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Beyond the Beat: The Facts about Policing in a Riotous City Author(s): J. Mervyn Jones and J. T. Winkler Source: Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer, 1982), pp. 103-114 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Cardiff University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1410348 . Accessed: 05/10/2011 23:59
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JOURNALOF LAW & SOCIETY

VOLUME NUMBER SUMMER 1982 9, 1,

BeyondTheBeat:TheFactsaboutPolicingin a RiotousCity
J. MERVYNJONES* J. T. WINKLERt and
INTRODUCTION

Following the riots last summer in London, Liverpool, Manchesterand over the elsewhere, there began a long process of nationalself-inquisition causes of the violence. Many explanations were advanced, based on a varietyof social, psychological,economic and politicaltheories. Attention was also repeatedlyfocussed on the mannerin which such areashad been policed over recent years, not only as one cause of the disorders,but also as an explanationfor the ferocityof the violence aimed at the police. This analysissurfacedin both the formalenquiries,by Scarmanin London and Hytner in Manchester,and in many independentstatementsand analyses by interestedgroups, not least of all the police themselves. Several versions of the theory that the police contributedto the outbreakswere put forward:that they had policed too coercively(antagonising the public), or too leniently (allowinglaw and orderto breakdown), or in a racistmanner (provokingblack resistance). However, the most common variant of the argumentwas presented broadlyas follows. The police have lost contactwith the communitiesthey are supposedto serve. As a result of technicaland organizational changes within police forces, and due to mounting pressure of work caused by increasingcrime, the numberof constables allocatedto foot-patrolduties (the proverbial"bobbies on the beat") has been severely reduced. Both with the publichave been severed. Policcommunication relationships and has become reactive and coercive, merely respondingto violationsof ing the law. In consequence, the public have come to see the police in a more punitiveand negative light, relationshipshave deterioratedfurther,and a self-reinforcingspiral of separation between the police and society has been created. There is considerableirony in this analysis.Most senior officers consistently state that they are highlycommittedto the conceptof foot patrolling by uniformedconstables. So much so that referencesto the value of the "bobbyon the beat as the backboneof the police service"have become a ritualpartof almostall generalstatementson policing.In a technicalsense, we may speak of there being an "Ideology of the Beat" among police
*Hampshire Constabulary tCranfield Institute of Technology

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officers. The chief constables in all the force areas where the rioting occurredlast summerare enthusiasticsupportersof this traditionalpolice philosophy. One possible explanation for this irony is that there is a discrepancy between the strategy of policing which senior officers espouse in theory and the actualpracticeof policingon the streets. In the years immediately before last summer's riots, we conducted research to test this hypothesis.[1]A detailedstudywas made of one of the forces seriouslyaffected by the riots, one whichis frequentlyaccusedof havinglost contactwith its communities.A conditionof the researchwas that the force would not be identified. We will honour that commitment. The research entailed identifying the formal policing strategy of the force, which placed high stress on the value of patrollingconstables, and then tracing how this was interpreted in practice. We measured the distributionof police manpower,the quantityand quality of the officers allocated to foot-patrolduties, the specializationof roles, the promotion of and rewardstructures the force, the meansby whichit measuredits own the trainingsystemsfor patrolconstablesand their attitudes performance, to their work. Broadly, we found that, despite the avowed intentions of its chief diminishedand devalued constable, the researchforce had systematically the beat-patrol function. It had indeed severed the primarymeans of with its communitiesto such an extent that the contactand communication whole beat policingstrategyhad been effectivelyabandonedin favourof a real, albeit unarticulated, strategy of enforcement-orientated "firebrigade"policing. The purpose of this article is not to point an accusing finger at one particularforce, for the phenomenon we encounteredin our researchis more general. One of the authors is a police officer (now serving in a differentforce from that in which the researchtook place), the other an sociologist. From our combinedexperience, as well as our organizational of other police research, we believe that the loss or severe knowledge of curtailment police contact with their communitiesis readilyidentifiable in most police forces throughoutthe country. Not only is the beat patrol functionemasculatedin practicealmosteverywhere,but the organizational processeswhich undermineit are common to all forces. Our findingswill be presented in the following way. We will consider separatelythe four principalassertionsabout policing style advancedby Scarman,Hytner and others. These were claims about which there was wide agreement,but little hardevidence. Under each of these impressively we will presentthe evidencewe gatheredin the researchforce. In headings each case, it will be seen that the facts substantiatethe claim.
As background to this analysis, we will establish first that the chief constables of the principal areas concerned all did indeed place a high 104

value on beat policingand not just after the riots but before. Then we will consider whether, in the research force, this ideology was reflected in practicalmanpowerallocations. Beat Ideology and Beat Manpower
I believe there is no substitutefor the man on the beat ... I have alwaysfelt that mobilesand other specialistforces are ancillaryto the man on foot patrol.[2] man in the police servicethan the beat constable, Franklythere is no more important whetherhe is on foot, or in a pandacar. I preferhim to be on foot whereverpossible . . I cannotoverstressthe importanceof the beat constable'srole.[31 (It is) my unshakeable philosophyand policyto have more and more officerson foot in patrolduties. ... I am completelyconvinced,andfullysupported this by my senior that foot commanders, the obviouspresenceof uniformed patrolofficersin the streetsof our cities, townsandvillagesis the mosteffectivedetterentto hooliganism, vandalism, generallawlessnessand the crimesof violence againstthe personsthat are currently posingsucha criticalproblem.[4]

The emphasison the beat patrolconstablewas apparently demonstrated in the initial allocation of 61% of the researchforce's manpowerto the UniformBranch,the section of the police responsiblefor the patrolfunction. However, a deeper examination of the manpower distribution revealedthat the numberof constablesactuallyperforming patrolduties at any one time was considerablydiminishedby the effects of four organizational factors. First, the figurefor the UniformBranchincludedofficersof supervisory rank who did not perform a patrollingfunction. They representedover 11%of the total researchforce. Secondly, not all the constablesallocated to the Uniform Branch were engaged on beat patrol. Many were "uniformed specialists" performing other duties, such as station, communication,gaoler, intelligence collation, dog handling, and specialised patrol (S.P.G.). These specialismsaccountedfor another 15% of the total manpower. After subtractingthese two groups, only 34.6% of the force proved to be constablesavailablefor patrol duty. But they were not all available simultaneously.The Uniform Branch must provide a twenty-four-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-weekservice. Some constablesare absentthroughsickness, in training,on leave or takingrest days. As a result, it requiresover five men to cover a single beat for one week. This meant that only 6.4% of the total force strength was even theoreticallyavailablefor beat duty at any one time. But even this diminished proportion was not achieved in practice because of staff shortages. For a variety of reasons, the force was 4.9% under its authorizedestablishmentat the time of the research.But these vacancies were unevenly distributed. Given the importanceattached to beat patrolling,it would not have been unreasonableto expect the shortages to be carried elsewhere in the organizationalstructure. In fact, 105

vacanciesin administrative, supervisoryand specialistroles were filled at the expense ultimatelyof the foot-patrolfunction.That sectionof the force furthestfromthe streets, Headquarters, was actually14.5%over establishwhile the Uniform Branchwas 9.5% understrength. ment, The manpowerpolicies of the force thus operatedin contradiction its to beat ideology. Moreover, the quantitative shortages were not the full extent of the problem. As many assertedin the aftermathof the riots, we found that the qualityof those who performedthe beat-patrolfunctionwas far from satisfactory. AssertionNumberOne: Beat Patrol Constableswere Youngand Inexperienced
The existence of a predominantly young and inexperiencedforce in vehicles rather as thanon foot has, we believe, in Manchester a whole and in Moss Side in particular, producedproblems...[5] . if the service continues to turn out raw youngsterson to the streets with a minimumof trainingthen manymistakesare going to be made .. .[6] A black "militant" quoted as shoutingat Sir David McNee, Commissioner "I was tell you how to reducethis problemby three quartersrightnow. Raise the recruiting age from 18 to about 27. These kids they're putting out as coppers don't know nothing."[7] to The Commission(for Racial Equality)is one of severalorganisations recommend 'homebeat'andcommunity policingin Brixtonandsaid, "Morematureconstablesand CID officersshould be deployedin multi-racial, deprivedareas."[8]

1. TheAge of Beat-PatrolConstables In our research we found that, overall, 27.4% of the force's constables were between 18 and 23 years old, but of those performingpatrol duties 40.8% were in this age group. The latter statistic lends substanceto the claim in the Hytner report ". . . that the majorityof the police who took part in these frighteningevents were young - indeed not much if at all older than the majorityof the rioters themselves."[9] Only 21.9% of the patrol constables had reached the age of 30. In contrast, we found that of the constables working in the Criminal InvestigationDepartment(C.I.D.), 61.4% were aged 30 or over, as were 71.1% of those in the uniformed specialisms and 86.7% of constables tasks. undertakingadministrative The absence of older officers on patrol was furthercompoundedwhen we examinedthe age distributionon the foot beat itself. There we found that whilstthe averageage of the mobile constablein a pandacar was 28.8 years, that of the foot-patrol constable - on whom the ideology places particularimportance- was 24.6 years. 2. The Experienceof Beat-PatrolConstables In the researchwe used lengthof serviceas a crudeindicatorof experience. 106

We adopted the categoriesused in an informalmannerby police officers themselves,classifying"probationers" (i.e. those with less than two years as "inexperienced"officers and those with six or less police experience) years service as "relativelyinexperienced". In the researchforce overall, 24.9% were probationersand a further 24.2% relativelyinexperiencedconstables.However, of those engagedon uniformedpatrol duties, 47.5% were probationersand a further 32.2% were relativelyinexperienced. Again, the more experienced officers were found to be located on mobile, ratherthan foot-patrolduties. The averagelengthof serviceof the mobile officerswas 7.8 years comparedto 2.9 yearsfor theircolleagueson foot. As was found with age, experiencein the police service is located away from uniformed patrol. The more experienced constables worked in C.I.D. (average service, 10.7 years), uniformedspecialisms(14.4 years), administration(18.2 years), and supervision (18.8 years). The average servicefor the whole force at the time was 9.7 years. For the most part, it is the relativelyraw who walk the beat. 3. Experienced and MaturePatrol Officers Researchconfirmsthe general impressionthat very few patrol constables could be classed as "experienced and mature" officers. Their absence however, was only part of the problem. Our study of the attitudesof the few availableexperiencedofficers revealed that many were disillusioned and cynical. Broadly, these officers could be placed in one of three categories. First, there were those patrol officers who were dedicated to beat patrollingbut viewed with deep suspicionand cynicismthe way in which they were treated by the organization, especially by their supervisors. Secondly, there were those who aspired"to get off the beat" in order to develop their careers, but were in a continuingstate of uncertaintyowing to the lack of a clear career-planning policy. They did recognize,however, that the informalroute to promotionwas throughlaw enforcement,piling up an impressivenumberof summonsreportsand arrests,"feelingcollars" in police jargon. This distracted their activity away from the broader objectives of a balanced beat-policing role - peace-keeping, crime prevention, informationgathering, communityrelations and social welfare. Thirdly,there were those officerswho had at one time specializedbut Far had been sent back to the beat aftersome transgression. fromthe most vital role in the police, beat patrol is actuallyused as a punishment. In sum, our research found that of the few experienced and mature officers availablefor patrol duties, most had been alienatedby organizational policies and practices and had developed attitudes which were not always in the best interests of the organization or its public. It was on these 107

officers,however, that the researchforce relied to undertakethe "on-thejob" trainingof recruits. AssertionNumber Two: On-the-JobTraining Recruitsby Experienced for and MatureOfficershas Fallen into Disuse
The old dayswhen a copperlearnedhis tradewalkingout with an older man seem to have gone.[10] in and (Recruittraining). .. shouldincludepractical training supervision the handling of people in situationsof potentialconflict . . preferably,througha tutoror parent constablescheme.[11] ... probationary constablesused to be teamedup witholdermenon the beat ... The mostpositiveconsequences the riotsmaybe a returnto the 'tutoring of system'. ..[12] It is our view thatexperiencedconstablesshouldbe encouragedto remainon the beat as tutorconstables.[13]

Whilemanyof the beat constablesare young and green, there is, in fact, no shortage of older, veteran officers - if one looks at the force as a whole. Invertingthe figures given just above, 44.4% of the force is aged thirtyor more, and over half have at least seven years' service. The real constables problemis that their experienceis not availableto probationary becausethey are engaged in other, non-patrolduties awayfrom the beat. Who then tutors the recruits? A superintendent told us, ". . . the choice of tutor (constable)is largely determinedby who happens to be on duty at the time". An inspector summed up his problems by saying, ". . . there are so few experienced (beat constables)that recruitsare havingto go out with other probationers - the blind leading the blind." Another inspector identified the problem of finding suitable tutor constables, "It's better to go the other way- how do you disqualifya manfromdoingtutorconstableduties?. You don't talk in terms of attributes,you talk in termsof disqualifications ... 'Don't put a recruitwith him or bless us he'll be in trouble within minutes.'"One detectiveconstablewho had been returnedto the beat as a punishmentand had become embitteredas a result, also recognizedthe dangers, "I'd be afraid of putting somebody on the wrong footing. I wouldn'tlike to ruin somebody'slife just because of the way I feel." In the researchforce there was thus no systematicon-the-jobtrainingof young probationaryfoot patrol constables. The ad hoc allocation of teach"tutors"that actuallytook place was frequentlycounter-productive, but breedinga contemptfor beat work. This was not inevitable, ing little, given the existence of many mature and experienced officers in the researchforce. Why then were so many absent from the beat? AssertionNumberThree:ThePolice have too manySpecialist Departments and theseget the Best Manpower
(the beat officer) . . . must, in my view, be seen not as occupyingthe bottom of the policepecking-order (afterthe CID andspecialistunitshave creamedoff the best), but

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at its apex, in the forefrontof the police team. Policing,like medicine,the law andthe civil service, is a professionin which the generalpractitioner as necessaryas the is specialist.[14] ... we mustput a stop to the situationwhere the men on the beat are those few left after the others have gone to CID, traffic,etc.[15] ... the practicein recent years of quicklyremovingthe cream to specialistdepartments in our view is shortsighted.. .[16]

Our research documented not only that specialist departmentswere strengthened at the expense of the beat-patrol function, but that administrative supervisoryroles were reinforcedat the cost of frontand line activityon the streets. Two specific organizational policies lay behind this pattern. 1. "Manning-up" In practiceas each regularvacancyoccurredin a specializedpost or in a supervisor rank, it was quickly filled by an officer drawn directly or indirectlyfromthe beat. As a result,while the whole force was 4.9% under establishment,there was only a 0.7% shortagein the supervisoryranks, but 6.3% vacanciesamongconstables.Similarly,the UniformBranchwas 9.5% short, while the Traffic and CommunicationsDepartments were respectively6.7% and 26.7% over their formal strengths. The manning-up process was also used to fill vacanciescaused temporthe absence of the regular incumbenton leave, sickness, or in arily by training, etc. This temporary manning-upprocess was utilized without exception for supervisoryranks and in almost all cases for specialized posts. In addition, manning-upwas used to enhance the formal strengthsof established departments. For example, the C.I.D. strength was permanentlysupplementedby a numberof "aides"drawnfrom the Uniform Branch. It is, therefore,by the regularand systematicuse of manning-up processes that the beat is maintainedshort of staff. Not only does the beat lose but quantitatively, also qualitatively,for it is alwaysthe most experienced, best qualifiedofficers who are "creamedoff" to the specialismsand the rank structure. 2. CareerAdvancement The researchforce used transfersaway from the beat as the first stage in the advancementof an individual'spolice career. Conversely,remaining on the beat was deemed to be failure. This was quickly recognized by incomingrecruitsto the force. A surveywe undertookof 391 probationary constablesin trainingestablishedthat 74% had definitecareerplansand of these only 2.5% stated any interestin continuedbeat workafterprobation. The remainderexpressed a desire to specialize, mainly in C.I.D. work (45%). As one recruitconstableput it, "I am looking forwardto the next two years (probation)but I'll be looking for somethingbetter after that. 109

Well until you've done your bit on the streets, you can't get on, can you? It's the first step really - it is somethingyou've just got to do." Such attitudesare only a realisticretlectionof the existingcareerstructure within the force. Only constables go on foot patrol. There are no higherranksengagedin beat work. To move up a youngpolicemanhas to move off the streets. The survey also showed that beat supervisoryofficers actively encouraged constables to abandon the beat. We asked 69 probationerswith between 18 and 20 months service whethertheir future careershad been discussedwith supervisory officers;62% said that they had. Of these 78% the instigationof the supervisoryofficer and in 71% of the had been at for cases the theme of the discussionhad been directencouragement them frombeat patrolaftercompleting or to seek specialization promotionaway probation. Later in their careers, the force's annual staff appraisalscheme was openly used by supervisoryofficers to encourageconstablesto specialize. One experiencedbeat-patrolconstablesaid, "The only motivationwe get is out of patrol and into promotionor specialization.There's nothingfor those who want to stay. . ." Such specializationis helpful in achievingpromotionup the rankstructure. We examined214 promotionsmade in one year in the researchforce and found that 62% of those promotedwere officersin specializedposts at or Headquarters in C.I.D., yet these roles accountedfor only 19.2%of the whole force strength. We also plotted the careers of 264 supervisory officersand found that 85% had had specialistexperience(mainlyC.I.D.) prior to being promoted. The promotionpolicies of the force, therefore, far from treating beat and role, actuallydevalueit, both symbolically patrolas the most important of Whatthen is the real significance beat workin contemporary practically. policing? AssertionNumberFour: The Role of Beat Patrol is Devalued Withinthe Police Force
The view taken of Home Beat Officersby at least some of their police colleagues, which may be summarisedin the nickname"hobby bobbies", must be vigorously rejected... the statusof the beat officerwill have to be enhanced.[17] ContactPolice are themselvesfine and sinceremen, they ... whilstthe Community have no standingwithinthe Police Force...[18J A number of those who have given evidence to the Inquiryhowever, see these Involvement)Branches,as a mere publicrelationsexercise.[19] (Community

The researchforce, by operatingthe policies describedearlier, overtly contradictedthe importancethe chief constable said he placed on beat work. Thiswas reflectedin the low informalstatusaccordedto patrolwork by other membersof the force. 110

The evidence gatheredduringour researchshowed that it was the lawenforcementactivitiesof the force, often referredto as "realpolice work", which were given greatest recognition. Consequently, in making assessments of its overallperformanceas well as that of its individuals,the force with statisticswhichcentredon crimedetectionratesand was pre-occupied numberof arrestsor reports for summons. No attempts, however, were madeby the force to assessthe qualityof beat work,normeasurethe success or otherwiseof its peace-keepingfunction. Yet peace-keepingis the primaryobjective of the police. A long line of commentators,inside and outside the police, from Sir RichardMayne to Scarman,have emphasized the point. In his report, Scarmanposed the question directlyand answeredit:
. .. his (the police officer's)prioritiesare clear:the maintenance publictranquility of comes first. If law enforcementputs at risk publictranquility, will have to make a he difficultdecision. . . The successfulsolution ... lies firstin the priorityto be given in the last resort to the maintenanceof publicorder, and secondly, in the constantand commonsenseexerciseof police discretion.[20]

We analysedover a thousandpolice commendations.It was found that 72.9% of them had been awardedfor crime detection as evidencedby the numberof crimescleared or arrestsmade, 15.9% for "good police work" again supportedby enforcementstatistics,8.8% for braveryand 0.5% for responsibleleadership.No commendationshad been awarded, however, for beat workor peace-keepingunless supportedby enforcementstatistics. The emphasisin the force on enforcementled directlyto open criticism of those officerswho did not producea "desirable"numberof arrestsand summonsreports,For example, a probationary constablewas not likely to be accepted as a regularmember of the force unless he demonstratedhis abilities at appraisaltime by producinga list of arrestsand reportsmade. Similarly,a beat officer, wishingto specialise in C.I.D. or Trafficduties, was unlikelyto be successfulunless he could supporthis applicationwith a "good"crime arrestor trafficsummonsreportrecord. As one superintendent said, "The numberand quality of process and arrestshe makes ... are useful to indicate whether he is preparedto work. . ." This concern for enforcement meant that other, non-enforcement aspectsof police work were accordedlow statusand thereforeneglectedor abandoned.Those dedicatedbeat police officerswho concentratedon such were assessedformallyas "inefficient",or informallyin the responsibilities vernacular as "uniform carriers". Another superintendentsaid, police "WhenI hear a constabletell me that he doesn't put manyprocessreports in or make many arrestsand he says its because he's doing other types of police work, I tend to turn a rather jaundiced eye on him." Broader policing concerns are suppressed, therefore, and beat patrol work is redefined simply as law enforcement. The low status accorded to non-enforcement police work, to those who

practiceit, and to the section of the organization where most of it is under111

taken (the beat) has led to a crude separationof thinking.Law enforcers are seen as "real policemen", while the others are stigmatisedas soft, inefficientor lazy. Beat policemen feel this denigration. One dedicated patrol constable told us, "In the eyes of the specialist,the uniformedpatrolhas become the poor relation. I think that the bosses tend to think, as the C.I.D. do, that the beat bobby is just an ignoramus." As a final irony, this distinction between two types of policemen is recognizedby the public as well. But they evaluate their relative merits differently. As the Hytner Report concluded, ". . .young people distinguish clearly between the CommunityContact Police whom they admire ... and the operationalpolice whom they do not".[21]
CONCLUSION

style of merchanized, Many people have asserted that the contemporary reactive policing contributedto the outbreak of last summer'sriots. We have not taken a stand on this causalrelationship.But our researchlends supportto the commonobservation,that the police have lost contactwith their communities.Whateverthe good intentions of chief constables, in and practicebeat-patrolpolicingis undermanned undervalued. For those who cherishthis approachto policing, the question is how to re-activateit. The two formalinquiriesevoked a large numberof suggestions, most concentratedon the immediatelyapparentissues of who patrols and the training they receive. Many wanted to see an increased numberof more experiencedconstables back walkingthe beat. Training shouldbe improvedat every stage, i.e. initialtrainingof recruits,induction trainingon moving to a new area, and on-the-jobtraining. Within this narrow range, proposals varied from the facile to the sophisticated.For example, the Member of Parliamentfor the London constituencywhichincludesthe riot area advocatedthat, "Policemenwith less than three years experience (after completing their two-year probation) should be banned from duties in Brixton".[22]In the force we investigated, this would eliminate the vast majority of constables who presentlypatrol the streets. He furthersuggestedtreblingthe numberof beat policemen. Given the numberof men it takes to cover a beat all day, every day, this would absorb 100%of police manpower. In contrast, Scarmanconcluded that, "Young police officers are an unavoidable,indeed valuablepart of the modernpolice service. The need is not to remove them from sensitiveareas, but to ensurethat they receive proper guidance and supervision."[23]This is a pragmaticsuggestion, sensible as far as it goes. But it still deals with the symptoms of the problem. It does not attempt to change the policing philosophy nor the organizationalstructurewhich, in our view, have combined to cause the decline of beat policing.
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a of more "reform" becomesimply matter putting At the simplest, may littleelse. Somesuch on andolderpolicemen the streetswhilechanging last At scheme begunin the Toxtethareaof Liverpool December. the was said:"Iwantto buildupthe the ChiefConstable, K. G. Oxford, Mr. time, on sortof rapport yesteryear of betweenthe policeman the beat andthe It will be real grassroots policingand I hope to make it community. sacrosanct."[24] Twomonths latera spokesman the Liverpool DefenceCommittee for 8 Relations assessed change:"Community the has faileddismally. policing someof the betweenthe policeandmostof us are non-existent. Maybe on who'vemade bobbies the beathavetried.It'sthe policein the vehicles it fail, withtheirintimidation harassment."[25] and A moreintegrated in was part response hintedat by Scarman an earlier of his report:"an approach policing.., whichmarries workof to the HomeBeat andoperational policeofficers. . . in a singlepolicing style foot."[26] of But creatingsuch a policingsystemimpliesa completeinversion to the presentpriorities, dumping ground elevating beat froma despised the primary focus of activity.Our researchindicatesthat the changes to this yet necessary implement approach muchdeeperthananything go or by proposed, Scarman anyoneelse. a of see Theywouldinclude reorientation prevailing policevalueswhich and criminals enforcing lawas the only"real" the catching policing. They wouldimplya substantial of of within the restructuring the division labour of the police force, diminishing size and significance specialist departments.The presently structure wouldhaveto veryhierarchical authority be reorganised devolverealresponsibility thosein contactwiththe to to to localcommunities. promotion The systemwouldhaveto be revamped rewardgood beat work and the careerstructure so reorganized that constables not haveto leavefront-line did experienced patrolin orderto advance. makethispossible,new andmoresubtlemeasures police To of wouldhaveto be developed,whichdid not simplytotalup performance the number arrests, seriously of but evaluated quality workon the the of beatandthe success the forceandits individuals keeping peace. of in the If people genuinely want to createan effectivebeat-policing system, thenthesearesomeof the changes theywillhaveto bringabout.Putting morebobbies backon the streetswillnot suffice.Reformers mustrecognize themagnitude the tasktheyhaveundertaken the resistance of and they willencounter the notwithstanding ideologyof the beat. AND REFERENCES NOTES
detailthe readeris advisedto consultJ. Mervyn Jones, Organisational Aspects [1] Forfurther of PoliceBehaviour (1980).

based on small beats regularlypatrolledby officers normallyoperatingon

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[2] K. G. Oxford,Chief Constable,MerseysidePolice, quotedin MaghullTimes,4 March 1977. Police Police,quotedin TheJob (Metropolitan Metropolitan [3] D. McNee, Commissioner, 12 Newspaper) November1976. Police. [4] The ChiefConstable's Reportfor 1976,GreaterManchester theMossSide EnquiryPanelto the Leaderof the Greater Manchester Council, [5] Reportof Chairman B.A. HytnerQ.C., para.21.7 (1981). of [6] Mr. James Jardine,Chairman the Joint BranchBoard of the Police Federationof 21 1982. EnglandandWales,quotedin the Daily Telegraph January [7] DailyMail, 13April1981. [8] TheTimes,28 August1981. [9] Hytner,op. cit., para.42.7. PoliceSergeant quotedafterthe Brixtonriotsin DailyMail, 13April1981. [10] Metropolitan [11] Reportof an Inquiryby the Rt. Hon. The LordScarman,TheBrixtonDisorders10-12 April, 1981,H.M.S.O. Cmnd.8427(1981),para.8.31. 29 [12] New Standard, April1981. Associationof Englandand Walesto of [13] Letterfromthe Secretary the Superintendents' the Scarman Inquiry,dated28 July1981. op. [14] Scarman, cit., para.5.51. Police Staff College, Bramshill,quotedin Police Sir KennethNewman,Commandant, [15] Review,5 March1982. Associationof EnglandandWales;evidenceto Scarman, cit., op. [16] Superintendents' 5.48 and5.51. op. [17] Scarman, cit., paras. [18] Hytner,op. cit., para.21.11. op. [19] Scarman, cit., para.5.55. [20] Ibid., paras.4. 57 and4.58. [21] Hytner,op. cit., para21.10. 25 [22] Mr.JohnTilley, M.P., LambethCentral,quotedin TheGuardian, August1981. op. [23] Scarman, cit., para8.34. 2 [24] Daily Telegraph, December1981. 7 1982. [25] TheObserver, February op. [26] Scarman, cit., para.5.51.

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