2004 IEEE International Conference on Electric Utility Deregulation, Restructuring and Power Technologies (DRPT2004) April 2004 Hong
Kong
System Blackouts: Description and Prevention
Dr Damir Novosel (KEMA T&D Consulting, US)
Blackouts rarely happen and are usually caused by
a sequence of low probability disturbances. The
sequence of low-probability disturbances is
generally not planned by the system designers and
is not expected by system operators, making a
power system more susceptible to a blackout.
These types of events most likely occur following
sequential outages on a stressed system, when the
system is operated marginally in compliance with
planning criteria. If a system is stressed and
system and equipment are removed without
sufficient levels of adjustment or when faults occur,
the chain of events starts. For example, some
generators and/or lines are out for maintenance,
line trips due to a fault. Other lines get overloaded
start to sag, and another line gets in contact with a
tree and trips. There is a hidden failure in the
protection system (e.g. outdated settings) that
causes another line or generator to trip. At that
stage, power system is faced with overloaded
equipment, voltage instability, transient instability,
and/or small signal instability. Based on the power
system condition such as the operating reserves and
equipment availability, the severity of the
disturbance may cause parts of the power system to
be islanded, loose synchronism, and even enter a
complete blackout. If fast actions (e.g. load
shedding, system separation) are not proactively
taken, system cascades into unplanned islands.
Evaluation of worldwide disturbances show that
protection systems have been involved in 70% of
the blackout events. Inadequate or faulty alarm and
monitoring equipment, communications, and real-
time information processing can further exacerbate
disturbances in the system. Human error or slow
operator response are other major contributing
factors leading to cascading outages. Either
information is not available or operators are
flooded with alarms, so they cannot make proper
decisions fast. Important aspect in designing
connected power systems is that individual systems
should not allow cascading outages to spread
through out the system.
There are a number of other contributing factors
that allow a blackout to spread, including
interconnection agreements, availability of reactive
support, and lack of coordinated response among
control areas. Each region focuses primarily on its
own transmission system. Each of the individual
parts can be very reliable, yet the total connected
system may not be as reliable. While accounting
systems have boundaries, electric power and
critical communications do not obey these
boundaries. Very often, intertie separations are not
pre-planned for severe emergencies, leaving the
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decision and system stabilization response to the
operators at the time that the operators have many
other responsibilities including coordination with
neighboring system operators, verification of
equipment rating and statuses, identifying
corrective measures, etc. Prevention of cascading
by operators is very difficult during a fast
developing disturbances.
The varying nature and types of extreme
disturbances coupled by their anticipated infrequent
occurrences make it desirable to take automated
actions to stabilize the system which may include
system separation in a controlled and coordinated
manner.
Any investment should consider the long-term
impact associated with system adjustments, be
backed and preceded by comprehensive system
studies, followed by frequent coordination studies
over life cycle, and prudent analysis of the types of
investments most necessary for successful
implementation. There is no single solution to
prevent blackouts, but there are general measures
than can and should be taken to minimize impact of
wide area disturbances. Since any of the above
referenced outages were caused by a complex
sequence of cascading events, electric utilities,
industry regulators, and state and Federal
legislators and regulatory bodies should undertake
the recommended steps to determine the root
causes, understand how each disturbance happened,
and identify measures and support actions to
prevent similar occurrences. Some of the actions
may require extensive legislative and governmental
support due to possible environmental, financial, or
intersystem or multi-national impacts.
Step Zero: Analysis & Audits
Multiple regulatory and government agencies have
done an intense analysis of the blackout data to
identify what actually happened during 2003
blackouts. In the US, the NERC board adopted
recommendations of the NERC Steering Group
including:
Specific actions to correct the deficiencies
that led to the August 14 blackout
Strategic initiatives to strengthen
compliance with existing standards and to
formally track completion of
recommended actions
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2004 IEEE Intemational Conference on Electric Utility Deregulation, Restructuring and Power Technologies (DRPT2004) April 2004 Hong Kong
Technical initiatives to prevent or mitigate
the impacts of future cascading blackouts
An immediate focus was placed to evaluate chain
of events and investigate possible
misoperation/(unnecessary actions) of the control
and protection systems. Inadequate exchange of
information between neighboring control centers
has been scrutinized. It is planned to conduct audits
of planning, operating, and maintenance practices.
Vegetation clearance around transmission lines will
be reexamined and corrected as necessary.
Fast restoring of power to the users is of paramount
importance after the blackout and can significantly
minimize consequences of outages. It took over a
day to restore the power after the August 14th
blackout in North America. Efficiency of
procedures and SW tools supporting restoration
need to be analyzed and audited to identify what
improvements are needed.
Step One: Preventive and Corrective Actions
The analysis and audit process identifies the set of
actions required to minimize the possibility that
outages will happen again. Fundamental upgrades,
such as improved real-time monitoring and
diagnostics and training for system operators, are
“low-hanging fruits” in actions to prevent major
blackouts. In addition, accurate and reliable
monitoring systems with faster detection and wider
communication capabilities play a key role towards
a comprehensive system defense plan.
Following measures should be taken to prevent
blackouts:
Implement System Protection Schemes
and Adaptive Protection;
Perform protection coordination studies on
a regular basis as system conditions
change
Identify adequacy of protection
application on routine basis and test not
only individual relays but system
protection applications
Improve monitoring, diagnostics, and
control center performance
Secure real-time operating limits on daily
basis
Perform dynamic voltage & transient
stability studies and use certified system
models
Operator training, including a coordinated
approach among control areas
Condition assessment of aging
infrastructure and improved maintenance
Regulatory actions to assure compliance
with standards
Improve restoration procedures
Step Two: Longer-term Investments
Preventing major blackouts will require a
combination of long-term investments in the
transmission system and much needed
improvements in public policy. Significant
investment in transmission hardware will be made
in the next decade. The transmission grid must be
upgraded and expanded to handle the increased
energy flows and address the operating conditions
subjected to. High-voltage power electronic
devices would allow more precise and rapid
switching to improve system control and to help
increase the level of power transfer that can be
accommodated by the existing grid. While the new
investment will certainly include some new
transmission lines, it will also encompass new
power delivery technologies, Flexible AC
Transmission Systems (FACTS), and Reactive
Power Management, including dynamic VAR
controls.
Today’s communication and computer technologies
have produced a new revolution in the power
industry, especially in the field of power system
control where vertical integration is much
improved. Computer based relays communicate not
only with a center, but also with each other. This in
turn facilitates the deployment of overall system-
wide protection and control philosophy. With an
information infrastructure, it is possible to tie all
the monitoring, control and protection devices
together through an information network. The key
to a successful solution is fast detection, fast and
powerful control devices, high-speed reliable
communication infrastructures, and smart
algorithms, in other words “True Wide Area
Protection and Control System” (WAPC).
Research and developments on application of new
technology such as energy storage and
superconductivity may also be very beneficial.