Statutory interpretation usually involves rules of thumb that are said to let readers to draw inferences regarding the

meaning of a exacting statute. These canons of construction guide the methods and sources used in statutory interpretation and are typically deployed according to an interpreters favored methodology. These are also known as maxims of interpretation. These interpretive rules of thumb are judge-made. I argue, consequently, that the common law be supposed to be understood to include interpretive methodology in addition to the customary substantive common law subjects, such as the law of torts. Judge-made rules of interpretation expand because methods of legal reasoning connect to results and weakly limit judges in potential cases. Thus, the canons form a body of interpretive common law that legitimizes sources and methods of legal reasoning, all with an eye in the direction of how the legislature would feel like its intent to be effectuated. The common law canons do more to limit the sources of legal reasoning than they do to categorize them with precision: resorting to context is fine, resorting to statutory purpose is fine, but employing peculiar extrinsic sources of meaning is not. However, the common law of interpretation has no existing rules for when an interpretation based on statutory point should trump a contradictory interpretation based on background. In this sense, though the canons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation,1 they do, in fact, limit and direct interpretive approaches for statutory construction, albeit imperceptibly. Judges, however, are not the only players in the development and ordering of canons of construction. When a legislature enacts statutes, its members have certain ideas about how those words convey meaning. To economize language and the legislative process, the legislature may rely on prevailing rules of interpretation extrinsic to that particular statute. Legislatures may even prescribe rules and methods by which they wish their statutes to be construed. Scholars and commentators often discuss legislative preferences, as expressed in statutes, with respect to particular policies.2 But legislative preferences, as expressed in statutes, with respect to interpretive method remains an uncharted subject.
There are both extrintic and well as intrestincti aids of interprretaion inadditon to rules of statutory interpritation. What we are about the discuss below is one form of the secondary rules of interpritaion which is legal maxims. Legal maxim is an established principle or a proposition. These Latin terms were developed in Europian countries during the medival era that used Latin as the laguage of governance and court laguage.

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS

This is where words must be construed in conjunction with the other words and phrases used in the text. In other words When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the i statute. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. Where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various

meanings, its true meaning may be clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated. Aisporna vs. CA: wife of insurance agent prosecuted for having sold an insurance without registering as an agent. Using this doctrine, the Court ruled that an insurance agent is one who sells insurance in return for compensation, and it was not proved that Aisporna received compensation for the insurance she was alleged to have sold. (Her defense was that as her husbands clerk, she only renewed the insurance because her husband was out at the time). Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing Corp. v. Villarama: Dai-Chi filed a complaint against Villarama for violating an agreement that he would not join the companys competitor within two years after leaving Dai-Chi. Dai-Chi filed a complaint against Villarama at the RTC, which dismissed it on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, for it should have been filed before a labor arbiter. Using the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the court ruled that while the Labor Code says that all money claims of workers were under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, it did not mean to encompass the entire universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers. Paragraph 3 should not be read in isolation, but rather in conjunction with paragraphs 1 to 5, which all refer to money claims of workers arising from violations of or in connection with an employee-employer relationship. Dai-Chis complaint was anchored on a violation of contract, since Villarama was no longer an employee. The court ruled that the RTC was the proper venue for filing of the case. EJUSDEM GENERIS

Where a statute describes things of particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a kindred nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statute to repel such influence. Ejusdem generis could be expansive, however, because the list is not exclusive; it may be expanded if a juridical tie could be found with another item. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp: Because gambling was with the phrase and other prohibited games of chance it was construed to refer only to illegal gambling. PBA v CA: Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS The express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Variation: Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. Canon of restrictive interpretation. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Malinias v Comelec: An attempt to use an administrative charge for a criminal complaint against police officers accused of violating the election code. The court ruled that not all violations of the election code provided for criminal penalties and in this case, the violated provisions only warrant the imposition of administrative, not criminal, penalties. Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos: A group of old men charged with violating the solicitation permit law was acquitted because the term religious purpose was not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, and what the law does not include, it excludes. The law referred only to charitable purposes, which phrase cannot be construed so as to include a religious purpose. DISSIMILUM DISSIMILIS EST RATIO The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification. Garvida v. Sales: Sales sought to have Garvida disqualified from the SK post because of age. The court ruled that while the Local Govt Code provided that SK members should be 21 years old, it added a qualification that should officials should be 21 years old on the date of election. Garvida was disqualified because she was more than 21 years old, although she was less than 22 years old. CASUS OMISSUS Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally. This needs two laws. In expressio unius, its just the enumeration you are looking at, not another law. COA of the Province of Cebu v Province of Cebu: This case is about the effects of a new law on an old law. The Special Education Fund (SEF) allowed the use of part of the realty and cigarette taxes for extension programs and scholarships. When the Cebu provincial office used it to pay for salaries of teachers and scholars, COA said those were not chargeable to the SEF since RA 5447, which created the SEF, was deemed repealed by the Local Govt Code. Because the two retained sections in the LGC omitted the scholarship grants, the court ruled that what was omitted must have been omitted intentionally, and so may not be included. UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMOS Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ramirez v CA: The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. Cebu Institute of Medicine v Cebu Institute of Medicine Employees Union-National Federation of Labor: Other benefits may refer to SSS, Medicare, Pagibig and may be taken from the 70% tuition increase since the law only says that money from this may be given to employees in the form of salaries and other benefits. Since the law did not distinguish between other benefits and SSS, etc, these may be deducted from the 70% increase in tuition charged by the school.

REDEENDO SINGULAR SINGULIS Referring each to each; let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively. Amadora v CA: Teachers should apply to pupils and students; and heads of establishment of arts and trades to apprentices. The teacher in charge must answer for a students tort, but in this case none of those charged were either the teacher in charge or the dean of boys. People vs Tamani: Promulgation should refer to judgment and notice should refer to order. The computation of the filing of the petition was wrong. (This was an obiter because the filing was late either way it is computed, and the court decided on the

Absoluta sententia expositors non indiget When language of law is clear, no explanation of it is required Actus me inuito factus non est meus actus An act done by me against my will is not my act. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential

Relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires Argumentum a contrario Negative-opposite doctrine. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege The contemporary construction is strongest in law

Distingue tempora et concordabis jura Distinguish times and you will harmonize laws Dura lex sed lex The law may be harsh, but that is the law. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis A thing not being excepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule Ex Bolo malo non oritur action No man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing Expressum facit cessare taciturn What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied Expressum facit cessare taciturn

What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat False description does not preclude construction: vitiate the meaning of the statute. Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat False description does not preclude construction: vitiate the meaning of the statute. Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum A general statement is understood in a general sense. Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum A general statement is understood in a general sense.

Generalia specialibus non derogant A general law does not nullify a specific or special law Generalia specialibus non derogant A general law does not nullify a specific or special law Impossibilium nulla obligatio est There is no obligation to do an impossible thing.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statutory_interpretation 2011 September 22