“SINCE WHEN AMERICA STARTED RULING PAKISTAN”

Pakistan was carved out of colonial India and came into existence in 1947.
It was the result of religious divisions that actually surfaced during the last
100 years of colonial rule—especially after the British, by enunciating
difference on the basis of religion, created ongoing tensions and conflict
between Hindus and Muslims in colonial India.

The issue of Kashmir and India's relatively greater military strength

prompted the emerging Pakistani elite to align the country with America's
strategic interests. This decision was also in response to India's alignment
with the former Soviet Union.

WHAT A DIFFERENCE a day makes. Pakistan before September 11 was

treated as a pariah state and General Pervaiz Musharraf was shunned by
Western heads of state for seizing power in a military coup. Since that day
there has been a sea change in the treatment of Pakistan and its military
President by the United States and its European allies.

Musharraf has been eagerly sought by Western heads of state, and he has
even been given an audience by George W. Bush. Pakistan has been
welcomed back into the international (read Western) community's fold, and
now promises are being made by the United States to chart a new course of
cooperation with this erstwhile client state.

Whether this change marks a new patron-client relationship, or a new Bush

doctrine, remains to be seen. As it has shown itself, this new doctrine is
about reasserting America's global hegemony and simultaneously a
declaration of resolve to move unilaterally to advance U.S. strategic national
and corporate interests and, if need be, in a violent and forceful manner
against militant Islamists.

Coincidentally, some fifty years ago, Pakistan was one of the first few allies
that the United States had enlisted as part of its Cold War strategy. At the
time, Pakistan's ruling classes were jockeying for power to gain significant
control of the new state apparatus.

Unlike the pressure that Musharraf must have faced in being forced to
accede to current U.S. demands, Pakistani rulers in the 1950s were not really
coerced to become American surrogates. However, the Pakistanis were to
later learn at their own peril that American "friendship" comes at a very
heavy price.Even from the perspective of the Pakistani ruling classes, they
don't seem to have derived much tangible benefit by aligning with the
Americans.

During the first decade of the alliance (1954-1964), the country's rapid
industrial growth (starting at a peak of 24% and leveling to 6% annual
growth rate in the mid-1960s) was largely a result of Ayub Khan's selective
import substitution strategy and his extremely oppressive anti-labor policies.

The high growth rates of this period resulted in only broadening the
availability of consumer non-durables at the cost of not establishing a basic
capital goods sector.

At the same time, the feudal elite remained unscathed despite Ayub Khan's
purported land reforms. The same could not be said for the people of
Pakistan, who remained impoverished while the country became a veritable
laboratory for Modernization theorists.

In the field of economics, W.W. Rostow, with his stage theory of economic
growth, was busy forecasting Pakistan's rapid economic growth and
claiming that the economy was on the verge of "take-off." Similarly, on the
political front, American theorists had blessed the military rule of General
Ayub Khan (1958-1969) and had made all kinds of rationalizations about
why democratic rule would not be possible within a largely illiterate
populace.

In the 1950s, the United States had seized the initiative by locking the
Pakistani elite into treaties which were to actually serve its containment
policy against the so-called "Soviet menace." In a space of five years (1954-
1959), Washington had entered into as many defence pacts and treaties.

The first of these was the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (1954)
which besides establishing a close military, political and economic alliance
with the Americans also allowed them military bases in Northern Pakistan to
spy on the former Soviet Union.
Then there were regional pacts: Baghdad Pact (1955), Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) which included Great Britain, Turkey and Iraq, and
the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO, 1956) when Pakistan was
not even part of South East Asia.

Because of these pacts and Pakistan's proximity to the former USSR and
China, the country saw a large U.S. presence and its meddling in Pakistan's
internal affairs. In the late 1960s, it was widely believed that the Americans
were supporting ultra right-wing Islamist parties, such as the Jamaat-e-
Islami, in a bid to weaken left-wing anti-American forces in the country.

Resentment in Pakistan grew against American presence and interference.

As a result, anti-American protests became widespread and US Information
Service (USIS) centers became favorite targets of protesters. With these
protests as a backdrop and the start of the Vietnam War, American presence
in Pakistan started to dissipate.

The consequence of American meddling and eleven years of military rule

produced serious internal convulsions, which brought to the fore the grave
problems faced by Pakistani society: subversion of the democratic process,
the denial of provincial autonomy to sub-national groups, the growing gap in
income and wealth, rising bureaucratic ineptness and corruption, and the
intense oppression of workers by industrialists—some of whom were said to
even have private prisons in their factories.

The collective toll of this misrule was the 1971 separation of East Pakistan
and the creation of Bangladesh. However, the aftermath of this tumult also
ensured that for the first time a popularly elected government of Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto would be swept to power.

Bhutto's stint in power (1973-1977) was a bundle of contradictions. He rose

to prominence as a populist, took on the military, played a pivotal role in
bringing Muslim states under the umbrella of the Organization of Islamic
Countries (OIC) and introduced fairly progressive labor legislation.
But he also stifled dissent with a heavy hand, overlooked massive corruption
of his own ministers, and nationalized key industries, banks and insurance
companies without any clear policy of how these sectors would contribute to
economic development after nationalization.

The Americans did not trust Bhutto, possibly because of his efforts to
organize the Muslim states outside the American orbit. With the overthrow
(and murder) of Bhutto by General Zia ul-Haq, and the coming to power of
pro-Soviet military rulers in Afghanistan who had similarly removed King
Zahir Shah, the United States began to again take interest in the region.

This time round, the primary U.S. aim was to garner support of Pakistan's
military for the recruitment and training of Afghan Mujahideen to fight
America's proxy war with the Soviet Union—naturally, with American arms.
Thus Pakistan not only became a conduit for American arms to Afghani
groups opposed to Soviet occupation, but its military actually fought
alongside the Mujahideen.

This second period of American meddling, starting in the late 1970s,

dovetailed with another eleven long years of martial rule. This military rule
of General Zia was a watershed for Pakistan's social and political
development. It also marked the return of American hegemony over
Pakistan and the region.

When Zia came to power in 1977, the military in Pakistan was thoroughly
discredited. With the arrest and subsequent execution of Bhutto by the
military, General Zia had almost no popular support. As a way to mask this
reality and stay in power, Zia had to rely on right-wing Islamist parties while
he went through the masquerade of implementing his notions of
"Islamization" of Pakistani society.

Since Zia's actions did not contradict American support of Islamist groups in
Afghanistan, the United States didn't seem to have a problem with his
policies.
Historically, the far right religious parties had been on the margins of
political power despite their intrusive street presence. To overcome this
marginality and to legitimize military rule, Zia brought the likes of Jamaat-e-
Islami into power.

This move gave Zia and these parties a carte blanche that enabled them to
"Islamize" the criminal code, implement their version of Islamic banking
laws, and to confine women within the four walls of the home. At the same
time, Zia directed funds from public education into building of madrassas
(religious schools), imposed his version of Shariat laws, publicly flogged
those that had transgressed his strict moral code, and placed on the books the
more heinous punishments of stoning and cutting off limbs.

In the process, eleven years of Zia ul-Haq's rule became extremely disabling
for Pakistanis in general, but specifically for women, the poor, religious
minorities, sub-national struggles for provincial autonomy, progressive
political activists, and enlightened intellectual or academic activity.It is also
in this period that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) came to wield
immense power under Zia's zealous army generals.

It is uncanny that in sketching this period of Zia's military rule, one could
very well have been referring to the Taliban—who now appear to be the
ultimate personification of Zia's version of Islam. Therefore, it should be no
surprise that the madrassas established during the Zia era, and spread to
Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, became the inspiration for Taliban
indoctrination.

Inside Pakistan, however, it should be said that despite Zia's so-called

"Islamization" the support for Islamist parties was insignificant. In the four
general elections since Zia's demise, the right-wing Islamist parties have
never received more than five to seven percent of seats in parliament.That
said, these parties nonetheless have caused immense havoc, pain and
bloodshed in the country. They still command a frightening street presence
that is most unsettling for ordinary Pakistanis.
But there are other troubling aspects of Zia's obscurantist rule, the effects of
which confront Pakistani society even to this day. This has to do with rising
religious sectarianism in Pakistan, and the expanding "Kalashnikov culture"
which signifies the easy availability of firearms that originate from
Afghanistan.

What should not be lost in this brief historical analysis is that imperial U.S.
interests have supremely guided its every move in the region. The United
States is currently involved in dictating what Musharraf and the Pakistani
state should do to assist and supplant its war effort in Afghanistan.

Similarly, U.S. involvement was quite central during Zia's pernicious rule,
using the ultra-right Islamist parties as a bulwark for its fight against the
spread of communism. This continued an historic trend: In Pakistan, the
United States courted Jamaat-e-Islami in the 1960s just as it did in Indonesia
in the same period by supporting General Suharto and the Islamist groups in
their massacre of Indonesian communists, who were the largest such
formation outside the former Soviet Union and China.

On the other hand, the former U.S. National Security advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski is on record urging the Mujahideen in Afghanistan to fight the
holy war against the Soviets in the name of Islam.To further complicate
matters, the hurried exit from the region by the Americans, once the Cold
War was over, not only left a power vacuum in Afghanistan but helped the
conflict to be internalized along ethnic lines.

Ordinary people in Pakistan were left to deal with the mess that Americans
had left behind, namely: civil war, sectarian conflicts, intertribal feuds, the
development of an arms culture, and the rise of petty-minded, militant,
misogynist and morally bankrupt religious groups.

In the case of Afghanistan, the ascendancy and in-fighting between different

Islamist groups enabled neighboring states, namely Iran and Pakistan, to
engineer outcomes that served their strategic or national interests.
In the case of Pakistan, it was the notion of "strategic military depth"—
meaning that a quiet Western front was needed in the context of its conflict
with India over Kashmir. But given the obscurantism of the Taliban and
their tenuous support for Pakistan, it now appears that this strategic depth
was actually the reflection of a shallow policy of Pakistan's military and
civilian rulers.

In the three years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, U.S.
military aid to Pakistan soared to $4.2 billion, compared to $9.1 million in
the three years before the attacks — a 45,000 percent increase — boosting
Pakistan to the top tier of countries receiving this type of funding. More than
half of the new money was provided through a post-9/11 Defense
Department program — Coalition Support Funds — not closely tracked by
Congress.

In return for American largesse, Pakistan has become a key U.S. ally in its
global war on terror. Since 2001, the country has allowed the U.S. to use air
bases in anti-terrorism operations, provided access to logistics facilities in
Pakistan, shared intelligence, helped identify and detain citizens who may
have been involved in terrorism, and tightened the border between Pakistan
and Afghanistan by deploying up to 80,000 Pakistani troops.

The United States is pushing Pakistan to move back toward democracy, but
its appeals are tempered by the knowledge that the few elections held in
recent years have shown the growing strength of religious parties that revile
American influence in their country. The elected local governments of the
Northwest Frontier province are among the most militant.

The stakes are critical. Pakistan is the epicentre of the most dangerous corner
of the world, where terrorism, nuclear weapons, war, narcotics and dictators
come together. America have looked to Musharraf since 9/11 to be the edge
of the spear against Al Qaeda, and handsomely rewarded him with over
$10bn in aid, but Al Qaeda is stronger than ever.
All too often America has forsaken its long-term interests and, worse, its
values in Pakistan and chosen the short-term convenience of backing
military dictators. Each time they have failed to develop the country’s
freedoms and undermined its democratic institutions. Consequently today
only 15 per cent of Pakistanis have a favourable opinion of America and
over 70 per cent fear an American military attack.

The September 11 attacks on New York and Washington and the ensuing
U.S.-led war on terrorism have given Pakistan's military dictator, Gen.
Pervez Musharraf, an opportunity to improve the relationship between
Washington and Islamabad. That relationship had experienced a steep
decline in the 1990s, as the end of both the Cold War and the common
struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan eroded the perception
of shared strategic interests. Moreover, while it was losing its strategic
significance to the United States, Pakistan was coming under the control of
an assertive military-religious nexus that promoted anti-American radical
Islamic forces at home and abroad.

Since September 11, General Musharraf, whose regime had been the main
source of diplomatic and military support for the terrorist Taliban ruling
neighboring Afghanistan, has portrayed his regime as an ally of Washington
in its counterterrorism campaign. Musharraf, though, headed a military
clique that brought an end to his nation's short democratic experience,
assisted radical Islamic terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir, pressed
for a war with India, advanced Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, and
presided over a corrupt and mismanaged economy.

In exchange for his belated support, Musharraf has been rewarded with U.S.
diplomatic backing and substantial economic aid. Musharraf's decision to
join the U.S. war on terrorism didn't reflect a structural transformation in
Pakistan's policy. It was a result of tactical considerations aimed at limiting
the losses that Islamabad would suffer because of the collapse of the friendly
Taliban regime in Kabul. Rejecting cooperation with Washington would
have provoked American wrath and placed at risk Pakistan's strategic and
economic interests in South Asia.
From the very beginning of the crisis, it hardly seemed possible that the
Taliban regime and its former sponsors, the government of Pakistan, could
coexist after Pakistan delivered Washington's hand-over-Osama-or-else
ultimatum.

Washington must have made a commitment to the Musharraf regime to

strike hard enough to demonstrate to the Pakistani military/intelligence
apparatus (as well as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) that anyone tempted to back
the Taliban will be on the losing side.

U.S. policy makers in the mid-'90s were happy to see Pakistan's military
intelligence services sponsor the Taliban's seizure of power, because after the
fall of the Soviet Union they didn't regard Afghanistan as worth the trouble
of directly managing—an option that doesn't exist now.

In 1986, CIA chief William Casey had stepped up the war against the Soviet
Union by taking three significant, but at that time highly secret, measures.
He had persuaded the U.S. Congress to provide the Mujaheddin [anti-Soviet
fighters in Afghanistan] with American-made Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to
shoot down Soviet planes and provide U.S. advisors to train the guerrillas.

The CIA, Britain's MI6 and the ISI [Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence]
also agreed on a provocative plan to launch guerilla attacks into the Soviet
Socialist Republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the soft Muslim underbelly
of the Soviet state from where Soviet troops in Afghanistan received their
supplies.

Casey committed CIA support to a long-standing ISI initiative to recruit

radical Muslims from around the world to come to Pakistan and fight with
the Afghan Mujaheddin. The ISI had encouraged this idea since 1982, and
by now all the other players [i.e. the Pakistani political leadership, the USA
and Saudi Arabia] had their reasons for supporting the idea.
Given the history of American involvement in Pakistan, it is no surprise that
many people are now speaking about the "blowback" from these ill-
conceived U.S. interventions. However, the big question in the minds of
almost all the pakistanis about the violent American misadventure around
the world is : What will be the fallout of America's “War On Terror” which
includes Pakistan as a Non-Nato alley?

It is almost certain that American actions will not reduce the level of
violence or terror in the world, whether it is carried out by a nation-state, by
Islamist groups or by the United States itself in supposedly fighting "evil."

It appears that America is not interested in the lessons of history, as She

seems intent on pursuing military solutions to root out militant Islam in
Pakistan, which in large part has been sponsored by the Americans in the
first place. If this trajectory of American policy continues, the world will
have to face another "blow back"—time from the new Bush doctrine.