1

Republic oI the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

Gk No 93833 September 28 199S
SCCCkkC D kAMIkL2 pet|t|oner
vs
nCNCkA8LL CCUk1 CI ALALS and LS1Lk S GAkCIA respondents

KAPUNAN,
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy."
1

n support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition
to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which
the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
2

The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo,
nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na,
magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCH Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCH Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing
ganoon
ESG to and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain
ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok.
Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka
sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo
na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.

2

CHUCH Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko
up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa
hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na
kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own
makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita
(Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCH tutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic)
ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung
on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo.
Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCH Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCH Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCH Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak.
Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCH Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka
kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak
ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas
ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCH Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa
akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCH na-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

3

ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCH Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo.
Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.
3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information
charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of
Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court,
the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by
Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a
tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter
communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other
person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the nformation on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. n
an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1)
the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished
by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the
communication.
4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on ertiorari with this
Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First
Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the
trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

4

T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A.
4200. n thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do
not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari.
5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution
6
dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant
petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"
7
that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to
the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a
private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.
8
n relation to this,
petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the
nformation, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.
9
Finally,
petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private
respondent was not illegal under the said act.
10

We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible
11

or absurb or would lead to an injustice.
12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. t shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized
by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of
a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by
the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator"
13
under
this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,

3

unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy
would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not
made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that
would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or
special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties
but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the
actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the
act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you
say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or
outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense
but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations
taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it
is not sportsmanlike. f the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the
parties. believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, was to say that in meetings of the board of
directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties
know. t is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please
be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness
and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging
statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you
are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without

6

him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being
recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. , No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as
now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person not between a speaker
and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. , No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of
the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the
acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the
respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed."
14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word
communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." n its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing
or imparting, as in a conversation,
15
or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are
shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)"
16
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-
charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the
privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and

7

"communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill
quoted below:
t has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations
being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well
the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their
lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often characterized by
exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social
desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of
communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution.
Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the
nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free
exchange of communication between individuals free from every unjustifiable
intrusion by whatever means.
17

n aanan vs. Intermediate Appellate ourt,
18
a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise
was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein,
19
following the
principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."
20
The instant case
turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of
R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts
punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and
leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENED. The decision appealed from is
AFFRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.








8

Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Gk No 82S11 March 3 1992
GLC8LMACkA CA8LL AND kADIC CCkCkA1ICN pet|t|oner
vs
NA1ICNAL LA8Ck kLLA1ICNS CCMMISSICN and IMLLDA SALA2Ak respondents
costi//o Lomon 1on Ponto/eon for petitioner
6erordo 5 4/onso/on for privote respondent

ROMERO,
For private respondent melda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin
Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. n May 1982, private respondent was employed by Globe-
Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by
petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom private
respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare
parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the
investigation of the latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the
company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a
partnership styled Concave Commercial and ndustrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner
and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended
by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders
airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao
to defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR
filed an action for replevin against Saldivar.
1

t likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that melda Salazar violated
company reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests.
Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and
Saldivar. t also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders
airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent
Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her
thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three
(3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for
illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick
leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective

9

November 8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove
these findings.
2

After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company
to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages
and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also
ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00.
3

On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned resolution
dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of
private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award
for moral damages.
4

Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in
ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his
position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any
employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by
th.e discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent
shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial
recourse available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive
suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges
she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection
of the company's property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance
committed by the employee.
5

Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due process
when she was promptly suspended. f at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when she
ignored petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her)
side to the Management." nstead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed her
complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the
controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual
separation from employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who
has not merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a
person is not to be deprived without due process, but also the compensation that should have
accrued to her during the period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. n cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by

10

this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the
time of his actual reinstatement.
6
(Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the mplementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. n cases of regular employments, the employer shall
not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the
Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages."
7

(Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has gone
further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized
groups of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new
Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other things, to "protect
and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas of concern
in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and Natural
Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of
Poople's Organizations and Human Rights.
9

The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all.
t shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions
of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be provided by law.
10
(Emphasis
supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an
Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or
creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall
ensure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective baegaining, security of

11

tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide for
compulsory arbitration.
11

To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the
State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the
present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection,"
at least greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the geographical location
of the workers and whether they are organized or not.
t was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially
contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that the
same be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of
Principles and State Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are giving now to social
justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in national
development."
12

f we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution and
the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job
except for a just or authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater importance under the
1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice.
And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms,
where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee,
or on the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of
dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find, application.
Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further by enacting
Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove
any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered down the
constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection."
13

To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal,
cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to
reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages."
14

The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of
backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her
job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions
etc. from which one had been removed"
15
and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during
the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not been
forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement
under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be
effected in view of the long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the
situation;
16
or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; "
17
or that reinstatement may no
longer be feasible;
18
or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved;
19
or that the
company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment;
20
or that it will not serve any
prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score

12

unjust or inequitable
21
or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy
and antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and
the employee.
22

n lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation
pay
23
or solely separation pay.
24

n the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. n the first place the wording of the
Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ."
25
Under the principlesof statutory
construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from
the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption
that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and
preclude the court from construing it differently.
26
The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use
of such words as are found in the statute.
27
'erba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of
a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. f in
the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited
provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be
inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee.
n such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he
enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an
atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency
and productivity of the employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where the
employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top
management;
28
or is the Officer-n-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works;
29

or is an organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the
workers in commercial and industrial establishments;
30
or is a warehouseman of a non-profit
organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign
individuals and organizations to the Philippines;
31
or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales.
32

Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey
reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered
between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature.
33

Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right;
otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by
merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already
become strained.
34

Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that
may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead
to strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an

13

exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully
dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in transactions
that may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of
company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving themselves with any company that has
business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed as a
witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of
GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable position as far as petitioner was
concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not
create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from
operations involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the
development of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. n other words, Salazar did
not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and company
assets.
n the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we
have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for
terminations it must rest an some basis which must be convincingly established.
35
An employee
who not be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since
Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that
complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's investigation
although unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's test.
36
While we should not
condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of
suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous
because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and
anomalous transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely insinuated
that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct
knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is
wanting from the records.
t is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already resigned
from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management's
findings, the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner
dealt principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his
side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried out to
ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as
well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been
unlawfully dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to RENSTATE
private respondent melda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period
of two (2) years only.

14

This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Bidin, rio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
ruz, J., concurs in the result.
utierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions
MLLLnClCPL88L8A dlssenLlng
l belleve Lhere ls [usL cause for dlsmlssal per lnvesLlgaLlve flndlngs (See ueclslon p 2)
-fffnn
1he Lawphll ro[ecL Arellano Law loundaLlon
















13

Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

R No 109445 November 7, 1994
FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his
capacity as Secretary of Justice, respondent.
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.

MENDOZA,
This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309,
which among other things provides compensation for persons who are unjustly accused, convicted
and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered released.
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated
murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding
of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of
June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and
petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately
detained after their bonds had been cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment, however,
as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that
the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to
by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into their
hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did
nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides
for the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned
but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."
1
The claim was filed with the
Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while
petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a
result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis
for finding that he was "probably guilty."

16

On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of
Justice in his resolution dated March 11, 1993:
t is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted
and imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was
wrongly accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making him
"a victim of unjust imprisonment." n the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant
cannot be deemed such a victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal
shows that his exculpation is not based on his innocence, but upon, in effect, a
finding of reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309,
however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless,
in view of the importance of the question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the petition as a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a)
of the law the claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he was
convicted in the trial court. Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and
does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime which
he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim
because he was not declared innocent would be to say that his imprisonment for two years while
his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one requirement for
conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. f the prosecution fails to
present such proof, the presumption that the accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no
reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of the crime before he can recover compensation
for his imprisonment.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. t would require that every time an accused is acquitted on
appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial
court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that
when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. t leaves out of the
provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The
following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted and] imprisoned." The fact
that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous
conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction
by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he may be acquitted
not because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in which case
he may be found civilly liable to the complainant, because while the evidence against him does not
satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to sustain a
civil action for damages.
2
n one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with
homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who consented to have sex with
him. Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered
deported.
3
n such a case to pay the accused compensation for having been "unjustly convicted"
by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to follow
petitioner's theory such an accused would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).

17

The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of innocence
of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution. f
"accusation is not synonymous with guilt,"
4
so is the presumption of innocence not a proof thereof.
t is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to place on the
prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. t is quite
another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted."
As this Court held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we
emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. t is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an
airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do
not exist.
5

To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his
conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did
not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an "unjust
conviction." f his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction
while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does
respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the
accused.
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael . limaco
6

applies:
n order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it
must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is
not supported by the evidence, and the same was made with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that
although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his
duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the
rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they
imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation.
nexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest
injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied,
yet in the contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and
indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept.
ndeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is
unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been
"unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. t is
important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been
wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the

18

prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on less than the required quantum
of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is
not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof."
Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a
conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an
erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
n the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the trial
court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To
the contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-accused were in league,
because petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the
victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his coaccused arrived
together in the hut of the victims and forced their way into it.
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that he did
or say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have
committed any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything
at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything in furtherance
of a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the defendants. t seems to be
a frail and flimsy basis on which to conclude that conspiracy existed between actual
killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated
murders on that night of June 26, 1988. t may be asked: where was the coming
together of the two defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder on two counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the
commission of the said crimes? Basbacio was as the record shows nothing but
part of the dark shadows of that night. . . .
One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concert of
action and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they apparently
flee together? And what about the fact that there was bad blood between petitioner and the victim
Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the acquittal of
petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had been unjustly accused,
convicted and imprisoned before he was released because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that
in view of these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did not
commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for compensation under
Rep. Act No. 7309.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DSMSSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, .J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
'itug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

19

lellclano ! ls on leave
Iootnotes
1 1he sLaLuLe ln perLlnenL parLs provlde
Sec 3 Who may llle Clalms 1he followlng may flle clalms for compensaLlon before Lhe 8oard
a) any person who was un[usLly accused convlcLed lmprlsoned buL subsequenLly released by vlrLue of a [udgmenL of
acqulLLal
b) any person who was un[usLly deLalned and released wlLhouL belng charged
c) any vlcLlm of arblLrary or lllegal deLenLlon by Lhe auLhorlLles as deflned ln Lhe 8evlsed enal Code under a flnal
[udgmenL of Lhe courL and
d) any person who ls a vlcLlm of vlolenL crlmes lor purposes of Lhls AcL vlolenL crlmes shall lnclude rape and shall
llkewlse refer Lo offenses commlLLed wlLh mallce whlch resulLed ln deaLh or serlous physlcal and/or psychologlcal
ln[urles permanenL lncapaclLy or dlsablllLy lnsanlLy aborLlon serlous Lrauma or commlLLed wlLh LorLure cruelLy or
barbarlLy
Sec 4 Award Celllng lor vlcLlms of un[usL lmprlsonmenL or deLenLlon Lhe compensaLlon shall be based on Lhe
number of monLhs of lmprlsonmenL or deLenLlon and every fracLlon Lhereof shall be consldered one monLh
rovlded however 1haL ln no case shall such compensaLlon exceed Cne Lhousand pesos (100000) per monLh
ln all oLher cases Lhe maxlmum amounL for whlch Lhe 8oard may approve a clalm shall noL exceed 1en Lhousand
pesos (1000000) or Lhe amounL necessary Lo relmburse Lhe clalmanL Lhe expenses lncurred for hosplLallzaLlon
medlcal LreaLmenL loss of wage loss of supporL or oLher expenses dlrecLly relaLed Lo Lhe ln[ury whlchever ls lower
1hls ls wlLhouL pre[udlce Lo Lhe rlghL of Lhe clalmanL Lo seek oLher remedles under exlsLlng laws
2 1he Clvll Code provldes ln ArL 29 When Lhe accused ln a crlmlnal prosecuLlon ls acqulLLed on Lhe ground LhaL hls
gullL has noL been proved beyond reasonable doubL a clvll acLlon for damages for Lhe same acL or omlsslon may be
lnsLlLuLed Such acLlon requlres only a preponderance of evldence upon moLlon of Lhe defendanL Lhe courL may
requlre Lhe plalnLlff Lo flle a bond Lo answer for damages ln case Lhe complalnL should be found Lo be mallclous
lf ln a crlmlnal case Lhe [udgmenL of acqulLLal ls based upon reasonable doubL Lhe courL shall so declare ln Lhe
absence of any declaraLlon Lo LhaL effecL lL may be lnferred from Lhe LexL of Lhe declslon wheLher or noL Lhe
acqulLLal ls due Lo LhaL ground
3 eople v 8lLLer 194 SC8A 690 (1991)
4 eople v uramayo 42 SC8A 39 64 (1971)
3 Supra noLe 3 aL 722
6 33 SC8A 107 119 (1974)




















20

Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

R No 109835 November 22, 1993
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAEMENT, INC, petitioner,
vs
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L DE LOS SANTOS,
respondent
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.

CRUZ,
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post the required
appeal bond.
1

The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended,
providing that:
n the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
and Rule V, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as
follows:
Sec. 6. Bond n case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award,
an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules
to decisions rendered by the POEA. t insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of
licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4,
Rule , Book of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash
bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000. t
shall also post a cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding

21

company acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited by the nsurance
Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from
violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation
and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with
the provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to
recruitment and placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of
the Department and all liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety
bonds shall include the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the surety
and that any judgment against the principal in connection with matters falling under
POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds
shall be co-terminus with the validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied)
n addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine
National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule , Book of the same Rule, "to primarily
answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money
claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that
the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the
POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of
Rule V, Book V of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with
proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond
as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received
the appealed decision and/or award and proof of service on the other party of such
appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall
not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award,
an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of
P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond
to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
t was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and surety
bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is
required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended

22

to further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually
affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
t is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to
guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are not
limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated. The
POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its
license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing
POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it
were, to be used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of
every claim of recruited workers that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may not
even be enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be exhausted
after satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to
the dismissed employee, the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the
POEA Rules would be depleted if this award were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but
against the bonds and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other
obligations the recruiter may incur.
ndeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of
P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.
t is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner
observes, but there is a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to
more stringent requirement because of the special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected
by their foreign employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The
overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the escrow money are
intended to insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to
whom our overseas workers are to be sent.
t is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case),
care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as
an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. &t res magis valeat
quam pereat.
2
Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the
aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow
money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not
see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and
Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be
avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as
parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter
prescribed in Section 4, Rule , Book of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under
Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6,
Rule V, Book V of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the
POEA.

23

Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to the
mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further
protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of
labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DSMSSED, with costs against the petitioner. t is so ordered.
Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J, is on leave.

# Footnotes
1 Order issued by NLRC Commissioner Domingo H. Zapanta, Second Division,
dated October 30, 1992.
2 "That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed." Simonds v. Walker, 100
Mass. 113; National Pemberton Bank v. Lougee, 108 Mass. 373, 11 Am. Rep. 367.
Charitable bequests are also governed by this maxim. Kieg v. Richardson, C.C.A.
N.C., B6 F. 2d 849, 858.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation














24

Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiII-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, deIendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, 1.P.,
The Iacts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, Iollowed by appropriate planning and
serious endeavors, but terminated in Irustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, Iollowing their mutual promise oI love, decided to get married
and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez leIt this note Ior his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the Iollowing telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE
MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
ThereaIter Velez did not appear nor was he heard Irom again.
Sued by Beatriz Ior damages, Velez Iiled no answer and was declared in deIault. PlaintiII adduced evidence
beIore the clerk oI court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering deIendant
to pay plaintiII P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as
attorney's Iees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 deIendant Iiled a "petition Ior relieI Irom orders, judgment and proceedings and motion Ior
new trial and reconsideration." PlaintiII moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the
parties and their attorneys to appear beIore it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage oI the proceedings

23

the possibility oI arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any oI them Iail to appear "the
petition Ior relieI and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted Ior resolution."
On August 23, 1955 deIendant Iailed to appear beIore court. Instead, on the Iollowing day his counsel Iiled a
motion to deIer Ior two weeks the resolution on deIendants petition Ior relieI. The counsel stated that he
would conIer with deIendant in Cagayan de Oro City the latter's residence on the possibility oI an
amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted Irom August 25, 1955.
PlaintiII maniIested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8,
1955 but that deIendant and his counsel had Iailed to appear.
Another chance Ior amicable settlement was given by the court in its order oI July 6, 1956 calling the parties
and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, deIendant's counsel inIormed the court
that chances oI settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying deIendant's aIoresaid petition. DeIendant has appealed to
this Court. In his petition oI June 21, 1955 in the court a quo deIendant alleged excusable negligence as
ground to set aside the judgment by deIault. SpeciIically, it was stated that deIendant Iiled no answer in the
belieI that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition Ior relieI Irom judgment on grounds oI Iraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be
duly supported by an aIIidavit oI merits stating Iacts constituting a valid deIense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules oI
Court.) DeIendant's aIIidavit oI merits attached to his petition oI June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good
and valid deIense against plaintiII's cause oI action, his Iailure to marry the plaintiII as scheduled having
been due to Iortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An aIIidavit oI merits like this stating
mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951;
Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
DeIendant, however, would contend that the aIIidavit oI merits was in Iact unnecessary, or a mere
surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence
adduced beIore the clerk oI court. In Province oI Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this
Court pointed out that the procedure oI designating the clerk oI court as commissioner to receive evidence is
sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) oI the Rules oI Court. Now as to deIendant's consent to said procedure,
the same did not have to be obtained Ior he was declared in deIault and thus had no standing in court (Velez
vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court oI First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support oI his "motion Ior new trial and reconsideration," deIendant asserts that the judgment is contrary
to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision oI the Civil Code authorizing" an action Ior breach oI
promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as
reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach oI a promise to marry" is not
an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated Irom the draIt oI the new Civil
Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless Ior Article 21 oI said Code provides that "any person who wilIully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter Ior the damage."

26

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiII and deIendant applied Ior a license to contract marriage,
which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set Ior September 4, 1954. Invitations
were printed and distributed to relatives, Iriends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's
trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel Ior the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses Ior
the maid oI honor and the Ilower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought.
Bridal showers were given and giIts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days beIore the
wedding, deIendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply leIt a note Ior plaintiII stating: "Will have to
postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next
day, the day beIore the wedding, he wired plaintiII: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he
never returned and was never heard Irom again.
Surely this is not a case oI mere breach oI promise to marry. As stated, mere breach oI promise to marry is
not an actionable wrong. But to Iormally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation
and publicity, only to walk out oI it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite diIIerent. This is
palpably and unjustiIiably contrary to good customs Ior which deIendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 aIoresaid.
DeIendant urges in his aIore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised
as to the award oI actual damages. What deIendant would really assert hereunder is that the award oI moral
and exemplary damages, in the amount oI P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision oI Article 2219 (10) oI the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
cases mentioned in Article 21 oI said Code. As to exemplary damages, deIendant contends that the same
could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 oI the New Civil Code the condition
precedent is that "the deIendant acted in a wanton, Iraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner."
The argument is devoid oI merit as under the above-narrated circumstances oI this case deIendant clearly
acted in a "wanton ... , reckless |and| oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering
the particular circumstances oI this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a
reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modiIication, the lower court's judgment is hereby
aIIirmed, with costs.
Beng:on, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Di:on, Regala, Makalintal, and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.

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