[5] L. Zhen and L.
Xu, “Sensorless field orientation control of in- Series FACTS Devices in Financial
duction machines based on a mutual MRAS scheme,” IEEE Trans. Ind.
Electron., vol. 45, pp. 824-831, Oct. 1998.
Copyright Statement: ISSN 0282-1724/01/$10.00  2001 IEEE.
Manuscript received 28 January 2001; revised 19 August 2001. This
paper is published herein in its entirety.
2002 FACTS Award
Call for Nominations
Deadline: 31 January 2002
The IEEE Power Engineering Society (PES) calls for nomination
of outstanding individuals to receive the 2002 Flexible AC Trans-
mission System (FACTS) Award.
Description: Power electronics and other static controllers are
making a major impact on future power systems through applica-
tion in transmission, distribution, and small generation. Applica-
tions in transmission include HVDC and FACTS. Since the
introduction of the FACTS concept, the technology has been mov-
ing ahead at an increasing pace. Very significant near to long term
benefits of FACTS technology are now recognized in the industry.
The FACTS Award is for individuals who have made a major con-
tribution to the state of the art of FACTS technology and its appli-
cations. The IEEE definition of FACTS is: “Alternating current
transmission systems incorporating power electronics-based
and other static controllers to enhance controllability and power
transfer capability.” By this definition, the FACTS concept, in addi-
tion to the hardware, software and applications work carried out
since its introduction, incorporates considerable prior work done
on Static VAR Compensators and other static Controllers.
Eligibility: Individuals who have made a major contribution to
the state of the art of FACTS technology and its applications.
Selection: Factors to be considered in selecting the FACTS
Award recipient include:
● The candidates contribution(s) to FACTS technology
● Originality or innovative nature of the contribution(s)
● Impact of the contribution(s) on FACTS technology and its
applications
● List of significant publications in FACTS
● Candidate’s stature in FACTS
● Achievements in other fields or technologies
● Professional activities or involvements.
Nomination Procedure: A nomination (2 copies) written in
English on behalf of each candidate along with at least four and no
more than five supporting recommendations must be received as
a package by the Chairman of the FACTS Award Committee on or
before 31 January 2002. These nominations will be considered
for the award planned to be made during the 2002 IEEE PES Sum-
mer Meeting. The above listed selection factors should be care-
fully considered during preparation of nominations and
recommendations. They must be complete and provide sufficient
information to establish the candidate’s contribution(s) and role
in FACTS. Nominators are encouraged to format the nomination
package in sections addressing each of the factors. Each support-
ing letter of recommendation should not exceed two pages
The Award: The FACTS Award consists of a plaque and an hon-
orarium of one thousand dollars. PES administers this award. The
2002 Award would be the fourth FACTS Award.
For More Information: Contact Narain G. Hingorani, chair,
FACTS Award Committee, 26480 Weston Drive, Los Altos Hills,
CA 94022, USA, +1 650 941 5240, fax +1 650 941 4309, e-mail
nhingorani@aol.com.
IEEE Power Engineering Review, November 2001 0272-1724/01/$10.00©2001 IEEE
Transmission Rights Auction for
Congestion Management
Xing Wang, Y.H. Song, Q. Lu, Y.Z. Sun
Author Affiliation: Brunel Institute of Power Systems, Brunel
University, Middlesex, U.K.; Tsinghua University, Beijing, China.
Abstract: Financial transmission rights (FTR) auction is an impor-
tant method for allocating the network transmission capabilities to the
market participants who value them most. In this letter, series flexible
ac transmission systems (FACTS) devices are modeled as additional
power injection at buses in the presented linear optimization problem
of FTR auction, which is based on a dc power flow model. The impacts
of controlling different FACTS devices on auction results are shown by
detailed studies of an eight-bus test system.
Keywords: FTR, FACTS, electricity markets.
Introduction: The concept of FTR, also known as transmission
congestion contracts (TCC) or fixed transmission rights, is introduced
by W. Hogan into power markets as a pure financial instrument to
hedge unexpected high-congestion charges on constrained transmis-
sion lines. Market participants can submit their bids for purchase and
sale of FTRs in a separated auction market conducted by the independ-
ent system operator (ISO), whose objective is to maximize revenues
from FTRs while keeping all the FTRs simultaneously feasible [1]-[2].
An FTR auction has been put into practice at PJM since May 1999 and
has been running efficiently.
Since the concept of FACTS was first proposed in 1988, many vari-
ous FACTS devices have been utilized to meet a growing demand of
transfer capabilities due to increasing wheeling transactions in the de-
regulation environment. In addition to all the well-known advantages
brought by FACTS devices, they can offer new opportunities for the
ISO to run a more efficient FTR auction to make the full use of the ex-
isting power grid.
A method is proposed to incorporate some FACTS devices into the
FTR optimal auction model. Since the FTR auction usually runs
monthly and only concerns active power, the dc power flow model is
used here. Two types of series FACTS devices, which are thyristor con-
trolled series compensators (TCSCs) and thyristor controlled phase
shifters (TCPSs), are modeled into the FTR auction with the so-called
power injection model (PIM). The solution of this FTR optimal auction
consists of the feasible sold FTRs and the optimal control parameters of
FACTS devices. An eight-bus test system is studied to illustrate the
proposed method.
Description of FTR: According to the PJM definition, FTR is a fi-
nancial instrument that entitles holder to receive compensation for
transmission congestion charges that arise when the transmission grid
is congested in the day-ahead market and differences in day-ahead
locational marginal prices (LMPs) results from the dispatch of genera-
tors out of merit order to relieve the congestion. The holder of the FTR
is not required to deliver energy in order to receive a congestion credit.
If a constraint exists on the grid, the holders of FTRs receive a credit
based on the FTR MW reservation, and the LMP difference between
point of delivery and point of receipt.
It is natural to have an auction for allocating part or all of the FTRs
to provide open access to the grid through a market mechanism. An
OPF model can be adopted to provide a formulation of an FTR auction
model for selecting the long-term capacity awards based on the will-
ing-to-pay principle. The power flow equations embedded into the FTR
auction make it straightforward to identify which FTRs are available by
characterizing all possible rights and selecting a set of feasible rights
that would provide the highest valued use of the network. The revenue
from the FTR auction will be allocated to the transmission owners (TO)
to compensate their investment on improving the power grid. A sec-
ondary market provides a contractual mechanism for long-term pricing
of transmission grid. Figure 1 shows that FTR is a market-based ap-
proach to network congestion management.
41
 Power Injection Model of Series FACTS Devices: Generally
speaking, there are two types of models of FACTS devices for static
power flow control and calculation: the voltage source model (VSM)
and the power injection nodel (PIM). VSM is straightforward but will
destroy the symmetric characteristics of the network admittance ma-
trix. PIM results from the VSM by interpreting the power injections of
the shunt and series converters as real and reactive node injections.
With PIM, FACTS devices can be embedded into power flow equa-
tions even without any modification of network admittance matrix and
Jacobian matrix [3]. As the dc model is used in this letter, only two
types of series FACTS devices, which are TCSC and TCPS, are dis-
cussed here.
Figure 1. FTR’s purchase and its role in congestion management
Figure 2. Power injection model for TCSC and TCPS
Figure 3. The eight-bus test system
42
The equivalent circuit of the general PIM of the transmission line
with series FACTS devices under the dc assumption is shown in Figure
2, in which components associated with FACTS devices have been re-
placed with two power injections on both sides of the transmission line.
For a TCSC, the power injections are
−x c
PF , i = − PF , j = (θ −θj . )
(
x ij x ij − x c ) i
(1)
For a TCPS, the power injections are
PF , i = − PF , j = − ψ x
ij
(2)
whereθ is the bus voltage angle, x ij is the reactance of branchij, x c is the
reactance of the series compensator, and ψ is the phase shifter angle.
Note that the value of power injections for a TCSC is a function of not
only its reactance but also the difference of voltage angles between two
ends of the transmission line. On the other hand, the power injections
for TCPS are independent of the state variables of the system.
FTR Auction Model with Series FACTS Devices: The proposed
FTR auction model can be seen as an extension of the general linear
FTR auction model presented in [1]-[2], where two additional types of
control variables are introduced: the angle of TCPS and reactance of
TCSC. In [4]-[5], where the dc power flow model was adopted too, the
phase shifter angle is replaced by compensation power injection at end
buses while series compensation is modeled as a change in circuit
reactance. Treating circuit reactance as control variable turns the corre-
spond nodal power balance constraints to be nonlinear equations, how-
ever. To make the problem still solvable by linear programming (LP), a
decomposition approach based on the Benders decomposition scheme
is applied in [4] while in [5] the nonlinear power flow control with
FACTS devices was solved in a separate subproblem. In this letter a
unified PIM is adopted to represent both TCSC and TCPS and new in-
equality constraints are introduced for modeling the operating limits of
TCSC to keep the problem linear. The mathematical model of the pro-
posed method is formulated as
Max( b FTR )T FTR (3)
subject to
Bθ − M FTR − M B PB + M F PF = 0 (4)
FTRmin ≤ FTR ≤ FTRmax (5)
Pl min ≤ Hθ ≤ Pl max (6)
PFmin ≤ PF ≤ PFmax (7)
where FTR is the matrix of winning FTR bids (MW), b FTR is the matrix
of bidding price of FTR bidder, PB is the matrix of FTR injection in the
base case, B is the linearized active power Jacobian matrix, H is the ma-
trix of branch power flow constraint coefficient, M B is the nodal map-
ping matrix of FTRs in the base case, M is the nodal mapping matrix of
FTRs in the auction, and M F is the nodal connection matrix for FACTS
devices. The last inequality constraint set is the operating limits for
power injections of FACTS devices. To make this model practical,
constraints of FACTS internal parameters must be involved. For TCPS,
the limits of power injections can be easily derived from the limits of
phase shifter angle
ψ max
ψ min
,i = −
PFmin
x ij PF , i = −
, max
x ij
.
(8)
IEEE Power Engineering Review, November 2001
But for TCSC, the limits of power injections are more complex, as II, III, and VI are listed in Table 4. In Case I, because of the bottleneck
shown in (1). Since there are no fixed limits for power injections of between the Left zone and Right zone, not all the FTR bids can be satis-
TCSC, its operating constraints can be formulated as fied and the revenue from FTR auction is limited. In Table 3, it can be
noted that MW flow constraints of Line 1 and Line 6 are bound while
x cmax Line 2 still has nearly two-thirds of its transfer capacity left. To improve
PF , i + (θ −θj ) ≥0
(
x ij x ij − x cmax ) i

(9)
the transmission capability between the Left zone and Right zone, the
TCSC on Line 2 is controllable in Case II, while the TCPS on Line 6 is
controllable in Case III. The results of both cases are better than Case 1.
and The TCSC on Line 2, which increases the power flow on Line 2 to
296.58MW from the value of 123.69MW in Case 1, has better impact on
x cmin the FTR auction than the TCPS on Line 6, however. The reason is that in
PF , i + (θ )
− θ j ≤ 0.
(
x ij x ij − x cmin ) i

(10)
With (9) and (10), the control of a TCSC can be implemented as power
injections in the linear FTR auction problem. After the optimal solution
of this problem is obtained, the optimal control parameters of FACTS
devices are given in (11) and (12) for TCSC and TCPS, respectively
Case III a new binding constraint of line flow (Line 4) occurs.
In Case VI, both installed FACTS devices are controllable in the
FTR auction. Obviously this is the best result out of the four cases.
From Table 3, it can be seen that all the three tie lines have reached their
thermal limits in this case. In other words, the total transmission capa-
bility between the Left zone and Right zone has been fully utilized with

x ij2 PF*, i
x c* = Table 1. Branch data of the 8-bus system
( i )
− θ − θ *j + x ij PF*, i
*
(11) Line From Bus To Bus Reactance Limit (MW)
1 1 2 0.0300 150

ψ = −x P .
* *
(12) 2 1 4 0.0300 340
ij F , i
3 1 5 0.0065 380
Test Results: An eight-bus system, which is modified based on the
4 2 3 0.0100 120
first test system in [2], is studied in this letter to illustrate the proposed
FTR auction model. Its network configuration and the FTRs of base 5 3 4 0.0300 230
case and bidding into the auction are shown in Figure 3. The branch pa- 6 4 5 0.0300 150
rameters and limits and the bid prices of six bidders in the FTR auction
are given in Tables 1 and 2. In addition, TCPS is installed on Line 6 and 7 5 6 0.0200 300
Line 2. From Figure 3 it can be seen that basically the system can be di- 8 6 1 0.0250 250
vided into a Left zone, including buses 1, 5, and 6, and a Right zone, in-
9 7 4 0.0150 350
cluding the rest of the buses. The Left zone is a generation zone, while
the Right zone is a demand zone. The tie lines between these two zones 10 7 8 0.0220 340
are Lines 1, 2, and 6. 11 8 3 0.0180 240
To demonstrate the impacts of different series FACTS devices on
the results of the optimal FTR auction, four cases are analyzed here:
● Case I: FTR auction without FACTS devices;
● Case II: FTR auction with a TCSC on Line 2; Table 2. Bid prices in FTR auction
● Case III: FTR auction with a TCPS on Line 6; Bidder 1 2 3 4 5 6
● Case VI: FTR auction with both TCSC on Line 2 and TCPS on
Line 6. Bid Price
($/MW) 12.0 10.0 12.0 11.0 9.0 8.0
The line flows in the results of the FTR auction in four cases are
min
shown in Table 3. The revenues from FTR auction in four cases are given FTR (MW) 0 0 0 0 0 0
in Figure 4. The operating limits and the optimal control parameters of max
FTR (MW) 200 300 100 175 120 200
FACTS devices and their corresponding power injection values in Cases

Table 3. Line flows in four cases

Line Flow in Case I Line Flow in Case II Line Flow in Case III Line Flow in Case VI
Line (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW) Limit (MW)
1 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150
2 123.69 296.58 220.63 340.00 340
3 -121.44 -236.03 -266.57 -311.98 380
4 50.85 96.64 120.00 52.60 120
5 -43.26 -82.35 30.63 -54.20 230
6 -150.00 -150.00 -150.00 -150.00 150
7 26.90 -10.35 -5.94 0.62 300
8 53.10 69.65 74.06 80.62 250
9 -258.16 -288.56 -195.94 -273.20 350
10 58.16 88.55 -4.06 73.20 340
11 -214.11 -211.44 -209.37 -226.80 240

IEEE Power Engineering Review, November 2001 43

 Table 4. Optimal control parameters of the FACTS devices
Optimal Value
Case II x c of the TCSC
Power injection at Bus 1 (MW)
Case III ψ of the TCPS
Power injection at Bus 5 (MW)
Case VI x c of the TCSC
Power injection of the TCSC at Bus 1 (MW)
ψ of the TCPS
Power injection of the TCPS at Bus 5 (MW)
the help from both FACTS devices. Compared with Case II, the
reactance of TCSC also reaches its maximum value but its power injec-
tion value is different from Case II. The reason is that the power injec-
tion of TCSC is also a function of voltage angle difference between bus
1 and bus 4, which varies in each case. The results show that the coordi-
nation between the two installed FACTS devices works very well. It is
due to embedding the power injection models of FACTS devices into
the linear programming problem directly instead of solving the control
subproblems of FACTS devices separately.
Conclusions: In this letter an optimal FTR auction model is pre-
sented as a linear programming problem. Two types of series FACTS
devices, TCSC and TCPS, are embedded into this auction problem
through the unified PIM to allow more existing transmission capabili-
ties be sold to market participants as FTRs. Some new special treatment
has been done on TCSC’s internal parameter limits to keep the auction
problem linear. The proposed FTR auction model with FACTS devices
is solved as one LP problem instead of dealing with the control of
FACTS devices as separate subproblems. This is very important for the
coordination between multiple FACTS devices in the system.
Acknowledgments: The work is partly supported by the Chinese
National Key Basic Research Special Fund (No.G1998020310) and the
National Science Foundation of China for overseas youth R&D coop-
eration (No.59928705).
References:
[1] W.W. Hogan, “A concurrent auction model for transmission
congestion contracts,” Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Harvard
Univ., Cambridge, MA, Jan. 1997.
[2] M.I. Alomoush and S.M. Shahidehpour, “Generalized model for
fixed transmission rights auction,” Electric Power Syst. Res., vol. 54,
pp. 207-220, 2000.
[3] Y. Xiao, Y.H. Song, and Y.Z. Sun, “Power injection model and
linear programming for FACTS control,” in Proc. IEEE 2000 PES
Winter Meet., Singapore, Jan. 2000.
[4] G.N. Taranto, L.M.V.G. Pinto, and M.V.F. Pereira, “Represen-
tation of FACTS devices in power systems economic dispatch,” IEEE
Trans. Power Syst., vol. 7, pp. 572-576, May 1992.
[5] S.Y. Ge and T.S. Chung, “Optimal active power flow incorpo-
rating power flow control needs in flexible AC transmission systems,”
IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 14, pp. 738-744, May 1999.
Copyright Statement: ISSN 0282-1724/01/$10.00  2001 IEEE.
Manuscript received 8 May 2001. This paper is published herein in its
entirety.
Figure 4. Revenue from FTR auction in four cases
44
Min. Value Max. Value
0.02 0.00 0.02
-197.72 -197.72 0.00
0.0384 -0.10 0.10
-128.38 -333.33 333.33
0.02 0.00 0.02
-226.67 -226.67 0.00
0.0093 -0.10 0.10
-30.93 -333.33 333.33
2002 International Conference on
Harmonics and Quality of Power
Call for Papers
Deadline: 1 March 2002
The International Conference on Harmonics and Quality of
Power (ICHQP) will be held 6-9 October 2002 in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil. ICHQP provides a forum for electrical engineers and scien-
tists in universities, utilities, and industry to present their work and
share information in the area of harmonics and power quality. It is a
well-established IEEE PES-sponsored conference that is held bien-
nially by rotation in and outside the United States. All presentations
and conference manuscripts will be in English.
ICHQP covers all aspects of power quality, including: analysis
and modeling; devices; loads; flexible, reliable, and intelligent
electrical energy delivery systems; measuring and monitoring
techniques; sources of disturbances; power converters; traction
systems; harmonics; voltage quality; power conditioning; active
and passive filters; var compensation; UPS; surge protection de-
vices; grounding systems; phase balancing; standards and rec-
ommended practices; diagnostic and expert systems
applications; electromagnetic compatibility (EMC); power quality
in distribution systems; quality aspects of industrial, commercial
and residential consumers; power quality economics and liability;
and power quality in a deregulated electricity market.
Paper Submission/Procedures: Submit previously unpub-
lished papers relevant to the conference topics. The deadline for
submissions of full papers is 1 March 2002. Final manuscripts are
due 28 June 2002. The PES author’s kit is available on the
Internet, http://www.ieee.org/power/ subpages/authors.html. For
more information, please contact PES Executive Office,, e-mail
pes@ieee.org.
Invitation to Submit Tutorial, Session, and Panel Programs:
Attendees are invited to submit one-page summaries of possible
tutorials (no longer than half day), technical sessions, or panels
(approximately 2 hours in length, and indicating number of panel-
ists or invited papers), which they desire to organize, directly to
the conference chair. Indicate the title of the tutorial, session or
panel. The deadline date is 12 April 2002.
Exhibits: Space consisting of tables or booths is reserved for
exhibits and demonstrations by corporations and businesses
specializing in power quality related instrumentation, mitigation
equipment and software products. Early reservation for exhibit
space is recommended. The deadline is 30 August 2002.
Secretariat: Gilson Paulillo, ICHQP 2002 Executive Secretary,
Itajuba Federal School of Engineering – EFEI, Power Quality Study
Group – GQEE, P.O. Box #50 37500-903, Itajuba, MG, Brazil, +55
35 3629 1312, fax +55 35 3629 1326, e-mail ichqp2002
@iee.efei.br, Web http://www.ichqp2002.efei.br.
IEEE Power Engineering Review, November 2001