Professional Documents
Culture Documents
BY JASON LAURITZEN
In November 2005, President Bush said, “We do not torture.” However, a large volume of
reporting shows that the United States does torture people and has been sloppy in covering the
trail.
Before Abu Ghraib, before Guantanamo, the Israeli government had its own “off the map” secret
prison: Facility 1391. “Off the map” is an appropriate term. According to London’s The
Guardian, the facility has been removed from modern maps and airbrushed from satellite photos.
The facility serves a disturbing purpose: “Our main conclusion is that it exists to make torture
possible—a particular kind of torture that creates progressive states of dread, dependency,
debility,” said Manal Hazzan, a human rights lawyer who helped expose the prison’s existence.
The Guardian article reveals that prisoners at the facility are stripped before interrogation,
blindfolded and handcuffed and threatened with rape. The coercive tactics do not stop there.
“They kept me there in a solitary cell for about 67 days … They did not let me sleep more than
two hours a day. When I started to get drowsy, they woke me up by making noise or by throwing
water on me. As a result of the torture, they were able to get me to admit to all kinds of
offences,” said one former prisoner.
The U.S. government—instead of reprimanding Israel for these abuses—sought to learn from the
Israelis. Israel has experimented for decades with ways of suppressing the Palestinian uprising.
The Israelis came up with a patented system for interrogation known to insiders as “R2I,” which
stands for resistance to interrogation. According to Lebanon’s The Daily Star, this includes such
methods as “hooding, sleep deprivation, time disorientation and depriving prisoners not only of
dignity, but of fundamental human needs, such as warmth, water and food.”
According to Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union, the Justice
Department held 70 men for indefinite periods of time on “baseless accusations of terrorists
links.”
Many of the suspects were not informed of the reason for their arrest, presented with evidence
used against them or allowed to see a lawyer. Any proceedings related to the suspects were
conducted behind closed doors.
Human Rights Watch described the tactics: “Witnesses were typically arrested at gunpoint, held
around the clock in solitary confinement, and subjected to the harsh and degrading high-security
conditions usually reserved for prisoners accused or convicted of the most dangerous crimes.
Corrections staff verbally harassed the detainees and, in some cases, physically abused them.”
Cofer Black, former head of the CIA’s counter-intelligence center summarized the change in law
in regards to terrorism suspects: “There was before 9/11 and there is after 9/11. After 9/11 the
gloves came off.”
“The gloves came off” and the CIA threw regard for the law to wind. As they started
interrogating al Qaeda suspects such as Mohammed, they showed little concern for what they
said were “namby pamby sensitivities of do-gooders who know nothing of America's suffering at
the hands of al-Qa'eda.”
One CIA official gave an opinion on the interrogation of prisoners: “Let's just say we are not
averse to a little smacky face. After all, if you don't violate a prisoner's human rights some of the
time then you aren't doing your job.”
While Mohammed was suspected to “stress and duress” interrogation techniques—which the
CIA said included tactics such as sleep deprivation—threats were expanding beyond Mohammed
to his family.
Mohammed’s two young sons were held by the CIA and dangled in front of the captive as a
bargaining chip.
"His sons are important to him. The promise of their release and their return to Pakistan may be
the psychological lever we need to break him," said a CIA official.
A former CIA official, acknowledged that CIA knew it was on—at best—shaky legal ground:
“We do what we do with our eyes open. I don’t think the Bush administration is going to be
wasting much time investigating this.”
The official was right: The Bush administration would not investigate the matter, but would
instead find ways of stretching U.S. and international law so it could apply brutal methods of
interrogation.
One of the first circulated memos—written by Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee—stated
that the Geneva Conventions should not be applied to prisoners from the Afghanistan conflict
because Afghanistan was a “failed state.”
On February 1, 2002, former Attorney General John Ashcroft summarized the position of the
Justice Department and said the Geneva Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda or Taliban
prisoners. The memo specifically warns that U.S. officials will be subject to “substantial and
ongoing legal challenges” and that the best way to avoid these “legal challenges” was to not
entitle prisoners to the rights afforded by the Geneva Conventions.
On December 2, 2002, the Defense Department started to weigh in on the topic and a handful of
interrogation tactics were approved by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
Rumsfeld approved the following tactics for use during interrogation: Allowing an interrogator
to falsely identify himself as an interrogator from a country “with a reputation for harsh
treatment”; The use of falsified documents; Deprivation of light; The removal of all religious
items; Removal of clothing; “The use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death
or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family”; and the “Use of a wet
towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation.”
Rumsfeld rescinded the tactics a month later, but added a caveat: “Should you determine that
particular techniques in either of these categories are warranted in an individual case, you should
forward that request to me.”
Martin Mubanga spent 33 months in Guantanamo and attested to the horrible conditions and
methods of torture used by the U.S. government. He spoke to London’s The Observer in 2005.
Mubanga described how one interrogator refused to let him go to the bathroom. After trying to
hold it, but failing, Mubanga relieved himself in the corner of his cell. The interrogator looked on
this situation as an opportunity.
“He comes back with a mop and dips it in the pool of urine. Then he starts covering me with my
own waste, like he's using a big paintbrush, working methodically, beginning with my feet and
ankles and working his way up my legs. All the while he's racially abusing me, cussing me …
He seemed to think it was funny,” said Mubanga.
The most notorious element at Guantanamo may not be the interrogators who abuse and torture
detainees, but the IRF or Internal Reaction Force.
Special Sean Baker, a 38-year-old military policeman at Guantanamo, was recruited for an
internal drill to pose as a captive. He wore an orange jumpsuit and posed as an unruly prisoner.
The IRF came to deal with Baker. The five-man team choked him, slammed his head against the
concrete floor and sprayed him with pepper gas, according to officials from the Pentagon.
The news began to filter out about the beatings and harsh interrogation methods, as well as the
indefinite imprisonment of suspects. The U.S. government set up two methods to quell critics:
staged interrogations and military commissions or tribunals.
The Weekend Australian reported on a former US Army translator who said that authorities at
Guantanamo “staged interrogations of detainees for visiting politicians and generals to give the
impression that valuable intelligence was regularly being gathered.”
The translator, Sergeant Erik Saar, said that it was “fictitious world” created for visitors and that
of the 600 detainees at the camp “only a few dozen” were terrorists and that little information
was obtained from them.
Military commissions setup to try suspects were ineffective. According to leaked e-mails, the
commissions were “rigged, fraudulent and based on ‘half-assed’ evidence.”
One of the prosecutors, Captain John Carr, said, “I find a half-hearted and disorganized effort by
a skeleton group of relatively inexperienced attorneys to prosecute fairly low-level accused in a
process that appears to be rigged." Carr also accused the panel sitting on cases to be
“handpicked” to ensure convictions.
Iraq: The Tactics Get Pushed Further
Weeks ago new photos from Abu Ghraib prison emerged. According to the Associated Press, the
photos include images of naked prisoners—some with bloodied bodies. Several images showed
dead bodies, wounded prisoners and prisoners performing forced sex acts. The photos are
reminiscent of photos released in 2004 on the news program 60 Minutes.
Tony Lagouranis, a U.S. Army interrogator stationed at Abu Ghraib, told the Public
Broadcasting Service’s news program Frontline about the torture he saw at the prison between
2004 and 2005.
He said hypothermia was a widespread technique. Other techniques included beatings, burnings
and a discotheque, which was a room with strobe lights and loud music meant to disorient the
prisoner
Lagouranis was shocked when he arrived at Abu Ghraib and was briefed by an Army psychiatrist
who provided inaccurate information based on false stereotypes.
The psychiatrist said, “Arabs, it’s part of their culture to lie. They just lie all the time and don't
even know that they're doing it.”
Interrogations got out of hand and Lagouranis said, “We weren't concerned with intel anymore;
we just wanted confessions from people.”
At least two prisoners died because interrogation sessions went too far. Manadel al-Jamadi died
after 90 minutes of interrogation by CIA officials due to “blunt force injuries” and
“asphyxiation” according to Time magazine. Blood from the body was mopped up with a
chlorine solution and a bloodied bag that had covered al-Jamadi’s head disappeared.
Asad Abdul Kareem Abdul Jaleel was also tortured to death. According to German Spiegel TV,
a pathologist wrote that Jaleel died in his sleep, but photographs of Jaleel’s body show that he
was severely beaten.
Spiegel TV found the majority of bodies the Forensic Pathology Institute in Baghdad received
were victims of torture. Iraqi pathologists were forbidden to investigate the cause of death if
there was an American death certificate—even if the information regarding the cause of death
was “obviously false.”
Outside of Abu Ghraib, near Fallujah, similar harsh interrogation practices were being pushed as
well. Three soldiers testified to Human Rights Watch that prisoners were tortured as a “form of
stress relief” and “as a way of breaking them for interrogation sessions.”
Two terms were used to torture and forced physical exertion: “Fucking a PUC” and “smoking a
PUC.”
“To ‘fuck a PUC’ means to beat him up. We would give them blows to the head, chest, legs and
stomach, pull them down, kick dirt on them. This happened every day. To ‘smoke’ someone is to
put them in stress positions until they get muscle fatigue and pass out. That happened every day,”
a sergeant told Scotland’s Sunday Herald.
The CIA began exporting terrorism suspects to other countries, so they could be tortured in
countries known for brutal interrogation methods.
“When the C.I.A. is given a task, it's usually because national policy makers don't want 'U.S.
government' written all over it," said Jim Glerum, a retired C.I.A. officer.
The CIA employed civilian planes instead of military aircraft because it allowed the agency to
“circumvent reporting requirements most countries impose on flights operated by other
governments,” reported the New York Times.
The outsourcing of interrogation did not stop with the CIA’s secret flights. In November 2005,
the Washington Post reported that CIA was holding terrorism suspects at “black sites” or covert
prisons in at least eight countries that include Thailand, Afghanistan and several eastern
European countries.
Top republican leaders called for an immediate investigation into the matter. However, leaders
did not want to know where these prisons were and what the conditions were like—they wanted
to know who leaked the information to the press.
An Ineffective Method
No matter how it’s classified to circumvent the law; No matter how many times and to how
many places it is exported and outsourced—there is a bottom line: Torture does not work.
"There's a huge body of literature showing not only that torture doesn't work, but that it's
counterproductive," said U.S. doctor Steve Miles, the author of a study on the Abu Ghraib prison
scandal in Iraq.
According to Miles, the intelligence system is overloaded with data. Torture induces suspects to
give out false information to make the torture stop, which floods “the analytic system with bad
data.”
“No one has yet offered any validated evidence that torture produces reliable intelligence. While
torture apologists frequently make the claim that torture saves lives, that assertion is directly
contradicted by many Army, FBI, and CIA professionals who have actually interrogated Al-
Qaeda captives,” said Irvine.
President Bush recently signed a bill introduced by Sen. John McCain to outlaw torture of
detainees, but the president issued a signing statement, which means that the president can
interpret the law how he pleases “in the context of his broader powers to protect national
security.”
A clear time line of harsh interrogation, abuse, torture and legal sidestepping is apparent in the
U.S. government. All this is done under the guise of national security—protecting the American
people. However, it has the opposite effect and floods the intelligence system with false data,
breeds hatred for the United States and above all, undermines fundamental rights entitled to all
under the Geneva Conventions.