformations reorganise the structure of the psychic being (joy, love or sorrow) in an infinite way as infinite is the power of the existing. More precisely, conatus is a unlimited force between nature and beings, which however inheres within these.57 This delineates an actual and potential reality, which might be better expressed through the Simondonian category of the transindividual (Balibar, 2002: 119-147). This form of transindividual reality, which pervades the Ethics, re-configures the grade of relations involved in a process of individuation, enriching different models of psychic existence. This transindividual and innate power is the ground of desire. As mentioned, for Spinoza desire is the very essence of man, which individualises eternal and unresolved states of heterogeneous power to new problematic psychic beings (E. III, Def. I). In this sense, Spinoza, I argue, fiercely rejects the distinction between desire and appetite. It is not in the divide between desire of mind and body that Spinoza locates the quidditas of human species; rather, it is in its openness that the essence of the human being lies.58 Desire expresses a constant exposure towards more complex transformations and incorporations leading to novel structures, which found psycho-social unions (E. III, prop. IX, schol.; see also chapter IV). This transindividual reality moulded through conatus and desire, I think, opens up to the understanding of the emotive tones of past and existing social struggles and communities. Put differently, as desire brings into question the problematic and abundant state of the individual in both its collective and singular aspects, every novel psycho-social community emerges in order to resolve a problem, that creates a further incompatibility in turn. The consciousness of this would contribute to the development of contemporary materialist conceptions of politics, ethics and history.
57

The conatus with which each single thing endeavors to persists in its own being does not involve finite, but indefinite time (E. III, prop. VIII). 58 [] I mean by the word desire any of mans endeavors, urges, appetites, volitions, which vary with mans various states, and they are not infrequently so opposed to one another that man may be drawn in different directions and know not where to turn (E. III, Def. I, Explication).

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Taking into account these arguments, we are in the position to advance some more general reflections. The importance of Spinozas philosophical gesture, I argue, concerns the re-characterisation of affects and passions for the development of psychic life. Spinoza, as we have discussed, raises significant questions concerning the definition of the individual, the collective and relational status of the affects, and importantly how these emerge. Through Simondons philosophy of individuation, the genesis and development of vital and psychic individual in the Ethics come to light as a very complex process; where each phase is an expression of an excess of power that sets forth novel transitions. It is in this context that the richness of Spinozas notion of the individual emerges. This asymmetric condition of the modes and nature calls for movements of speed and slowness, through which vital and psychic relations are grounded and developed. Further, the heterogeneous condition of the modes and nature unveils potentialities, which surround and give rise to the becoming of the system. From the physics of the bodies to the geometry of affects, there is a form of pre-individual mass (the common notions), which re-signifies constantly the structure of Being and beings. This pre-individual mass, we have seen, inheres within the order of the real, contingency. This implies, on the one hand, the understanding of the concept as creative and essentially plural. On the other hand, this actualisation of thought leads to a thinking of the actual as generative mass of meanings (ideas, actions, imaginations, passions).59 Therefore, Spinozas arguments concerning affectivity and the individual realm open the way to understand the reality of humankind as problematic, relational, and fundamentally plural. It follows that every social and psychic community is moulded through these transindividual conditions. In order to look for novel materialist conceptions of politics and ethics, I think that we should incorporate Spinozas thesis into our political and ethical discourse; or at least we may question what are the implications of thinking society and individuals in the
59

I follows in my re-reading of Spinozas notions of the actual and thought, Deleuze and Guattaris theory of the materiality and productive of concepts (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 15-34).

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light of Spinoza. The remaining chapters of my thesis explore the following questions. Firstly, what are the implications of thinking a collective and affective process of individuation for political and social practises? Secondly, what are the historical, social and ethical expressions of this transindividual reality. Let us now turn to a political analysis of these questions.

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Chapter IV Tractatus Theologicus-Politicus: The affective tones of the political

Introduction

In chapter III, I examined the materialist paradigm of the individual proposed by Spinoza, and re-considered the principal and more critical theses of parts II and III of the Ethics through Simondons categories of thought. The detour of Spinoza via Simondons ontology has brought about the discovery of a distinct model of individuation, which commences in the Ethics and, we will see below, continues in the political Treatises. Spinozas account of the individual is based on the unity of the process of individuation, within which the individual is not an unknown principle but rather the constitutive element of a more general system of production. This implies the consideration of historical and social transformations, psychic and biological processes as parts of a unique and complex process of individuation, which inheres within nature. Spinozas process of individuation is centred on the concepts of relationality, the collective and affectivity. For Spinoza, phases of individuation are relational movements, which activate exchanges and alteration of heterogeneous levels of power and degrees of reality. These structure and further develop the biological and psychic anatomy of individual beings as well as nature. More accurately, nature is the collective ground, which is traversed by confluences of undifferentiated and differentiated quantities of matter and thought. It is the ground of relational phases, which is place of individuation and, at the same time, individual. Related particularly to psychic individuation, relationality operates within the domain of affectivity. This individuates and further complicates individuals towards

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more problematic forms of relational life. From the analysis of the general process of individuation, Spinoza defines the peculiarity of the individual as a desire, which denotes a state of excess of heterogeneity and more significantly a transindividual force towards the others. Spinozas theory of affects and, more generally, the process of collective individuation constitute the bases, upon which his political analysis is grounded and developed. Taking into account the arguments developed in chapter III, this chapter explores the relation between affectivity and politics in Spinozas thought. The focus is addressed to the manifold and somewhat ambivalent status of passions and affects in the theological section of the Tractatus Theologicus Politicus (hereafter TTP), and the various ways in which these form complex political communities, meanings and transformations. In the theological part of the Treatise, particularly, passions and the power of imagination occupy a central position within the political life of the individuals, shaping entirely the action and thought of the mass. Spinozas treatment of the affective condition of the mass developed through the exegesis of the Old and New Testaments brings about the discovery of the problematic status of passions and imagination within the political context. These are, on the one hand, the origin of human misconceptions about God, the state and the Church, and thereby the exploitation of peoples desires and needs; on the other, passions, grounded in the domain of imagination, are powerful source of relations, common values, practises of participation and mutual support, which undeniably reinforce the entire political body. The analysis of the multisided power of passions over a community constitutes the basis, upon which the multitude as a political individual emerges progressively within Spinozas political arguments, becoming the principal protagonist of the political section of the Treatise and the Tractaus Politicus (hereafter TP). More accurately, in the theological section of the Treatise affects and passions pose the problem of the existence of a collective and powerful body, which exceeds the categories of people, mob, and subjects. This collective individual is nuanced by a variety of affective tones, each of which produces critical political act and thought

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that shape the realm of the political in turn. It is precisely through the dynamics of affects and passions that Spinozas notion of the multitude comes to light. Therefore, the understanding of the ways in which affectivity produces political individuals, meanings and forces is crucial for determining the genealogy of the multitude within Spinozas thought. It follows that in this chapter, I will not draw attention to the multitude itself; rather, I examine the political and ontological role of affectivity within the production of the political. As passions and imagination represent the most ambivalent notions within Spinozas theory of affects, the discussion focuses upon the passive and imaginative tones of the body politic of certain political communities examined in the theological section of the Treatise. An inquiry into Spinozas conception of the political dimension of affectivity might contribute to the re-founding of a proper political vocabulary for passions and affects, affirming their autonomy from the spheres of ethics and psychology. These have fragmented the expansive power of affectivity into social and cultural codes, an obscure unconscious and an inexplicable natural drive. By contrast, Spinozas treatment of affectivity as a psychic and collective process of individuation opens up to the vision of affects and passions as powerful and collective source of actions, thoughts and relations, through which the constitution and development of the multitude as a political individual and, more generally, a community reside. Concerning these arguments many questions guide this chapter. Firstly, how and to what extent does Spinozas ontology of individuation re-shape effectively the mode of theorising the commencement of political society? Assuming that Spinozas ontology of individuation developed through affects, passions and bodily movements in the Ethics is already political, then the difficulty entails how his philosophy of individuation re-founds traditional paradigms of the origins of civil society, going far beyond theories of social contract, rational choice, and self-interest. If this is the case, then the main problem arises as whether this collective and affective process of individuation implies a return to teleological arguments or a transcendent agency behind human association. Secondly, how does

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Spinozas account of affectivity as relational, complex, and powerful concretely produce and transform political individual and communities? Thirdly, related specifically to the definitions of passions and imagination as causes of partial knowledge and decrease of power, what different form of political praxis and problems do these introduce within society? In order to address these questions, I propose to proceed further with the detour of Spinoza via Simondon. Simondons ontological categories, I think, might shed light on the originality of certain themes of the Treatise, which otherwise would remain obscure. I refer to the question of society as a becoming rather than a contract between rational and self-interested men. The view of society as a becoming, better a process, implies the understanding of actual and past human associations as complexity, which are traversed by problems, solutions and potentialities. Furthermore, by reading the treatise in the light of Simondon the theme of the political role of affectivity, significantly passions, in politics acquires a cogent and multisided status. This concerns the definition of affectivity not only as a central element characterising the ethical and psychological life of a specific community. Rather, affectivity, even in its aspect of passion, involves a more complex process, which grounds alternative modes of thinking temporality, history, politics and society. The claim, I will make through this chapter, is that in Spinozas analysis affectivity becomes recognised as the generative source of the production of the political. It is precisely in this context that great modernity of Spinozas political gesture lies. Spinoza forwards the idea of the status of affectivity not only as the mediator of social relations, but also as powerful and endless process of the production of the common, which signifies entirely the political scene. As full expression of affects and passions, the multitude, although not explicitly named in the theological section of the Treatise, is the actor and, at the same time, theatre of the production of the common.

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In order to explore the affective production of the common and how affectivity configures the body politic, in this chapter I will give a reading of the theological section of the Theological Political Treatise structured through conceptual, better affective, personae. More accurately, the facts and the personages analysed by Spinoza in the first part of the Treatise will form the constitutive elements of more complex conceptual personae. In this light, we will encounter the personae of the Devotees of the prophet, Subjects of Moses and the Apostles, each of which brings into the realm of the political problems, potentials and relational beings. The importance of analysing the themes of the Treatise through conceptual personae concerns, on the one side, the possibility of stressing the notion of affectivity as a process, through which movements of actualisation, differentiation and transformation take place. On the other, the usage of conceptual personae will disclose alternative trajectories towards the conceptualisation of the role of affectivity within the foundation of the theory of the multitude. Although the chapter is a study of the political significance of affectivity within Spinozas thought, the intrinsic relation between affects and the multitude requires, primarily, the analysis of the affective characters given by Spinoza to the multitude in the theological section of the Treatise, and the ways in which these structure specific political behaviours and problems. In the following section, I shall pass to examine the structure and main purpose of the theological section the Treatise, drawing particular attention to the controversial passive conditions of the mass within the thread of the Treatise. The analysis of these problematic aspects will frame our reading of the TTP through conceptual personae.

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1. The Plan of the Theological Political Treatise: Situating the question of affectivity in Spinozas political theory

In the Theological Political Treatise, Spinozas engagement with the multitude is an intricate issue, which still generates an intense debate. The main problem entails the understanding of who truly is the multitude and, consequently what is its role within a political body. The difficulty of locating the multitude within a specific category of people, mob and citizens concerns the variety of contrasting affective tones, with which Spinoza defines its action and thought. In the thread of the Treatise, the multitude is nuanced by fear, hope, ambition, anger and indignation. These different affective denotations bring to light the manifold status of the multitude, which thus makes a definite conceptualisation in a determinate social class quite problematic. In order to examine the multifaceted character of the multitude and the role of affectivity within its constitution as mob, people and mass, we need, firstly, to look at the structure and the main arguments of the Theological Political Treatise. These offer a preliminary, however not exhaustive in itself, account of the function of affectivity within a political context and the mechanisms in which this shapes the body of the multitude. As indicated above, the attention will be given to the analysis of the theological section of the Treatise, whereas Spinozas political thesis developed in the Treatise and in the TP will be discussed in chapter V. The Theological Political Treatise consists of a pars destruens (chapters I-X) and a pars contruens (chapters XVI-XX).
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As the title suggests, the Treatise is

grouped into two main sections, the theological and political parts. In the theological section, corresponding to the pars destruens, we are immediately projected into the affective status of the multitude, through which Spinoza introduces the causes of superstition, a vehement critique of the ideological apparatus of faith, and thereby the ability of the clergy to exploit religion for the control and manipulation of needs and
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For an historical background of the TTP, see Nadler (1999), and Pollock (2005).

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acts of the people. In this part, Spinozas inquiry is concerned with undermining the entire metaphysical nucleus of theology, through which the Church has surreptitiously constructed its influence over the mass, political affairs and philosophical issues. For this, Spinozas move concerns a new method of examination of the holy texts, which has to consider the historical, cultural, linguistic context within which the stories of the Scriptures occurred (Strauss, 1997: 111-144; Balibar, 1998: 25-48). Spinoza employs a very accurate exegesis of the New and Old Testaments, through which the extraordinary origins of certain unusual natural phenomena (miracles, signs and revelations), the alleged divinity of the prophets, the impenetrable object of faith are brought back to the realm of imagination. The knowledge of the prophets, prophecies and speeches, on the one side, are simply based on the understanding of the laws of nature through the first kind of knowledge, imagination, which is the ground of the passions of fear, hope, devotion and hate. On the other, the messages of the prophecies are adapted on the ignorant condition of the mass, which are easily inclined to believe in myths and extramundane forces. It is through the power of imagination, Spinoza explains, that people are persuaded of the esoteric meanings of the Scriptures and the belief in an ultimate end beyond the order of nature. This causes the emergence of superstition and ignorance amongst a community, through which human beings are now moved by the fear for misfortune now by the hope for fortune. The hegemony of the Church over society, Spinoza warns us, is erected on this superstitious apparatus, which plays deceitfully with the fear, hope and ignorance of the people.61 Therefore, Spinozas attack on religion is directed to invalidate not religion itself but rather the causes of human misconceptions about God, the authority of the clergy and nature, by which, as he announces in the preface, individuals fight for their servitude as if for salvation (TTP: 389-390). Spinoza, instead, affirms that the very object of the faith resides on moral precepts, which aim at the development of obedience and piety between individuals (credo minimum).
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Concerning political authority of the Church and conflicts between the different faiths in seventeenth-century Holland, see Balibar (1998: 1-20), and Nadler (1999:116-244).

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From these first stages of the Treatise, many problems arise. These refer to the ambivalent position of Spinoza concerning the role of the multitude and affectivity within a political context. On the one side, Spinoza gives a somewhat negative account of the multitude, which becomes recognised with the categories of plebs, mob and mass. For this, he refers to the multitude as ignorant, superstitious and unreliable, which can be easily mobilised against this or that authority. On the other, Spinoza includes within these categories the exponents of the Church too, which encourage and increase the passions of the mass through the expedients of miracles, prophecies, and also the notions of evil, sin, and grace. Furthermore, for Spinoza, as we will further discuss, the passions of fear and hope are experienced by both the clergy and the masses.62 For Spinoza, the clergy and the mass are reciprocally afraid one of the other. Additionally, if Spinoza conceives the domain of imagination as the ground of the human misconceptions, through which superstition is founded and developed; it is through imagination too that the growth of ethical values and cohesive practises such as love, piety and mutual support derives. Proceeding from these first chapters of the theological part towards the political ones, Spinozas notion of the multitude and affectivity becomes even more ambiguous. If the affective status of the multitude can be accounted easily for plebs in the theological section, which requires praxis of emancipation from the authority of the Church, it is in the arguments articulated from the chapter XI to the XVI that Spinozas theory of the multitude becomes increasingly more ambivalent (Balibar, 1994: 3-38). Before entering the political section, there are a series of chapters (chapters XI-XV), which prepare the terrain to the themes of the political part. As mentioned, the religious argument still persists, however, in this part these acquire a different meaning. The transitional part considers, on the one side, the ethical function of

62

The twofold status of fear within the Treatise has been acutely analysed by Balibar (1994). I will discuss his approach in chapter V.

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religion, precisely the one of the New Testament; and on the other, attention is addressed to the separation between philosophy, religion and politics. In these chapters, Spinoza passes to analyse the very object of faith, drawing a line firmly between philosophy and religion. For Spinoza the focus of any faith should be solely addressed to the encouragement of the positive affects and actions such as love, joy, devotion, through which practises of mutual support are developed. As anticipated in the pars destruens, Spinoza consequently re-draws the domain of religion by narrowing its importance to ethical habits: Pietas. This form of faith (credum minum) does not affect negatively the development of political institutions as for example democracy; rather, it favours social relations, contributing to the growth of the sentiment of community (the common good). Spinoza refers here to the doctrine of the apostles. However, in the same part, Spinoza states further that the advantage of this conception of religion resides on the increase of the obedience between people. It is precisely in this context that Spinozas arguments of the multitude become ambivalent. The main difficulty concerns how Spinoza combines the two aspects of religion as reciprocal love and obedience. More accurately, if the apostolic message of universal (Catholic) love leads to cooperative practices, why and to what extent this has to be formulated in terms of obligation? In this light, it might seem as the affective constitution of the many is predominantly shaped by negative passions of fear, rivalry and egoism, which are not naturally disposed towards cooperation and, more generally, a life in common. This would suggest that the object of the faith of the apostles serves to educate the mass how to love each other. Nevertheless, Spinoza repeatedly points out that the knowledge of the apostles as well as the certainty of the prophets of the Old Testament are based on natural understanding, which is owned by every human being. This would indicate that there are no ontological and ethical differences between the apostles and the mass, thus everyone should, spontaneously, follow the Catholic teachings of love without concurring to external devices of obedience (Deleuze, 1992: 255-288).

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Concerning the question of the ambiguous status of passions and imagination, the anatomy of the mass and the role of obedience in the theological section of the Treatise a number of diverse interpretations have been proposed. Two strategies of reading these themes are particularly important for the purpose of this work. These refer, on the one side, to a specific political analysis of Spinozas critique of theology and the condition of the mass, and on the other a study of the psychological and social dimension of imagination and affects contained within Spinozas descriptions of prophecy, miracles, rituals and the message of the apostles. Moving from a post-Marxist theoretical position, Althusser, Giancotti, Balibar, Negri, Matheron and Tosel, among others, have raised fecund arguments on the political implications of Spinozas critique of theology, configuring his thesis alongside Marxist notions of alienation, emancipation and the exploitation.63 Spinozas critique of religion, they have commonly argued, offers a theory of the genealogy of ideology, and the various and hidden ways in which masss tendency toward a form of spontaneous servitude has been created. In this light, the passive state of the mass have been considered as the direct consequences of a politics of enslavement persevered by any form of sovereign power, whose central purpose is the maintenance of ignorance and illusions amongst individuals. Spinozas attack on the metaphysical nucleus of theology, they have claimed, reveals a precise strategy of disalienation of the mass, which proceeds from the apostolic formula of universal love to the advocacy for freedom of the political section of the Treatise (Matheron, 1988; Negri, 1998; Giancotti, 1969). Although this first mode of reading the pars destruens of the Treatise have reinstated the political significance of Spinozas critique of religion as a praxis of emancipation, within which the mass are a central element of the political context, nevertheless the effective impacts of passions and imagination upon a community still remained not entirely explored. More accurately, beside the aspect of alienation

63

In contrast with post-Marxist position, there is a Liberal-individualist approach to the political section of the TTP, which places Spinozas notions of freedom, the social contract and democracy alongside Hobbes, Smith, Toqueville and Voltaire, see for example Israel (2002), Smith (1997), Feurer (1987). I will discuss this interpretation in chapter V.

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and servitude, as we have seen, imagination and passions are the ground of common habits, beliefs and actions, which are located within the political order. Spinozas account of the passive tones of the mass under the condition of ignorance and servitude reveals a more multisided understanding of the affective dynamics which characterise a community. The second way of reading Spinozas question of religion investigates precisely this further role of passions. From a different perspective, there have been important attempts to extrapolate a socio-psychology from Spinozas description of the passive condition of the mass. Although they have reached diverse conclusions, Curley, Rice, Gatens and Llyod have offered fruitful insights on the social and psychological elements derived from Spinozas description of the role of passions and imaginations within civil society. Significantly, the works of Gatens and Lloyd (1999) have stressed the social function of imagination and passions in the theological section of the Treatise. The power of imagination, they argue, does not only allow for the growth of superstition, ignorance and alienation. Rather, this refers to a more complex mechanism, which brings to light the centrality of the notions of the body, actions, relations and identity. Spinozas thesis of the origins of prophecy, rituals and sacrifices, for example, discloses the ways in which imagination and passions give rise to collective identities, common rules and ethical practise, upon which a community is founded and developed. Furthermore, given Spinozas definition of imagination as the domain of the fluctuation of actions and thoughts, this crucially introduces within the constitution of the social and political body a certain contingency, which enriches the system with dynamic elements (Williams, 2007). Certainly this second way of reading the theological part of the Treatise has given full attention to the powerful role of imagination within the community, bringing about the complexity of Spinozas theory of imagination and passions. Although this analysis has rightly affirmed the social dimension of passions and imagination, nevertheless important questions are not entirely answered. These refer to a more political definition of passion and imagination, which should consider both the relational and passive aspects of imagination described in the TTP. In other words, if

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imagination is source of social relations, this is, at the same time, cause of human misconceptions and servitude. Therefore, the problems still remain the understanding of the political and social role of passions and imagination within the thread of the Treatise.64 Taking into great consideration both readings, however, I think that the political meaning of imagination and passions in the theological section of the Treatise might be further explored through a different path. I refer to a more extensive definition of affectivity, which involves notions of time, relations, becoming and actualisation. The different affective tones of the mass emerged from Spinozas discourse, in my analysis, come out from a process of political and ontological individuation, which transforms and further problematises the realm of the political. It is precisely this process of individuation that signifies the anatomy and power of the multitude, explaining its centrality within the political part of the Treatise and the successive TP. In order to re-consider the political meaning of affectivity, specifically passions, and imagination and thereby their importance for understanding Spinozas notion of the multitude, a further strategy of reading the TTP has to be adopted. I propose to insist further on the detour of Spinozas thought through the philosophy of Simondon, which we have commenced in chapter III. An inquiry of the role of affectivity within Spinozas political discourse, I suggest, in the light of Simondons philosophy of individuation becomes crucial. Simondons ontological categories might shed light on what processes and relations affectivity brings to question, and how these impact effectively and intensively on the political. Through Simondonian notions of the collective being, emotions, transindividuality, pre-individual force and disparateness, Spinozas ambivalent treatment of passions and imagination acquires great cogency, introducing a new awareness of the reality
64

The relation between imagination, affectivity and politics in Spinozas thought has nurtured an intense literature, which pushes much forward the importance of his notion of imagination within contemporary political theory, see Manning (2007) and Massumi (2002). Significantly, Williams (2007) has further developed the significance of Spinozas notions of imagination and affectivity within democratic theory.

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and potentialities embodied by the community. In this light, the arguments, I will make through this chapter, concern the understanding of passions, affects and imagination as natural and unavoidable conditions of the becoming of society as whole, which enrich the domain of the political with unpredictable orders of problems, solutions, relations, meanings and time.

2. The conceptual personae of the Theological Political Treatise: The affective and collective production of the political

In chapter III, we have seen how Simondons theory of the psychic and collective individuation sheds light on the relational and collective ground of Spinozas geometry of the affects and bodies, which characterise Spinozas ontology of individuation. This has opened the way to the possibility of analysing the domain of the individual as a system of continuous transformations, within which the action of entering into relations with others literally is a movement of individuation. The importance of Spinozas notion of relation, as argued in the previous chapter, concerns the re-founding the paradigm of relation itself, which becomes the cornerstone of the becoming of both the individual and reality. In this sense, notions of movements as speed and slowness, qualities of bodies as hard and fluid, power, conatus, desire and, over all, affects and passions create equally relational phases, without which the process of vital and psychic individuation could not take place. Related particularly to human beings, the reading of the Ethics through Simondons philosophy had many significant implications. Affects and passions play the pivotal role in order to develop further the process of psychic individuation. These have led to re-shaping our awareness of the richness of affectivity and its central role for the individuation of psychic individuals. For this, affects and passions such as hate, love, fear, hope and sorrow do not pass from one already individuated being to the other, neither are these located in an obscure interiority of the individual. Rather, these are collective and importantly are irreplaceable phases of individuation.

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In the Ethics, we have seen, Spinoza describes emotions not or not solely as auxiliary functions of human beings, which appear subsequent to the constitution of physical and psychical beings. Emotions, specifically affectivity, activate relational movements, upon which the individual lies. Thus, Spinozas conception of the psychic being, more generally, the humankind brings about the need for repositioning the constitutive role of affectivity at the centre of the human theatre. The reinstatement of the significance of affectivity has immediately political implications, which can still offer thoughtful theoretical insights for contemporary thought and society. In order to examine the affective process of the constitution of political individuals through Simondons ontology, a different strategy, perhaps unorthodox, of reading the TTP has to be introduced. Despite their differences, we have seen, the ways of reading the TTP, commonly, begin with the analysis of the theological section, the pars destruens, proceeding through the transitional chapters on the separation of religion and philosophy, to the political part (par construens) on democracy and freedom. Without contrasting and denying the importance of these methods, the inquiry on the theological section of the TTP draws particular attention to the affective events occurring through the thread of the Treatise, constructing around these conceptual personae, better affective personae. These will show us an unexplored path of thinking and making the anatomy of community, which goes through the emergence of an excess of incompatibilities, complexity, relational movements, power and potentials. Affectivity lies at the heart of this process, through which problematic and collective individual populate and re-populate constantly the political. In this chapter, the understanding of the notion of the conceptual personae proceeds from Deleuze and Guattaris formulation (1994: 61-83). For Deleuze and Guattari, conceptual personae are movements, which describe the philosophers plane of immanence, within which concepts are founded and developed. Importantly, conceptual personae are not aesthetic figures of novels and arts. Conceptual personae are the power of concepts, whereas aesthetic figures are the power of affects. The

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former functions on the plane of the immanence, the latter takes effect on the plane of composition (for example the image of universe). Certainly the plane of arts and that of philosophy, conceptual personae and aesthetic figures, may meet each other, however they would never coincide entirely. In the history of philosophy, conceptual personae have always played a pivotal role within the production of the philosophers thought, engaging with him eventually an ideal dialogue throughout the entire journey of his philosophy. In this sense, conceptual personae have accompanied the development of the works of Plato, Descartes, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx and so and so forth. In some cases, they are sympathetic to the philosopher as in Nietzsches Dionysus, in others antipathetic such as the Idiot, which leads Descartes to discover the cogito (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 61-62). The importance of conceptual personae within the development of the philosophers theoretical production concerns the possibility of activating multiple potentialities of a concept, positing a problem and glimpsing a solution. In this light, we may see Marx playing with a varied range of conceptual personae from the bourgeois, the proletariat, the Jewish people and Hegel, each of which does not express an ideal model rather a different actualisation of a principal problem and the possibility of its solution. In Spinoza, then, the question of the conceptual personae becomes more complex and manifold. This refers to the presence of affectivity within Spinozas thought. In contrast with Deleuze and Guattaris exclusion of affects from the conceptual personae, I have found a variety of powerful personae in the TTP, which are moulded through the mixture of thoughts, affects and bodies. These activate and problematise the becoming of Spinozas philosophy. In this light, we will see that beside the historical figures of the prophet, Moses and the apostles there is a more complex process, which is grounded in the domain of affectivity. The conceptualaffective personae of the Treatise signify this process, actualising specific Spinozas concepts and concerns.

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As anticipated previously, the conceptual personae of the theological section of the TTP are the Devotees of the prophet, Subjects of Moses and the Apostles, each of which brings into the political order problems and solutions, novel times and territories, movements and intensities, incompatibilities and compositions. As the names I have given to these personae suggest, these conceptual personae are essentially plural, which means relational, disparate and fundamentally complex. Taking into account these arguments, the first conceptual persona we encounter is the Devotees of the prophet. This conceptual persona expresses a crucial phase within thread of the TTP, that is, the constitution of the political from the abundance of nature. The Devotees of the prophet are precisely the emergence of the political incorporated within the dynamics of imagination and passions.

3. The Devotees Of the Prophet

In chapter II Of the prophets, Spinoza tells us that the prophets were not endowed with a more perfect mind, but with a more vivid power of imagination(TTP, chapter II: 404). The certainty of the prophets is based not on an extraordinary faculty or an intimate relation with God. The knowledge of the prophets, Spinoza asserts, is based simply on signs, revelations, lumen naturalis, memories of past events and stories and, more importantly, their own physical and psychic attitude. As he summarises, Therefore the certainty of the prophets was based entirely on these three considerations:
1. That things revealed were most vividly imagined, just as we wont to be affected by objects in our waking hours. 2. The occurrence of a sign. 3. Lastly and most important, that the minds of the prophets were directed exclusively towards what was right and good. (TTP, Chapter II: 406)

Spinoza, then, proceeds with analysing the historical figures of Isaiah, Moses, Abraham, Joshua, Amos, Nahum and Christ, and how these have experienced and divulged the idea of God. As Christ understood God without the use of images, signs

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and revelations, Spinoza sets aside his doctrine from the circle of the other prophets of the tradition of the Old Testament (TTP, Chapter IV: 431). Excluding Christ from the tradition of the prophets, Spinoza addresses the demystification of the divine status of the prophets, through which their actions and beliefs have been considered as indisputable. In order to clarify the mundane origins of prophets, Spinoza gives a detailed account of their respective historical, emotional, social and linguistic milieu, upon which the alleged divinity of their authority has been grounded. Spinoza contextualises actions, beliefs and writings of the prophets, through a very accurate exegesis of the holy texts. This replaces the sacred reputation of the prophets with ordinary imaginative abilities, affectivity, bodily movements and, importantly, the environment (TTP, Chapters I-II). Each of these personages, examined in the TTP, reveals a particular use of imagination, which denotes an immature mode of intending the order and connection of natural phenomena (TTP, Chapter II: 409). The prophet, Spinoza explains, situates and orients himself within nature through picturing images of fire or flood, and also emotional states such as joy, hope, astonishment and prostration. Moreover, the impact of the excess of nature on the body of the prophet produces the perception of unpredicted events as a gift, miracle and punishment for his devotion or impiety (TTP, chapters I, II, III, VI). These are the causes of the growth of the anthropomorphic idea of God and nature within the prophet and his followers. Spinozas arguments concerning the false divinity of prophets constitute a decisive move against the ideological apparatus of the Church, through which peoples needs and desires have been manipulated. As analysed in the preceding part, Spinozas critique of the sacred status of the prophets has been commonly viewed as his political commitment to the emancipation of society from the enslavement of theology. These aspects undeniably occur in Spinozas refusal of the divine authority of the prophets, re-positioning their knowledge within the domain of humankind. Related particularly to the prophet, however, Spinozas description unveils more diversified tones. Spinoza does not only portray the image of the prophet as negative,

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but also as joyful, ingenuous and compassionate. For this, the prophecies of Abraham, Moses or Joshua are characterised by important ethical messages, which reveal different forms of commonalities between individuals. Alongside these aspects of emancipation of society from theology, we should also draw attention to the domain of imagination, which grounds the stories of the prophets. Spinozas portraits of the prophets and their devotees, in my view, reveal more complex arguments, which go far beyond the critique of theology and the liberation of society from the conditions of ignorance and servitude. These refer to value of imagination and affectivity as powerful source of relations, meanings and practises. Concerning these arguments, from different perspectives, Williams (2007), Lloyd and Gatens (1999) and Althusser (1976), among others, have pointed out how Spinozas analysis of imagination and affectivity brings to light cooperative and ethical practises within a community. Although these themes rightly emerge from Spinozas inquiry of theology, I believe, that the domain of imagination structured through affects and passions discloses a more problematic process, which exceeds the production of social habits, ethical and political norms. Spinozas account of the imaginative status of the prophets and devotees brings to question the anatomy of a group within a forming political context, the production of the common through relational movements of bodies and affects and the experience of nature as pure excess. The claim, I will forward through this section, concerns the understanding of imagination and affects as fundamental elements of a process of individuation, through which political realities and individual emerge. In other words, we must consider the multifaceted realm of the prophet as a process of individuation, which embraces contemporaneously the political, the social and the psychic. In order to discover these aspects, a different path has to be followed. I propose to reconceptualise Spinozas conceptions of prophecies, prophets, rituals and miracles (chapters I, II, V, VI) within a more complex conceptual persona, that is, the Devotees of the prophet. The analysis of the theological arguments of the Treatise

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through a conceptual persona might enable us to determine what lies at the very basis of the production of the political and how affectivity brings into the system meanings, tensions, individuals and flowings of time. For the complexity and heterogeneity of the themes involved within this persona, Simondons philosophy of collective and psychic individuation might shed light on the manifold status of the prophets and their devotees. Simondons theory of the collective individuation might translate into contemporary language the personages of the Treatise, through which the originality of the political stakes of Spinozas notions of imagination and affectivity might come to light.65 Prophecy: the threshold of the political In chapters I-II (of prophecy and of the prophets respectively), Spinoza describes the genesis and meaning of prophecy. As with the knowledge of the prophet, imagination grounds the prophetic messages too. This implies the interpretation of prophecy as a direct consequence of particular affective circumstances as the prophets emotive disposition, linguist expressions and the ignorance of certain natural laws. Spinoza defines prophecy or revelation as the understanding and communication of Gods power and existence through images and words (TTP, Chapter I: 396). The prophet is the interpreter (in Hebraic nabi) of Gods messages, and he also plays the fundamental role of divulging Gods will to the members of a group (TTP, Chapter I: 394). The images and words of God mediated through the prophets imagination are instrumental in the developing human beings awareness of the richness of nature. The message of prophecies, Spinoza explains, concerns an immature mode, however not false, of understanding the laws of nature. For Spinoza, thus, the focuses of the revelation are, on the one hand, addressed to the unveiling the structure and becoming of the order of the real throughout the employment of affective discourses and figures. On the other, the aim of revelation is directed to the establishment of
65

For Simondon, the group is always a mixture of psychic and social realities. For him, there are not groups exclusively psychic or social, instead groups are a confluence of these two poles of Being (Simondon, 2007: 175-214).

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moral behaviours within a group.66 This leads to the creation of common beliefs, opinions and actions, through which new forms of relations between individuals come to light. The prophets gestures of revealing Gods will to others sets in motion a mechanism of production of a series of commonalities, which differentiates the entire equilibrium of the system. Therefore, prophecy here expresses not or not only an ingenuous way of thinking God, rather, a more complex process, which transforms and expands the domain of the individual on the realm of the common. In other words, behind the vague and mutilated opinions generated through the prophets speeches, there is the reorganisation and re-signification of the equilibrium of a collective body. Following Spinozas arguments, the prophetic message gives rise to a sense of closeness and participation between ignorant (disparate) individuals, through which they recognise their role within the world. They become devotees, importantly, not of God but of the prophet collectively.67 As the occurrence of the collective ground is moulded though the prophets speeches and images, it is through his body, stories, dreams and memories that common actions, ideas and tendencies are individualised. In order to prophesise and narrate stories, the prophet requires a group to whom he can address his messages. Without the group the prophet is directly confronted with the undifferentiated nature, which reveals his impasse in thinking God. The encounter of the prophet with the pre-individual mass of nature is nuanced by the passive tones of fear, hope, sorrow and astonishment, which structure two fluctuating movements. The prophet, on the one side, is frightened by the boundless force of nature, which is greater than the singular individual.68 On the other, a form of recognition occurs between the prophet and the multiplicity of nature, which derives from the composition of the individual as a mixture of individuated reality
66

[], Gods testimony to Abraham implies only that he was obedient and commanded his household to the ways of justice and goodness (TTP, Chapter II: 411). 67 For Moses commanded them [Israelites] to love God and keep his Law, to regard to their past blessings [] as bestowed by God; and he further made terrifying threats if they should transgress these commandments, while promising many blessings if they observed them (TTP, Chapter II: 413). 68 Adam, to whom God was first revealed, did not know that God is omnipresent and omniscient, for he hid from God and attempted to excuse his sin before God as if he had to do with a man. []. For Adam heard God walking in the Garden, calling him and seeking him out, and then seeing his guilty bearing, asking him whether he had eaten of the forbidden tree (TTP, Chapter II: 410).

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and pre-individual mass.69 For this, the prophet considers himself as a constitutive element of the order of the real.70 It follows that the prophet experiences the power of nature as Otherness and, at the same time, Sameness, which structures his incapacity to signify himself through God. It is precisely at this moment that passions of fear, sorrow and hope activate a process, through which the individual enters into the realm of the collective ground. In order to solve prophets impasse of orienting himself within the world, passions bring about the re-discovery of the group of the devotees. 71 However, this group is not a mere assemblage of listeners, rather they are followers characterised by devotion (faith). This moulds, on the one side, the message of the prophecy through collective meanings, upon which a group of listeners becomes devotees of the prophet. On the other, the devotees attune their actions and thoughts to the stories narrated through the prophets voice. Given the central role of the action of communicating images for the creation of collective habits and opinions, one certainly might argue that Spinozas analysis of prophecy, and more generally imagination, delineates a theory of communication and the ways in which this grounds and develops commonalities within a society.72 Spinoza, undeniably, gives full account of the language, speech and writings of prophets and how these have been used to influence peoples actions and thoughts. However, the significance of the prophecy in the Treatise, I think, does not only rely on the unveiling the mechanisms of language. It is not communication that lies at the
69

For a more detailed explanation of the theme of the composition of the individual in Spinozas ontology, see chapter III of this work. 70 Therefore, if Moses spoke with God face to face as a man may do with his fellow (that is, through the medium of the two bodies), then Christ communed with God mind to mind [italics mine] (TTP, Chapter I: 399). 71 Concerning the figure of the prophet, Deleuze and Guattari strive towards the dramatic relation between the prophet and God. Referring to Spinozas description of the prophet, they view the condition of the prophet as mere instrument of Gods will, whose role is signified and dependent on the power of God. The prophet, they conclude, is only a messenger of the Lord, insignificant in himself (Deleuze and Guattari (2004b; 135-141), 72 See on the question of Spinozas theory of imagination as a form of communication, Balibar (2002), Giancotti (1969), Gatens and Llyod (1999), Visentin (2001), Williams (2007).

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basis of prophetic discourses, which would organise a community of devotees. Simondons theory of information, analysed in chapter III, might better explain the imaginative process, which founds the art of prophesy, and how this effectively alters the equilibrium of the collective body. For Simondon, to inform, better to exchange information, means literally to transform. This leads directly to consider the forces, through which actions and thoughts signify and, at the same time, are re-signified within a collective body. To be more precise, information calls for productive changes and movements, to which immediately correspond alterations of the entire equilibrium. In the Devotees of the prophet, the art of prophesy goes far beyond the method of communication, bringing to light a process structured through a knot of bodily motion, forces, thoughts, images and potentialities. As mentioned, prophecy means the act of interpreting and communicating Gods gestures; and also it involves the art of predicting future events, which, however real or illusory, influence actions and thoughts of the devotees in their actuality. Although the prediction concerns coming events, however, this guides and transforms the present actions and thoughts of the devotees (TTP, Chapters II and V). Spinoza tells his readers that the prophet communicates through images and words, which implies a very extensive understanding of the status of revelation. Bodily intensive movements here play the pivotal role of divulging Gods stories. It is through a combination of prophets voice, eyes, memories and dreams that the common sense of devotion is developed (see particularly chapter V). Additionally, from the Ethics we know that thinking and acting are developed contemporaneously. These elements indicate that the gestures of prophesy and devotion refer to moments of actualisation, differentiation and transformation of a general system. The power of prophecy entails a re-shaping of the common understanding of time, bodies and thoughts. It is precisely in the middle of these movements that passions and affects become crucial. In this phase, passions actualise and further individualise relational forces, re-configuring entirely the realm of the collective. Fear, hope and devotion

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are mainly the conditions, which re-form and complicate the domains of the prophet and the devotees. In the Ethics, part III, Spinoza defines fear as inconstant pain arising from the idea of a thing future or past, of whose outcome we are in some doubt (E. III, Def. XIII). Similarly hope is inconstant pleasure arising from the idea of a thing future or past, of whose outcome we are in some doubt (E. III, Def. XII). Lastly, by devotion Spinoza means love toward one at whom we wonder (E. III, Def. X). In our affective-conceptual persona of the Devotees of the prophet, it is the devotion toward the prophet that lies at the very heart of the common. In this state, devotion constitutes the fundaments and the purpose, through which desires and conatus are actualised into the political ground. The relational movements generated through the devotional force re-signify and expand intensively the realm of the common to the political. Although devotion is a passion, this structures collective actions, thoughts, forces, which notably do not pass from one individual to the other as from the prophet to his devotees; rather, devotion re-organises the equilibrium of the collective being into a political individual. Given Spinozas claim of the correspondence between acting and thinking, devotion expresses already an action, which might be founded and developed only within a relational context. To act, however moved by fear or hope, within a collective structure directly means to behave politically. In his critique of theology, Spinoza gives full rights to the political meaning of passion without narrowing its role to ethical habits and alienating practises. The creation of rituals, laws and ceremonies within religious communities of the past exemplifies the political consistency of passions such as devotion and piety (TTP, Chapter V: 439). In this fashion, the novel political individual emerging from the devotional relations between devotees and the prophet brings to light multiple levels of heterogeneity such as time, ethics, humankind and history, each of which is nuanced by the

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passionate tones of the Devotees of the prophet. As expressions of devotion, miracles, for example, do not only describe the misinterpretation of the causes behind the natural phenomena, rather how the collective individual of the Devotees moulds time, life and the becoming of nature. In the case of the miracles, the Devotees conceptualise (understand) the past (history) and organise their future through wonder, which includes political actions as the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt. As admiration toward wonder gives rise to novel political practises, which transform the community as a whole. For this, the miracle is always described as a relational event, which is experienced collectively. Although with a negative meaning, Spinoza clearly states that the miracles are essentially created for the common people (TTP, Chapter VI: 444-447). Taking into account the political and relational status of devotion, piety and wonder, however, we cannot ignore that Spinoza defines these as passions and, in the Treatise, the devotees are described as vulgus (plebs). For the Ethics, passions delineate a passive state, within which individuals are dependent on external forces and events. To put this in political terms, fear, hope and devotion are the causes of the manipulation of devotees needs and desires, through which ideological apparatuses are erected. If devotion, fear, piety and hope reduce progressively actions and thoughts of individuals, in our case of the Devotees, no one can deny that these, nevertheless, constitute relational states, which transform the parts as well as the whole. Furthermore, by definition devotion is love toward, which forwards the idea of certain active movements, forces and desires. Therefore, the questions immediately arise, first, as what Spinoza truly means by passivity. Secondly, who or what is passive in the relation between devotees and the prophet? Reading the chapters of rituals and miracles, for example, Spinoza seems to attribute a quite passive role to the devotees. Therefore, the devotees, at first sight, appear as the place, within which passions are grounded and developed. Proceeding further with the reading, however, we discover that the state of passivity pervades the entire

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conceptual-affective persona of the Devotees of the prophet not only parts of it. For this, both the prophets and the devotees are ignorant of the laws of nature and God. It means that devotion and wonder, for example, affect equally Mosess actions, the pharaoh and the devotees.73 Both prophets and their followers institute sacrifices moved by fear of misfortune and hope of fortune. Strictly speaking, the wondering (devotion) toward someone or something shapes the entire persona of the Devotees of the prophet. It means that ceremonies and sacrifices are the results of a more complex process, which passes and exceeds both prophets and devotees, resignifying the realm of the common. In order to better situate the political meaning of passions within the TTP, we need to return briefly the analysis of affectivity developed in chapter III. I have argued through the adoption of Simondons categories that passions do not express a fracture within the process of individuation. By the necessity of nature, this would be absurd. These instead refer to different combinations of relational movements between the collective, the pre-individual and the disparate structure of beings. In the case of passions, the pre-individual reality is experienced more vehemently than the collective, which delays the series of transformations within the collective individual. Similarly in the Devotees of the prophet, I think, the tendency towards passivity reveals the predominance of the pre-individual over the actions and thoughts of the devotees, which is exemplified by the conception of God as otherness. This leads to stabilising progressively the entire equilibrium of the collective body, within which relational movements are not the ground of novel meanings, individuals and tensions. Rather, these become simply a motionless and repetitive system of rules and regulations. As a consequences the temporal life the Devotees is constantly structured through moments of expectation and forgiveness, for a gift, a miracle and punishment. The

73

See for example, the anger of Moses toward the pharaoh (TTP, Chapter II: 407), and how from this generates political gestures.

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time of the devotees expresses an enduring state of expectation.

74

Expectation

means that the present does not actualise the infinite possibilities of the collective ground embodied by a group (in a Simondonian fashion the reserve of Being), rather potentialities, actions and thoughts remain enclosed within a time in between past and future.75 Taking into account these arguments, we might raise some reflections. The impasse (the passivity), I would argue, of the Devotees of the prophet is not caused by passions in themselves, which would generate misconceptions and servitude. The status of the devotees is not lacking. Instead, it folds and unfolds a variety of emotive tones such as fear, hope, anger and piety, each of which signifies different relational phenomena. The drama of the entire conceptual persona of the Devotees concerns, instead, the condition of being passive in relation to the pre-individual, which shapes relational conditions such as ceremonies, laws and sacrifices ordered through expectation and otherness. These situate political individuals (human beings, laws, institutions, ethical norms), however collective, within stable organisations, where relations are not productive of possible transformations and individuations. From Simondon, we know that a stable equilibrium (political, ontological and ethical) means the effacement of any possibility for transformations and movements, through which the advancement of the process of individuation is avoided entirely. The importance of this conceptual persona, on the one side, concerns that its emotive status brings about the discovery of a quite complex process, which forms not only social and psychological behaviours between individuated beings. Rather, this involves the re-actualisation of reality itself, which becomes differentiated and signified through intensive relational movements nuanced by devotions, wonder and piety. On the other, the Devotees bring into light a problem within the system, which refers to the possibility of being excluded from the more general process of the becoming of the real.
74

Concerning the notion of time derived from passions and imagination, differently Gatens and Lloyd have pointed out that imagination introduces a time of contingency within the social context, which gives special priority to the present (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 29-51). 75 Concerning a more general account of theme of the time of prophecy, by contrast, Agamben affirms that the time of the prophet takes the only form of the future (Agamben, 2005:59-60).

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However, this conceptual persona certainly leave unresolved many important questions regarding the political meanings and the role of passions within the production of specific political behaviours such as struggle, resistance and pact of fidelity. In order to determine what other form of politics and society passions might produce, we need to look at the story of Jewish people, which plays a pivotal role within the thread of the Treatise. The theme of the formation and development of the Hebrew state discloses how passions and affects give rise to important political events, movements and even the collapse of the state of Israel. It is to the question of Jewish people that I now turn. This conceptual persona occupies a crucial role within the thread of the TTP. It indicates the ways in which passions are productive of powerful political behaviours such as struggle, resistance and pact of fidelity. It is to the history of the Jewish people that I now turn.

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4. The Subject of Moses

The theme of the Jewish state is a critical issue in Spinozas political thought, which raises many fecund arguments, running from specific questions about Judaism such as the messianic vision of the world and the role of Moses for the development of Jewish nation, to more general political analyses such as the limits of the confessional foundation of political states, the origin of the pact, the necessity of the separation of religion, politics and philosophy and the nature of power within a civil society. Spinoza gives a very accurate and radical account of the Jewish question, which plays a strategic role both in the theological and political sections of the Treatise. Spinozas focus is to question the belief in the divine vocation of the Jewish people, upon which the alleged conviction of being the nation chosen by God before all others has been based (TTP, Chapter III). For Spinoza the distinctive status of the Jewish state resides on a well-organised system of laws, political institutions and social cohesion, which overshadowed the other political governments of the time. This implies the recognition of the value of the Jewish nation independently from the faith professed. This is a decisive move within the thread of the Treatise, which has political and religious implications. Concerning the theme of Judaism, Spinoza forwards the idea of developing a laic vision of the Jewish society, opening the way toward the secularisation of Jewish culture and history (Yovel, 1992a: 15-126; Smith, 1998: 1-24, 166-205). For this, Spinoza does not deny the great achievements of the Jewish community obtained in history, which becomes an exemplary administration of society. Through his exegesis of the holy texts, Spinoza, instead, questions the sacred origins of the state and the idea of the divine election of the Jewish people. For Spinoza, there is a stipulation of a pact at the very basis of the Jewish nation, through which people have transferred part of their power to Moses. Spinozas critique of the divine

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vocation of the Hebrews opens up directly to the refusal of the paradigm of messianism, around which the entire apparatus of Judaism has been constructed. Concerning the political implications of Spinozas claim, the refusal of the messianic vision of the world, the replacement of the divine foundation of the state with the social pact have an impact on a more general mode of conceptualising the foundation and the objectives of the state, the status of people in relation to the political authority. Spinozas denial of any form of messianism within politics brings to light his philosophy of praxis, which has been situated along a certain Marxist notions such as the alienation of the proletariat, false consciousness and historical materialism (Tosel, 1984; Matheron, 1988; Balibar, 1998; Negri, 1998). Although Spinozas thesis of the Jewish question and its political implications have been largely analysed, and all possible alliances with other traditions of thought exhausted, I think, that there are still dormant themes, which might come to light through a different strategy. These brings to question the relational process involved within the formation of the political community, the implications of the passionate relation with God for the constitution of the political individual; and more importantly, the theme of the affective tones of Moses subjects, and how these have played a crucial part within the becoming of society. The arguments I investigate, point to the ontological and political status of affectivity, and how this gives rise to the nation of Israel. In order to examine these themes, Spinozas analysis of the Jewish nation will form our conceptual-affective persona following the Devotees of the prophet. In this light, the historical figures of Moses and the Israelite community will be incorporated within a more complex personage, that is, the Subjects of Moses. The importance of this conceptual-affective persona concerns the unveiling some of the ways in which affectivity structures relational movements within a process of collective individuation. The inquiry into the conceptual persona of the Subject of Moses brings about the discovery of the notions of obedience, sacrifices, laws, and messianic tendency as results of a process of individuation, which signifies and re-signifies

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constantly the realm of the political. It is precisely in this context that Spinozas conception of the anatomy and becoming of a community as a complex political individual comes to light. The claim, I will make through the thread of this conceptual persona, concerns the relocating of passions, desires and affects at the centre of a process, which brings to light the structure of individuals as an excess of heterogeneity. This excess of heterogeneous forces and meanings is crucial for signifying the realm of the common. In case of the Subjects of Moses, desire, anger, hope and wonder generate powerful collective individuals, which give rise to the production of new political realities. It is through the dynamics of the Subjects of Moses that Spinozas conception of society as a mixture of incompatibilities, tensions and potentials emerges. Taking into account these arguments, let us map the affective and relational dynamics of the conceptual persona of the Subject of Moses.

4.1 Anguish and gift: Time and becoming of the Jewish people

In chapter III of the vocation of the Hebrew, Spinoza makes a fundamental claim, that is,

Everyones true happiness and blessedness consists solely in the enjoyment of the good, not in priding himself that he alone is enjoying that good to the exclusion of others. He who counts himself more blessed because he alone enjoys wellbeing not shared by the others, or because he is more blessed and fortunate than others, knows not what is true happiness and blessedness, and the joy derives therefrom, if it be not mere childishness, has its only source in spite and malice. [italics mine] (TTP, chapter III: 415-416).

This general statement means, on the one hand, that happiness and wellbeing do not consist in an individualist and possessive fruition of these conditions. This might suggest that true happiness and blessedness, instead, require a state of sharing and participation or, at the very least, a non ambitious and immodest enjoyment. On the other hand, Spinozas affirmation might be considered as the recognition of the

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central limit of the Jewish people, which searches and enjoys happiness and fortunes for their own advantage, and also with the pretence of being more fortunate or blessed than other nations. In our conceptual persona, the twofold meaning of Spinozas thesis identifies the path of the Subjects of Moses towards the political. The practises of sharing, participation and exclusion signify the ontological and political becoming of the Subjects of Moses. It is in these moments that the drama and, at the same time, power of this conceptual persona resides. Following the thread of Spinozas arguments, the supposed divine vocation of the Jewish people merely concerns a well-organised political and social government (TTP, Chapter III: 418). This refers to the sharing of fortunes, rules and regulations collectively and not as independent beings. These factors come to constitute the sole exceptional character of the Hebrew state. From these initial explanations, however, many questions soon arise. Firstly, how does Spinozas system of necessity allow the political uprising of the state of Israel? In other words, are there ruptures, messianic figures or inexplicable events, which brings about the genesis of the Israelites? Secondly, what conditions or individuals (if any) prepare the terrain for the affirmation of this political body? Ultimately, who or what lies at the very heart of the state of Israel? In order to address these questions, we need to take a step back and draw our attention to the conditions and phases, which have led to the emergence of the Subjects of Moses. Following Simondons dictum of the priority of knowing the process for the understanding of the individual, there is a process of collective individuation moulded by a mixture of passions and affects at the very heart of the becoming of the Subjects of Moses. As we have seen with the Devotees of the prophet, affectivity structures various levels of relational conditions within the realm of the political. This involves the differentiation, actualisation and further complication of individual beings within a new metastable order, which is the collective ground. This acts as a complex individual and, at the same time, source of further phases of individuation.

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The realm of the political plays this role within the development of the Subjects of Moses, within which they re-situate and re-orient themselves within the world. The importance of this state concerns the possibility of unveiling some of the ways in which the Subjects of Moses become the place and elements of the production of the political. In other words, the path of the Subjects of Moses towards the actualisation of the state of Israel delineates the affective force employed for the creation of a political community. Exodus: Slaves and claimants Spinoza tells us that the Jewish people after the exodus from the empire of Egypt find themselves in an unexpected situation resembling closely a state of nature (TTP, Chapter XVII: 539). The exodus expresses a very crucial moment, within which they passed from a condition of servitude to one of freedom. In the thread of our conceptual persona, this connotes a process, within which the passions of fear, anger and hate expose the realm of slavery towards the problematic phase of refugees. Given Spinozas conception of passion as a dependence of ones action upon an external cause, the passions of fear and hate might seem to contradict the definitions of the Ethics. This might lead one to think that fear and hate, under certain circumstances, produce forces instead of passions, which would be absurd for the arguments of the Ethics. Therefore, the question immediately arises as how do the Jewish people escape from Egypt given the passivity of their relations? The state of the Subjects of Moses preceding the exodus, I suggest, should be incorporated within a more complex equilibrium, which is shaped by a mixture of forces, meanings and potentialities. This is the collective ground, within which the Israelites under the pharaoh are nuanced by the wonder toward God and the hate for the empire of Egypt. Although the Jewish people are under the passive relational movements of hate and fear, they are, over all, a group. They recognise themselves as one, however multiple, individual claimant of the Promised Land. The actualisation and development of a collective individual implies an enduring

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condition of transformations, exchanges of information and relations, without which the disparate being would cease to exist. In the group of the Israelites, the state of claimant moves this process of transformations towards more complicated phases. As claimant, the Israelites express, on the one side a force, a desire toward more problematic individuals; on the other, the act of claiming brings to light their intrinsic asymmetric structure (the level of disparation), which causes their the condition of slavery or passivity. However, the group of claimant is located in the middle of a political context, the state of the pharaoh, which brings about a confluence of already individualised realities (the Egyptian rules, hierarchic equilibrium and customs) with forming political individuals (the hope of the Promised Land). The wonder of God structures and reinforces the equilibrium of this emerging individual towards the individualisation of more productive relations, which should overturn the passivity of the state of servitude. These elements, in my reading, play equally the pivotal role within the transition from the phase of servitude to the one of refugees. However, there is another crucial aspect of this transitional moment, which might shed light on the dynamics of the exodus. This entails to the image of Moses, precisely his affective status.76 Spinoza describes the wisdom of Moses as a vivid attitude towards mercy, devotion and wonder of God (TTP, Chapter II: 412-413). Moses, Spinoza claims, communicates with God as one friend does with another (TTP, Chapter I: 399). These emotive tones structure a positive force, which greatly exceeds and re-signifies the moments of fear and hate. It is in truth the love of Moses towards both God and the Israelites that surpasses and expands the passive relations of the phase of servitude. Importantly, this positive tension is located and operates only within a collective individual, which corresponds, in this case, to the body of the Israelites. The exchanges and alternations of information between the affective status of Moses and the Jewish people re-organise the equilibrium of the process towards more
76

By the term Moses I mean a specific affective degree of intensity, which resides on a collective individual.

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problematic individuals. The two degrees of intensity expressed by the Israelites hope of the Promised Land and Moses friendship with God re-shape intensively the passive relations of the fear for the pharaoh towards the production of novel forms of political beings. From the Ethics, we know that hatred, however strong might it be, is always destroyed by love (E. III, prop. XLIII). This suggests a very different mode of intending passions and servitude, which discloses new trajectories towards its possible subversion without deferring to any external force or agency. It is not Moses that liberates the Israelites, neither God or the Israelites themselves. It is, instead, through the emergence of a collective individual carrying novel meanings, incompatibility and tensions that the exodus can be realised. Strictly speaking, there is always a possibility of overturning hate and servitude insofar as there are productive tensions, heterogeneity, relations and exchanges of meanings, which, in our case, are nuanced by the tones of Moses love toward his subjects and the Israelites desire of the Promised Land. These affective tones, crucially, are not merely psychic states or thoughts, which reside, secretly, within the intimacy of the group or the disparate being; neither do these precede actions and movements. By the definitions of Ethics, affects and passions, however self-oriented or hetero-directed, are already actions. The significance of Spinozas philosophical gesture acquires great consistency particularly in relation to the political event of the exodus. For the Israelites and Moses, what is at the stake is not only the turn from a polytheistic position to a monotheistic one, rather it is life itself (the attainment of the Promised Land), which is at risk. Therefore, devotion, fear, hope, anger and wonder signify collective actions and forces, which inhere within the realm of the political.

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The community of God:Productive and messianic times The arguments of the exodus and servitude move our discussion towards the centre of our conceptual persona. This refers to the condition of the Jewish people within the unexpected state of nature. The analysis of the status of the Subjects of Moses within the state of nature is crucial. This might enable us to discover the genealogy of a community and the ways in which this signifies more complex political beings such as theocracy, anarchy and monarchy. In the natural condition, Spinoza explains, the power of everyone corresponds exactly to his right to act (TTP, Chapter XVI: 527). This delineates a place of pure potentiality, a mixture of unpredicted and undetermined events. Furthermore, this implies the recovering of the conception of the natural condition from its Hobbesian meaning as the domain of cruelty to a boundless territory shaped by desires, power and tensions. Related particularly to the Subjects of Moses, the regained condition is more complex and manifold. This expresses a situation in the middle between existing political reality (the hierarchic system of the pharaoh) and the one to be formed (the state of Israel). In this phase, the status of the Israelites is an anomalous one. They are not yet-subjects of the state of Israel and the followers of Moses laws, at the same time, they are no longer the slaves of the pharaoh.77 They are mixtures of individuated realities, potentialities, affects, passions, bodily movements and desires grounded upon the collective being. Spinoza describes the repossessed state of nature as a boundless territory, where the Hebrews were at the liberty to sanction any new laws that they pleased or to establish new ordinances, to maintain a state wherever they wished and to occupy any lands they wished [Italics mine] (TTP, chapter V: 439). Given the complete absence of external constrictions, the Promised Land connotes an open structure, which is densely populated by desires, potentialities and various heterogeneous knots
77

The theme of the anomalous condition of the Jewish people from the exodus to nowadays have been re-explored by Yovel recently. Referring to the situation of the Marranos, Yovel has coined the expression split identity, which refers to a fragmented and partial identity. This psychological state derives from the condition in the middle between two cultures and politics, in which he includes Spinoza too (Yovel, 2009).

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of bodies and thoughts. This confluence of disparate elements re-exposes and greatly expands the collective being of the Subjects of Moses towards further and more problematic stages of political individuation. These involve the re-signification of the Israelites within an unknown context, which becomes the ground of further relational movements. Desires play the pivotal role for the re-colonization of the state of nature, re-organising venture, actions, events, thoughts and incompatibilities. As we have analysed in chapter III, Spinoza defines desire as the very essence of humankind. Desire, however, is not a category a priori deduced, which is attached to an already-made individual (E.III, Def. I). Spinoza considers desire as a transition, which greatly exceeds the individuated being and continuously exposes him towards moments of individuation within the collective field (E. III, Def. II). Following Simondon, we have called this tendency a transindividual force, which is contemporaneously individual and more than the individual. In our conceptual persona of the Subject of Moses, desire lies at the very basis of the state of nature. It is through the gesture of desiring that Israelites pass from being claimants and refugees to people of a new political body. As collective (better transindividual) force, desire resolves and further complicates the problematic condition, in which the Israelites found themselves following the exodus. As mentioned, they were precisely in the middle between actuality (the status of claimant and slaves) and potentiality (the people of the state of Israel, the nation of God). The abundance of the state of nature, then, reveals a territory of pure excess of heterogeneity and asymmetric bodies, within which Israelites are purely the whatever is (quodlibet ens), borrowing Agambens expression. Agambens notion of the whatever, I think, captures the status of potentiality of our conceptual persona. For Agamben, quodlibet ens means literally being such that always matters, which connotes a singularity such as it is (Agamben, 1990: 1). Being as it is means the recognition of a singularity without any attached predicates or categories such as French, Muslim or Jewish. This leads directly to knowing the

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condition and thus potentialities of singularity in itself. The importance of this notion for our conceptual persona of the Subjects of Moses resides on Agambens resignification of the Scholastic expression of quodlibet as desire and love. Assuming being without predicates, Agamben brings the meaning of the quodlibet back to its original Latin connotation, which implies a direct relation with desire (libet). This brings about the re-discovery of the state of singularity emptied of all its predicates as the whatever you want, that is, lovable. In other words, taken as it is, the realm of the whatever is expresses a condition of desiring (Agamben, 1990: 2).78 For our conceptual persona of the Subjects of Moses, however, the state of nature moulded through desires does not only express a condition in tension, but also actions, thoughts, relational exchanges of information and degrees of intensity. As Spinoza says, in the state of nature, natural right corresponds to the power of act (TTP, Chapter XVI: 527). This means that desires connote already actions, movements and relations. As mention before, what is at the stake here is the actualisation and further complication of the state of Israel, within which the Subjects of Moses become the theatre and actors. The actualisation of the political body comes to light through a pact between the Jewish people and God. In this first pact, they decided to transfer their natural rights collectively to God, electing him the only ruler. The emergence of the pact raises fundamental themes for the understanding of the anatomy and development of the Subjects of Moses. First of all, the pact does not delineate a rupture between the state of nature and the political one. Given the collective alienation of the natural right to God, the pact expresses a transitional phase, an expansive movements from a state of lesser perfection to a greater one. Secondly, as transitional phase, the pact emerges from an act of desire, which expands and complicate the collective being. For this, Spinoza grounds at the very basis of any community including the Jewish one- different degrees of desire. These refer to the knowledge through primary causes, the acquisition of a habit of virtue and the enjoyment of a secure and good
78

By love and desire Agamben refers to Platos conception of the erotic anamnesis. According to Agamben, Platos erotic anamnesis concerns the movement that transports the object toward its own taking place- the Idea, Agamben (1993: 2).

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life (TTP, chapter III: 417). Ultimately, the pact with God is structured through emotive tones. Spinoza stresses the states of fidelity and devotion for the actualisation of the pact. It is through fidelity and admiration toward Moses and devotion toward God that the political equilibrium comes to light.79 Unlike the exodus, the figure of Moses plays a relatively marginal role. In this phase, Moses simply denotes a degree of affectivity, which enriches the movements of the Israelites towards the political. These elements lead Spinoza to consider the creation of the community of God grounded on a spontaneous and joyful becoming. The re-colonisation of the state of nature through the occurrence of the pact with God, Spinoza argues, proceeds from a collective gesture of desire (Without much hesitation), which crucially does not derive from fear and anger either an egotistical attitude (TTP, Chapter XVII: 539). For this, Spinoza describes the phases of the actualisation of the agreement with God as not conditioned by forcible coercion or fear of threats(TTP, Chapter XVII: 539). It is in this context that the great modernity of Spinozas political thought lie. Spinozas conception of the pact opens the way to re-shaping our awareness of the meaning and origins of society itself. Given the formation of the pact as transitional and expansive movement nuanced by desires and affectivity, society simply becomes. It is not created by obscure forces and rational choice; rather, societies are processes, carrying various levels of incompatibility, problems and solutions. 80 To consider society as a process, significantly, does not imply the return to any form of agency, absolute spirit and God, which would guide and determine human history and practices. In this sense, in Spinozas analysis of the different types of society (the Jewish community, the state of nature, the English commonwealth under Cromwell, democracy and monarchy) no one would find a linear progression of the civilization
79

Finding themselves thus placed in this state of nature, they hearkened to Moses, in whom they all placed the greatest confidence, and resolved to transfer the right not to any mortal man, but to God alone. (TTP, chapter XVII: 539). 80 Concerning Spinozas notion of the social contract, Negri suggests that Spinoza in the second foundation of his political thought replaces the idea of the pact with that of consensus (Negri, 1998: 235-355). My interpretation of the foundation of society in the Treatise follows Simondons theory. For Simondon, the emergence of society corresponds to phases of individuation structured through emotive exchanges, potentials and preliminary tensions (Simondon, 2007:183).

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of humankind, within which human beings are merely instruments of a higher mind; neither is there no a dialectical vision of history and society developed through moments of opposition and reconciliation. Society is instead a non-linear process, which proceeds through expansive movements, through which the multiplicity of nature is actualised and individualised. In this light, the structure of every society is fundamentally problematic, collective and asymmetric, which unveils novel and unsuspected phases of differentiation, complication and transformations. However, as the system follows a non-linear process, this does not mean that the solution of a precedent problem create a qualitative change toward the better; rather, transformations, as soon we will see, predominantly tend to expand the asymmetric structure of the individual, increasing intensively the level of incompatibility. It is for this reason that Spinoza in the Ethics claims that the more grades of reality a thing has, the more perfect is (E.II, prop. XIV). The perfectibility of an individual resides solely in the progressive complication of its asymmetric structure: its being constantly incompatible with.81 This is exactly the case of our conceptual persona of the Subjects of Moses. The political realm emerging from the pact brings to light its asymmetric equilibrium, which further complicates its heterogeneous (disparate) structure. The formation of the community of God expresses a great improvement from the condition of servitude and the whatever of the state of nature. However, the political territory reveals considerable problematic moments, which disclose somewhat dramatic aspects of the disparate composition of the Jewish people. The transfer of the natural rights to God gives rise to the re-signification of the Subjects of Moses through the realm of the political, and equally the political
81

By the expression incompatible with, I do not intend the ontological and political status of the collective individual as lacking, either I refer to the Marxist notions of contradiction and class struggle, which Negri instead employs in his interpretation of Spinozas politics and, more generally, his theory of the power of the multitude (Negri, 1988; 2004; 2005: 170-208); and also I do not mean Balibars definition of the aporetic meaning of the mass in the Treatise, Balibar (1994: 3-37). Developing Simondons claims of the individual as problematic and disparate, I rather understand an ontological, which is however already political, state of constant excess of being, which arises from different levels of heterogeneity and intensity (conatus, desires, power, movements and grades of reality).

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through the group of the Israelites. This involves, on the one side, the re-positioning the collective individual within the political context, within which they pass from being the whatever to constitute the community of God. On the other, the realm of the political becomes re-populated through relational movements, which bring into the system different modes of thinking time, ethics and language. It is precisely in this context that the status of Subjects of Moses becomes intensively complex and dramatic. As mentioned, they are in the middle between pre-existing meanings (the condition of slavery under the Egyptian state) and a potential one (the Promised Land). It means that they are not only the ground of desires and forces, but also already individuated reality. In the new political body of the community of God, the status of the Jewish people is twofold. As claimants of the Promised Land, on the one side, they are a mixture of desires, and devotion towards God and Moses. They are expression of power, tension (devotion is always towards something or someone) and actions. This implies the recharacterisation of the collective individual as a productive force, which re-defines the equilibrium of the system as an enduring theatre of transformations. The Subjects of Moses, in this stage, constitute a form of invasive and intensive power, which can be partially predetermined and controlled. Moses hence invokes Gods help for the obstinacy of his people. The Israelites, Spinoza observes through Moses plea, are essentially an obstinate and passionate group, which can hardly be dominated and defeated.82 Furthermore, Spinoza himself (through Senecas discourses) points out the impossibility of fully restraining passions and desires of the mass (TTP, Chapter V: 438, and the same quotation recurs in chapter XVI: 530). From the Roman Empire onwards, Spinoza comments, any attempt to restrain and oppose the resistance to damaging the political system itself.
82

the mass has been vain,

The fact is that when Moses realised the character and obstinate spirit of his nation, he saw clearly that they could not accomplish their undertaking without mighty miracles and the special external help of God, and must assuredly perish without such help; and he besought this special help of God so that it would be evident that God willed them to be saved. For he speaks []If now I have found favour in their sight, O Lord, let my Lord, I pray thee, go among us, for it is a stiff-necked people (TTP, Chapter III: 422).

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Given the impossible effacement of passions and desires, thus, the political body can only accustom itself to the affective dynamics of the group. For this, Moses gives voice to the collective forces and desires of his community. In order to modulate and not to dominate, rules, ceremonies and sacrifices are instituted (TTP, Chapters III, XVII). Obedience and gift come to re-configure the realm of the political, within and through which the collective individual is the ground of transformations and further forms of incompatibility. As anticipated before, desire expresses a productive power, which calls for structural changes in time, relations and society itself. In this way, the establishment of rituals and sacrifices goes far beyond moral habits and alienating practises, re-shaping modes of counting and perceiving time. In the realm of the Subjects of Moses, rituals invade every singular moment of the life of the community. The affects of devotion, wonder, piety and hope structure time through gestures of remembrance and expectation. Rituals and sacrifices come out from the expansive force of the Subjects of Moses, through which the entire political body re-situates itself within the realm of the collective individual. Religious festivals, for example, express some of the way in which the invasive and joyful force of affects exposes and further complicates the equilibrium of the political society of God. Certainly, Spinoza claims that these ceremonies are instrumental for reinforcing peoples obedience. However, religious rules become a common habit of both the ruler and the subjects to the point that the political body becomes a theocracy (TTP, Chapter V: 439-440; Chapter XVII: 540). As mentioned, in his plea Moses asks for a gift from God. In order to give voice to the unavoidable force of his subjects, Moses demands a recompense for the past servitudes of his peoples. In other words, as claimants, the Israelites are still waiting for the gift, the Promised Land. In turn, Moses communicates to them that they are, first amongst other nations, the elected nation of God. The gift brings about a further mode of conceptualising time. This becomes re-counted through the affective tones expressed by the gratitude and expectation of God (TTP, Chapter III). Therefore, these elements bring to light the effective and unpredictable force of desires, passions

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and affects, disclosing the concrete impact of these over the boundaries of the political. The desires of the Jewish claimants, I would argue, structure, individualise and transform the community of God from a form of democracy (the first pact with God), through theocracy and monarchy (from the second pact with Moses onwards) to its collapse. These arguments of the gift and divine vocation of the Hebrew move directly our inquiry to the second aspect of the Subjects of Moses. As mentioned, they are in the middle between the status of claimant and that of slaves of pharaoh. In our conceptual persona this opens up directly to the dramatic phase of the messianic vision of politics and the return to servitude. Although the Israelites have left Egypt and founded their own state, nevertheless, Spinoza observes, they have so long been habituated to the condition of slavery that the structure of the political body still echoes the hierarchic order of pharaoh (TTP, Chapter V: 439). For this, they elect collectively Moses the representative of Gods will on earth, instituting theocracy and then monarchy (TTP, chapter V: 439-440; Chapter XVII: 540-552). It is in this moment that the Israelites becomes individualised as Subjects of Moses and his heirs. This phase of the conceptual persona of the Subject of Moses is crucial. It is through the stipulation of the second pact with Moses that messianic and anguished modes of structuring time and relations come to light. Spinoza describes the occurrence of the pact with Moses as deriving from the astonishment of the Hebrews following the encounter with God. He observes,
But on this first appearance before God they were so terrified and so thunderstruck at hearing God speak that they thought their last hour had come. So, overwhelmed with fear they went to Moses again, saying, Behold, we have heard God speaking in the midst of the fire; now therefore why should we die? For this great fire will surely consume us; []. Go thou near therefore, and hear all that our God shall say. And speak thou (not God) to us.[Italics mine] (TTP, chapter XVII: 540).

In the first part of the extract quoted above, Spinoza uses very suggestive expressions to explain the affective state of the Jewish people in relation to God. Expressions as

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terrified and thunderstruck connote the impossibility of orienting oneself within the realm of the pre-individual mass of nature. Furthermore, the impasse of the Jewish people in understanding the voice of God brings to light their disparate equilibrium (their ignorance), whereby they recognise God and the pre-individual reality as the Other. Similar to the state of the prophet in the persona of the Devotees of the prophet, the vision of the pre-individual as otherness involves the fear of death (why should we die?) and the search for eternity and forgiveness. Whilst the drama of the prophet derives from the absence of the collective ground, here the Subject of Moses are already in a collective condition. They are the political community of God following the first pact. Therefore, the question arises as to why they are so overwhelmed by the fear of death? Simondons conception of anguish might shed light on this critical moment of the conceptual persona of the Subjects of Moses. Taking into consideration the different philosophical ground upon which Simondon focuses his analysis of anguish (psychic individuation), his reading offers alternative answers for understanding the problematic status of the Jewish people within the political scene. For Simondon, the psychic state of anguish arises from the relation between the preindividual and the disparate being in the progressive disappearance of the collective field. The disparate being comes to experience the pre-individual force as greater than the individual. The individual begins by signifying himself as an ephemeral and meaningless entity in opposition to the all-inclusive power of the pre-individual realm. This moves the disparate being towards a progressive withdrawal from the collective ground, experienced as redundant. In solitude the individual recognises his fragility, his unavoidable asymmetric equilibrium, which causes his exclusion from the process of actualisation and differentiation. In other words, the anguished being ceases to actualise himself within and through the dynamics of the collective ground, giving rise to a process of displacement between meaning and time. Simondon explains that what appeared before as closer, now is experienced as distant and

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disconnected from reality; by the same token, what was perceived before as distant now becomes closer and disorienting (Simondon, 2007: 111-114). The present becomes spoiled of all its actualising forces and replaced by the thought of the past and future. As Simondon says, anguish corresponds to the dramatic moment, in which the individual being is folded in himself. Dissociated from the collective ground, the disparate individual ceases to constitute the theatre and actor of the process of individuation, which implies the loss of crucial moments of transformation, actualisation and complication. Therefore, Simondon concludes, anguish brings about the gradual disappearance of the individual as such (Simondon, 2007: 113-114). Certainly this account of anguish greatly exceeds the astonishment of the Israelites in relation to God. However, Simondons arguments might unveil some dormant themes underneath the overwhelmed Jewish community. Given Spinozas attention to the emotive origins of the second pact, and also the collective context from which this pact emerges, an analysis of the emotive status of the Israelites in the light of Simondon acquires great consistency. Before venturing into the realm of God, the Jewish people were already a political individual. They collectively stipulated a first pact with God, assuming the status of the nation of God. Considering themselves alone the people of God, they believed that his power and not their actions could save and protect them in case of possible risks (TTP, Chapter XVII: 540). It is precisely in this moment that the state of anguish emerges gradually within the community of the Jewish people. In order to understand the mechanisms of anguish and its political implications, we need to look back at some fundamental propositions of the Ethics. In the Ethics, Spinoza claims that thinking is on par with acting, and also the perfection of a body (its grade of reality) is sized upon its degree of complexity. For Spinoza the complexity of a body depends upon the capacity of being affected and to affect other individuals in turn. As we have analysed in chapter III, the capacity of being affected

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refers to a more problematic process of collective and psychic individuation, through which affective exchanges and alteration of information complicate and transform the equilibrium of the individual within a collective ground. In the conceptual persona of the Subjects of Moses, the first pact with God and the following encounter give rise to a mechanism, through which the individual begins with regressing towards an unchangeable position. The fidelity of the Jewish people to the external aid of God involves the suspension of any productive forces and tensions, which instead have characterised the states of the claimant and refugee. Therefore, the Jewish peoples abstinence from acting and thinking precludes the possibility of signifying and being signified within the process of individuation. As a consequence, the community of God is brought towards the progressive stabilisation, which involves the fracture with the crucial phases of transformation, actualisation and differentiation. This involves the re-shaping of the realm of the political being, which passes from being a place of affective relations and productive forces to a linear and motionless system. If desire and affects have exposed and complicated the collective ground of the claimant to intensive changes and new meanings previously, these are now folded within the static body of rules, regulations and the moral norms of punishment and recompense. Devotion and wonder, particularly, pass from constituting relational movements and tensions to simply denoting a set of laws and commands of God. Significantly, the affect of piety, Spinoza observes, as source of relations becomes redefined as justice; incompatibilities and differences as injustice and crime (TTP, Chapter XVII: 540). In other words, the collective body of the Subjects of Moses regresses to an inoperative position, implying the estrangement of the individual from time, becoming and affectivity. As in Simondonian anguish, this causes the disjuncture between time and meaning, for which the other nations become, on the one side distant, and viewed as enemies of God. In this light, notions of cruelty,

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exclusion, invasion, rivalry and jealousy come to re-signify the community of God, upon which the divine vocation of the Hebrew relies.83 The productive flowings of time moulded through festive rituals and sacrifices reverts to a linear and repetitive remembering of the past adventures of the exodus, servitude and the regained state of nature. The all-inclusive power of nature becomes dramatically closer and recognised as the Other, which oversees scrupulously actions and thoughts of the Subjects of Moses. The all-embracing presence of God brings about the emergence of the fear of death and the hope for salvation. It is in this moment, I would argue that the conceptual persona of the Subjects of Moses enter the threshold of Simondonian anguish. Spinozas description of the astonishment of the Jewish people in hearing the voice of God, I think, goes far beyond the passions of fear and anger and the status of ignorance of the Hebrews. For the sudden feeling of fear and the certainty of death, this encounter between the Subjects of Moses and God is the result of a more complex process of exclusion from the collective process of individuation, which gives rise to the emergence of a state of anguish. It is through this state of anguish that a messianic vision of politics and, more generally, of the world comes to light. As we have seen, Simondon explains that the condition of anguish bounds the individual within two coordinates of time, past and future, which can never be actualised insofar as the collective ground is excluded. Jewish form of messianism derives from the regressive movements of exclusion, stabilisation and remembrance. This folds the realm of the individual within a never actualised present, which casts the Subjects of Moses in a gap between past and future. In this gap, the past events of the exodus and the Promised Land become materialised through the repetitive movements of ceremony and sacrifice, and the potentialities of the future are narrowed to the time of the expectation of the Messiah to come. Importantly, given the Israelites refraining from actions and thoughts, the productive flowings of time
83

As to their continued existence for many years when scattered and stateless, this is no way surprising, since they have separated themselves from other nations to such a degree as to incur the hatred of all, and this is not only through external rites alien to the rites of other nations but also through the mark of circumcision, which they most religiously observe. That they are preserved largely through the hatred of other nations is demonstrated by historical fact (TTP, Chapter III: 425).

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is re-defined as a linear sequence of events. This re-configuration of time has a strong impact on the political body.84 The messianic vision of the world and time brings about the return of the Subjects of Moses to the servitude to the Messiah, to Moses, and his heirs.85 Taking into account these themes, we might raise some conclusions. The conceptual persona of the Subjects of Moses reveals the centrality of the collective ground for the complete development of the relational function of affects, passions and desire, without which the transformations and complications of the political body is entirely lost. As we have seen with the phases of claimants and anguish, the collective process of individuation calls into question crucial elements such as time, humankind, society and ethics, whilst affective and relational movements re-shape intensively the realm of the political being. Therefore, the Subjects of Moses introduce a different understanding of affects and passions, disclosing their relational and productive power. The themes of the productive force of affects become crucial in the second part of the Treatise, the pars contruens. In this section, Spinoza forwards the idea of the conception of religion as expression of love and joy. For Spinoza, these affects are instrumental in the realisation of democracy. The originality of Spinozas philosophy lies in his politicisation of joy and love, which have been traditionally restrained within the psychological, ethical and religious domains. In this light, the apostles and Christ express the productive political meaning of affectivity, through which the actualisation and transformation of the collective ground of the political are developed still further. It is to a consideration of these themes that I now pass to examine.

84

Concerning the theme of the messianic structure of time, Agamben proposes a quite alternative reading. Discussing the form of messianianism in the figure of Saint Paul, for Agamben, the constitution of the messianiac time is not time of expectation. By contrast, it is the time of the present, in which he includes the kairotic moment, the right moment, (Agamben, 2005a: 59-87). 85 The people [the Jewishs under Moses] could do nothing without being required at the same time to remember the law and to follow its commands, which were dependent solely on rulers will. []; they had to have certain signs on their doorposts, on their hands and between the eyes, to give them constant reminder of the duty of obedience (TTP, Chapter V: 440).

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5. The Apostles

In the Theological-Political Treatise the exegesis of the New Testament occupies a very central role. This constitutes the passage from the pars denstruens to the pars contruens of the text, which prepares the terrain for the political section on the fundaments of the democratic society. Proceeding from the deconstruction of the ideological apparatus of theology, Spinoza passes to examine the real object of religion throughout the stories of the early Church, which refer to the Acts of the Apostles. Given the non divine and non scientific account of the doctrine of the Old Testament, Spinoza examines the aims and implications of the precepts of the Catholic doctrine. Assuming that the dogma of faith is not concerned with the attainment of any extraordinary faculty and reality, and also that it does not imply the improvement of the philosophical knowledge, Spinoza questions, firstly, what notions remain to be used from the theoretical nucleus of religion, and secondly what categories (if any) might be qualified as properly religious? In order to address these questions, Spinoza looks back at the lives and speeches of the apostles as fundamental expressions of the authentic doctrine of the faith, to which both the organised church and state should pay closer attention. He finds in the doctrine of the apostles, structured through teachings, dialogue, and encounters with people of different cultures and nations, the expression of the key tenets of Catholicism. These are based on a pure exercise of love, piety and devotion, which are the ground of the Catholic paradigm of universalism. Proceeding with the analysis of the historical figures of the apostles, Spinozas inquiry is focused, on the one hand, to a reinstatement of the independence of philosophy from religion; on the other, to the re-affirmation of the genuine concepts of the early Church, such as joy, love, piety and devotion that have been corrupted by the ambition and ignorance of political and theological authorities. Spinoza does not reject the value of religion as such. He neither contrasts religious principles with

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ontological notions, nor replaces religion with philosophy. For him, there is a form of epistemic rupture between the object of faith and that of philosophy (TTP, Chapter XV: 523). Instead, Spinoza demonstrates the true of object of faith through religion itself, showing its original message through the exegesis of the holy texts and the example of the apostles (Balibar, 1998: 5-9). As we have analysed previously, Spinozas critique aims to invalidate the alleged philosophical authority of the church, and the mystification of the religious principles, upon on which superstition, ignorance and servitude have been constructed. The speeches, writings and the mission of the apostles represent the true object and aim of the Catholic religion, which disclose a practise of joy and love. For Spinoza, the authentic message of religion is based on ethical norms, consisting of affects such as joy, love, devotion and piety (Spinozas notion of the credo minimum). This involves re-positioning religion within society rather than suppressing it, so it may become as an important instrument of social cohesion. Whilst Spinoza considers the role of religion as an important element of social cohesion, importantly this does not attune his position on those of Machiavelli and Hobbes. For Spinoza religion is a part of a more complex process, which exceeds Machiavellis definition of faith as instrumentum regni;86 and Hobbess divide between the official credo professed by the state and the private beliefs of the subjects allowed under the silence of the law.87 For Spinoza, religion is important insofar as joy, love, piety and devotion found its messages (TTP, chapter XIV: 515). The social function of the faith is not simply a device of the state; it is located, instead, in the body politic, passing from the political authority to the community and vice versa.
86

I am aware of the dispute among scholars concerning the relation between religion and the state in Machiavellis thought; and also, the differences between the Prince (1532) and the Discourses (initiated in 1513 and concluded between the 1517-18). My reference to Machiavelli, in this context, has the only purpose to show the diverse approach to the problem of religion between Machiavelli and Spinoza. 87 Although Hobbes agrees with Spinoza on the non scientific and philosophical value of religion, in the body of laws of the Leviathan (1651) religion and certain forms of freedom are allowed insofar as these are not formally prohibited by the state. For the stability and unity of the government, it is better that subjects in the public sphere follow the official religion of the state, whereas in their private life they can profess a different faith, Hobbes (1998: 139-160).

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Given the assumption of the authenticity of religion as an exercise of the affects of love, joy, piety and devotion, many questions arise. Firstly, what is at stake in Spinozas idea of religion as joy, love and piety? Secondly, assuming the impossibility of the suppression of faith from society, the problem entails to what is the place given to religion within the political domain? Thirdly, what paradigm of society emerges from Spinozas idea of religion as joy and love? Ultimately, assuming the figures of the apostles as the embodiment of true religion, how did their message impact effectively on the communities, which they visited? Concerning these questions, many interpretations have been proposed. Developing further Althussers dictum of the detour Marx via Spinoza, contemporary readings, generally, are inclined to view Spinozas conception of the credo minimum as the reduction of the ideological apparatus of the Church to simple (minimum) ethical norms and practices, which further encourage peoples commitment towards the civil society. Thinkers, for examples, as Matheron (1988), Balibar (1998), Strauss (1997), Deleuze (1992), Negri (1998) and Giancotti (1995), share the conviction that the very of role of the figures of the apostles within the Treatise responds to a precise political strategy. This involves, on the one side, the political emancipation of the masses from the obscurantist policies of states and churches. Spinozas move, in this respect, concerns the replacement of moral concepts and rules as evil, truth, punishment and gift with an ethical habit of joy and love. On the other, Spinozas definition of the apostolic mission as the development of the affects of joy, love and piety within a community expresses his awareness of the social function of religion purified from its metaphysical edifice. In this light, the implications of the teachings of the apostles concern the improvement of cooperative actions and thoughts, through which individuals recognise themselves as constitutive parts of the body politic. As joy and love are active affects, the development of an ethical habit through these affects structures social relations, mutual needs and, more generally, commonalities, upon which the progress of society relies.

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Taking into consideration these mentioned interpretations, I think, Spinozas engagement with the role of the apostles and the doctrine of love and joy unveils a more complex process, which founds and greatly exceeds ethical praxis. Certainly, the aim of Spinozas exegesis of the Acts of the Apostles describes how the pursuit of positive affects within a political context gives rise to practices of sharing, commitment and participation. Beside these ethical and political implications, there is a multifaceted notion of the role of the positive affects emerging from Spinozas arguments, which require further consideration. This refers to the status of joy and love not only as ethical habits but also as productive forces, which bring into question concepts such as time, society, relations, life and, more generally, the realm of the political itself. The role of the apostles within the thread of the Treatise unveils the dynamics of this process, through which heterogeneous individuals emerge. I argue here that the political meaning of the active affects does not or not only reside in the formation of an ethics of mutual love and support within a given society. Rather, these should be thought as generative sources of relational movements, transformations and actualisation, which espouse and further complicate the entire equilibrium of the political and not solely an already formed community. It means that affectivity discloses a process of individuation, which signifies the domain of the political. Taking into account these prerequisites, I shall pass to discuss these questions in further details.

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5.1 The Good News: Life

Compared with the analysis of the stories of the Old Testament, Spinozas inquiry of the Acts of the Apostles is not amply developed. Certainly, references to the discourses of the apostles, particularly the Pauline doctrine, are disseminated throughout the entire Treatise, and yet are not fully developed as with the history of the Jewish people. Although the apostles embody the true religion, strikingly, in the Treatise Spinoza dedicates to the specific description of the apostolic doctrine no more than one chapter. In this chapter, Spinoza offers a concise but extremely dense account of the mission of the apostles towards society, within which a very different and dynamic conception of religion is proposed. Given this brief and meaningful portrait of the apostles, an analysis of Spinozas view of these figures and their effective role within a political context become very difficult and, at the same time, crucial. If the objective of both the prophecy and the Mosaic laws is the development of obedience, the epistles of the apostles aim at obedience too. Two questions arise: What is the distinctive strategy of the apostolic message, and how does this effectively contrast with prophecy? What are the political stakes not only of the doctrine of the apostles itself but also the form in which these arguments are realised? In order to investigate these aspects, our strategy of the conceptual personae becomes imperative. It is through this alternative approach that these questions might, perhaps, find a response. Pilgrims, doctors and communities In chapter XI of the apostles, at the very beginning, Spinoza draws a line between the status of the apostles and the prophets as Moses (TTP, Chapter XI: 499). If the protagonist of the Old Testament was Moses, the storyteller of the images of God, the protagonist of the New Testament is the apostle, who divulges the life of Christ. These aspects delineate two different modes of knowing and experiencing the preindividual force nature. The knowledge of the prophet, Spinoza explains, is structured through images, visions, signs and revelations, which are grounded in the

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domain of imagination (TTP Chapters I, II, VI). These are nuanced by various and different affective tones, which run from fear, devotion, anger, hope, wonder to anguish. The knowledge of the apostles differs profoundly from the one of Moses and, more generally, the prophets of the tradition of the Old Testament. The apostles, Spinoza affirms, are the expression of the new religious formula, which establishes a different relation with God, nature and humankind. The Catholic faith is based on the life and precepts of Christ, who recovers the notions of love, piety, devotion and joy from the domain of Mosaic commandments to general suggestions and admonitions. These simply delineate a mode of living. As simple and general styles of life the precepts of Christ pass from being an exclusive gift of the Jewish nation to universal (Catholic) recommendations for pursuing a better life, which can easily be followed by every human being regardless of nation, culture and language (TTP, Chapter XI: 501). Thus, the idea of God as legislator and judge of human actions is replaced by the role of Christ as teacher and friend.88 The encounter with Christ leads the apostles to re-situate themselves directly within the world, without passing through an initial relation of fear and anguish with the obscure power of God. This involves the conversion of the anguish of death and hope for salvation into love and piety for the humankind. In our conceptual persona, Spinozas divide between the knowledge of the prophets and the apostles, and also the Catholic formula of the universal love are the fundamental conditions, around which the political body of the Apostles is constructed. Love and piety, as we will see, structure a relational process and transformations, which re-configure the realm of the Apostles towards new modes of thinking and actualising the political. The persona of the Apostles brings about the discovery of multiple meanings emerging through and within the political context.

88

For Christ was not sent to preserve the state and to institute laws, but only to teach the universal law. Hence, we can readily understand that Christ by no means abrogated the law of Moses, for it was not Christs purpose to introduce new laws into the commonwealth, His chief concern was to teach moral doctrines, keeping them distinct from the laws of the commonwealth (TTP, Chapter V: 436).

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These involve the understanding of the political as generative of relations, time, tensions and forces, which greatly exceeds, not opposes, the notions of state, laws, justice and equality. The claim I will make through this conceptual persona, is that Spinozas definition of the apostolic mission as love and piety opens the way to reshape the meaning of the political, including in its domain unsuspected notions such as desire, love, becoming and productive time. These crucially express life.89 Spinoza describes the apostles as teachers, messengers and pilgrims of the Good News. These multiple functions bring to light the manifold status of the Apostles within the political body. Like the Subjects of Moses, the persona of the Apostles is already folded within an established political domain, the state of Israel. As with have seen with the Israelites before and after the exodus, the apostles are the group of the disciples of Christ and the Jewish tradition. More importantly, they are not only apostles collectively, but also they experience the life of Christ as a group.90 This means that the realm of the Apostles is a political and collective individual formed of individuated reality (the Mosaic laws, system of rituals, sacrifices, Jewish history) and forming one (the presence of Christ). Unlike the Subjects of Moses, importantly, they do not pass progressively from being disciples, teachers, messengers and pilgrims as the Israelites from the phase of servitude, through the whatever of the state of nature, to subjects. By contrast, the apostles are teachers, messengers, pilgrims and disciples contemporaneously. Spinoza remarks, on many occasions, that their peculiarity concerns the fulfilment of all these roles, for which the apostles differ from the prophets of the Old Testament (TTP, chapters XI, XIII, XIV, XV). This indicates, on the one side, that anatomy the Apostles is consistently more complex and diversified (disparate) than the previous conceptual personae examined, revealing a structure traversed by a higher degrees of
89

Concerning the theme of the politicisation the concept of life, or better the widening of the definition of the political to physics and, to some extent, biology, there has been a flourishing literature recently, commenced with works of Foucault (1998, vol.1). For the purpose of this work, the theories of Deleuze and Guattari (2004a; 2004b), Simondon (2007), Negri (2006; 2005), and Agamben (2000; 1998) have been particularly influential. 90 Concerning the collective formation and development of the Apostles, there are many places in the New Testament, showing this collective condition. Over all, I think that the image of the Last supper offers a quite illuminating example, see for example Saint Paul, Epistle to the Corinthians 11:23-26, to which certainly Spinoza pays attention.

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relational movements, contingencies and a variety of heterogeneous forces. On the other, this multisided constitution portrays the body of the Apostles as an open system, within and through which a never-ending process of actualisation, transformation and tension takes a place. These elements lead us to conceive the Apostles as fundamentally a collective and problematic individual, which is the ground of powerful exchanges and alterations of meanings, bodies and thoughts. The roles of pilgrim, teacher, disciple and messenger create not only a relational status; these also function to maintain the equilibrium of our conceptual persona in an enduring condition of exposure toward the multiplicity of the world. These roles, firstly, presuppose a community or, at very least, other disciples. Secondly, they imply a tension and movement toward something or someone, which is owner of further meanings, demands and information in turn. It is in this context that the collective individual of the Apostles becomes an element and place of the production of the political, within which positive affects acquire a pivotal role. The multiform dimension of the Apostles throws light upon a range of affective states, which actualise, complicate the collective individual. Differently from the persona of the Subjects of Moses, which is traversed by positive and passive affects, the group of the apostles is, instead, nuanced predominantly by the active affects of piety, love, joy and wonder. More significantly, in the case of the Apostles the affect of wonder is not addressed to an obscure God but rather to nature itself embodied by the life of Christ. These affects shape the body of the Apostles as an open structure, which is traversed intensively by relational movements, heterogeneity and transformation.

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Love and piety: The actualisation of the present and the potency of the action In chapter III, we have seen, in the Ethics the view of the body as pure openness means the re-signification of the individual as place and part of a more complex process of individuation. This is moulded through affects, desire, conatus (forces), common notions, movements of speed and slowness, grades of intensity (hard and fluid bodies), which signify and re-signify the realm of the individual. In our conceptual persona, these elements set forth the actualisation and differentiation of a novel political being. It is in this context that love becomes a powerful source of political transformation and destabilisation, through which life folds the political and vice versa. As in the state of claimants and the whatever of the Subjects of Moses, the affects of love and piety operate as expansive and productive forces, through which different forms of time, relations, meanings and problems come to light. In the persona of the Apostle, the encounter with Christ in his actuality re-positions the Apostles within the order of the real, exposing their naturale iuditium (natural understanding) towards the production of more problematic modes of structuring the present, actions, ideas and commonalities. Following Spinozas arguments, it is from the simple human (natural) understanding that the Epistles of the apostles derive, each of which expresses a different mode of thinking the life of Christ (TTP, Chapter XI: 500). Furthermore, the differences and disagreements between apostles, which have caused varied controversies within the Catholic Church, are the results of this productive force of the lumen naturalis shaped by love and piety (TTP, chapter XI: 503). In the Ethics Spinoza explains that the positive affects of joy and love give rise to a transition from a condition of lesser perfection to a greater one, through which the power of acting, existing and thinking (conatus) of individuals is increased and further developed (E. III, postulate I, prop. XI; schol., Def. II, VI). Related particularly to singular beings, the increase of the level of perfection indicates that individuals are formed of great number of heterogeneous elements such as bodies,

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potentials and thoughts, which intensify the power of mind and body (E. II, postulates I, III, IV; prop. XIV, prop. XXXVII, corollary). Perfection determines the level of complexity of the individual beings. In this sense, positive affects are fundamental conditions, which bring into the realm of the individuals further orders of heterogeneity and contingency (E. III, prop. XV). From the study of the geometry of the affects through Simondons ontology of individuation conducted in chapter III, we have discovered that Spinozas conception of joy and love as transitional phases unveils a more complex process, which greatly exceeds ethical and psychological habits between already individuated beings. These are located in the middle of the collective field or, to say with Simondon, active affects are transversal to both beings and the collective field. Given the assumption of these affects as important instruments for the increase of the level of perfection, this means that joy and love re-actualise and re-signify the entire equilibrium of individuals. In this light, joy and love become recognised as powerful sources of intensive and relational movements, which individualise individuals within the collective context, moving further the process of individuation. This view of affects as productive forces impacts effectively on the order of the real, setting forth concrete actions, ideas, tendencies and, more generally, problematic collective beings. The role of joy and love acquires great consistency within the political context of the Treatise, specifically through the figures of the apostles. These reorganise the equilibrium of the political body throughout the emergence of more complex flowings of time, incompatibilities and relational individuals. If in the Subjects of Moses the becoming of time suddenly collapses in the gap between the past of exodus and the future of the arrival of the Messiah (the state of anguish), here past and future take only the coordinate of the present. The present becomes an enduring process of actualisation of the future and the past.91 The apostles, Spinoza refers, are disciples of Christ. This means that they do not wait for

91

The theme of the notion of the present as the form of actualisation and differentiation of the individuals is central in Simondons process of the collective and psychic individuation, to which I refer. For Simondon, the role of collective process of individuation concerns the re-signification of past and future within the domain of the present, Simondon (2007: 97-132, 175-214).

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the advent of the Messiah, rather the Apostles enter into relations with the materiality of Christ, his life (TTP, Chapter XI: 499). As life, Christ abandons all the divine properties of omnipresence, omnipotence and omniscience by taking the form of pure materiality. Christ becomes a body, expressing the abundance and potentialities of the material world. As we have seen, Spinoza gives full rights to the status of the body as an unavoidable element of transformations, relations, thoughts and actions. This conception brings Spinoza to consider the body a fundamental condition for the constitution of time. In the Ethics, Spinoza states that it is solely through the existence of the body that various modes of organising time come to light. To be more precise, it is through the plenitude of the actuality of the body that our awareness of time emerges.92 Thus, the actuality of the world is the only condition, through which the past and future can be thought. As a body, consequently, the presence of Christ becomes crucial within the development of the conceptual persona of the Apostles. The corporeality of Christ reconfigures the notion of time, through which the mode of the present becomes the only source and condition for the flowings of the past and realisation of the future. Put differently, it is through the actuality of Christ that the present does not mirror the events of the past; neither it is a mere consequence of previous gestures. By the same token, the constitution of the present is not a place, within which the future can be prepared or simply expected. The materiality of Christ reinstates the importance of the present, which acquires the pivotal role of producing the past and actualising the possibilities of the future.93 In this sense, Christs gesture of indignation for the

92

The mind can exercise neither imagination nor memory save while the body endures and in the proof: It is only while the body endures that the mind expresses the actual existence of its body and conceives the affections of the body as actual []. Consequently [], it does not conceive any body as actually existing save while its own body endures. Therefore [], it cannot exercise either imagination or memory save while the body endures []. (E., V, prop. XXI and proof) [Italics mine]. 93 Concerning the theme of the incarnation of Christ as the expression of the richness of the material world, see Hardt (2002: 77-84).

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vain Hebrew rituals, followed by the commitment of the apostles to the re-foundation of the community of God, greatly exemplifies the path of the present.94 In the persona of the Apostles this implies the replacement of both the messianic time and the motionless remembrance of the glorious gestures of the Old Testament with the richness of expressions of the present. This actualisation of past and future within the becoming of the present leads directly to the production of actions developed through relational movements, exchanges and alterations of individuated meanings, intensity and potentials. It is precisely in this moment that the affective tones of the persona of the Apostles re-populate and complicate the political realm. As we have seen with the figure of Moses, what is at stake here is not solely re-founding the temple of God, returning the Church to its origins. It is the affirmation and the realisation of the Good News. For the meaning of the term News suggests, good news should indicate qualitative changes and certainly not a return. The power of the apostolic message, Spinoza tenaciously reminds us, resides in its open structure, upon which the Catholic paradigm of universalism is founded and developed. For this open structure, the revealing of the Good News goes far beyond the simple re-organisation of preformed religious rules within a given political context. The potency of the Good News, as we will see, concerns, on the one hand, the destabilisation of the existing political orders as the state of Israel or the Roman Empire; on the other, this sets forth different actions, thoughts and tensions, which prepare the terrain to the constitution of the community of God (the universal Catholic Church). In this fashion, the tension encapsulated by the Good News opens the collective body of the Apostles towards complex and unpredictable modes of actualising, better individuating, the life of Christ. Importantly, these are not only different ways of narrating the precepts of Christ; instead, these re-signify the structure of every political being encountered by the apostles, re-configuring religious communities,
94

For the indignation of Christ, I refer to his visit of the temple in Jerusalem and his whip in seeing the moneychangers, as reported in Mathew 21-26. In the Ethics, Spinoza defines indignation as hatred toward one who has injured another (E. III, Def. XX).

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laws, human relations and states. For this open structure of the Good News, Saint Paul, for example, considers work irrelevant for the attainment of the faith, whereas for James only actions qualify a catholic observant (TTP, Chapter XI: 503). These two modes of defining faith have direct effects on societies visited by each apostle, which generate diverse ethical practises, relations, ecclesial groups and conflicts (TTP, Chapter XI: 503). Given this notion of the Good News as a mixture of force and intensity, many questions arise. Firstly, what truly are the contents of the Good News, secondly to what extent this might re-shape the boundaries of the political? Following Spinozas arguments, the message of the Good News does not contain metaphysical notions and obscure truths, but instead, the life of Christ as it is, (TTP, chapters XI, XIV). As reported in the Epistles of the Apostles, the story of the life and teachings of Christ simply concerns the praxis of universal love, that is the unlimited loving-kindness towards others. As anticipated, Spinoza attributes to the affect of love a very fundamental role. The theme of love occupies the entire thread of the Ethics from the third and fourth to the fifth part, which becomes recognised as an ontological political function. Accordingly, love is viewed as an expansive force, which individualises and further develops human desires. This force engrossed by love is formed through a degree of intensity always greater than any disruptive tendencies as hate (E. III, Def. VI, prop. XLIII, XLIV), which maintains the equilibrium of the process constantly in tension (metastable). As productive sources of movements and transformations, this embraces the entire system of production of nature-God, bringing into the order of the real meanings, movements, heterogeneity and contingency. More accurately, it is the potency of love that lies at the very basis of the whole system of production of the Ethics. It is the mechanism that governs, produces and individualises the domain of nature, which is defined in the final part of the Ethics as the intellectual love of God (the third kind of knowledge).95 The intellectual love of God is twofold. On the one side, it refers to
95

Deleuze gives a very suggestive account of Spinozas conception of the intellectual love of God or Beatitude. For Deleuze, Spinozas third kind of knowledge concerns the complete actualisation of the plane of immanence initiated in the part I of the Ethics, which becomes re-populated with novel forms of multiplicities such as desires, bodies, affects and, more generally, heterogeneity (Deleuze, 1992: 289-320). In successive works, Deleuze will further develop this idea of the intellectual love of God, describing this as the plane of consistency, that is, pure desire-machine (Deleuze and Guattari,

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the mode in which the process of individuation of humankind proceeds through phases of actualisation, differentiation and complication. On the other, it expresses the love of God towards the world, which simply is the life of nature (E. V, prop. XXXVI, corollary). Without venturing into the vicissitudes of the third kind of knowledge, for the purpose of this work, we need to draw attention to the political implications of Spinozas notion of love as productive force, which emerges from the Ethics and becomes a political category within the pars contruens of the Treatise. In the conceptual persona of the Apostles, this vision of love as force becomes crucial. It is through love folded within the Good News that the Apostles act politically, moving further the process of individuation. As mentioned before, the message of the Good News refers to the notion of life, specifically the life of Christ. We have seen that the corporeality of Christ re-founds the conception of the present as a place of actualisation of past and future. This exposure of Christ to the abundance of the world, Spinoza tells us, is shaped by love and piety toward humankind. The life of Christ is the actualisation of the affect of love, which gives rise to the political actions and thoughts of the apostles. It is in this moment that the notion of life as actualisation of love enters the threshold of the political, re-drawing the boundaries of the political in turn. The great modernity of Spinozas political move lies precisely in this context. From the pars destruens to the pars contruens of the Treatise, Spinoza only refers to the life of Christ politically without mentioning his crucifixion and resurrection. For this, Spinoza discusses the political stakes of Christ through his actions and teaching formed by love and piety. In this light, the life of Christ discloses the political effects

2004b:170-184). Differently, Negri, Balibar and Matheron, among others, read the third genre of knowledge directly connected with the two the political treatises, underling the political implications of Spinozas notion of the intellectual love of God. Negri, for example, argued that parts IV and V of the Ethics together with the Political Treatise constitute the mature foundation of Spinozas form of materialism, upon which the political theory of the power of the multitude is grounded and developed (Negri, 1998: 193-285, 296-342).

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of the notion of love, which exposes and complicates the realm of our conceptual persona towards further transformation and individuation.96 The political implications of the affect of love do not concern the development of practises of participation, sharing and giving. Spinozas politicisation of love, instead, brings about the discovery of love as the expression of the potency of action, which lies precisely in the middle of a collective individual. As force, love traverses and transforms individuals without inhering within these, exposing continuously the collective ground towards unpredicted and unsuspected relational movements and transformations.97 In the Treatise, Spinoza tells us, the mission of the apostles is directed to every people regardless of nation, language and culture. In each of their destinations, the encounter with the community structures meanings, time, society and relations. In other words, it re-organises the entire equilibrium of both the collective body of the apostles and the community. As Spinoza affirms, the Epistles and the teachings of the apostles, on the one side, are attuned to the different opinions, ideas and imaginations of the people, to whom the apostles speak. On the other, the community itself is transformed by the Good News. This re-signifies and actualises the realm of the existing group into new ethical and political practises, which are nuanced by the evangelic formula of love ones neighbour (TTP, chapter XIV: 515). This brings to light the production of new political and ethical notions of justice, labour, right and impiety, Christ and the anti-Christ (TTP chapter XIV). In other words, as force and tension love re-shapes the boundaries of the common. Concerning this view of love as an enduring source of production, nevertheless, one might question the kinds of political practises the teachings of the apostles have brought to light; and also how these have created novel political individuals. The
96

On the figure of Christ in Spinozas politics, see particularly Matheron (1971), and Deleuze (1992: 290-310). 97 The theme of Spinozas political conception of love and joy as power has been particularly developed by Negri and Hardt. For Negri and Hardt Spinozas vision of love is productive of political praxis and resistances, through which the multitude as a political subject emerges (Hardt and Negri, 2006; and Negri, 2005).

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political stakes, I think, of the praxis of love concern essentially the destabilising role played within the political scene. As the encounter of Saint Paul with the Roman Empire exemplifies, the apostle questions the meaningless and motionless equilibrium of the Roman state as such, challenging not the ruler or the subjects but the stability of the system itself. Saint Paul as well as the other apostles brings into the existing community problems (the corruption of the Roman system, the hierarchic structure, the question of the pauperism) and possible solutions.98 In this light, the originality of Spinozas political gesture concerns not only the political meaning of the notion of love, (which has been used in Ancient Greek philosophy, particularly in Platos thought). Rather, Spinozas move brings about the discovery of the political significance of love as production, action, transformation, that is, a process. As a process of production, consequently this does not pass from one individuated being to another; differently, love resides in the collective field, however, without inhering within this. In chapter III, in order to re-conceptualise this tendency, we have employed Simondons definition of transindividuality. Simondon affirms that religion expresses one of the ways in which the transindividual force operates. The domain of religion is the place, in which a sense of spirituality emerges, which is productive insofar as remains within the collective body. In a political context, the spirituality of a group is precisely a force, which gives rise to relations, transformation and metastability. It is this expansive force that shapes the progress of a society (Simondon, 2007:175-197). From the Ethics to the political Treatises, Spinoza, I would argue, gives voice to these instances and tensions, which lie underneath any community. In the Ethics
98

The political and ethical role of Saint Paul has nurtured an intense debate recently, which is centered on the essays of Badiou and Agamben. Whilst Badiou envisages in the figure of Paul the example of revolutionary subject and universalism, who challenges the Roman Empire and the Judaic law (Badiou, 2003), Agamben opposes Badiouss ethical reading with the ontological notion of the remnant. By this, Agamben refers to a concept of singularity based on what is left. This is a condition, in which there are no differences left between the Jew and the Greek, or a principle of beginning and end, rather the absence of all possible divisions. The notion of remnant embodied by Saint Paul, in Agambens analysis, opens up towards new perspectives in politics that might dismiss traditional notions of people and democracy (Agamben, 2005a: 44-58).

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towards the end, Spinoza describes this spontaneous need for spirituality as the feeling and experience of eternity (E. V, prop. XXIII, schol.). This traverses and orients every given political, ethical and ontological society and, more importantly, the one to come. In the political section of Treatise, this tendency is presented by the figure of the Apostles through the notion of the credum minimum, and, as we will see in chapter V, the role of democracy as mens una. The notion of the credum minum unveils Spinozas awareness of the importance of spirituality as one of the condition, through which the body politic is founded and developed. The becoming and the power of a society go far behind the fulfilments of material and intellectual needs, the question of the social contract and the boundaries of the state. This involves, rather, a structural tension, which re-situates and alters intensively a collective body, gathering individuals together in as many ways as is infinite the multiplicity of nature. This, however, does not mean that material and intellectual needs are irrelevant for the advancement of the social system, rather these are fundamental parts of a more complex process, which structures and complicates the realm of a community in any given time and space. Our awareness of this, I think, should be incorporated within contemporary political discourses, which aspire to re-found a paradigm of philosophy of praxis.

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Conclusions: towards a life in common

This chapter has examined the relation between affectivity and politics within Spinozas political philosophy, and considered the extent to which his conception of the political meaning of affectivity might open novel possibilities for thinking the anatomy and becoming of the community today. In order to examine the political status of affects and passions as fundamental elements of a more complex process, I have adopted a different strategy of reading the Treatise. This refers to the exposition of the facts and personages of the theological section of the Treatise through conceptual-affective personae. Following Deleuze and Guattaris conception of the conceptual personae, I have re-considered Spinozas themes of the Jewish nations and the apostles as parts of more complex conceptual personae, each of which expresses the ways in which affects and passions re-signify intensively the domain of the political. Related particularly to the pars destruens of the Treatise, the use of conceptual personae has revealed a more extensive meaning of the political role of passions, which reconfigures the political body through different notions of temporality, meanings and relations. These arguments of the concrete dynamics within a community move our discussion directly to the question of the next chapter. This investigates what form of political society emerges from Spinozas view of community as a mixture of affects, spirituality and passions. More precisely, the problem arises as whether only religion is the ground of these transindividual disposition; or rather there are more complex political models, which incorporate Spinozas multifaceted theory of society. As mentioned, Spinoza in the political section of the Treatise puts forward the idea of democracy as a place, within which a community acts and thinks as mens una (a unique mind). Spinozas conception of democracy, I think, opens up to a quite different understanding of the dynamics that operates within a political context, raising fundamental questions concerning the multiple connections between desires, life, love and sovereignty. It is to these arguments, specifically to the relation between affectivity and democracy that the remaining chapter investigate.

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Chapter V Time for democracy: Towards a life in common

Introduction

In chapter IV, I investigated the relation between politics and affectivity in the Tractatus Theologicus Politicus, and argued that affects are constitutive elements within Spinozas political analysis. Attention has been given to the ambiguous position of passions within the theological section of the Treatise, and the ways in which these are productive of both social relations and subjection. Following Deleuze and Guattaris theory of conceptual personae, I have re-considered the arguments of the theological section of the Treatise concerning prophecy, the Jewish history and the apostles as phases of more complex conceptual personae, expressing various affective tones. These have shed light on the powerful role of affectivity within the process of production of the political. In the pars destruens of the TTP, we have encountered the conceptual-affective personae of the Devotees of the prophet, Subjects of Moses and the Apostles, which have revealed the multisided meaning of Spinozas definition of passions. The political status of passions expresses not only the subjection of an individual and community towards the authority of the ruler or God, but also the emergence of a new order of problems, a drama, within the political itself. This refers to the progressive stabilisation and simplification of the political body, within which passions of fear, hate and hope are founded and developed. This has brought about the discovery of affectivity as a generative source of political individuation, through which notions of life, death, time and relation re-colonise the domain of the political. It is precisely in this context, I have argued, that the great modernity of Spinozas philosophical gesture lies. This concerns the affirmation of the autonomy of affects

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from the spheres of ethics and psychology, which have narrowed affectivity to an obscure intimacy of the individual, antagonist to rationality, and also pre-established moral formulas. Spinoza extrapolates affects from an already-made individual and re-situates affectivity at the centre of a materialist ontology. Affects become recognised as productive, collective and, fundamentally, complex. Taking into account these themes, this chapter explores the relation between affectivity and democracy in Spinozas political writings. The focus is addressed to the centrality given by Spinoza to affects of joy, love and indignation within the process of actualisation of the democratic community. It means that I draw attention to the emotive circumstances described in both the Theological Political Treatise and the Political Treatise, which activate and, in same other cases, defer the production of democracy. As full expression of affectivity, the multitude becomes crucial for understanding Spinozas theory of democracy. Thus, an inquiry into the relation between democracy and affects implies directly the analysis of the anatomy of the power of the multitude, and the ways in which this political body acts and thinks democratically. The importance of examining the relation between affectivity, the multitude and democracy concerns the possibility of re-affirming the independence of democracy from concepts of the state, the public and individual freedom. Spinozas vision of democracy escapes the logic of the state apparatus, identifying this directly with the process of producing the common good. Affectivity lies at the very heart of the fruition of the common good, through which the political life of the multitude under democracy emerges. Concerning these arguments, many questions accompany this chapter. First of all, the main problem refers to the understanding of the ontological status of the multitude, whether this derives from a certain condition of lack or abundance. From the Theological Political Treatise to the Political Treatise, Spinoza gives a quite ambivalent account of the ontological causes, which determine the political behaviour of the multitude. In some cases, Spinoza describes the multitude as a disruptive force of the constituted order, which is nuanced by the passive tones of fear, ambition, hate and anger. In others, Spinoza emphases the role of the multitude

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as a powerful source of social cohesion and mutual assistance shaped by the affects of joy, love and devotion, which unveils a certain tendency towards democracy. Therefore, the questions arise as to whether the multitude posits itself as a counterpart of the sovereign authority of the state, greater than the state, or rather other than sovereignty as such; and if this is the case, the problem is whether the multitude is already an expression of a certain democratic existence. Secondly, given Spinozas portrait of the multitude as fundamentally affective and problematic, how this might play an active role within the construction of democracy? What forces, thoughts, affects and actions activated through the multitude are essential for the development and defence of democracy? Thirdly, assuming Spinozas concern with the importance of increasing affects of joy and love within the democratic community, what new elements, order of problems, transformations, affectivity introduces within democratic theory and practices? How might be these considered politically relevant for contemporary thought and society? In order to address these questions, I propose to insist further upon a detour of Spinozas political theory via the philosophy of individuation of Simondon. Simondons ontological categories might provide us, once more, with alternative instruments, through which the interface between affectivity and democracy might come to light. The use of Simondons ontology of individuation might allow us to discover the novelty of Spinozas paradigm of democracy. I will argue that Spinozas political move refers to the view of democracy as pure openness, which means a complex, metastable, and collective body. In order to explore the dynamics of a democratic life within Spinozas writings, I think that the use of conceptual personae adopted in chapter IV continues to be crucial. Having analysed the emotive gestures of the Devotees of the prophet, Apostles and the Subjects of Moses, the protagonist of this chapter is the conceptual-affective persona of the Citizens of democracy. The conceptual persona of the Citizens of Democracy will show us an alternative mode of thinking the linkage between the multitude and democracy, affectivity and the common good, and also the relation between life and sovereignty. It indicates the way in which a life in common might be constructed.

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1. The political turn of the multitude: Re-theorising the common today

The theme of the political role of the multitude has become a central argument within contemporary thought, which has nurtured a very intense debate recently. The discovery of the multitude as a proper political category embraces ontological, political and ethical issues. These concern a more extensive genealogy of the notion of power within society, the re-definition of present forms of solidarity and an expansive view of the concept of production, which should incorporate heterogeneous factors involved within the triad of the product-producer-producing such as affects, relations, language, information, imagination and time. As the name turn suggests, the political turn of the multitude indicates a novel path toward the re-characterisation of the domain of the social, opening the way to ignored possibilities for politics and society. The political turn of multitude means a heterogeneous and complex form of political subjectivity, which posits itself as other than the notion of people, nation, individuality and class. It embodies every contemporary phenomenon of association, resistance and struggle, expressing a productive process of meanings, affects, thoughts, actions and contingency. In other words, the multitude, as we will see in this chapter, has to be understood as a theatre and, at the same time, actor of the political scene. The increasing popularity of the concept of the multitude derives from a more general discussion within a certain post-Marxist thought concerned with the reconceptualisation of the meaning, genesis and anatomy of community, upon which a new paradigm of materialism and philosophy of praxis might be predicated. As I have indicated in chapter II, certainly Althussers dictum of the detour of Marx via Spinoza offered fundamental theoretical insights for re-thinking the dynamics of social practises of cohesion, giving rise to a new approach to political theory not to mention the re-situating of Spinozas politics within contemporary thought.

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Post-modern thought have brought about the need for re-structuring the domain of the political, which might disclose unexplored avenues of thinking and making community. Although this question has generated different theoretical positions, common to post-modern political theory is the conviction that the reality of society greatly exceeds the Liberal divide between private and public spheres, political state and civil society; and also the rationalistic formula of homo economicus, who acts moved by self-interest and rational choice.99 In contrast with the traditional model of society as a mere agglomerate of rational and autonomous individualities, the system of a community, they claim, follows a non-linear path, which folds and unfolds a variety of heterogeneous elements such as desires, affects, bodies, thoughts and forces.100 This implies the complication of the domain of the political with non conventional notions such as life, becoming, multiplicity, contingency, imagination and spirituality.101 In this light, the focus of the inquiry into the political domain of a community, generally, has replaced the concept of individuality with singularity, self-interest with desire, authority (Potestas) with power (potentia), progress or evolution with becoming, homogeneity with multiplicity, and sequential and quantitative time (Kronos) with the time of contingency and productive moments (Kairos).102 These re-formulations, over all, bring to light the growing awareness of society as a

99

Concerning the post-modern debate around the meaning of the political, the anatomy of community and the re-definition of the status of individuals within society, particularly influential have been the works of Balibar (1994, 1998), Foucault (1998), Negri (1998; 2000), Badiou (2005; 2002) and Nancy (1991) recently. 100 Concerning the role of affectivity, body and desires in the production of the political, Feminist thought has given an important contribution, see for example Irigaray (1994), Cavarero (2002) Ticineto Glough and Halley (2007), and Manning (2007). 101 On the theme made of the politization of the concept of life, Foucault (1998, vol. 1), first, introduces the question of the impact of the political authority of the state over everyday life, coining the term bio-power. Negri and Hardt (2000; 2006) conceptualised the term bio-politics as the opposite to bio-power, which is seen as the insurrectional response of the multitude through the use of the body and life to the bio-political control of the capitalist state. For further readings see also Agamben (1998: 71-104). 102 Concerning the theme of time in post-modern political thought, Deleuze and Guattari (2000a; 2000b) put forward the idea of the flowing of time through contingency and multiple movements of composition and decomposition of planes. Negri (2005: 131-169) reiterates the two Greek conceptions of time as Kronos (quantitative time) and Kairos (the time in between, qualitative), describing the latter as proper of the multitude. For further readings see particularly Massumi (1992, 1993) and Hutchings (2008).

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complex body, for which alternative and more adequate categories have to be employed. Concerning these arguments, many questions arise. Given the multisided account of the community of the global era, the question concerns whether there is any existing or past political model (democracy, republic, anarchy, socialism and communism) that might fully incorporate the abundance and complexity of this social body. Secondly, assuming that political gestures greatly exceed models of rational choice and self-interest, the problem concerns what is (if any) the emerging philosophy of praxis? Thirdly, supposing that social relations go beyond the differences of class, geographical and political territory, the question is what lies at the very basis of the political community today? Ultimately, if the process of production of a collective body does not or not solely reside on the dual schema of the object-subject distinction, the difficulty becomes one of the unveiling the possible mechanisms of the contemporary system of production; and revealing the instruments employed and the outcomes of this process. In other words, what is at stake here is the understanding of the production of the common (Negri, 2005; Hardt and Negri, 2006). In order to re-theorise the complexity of the social, the inquiry into the anatomy of the contemporary society has taken a myriad of different positions. Without embarking on a detailed discussion of the variety of theoretical approaches that have been developed in political theory recently, for the purpose of this chapter, we must, at the very least, consider the important contributions made by certain theories of radical democracy. These have raised fundamental questions about the redefinition of contemporary mass movements through more exhaustive concepts of hegemony, power, subject and bio-politics.103 Central within radical democratic theory has been the recovery of the notions of freedom, equality, rights, public and private spheres from the liberal tradition of thought, which have reduced these values to abstract and incontrovertible truths. In contrast with the liberal democratic approach, these principles, it has been claimed, involve concrete political practises of
103

For a complete account of debate surrounding the theme of radical democracy, see Thomassen and Tnder (2005), Laclau and Mouffe (2001); Butler, Laclau and Zizek (2000); and Badiou (2002).

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transformations, and the constitution of new social and political identities (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Connolly, 2002). These themes of the autonomy of democracy from the liberal paradigm have nurtured fruitful debates concerning the meaning of community, repositioning its existence outside the boundaries of the state and civil society. This has brought about the necessity of re-considering the anatomy of community as an expression of heterogeneity, spontaneous movements, which is not lacking or contrary to the state; rather it is other and more than the sovereign authority. In order to re-conceptualise the richness of expressions of community, notions of being-in-common, violence, and the whatever have been proposed.104 These have offered an alternative account of the forces and potentials that shape the present community, and unexplored possibilities for realising a pure democracy, escaping the surreptitious violence of the state apparatus. Although these theories have brought to light thoughtful arguments and problems on the question of the autonomy of the community, a thought of and about the multitude becomes, even more, crucial today. I think that the class-concept of the multitude appears to a far greater extent as expressing the anatomy, becoming and dynamics of the political subjectivities (Negri, 2004). For the indeterminacy and multiplicity that the term multitude expresses, this concept brings to light fundamental questions such as the role of affectivity, imagination and relation within the political context, as we will see, re-shaping the idea of society as a process.105
104

Concerning the re-formation of the paradigm of community, parallel to the notion of the multitude, see for example, the stimulating dispute between Agamben and Nancy, articulated through Agambens reaction to Nancys thesis of the Inoperative Community (1982) with the theory of the Coming Community (1991); and also the continuous debate between Nancy and Blanchot, who responses to Nancys thesis of the inoperative community with the writing Unavowable Community (1988). 105 The origins of the term multitude comes from the Latin idiom multitudo-inis, which is a composite of the adjective multus (many, plural, a large number of etc.) and the suffix tude (corresponding to the English -ess). By multitudo, the ancient Romans refer to a condition, permanent or transitory, of indeterminacy. It means the state of being numerous, within which singulars events are not visibly discernible one from the other; these are also impossible to be counted qualitatively and quantitatively. In political theory, Roman writers as Polybius (Polybius is of Greek origins, however, he spent almost of his life in Rome, where he also completed his Histories), Seneca, Cicero and Sallust, have amply used the term multitudo in most of the cases with the negative meaning of a large number of (multus) people without any political authority and social cohesion. It is during the

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Concerning the theme of the multitude, no one can deny that the conspicuous part of the actual debate is largely indebted to the works of Deleuze and Guattari, Negri and Hardt. Deleuze and Guattari have pictured the community of the global era as a nomadic organisation structured through desiring-machine, and movements of territorialization (maintenance) and deterritorialization (dissipation), opposing the homogeneity and stability of the state-apparatus.106 Deleuze and Guattaris philosophy has played a central role within the development of the ontological and political conception of the multitude today. This has significantly formed the ontological ground, upon which the multitude as a proper and alternative political individual has emerged. It is, however, through Negris political reflections that the thought of the multitude acquires great consistency and coherence, giving rise to what we have called above the political turn of the multitude. The importance of Negris philosophical gesture concerns the retreat of the multitude from its negative definitions of chaos, mass and mob to a positive meaning of productive force of desires, power, actions and conflicts and, more generally, commonalities. Negri examines the emergence of the multitude not as a transitional social phenomenon derived from a specific historical or political moment of crisis within the political body, which would be re-incorporated into the categories of citizens, subjects and people as soon as the hierarchic order of the state is restored. Rather, the multitude, Negri claims, is the political antagonist of the contemporary state apparatus, which is as global (plural, decentralised and powerful) as the capitalist state itself, and as invasive as the Empire. The multitude opposes to the politics of the Empire, a praxis of spontaneous democracy structured through desires, kairotic flowings of time and life, through which the production of the common is founded and developed (Negri and Hardt, 2000; 2006).
XVI and XVII centuries that the expression multitudo acquires a more neutral significance and political consistency. Machiavelli, Hobbes and, over all, Spinoza amply adopted the category of the multitude for describing the role of the mass within the state. 106 Deleuze and Guattaris conception of the Desiring-machine, roughly, affirms the productive nature of desires, opposing both the Freudian and Marxist views of desire as emerging from lack (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a). The notions of territorialization and deterritorialisation, and the theory of nomadic forms of organisation connote an expansive force (nomadic war machine) composed of heterogeneity and contingency strongly challenging the process of homogenization and stabilisation of the state-apparatus (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b).

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It is in this moment that the marginal status traditionally occupied by Spinoza within the history of political thought is eventually undermined. Negri reiterates Spinozas conception of the multitude, reinstating Spinozas politics and ontology as its weight.107 For Negri, Spinozas political philosophy proposes a multisided vision of the multitude, which is not solely capable of challenging concretely the hegemony of the state and the Church, but also the only condition for the attainment of democracy. Although Negri and other political theorists such as Balibar, Moreau, Matheron and Giancotti have consistently re-located Spinozas thought of the multitude and democracy within contemporary political theory, nevertheless there are, I think, still dormant and unexplored themes within Spinozas political treatises that require further consideration. Firstly, I refer to a more extensive understanding of the concrete political stakes of affects of joy, love and indignation within the constitution of the multitude, which are presented in the final part of the TTP and the TP. As we have examined in chapter IV, passions do not only describe an inoperative psychological and ethical condition, which is rooted in a specific historical, political and religious community. Affectivity, however passive or active, sets in motion intensive and relational movements of exchanges and variations of parts, which transform the political scene entirely. In the conceptual persona of the Subjects of Moses, for example, we have seen that Hebrews fear of God and hope for salvation generate a form of anguish, which signals the emergence of a dramatic moment involving not only the Jewish people and Moses, but rather the production of the political as whole. In this light, if passions are capable of producing and dissolving the political, the status of affects of joy, love and indignation in Spinozas political inquiry upon democracy and the multitude certainly goes far beyond particular practises of sharing, sedition, subjection, individual freedom and mutual assistance. As we will
107

The reinstatement of Spinozas philosophy today certainly is not only Negris achievement. In the course of the chapter, I will further discuss the other readings.

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analyse in the following section, affects are the ground of fundamental political notions of social contracts, natural and civil rights, sovereignty and consensus, upon which the very power of the multitude resides. Therefore, the study of the ontological and political foundations of affectivity is instrumental to investigating the many ways in which the multitude produces the common regardless of regimes of monarchy, aristocracy and tyranny. It is for this reason that in the thread of both Treatises, the multitude, obstinately, persists in any historical juncture, political crisis and restoration. In the absence of an adequate political vocabulary for affectivity, Spinozas analysis of the multitudes affective politics, I believe, becomes crucial. This might enable us to re-consider how the common is produced, and specifically the forces, movements and tensions activated by affects of joy, love and hate for the constitution and fruition of the common. Furthermore, Spinozas concern with the affective tones of the multitude might provide us with alternative instruments for re-theorising the richness of expression of the social. The claim I will make through this chapter is that Spinozas attention to a praxis of joy and love reframes the controversial question of the relation between life (whether biological or already political) and sovereignty. Secondly, re-locating the role of affects for the production of the common directly questions the effective anatomy and potentials of democracy in Spinozas thought, which is described as the most natural system. As examined in chapter IV, societies are processes, which follow a non liner path shaped by a mixture of relations, complexity and tensions. The emergence of a specific political individual does not create community made by the establishment of laws, rules, private and public spheres. From the arguments of both the Ethics and the Theological Political Treatise, we have learnt that individuals are already collective and the order of nature is not qualitatively different from human vital and political systems. As the most natural model, democracy cannot be considered as a well-ordered form of government with a specific organisation of authority into laws and social division. Democracy instead refers to a process of continuous actualisation and

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transformation, which gives full rights of citizenship to the actuality of the community as it is. This means that incompatibilities, relations and tensions shape a democratic realm, maintaining its body constantly open towards alternative transformations in turn. As we have seen in chapters III and IV, affectivity is the cornerstone of relation, which places individuals in the middle between generality and singularity, movements and transformations. It is in this context that the interface between affectivity and democracy comes to light, complicating the domain of the political through the production of the the common good. This focus on Spinozas conception of democracy introduces a new awareness of the relation between affectivity and politics, the meaning of common good and its production. In the search for a different conception of democracy today, Spinozas account of the linkage between affects and democratic praxis, I argue, might open unexplored avenues towards alternative modes of re-thinking pacts of solidarity, fidelity and struggles. It is to this interface between democracy and affectivity that contemporary political thought should pay greater attention. Taking into account these arguments, in the following section I shall pass to examine Spinozas multisided theory of the multitude, and the extent to which its life, political gestures and affective tones carry democratic meanings, actions and forces. As mentioned, the discussion on democracy, the multitude and affects will proceed through conceptual personae. In this chapter we encounter the Citizens of the democracy. This embraces and somewhat challenges, in my analysis, Spinozas engagement with democracy, that is, how a life in common might be formed.

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2. Spinozas political strategy: Democracy, sovereignty and the power of the Multitude

The theme of democracy occupies the central part of Spinozas political theory, which is developed in both the political section of the TTP and the unfinished Political Treatise. Whilst in the pars contruens of the TTP, Spinozas treatment of democracy is folded within a more general investigation of typical themes of modern political thought such as the contractualist origin of society, natural and civil rights, freedom of speech and thought, in the Political Treatise the analysis of the democratic state follows a more complex discussion of the structure of sovereignty within monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. These questions involve the study of the notions of the differences and relation between natural and civil rights, the definition of political authority, the aims of the state, the meaning of the law, citizenship and the various forms of freedom. In both Treatises, Spinozas arguments delineate an accurate anatomy of power, through which its twofold status comes to light: power as fixed authority (Potestas) and as productive force (potentia).108 The description of the complex structure of power within society is the ground of Spinozas conception of democracy as the full expression of human association. The theme of inalienable right plays a fundamental role in the two Treatises. In the TTP, this argument is crucial for understanding Spinozas conceptions of the authority of the state, the social pact and freedom. More precisely, definition of the inalienable right explains where sovereignty is located within the body politic, and more importantly under what circumstances its authority might be legitimate. In the TP, the definition of inalienable rights is instrumental for determining the emergence of the multitude as a proper political counterpart of the state, and Spinozas thesis of
108

Concerning the category of power within the political treatises, Negri identifies its twofold status of power. Accordingly, the notion of power refers on the one side to Potestas, indicating the authority of the state; on the other, power means Potentiae, describing the productive force of the multitude. Negri concludes that Spinozas thought of the multitude is an affirmation of potentia contra auctoritas (Negri, 1998: 242-253). Moving on the same distinction between Potestas and Potentia, but taking a complete opposite direction, Rice too points to the two dimensions of power. In a liberal fashion, Rice claims that power as Potestas denotes the authority of the state, which is viewed as an added capacity always inferior to the individual and opposing the order of nature. In this sense, Spinozas notion of the state is not a further development of his ontology. Power as Potentia, instead, means the ability of the individual, which is greater than the state (Rice, 1990).

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the superiority of democracy over the other political models of aristocracy and monarchy. In the political section of the TTP, Spinoza claims that natural rights are coextensive with civil rights, and reiterates this more strongly in the TP through his adage of the tantum juris quantum potentiae (TTP, Chapter XVI: 527; TP, Chapter II.3). This means that the creation of the political body does not suppress the rights owned by every man in a pre-civil condition. For Spinoza, natural and civil rights are not contradictory terms, rather these are compatible one with the other. Spinoza defines, more importantly, natural right as power, which means unpredicted and productive force. Following Spinozas analysis, in the state of nature the power of each individual does not lead necessarily to actions of reciprocal cruelty as in the Hobbesian condition of perpetual war. Rather, Spinozas account of the pre-civil situation is multisided, where a variety of affective tones shape the actions and thoughts of individuals. This variegated structure of the state of nature produces a different kind of relational condition as the fear towards others, humility or selfesteem (TTP, Chapter XVI: 528-529; TP, Chapter III. 3-8). To put this in a more Simondonian fashion, the state of nature is fundamentally a heterogeneous being, which carries problems, incompatibilities and metastability that give rise to complicated individuals in turn. In this light, as a productive force, power exposes the equilibrium of the individual towards further transformations and actualisations. It is in this moment that the desire for society emerges. As mentioned, the civil body does not oppose the state of nature, rather the passage from the pre-civil context to the civil one indicates a process rather than a rupture. As there is no contradiction between these two forms of power, this leads Spinoza to maintain natural rights entirely within society. Furthermore, individuals surrender collectively (collegialiter) their powers for the creation of the new political equilibrium (TTP, Chapter V: 438, Chapter XVI: 528). This implies the acknowledgment of civil authority as a result of this union, thus dependent on this collective power, which is always greater than the established authority (TP: Chapter III. 6-8).

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These arguments regarding the transfer of natural rights to the political body moves Spinoza to pose the fundamental problem of sovereignty; and consequently which regime between monarchy, aristocracy and democracy best maintains and guarantees the balance between powers (civil and natural) within society. In the TTP, Spinoza finds untenable the composition of sovereignty within the systems of monarchy and aristocracy. For Spinoza, these easily degenerate into regimes of violence and tyranny (TTP, Chapter XVI: 531). In order to justify their sovereignty, both monarchic and aristocratic governments, Spinoza explains, have to rely on religious expedients, such as the divine origin of authority or the suppression of the masss desires, needs and freedom. In the unfinished Political Treatise, Spinoza reespouses the theme of sovereignty more rigorously, introducing the question of the maintenance of consensus within the body politic; and the extent to which this is defended and encouraged within monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. If in the TTP the contruactualist foundation of sovereignty might be interpreted as the premise for the formulation of the category of political obligation, which binds both the state and civil body, it is in the TP that the theory of consensus dispels entirely any possible recourse to a politics of obedience. As Spinoza relates directly the notion of the consensus with the multitude, this brings to light the centrality of the multitude as a powerful political individual (TP, Chapter IV). In order to consolidate the legitimacy of the state, Spinoza explains, both monarchy and aristocracy have necessarily to be dependent on the consent of the multitude (TP, Chapters V, VII, X). Specifically, the preservation of monarchical government resides in the reinforcement of the rulers alliance with his subjects, and the progressive disappearance of the nobilitys privileges (TP, Chapter VII. 20). This involve the constitution of counsellors to the king chosen from the citizen-body, the formation of a popular army, non hereditary election of the monarch, and the definition of the king as representative of the peoples will and not as the owner of the state (TP, Chapter VI. 10, 15; Chapter VII. 12, 25). For Spinoza, these are the conditions, through which subjects consent can be best preserved, and thereby the authority of the monarchic regime maintained. Similarly, in an aristocratic regime, Spinozas attention is given to the increase of the relation between patricians and

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plebeians. In order to avoid the predominance of a specific cast of patrician, Spinoza opts for a solution of a regular alternation between the patrician clans. This should prevent the emergence of inequalities between patricians and the formation of hereditary privileges, which would encourage sedition, ambition and rivalry among citizens (TP, Chapter X). A central consequence of this strategy of consensus is that in each of these regimes, the stability of the state is based essentially on the progressive reduction of indirect forms of representation, which would better guarantee the balance between powers. In this light, each regime seems to move progressively towards democracy, through the constitution or, at the very least, the permission of practices of sharing, participation and freedom. Given this intrinsic tendency towards democratic customs within each type of regimes, the question immediately arises as what might be the anatomy of sovereignty in a proper democratic state? Since the chapter XI on democracy is missing from Spinozas text, we do not know how the distribution of sovereign power in a democratic body is articulated in his later thought. In order to avoid tempting conjectures on how Spinoza might have conceived the democratic state, I think that we might instead examine, deductively, Spinozas paradigm of democracy from the arguments developed in the Theological Political Treatise and his theory of the consensus conducted in the Political Treatise. These reveal, we will see below, Spinozas awareness of the pivotal role of the multitude within the formation of democracy, and its centrality for the production of the common good. In the TTP, Spinoza advocates democracy as the more natural form of political institution, within which the individual transfers it [the natural right] to the majority of the entire community of which he is a part [italics mine] (TTP Chapter XVI: 531). For Spinoza, the democratic state ensures stability, peace and freedom of speech and thought, which are the only aims of the state. More accurately, in the TTP, Spinoza claims that the aims and purpose of the state are freedom and the observance of the principles sanctioned in the social pact, whereas in the TP the

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reason of the state is the defence and preservation of peace and stability through the preservation of the citizens consensus. Given this collective structure, it is unlikely that the democratic government will degenerate into tyranny and efface human rights. It is through the maintenance and development of these conditions that the progress of society lies. Concerning these themes about the very role of the multitude from the TTP to the TP, civil and natural rights, consensus and democracy, many interpretations have occurred in the history of Spinozas thought, each of which stresses a particular argument and ignores or, at the very least, underestimates others. As mentioned at many junctures in this work, there have been two influential ways of reading Spinozas political philosophy. These are a liberal-individualistic approach, and a contemporary study of Spinozas philosophy influenced by Marxist paradigm, which has flourished particularly in France within certain post-Althusserian debate. Related particularly to the thesis of the political section of the TTP, the liberal-individualistic approach has been quite dominant and this has been challenged by post-Althusserian interpretations more recently (Smith, 1998; Feuer, 1987). As Spinoza posits a contract at the very basis of the political body, this has led to an assimilation of his thought to Hobbes, Locke and Grotius. Furthermore, Spinozas reference to the notion of profit as the very basis of the state has aligned him on the utilitarian tradition of thought of Benthan and Mill, or the theory of the rational choice (Israel, 2002). The main limits of these interpretations, in my view, are that they do not pay adequate attention to crucial aspects of Spinozas themes of the pact and the profit. The foundation of the pact is, first of all, a form of spontaneous passage from the natural condition; also this is collectively postulated. Thus, there is no singular individual being at the basis of the contract but instead a collective being. This implies that the conception of the community is to some extent prior to civil society. As it is formed collectively, the authority and the reason of the state resides in the power of the collective. Whilst Spinozas claim of the interest or profit as the basis of the state may certainly lead one to utilitarian conclusions, however this contrasts with

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the definition of the human being given in the Ethics as desire (E. III, Def. I). As we will further discuss in the successive parts, from the state of nature to the civil body Spinoza does not refer to the human being as a self-independent individual, who experiences society as an attached and secondary body (Rice, 1990).109 By contrast, society is an expression not of self-interest, however rational or passionate, but instead of desire, which greatly exceeds both models of the rational choice and the Hobbesian fear of death. Furthermore, assuming Spinozas theory of the state and the human being as expressions of Liberal and individualistic conceptions, this would mean that, for Spinoza, the individual can live under any form of government insofar as this does not limit the attainment of personal interest and self-realisation, as the Hobbesian man can perfectly exist under the Leviathan. In this case, monarchy and aristocracy might adequately meet the needs of individuals similarly to democracy insofar as these do not degenerate into despotic and confessional regimes. However, as we have seen, Spinoza firmly advocates democracy as the best and more natural model of governance for the development of a society as a whole. The superiority of democracy, Spinoza claims, resides not on the possibility of expansion of the singular freedom either on a community as quantitative sum of parts. It is rather a system, through and within which the sharing of power is the only condition of collective freedom. In an opposing way, post-Althusserian approaches to Spinozas politics have stressed the collective aspects of his thought. These have forwarded the idea of the political foundation of Spinozas ontology and, at the same time, the ontological or naturalist ground of his politics. Post-Althusserian analysis has highlighted how his philosophy raises fecund arguments in relation to the strategy for maintaining power over people, the mechanisms of alienation used by religious and political authorities, the multisided forms of ideology, and a non individualist conceptions of society and human nature. In this light, Spinozas affirmation of freedom of speech and thought has been explained as a project of emancipation of the mass, the ultimate object of
109

For an analysis of the psychological implications deriving from of Spinozas theory of the contract as the deference of the individual to the state, see Curley (1996: 315-342), and James (1997: 136-156).

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which is the creation of a community aware of itself as unity and not as sum of individuals (Matheron, 1988; Giancotti, 1995). It follows that the political body, instead of representing a mere sum of singular individualities, is the result of the collective power and desires of people. Thus, Spinozas advocacy of democracy is understood as the affirmation of the power of the mass against the authority of the state. Above all, these series of studies have brought about the rediscovery of the originality of Spinozas theory of the multitude, which is conceptualised without reference to citizens, people and subjects. Taking into great consideration both readings of Spinozas politics and proceeding further with the post-Althusserian approach, I think that there are some further important arguments emerged from the Theological Political Treatise and the Political Treatise, which might still offer thoughtful theoretical insights for contemporary thought. Besides these disputes of the foundation of democracy as either individualist or collective in nature, we should emphasise the hypothesis that lies at the basis of Spinozas democratic thought. The importance of Spinozas thesis of democracy, in my reading, resides primarily in the question, which brings him to affirm the superiority of this institution over the other political models. Spinoza does not ask what is the best form for governing and gathering people together within the boundaries of a political equilibrium. Most importantly, Spinozas quest is not addressed to how people can rule themselves. This would imply a certain acceptance of the intrinsic incapacity of individuals to govern themselves collectively. We already know from the Ethics that individuals are ontologically collective. Therefore, Spinoza questions how this complex and collective being may act politically. Given the Greek meaning of the term democracy as the government of the many (demos), this might appear to Spinoza the more adequate political formula able to give rise to the manifold and heterogeneous status of the individuals. The open equilibrium of the democratic system creates the conditions, through which relational movements can be further actualised and developed. It is for this reason that Spinoza fiercely defines democracy as the most natural form of political praxis.

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If Spinozas account of democracy is concerned with the question of how people govern themselves in order to develop further the collective process of individuation, many problems arise. Firstly, how does this complex individual act politically once democracy is formed? Secondly, given Spinozas conviction of the affective and passionate nature of individuals, how does the multitude act politically, favouring the progress of a society? In other words, how do affects and passions impact positively and concretely on the production of democracy? In order to address these questions, our reading of the Treatises through affective-conceptual personae acquires great significance. The analysis of the relation between the multitude and democracy as more complex conceptual persona might shed light on certain dormant aspects of Spinozas democratic theory, which otherwise would remain entangled in the gap between individualist and collective readings of Spinozas political philosophy. These refer to an alternative mode of thinking the relational role of affectivity within the democratic order and, more generally, the interface between affects and sovereignty. In the remaining part of the chapter, I shall pass to examine the affective political phases of the multitude towards democracy as a conceptual persona, which I call the Citizens of democracy

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3. Citizens of democracy: Sovereign life, common good, affective time

The conceptual persona of the Citizens of democracy expresses the central problem that accompany Spinozas inquiry from the Ethics, through the Theological Political Treatise, to the Political Treatise. This concerns the understanding of the form of life in common embodied by and through the multitude. Following Deleuze and Guattaris thesis, if the conceptual persona of Descartes is the Idiot and the one of Nietzsche is Dionysus, I would argue here, Spinozas major persona is the living in common, which he envisages in the body of the multitude (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 61-83; and also chapter IV of this work.). By this, importantly, I do not intend that the multitude itself is Spinozas conceptual persona; rather, the paradigm of the life in common of the multitude becomes the privileged object-subject of Spinozas philosophical production. It activates multiple potentialities of Spinozas concept, raising a problem and glimpsing a solution. It is the multiform life in common of the multitude that forces Spinoza to question the power of affects and the openness of the body, dismissing the paradigm of individuality and the Cartesian hegemony of the mind.110 Related particularly to the production of the political, Spinoza is confronted with the multiple and various levels of the relational behaviour and forces that the multitude introduces through cruelty and joy within the political process. The multitude, Spinoza observes, obstinately persists through historical crises and social hierarchy. The multitudes omnipresence in history, Spinoza recognises, is not inoperative at all, rather it carries unsuspected meanings, relations, powers and tensions, which transform and further individualises the political scene. Every attempt to restrain the life of multitude within a well-organised class of subjects, people and plebs causes directly the collapse of the political body (for the language of the TP the outrage of the masses). By contrast, as we have seen, the search for a form of consensus leads towards more democratic regimes. Therefore, Spinoza questions what are the founding elements of a life in common of the multitude, and how we might
110

For a full account of the questions of the body, the autonomy of the affects and the negation of Cartesian philosophy developed in the Ethics, see chapter III of the present study.

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conceptualise its collective political life. It is in a consideration of these problems that Spinozas quest lies, drawing a line of continuity between the Treatises. The conceptual persona of the Citizens of democracy precisely takes shape from this continuity between the Treatises, expressing the variety of affective tones given by Spinoza to life-in-common. Hence, I consider the arguments and problems of the pars construens of the TTP and TP as phases in the more complex conceptual persona of the Citizens of democracy, each of which expresses a crucial relational, thus emotive, moment within the production of democracy. Taking into account these arguments, let us flesh out the dynamics and problematic characters of this conceptual persona. As anticipated previously, Spinoza gives a multisided account of the political role of the mass within a political context. In the TTP, Spinozas rare use of the term multitude and frequent reference instead to mob and plebs appears to stress only the passionate character of the mass, which can be mobilised now against this faction now against the other. In contrast, in the TP the multitude becomes the central name for defining the political status of the mass within the state. This is recognised as the concrete counterpart of the state, which can destroy any form of tyranny; consequently any ruler has to adapt its authority to incorporate the consent of the multitude. In other words, the mass is the social and political category, whose consent, however passive or active, alters inevitably the equilibrium of the political system. From this multifaceted vision of the mass, many questions arise. Firstly, how do they can found a political body as democracy without being ruled by any external authority? In other words, given the passionate tones of the masses, how does Spinoza think a possible government of the many, which could guarantee stability and peace? Secondly, given Spinozas refusal of any form of agency and a strictly determinist philosophical system, how might the mass pass from being a passionate and violent mob to the citizens of democracy and the guardians of freedom? Concerning these questions, for the purpose of this chapter, Balibar (1994; 1998) and Negris (1998) theses offer fecund arguments for our discussion. The former

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emphasises the ambivalent status of the multitude in Spinozas analysis, whereas the latter its praxis of emancipation.111 Barlibars focus is upon the twofold dimension of Spinozas notion of the multitude, within which imagination and communication play a pivotal role for the attainment of democracy. For Balibar, Spinozas analysis of the power of the multitude within a given political context reveals an irresolvable internal contradiction, which refers to a passive tendency towards servitude, and a constitutive power of new political order. On the one side, Balibar observes, the body of the multitude is the rich expression of collective praxis, which limits the growth and expansion of any despotic and confessional state. In this light, affectivity is the generating source of the constitution of the power of the mass against the authority. On the other, Balibar rightly notices, the TTP displays a negative aspect of the movement of the mass, which is characterised by manipulation. The role of imagination generates superstition, mystification, alienation, for which a politics of obedience and a doctrine of mutual support become indispensable instruments for the stability of a community. Balibars reading concludes with envisaging an irreversible aporia within Spinozas theory of the multitude, which is characterised by the internal contradiction between citizens and mob (Williams, 2007; 2002). It is precisely in this aporetic status of the multitude that the great originality and modernity of Spinozas political gesture lies. The coexistence of the mob and the citizens, Balibar argues, makes of the multitude the very problem and subject of the historical process, which traverses and forms human societies. 112 In contrast with Balibars reading and in a strong Marxist fashion, Negri opposes the definition of the masses as inconceivable contradiction with the view of the multitude as internal to the domain of the state. Negri points to the constitutive force of the multitude, which re-signifies the political and social conception of power
111

For an analysis of Negri and Balibars interpretations of Spinozas theory of the multitude, and a possible advancement of both readings through a more complex theory of imagination and affectivity, see Williams (2007; 2002), to which this discussion refer. 112 Concerning the twofold status of imagination within the TTP, Balibar stresses the double meaning of the passion of fear as fear of the mass and the fear experienced by the ruler in relation to the mass (Balibar, 1994: 3-37).

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itself. For him Spinozas theory of the multitude reveals a radical anatomy of power, which brings to light its two meanings as dynamic force (potentiae) and immobile authority (Potestas). In Negris view, Spinozas notion of the multitude exemplifies the dimension of power as transformation of the established order, which contrasts the authority of the state. The role of the multitude becomes recognised as the counterpart of the state and the destabilising actor within the political scene (Negri, 1988: 242-253). Without negating or supporting either of these readings, the strategy, I follow in this part, considers the condition of the multitude from another perspective. In order to re-situate the problem of the multitude within a political body and especially in a democratic system, I draw attention to the emotive states themselves, through which political actions are founded and developed. Thus, I propose to examine both passive and active actions of the mass as a result of a more complex process formed by affective phases, each of which discloses relational movements, problems and potentialities. The arguments, I will put forward through the thread of this conceptual persona, concern the discovery of a more complex process nuanced by varied confluences of emotive tones, which shape and further complicate not the singular being rather the collective body of the multitude.113 It is through this affective process of enduring individuation that Spinozas vision of democracy as mens una comes to light.114 Furthermore, this analysis of Spinozas thesis of the multitude as a process draws attention to the ways in which affects are generative sources of the common good; and allows the opportunity to address the question of the interface between democracy and affectivity.

113

Concerning Spinozas theme of the political actions of the mass, Balibar and Negri too view these as phases of more problematic process. Whilst Balibar stresses the notion of process in the treatise as a form of historical becoming, and Negri instead as emancipating progress, my reading tends to maintain a stronger ontological foundation in the same line with Simondons thought. 114 Spinoza in the Theological Political Treatise does not use the term mens una explicitly. This will appear in the Political Treatise (Chapter II. 16). In the Theological Political Treatise, he instead adopts the equivalent expression coetus universus hominum (united body of men), (TTP, Chapter XVI: 530).

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States of fear: The servitude of the emperor, the freedom of the subjects Following the political arguments of the two Treatises, Spinoza addresses the reasons for the necessity (its natural status) of democracy. In order to expound this thesis, he considers first non democratic systems and historical circumstances, in which the politics of consensus has been totally or partially corrupted. In the TTP, Spinoza looks at the negative examples of the Roman Empire, the Jewish state, and the recent events of the English Revolution of Cromwell. In the TP, he examines the ways in which the multitudes agreement can be preserved within monarchy and aristocracy. In each of these cases, the multitude is the centre and the end of Spinozas inquiry. In his analysis of non democratic orders, the passive tones of fear, anger, hate and ambition form the political practises of the mass. These cause instability, anarchy and the collapse of the entire political apparatus. In the thread of the persona of the Citizens of democracy, these passive states determine crucial phases within the process of the democratisation of the political, revealing an alternative mode of producing the common. Spinoza makes a fundamental claim at the beginning of the chapter XVII of the Theological Political Treatise, in which he affirms Nobody can so completely transfer to other all his rights, and consequently his power, as to cease to be a human being, nor will there ever be a sovereign power that can do all it pleases (TTP, chapter XVII: 536). As discussed above, Spinozas thesis of the inalienability of natural right becomes the dominant argument of the Political Treatise, upon which his theory of legitimacy of the state is based and developed (TP, II. 3-4). It is the impossibility of the complete embodiment of the natural right within the canon that raises the problem of consensus and the existence of the multitude into politics. In the case of the conceptual persona of the Citizens of democracy, Spinozas statements are crucial. As nobody transfers entirely to an external authority his natural right, there remains a non expressed quantity of power within any given state. The anatomy of a political body is constituted by an individuated part (the civil right, laws and freedoms) and an

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undifferentiated potential mass, which might suddenly be actualised, bringing into the system novel meanings, actions and thoughts. This vision of the constituted political order brings about the discovery of society continuously traversed by different and heterogeneous forces and movements, which maintain its equilibrium constantly in tension and open to transformations. As we have seen with the previous conceptual personae in chapter IV, Spinozas conception of the civil community unveils his awareness of society as a process, a becoming, which particularly in states of fear and violence acquires great cogency. In the political order regulated by fear and violence (such as the Roman Empire and the Jewish monarchy after the death of Moses), the state of passivity does not only delineate the decrease of power of action within the domain of the Citizens of the forming democracy, but also expresses a condition of potentiality, through which unsuspected and unpredictable political beings (revolts, anarchic phenomena, despotic regimes) emerge. These varied phenomena derive from the partial transfer of natural rights to a new political authority, which maintain the collective power of individuals naturally stronger than the established political order. The phases of fear and anger characterising non democratic system activate a distinct tendency within the body of our conceptual persona. In the states of fear, the Citizens of democracy begin to act politically as demons.115 This demonic role is twofold. The Citizens of democracy incorporate the two meanings of the image of the demon: the Ancient Greek notion of the inspiring and multiple force or spirit, and the Catholic figure of evil as negative presence. As an inner force within the political system, they constitute an expansive and invasive power, which bring into the existing order tensions, problems and various forms of resistance. This aspect becomes more intense, particularly under the states of violence, tyranny and, generally, slavery,

115

I borrow the figure of demons from Hardt and Negris appropriation of the novel of Dostoyevsky Demons (1873) (Negri and Hardt, 2006: 138-140). The authors refer to the notion of demons as an inner force, which is always present within any given political context. They indicate the Greek origin of the term demon, which means a great number, and also a creative spirit. My use of the notion of demons follows partly Hardt and Negris elaboration, partly the negative meaning of demon as disruptive tendency.

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which are structured through fear, hate and indignation. They are, now latent now manifest, the real enemy of the established political system (TP, Chapter III. 9). In a condition of oppression, Spinoza reminds us through the Annals of Tacitus, the power of the mass becomes increasingly stronger, causing the collapse of the entire political apparatus, the overthrow of the emperor or, at very least, an enduring state of insecurity.116 In the Roman Empire, in order to maintain the authority over the subjects, every emperor had to justify his role through the expedients of the glorious and divine origins of his power (for example Augusts alleged origin from Aeneas) (TTP, Chapter XVII: 538). Spinoza argues that the state of passivity, the decrease of the power of action and thinking, does not pertain to the mass, but instead to the tyrant. It is the fear felt by the emperor for a possible insurrection of the subjects and their hate that causes him to rely upon external aids such as myth and violence. Therefore, the authority of the ruler relies on the pure image of power, whereas the force of his subjects is a concrete and effective obstacle (TTP, Chapter XVII: 537). In the case of the persona of the Citizens of democracy, Spinozas analysis has many important political implications. The state of fear re-defines the political scene entirely, within which the Citizens of the coming democracy, in their demonic aspect, play a pivotal role. They act as productive forces, which re-signify the domain of the common through new flowings of time, relation and society. The re-characterisation of the common does not only signal a cultural or religious turn, but also a different political theatre. In the state of Israel after the death of Moses and the failure of the democratic experiment, the fear and ignorance of the collective body of the Israelites gave rise to anarchic phase, that prepared the terrain for the complete dissolution of the political apparatus and the dispersion of the Jewish people (TTP, Chapter XVII: 541-544). In the Roman
116

It is also beyond doubt that a commonwealth is always in greater danger from its citizens than from its enemies; []. It follows that he on whom the whole right if the state has been conferred will always be more afraid of citizens than of external enemies and will therefore endeavour to look on his own safety, not consulting the interests of his subjects but plotting against them []. (TP, Chapter VI. 6).

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Empire, fear, hate and indignation of the subjects maintained the equilibrium of the political body in an enduring state of tension, through which the mythic foundation of the empire, restrictive laws and various forms of violence emerged as the only defence of the state. In the despotic regime, society is characterised by two main passions: fear and indignation. In the Ethics, Spinoza defines fear as inconstant pain arising from the idea of a thing future or past, of whose outcome were in some doubt (E. III, Def. XIII); whereas by indignation Spinoza means hatred toward one who has injured another (E. III, Def. XX). In the conceptual persona of the Citizens of democracy, the tyrant is nuanced by the passive tones of fear and the mass is mostly shaped by the indignation toward the ruler. These two passions give rise to crucial political moments, which question concepts of life, death, relation and time. The emperor, Spinoza reminds us, is constantly dominated by the fear of the imminent upheaval of the subjects against his domain. For this, he calls for friends support and seeks alliance with Greek and Christian gods, through which he attempts to placate the anger of the mass (TTP, Chapter XVII: 538). These attempts are the results of a more complex process, whose origin lies in fear and passivity. The sacred origin of the figure the ruler goes far beyond the establishment of the ideological apparatus of the state, revealing instead the emperors fear for a secure death. It is this fear that causes paradoxically the death of the ruler and thereby the dissolution of the entire political body. Spinozas definition of the ontological state of fear as pain emerging from the uncertainty of a future or past has an effective impact on the realm of the political. This concerns a different constitution of time, the re-definition of the form of government and the institution of slavery. Like the Subjects of Moses under the phase of anguish analysed in chapter IV, in this context, the two coordinates of the past and the present play out the drama of the emperor. In order to avoid the future possibility of death, the emperors fear brings back, however real or illusory, gestures of the past and the authority of his predecessors. In this light, the present abandons

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the forces and multiple possibilities of the future, and becomes a mere reflection of the past. Spoiled of the potentialities of the future, the realm of the emperor tends progressively toward a stable equilibrium, which implies the loss of opportunities for transformation. However, this fear of death goes beyond the constitution of time, restructuring the political reality of the emperors authority. As mentioned before, this fear of the future shaped by the need for the past produces the divine status of authority, which implies the entire re-characterisation of the form of government. The emperor, under the state of fear, ceases to be the absolute ruler of the state, and becomes now the son of Jupiter now the heir of Aeneas. The emperors need for Greek gods brings about the discovery of the progressive process of enslavement of his state. In order to persuade the mass of the legitimacy of their authority, Spinoza explains, Roman emperors such as August or Alexander declare to simply follow someones desire. For example, Alexander will motivate his power as the realisation of an higher policy rather than an act of pride (TTP, Chapter XVII: 538-539). These examples indicate the growing condition of servitude coming from the state of fear, which becomes two-sided. On the one hand, the emperor is slave of the epic gestures of his fathers, which exclude his dominion from any possibility of change and becoming. On the other hand, as we already mentioned, the tyrant is subjected to the anger and indignation of the mass. As anticipated, the passion of fear activates this condition of servitude, upon which despotic regimes are based and developed. It is precisely the fear of death (you will find more who died at the hands of their own people recites Alexanders plea) that lies at the very basis of the emperors enslavement. In the Ethics, Spinoza affirms that only one who acts moved by fear of death and hope for salvation is a slave (E. IV, prop. LXIII), whereas a free man is concerned solely with the enjoyment of life and thinks least of death (E. IV, prop. LXVII). The political consequence of this fear of death concerns the realisation of the emperors anxiety, that is, death (TP, and the whole Chapters VI, VII). In the Roman Empire, Spinoza comments, subjects have made their rulers destitute six

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times, and in the state of England, for the first time in the history, a popular assembly has condemned the king to death (TTP, Chapter XVIII: 556-557). Many questions arise from this analysis. First of all, the main problem concerns who or what is the real enemy of the emperor, that whose power is so great so as to reduce him to servitude? Secondly, given Spinozas claim that it is the subjects of the tyrant who are most feared, the question arises as to how their forces are structured; and what elements might give rise to the death of the ruler. These questions bring us to the core of Spinozas political philosophy, that is, to the origin of sovereignty. Without addressing this theme, our inquiry would not go any further. In order to examine the problem of sovereignty, an investigation of Spinozas definition of reason of the state is required. In the opening of the Political Treatise, the question of the relation between life and sovereignty is posed as soon as Spinoza comes to define the aim of the state. For Spinoza, the purpose of the state is peace and security of life (TP, Chapter V.2), which is centred on a well-organised balance between duty and freedom. From the position of individuals, the creation of the state apparatus guarantees the improvement of their lives. Since, the state is the higher expression of human association and is always desirable to the state of nature, and the preservation of its form is necessary (TP, Chapters III. 4-8, VI. 1-8). Following these general elements of Spinozas conception of sovereignty, one might argue that his notion of the political authority tends towards a certain vision of an all-invasive state, which decides upon human life and death through laws and punishments. If we include in this notion of the state Spinozas statements regarding the inalienability of natural right, the power of affects, and his definition of the political body as the union of individual powers, then his paradigm of sovereignty becomes more complex. In order to explore Spinozas thesis of sovereignty and life, our inquiry into the anatomy of sovereignty might be usefully framed by Agambens political philosophy. Without venturing into the vicissitudes of Agambens inquiry regarding the structure of contemporary sovereign power, or presenting a dialogue between

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him and Spinoza, for the purpose of this work, I will draw attention to his definitions of sacred and bare life, utilising these as theoretical tools to analyse the question of sovereignty in Spinozas political writings. In order to describe the very status of the human being in relation to contemporary sovereignty, Agamben looks back at the ambiguous figure of the sacred man defined in Roman law. The sacred man (homo sacer) is a person whose life lies in the between of an inclusion and exclusion from the state. The sacred man is excluded from civil rights, thus he may be killed but not be elevated to religious sacrifice. In Agambens own re-formulation, the paradigm of the sacred man defines the existing condition of the individual in relation to the state, in whom life is sacred but yet may be killed(Agamben, 1998: 15-28, 72-85) For him, the political position of human life resides dramatically in the paradox of the inalienability of human rights (the sacredness of human being sanctioned by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizen), which, given certain exceptional circumstances, may be abrogated (such as during wartime, and in the case of refugees). Deprived of the sacrality of its status, individual life returns to its original meaning of bare life (biological existence), which in turn may be killed. It is precisely in the schism between bare life and political life, Agamben claims, that the power of sovereignty lies (Agamben, 1998: 71-110).117 Agamben envisages the origins of this paradox in the history of Western thought from Aristotle onwards, which has classified qualitatively the unity and complexity of human existence into two capacities, vital and political, negating the relevance of the biological one (Agamben 1998: 15-30). Certainly this reading goes far beyond Spinozas definitions of the relation between the state and citizens, natural and civil rights. Nevertheless, I think, Agambens concepts of bare life and sacred man might offer very thoughtful points of discussion for developing further the theme of life, affects and sovereignty in Spinozas thought. In our conceptual persona of the Citizens of democracy under the state of fear, the relation between the sacred authority of the emperor and the passionate life of his subjects re-defines the domain of tyranny, provoking the enslavement of the despot
117

Agambens definition of bare life has been strongly influenced by Arendts description of the refugee as naked life explained in the Origins of Totalitarianism (1951).

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and the uprising of his subjects. In the state of fear, it is the life of the emperor which is considered sacred, whereas the life of the subjects is deprived of any political significance. In a regime of fear, Spinoza reminds us, the only form of life permitted by the emperor is that of a pure biological life, a bare life in Agambens terminology (TP, Chapters V. 4, VI. 4). Whilst they are reduced to bare life, the emperors subjects do not only resist slavery, they are also capable of political action. It is in this context that the interface between affects, sovereignty and life comes to light, reconfiguring dramatically the state of fear. In Spinozas political analysis, the notions of conatus, desire and passions explained in the Ethics occupy a strategic role. A bare life, in the language of the Ethics, is conatus, which is power (literally striving) of preserving and persevering into life. Thus, life even at the biological level, is intrinsically linked to the idea of producing, better individualising (E. III, prop. VI, VII, VIII). Strictly speaking, conatus is a power of acting and thinking, which pervades beings without coinciding with them. As I have argued in chapter III, it is a process, which gives rise to relational and expansive phases of exchanges and subsequent variation of information, bodies and potentials located within a collective ground. With particular reference to human beings, conatus is a power of desiring structured through invasive and relational movements of affecting and being affected, through which individuals re-signify themselves within the collective and vice versa (E. III, Def. I). This vital force of affecting and being affected incorporates political action too. In other words, spoiled of all its predicates (vital, affective, rational, political and ethical), life is fundamentally abundant (desire) and politically cogent. In the case of our conceptual persona, under the state of fear, the bare life of the emperors subjects gives rise to effective political actions, meanings and time. These are, on the one side, the ground of the enslavement of the tyrant moulded through the loss of the present and the refuge in the past; on the other, the rise of subjects to freedom. In chapter XX of the TTP, Spinoza re-formulates in more political terms the affective anatomy of the power of subjects under a despotic regime, which is

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always stronger than any restrictive laws. Spinoza claims that in the state, where freedom is avoided
Those who are conscious of their own probity do not fear death as criminals do, nor do they beg for mercy, for they are not tormented with remorse for shameful deeds. On the contrary, they think it an honour, not a punishment, to die in a good cause, and glorious thing die for freedom [Italics mine] (TTP, Chapter XX: 570).

In this apologia for freedom, we might discover the political constitution of the power, now dormant now manifest, of every community under a repressive state. It is this indifference to death, I argue, that transforms the emperors subjects into his cruel enemy. The subjects oppose to the despots fear of death the attachment to life (conatus), which is a pure abundance of forces, desires and tension. As anticipated before, in the Ethics, the lack of concern for death makes individuals free, which implies in turn a pleasure for life.118 The indifference to death, which in the Ethics is freedom and plenitude of life, structures concretely the political resistances not of the enlightened men but of a heterogeneous group of individuals spoiled of political status. Strictly speaking, everyone who lives under a regime of despotism rebels against the ruler regardless of the forms of life and rights allowed by the state. Thus, in the TTP Spinoza warns his readers that human beings under coercive laws naturally react against the state, causing rebellions and disorders.119 Whilst laws against freedom originate from fear of death (the sacredness of the tyrants life), a groups revolts derives from desire of life (conatus). The former condition, as we have seen, generates the progressive enslavement of the emperor, to say with Simondon the folding of the individual in himself, whereas the concern of life opens

118

A free man, [], is not guided by fear of death [], but directly desires the good []; that is [], to act, to live, to preserve his own being in accordance with the principle of seeking his own advantage. So he thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a meditation upon life [italics mine] (E. IV, prop. LXVII, proof). 119 Men in general are so constituted that their resentment is most aroused when beliefs when they think to be true are treated as criminal, and when that which motivates their pious conduct to God and man is accounted as wickedness. In consequence, they are emboldened to denounce the laws and go to all lengths to oppose the magistrate, considering it not a disgrace but honourable to stir up sedition and resort to any outrageous action in this cause [italics mine] (TTP, Chapter XX: 569); and (TP IV. 4).

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the way to freedom. No matter how many times a sacred power attempts the depoliticising of life, this always turns to the political again. Spinozas definition of bare life as already and always political has more radical implications. The view of bare life is not only an expression of defence and care of life; but also it is capable of transformations. Spoiled of all its predicates, the life of the Citizens of democracy is conatus (perseverance in life), as a knot of power and potentiality, singularity and generality. It is this perseverance in life that connotes the aspect of the Greek demon, which acts as an inner and invasive force of the body. In the political individual (when some of its parts are damaged), this force passes from a condition of potentiality to actuality. In order to signal the total or partial corruption of the system, the demons internal to the structure of the state operate through the actualisation of concrete actions and thoughts (TP, Chapter X. 1). This is the case of despotic regimes structured through repressive laws. The administration of authority of these political orders, Spinoza explains, inevitably produces the indignation of its subjects, giving rise to rebellions, disorders and the entire dissolution of the state (TTP, Chapter XX: 569-570). However, these themes of the demonic force of the subjects of the emperor leave two fundamental questions unanswered. Firstly, how might the bare life of the Citizens, however powerful and demonic, produce the common? Secondly, how and why is the peoples power always greater than any established authority even under the guidance of the passions? In order to avoid tempting populist answers and alliances with certain Marxist explanations, we might find a response to the origin of the power of the mass in Spinozas definitions of the social contract and natural rights. Spinozas arguments regarding the pact and the power of individuals in nature, I think, are the basis of the natural (ontological and political) condition of superiority of the multitude under every established authority in any given time and space. Further, these explain the reasons of Spinozas thesis of the primacy of democracy over other forms of government such as monarchy and aristocracy.

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In this light, the power of our conceptual persona derives from two crucial elements. Firstly, it is the form of the pact stipulated between individuals, from which civil society emerges. As analysed at the beginning of this chapter, the contract signals a passage and not a rupture from a hypothetical state of nature to a political one. This leads to a conception of society as becoming and not as an artificial institution, which is merely added to the lives of human beings. In accordance with the thesis of the Ethics, it is a process from a lesser phase of perfection to a greater one, which signals the increasing level of complexity within the collective field. This contract, more importantly, occurs between already collective individuals, through whom the stipulation of an agreement acquires political cogency. In this way, the community is prior and founds the state, which is always dependent, in turn, upon the power of individuals as a collective body. Furthermore, Spinoza insistently reminds us that the status of individuals within the state must not to be considered as a state within the state but rather as a mens una (TP, Chapters II.2; III.2-6). Spinozas statement has crucial implications for determining the very role and persistence of the non yetCitizens of democracy. Since the state is not fragmented into different organs, each of which holds a specific function separated from the others, the power of our conceptual persona goes far beyond the role of challenging, opposing and defending the state. Spinozas idea of the body politic as a mens una does not allow a dialectical mechanism or a strict divide between the public affairs of the state and the private interests of the citizens. They are, instead, the constitutive and indestructible forces of more complex process of signification and re-signification of sovereignty itself. In other words, paraphrasing Agambens expression, the Citizens of democracy are not sacred and yet may be sovereign, thus cannot be killed. It is for this reason, I would argue, that they are the demons of the state; plural, powerful and, importantly, inherent within the body politic. In the case of the despotic regime examined before, they become operative when dismissing the ruler and moving further the process of transformation.

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Secondly, as Spinoza claims, individuals do not surrender entirely their natural rights to the point of ceasing to be a human being. As we have seen, this means that the collective being preserves in any individualised social system a potential mass of power (natural rights), which constitutes, using a Simondonian expression, the reserve of being of the individual (Simondon, 2007: 125-132). In a political context, I think, this reserve of being (potentiality) is the ground of the production and fruition of the common, upon which the boundaries of the political are constantly signified and re-signified. It is precisely the power of producing the domain of the common that the natural (ontological) supremacy of the collective body, whether mob or citizens, lies. This power of producing the common secures, generally, the equilibrium of the system from possible tendencies toward stabilization, which would prevent movements of exchanges and alterations of intensity and potentials. In a particular situation, this generative power of production orients and constrains the actions of any form of government, however democratic or despotic, as the events occurring in the Roman Empire have shown (TP, Chapter VI.2). In chapter IV the affective and relational gestures of the Subjects of Moses have brought about the need for re-shaping our understanding of society through a thought of complexity. This vision of society as part of a more problematic process and the disparate status (excess of heterogeneity) of individuals does not suggest the idea of a form of agency behind and beyond the constitution of the political order, which would direct the system toward the better or the truth. Rather, historical events amply testify to the impossibility of conceptualising the development of societies within fixed categories of Truth, Spirit and obscure agency. A theory of complexity, instead, implies the understanding of the human modes of association as intensively problematic, which resolve and further complicate an excess of heterogeneity inherent within the order of the real. As there is no pre-established project beyond the becoming of human societies, this means that its development follows unsuspected movements, which can hardly be predicted. For this, spontaneous movements might lead in some cases to dramatic phases as the state of anguish of the Subjects of Moses or the joyful moments in the

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emergence of the Good News within the conceptual persona of Apostles. In the conceptual persona of the Citizens of democracy, the complexity of the system becomes more problematic and multisided, disclosing more intense levels of heterogeneity. This concerns, on the one hand, the aspect of the Greek demon, which we have analysed before. On the other, the disparate status of our conceptual persona brings to light a destructive tendency, which gives birth to cruel political gestures. It is in this moment that the Citizens of democracy behave as evil within the body of society. The evils of the state: a defence of life As we have seen, Spinoza does not only refer to the productive aspect of the mass (as the figure of the Greek demon), in many circumstances he describes it in quite negative tones.120 On several occasions, Spinoza develops severe attacks upon the masses, accusing them of ignorance, servility and ambition. Spinozas hostile vision of the many opens up to the other aspect embodied by the Citizens of democracy, that of the meaning of demon in a Catholic sense.121 This refers to an inclination to act as an evil force within the state, which brings about the emergence of a blind cruelty. As we have seen above, in repressive states, passions of fear, hate, ambition and indignation shape the political actions and thoughts of the entire body of society, passing from the ruler to the ruled. Although passions of indignation and anger might lead to concrete and constructive actions, such as the collapse of despotic regimes, nevertheless, Spinoza explains, these still remain passions. From the arguments of the Ethics, we know that passions decrease the power of acting and thinking of
120

See for example, Spinozas attack to the multitude, who is easily manipulated by theological superstition, as he says, Following this example of the Pharisees, the vilest hypocrites, urged on by the same fury which they call zeal for Gods law, have everywhere persecuted men whose blameless character and distinguished qualities have exited the hostility of the masses, publicly denouncing their beliefs and inflaming the savage crowds anger against them[italics mine] (TTP, Chapter XVIII, p. 555). 121 For Spinoza the notions of evil and good do not exist in terms of universal categories of thought. Rather, Spinoza claims that the couple evil and good refers to what can increases or decreases the individual conatus, see (E. IV, Def. I-II; TTP, Chapters XVI-XIX). My use of the image of the evil is addressed to simply conceptualise a disruptive force, which operates within the body of Citizens of democracy.

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individuals, which implies the reduction or stabilisation of the level of complexity, thus, heterogeneity. To put this in more Simondonian terms, passions are negative for the individuals insofar as these detach the singular being from exchanging and altering grades of intensity, information and various individuated realities with the collective field. Strictly speaking, in a passive state an individual loses the possibility of being a constitutive part of the process of individuation. In the thread of the conceptual persona of the Citizens of democracy, Spinozas account of passions has important political implications. These concern the role of evil played by the mass within a civil context, in which the objects of the social pact are partially or totally corrupted. As mentioned before, this aspect is significantly highlighted in the Theological Political Treatise. Commenting on the events of the English revolution of Cromwell, Spinoza observes that people were only able to change the monarch without extinguishing the causes of tyranny effectively (TTP, Chapter XVIII: 556). This has led, Spinoza claims, to the re-creation of the monarchic system under a different ruler, who behaves politically as the former king in all but in name.122 It is through the example offered by the English events that the passive tones of our conceptual persona re-define the political scene entirely. As discussed before, in a despotic regime fear shapes the political action of the emperor, whereas indignation structures the reaction of its subjects. The consequences of the emperors fear were the progressive enslavement and the death of his empire. The limit of the subjects indignation concerns the incapacity of structuring actions, which go far beyond the defence of actual life. Although the subjects of a tyrant are a powerful and free community, Spinoza observes, their political gestures are unable to defeat tyranny. This inadequacy is caused mainly by the origin of the emotions of indignation and anger, which Spinoza explains in the Ethics, are generated from hate and not joy. This causes the effacement of movements of exchanges and alterations of intensity, meanings and potentialities, thus the possibility of transforming and being transformed (affect and being affected by the others in the language of the Ethics).
122

Spinoza specifically refers to the execution of Charles I (1649), the establishment of Cromwells protectorate (1653-58), and the Restoration of monarchy (1660).

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This absence of expansive movements in the political body implies immediately a different constitution of time, which becomes folded only within the form of the present. The present is no longer the actualisation of the infinite possibilities of the future or the meanings of the past; rather, it is a static place characterised by retreats and restorations. Spoiled of the multiple and heterogeneous potentialities of the future, the care of life nuanced by indignation and hate cannot produce political gestures other than destructions and sudden returns. For this, the Citizens of democracy can kill and overthrow monarchs as many times as they please without abolishing monarchy. As the English revolution has shown, after having executed the king and caused cruel massacres, people searched for the return to monarchy. It follows that the care and defence of life, however free from the fear of death, do not directly mean joy and love of life, which instead are the ground of productive movements of complication, differentiation and actualisation. By contrast, in its aspect of evil our persona lacks a future, which involves a loss of power to actualise the possibilities of the future within the present. Concerned more with the defence of actual life rather than an enjoyment of it, the Citizens of democracy understand all the new and unpredictable events as possible risk (a new king) to their life, which consequently have to be destroyed as soon as these enter the threshold of the community (TP, Chapter V.6). For this lack of future and joy of life, they will kill Christ. Masses under the guide of hate, Spinoza warns us, do not hesitate to prosecute Christ, philosophers and intellectuals (TTP, Chapter XVIII: 555). A consequence of this evil tendency is that the body of our conceptual persona tends toward a stabilisation of the political order, which implies the progressive decrease of the power to re-signify the domain of the common. In this light, every emerging political reality will be necessarily re-defined and bounded within the pre-existing order. For this, Cromwells protectorate and Augusts empire are simply a motionless repetition of the former ruler. This, notably, does not mean that the collective body under the control of hate ceases to be the ground and the generative source of the common. As we have analysed, it is the very ontological (natural) constitution of

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the collective beings that produces the common and makes them impossible to kill. The evil character, rather, involves a mere reproduction of the present order and the oblivion of the future. In this way, Spinozas inquiry into the cruelty of the mass unveils his concern for the loss of political life under the domain of hate, and thereby the necessity of giving a sacred status to people through civil rights and laws. As discussed before, whilst the lives of individuals might be reduced by a politics of hate, this is always political. Spinozas analysis brings to light a more complex process, that is at risk under the states of fear and hate. This process pertains to the development and fruition of the common, through which and solely through which relations, meanings and further transformations are founded. Concerning these arguments a fundamental question arises. Assuming Spinozas refusal of any form of agency, higher mind and a society of philosophers, how might this complex and disparate collective being constitute a democratic state? To answer this question, we must examine the constructive elements in Spinozas discourse, which encourages the development of a community and prevent its possible dissolution. Spinoza observes that the political life of every community nuanced by the affects of joy, love, piety and hope has been directed towards stability, peace and unity of the entire society. In the TTP, Spinoza reflects upon the amor patriae (love of ones nation) of the Israelites under Moses governance, and the apostolic doctrine of love and piety. Although the Hebrews love for their nation in the end caused the exclusion and successive failure of the Jewish nation, Spinoza notes how this amor patriae in itself favoured a politics of fidelity and solidarity, which certainly reinforced the entire political order (TTP, Chapter XVII: 547). This was based, Spinoza explains, on the use of a popular army, a certain respect for the principle of unanimity in issuing laws, decision making, and common ethical habits and opinions. Concerning the religion of the New Testament, Spinoza finds many fruitful insights in the precepts of the apostles and teachings of Christ, which might consolidate an ethics of mutual assistance and cohesion. Specifically, Spinozas interest is directed to the apostolic principle of love ones neighbour, which

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reinstates the importance of relations, sharing and tolerance, favouring the development of democratic values. The Jewish form of patriotism and the apostolic ethics shaped by love and devotion provide Spinoza with important instruments for conceptualising in more political terms his theory of consensus and thereby democracy. Spinozas inquiry into the dynamics of the democratic community is addressed to unveiling some of the mechanisms in which joy and love structure powerful political behaviours and transformations. Agor: A common desire Beside the question of the apostolic doctrine and the patriotism of the Jewish people, the importance of Spinozas references to amor patriae and universal love concern his recognition of love, devotion and wonder as important counter arguments to the state of fear (despotism). Affectivity, once again, populates Spinozas political discourse as a basis and not an instrument for the establishment and progress a community. In his search for more adequate conditions for the development of society, the role of affectivity becomes increasingly central and multisided. It is through the affects of love, devotion and piety that democratic values are mostly founded and developed. These affects are recognised as proper political categories, which open the way to a new path of making and thinking the polis. Spinoza develops the idea of a possible linkage between democracy and affectivity, specifically between love (piety) and democracy, through which notions of life, qualitative flowings of time and relations re-colonize the domain of the political. The novelty of Spinozas political move, I think, concerns the way his arguments are not limited to the unveiling the mechanisms, in which the sovereignty invades every moment of the lives of a community, but to how life as an expression of joy and love determines the production of the political.123 In other words, Spinozas democratic formula offers important insights on how life can re-exercise control over the sovereign power.
123

The political relevance of Spinozas notions affects and life has been particularly emphasised by Negri and Hardt, influencing also the development of Negri and Hardts own theory of bio-politics (Negri and Hardt, 2006: 93-95; Negri, 2005: 170-229).

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Although a detailed description of the democratic institution is missing from the TP, nevertheless, its absence does not constitute an insurmountable obstacle. Since the focus of this work is mainly on how the affective life in common of the multitude tends naturally towards democracy, both the Treatises amply address these themes. Drawing particularly upon the final chapters of the Theological Political Treatise with the theoretical support of the Political Treatise and the Ethics, we might determine the modes in which the multitude behaves democratically, specifically, how affects are powerful sources of democratic actions, thoughts and tensions. Having explained the collective foundation of the social pact and the negative consequences of an exercise of a politics of fear, Spinoza makes a fundamental claim at the very beginning of the Political Treatise, which enriches the thesis espoused in the TTP, Spinoza affirms that a common desire gives birth to civil society.124 This reveals Spinozas awareness of the emergence of society as the abundant and collective production of desires, and certainly not poverty or need, through which human beings re-orient themselves into the world and vice versa. The significance of Spinozas position is that he identifies an excess of being, desires and tensions at the very basis of the origins of society, which opens up to the reading of human forms of association through complexity shaped by problems, potentials and transformations (TP, Chapter III. 6-9). It is at this moment that Spinozas quest for democracy commences. Spinoza describes democracy as a united body of men (coetus universus hominum) which corporately (collegialiter) possess sovereign power over everything within its power (TTP, Chapter XVI: 530). For Spinoza, the superiority of this political model is that the authority of the state (Potestas) relies directly on the power of its members, who through the original pact, have founded the civil body. It is for this reason, Spinoza argues, that democracy is the closer form of political

124

Since men, [], are led more by passions than by reason, it naturally follows that a people will unite consent to be guided as if one mind not at reasons prompting but through some common emotions, such as [] a common hope, or fear, or desire to avenge some common injury (TP, Chapter VI. 1)

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organisation and coherent transformation of the state of nature, in which the right of everyone is coextensive with its own power (TTP, Chapter XVI: 531). These primary definitions form the basis of Spinozas advocacy of democracy, that is the defence and expansion of consensus and freedom within the commonwealth. In the TTP, Spinoza clarifies his treatment of democracy before the other forms of state, because the notion of freedom is immediately implied in the democratic system (TTP, Chapter XVI: 531). A democratic life inaugurates a practise of freedom, which is never simply individual liberty circumscribed within the private sphere of the citizen. From the arguments of the TP, we know that freedom is concerned with a collective (collegialiter) production of consensus and unanimity (a mens una), which is fundamentally political and inherent within the domain of sovereignty. Related particularly to the TTP, the vision of democracy as a collective and spontaneous (unrestricted) production of consensus moves Spinoza to advocate freedom as the very object and end of the state, without which the entire body of a society loses its power and potential (TTP, Chapter XX: 567). Spinoza claims that the organisation of the political body should be based on the inalienable freedom of speech and thought, upon which the progress of the whole society resides (TTP, Chapter XX: 568). The importance of Spinozas arguments of the inalienability of the freedom of judgement resides on how this has a direct impact on the political life of a community, re-characterising and further transforming practises and ideas collectively. Moreover, Spinozas advocacy of freedom is immediately nuanced by affectivity, specifically love and piety, which consequently become the sources and, at the same time, the outcome of a politics of freedom. Spinozas thesis of the linkage between democracy, freedom and affects become a crucial element within the thread of our conceptual persona of the Citizens of democracy, which we have examined under the state of fear. The affects of love and piety deriving from the democratic state give rise to more problematic relational movements, which connote the political actions of the collective body of the Citizens. In the state of democracy, they behave politically as virtuosi and demons of the state. More accurately, in democracy demons are the virtuosi of the state and vice

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versa. It is in this moment that the affective production of the common good emerges.125 In the states of fear and violence, we have seen that our persona incorporates the two meanings of the image of demon (the Ancient Greek and Catholic one), which characterise its political actions now as productive force (the enslavement of the emperor) now disruptive one (the execution of Christ). In the state of democracy, the citizens still express the Ancient Greek conception of demon as inspiring force, which plays a pivotal role within the dynamics of the community. Unlike the state of fear, in this democratic stage the Catholic figure of evil is replaced by the constructive function of the virtuosi of the polis. As mentioned before, freedom is the ground of the development of democratic body. In the Ethics, we have seen, the notion of freedom has a direct relation with the concept of life, which is connected with the theme of desire as the very essence of humankind in turn (E. IV, prop. LXVII, prop. LXIII and schol.). For Spinoza, a free life is nuanced by the affects of joy and love, which individualise and further complicate the disparate status of beings (excess of desires and tensions) toward more heterogeneous realities (E. III, prop. XI, schol.; E. IV, prop. LX, prop. XLI). In chapter III, we have seen that these affects do not express a private virtue or ethical attitude. Rather, love and joy are expansive and invasive phases of a more general process of individuation, which resolve problematics of heterogeneity into more complex individuals. Importantly, these do not coincide with already individuated individuals, instead these create individuals coinciding one with the other. Thus, joy and love increase the relational composition of individuals (the level of complexity), giving rise to thoughts, bodies, power and potentials. Given these conceptions of love and joy as relational and powerful forces of transformation and individuation, and also conditions of freedom, then Spinozas theory of a free democratic community necessarily exceeds practises of sharing, mutual assistance and political principle of unanimity. In the conceptual persona of
125

Concerning the ways in which the multitude, in its aspects of demons and virtuosi, act within democracy, I follow Hardt and Negris analysis (2006).

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the Apostles in chapter IV, we have seen that the actualisation of love through the body of Christ has produced not only a different religious and cultural move, but also complex political transformations. In Spinozas political inquiry, affects acquire a more radical and powerful position. To assume the necessity of founding a democratic body on love, joy and thus freedom, suggests the idea of democracy as openness, whose structure allows for transformations, heterogeneity and exchange of forces. In this way, the time of democracy is structured through unsuspected and unexpected phenomena, which activate the multiple potentialities of the future. In aristocracy, for example, this proceeds through the interstices of the patrician assemblies and the rumours of the plebs, and suddenly accelerates each time a state of fear collapses (TP, IX. 14- VII. 27). Given that for Spinoza there is no theory without praxis, thus democracy is not solely a political project or possibility and it can be never fully realised. This would inevitably imply a return to a form of messianism, a time of expectation. In contrast, the openness of democracy means an actual individual, whose reality is shaped by a metastable equilibrium. This metastable equilibrium maintains democracy in a condition of actuality and potentiality. In this way, a democratic system is a concrete political organisation, which is actualised in many different forms; and also it contains unexpressed meanings, individuals and actions, which will be transformed into more complex political subjectivities. For Spinoza, paraphrasing Negri, democracy is the one already achieved and yet to come. However, the open structure of the democratic state does not imply that it is qualitatively more perfect, or the embodiment of truth. Rather, it denotes the level of complexity of a society, its grade of disparation, the pathways of being towards different thoughts, communities and actions. Thus, the democratic community is densely populated by emerging problems, realities, conflicts and pacts. It is in this moment that the Citizens behave as demons within the domain of the political. In a free democratic system, Spinoza warns us, many are the possible problems as internal enemies and various conflicts. Spinoza, here, refers to possible phenomena

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of subversion (TTP, Chapter XX: 567-568) and, more generally, disagreements amongst citizens. As in the state of fear, the demons imbued within the body politic pass from a condition of latency to an actual one. The actions of the demons, we have seen, do not tend to remove or exclude the emerging political being, but instead, transform this into a more complex reality. Importantly, the emerging problematic reality will be not integrated and attuned with the existing community. This would direct the process toward movements of retreat and restoration as occurred in the English revolution or the crucifixion of Christ. As argued before, in the state of joy and love (democracy), instead, the collective body is affected by and affects the emerging reality, enriching the present with the possibility of the future. In this light, certainly, the Citizens of democracy place the existing political order under constant threat. It is in this constant risk that the superiority (its openness) of democracy lies.126 For this, Spinoza concludes, what cannot be prohibited must necessarily be allowed, even if harm often ensues [italics mine] (TTP, Chapter XX: 569). In other words, Spinoza tells us that a life in common is always placed on the edge of incompatibilities and further movements of signification, which is always better to release rather than restrain. Thus, as with the state of fear, the life in common of the Citizens of democracy expresses a pure excess of desire, through which they move towards tyranny. It is this form of the life in common of the individuals originated by a common desire, which cannot be killed. Collective individuals, in every community (historical, political, ethical) they live, express a constant condition of incompatibility. As I have argued in chapter IV, it is in the very anatomy and power of individuals to encounter this incompatibility. Therefore, a political institution founded on this ontological structure necessarily has to give rise to the complete actualisation of these problems and incompatibilities, and also to be the place itself of these tensions. Spinozas complex description of a democratic life populated intensively by relations, tensions and various forms of heterogeneity, evokes the Ancient Greek
126

I do indeed admit that there may sometimes be some disadvantages in allowing such freedom, but what institution was ever so wisely planned that no disadvantages could arise therefrom? (TTP, Chapter XX: 569).

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notion of agora (literally place of assembly). The Ancient Greek agora was a place of assembly not recognised by the sovereign state as politically relevant, in which nevertheless political ideas, discussion, struggles and sedition were organised. The agora delineated an alternative political life out of the boundaries of the state, impacting upon the stability of the body politic. In Spinozas own re-formulation, the agora acquires a more radical political meaning. It becomes the fundamental place of the actualisation of the common desire and the production of the common good. In the TTP, the structure of the agora is not conceived as a state within the state, but instead becomes the condition for the production of the political itself. It is precisely in this context that our conceptual persona embodies the role of the virtuosi of the state. In the Spinozian agora everyone, who intervenes within the administration of democracy, is a virtuosi rather than an enemy of the state. A good citizen is, for example, a man that views,
[] a certain law is against sound reason, and he therefore advocates its repeal. If he at the same time submits his opinion to the judgement of the sovereign power [], and meanwhile does nothing contrary to what is commanded by that law, he deserves well of the state, acting as good citizen should do. (TTP, Chapter XX: 568).

This active role given to the virtuosi of the state moulded through love and piety reinforces and further expands the image of the demons, which expose the political domain towards novel realities, tensions and metastability. As we have analysed in the state of fear, the power of the demons is fundamentally founded on the capacity to produce the common, through which Greek gods, divine fathers and epic gestures have been developed. It is in this context that the originality of Spinozas notion of democracy lies. Spinozas definition of the political status of virtuosi as fundamentally productive and invasive leads to relate directly the meaning of democracy with the fruition of the common good, which is grounded in the collective body of the Citizens of democracy. To situate the production of the common good at the very heart of democratic praxis is to set aside the construction of the democratic body from the logic of the state apparatus. The identification of democracy with the production of the common good suggests the vision of

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democracy as an actual and complex process, which is structured through the intensive and expansive forces of the affects of joy, love and piety. From the Ethics, we know that these are transversal to the collective body, which expose and complicate the realm of the individuals. This implies the understanding of democracy as a political individual in the middle between generality and singularity, individuation and potentiality. This view of democracy as essentially an amphibious individual brings about the discovery of a different paradigm of the democratic body, which is constituted by and through a theory of complexity. As anticipated, a thought of complexity in political theory is based on a process of collective ad affective individuation moulded through intensive and expansive phases of actualisation, differentiation and alterations of power and potentials. The understanding of democracy through a theory of complexity might provide us with an approach, which exceed dialectical process, logic of poverty or lack, transcendent and religious agency.

Conclusions: Towards a new grammar of democracy

This chapter has investigated the relation between democracy and affectivity within Spinozas political writings, and considered the extent to which his democratic theory might offer relevant insights for contemporary thought and practice. Attention has been given to the affects and passions of joy, love, fear, hate and indignation within the political section of the TTP and the unfinished TP, and some of the mechanisms by which these produce important political individuals, meanings and transformations. In both treatises, Spinoza gives full attention to the political status of affectivity within the constitution and development of the democratic community, locating affects directly within the realm of the multitude. This has brought our inquiry to investigate the anatomy of the power of the multitude, asking whether or not the multitude can be an expression of democratic practises and tendencies. The protagonist of this chapter was the conceptual persona of the Citizens of democracy. This has shown us an alternative mode of thinking life under democracy,

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within which affectivity and the multitude occupy central positions. More precisely, the Citizens of democracy have brought to light the fundamental problem and thesis of Spinozas philosophical production, that is, how a life in common might be constructed. In this light, the manifold status of the Citizens of democracy exemplified by the aspects of demons, evils and virtuosi has indicated how affects of joy, love, hate and indignation have a concrete impact upon the political body, reconfiguring notions of temporarility, sovereignty and relations. It is precisely in this context, I would argue, that the originality of Spinozas philosophical gesture lies. Spinoza forwards the idea of the bare life of individuals structured through a confluence of desires, affects and passions, which are powerful source of political meanings and actions and make them always stronger than any formed sovereign state. As a full expression of collective and joyful life, democracy is an open plane moulded through continuous transformations, movements of actualisation and complication, through which the flows of time take only the coordinates of the present. This means that Spinozas vision of democracy is not merely a project or a possibility, instead, is a concrete political individual, which is actualised in many ways as infinite is the multiplicity of nature. This definition of democracy as pure openness has a further political implication. This refers to the relation between the democratic body and the state apparatus. The novelty of Spinozas thesis concerns the identifying of the realisation of the democratic order with the fruition of the common good, without passing through the constitution of any form of sovereign authority; democracy resides thereby directly in the collective body of the multitude. In order to search for an adequate paradigm of democracy today, I argue, Spinozas account of the democratic system as open structure, which is at the same time, individual and process of transformation, might disclose alternative trajectories towards a different political vocabulary for democracy. This should include a more expansive view of the relation between affectivity and democracy, through which the power of the multitude might conceptualised.

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Conclusion: The individual as a powerful problem

The thesis has investigated the convergence between ontology and politics in Baruch Spinoza, and considered the extent to which his philosophy might disclose unexplored possibilities for re-theorising the social in a materialist way. The inquiry upon Spinozas thought is situated within the general tendency inaugurated by Continental thought, which has seen the rehabilitation of the materialist ontology within political theory. My contribution in the existing debate has been the repositioning of the importance of a materialist ontology of individuation in order to re-define the realm of the individual of the present. The return to a thought of individuation, claimed in the thesis, has been motivated by post-modern portrait of the social body, as a complex and heterogeneous system, for which a fresh notion of the individual is required. A materialist ontology of individuation does not offer a formula, principle and archetype of the individual being, but rather explains the mechanism through which individuals come to light. More importantly, for a materialist theory of individuation this mechanism is common to all beings and inherent within nature. In order to re-assess the importance of a thought of individuation today, the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza has been decisive. The study of Spinozas philosophy of individuation has been constructed around a specific object. Following a suggestion of Balibar about a certain affinity between Spinoza and Simondons philosophical views, I have re-interpreted the arguments of the Ethics and the political Treatises through Simondons ontology of individuation. My aim has not been directed to the establishment of similarities and influences between the two thinkers. Rather, the recourse to Simondons reflections has re-situated Spinozas thought upon an alternative theoretical ground. This refers to a materialist model of

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individuation, which analyses the genesis and development of ontological, ethical and political beings. Spinozas theory of individuation is based on an intricate paradigm of materialism. This interpretation of Spinozas materialist discourse has been conducted in chapters I and II. In chapter I, the central theme has been the analysis of Spinozas claim of the absolute and positive infinity of reality, upon which his rejections of transcendence and the pluralism of essences such as matter and thought are grounded. By absolute, Spinoza means the absence of the negative from the genesis and becoming of reality. The absolute and positive infinity is the inclusion of God, its predicates and contingent beings within one and self-caused plane, within which none of these elements is assumed as prior and contradictory to the others. The category of the absolute replaces the metaphysical figures of the creator, the I, and the prime motor, with the notion of the plane, which is located within the domain of nature. In order to determine the strategic position of the notion of the absolute within the Ethics, I have examined the many ways in which this has been translated into a form of pantheism, radical rationalism and acosmism in the history of philosophy. The analysis of Goethe, Jacobi, Schelling and Hegels engagements with Spinoza has been decisive for unveiling the complexity of Spinozas materialist ontology. This has brought to light a common difficulty characterising these readers of the Ethics, which refers to the impossibility of conceptualising Spinozas notion of the absolute through the categories of thought elaborated by the Enlightenment, Romanticism and German Idealism. Spinozas notion of the absolute greatly exceeds Goethes definition of the material world as a divine subject and also Jacobis faith in the ineluctability of reason. For Schelling and Hegel, Spinozas ontology of the absolute becomes a challenge, which they fiercely reject. This confronts them with the vision of the world not as the object of the I and the counterpart of the ideal but rather as the place of transformations, which is always thought at the present. The discussion of Schelling

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and Hegels respective impasse in following the arguments of the Ethics has disclosed that Spinozas gesture of excluding the negative from the absolute plane of reality does not mean the effacement of all the distinction in nature and thought within an obscure absolute identity as Schelling supposed. Similarly, Spinozas account of the absolute as positive infinity does not involve the negation of the cogency of the world under the supremacy of an all-inclusive Being as Hegel argued. By contrast, Spinozas ontology of the absolute introduces a different meaning of the actual, which invalidates the authority of the ideal. This refers to Spinozas move of constructing the absolute from the multiplicity and contingency of singularities and modes of Being, through which the actual is recovered from a place of mechanical rules to an extremely abundant, multiple and powerful plane. It is precisely the concept of the absolute, I have claimed, that poses the actuality of the world as the only condition of possibility of reality. The reinstatement of the actual implies crucially the withdrawal of thought from the domain of the ideal to the concrete realm of nature. Having delineated Spinozas foundation of reality, chapter II has been engaged with the analysis of the conditions, upon which Spinozas materialist system of production is developed. The study has been preceded by an overview of twentieth-century new approach to Spinozas thought, paying particular attention to Deleuzes elaboration, which has been followed by the re-assessment of the importance of the geometrical method of the Ethics for the establishment of ontological claims. The central question of the chapter has been the role of singularities (attributes and modes) within Spinozas plane of absolute immanence. The problem concerned the ways in which attributes and modes, actualising and differentiating nature, activate a system of production. In order to address these questions, I have proposed a reading of Spinozas definitions of nature, attributes and modes as elements of a complex process, through which the notions of immanence, contingency, power and heterogeneity acquire a pivotal position. This has shed light upon the structure of nature as a dynamic organisation, within which singular beings maintain the system constantly in tension.

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The strategy of the process has brought about the discovery of a complex conception of multiplicity, which governs Spinozas system of production of reality. In the Ethics, multiplicity does not only express the contingency and heterogeneity of beings, but more importantly the multiple phases of the process of production. These set forth a non-linear process, which proceeds through expansive and affirmative movements of actualisation and differentiation. In this way, Spinoza replaces the dialectical production of reality structured through moments of conflict and reconciliation with the understanding of the material world as a multi-phasic process of production. It means that his treatment of nature as a plane of immanence, I have argued, does not only involve the rejection of transcendence, but also the recognition of the world as an extremely powerful body, which is traversed by unsuspected and unexpected forces, tensions and transformations. This model indicates an alternative mode of thinking the development of historical, natural and social systems and the mechanism in which these are connected one to the others. Taking into account Spinozas vision of nature as a multi-phasic process of production, in chapter III, I have examined Spinozas materialist vision of the individual. Spinozas conception of the individual derives from his denial of a unitary definition of individuality such as matter and body. This becomes more evident in his analysis of the human being. Spinoza does not deduce the peculiarity of humankind from a priori principle or archetype such as the mind, the self and the soul. Furthermore, there is not in the Ethics a moral evaluation of human nature as egotistic and self-interested. By contrast, there is an accurate study into the vital and psychic mechanisms, through which individuals are formed. This indicates the centrality given by Spinoza to the relation between individuals and their milieu. As mentioned above, given Spinozas attention to the genesis and development of beings and his dismissal of the formula of individuality, I have suggested a detour of Spinoza via Simondons paradigm of individuation, focusing on the Simondonian categories of pre-individuality, collective field, disparation, metastability and transindividuality. These notions delineate the value of the collective as an irreducible condition of individuation, the definition of the individual as an excess of

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heterogeneity, and the crucial role of emotions within the formation of psychic beings. The usage of these categories has brought to light many ignored and obscure themes within the Ethics. These refer to the collective character of thought, the openness of the body, the power of affects, the vision of nature as an individual and place of individuation. By reading Spinozas theses of the individual and affectivity via Simondon, the arguments, I have put forward, concern the way in which Spinozas ontology unveils a manifold process of vital and psychic individuation. This is constructed around the notions of relationality and affectivity. More rigorously, for Spinoza, vital and psychic individuals are created through relational confluences and exchanges of power, which are located in the collective domain of nature. Related particularly to the psychic process of individuation, this resides in the realm of the affects, which individuate and further differentiate beings into more complex forms of collective life. The status of the individual emerging from this process of individuation is very complex. This is not the principle of individuation either a unitary system and yet it is extremely powerful. For Spinoza, the individual expresses an unstable mixture of various grades of reality, where perfection consists in its capacity of affecting and being affected by other individuals. Considered in itself, the singular being is not lacking, instead, abundant of individuated and non individuated parts, which are actualised and further differentiated within the collective. The role of the individual within the process of individuation resides in constituting the problem and solution within the system. As a problem, the individual introduces into the collective heterogeneous meanings and potentials. As a solution, the singular exchanges subsequently transforms a mass of power with the collective, moving further the process of individuation. In this light, the power of the individual, I have suggested, concerns its being one and more than one, in the middle between collective and particular realities. In other words, it is the unavoidable and powerful problem in every context (political, psychic and natural) in which the individual lives. The understanding of this is imperative for determining the political stakes of Spinozas thought.

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In chapters IV and V, I have discussed the political implications of Spinozas ontology of individuation for the constitution of the multitude as a political category. In these chapters, I have adopted an alternative strategy of reading the political Treatises. Following Deleuze and Guattaris conception of conceptual personae, I have constructed conceptual-affective personae around facts and historical figures discussed in Spinozas political writings. These pose or resolve a question within Spinozas political reflections. In chapter IV, the passionate-conceptual personae of the Devotees of the prophet, Subjects of Moses and the Apostles have been crucial in addressing the problem of the ambiguous position of passions within the Theological Political Treatise. These are, on the one side, the origin of human servitude and, on the other, productive of social relations, common values and practises of sharing and participation. In both cases, passions impact effectively upon the dynamics of a community, generating new meanings, relational events, collective life and flowings of time. These factors re-shape consistently the existing political theatre. The exposition of these themes via conceptual personae has revealed a more extensive role attributed by Spinoza to passions within the political context. In each conceptual personae examined, passions of fear, hope, devotion and wonder indicate the emergence of a problem, which affects not the individual community but rather the entire political body. This refers to the stabilisation of the political equilibrium in formal norms and rituals, which are indicated by the presence of passions such as anger and anguish. It means that the domain of the political is not the place of exchanges and transformations of thoughts, actions and potentials, which inevitably modifies the development of the process of individuation. The conceptual personae of the Treatise do not signal a rupture within the production of the political but the presence of incompatibilities in the existing system. In this light, we have seen, for example, the Apostles and the Subjects of Moses are not the political and ethical revolutionary subject either are the oppressed class. Rather, they are fundamentally incompatible with the homogeneity of the state of God, the

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pharaoh and the Roman Empire, for which they constitute a powerful problem. The great modernity of Spinozas political thesis resides in his idea of community, structured and individuated through levels of heterogeneity, incompatibilities and problems, which do not proceed through logics of social contract, rational choice and transcendent agency. Affectivity, even its passive aspect, is the ground of this process, which introduces and further problematises the political domain with more complex flowings of time, collective life and tensions. Having examined the affective tones of the political within the Theological Political Treatise, in chapter V, I have discussed the interface between affectivity and democracy, which Spinoza describes as the greatest expression of political society. Specifically, I have drawn attention to the affective politics of the multitude, and considered its role within the development of democracy. The protagonist of chapter V is the Citizens of democracy. This affective-conceptual persona articulates the central thesis and great preoccupation that accompanies Spinozas quest from the Ethics, through the Theological Political Treatise, to the Political Treatise. This is the conceptualisation of the paradigm of the life in common embodied by the multitude. Spinoza envisages in the life in common of the multitude an alternative form of democratic praxis, which lies, obstinately, in the interstices between the authority of the tyrant and the power of its subjects, revolutionary and reactionary movements of the mass. The analysis of the affective status of the multitude through the conceptual persona of the Citizens of democracy has shown that the power of the multitude emerges from its life. Spoiled of its predicates (ethical habits and political rights), the life of the multitude is a mixture of affects and passions such as joy, love and hate, which, we have seen in chapter IV, are continually productive of complex political meanings, individuals and actions. These form the domain of the common, which is produced and further developed by the affective politics of the multitude. It is for this reason, I have argued, that in Spinozas political writings the multitude tenaciously persists in every historical juncture and is greater than any form of sovereignty such

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as monarchy, oligarchy and tyranny. It means that the multitude is not only a political subject such as the people, class and subjects, but more significantly it is the theatre of the realisation of common. In this manner, the multitude cannot be thought as a social category in opposition to others, but rather as a problematic and incompatible individual. In a Spinozist way democracy is an open individual, which embodies and further develops the collective and affective life of the multitude. This marks the difference between Spinoza and his contemporaries, indicating his modernity. Spinoza does not associate democracy with the concept of sovereignty, but instead, with the fruition of the common good, which in turn resides in the realm of the multitude. More significantly, democracy is not a final goal, to which human society should tend, but rather a concrete political reality. This lies inside and between the state apparatus, which is actualised in infinite ways as many are the lives of the multitude. The discovery of these democratic practises is the challenge that Spinozas thought launches to post-modernity. It is for this reason that the position undertaken in the thesis has not meant to re-draw a manifesto for the multitude of the present or establish new principles for democracy. By contrast, it aims at the understanding of these ignored concrete forms of political life, and from their analysis learn a novel democratic grammar. Spinozas ontological politics of individuation provides contemporary thought with alternative theoretical instruments for re-conceptualising the connections between affectivity and politics, life and sovereignty and the a-temporarality of the multitude.

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