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A transit alternative increasingly counterposed to light rail transit (LRT) as an option for new and better transit service is so-called "Bus Rapid Transit" (BRT). While improvements in basic bus transit services, by whatever name, are direly needed in North American cities, what is actually meant by "BRT"? The concept seems to be applied, by some of its most ardent proponents, to a wide swath of concepts in effect, virtually any type of long-haul bus transit above regular local service in mixed street traffic or slow circulator/connector services. Examples offered by "BRT" promoters include: Limited-stop service in mixed traffic (Honolulu), in some cases with traffic signal prioritization, and perhaps passenger stops upgraded with shelters, amenities, good signage, and even realtime information systems (e.g., Los Angeles's MetroRapid services).
[Photo of LA's MetroRapid "BRT" from Transit Rider website]
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Limited-stop circulator service in reserved lane (Orlando). Express bus service connecting suburbs with a central city (Orlando). Express buses operating on HOV lanes (Houston, Dallas, San Diego). Buses operating in dedicated busway, reserved lanes, and mixed traffic (Ottawa, Pittsburgh, Miami, Curitiba, Bogota).
Buses in busways or reserved lanes with some form of guidance (Adelaide, Essen, Leeds, Nancy, Caen).
Obviously, "BRT" is being applied to a very broad spectrum of quite diverse kinds of services (and, because of this fuzziness of the concept, we prefer to place the term in quotation marks). Moreover, there seem to be inconsistencies and contradictions among the conflicting definitions of what constitutes "BRT". For example, while some "BRT" proponents assert that such services must be characterized by new, innovative, comfortable rolling stock, new, upgraded passenger stops with shelters and amenities, and similar features, clearly this is not uniformly the situation in actual practice.
[Photo of Miami-South Dade Busway by Jon Bell]
A number of services identified as "BRT" use older, relatively spartan shelter facilities, with none of the modern amenities and "bells and whistles" publicized for "BRT". Some supposedly "BRT" operations even use nothing more than simple bus stop markers in
lieu of stations. Furthermore, ordinary older buses, many of them well worn in service, are commonly found in operation on several busways and in other "BRT" applications.
And this early "BRT" proposal was not ignored indeed, by the characteristics defining "BRT", virtually every major city in the country has long been operating some form of this service mode, from limited-stop and express bus services in mixed traffic, to HOV lanes, reserved street lanes, full busways, and traffic signal prioritization ... and this has been happening for the past several decades. initially, "BRT" (in concept if not in name) was implemented as a substitute for various levels of electric surface railway service streetcar and interurban electric railway services, in particular. (in St. Louis, some former streetcar lines were converted to "BRT" busways, such as the Hodiamont line in the photo, above right, seen in 1966.)
[Photo: National Museum of Transportation, St. Louis]
While "BRT" has clearly been implemented in cities throughout North America for many decades, what has been the result for public transit? Empirical evidence suggests that "BRT" has never fully met the original claims of its proponents as a superior "rapid transit" mode to, and a replacement for, rail transit service. Far from even a modest increase in ridership and public acceptance, public transit experienced a relentless decline, both in public use and community image. The real surge in national transit ridership has occurred only after the major investments in rail transit, especially LRT, mainly since the early 1980s. This in itself would tend to suggest that "BRT", in its variety of manifestations,
has been something less than a phenomenal success as a supposedly "cheaper" substitute for rail transit in bolstering the fortunes of North American public transport.
Dr. Vukan R. Vuchic, for example, an internationally acclaimed transportation professor at the University of Pennsylvania, in his classic textbook Urban Public Transportation (1981), applies rapid transit to modes which operate in "a fully controlled R/W [right-ofway] without grade crossings.... in exceptional cases the R/W may have widely spaced grade crossings with signal override and gate protection of the track ... since such crossings have little effect on line performance." Dr. Vuchic further emphasizes that "Strictly, bus rapid transit neither exists nor is it a viable concept..." (because of capacity and operational issues). (pp. 66, 62) The CFTE website also notes that Professor Vuchic "challenges the word 'Rapid' in the name Bus Rapid Transit, instead offering the term 'Bus Semi-Rapid Transit' and arguing that 'Rapid' should only be used when referring to exclusive-right-of-way rail transit."
Similarly, the institute of Transportation Engineers, in Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook (1976), differentiates "rapid transit lines" as "grade-separated" (p. 227). The ITE goes on to note that
In corridors where no grade-separated rapid transit exists, surface transit may perform limited and express functions as well, although often with reduced speed in congested mixed traffic during peak periods. [p. 227]
used. However, "BRT" is commonly presented as a kind of interchangeable (but supposedly lower-cost) substitute for electric LRT. For example, the US Federal Transit Administration's "BRT" website proclaims "Think Rail, Use Buses That's the quickest way to describe Bus Rapid Transit. BRT combines the quality of rail transit and the flexibility of buses." This appears to be a highly misleading conception, ignoring the vast differences in performance and public appeal between the two modes and potentially leading to imprudent planning decisions. An avalanche of credible evidence suggests for most comparable service levels in the same corridor clear advantages of LRT, particularly in terms of total cost (capital plus operating), environmental impact, attractiveness to potential riders, and influences on land use and transit-oriented development.
Tennyson also points out, for medium volumes of passengers, that LRT can achieve greater operating cost savings, primarily though reducing labor costs by running larger vehicles, entraining vehicles, or both something not available to buses within current technology. (The photo at right shows a 3-car San Diego Trolley train.) As a result, he noted in a 2002 analysis, "Light rail averages 175,000 annual passenger-miles per employee, but buses only 125,000."
[Photo: Transit Rider website]
The stark differential in LRT operating cost vs. that of bus is evident
from published FTA data see, for example, our analysis How Light Rail Saves Operating Cost Dollars Compared With Buses. Tennyson argues that LRT has an inherent cost efficiency compared with bus. in a 2002 analysis, responding to arguments promoting "BRT" presented by transportation consultant Sam Zimmerman, and using Zimmerman's cost data, Tennyson notes that
Light rail cars are larger than buses .... If you take a typical quoted cost of $90 per bus-hour and divide by 57 passengers, you get $1.58 as the cost per passenger [all US dollars]. At the same six square feet per passenger, light rail at $160 per car-hour will carry 120 to 135 passengers depending upon the size of the car ... so the cost per passenger is $1.19 to $1.33 per passenger using Zimmerman's data. Light rail is 16 to 25 percent less costly for operations.
[E. L. Tennyson, "Sam Zimmerman on BRT...", personal discussion paper (edited), 26 Oct. 2002]
Of course, this analysis applies primarily to peak or other heavyvolume conditions. Offpeak and less intensive weekend ridership tends to reduce the advantage of LRT's higher capacity and thus raise average costs. Nevertheless, LRT has tended to demonstrate higher offpeak ridership than bus, including "BRT" thus the FTA data, averaging both peak and offpeak, year-round, suggest a decisive operating cost advantage for LRT. Tennyson also argues that, when the logistical needs of "BRT" busways are accounted for as they have been done in recent "BRT" busway projects the unit capital cost of busways has tended to be much higher than the unit capital cost of LRT. in an analysis reported in the fall of 2003, Tennyson reports that ...exclusive busways are in no way less costly than light rail.... Boston, Los Angeles, Ottawa and Pittsburgh have about 50 [total] miles of exclusive busway. At today's updated construction cost, they average over $50 million per mile plus a million a mile or two for buses and garages. The buses only last 15 years.... Light rail for [total] 46 miles in Denver, to Portland Airport, in Salt Lake City to Sandy, and east of Saint Louis, cost only $23 million per mile including both cars and shops ([except] no shop at Portland Airport) The cars last for 35 or 40 years.
[E. L. Tennyson, "$3.3 billion Freeway proposed for Honolulu", personal discussion paper (edited), 12 Sep. 2003]
Conclusion
The evidence from actual operating experience seems compelling. Bus services improvements, including low-cost Quality Bus, or "BRT", are essential but they are not "cheaper rapid transit" substitutes for LRT or other rail. in transit as elsewhere, "you get what you pay for."
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