The University of Trinidad and Tobago San Fernando Campus Bachelor of Applied Science Part Time Project Development

t Workshop (PDWK 110B) Group 7 Question 2: The Deepwater Horizon Incident

Imagine yourself an engineer working on the Deepwater Horizon and discuss the Health, Safety, Environmental and Governance issues that arose out of this incident and make recommendations to prevent the recurrence of such a disaster

Authors: Jenner Baldeo Janelle Ramjit-Baldeo Ellery Campo Anil Singh Barry Samaroo Larry Samaroo Rodney Sahabdool 111005888 102011057 106001214 106001281 107000286 106000295 107000283 jenner.baldeo@petrotrin.com jbaldeo@live.com ellerycampo@hotmail.com anil_c_singh@yahoo.com Barrer20_04@hotmail.com larrysamaroo@hotmail.com rodney_sahabdool@hotmail.com

Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................... 3 BACK GROUND ......................................................................................................................................... 5 SCOPE ........................................................................................................................................................ 6 CRITICAL SAFETY FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE BLOW OUT ................................ 7 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF THE OIL SPILL............................................................................ 12 GOVERNANCE ........................................................................................................................................ 17 HEALTH RECOMMENDATIONS: ......................................................................................................... 19 CONCLUSION: ......................................................................................................................................... 21 RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................................................... 22 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................... 24

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The well blowout and explosions that forced the abandonment of the Deepwater Horizon rig on April 20, 2010, were the start of a human, economic and environmental disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven crew members were killed and seventeen injured, the crippled rig burned uncontrollably for two days before disappearing into the sea and 4.9 million barrels of oil contaminated the gulf before the well flow was stopped by a temporary cap on July 15, 2010. Two relief wells, costing USD100 million each, were drilled to permanently seal the well, which was declared effectively dead on September 19, 2010. The spill, the largest ever in world history, caused extensive damage to marine and land wildlife habitats as well as the fishing and tourism industries of the Gulf States. At its largest extent the spill produced an oil slick that covered approximately 75,000 square kilometers, affected 32 National Wildlife Refugees and caused the banning of fishing in 36% of the federal waters in the gulf. Immense underwater plumes of dissolved oil were discovered, one measuring 35 kilometers long, 200 meters high and 2 kilometers wide, as well as oil in the sediments of underwater canyons that provide nutrient rich water to spawning grounds. Skimmer ships, floating booms, anchored barriers, sand-filled barricades, dispersants, oil eating microbes and controlled burning were used in an attempt to protect hundreds of miles of shoreline, beaches, wetlands and estuaries from the oil. These measures severely diminished the impact of the oil spill on the Gulf States, though significant quantities of oil still made its way to the coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and even Florida affecting beaches, rivers and marshlands. The federal government declared a fisheries disaster for the affected states with initial cost estimates at USD 2.5 billion. The Tourism industry ground to a halt in 2010, with the US Travel association estimating losses of USD25 billion over three years. British Petroleum has pledged USD 20 billion towards a compensation fund for business and communities affected by the spill.

Our review of this incident revealed that there were a series of contributing factors such as mechanical failures, engineering design, and human judgments. Additionally eight direct contributors to the blow-out can be identified as follows: 1. The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons. 2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons 3. The negative pressure test was accepted even although well integrity had not been established. 4. Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser. 5. Well control responses failed to regain control of the well 6. Diversion into the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig 7. The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition 8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well

Based on our assessment of this incident and all the contributing factors we recommend that the following measures be implemented to reduce the likelihood of a recurrence: A complete review of Offshore Drilling Governance Emergency Response Training should be improved to have crews adequately prepared to respond various emergency scenarios. Enhanced containment and clean-up infrastructure is needed due to inherent deepwater risks In the light of this disaster, BP should review their Drilling Technologies Changes in Safety and Environmental Practices should be made at the Federal and Corporate level to ensure that risks are fully assessed, especially with regard to deepwater installations.

BACK GROUND

In February 2010, the Deepwater Horizon commenced drilling an exploratory well at the Macondo Prospect, about 66 kilometers southeast of Louisiana, at a water depth of approximately 1500 meters. The exploration rights were acquired by BP in 2009, with the prospect jointly owned by BP (65%), Anadarko (25%) and MOEX Offshore 2007 (10%). On April 20, 2010, during completion operations for temporary abandonment, a blowout and subsequent explosions forced the abandonment of the Deepwater Horizon rig. This was the start of a human, economic and environmental disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven crew members were killed and seventeen injured, the crippled rig burned uncontrollably for two days before disappearing into the sea and 4.9 million barrels of oil contaminated the gulf before the well flow was stopped by a temporary cap on July 15, 2010. Two relief wells, costing USD100 million each, were drilled to permanently seal the well, which was declared effectively dead on September 19, 2010.

SCOPE

This report seeks to achieve the following objectives: Identify the causes of the blow-out and fire Examine the response to the initial incident, the clean-up operations and the impact of the spill Discuss the Safety, Health, Governance and Environment issues arising from this incident Make recommendations to prevent the recurrence of this disaster

CRITICAL SAFETY FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE BLOW OUT

Bp Deep Water Horizon Investigation Report September 8th 2010 found the following: Well integrity was not established or failed Hydrocarbons entered the well undetected and well control was lost Hydrocarbons ignited on Deepwater horizon Blow out preventer did not seal the well (p.31)

Investigations revealed that there were a series of factors that contributed to the deepwater horizon accident, such as mechanical failures, engineering design, and human judgments. Out of investigations carried out eight key findings were found. Bp Deep Water Horizon Investigation Report September 8th 2010 found the following: 1. The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons. 2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons 3. The negative pressure test was accepted even although well integrity had not been established. 4. Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser. 5. Well control responses failed to regain control of the well 6. Diversion into the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig 7. The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition 8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well

Finding 1: The investigations found that annulus cement barrier failed to prevent hydrocarbons from entering the well bore after cement placement. The investigation team possible failure modes for hydrocarbon to enter the annulus Ineffective cement design Cement placement Cement channeling and Lost cement circulation.

Figure 1.a Fliuds Leak past Annulus Cement Barrier

Source: Deep Water the Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Jan. 2011: Report to the President, National Commission on the BP deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Mar. 2011, Web, Figure 1

Finding 2: After it was determined that the annulus cement did not effectively isolate the reservoir, mechanical failures were then investigated. Mechanical barrier failures were examined, the shoe track barriers, the casing hanger seal assembly and the production casing and components .The findings of the investigation revealed that the shoe track barrier failed to isolate the hydrocarbons and that the initial ingress came through the shoe track barriers. Figure 1.b Shoe Track

Source: Deep Water the Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Jan. 2011: Report to the President, National Commission on the BP deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Mar. 2011, Web, Figure 1b

Finding 3: In the temporary abandonment of a well a positive pressure test is done which involved closing off the well just below the blow out preventer and pumping fluids into the well to generate a (250-2500psi) pressure then checking if the pressure holds . A negative pressure test follows the positive pressure test which checks both the integrity of the casing and the bottom hole cement job. To carry out the negative pressure test, pressure was removed from inside the well to determine if fluids leak into the well past or through the bottom hole cement job. At the time of the negative pressure test the test was deemed successful, however subsequent investigations of the test results indicated that well integrity had not been established and therefore remedial steps were not taken at the time Finding 4: A requirement of safe drilling and completion was that operations are to maintain control of the well to prevent influx of hydrocarbons. However investigation data revealed that an inflow of hydrocarbon for a period of forty (40) minutes during which hydrocarbons entered that riser before the first operations response took place. Finding 5: On line data obtained showed that no well control actions were taken until hydrocarbons were in the riser. The procedures in place did not fully address high flow emergency situations and the well control actions taken prior to the explosion; suggest that the crew were not fully prepared to deal with the escalating situation. Finding 6: The mud gas separator function was to removes small amount of gas entrained in the mud, however when the crew diverted high flow the system was overwhelmed, at that point causing highly flammable gas to be vented onto the rig and into confined spaces under the deck.

Finding 7: The heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) fans and dampers were not activated automatically, manual activation was necessary. The system (HVAC) transferred the highly flammable gas mixture was transferred through the system into engine room, causing one engine to overheat and creating a potential source of ignition. Highly flammable hydrocarbons reached potential ignition sources due to the failure of the fire and gas system.

Finding 8: From the findings one of the major safety devices did not function as it should under emergency conditions. The Blow Out Preventer is a valve which can be closed if the drilling crew loses control of the formation fluids .To isolate the well after the explosion an attempt was made to operate the emergency disconnect sequence that would close the blind shear ram, that ram had to shear the drill pipe and seal the well bore and disconnect the lower marine riser package. However the lower marine package did not disconnect, resulting in hydrocarbons continuing to flow indicating the blind shear ram did not seal. The investigations findings suggest that the explosion and resulting fire damaged the multiplex cables resulting in the emergency disconnect sequence from closing the blind shear ram.

ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF THE OIL SPILL

The adverse effects of the deepwater horizon incident are of epic proportions. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that not only was the livelihood of the people residing in the area affected, but the spill also had a serious backlash on the environment. To successfully examine the effects of this oil spill we will look at it using the following categories: 1. Effects on wildlife 2. Effects on Humans 3. Legal issues Oil spills have grave effects on the wildlife of any environment. The consequences of this incident are no different. Indigenous species of every type were damaged or stunted as a result of the spill and its magnitude. According to the Spisharam in the environmental impact of the deepwater horizon oil spill document, some of the affected organisms include: Coral reefs Microbes Birds and Animals Ocean dwellers

Source: Spisharam, (June 3rd 2010). Environmental Impact of Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Environmental News. Retrieved from http://www.connect-green.com/environmental-impact-ofdeepwater-horizon-oil-spill/

Coral reefs (primarily made of limestone), house approximately 25% of all marine species. The sensitivity of the animals and ecosystems that inhabit these reefs make them very subject to destruction when polluted. There are two coral reefs in the Gulf of Mexico, the Flower Garden Banks, and the Florida Reef Tract (both illustrated below). Figure 2A: Coral Reefs in the Gulf of Mexico

Figure 2a: Source: Spisharam, (June 3rd 2010). Environmental Impact of Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Environmental News. Retrieved from http://www.connect-green.com/environmentalimpact-of-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill/ It has been shown that dispersed oil droplets and dispersants cause extensive death to coral colonies, as well as delay in growth rates. There are key factors affecting the toxicity of oil on coral. The document Oil Spills In Coral Reefs: Planning and Response Considerations: highlight some of these factors as follows: Spill impacts vary in severity with the specific conditions at a given spill, including oil type and quantity, species composition, and the nature of oil exposure. Oil can kill corals, depending on species and exposure. Longer exposure to lower levels of oil may kill corals as well as shorter exposure to higher concentrations. Chronic oil toxicity impedes coral reproduction, growth, behavior, and development. The time of year when a spill happens is critical, since coral reproduction and early life stages are particularly sensitive to oil.

Branching corals are more sensitive to oil impacts than are massive or plate-like corals.

Source: Shigenaka, G., Yender, R. A., Mearns, A., & Hunter, C.L. (July 2010). Oil Spills in Coral Reefs: Planning Response and Considerations. Retrieved from http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_shelf/8_coral_chapter3.pdf: pg 24 -33. This document also reports that various studies show that acute and chronic exposure to oil (even at low levels) cause harm to coral reef tissues. Although it showed that the larger coral species are more resilient to oil pollution, the branched type coral are easily damaged. Microbes in the water break down the oil. The issue is that the balance of these microbes can grow out of proportion as a result of the extent of the spill. This results in a massive drop of the oxygen available in that area, and, as an end result of too many microbes. This leads to the creation of a hypoxic area or "dead zone" which is uninhabitable. The shores of the Gulf of Mexico are the living areas of many endangered species of birds and animals. As the oil contaminates the living habitats of these animals, their already challenged numbers are further dwindled due to pollution. One such example is the national bird of Louisiana the Brown Pelican (shown below).

Figure 2b: The Brown Pelican Source: Spisharam, (June 3rd 2010). Environmental Impact of Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Environmental News. Retrieved from http://www.connect-green.com/environmental-impact-ofdeepwater-horizon-oil-spill/

This birds nesting area and food source has been contaminated and its numbers are again in jeopardy. This is especially disturbing as the species has grown since the onset of Hurricane Katrina. According to the marine environment protection agency of Australia, some of the outcomes oil spills has on birds are: Hypothermia in birds by reducing or destroying the insulation and waterproofing properties of their feathers. Birds lose body weight as their metabolism tries to combat low body temperature. Birds become dehydrated and can starve as they give up or reduce drinking, diving and swimming to look for food. Damage to the insides of the birds bodies. "

Source: Australian Maritime Safety Authority (Mar 30th 2011). The Effects on Wildlife. Retrieved from http://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/Educational_resources_and_infor mation/Teachers/The_Effects_of_Oil_on_Wildlife.asp. Under the water contain another faction of animals affected by the spill. Fishes, plankton and other sea dwellers will undoubtedly be affected by this spill. The toxins in the oil will kill these species as well as the larger predators that feed on them. The ocean food chain ranges from small plankton to large whales, and all are affected by the woes of one species. Some examples of fish species directly affected include the blue fin tuna whose spawning grounds are damaged, and the small minnow fish, which were seen swimming just below the oil layer. The effects of the spill on the human inhabitants of the area were also very serious. On one hand there were some reported cases of adverse health effects such as rashes, trouble breathing, and dizziness. These were however mainly concentrated to the people involved in the clean-up effort. A more salient effect is on the income of the fishermen in the area. It is well known that BP spent a large sum of money in compensation to individuals whose livelihoods were cut off due to the oil.

The most important point is that of the legislation involving the oil drilling operations. According to the Washington Post in an article printed on Wednesday May 5th 2010, the BP lease at deep water horizon was exempted from doing and environmental impact analysis in accordance with the US National Environmental Policy Act on April 6th 2009 by the Minerals Management Service. This has led to environmentalists calling for a re-examination of the policy involving drilling operations. The greater concern is that no one saw the potential for the deep water project to result in the incident that happened, which was one of the largest US oil spills to date. According to government documents three reviews of the area led to the conclusion that a massive oil spill as improbable. It goes without saying that more stringent policies must be put in place. In my opinion the environment cannot afford to have these types of incidents taking place on a regular basis, if at all.

GOVERNANCE

The Deepwater Horizon rig sank on April 22, 2010, two days after the well blowout and explosion that killed eleven workers. Soon after this, attention shifted to the Minerals Management Service (MMS), the federal agency responsible for oversight of wells drilled and operated within Americas Exclusive Economic Zone in the Gulf of Mexico. On May 11, 2010, the MMS was stripped of its safety and environmental enforcement responsibilities with the Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar, announcing his intention to place this function within a separate and independent entity. By June 19, 2010 the MMS name had been discarded entirely with plans in train to reorganize the agency into three (3) separate entities: a bureau of Ocean Energy Management; a bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement; and an Office of Natural Resource Revenue. The U.S governments response to this tragedy was an acknowledgement of the shortcomings of federal regulation of offshore oil and gas installations over the years. The increased revenue associated with drilling further offshore came with increased safety and environmental risks, which were not matched by more sophisticated regulatory oversight. The Industry resisted such oversight and since the MMS was created in 1982, neither the US congress nor a succession of presidents has been able to overcome that opposition. This typifies a reactionary approach to the governance of offshore oil and gas installations, not only by the U.S but by governments worldwide. Following a series of disasters in the 1980s, the Alexander Kielland rig capsized in the North Sea, the Ocean Ranger sank off Newfoundland and the Piper Alpha platform exploded and sank off Scotland, the respective governments of Norway, Canada and the United Kingdom each responded by transforming there approach to the industry. In this approach the regulator would consent to development activity, proceeding only upon the operators demonstration that sufficient safety and risk management systems were in place and requiring that operators demonstrate thorough consideration of all risks associated with the structures and operations for a drilling or production plan. The regulator no longer approved operations relying solely on prescribed operational and safety standards.

After an explosion destroyed a platform operated by ARCO, of the Louisiana coast in 1989, a marine board review found that the MMS needed to upgrade its program to address the changes in the operations of the deepwater blocks. The report concluded that MMS should place its primary emphasis on the detection of potential hazards, particularly those associated with human factors, operational procedures and modification of equipment and facilities. In 1991 the MMS published a notice requesting comments on a proposed Safety and Environmental Management Program (SEMP), similar to that of the UK and Norway. In 1994 the MMS announced that it would continue evaluations for two more years. Further deadlines slipped and faced with continuing industry opposition the MMS proposed a watered down version of the SEMP in 2006, requiring that only 4 of the 12 widely accepted elements of industrial safety management be put in place. Industry opposition to even this was swift and only after the Macondo blowout in 2010 was the federal agency able to implement a comprehensive, mandatory SEMP. In concluding it must be noted that the federal government has never lacked the authority to control whether, when and how oil and gas are leased, explored and developed in the US. The governments authority is virtually without limitation in this area and the MMS was the agency mandated to regulate the industry. While advances in drilling technology enabled operators to explore further offshore and in deeper waters both the Executive branch and the Congress failed to ensure that agency regulators receive the additional personnel and technical expertise and political autonomy needed to overcome the commercial interests that have opposed more stringent regulation.

HEALTH RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1 Monitoring of Workers Health Companies must monitor the health of their workers before, during and after an incident. Agencies should be set up to continuously monitor the health status of all affected employees. These affected employees are those who have been exposed to crude oil and/or toxic fumes Recommendation 2 Enforcement of Safety Practices All employees of the platform should always wear the proper and necessary Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). The safer a worker is the less likely to be injured. Employers should always enforce all safety practices and procedures. Workers must be trained to inspect all their PPE for signs of damage or wear and tear. Emergency PPE should be accessible to all employees in well visible areas. All employees should receive training on emergency and evacuation procedures regularly. Recommendation 3 Training Centers for Volunteers Centers should be established to train volunteers who choose to respond to oil spills. In that oil spills may contain chemicals that can be toxic to individuals in contact with the spill. Volunteers must be aware of the dangers associated with the chemicals they are handling. Especially when using chemical agents during an oil spill cleanup. Chemicals used in the clean up must have all the necessary documents attached such as instructions for use and the Material and Data Sheet.

Recommendation 4 Increased Screening of Fishing Communities Government should enforce rules for fishing areas. In that restrict access to fisherman in areas that may contain traces of oil or contaminants that could poison fishes. By restricting access to certain areas may help in reducing the number of contaminated fishes entering the market. Fishing communities close to offshore platforms should have regular screening and testing of all aquatic life and water. Through regular testing the government will know the areas being affected by an oil platform. They will be able to pinpoint oil spills and leaks before they climb into a more serious situation. Also with continuous monitoring we can track the number and severity of affected communities.

Recommendation 5 Therapy centers For Family Members of Affected Employees The stability of a family can be affected as a result of any disaster. In that the families of the employees at the platform were affected emotionally. Studies show that children are more vulnerable to emotional stress that adults. Centers should be established for the families of all employees affected by the disaster. These centers should be equipped with therapists who will attend to these families. The centers shall also provide advice and assistance with caring for all the injured parties.

CONCLUSION

As the world has seen, the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster was of such a devastating magnitude, that no private sector company would have been prepared to respond and handle. All that can be done now is Recommendations and Measures that can be made and put into practice so that a disaster like this would not happen again.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Changes in Safety and Environmental Practices BP has proclaimed the importance of safety for its vast worldwide operations and yet this disaster has occurred. What they need to do now is fully review their safety practices as well as their Environmental laws in order to prevent further accidents. As research shows this is not the only incident that BP has been responsible for, there was the Texas City Refinery Explosion and the BP Forties Alpha gas line rupture just to name a few. So many past events have occurred. Strong recommendations should be made by foreign entities for BP to review their practices and set higher safety standards.

Safety Training The importance of safety Training for employees cannot be stressed enough. Workers need to be adequately trained in performing safe work practices and everyone needs to know how to respond to accidents and in what ways to handle it. Refresher training should be carries out in a continuous basis to keep workers well informed and well prepared.

Drilling Technology In the light of this disaster, BP should review their Drilling Technologies in an event to try or even change their drilling habits. Engineering needs to be actively involved in this aspect. Management and also Reliability also should be included as well as all departments from across the board in an event to improve this aspect.

Containment and Clean up Technology If BP is to perform further drilling operations of this magnitude then they need to have adequate containment and clean-up infrastructure. Maybe the same technology can be used but measures can be put in place o handle a larger capacity spill.

Preparedness Improved measures should be put in place to have crews adequately prepared to handle accidents. They should be able to respond in a timely manner so that the situation would not get out of control. Management, Safety, Risk Assessment and others should actively take part in this activity.

Corporate Culture and Management Behaviour A complete review of Offshore Management Drilling practices should take place and proper guidelines should be implemented because a disaster like this should have never have happened. The companys Risk Management practices should come under scrutiny. Corporate BP should realize the impact that this disaster had on the world and the effects that are still ongoing. They need to be actively involved in all aspects like Clean-up campaigns, worker training and counseling just to name a few. They need to get back peoples trust in their company and the only way to do that is to go directly to the people.

REFERENCES

Deepwater

Horizon

Accident

Investigation

Report,

BP,

Sept.8th

2010.Web.

Mar.2011<http://www.bp.com/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation >

Deep Water The Gulf Oil disaster and future of offshore , Report to the President, National commission on BP Deep Water Horizon Oil spill and Offshore Drilling .Jan.2011.Web.Mar.2011http://www.oilspillcommission.gov

Australian Maritime Safety Authority ( Mar 30th 2011). The Effects on Wildlife. Retrieved from http://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/Educational_resources_and_in formation/Teachers/The_Effects_of_Oil_on_Wildlife.asp.

Spisharam, (June 3rd 2010). Environmental Impact of Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Environmental News. Retrieved from http://www.connect-green.com/environmentalimpact-of-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill/

Shigenaka, G., Yender, R. A., Mearns, A., & Hunter, C.L. (July 2010). Oil Spills in Coral Reefs: Planning Response and Considerations. Retrieved from http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_shelf/8_coral_chapter3.pdf: pg 24 -33.

Eilperin, J. (2010, May 5). U.S. Exempted BPs Gulf Of Mexico Drilling from Environmental Impact Study. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/04/AR2010050404118.html?hpid=topnews.