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INDIAN INTERNAL SECURITY BUILDUP

The article deals with the organisation, management and

operations of intelligence network in reference to India

and its significance in safeguarding the internal security

of the country. Efforts are made to trace the Achilles’

heel in the organisation and functioning of the present

intelligence build-up in India and how it has to be handled

to strengthen the internal security machinery of the country

is discussed in the article with emphasis on selection of

right people, right training, right motivation, right planning

and right preparations before each field action. The intricacies

of intelligence operations are also discussed in three distinct

levels namely intelligence gathering, research & planning and

field operations with reference to their importance to the

internal security.

The police force in India was raised imprimis to tackle crime and law and order

problems. Its recruitment, training and on-the field experience programmes stress upon

the elements required to tackle those problems. The Indian police organisation, in its
stiff hierarchical order and discipline, is geared to meet these challenges. There is little

scope in the present police for the growth of an aptitude other than for these déjà vu

function. No effort was made to overhaul the police even after security challenges have

superated in their primacy in police functions. It should be borne in mind that the

demands on the police to meet security challenges are tout a fait distinct from the

demands to which the Indian police has long been accustomed. The aptitude required to

protect targets from determined esoteric strikes by terrorists is antipodal with the

aptitude required for the show of strength, necessary to suppress a loosely knit mob of

wankle law-breakers. In spite of these excessive strains on the Indian police, its

organisation and resources, due to the dangerous spurt in security threats, it unfortunately

has failed to abraid and overhaul its system to face the new challenges. The glitches of

the Indian police in internal security are obvious by the fact that Indian soil has become a

fertile ground to breed and feed terrorist organisations. Every corner of India has its own

terrorist outfit and each of these outfits has proved itself a pernicious challenge to the

Indian police. Never, even by chance has the Indian police shown that it can control a

terrorist outfit. The fact is that even all armies of the world together cannot bring a

terrorist outfit to heel, unless the soft belly of the terrorist outfit is subtly hit embusque by

intelligent operations. Sadly, the Indian police is yet to realise this fact.

Sabotage, terrorism and security risks are not phenomena, pro tempore. They are

here to stay and the police must know to meet the situations they engender. And threats

to internal security, by all means will assume demonic proportions as time advances. The
survival of the police in coming years depends upon its ability to meet the needs of

internal security. It has no alternative but to overhaul its passe system, organisation,

operational methods, approach to work, training and manpower resources to be able to do

so. The faster it is done, the better. For, the inability of the police in successfully

handling security challenges is resulting in fatalities almost every day.

The first parameter for preparing the police for the future challenges of the

internal security is selecting right people with right aptitude, right abilities and right

background. This requires thorough job analysis in the requirements to handle the

pertinent responsibilities. Choosing the right man from the motley to inclip him to the

ergon forms the foremost need of preparing the police for the impending challenges. It

should be realised that the need of such people to the police overweighs the need of the

police for these extra-ordinary species. As internal security is a condition of national

survival, no law, no fundamental right, no directive principle nor any social welfare

ideologies should interfere with the recruitment of the right people. Internal security

being a highly sensitive and secretive job, each less than right man inside is a positive

risk to security operations. Further , such people are a drain on the efficiency and

effectiveness of the organisation. Ergo, avoiding people less than right for the job is as

important in recruitment as selecting the right person.

The people who fit-in to internal security responsibilities must have an innate

trait to give themselves to the job that they take up. They must be sensitive people with

a high commitment to their responsibilities with the mental and physical ability to fulfil
the task. Men of high intelligence quotient, patience, aplomb and perseverance have to

be immanent in their nature. A profound sense of patriotism is an added qualification.

However, not many people having these rare qualities are readily available. It must be a

sacred duty of the security operators to ingest such rara avis to the organisation

wherever they are found and with whatever sacrifice. It is possible only if recruitment to

these places are made a postern affair at the highest level without throwing recruitment

open to competitions where all types of people sneak in for various reasons. Internal

security, more often than not, is an envious profession wherein life is committed to its

objectives.

In the circumstances, the indraught to the fold must be agraste with respect and

behoofs in form of liberal purses and perks apart from more than generous promotional

and death-cum-retirement benefits that behove to the compulsive commitment sine qua

non for the job. This helps to widen the latitude of choice by promising a belle vue

which is puerile to its demands to the aspirants to this difficile career.

Having suitable manpower is one thing. Preparing them for the future challenges

is quite another. It is here that training comes into picture. Training high-calibre,

sensitive people is a much more responsible and arduous job. If the training is to prepare

them for sensitive job like internal security, the gravity of the task gets further

compounded by the addition of another dimension to the responsibility. The emphasis

here is to raise the innate traits of the trainees to desired levels. They should be moulded

to be highly motivated, knowledgeable, bright professionals with a flair for results. They
must be taught to operate without plangent attention and get maximum mileage from

minimum basic action. Such a training needs a carefully drawn-up training programme

with creative inputs. In sensitive jobs like internal security, grooming manpower

including recruitment and training is more vital than the job itself.

Indian security plans lay stress on covering targets with armed men and

preventing people from approaching the threatened target. In absence of adequate

penetration into the source of threat, none of these tactics can have any impact on the

capabilities of a terrorist to strike his target. A human wall around the target is an

infructuous show of strength in an age where there are powerful weapons and

ammunitions that can penetrate several such layers in a single stroke. Even the best of the

snipers protecting a target would be at a disadvantage in feeling a terrorist-to-strike who

has all the advantages of time, place, surprise and the mental and physical reflexes to

superate both his target and armed protectors. A well-planned terrorist attack fully

prepares for all these odd contretemps.

Another important strategy of the Indian security machinery is screening people

before permitting proximity to the threatened target. A resourceful terrorist plan can

facilely circumvent this with money connections and influence. There are infinite

ingenious ways available to a resourceful and imaginative man, determined to reach his

target in circumstances where a police force remiss and ineffectual at best and corrupt at

the worst is in charge of screening as spotters, his job is facile and custom-made for his

aptitude.
The Indian police system lays emphasis on dashing qualities rather than on mental

qualities and planning that form the elan vital of security policing. The age-old police

traits like a criant show of force and a strict adherence to hierarchical order have a mis-

alliance with the needs of security operations where patience, perseverance, calculating

mind and imagination was to foresee developments, speedy physical and mental reflexes,

unbreachable sang-froid in adverse situations, high commitment to the work in hand,

initiative and above all, courage to take responsibility for action decide the success or

otherwise of the security build-up. Indeed, these human qualities have to be reinforced

with neoteric security equipment including latest communication, transport,

information, weaponry and other security –oriented systems. The organisation must

have three full-fledged wings in charge of (a) collection of intelligence; (b) process and

assessment of security risks; and (c) field operation.

Collection of vital intelligence forms the pith of perficient security operation. An

effective security build-up perforce stands on the foundation of strategic intelligence.

The ferocity of security basically depends on the quality of intelligence as an input. A

security organisation of neoteric age cannot survive without an effective intelligence

wing as a backup unit. And key intelligence does not come freely. It has to be extracted

at great risks from closely guarded sources by resourceful intelligence operators. Often,

such an operation may require years of patient preparation by an undercover to cultivate

dependable insiders to the cause. These operations are potential comminations to the

mutual relation and ergo intelligence operators are left to their own fate by employers
when the operators are caught. Intelligence is a venal commodity and its price can be

fixed in monetary terms. Collection of intelligence involves huge expenditure to

maintain organisation and communication reticulation, support the logistics of the

operations and at times to affect outright purchases as well. It requires a huge army of

highly-paid and expensive operators and agents to cover places and groups that are

potentially security risks. The success of security back home tout a fait depends upon

the quality of the intelligence sent back. In an age of bitter concourse to win over or

withhold a piece of intelligence, double crosses or even triple crosses are au naturel. The

situation necessitates keeping an ey on these operators from a distance.

The raw inputs from intelligence sources have to be winnowed, classified and

processed if found to have security relevance. Intelligence collection sans processing is

as good as, if not worse than, not collecting them at all. Raw intelligence throws the

national security to the winds by raising a maelstrom, wherein facts and fancies are

completed beyond recognition. It blunts the sensitivities of the sleuths and excoriates

targets to real danger. The possibility can be avoided by creating a nerve-centre, a

command post in the security organisation to process and assess intelligence inputs anent

ground realities, past history and known facts. This organisation must be manned by

people au fait and capable of reading between lines to arrive at right conclusions as well

as invenit strategies in the interests of the internal security. This body must have a flair

for research and analysis and knowledge of the internal situation of the country, dynamics

of various factors that have bearing on the internal security and possess an insight into

minor developments that may blow up into serious security risks at some future date. It
must be constituted of carefully chosen professionals with proven records of eximious

work and a deep sense of patriotism and commitment to their work and should be

directly responsible to the chief of the organisation and work as a high-power advisory

body in all matters pertaining to the security.

Field operation is the cutting –edge of the security build-up. Other activities in

the organisation are just postern backups to the field operation that forms the mainstay of

the security organisation and inclips a vast portion of the organisation’s manpower,

equipments, machinery, money, time and other resources. If intelligence operators must

have alert eyes and ears, security analysts must have smart mental faculties and field-

operators must have smart reflexes inter alia. Only people with exceptional courage and

perseverance and dare devilry can behove to this job. Resourceful people with energy

and willingness to work hard in tramontane circumstances, rare single-mindedness of

purpose and devotion can alone be successful in the dangerous world of field operations.

They have to be pollent-willed people with the precinct to risk their lives for the sake of

achieving goal. Screening people for these traits is not a facile job. This arduous job has

to be performed with great care and caution for the quality of internal security of the land

depends upon the work turned out by them. The people who are chosen for the job

must be able to provide security to men, places and structures, known to be sensitive

and comminuted by enemies, while themselves remain in shades. Speed and surprise are

their chief attributes. Resourcefulness to do jobs which appear impossible is their

mainstay. Indeed, the demands are too high and this necessitates careful selection and

recruitment, efficient training, high motivation and liberal compensation in the form of
generous pay, perks and expenditure accounts. The people who play with their lives to

meet the objectives of the internal security have to be treated well for the risks to which

they willingly submit themselves in the interests of the country and its internal security.

All internal security operations must be part of a raisonne security plan that is

drawn out in advance after through research and study of the best available intelligence

on internal and external affairs, the geographical position of the country, the internal and

external economic situation, likely shifts in foreign relations, objects and intentions of

neighbouring countries, the dynamics of ethnic, communal and linguistic interaction

within the country and scientific advances in weaponry and other gadgetry, having a

bearing on the security matters. The security plan must foresee likely sources of trouble

inside and outside the country and cultivate undercover operators at sensitive spots

either by its own resources or through agents, often years or decades in advance to keep

an eye on developments, feed intelligence and control situations by infiltration to

strategic positions. Without this groundwork, no security operation can make much

headway.

Any security build-up must stand on two basic requirements; firstly, up-to-date

knowledge of the security risks and their starategies and secondly, a security machinery

devised to meet specific demands of the specific circumstances. A thorough knowledge

of the adversaries includes an in-depth knowledge of their long and short term

objectives, their time-to-time aberrations, strategies, expertise, modes of operation,

friends, enemies, sources of support, likely change of strategies and their analyses to
assess the possibility of security threats and likely targets. Yes, it is a stupendous task

involving huge manpower and other resources a grands frais. Yet, it is worth the cost

and trouble in the interests of the national security and a far more intelligent and

meaningful use of human and material resources than spending them to criminals after

they accomplish their pernicious job. Investigation of terrorism-oriented crimes serves

practically no purpose and makes no impact on the plan and strategies of a well-planned

terrorist outfit.

A security build-up is infrangible only if it is specific for each circumstance

depending upon the needs as assessed by security experts from time to time. Security

must essentially be an esoteric operation with open eyes and ears and closed mouth; with

open mind and closed heart . It must be a shadowy operation rather than a gust of light

blinding people around. Intelligent terrorist operators prefer to strike in this gust of light

which is what security tends to be. A good and pollent security plan should not have an

open set-plan which by all likelihood would be used by intelligent terrorists to their

advantage. The pollicitation of a good security plan depends upon its secretiveness,

perspicacity and ability to take even a well-prepared and resourceful terrorist operator

by surprise.

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