Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991 RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents. Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf. Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence. The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied) The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides: There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office. Black defines "practice of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.) The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: ... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852) This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure

of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied) Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours) The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service. One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312) Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law." MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement? THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Commissioner will please proceed. MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years". To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit. This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up. MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question. MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit? MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance

with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes. MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law. MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. OPLE. Thank you. ... ( Emphasis supplied) Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied) Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15). At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.). The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.). The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the

litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.). In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687). By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.). Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.). In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law. We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional

groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making. Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts. In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom. Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a crossdisciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity. Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making. Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry. Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house. A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law. At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.) In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business. Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4). This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one

who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues. Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself. These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning. Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in other arenas. Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied) The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative

efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied) Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes. In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied) Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos: First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied) Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied) Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point. [Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made. Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work. Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions. This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4). The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo) After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied) Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member. In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan

Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied) After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13). In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied) Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied) A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyereconomist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said: Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied) No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated: It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied) The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200) The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) SubArticle C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides: The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven

years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent. Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined. Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers. Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President? We now proceed: The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of

discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. Additionally, consider the following: (1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative. (2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear. (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate. Finally, one significant legal maxim is: We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life. Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that No blade shall touch his skin; No blood shall flow from his veins. When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement. In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.) Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring: I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting: The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met. The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."

(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries." The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with. What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily. Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law. As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2 Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied). It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states: 1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864). 2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359) 3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra) 4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3 The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. The following relevant questions may be asked: 1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law? 2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually? 3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4 Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position. CRUZ, J., dissenting: I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint. To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review. In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed. If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments. Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than

the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place. Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation." The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board. The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable." The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions. The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and

the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections. I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition. GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting: When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result. Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision. There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution. Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits. A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law. Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period. I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there? The professional life of the respondent follows: 1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following: 1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania 2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation 3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation 4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies 5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer 6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer 7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member 8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies: a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc. b. Dataprep, Philippines c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc. d. Semirara Coal Corporation e. CBL Timber Corporation Member of the Board of the Following: a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines b. First Philippine Energy Corporation c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation e. Graphic Atelier f. Manila Electric Company g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc. h. Philippine Electric Corporation i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22) There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful. I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law? The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years." Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows: The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited. It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776) For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit: xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned." xxx xxx xxx Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773) xxx xxx xxx ... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a

theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied) In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]): xxx xxx xxx ... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112) It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit: l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968). Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115) xxx xxx xxx While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the FactFinding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual

transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]). Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate. I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. I vote to GRANT the petition. Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions NARVASA, J., concurring: I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition. Melencio-Herrera, J., concur. PADILLA, J., dissenting: The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent

Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met. The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries." The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with. What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily. Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law. As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2 Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states: 1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968). Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864). 2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359) 3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra) 4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. The following relevant questions may be asked: 1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law? 2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually? 3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman? Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4 Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position. CRUZ, J., dissenting: I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint. To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts,

not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review. In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed. If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments. Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place. Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation." The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board. The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions. The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections. I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition. GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting: When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result. Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision. There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits. A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law. Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations? The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period. I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there? The professional life of the respondent follows: 1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following: 1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania 2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation 4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies 5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer 6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer 7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member 8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt Member 9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies: a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc. b. Dataprep, Philippines c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc. d. Semirara Coal Corporation e. CBL Timber Corporation Member of the Board of the Following: a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines b. First Philippine Energy Corporation c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation e. Graphic Atelier f. Manila Electric Company g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc. h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22) There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer. The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful. I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law? The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years." Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows: The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited. It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and

customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776) For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit: xxx xxx xxx Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned." xxx xxx xxx Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773) xxx xxx xxx ... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and

non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied) In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]): xxx xxx xxx ... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112) It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit: l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968). Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the FactFinding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]). Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate. I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. I vote to GRANT the petition. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988 PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA, respondents. Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner. Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.: The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling with his own client, more often than not, in the matter of fees. The lawyer, the petitioner himself, would have his petition decided on pure questions of procedure, yet, the Court cannot let pass unnoticed the murkier face of the controversy, wherein the law is corrupted to promote a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and the law profession, debased into a simple business dealing. Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only of the questions raised by the petitioner pertaining to procedure, but considering its serious ethical implications, on its merits as well. We turn to the facts. The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of land located in Quezon City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he obtained various loans from the L & R Corporation, a financing institution, in various sums totalling P420,000.00 As security therefor, he executed deeds of mortgage in favor of the corporation over the parcels aforesaid. On August 28,1979, and upon the maturing of said loans, the firm caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage following his failure to pay, as a consequence of which, the said eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of land were disposed of at public auction, and in which L & R Corporation was itself the highest bidder. Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for injunction against L & R Corporation, to enjoin consolidation of title in its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. He was represented by the petitioner. Two years later, and with no imminent end to the litigation in sight, the parties entered into a compromise agreement whereby L & R Corporation accorded the private respondent another year to redeem the foreclosed properties subject to payment of P600,000.00, with interest thereon at one per cent per month. They likewise stipulated that the petitioner shall be entitled to attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On November 19, 1982, the court 3 approved the compromise. The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits a fact the petitioner himself concede 4 for which reason he failed to acquire the finding to repay the loans in question, let alone the sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees demanded by the petitioner. That notwithstanding, the petitioner moved for execution insofar as his fees were concemed. The court granted execution, although it does not appear that the sum was actually collected. 5 Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief for the latter with respect to his liability to L & R Corporation on the one hand, and his obligation to the petitioner on the other. The petitioner contends that the private respondent "earnestly implored" 6 him to redeem the said properties; the private respondent maintains that it was the petitioner himself who 'offered to advance the money," 7 provided that he, the private respondent, executed a "transfer of mortgage" 8 over the properties in

his favor. Who implored whom is a bone of contention, but as we shall see shortly, we are inclined to agree with the private respondent's version, considering primarily the petitioner's moral ascendancy over his client and the private respondent's increasing desperation. The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document that enabled the petitioner, first, to redeem the parcels in question, and secondly, to register the same in his name. The private respondent alleges that he subsequently filed loan applications with the Family Savings Bank to finance a wet market project upon the subject premises to find, according to him, and to his dismay, the properties already registered in the name of the petitioner. He likewise contends that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem" on file with the Register of Deeds (for Quezon City) had been falsified as follows: WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I, FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679 ... 9 whereas it originally reads: WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I, FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of equity of redemption and/or to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679. . . 10 As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim upon the respective certificates of title embracing the properties. Upon learning of the same, the petitioner moved for the cancellation of the adverse claim and for the issuance of a writ of possession. The court granted both motions. The private respondent countered with a motion for a temporary restraining order and later, a motion to recall the writ of possession. He likewise alleges that he commenced disbarment proceedings before this Court against the petitioner 11 as well as various criminal complaints for estafa, falsification, and "betrayal of trust" 12 with the Department of Justice. On December 1, 1983, finally, he instituted an action for reconveyance and reformation of document, 13 praying that the certificates of title issued in the name of the petitioner be cancelled and that "the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem dated May

3, 1983 ... be reformed to reflect the true agreement of Francisco Herrera and Paterno R. Canlas, of a mortgage." 14 He vehemently maintains that the petitioner's "agreement with [him] was that the latter would lend the money to the former for a year, so that [petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for the wet market which [the petitioner] intended to put up on said property." 15 Predictably, the petitioner moved for dismissal. The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It held that the alteration complained of did not change the meaning of the contract since it was "well within [the petitioner's] rights" 16 "to protect and insure his interest of P654,000.00 which is the redemption price he has paid;" 17 secondly, that the petitioner himself had acquired an interest in the properties subject of reconveyance based on the compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in the injunction case, pursuant to Section 29(b), of Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, that had, consequently, made him a judgment creditor in his own right; thirdly, that the private respondent had lost all rights over the same arising from his failure to redeem them from L & R Corporation within the extended period; and finally, that the petitioner cannot be said to have violated the ban against sales of properties in custodia legis to lawyers by their clients pendente lite, since the sale in question took place after judgment in the injunction case abovesaid had attained finality. The complaint was consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually attained a character of finality. Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a suit for "Annulment Of Judgment 18 in the respondent Court of Appeals, 19 praying that the orders of Judge Castro: (1). granting execution over the portion of the compromise agreement obliging the private respondent to pay the petitioner P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; (2) denying the private respondent's prayer for a restraining order directed against the execution: and (3) denying the motion to recall writ of possession, all be set aside. The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with a motion to dismiss. On December 8, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the first of its challenged resolutions, denying the motion to dismiss. On March 3, 1987, the Appellate Court denied reconsideration. 20 Hence the instant petition. As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on grounds of improper procedure. Specifically, he assigns the following errors: I. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED OUT OF TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN DUE COURSE. II.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA III. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT CONSIDERING AC G. R. 07860 AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER HAD DISPOSED OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE THE FILING OF THIS SUIT. IV THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED THEREIN ARE BUT REHASH OF THE ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE PETITION. 21 The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent court "is actually a petition for certiorari," 22 disguised as a pleading for annulment of judgment and that in such a case, it faces alleged legal impediments (1) It had been filed out of time, allegedly two years from the issuance of the assailed orders, and (2) It was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration. He adds that assuming annulment of judgment were proper, no judgment allegedly exists for annulment, the aforesaid two orders being in the nature of interlocutory issuances. On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are impressive. Annulment of judgment, we have had occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What "extrinsic fraud" means is explained in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation : 23 xxx xxx xxx It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, however, that can serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule, "where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but of the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy." In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. 24 A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera pending before the respondent Court reveals no cause of action for annulment of judgment. In the first place,

and as herein petitioner Canlas correctly points out, the judgment itself is not assailed, but rather, the orders merely implementing it. Secondly, there is no showing that extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines it, indeed vitiated the proceedings presided over by Judge Castro. On the contrary, Herrera's petition in the respondent court will show that he was privy to the incidents he complains of, and in fact, had entered timely oppositions and motions to defeat Atty. Canlas' claims under the compromise agreement. What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas and His Honor to expedite the former's collection of his fees. He alleges that his counsel had deliberately, and with malevolent designs, postponed execution to force him (Herrera) to agree to sell the properties in controversy to him (Atty. Canlas) subject to redemption. ("...[I]t was understandable that respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas did not implement the writ of execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order that petitioner would sign the questioned documents. This was the clincher of the plan of respondent Atty, Paterno R. Canlas to divest petitioner of his properties. For this purpose, it is obvious that respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas had to conspire with the respondent court judge to achieve his plan." 25) Aside from being plain speculation, it is no argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it does not amount to extrinsic fraud as the term is defined in law. Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the absence of an appeal 26 and while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies in case of irregular implementation of the writ. 27 In the case at bar, there is no irregular execution to speak of As a rule, "irregular execution" means the failure of the writ to conform to the decree of the decision executed. 28 In the instant case, respondent Herrera's charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in denying his motions for temporary restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or that His Honor had acted hastily (". . . that respondent court/judge took only one [1) day to resolve petitioner's motion for issuance of [a] [restraining] order. . ." 29) in denying his twofold motions, do not make out a case for irregular execution. The orders impugned are conformable to the letter of the judgment approving the parties'compromise agreement. The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to in a last-ditch bid to hold on to his lands and constraints of economic privation have not been lost on us. It is obvious that he is uneasy about the judgment on compromise itself, as well as the subsequent contract between him and his lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038 of the Civil Code applies: Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article 1330 of this Code ... in relation to Article 1330 thereof: Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.

in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts. 30 The court notes that he had, for this purpose, gone to the Regional Trial Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in which the decision had become final. We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of procedure for the enlightenment solely of the bench and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his petition. As we have intimated, we cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the proceeding, in which a member of the bar would exploit his mastery of procedural law to score a "technical knockout" over his own client, of all people. Procedural rules, after all, have for their object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 31 If procedure were to be an impediment to such an objective, "it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy." 32 It was almost eight decades ago that the Court held: ... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by the a rapier's thrust ... 33 It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds true as ever. By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing entity was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," 34 a development that should have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." 35 The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money." 36 It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so at the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 37 Anent attomey's fees, section 24, of Rule 138, of the Rules, provides in part as follows:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney... A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows: Art. 2208 ... In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00 reasonable. We do not believe that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the services he had rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the records will yield, is not impressive to justify payment of such a gargantuan amount. The case itself moreover did not involve complex questions of fact or law that would have required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to warrant his demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome prices in the market should not be a measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. We are not likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed. All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to P20,000.00. It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation similar to that vested upon redemptioners. 38 To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a result of execution in satisfaction of judgment. In this case, however, redemption was decreed by agreement (on compromise) between the mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not give the petitioner any right to the properties themselves, much less the right of redemption, although provisions for his compensation were purportedly provided. It did not make him a redemptioner for the plain reason that he was not named one in the amicable settlement. To this extent, we reverse Judge Pedro Santiago's ruling in Civil Case No. 40066, recognizing Atty. Canlas' "legal right, independent of the questioned deed of sale and transfer which was executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the subject realty from the L & R Corporation pursuant to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." 39 Whatever right he had, it was, arguably with respect alone to his renumeration. It did not extend to the lands. Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in proportion to the "just fees and disbursements" 40 due him. It is still subject to the tempering hand of this Court. The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute the compromise agreement and subsequently, to force the transfer of the properties to himself. As we have

observed, in spite of the issuance of the writ of execution, it does not appear that the petitioner took pains to implement it. We find this perplexing given his passionate and persistent pleas that he was entitled to the proceeds. There can indeed be no plausible explanation other than to enable him to keep an "ace" against the private respondent that led finally, to the conveyance of the properties in his favor. To be sure, he would have us beheve that by redeeming the same from the mortgagee and by in fact parting with his own money he had actually done the private respondent a favor, but this is to assume that he did not get anything out of the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that "[t]itles to the properties have been issued to the new owners long before the filing of private respondents [sic] petition for annulment." 41 To say that he did not profit therefrom is to take either this Court or the petitioner for naive, a proposition this Court is not prepared to accept under the circumstances. We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having the private respondent sign the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a pre-prepared document apparently, that allowed him (the petitioner) to exercise the right of redemption over the properties and to all intents and purposes, acquire ownership thereof. As we have earlier averred, the private respondent, by reason of bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his counsel's moral influence and ascendancy. We are hard put to believe that it was the private respondent who "earnestly implored" 42 him to undertake the redemption amid the former's obstinate attempts to keep his lands that have indeed led to the multiple suits the petitioner now complains of, apart from the fact that the latter himself had something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to above. We are of the opinion that in ceding his right of redemption, the private respondent had intended merely to forestall the total loss of the parcels to the mortgagee upon the understanding that his counsel shall acquire the same and keep them therefore within reach, subject to redemption by his client under easier terms and conditions. Surely, the petitioner himself would maintain that he agreed to make the redemption"in order that [he] may already be paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded him in the Compromise Agreement," 43 and if his sole concern was his fees, there was no point in keeping the properties in their entirety. The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that he acquired the properties as a gesture of magnanimity and altruism He denies, of course, having made money from it, but what he cannot dispute is the fact that he did resell the properties. 44 But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it necessary to reword the conveyance document executed by the private respondent? It shall be recalled that the deed, as originally drafted, provided for conveyance of the private respondent's "rights of equity of redemption and/or redeem" 45 the properties in his favor, whereas the instrument registered with the Register of Deeds purported to transfer "any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem," 46 in his favor. He admits having entered the intercalations in question but argues that he did so "to facilitate the registration of the questioned deed with the Register of Deeds" 47 and that it did not change the meaning of the paper, for which Judge Santiago acquitted him of any falsification charges. 48 To start with, the Court is at a loss how such an alteration could "facilitate" registration. Moreover,

if it did not change the tenor of the deed, why was it necessary then? And why did he not inform his client? At any rate, the agreement is clearly a contract of adhesion. Its provisions should be read against the party who prepared it. But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification this is not the proper occasion for it we condemn him nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do no falsehood" 49 This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor of the petitioner is subject to the ban on acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state as follows: Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another: (1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his guardianship; (2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal have been given; (3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration; (4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the administration of which has been instrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the sale; (5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. (6) Any others specially disqualified by law.** In Rubias v. Batiller, 50 we declared such contracts to be void by force of Article 1409, paragraph (7), of the Civil Code, defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v. Ababa 51 however, we said that the prohibition does not apply to contingent contracts, in which the conveyance takes place after judgment, so that the property can no longer be said to be "subject of litigation."

In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem" was executed following the finality of the decision approving the compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract not one in pursuance of what had been agreed upon on compromise in which, as we said, the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption rights over the disputed properties (but in reality, acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such a subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be properties which are "the object of any litigation." Parenthetically, the Court states that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from possession unless sought in connection with: (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It is noteworthy that in this case, the petitioner moved for the issuance of the writ pursuant to the deed of sale between him and the private respondent and not the judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a writ of execution on the compromise agreement but as we likewise observed, he did not have the same enforced. The sale agreement between the parties, it should be noted, superseded the compromise.) The writ does not lie in such a case. His remedy is specific performance. At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of the Civil Code. But like all voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake, fraud, or undue influence, 53 which is in turn subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value. 54 For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence as earlier detailed. While the respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the clear tenor of his petition for annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing, however, that the properties have been conveyed to third persons whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for value, the petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by way of actual damages, for such a loss of properties. We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his hability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the other. To obviate debate as the actual amounts owing by one to the other, we hold Francisco Herrera, the private respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of P654,000.00 representing the redemption price of the properties, 55 in addition to the sum of P20,000. 00 as and for attomey's fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay the respondent Herrera the amount of P1,000,000.00, the sum he earned from the resale thereof, 56 such that he shall, after proper adjustments, be indebted to his client in the sum of P326,000.00 as and for damages. Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of Appeals in taking cognizance of the petition below. But as we have stated, we are compelled, as the final arbiter of justiciable cases and in the highest interests ofjustice, to write finis to the controversy that has taxed considerably the dockets of the inferior courts.

Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and as a matter of general policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to dispense justice. At the outset, we have made clear that from a technical vantage point, certiorari, arguably lies, but as we have likewise stated, the resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate of technical rules, but if the decision is to have any real meaning, on the merits too. This is not the first time we would have done so; in many cases we have eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it would establish a barrier upon the administration ofjustice. It is especially so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit and counter-suit appears imminent and for which it is high time that we have the final say. We likewise cannot, as the overseer of good conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go unpunished what convinces us as serious indiscretions on the part of a lawyer. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered. 1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, the sum of P326,000.00, as and for damages; 2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary action may be imposed on him for violation of his oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, after which the same will be consolidated with AC No. 2625; 3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the respondent Court of Appeals for execution; and 4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs. SO ORDERED. EN BANC G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, Respondent. MONTEMAYOR, J.: chanrobles virtual law library This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient

scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-

judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours). In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to

public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that: . . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library . . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied). The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice: Registration of attorneys and agents. - A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (a) Attorney at law. - Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys. xxx xxx x x x chanrobles virtual law library

(c) Requirement for registration. - No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office. Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows: The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied) Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. - The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office. The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent

Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs. EN BANC July 30, 1979 PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners. RESOLUTION MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.chanrobles virtual law library Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments: 1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual

property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership. 1 2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy - a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client - to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3 3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: ... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. ... 4 4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5 5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7 6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world. 8 The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead." The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a

Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.chanrobles virtual law library On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm name. Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.chanrobles virtual law library The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.chanrobles virtual law library A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the name of one or more of the partners.chanrobles virtual law library Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner. It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor

the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyerpredecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.chanrobles virtual law library Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.chanrobles virtual law library B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.chanrobles virtual law library Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9 As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied) On the other hand, ... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied) C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy. 10 A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of

carrying on trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. 12 The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.chanrobles virtual law library Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service, - no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood." xxx xxx xxx Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are: 1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money.chanrobles virtual law library 2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.chanrobles virtual law library 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.chanrobles virtual law library 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13 "The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16 D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association" in support of their petitions.chanrobles virtual law library It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.chanrobles virtual law library It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in

this country would show how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed. The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify the active members. ...chanrobles virtual law library There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied). The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.chanrobles virtual law library E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein: The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use." There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the matter and reached The conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18 Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no

judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.chanrobles virtual law library Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24 The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." ... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25 In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical impediment.chanrobles virtual law library ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.chanrobles virtual law library

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring: The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes AQUINO, J., dissenting: I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.chanrobles virtual law library On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.chanrobles virtual law library They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.chanrobles virtual law library Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased

partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).chanrobles virtual law library I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.chanrobles virtual law library Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.chanrobles virtual law library The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.

# Separate Opinions FERNANDO, C.J., concurring: The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes AQUINO, J., dissenting: I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.chanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.chanrobles virtual law library They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.chanrobles virtual law library Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).chanrobles virtual law library I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.chanrobles virtual law library Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.chanrobles virtual law library The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant. PAREDES, J.: On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule. Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read: The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused. Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial

Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party. WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs. The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding. The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1wph1.t Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy: Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant.. EN BANC

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975 IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, Respondent. A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975 IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, Respondent. A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975 IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, Respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.: Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo - for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang - for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. - for disciplinary action - for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for recorrection and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho - who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively - invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations - to raise the grades prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due

process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects - Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law - of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having reevaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against

them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 4547, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their crossexamination.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed: 2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade; chanrobles virtual law library 3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark; chanrobles virtual law library 4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; chanrobles virtual law library 5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95; chanrobles virtual law library

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied). His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional statements: xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library 3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%; chanrobles virtual law library 4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects; chanrobles virtual law library 5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances: a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him and considered his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his words; chanrobles virtual law library b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner; xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied). Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law. I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said examinee. Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied) In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that: xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library 3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the present; chanrobles virtual law library 4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his

identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...; chanrobles virtual law library 5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me: chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library 7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that: chanrobles virtual law library 8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the candidates.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied). Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library 2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would make the general passing average.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied). In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that: xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library 2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after reevaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied). In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the following: xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library 5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was legitimate. xxx xxx xxx c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that the said examine failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied). Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972: xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law; chanrobles virtual law library That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%; chanrobles virtual law library That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%; chanrobles virtual law library That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied). In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library 2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned reevaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied). In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated: xxx xxx xxx As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that ... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied). In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers: That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied). On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating: xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order, chanrobles virtual law library 2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question: Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954". This number became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-aLanuevo).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me having been saved

from the possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot children the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited reevaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to the respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment. 3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely: (a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50% after reevaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and chanrobles virtual law library (b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo). 4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners concerned; chanrobles virtual law library 5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly

substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954." chanrobles virtual law library Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others; 1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library 4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official business? chanrobles virtual law library It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled? chanrobles virtual law library 5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's

actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library 7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). I chanrobles virtual law library The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his

further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he reevaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows: 4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning. Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible - the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject - respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject - Criminal Law - that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing

average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the reevaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme - by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after reevaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.). Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.). A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar

Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo reevaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 2930, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library II chanrobles virtual law library Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library A chanrobles virtual law library UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We believe the Examiners - Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized reevaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25% - which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows: BAI 1. Political Law Public International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts. or 30 weighted points BAI

Labor Laws and Social Legislations 67% 67% = no reevaluation made.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points or 33 weighted points.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Taxation 74% 74% = no reevaluation made.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts. or 30 weighted points.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or 22 weighted points.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) = 11 pts. or 44 weighted points.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises 81% 81% = no reevaluation made. ------------ chanrobles virtual law library General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15% Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who - Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the reevaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal

made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of reevaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the reevaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively - as hereinafter shown.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library B chanrobles virtual law library

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. BMontecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows: Labor Laws 3% chanrobles virtual law library Taxation 69% chanrobles virtual law library Mercantile Law 68% Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows: B A chanrobles virtual law library

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27 weighted points Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation Civil Law 75% 75% = " Taxation 69% 69% = " Mercantile Law 68% 68% = " Criminal Law 78% 78% = " Remedial Law 85% 85% = " Legal Ethics 83% 83% = " ---------------- chanrobles virtual law library Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5% (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.) chanrobles virtual law library Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are: Political Law 70% Taxation 72% His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows: B A chanrobles virtual law library Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation Labor Laws 75% 75% = " Civil Law 89% 89% = " Taxation 72% 72% = " Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9 weighted points Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation Remedial Law 88% 88% = " Legal Ethics 79% 79% = " ----------------- chanrobles virtual law library Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4% (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in

February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized reevaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct - of having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library III chanrobles virtual law library Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library A chanrobles virtual law library The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized reevaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects - Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan - Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the

Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library B chanrobles virtual law library Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record - whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending - becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of

good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well - settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus: [1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library [2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of

the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N - W - 709 - 710). The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that: [1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied). Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario: The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its

confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401]. What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library IV chanrobles virtual law library RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or recorrecion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the

stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words: chanrobles virtual law library Montecillo Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper? chanrobles virtual law library A Yeas, your Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such information? chanrobles virtual law library A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo;

allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.). Pamatian 3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark; chanrobles virtual law library 4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and chanrobles virtual law library 5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.). Manalo (c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied). Pardo ... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied). With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondentsexaminers, which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest - absolute purity of the proceedings - and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library V chanrobles virtual law library Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend - a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into reevaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly

expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library VI chanrobles virtual law library The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library A chanrobles virtual law library There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court. 1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage - P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument - April 5, 1972, date of inscription - April 20, 1972: Second mortgage - P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument - April 5, 1972, date of inscription - April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.] chanrobles virtual law library It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an illgotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 - date of instrument; August 23, 1972 - date of inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for: (a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library B chanrobles virtual law library

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days - 1951 to 1955 - up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) - 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver - July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational

benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 4148 July 30, 1998

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. Atty. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent. PER CURIAM: In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances. 1 Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. In Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension without pay, 2 while in Administrative Matters Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated, 3 this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from the service of respondent. 4 Now he faces disbarment. The records reveal the following facts: From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that complainant and respondent married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (now Gen. Santos City), where his last three children were born and where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.

In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On December 28, 1977, Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Pea. In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent. 5 Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. 6 But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Pea Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by her. Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondent's marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the dissolution thereof. Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their father's acts, including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case. Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena. 7 In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges against him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as when he said:

I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea will constitute triple jeopardy. If that's the law so be it. 8 Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioner's recommendation, as follows: RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97 Adm. Case No. 4148 Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 (b), of the Rules of Court. * We are in agreement that respondent's actuations merit the penalty of disbarment. Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. 9 There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law. 10 The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that: Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Emphasis supplied.)

As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly. Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a fact that aggravates his professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in the Bench, he knew a judge's actuations ought to be free from any appearance of impropriety. 11 For a judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the law. 12 Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. 13 Surely, respondent could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives. 14 Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct, 15 an attorneyat-law is also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree of moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He must maintain due regard for public decency in an orderly society. A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. 16 Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as "moral character." To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 17 The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar. 18 For disbarment proceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of administering justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the clients may repose full confidence.

In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., 19 a complaint for disbarment was filed against a member of the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another case, 20 a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar. In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon him by this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his lawfullywedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance, in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action. IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO ALAFRIZ and ASSOCIATES, Respondents. REGALADO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari impugns the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. Nos. 08265-08268 1 affirming the order of Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, in Civil Cases Nos. 19123-28, 19136 and 19144, fixing attorney's fees and directing herein petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank, for brevity), as defendant in said civil cases, to pay its attorneys, herein private respondent Arturo Alafriz and Associates, movant therein, the amount of P936,000.00 as attorney's fees on a quantum meruit basis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The records show that from March, 1974 to September, 1983, private respondent handled the above-mentioned civil cases before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig (Branches I, II, VI, X, XIII, XIX, XX AND XXIV) in behalf of petitioner. 2 The civil cases were all for the declaration of nullity of certain deeds of sale, with damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The antecedental facts 3 which spawned the filing of said actions are undisputed and are hereinunder set forth as found by the trial court and adopted substantially in the decision of respondent court. A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of about ten (10) hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. The obligors having defaulted, petitioner foreclosed the mortgages after which certificates of sale were issued by the provincial sheriff in its favor as purchaser thereof Subsequently, Alejandro, alleging deceit, fraud and misrepresentation committed against him by Javier in the sale of the parcels of land, brought suits against Javier et al., and included petitioner as defendant therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It was during the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister corporation, Service Leasing Corporation on March 23, 1983 for the purported price of P600,000.00. On the same day, the properties were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation for the purported price of P2,500,000.00. Three months later, or on June 7, 1983, Herby mortgaged the same properties with Banco de Oro for P9,200,000.00. The lower court found that private respondent, did not have knowledge of these transfers and transactions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to Service Leasing Corporation, petitioner filed an urgent motion for substitution of party on July 28, 1983. Private respondent, on its part, filed on August 16, 1983 a verified motion to enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed to appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted the same and ordered the, Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of title of the parcels of land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Meanwhile, the plaintiffs Alejandro, et al. in the aforesaid civil cases, which had been consolidated and were pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, filed a motion to dismiss their complaints therein, which motion the lower court granted with prejudice in its order dated September 5, 1983. On December 29, 1983, the same court ordered the Register of Deeds to annotate the attorney's liens of private respondent on the derivative titles which cancelled Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 453093 to 453099 of the original seven (7) parcels of land hereinbefore adverted to.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On May 28,1984, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit, which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the amount of P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash advance, including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15, 1980. It further appears that private respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, offering a compromise amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Finally, on October 15,1984, the court a quo issued the order assailed on appeal before respondent court, granting payment of attorney's fees to private respondent, under the following dispositive portion: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the motion is hereby granted and the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (METROBANK) and Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation 4 are hereby ordered to pay the movant Arturo Alafriz and Associates the amount of P936,000.00 as its proper, just and reasonable attorney's fees in these cases. 5 chanrobles virtual law library On appeal, respondent court affirmed the order of the trial court in its decision promulgated on February 11, 1988. A motion for reconsideration, dated March 3, 1988, was filed by petitioner but the same was denied in a resolution promulgated on November 19, 1988, hence the present recourse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The issues raised and submitted for determination in the present petition may be formulated thus: (1) whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorney's fees; (2) whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien and (3) whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On the first issue, petitioner avers that private respondent has no enforceable attorney's charging lien in the civil cases before the court below because the dismissal of the complaints therein were not, in the words of Section 37, Rule 138, judgments for the

payment of money or executions issued in pursuance of such judgments. 6 chanrobles virtual law library We agree with petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides: . . . He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid. 7 chanrobles virtual law library In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill satisfaction of their claims." 8 The dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment nor made any monetary award to any litigant, much less in favor of petitioner who was a defendant therein. This being so, private respondent's supposed charging lien is, under our rule, without any legal basis. It is flawed by the fact that there is nothing to generate it and to which it can attach in the same manner as an ordinary lien arises and attaches to real or personal property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In point is Morente vs. Firmalino, 9 cited by petitioner in support of its position. In that case, movant-appellant attorney sought the payment of his fees from his client who was the defendant in a complaint for injunction which was dismissed by the trial court after the approval of an agreement entered into by the litigants. This Court held: . . . The defendant having suffered no actual damage by virtue of the issuance of a preliminary injunction, it follows that no sum can be awarded the defendant for damages. It becomes apparent, too, that no amount having been awarded the defendant, herein appellant's lien could not be enforced. The appellant, could, by appropriate action, collect his fees as attorney. Private respondent would nevertheless insist that the lien attaches to the "proceeds of a judgment of whatever nature," 10 relying on the case of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Inc. vs. Henares 11 and some American cases holding that the lien attaches to the judgment

recovered by an attorney and the proceeds in whatever form they may be. 12 chanrobles virtual law library The contention is without merit just as its reliance is misplaced. It is true that there are some American cases holding that the lien attaches even to properties in litigation. However, the statutory rules on which they are based and the factual situations involved therein are neither explained nor may it be said that they are of continuing validity as to be applicable in this jurisdiction. It cannot be gainsaid that legal concepts of foreign origin undergo a number of variegations or nuances upon adoption by other jurisdictions, especially those with variant legal systems.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In fact, the same source from which private respondent culled the American cases it cited expressly declares that "in the absence of a statute or of a special agreement providing otherwise, the general rule is that an attorney has no lien on the land of his client, notwithstanding such attorney has, with respect to the land in question, successfully prosecuted a suit to establish the title of his client thereto, recovered title or possession in a suit prosecuted by such client, or defended successfully such client's right and title against an unjust claim or an unwarranted attack," 13 as is the situation in the case at bar. This is an inescapable recognition that a contrary rule obtains in other jurisdictions thereby resulting in doctrinal rulings of converse or modulated import.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library To repeat, since in our jurisdiction the applicable rule provides that a charging lien attaches only to judgments for money and executions in pursuance of such judgment, then it must be taken in haec verba. The language of the law is clear and unequivocal and, therefore, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, barring any necessity for elaborate interpretation. 14 chanrobles virtual law library Notably, the interpretation, literal as it may appear to be, is not without support in Philippine case law despite the dearth of cases on all fours with the present case. In Caina et al. vs. Victoriano, et al., 15 the Court had the occasion to rule that "the lien of respondent is not of a nature which attaches to the property in litigation but is at most a personal claim enforceable by a writ of execution." In Ampil vs. Juliano-Agrava, et al., 16 the Court once again declared that a charging lien "presupposes that the attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for his client . . ." Further, in Director of Lands vs. Ababa, et al., 17 we held that "(a) charging lien under Section 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited only to money judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract or for delivery of real property as in the instant case." chanrobles virtual law library Even in the Bacolod-Murcia Milling case, which we previously noted as cited by private respondent, there was an express declaration that "in this jurisdiction, the lien does not attach to the property in litigation." chanrobles virtual law library Indeed, an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon money due his client from the adverse party in any action or proceeding in which the attorney is employed, but

such lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of the litigation. 18 More specifically, an attorney merely defeating recovery against his client as a defendant is not entitled to a lien on the property involved in litigation for fees and the court has no power to fix the fee of an attorney defending the client's title to property already in the client's possession. 19 chanrobles virtual law library While a client cannot defeat an attorney's right to his charging lien by dismissing the case, terminating the services of his counsel, waiving his cause or interest in favor of the adverse party or compromising his action, 20 this rule cannot find application here as the termination of the cases below was not at the instance of private respondent's client but of the opposing party.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The resolution of the second issue is accordingly subsumed in the preceding discussion which amply demonstrates that private respondent is not entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Nonetheless, it bears mention at this juncture that an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is settled. 21 There is certainly no valid reason why the trial court cannot pass upon a petition to determine attorney's fees if the rule against multiplicity of suits is to be activated. 22 These decisional rules, however, apply only where the charging lien is valid and enforceable under the rules.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On the last issue, the Court refrains from resolving the same so as not to preempt or interfere with the authority and adjudicative facility of the proper court to hear and decide the controversy in a proper proceeding which may be brought by private respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in the main action, has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other money claim. The persons who are entitled to or who must pay attorney's fees have the right to be heard upon the question of their propriety or amount. 23 Hence, the obvious necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Besides, in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer. 24 These are aside from the several other considerations laid down by this Court in a number of decisions as pointed out by respondent court. 25 A determination of all these factors would indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial where private respondent can adduce evidence to establish its right to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose or refute the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Nothing in this decision should, however, be misconstrued as imposing an unnecessary burden on private respondent in collecting the fees to which it may rightfully be entitled. But, as in the exercise of any other right conferred by law, the proper legal remedy should be availed of and the procedural rules duly observed to forestall and obviate the possibility of abuse or prejudice, or what may be misunderstood to be such, often to the undeserved discredit of the legal profession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 26 chanrobles virtual law library ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of February 11, 1988 affirming the order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to establish its right to attorney's fees and the amount thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. EN BANC A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978 In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1) RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads: .... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned. On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 - in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated - and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads: SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. - There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule: SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ... The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body." chanrobles virtual law library The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was ... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ... Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2 chanrobles virtual law library The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3 Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State - the administration of justice - as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to

restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ..., and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads: SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6 chanrobles virtual law library Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8 chanrobles virtual law library Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers. 9 chanrobles virtual law library Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10 chanrobles virtual law library 2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) - which power the respondent acknowledges - from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11 chanrobles virtual law library 3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to

regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12 chanrobles virtual law library But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14 chanrobles virtual law library In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court - appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..." chanrobles virtual law library The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

EN BANC A.C. No. 98 July 13, 1958

En el asunto del Abogado FELIX P. DAVID D. Felix P. David en su propia representacion. El Procurador General Auxiliar, Sr. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. y el Procurador, Sr. Esmeraldo Umali en representacion del gobierno. PABLO, J.: En la causa administrativa No. 35 el recurrido fue suspendido por malas practicas en el ejercicio de su profesion de abogado por un periodo de cinco aos a contar desde el 9 de noviembre de 1949. El recurrido admite esta suspension en su informe escrito presentado el 17 de marzo de 1951; con todo, el continuo ejerciendo la profesion dentro del periodo de la suspension, 9 de noviembre de 1949 a 8 de noviembre de 1954. En 28 de febrero de 1950 el recurrido presento un alegato (Exhibit J) en la causa CA G. R. No. 4792-R, Tan Tek Sy vs. Maliwanag, no como abogado de Tan Tek Sy, sino con las siguientes palabras: "for and in behalf of Tan Tek Sy"; en 26 de enero de 1951 se le envio por correo certificado notificacion de la decision en dicha causa (Exhibit G), confirmando la decision del Juzgado de Primera Instancia; en 13 de marzo de 1951 presento una mocion en dicho juzgado devuelto ye el expediente pidiendo la expedicion de una orden de ejecucion, la cual mocion esta firmada de la manera siguiente: Tan Tek Si By (Sgd.) Felix P. David, % Atty. Felix P. David, Corner Dagupan and Azcarrag St. Filipinas Saw Mill & Construction, Manila El recurrido presento, por tanto, el escrito no como suelen hacerlo los abogados en ejercicio, sino como un agente de Tan Tek Sy. En la causa civil No. 3658 del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila, titulada Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. Contra Tolentino, el recurrido presento un escrito en 25 de septiembe de 1950, pidiendo una orden de demolicion de las casas de los demandados (Exhibit A); en 10 de octubre de 1950 presento una mocion pidiendo que el Sheriff de Manila fuese autorizado a pagar "the amount or such other amount as may be collected by the Sheriff from time to time" (Exhibit B); en 13 de noviembre de 1950 presento otra mocion (Exhibit C) pidiendo otra orden de demolicion, firmado los tres escritos, ExhibitsA, B y C, como abogado de la demandante; los exhibits B hasta B-34 demuestran que estuvo recibiendo pagos de cantidades de varios demandados como abogado dela demandante; el recibo mas antiguo esta fechado 12de febrero de 1950 y el ultimo 7 de diciembre de 1950. En defensa el recurrido dice que comparecio como abogado de Tan Tek Sy desde el Juzgado Municipal de Manilaen 1948; que, al ser suspendido, habia aconsejado a sucliente que buscase otro abogado para preparar el alegato que debia presentarse ante al Tribunal de

Apelacion; que cuando no quedaban mas que dos o tres dias y sucliente no podia presentarlo, el mismo lo redacto y presento a peticion de su cliente; que el preparo el alegato con la intencion de que su cliente lo firmase, pero como este estaba en Dagupan y no lo podia firmar y no quedaba mas que un solo dia, entonces el lo firmo de la manera siguiente: "Felix P. David, for and in behalf of the appeellee." en 25 de septiembre de 1950 presento ante el Tribunal de Apelacion un memorandum en contestacion al del apelante, firmado como lo esta el alegato. In order dice el recurrido to show that I did not have the intention to disregard the suspension of the Supreme Court, I did not with the knowledge of Tan Tek Sy even identified myself as the attorney for the appelles but in good faith, I signed for and in behalf of the appellee without designating that I am practising as attorney-atlaw. No creemos que este justificada la actuacion del recurrido al presentar el alegato y su memorandum en representacion de su cliente estando suspendido en el ejercicio de su profesion; sabiendo que estaba suspendido, no debia haberlos presentado ni como agente ni como abogado; estaba en la obligacion de no continuar sirviendo a su cliento ante el Tribunal de Apelacion; debio advertir a su cliente que estaba suspendido en el ejercicio de su profesion de abogado y debvia aconsejarle que empleara otro en su lugar si gueria tener representacion; no debia contravenir la orden expresa de este Tribunal; debia saber que el que no es abogado en ejercicio no puede comparecer por un litigante ante un trivunal expecto ante un juzgado de paz. Cuando presento su alegato y su memorandum con las siguientes palabras "For and in behalf of the Appelle" infringia el articulo 31 de la Regla 127 que dispone que 'En los demas tribunales, una parte puede dirigir su propio litigio personalmente o con la ayuda de un abogado, y su comparecencia debera hacerse personalmente o mediante un miembro del Foro debidamente autorizado." Un agente o un apoderado o un miembro del Foro suspendido no puede comparecer por un litigante. Para explicar la presentacion de las mociones en la causa No. 3655, Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. contra Tolentino, el recurrido dice que obro de buena fe, que las presento no para desobedecer la decision de este Tribunal sino para poder cobrar sus honorarios. Como funcionario del Foro, el abogado debe cumplir la decision de este Tribunal por encima de cualquier otra consideracion.Creemos que no obra de buena fe el que, anteponiendo su interes en el cobro de sus honorarios, ejerce la profesion sabiendo que le estaba vedado ejercerla. Aunque no hubiese presentado sus mociones exhibits A, B y C yexpedido los recibos B al B-34 por cantidades cobradas de los demandados, el recurrido hubiera podido cobrar sus honorarios, ya demandando directamente de su cliente,ya reclamandolos de acuerdo con el articulo 33 Regla 127. El recurrido dice que si el comparecio en 2 de marzo de 1950 en la causa No. 7679 del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila, Juan de la Torre contra Philippine Trust Co., fue por suplica de su cunado Juan de la Torre y ademas el no cobro honorarios por su comparecencia porque sabia que estaba suspendido en el ejercicio de la profesion. Aunque no se tuviera en cuenta esta comparecencia, el recurrido no puede salvarse por haber prestado los varios servicios profesionales ya relatados.

Ejercer la profesion de abogado es practicar los actos propios de dicha profesion. El preparar y presentar mociones pidiendo la ejecucion de la sentencia, la demolicion de las casas de los demandados, pidiendo al juzgado que ordenase al Shereiff que le entregase las cantidades cobradas, son actos que forman parte del ejercicio de la profesion de abogacioa; el presentar alegato y memorandum ante el Tribunal de Apelacion es ejercer la profesion de abogado, porque un agente no puede hacerlo; el cobrar alquilers de los 109 demandados expidiendo 35 recibos y firmandolos como abogado de la demandante, es ejercer la profesion. El hecho de que el no hapia puesto en su mocion pidiendo orden de ejecucion en Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. contra Tolentino, que actuaba como abogado sino como agente y empleado de Filipinas Sawmill and Construction, no altera la naturaleza de sus servicios que son ciertamente servicios profesionales de abogado; pero, ocultando que actuaba como abogado de Tan Tek Sy y aparentando que era solamanete un agente, se agrava su situacion: es mas culpable el que, cubierto con un antifaz, dispara contra su enemigo que aquel que lo hace a cara descubierta ya la vista del publico; de ahi que la ley penal impone pena mas severa en el primer caso. Las pruebas obrantes en autos demuestran que el recurrido Felix P. David ejercio la profesion de abogado desobedeciendo intencionalmente la decision de este Tribunal de 30 de septiembre de 1949, Causa Administrativa No 35. Por tanto, se le inhabilita para ejercer la profesion de abogado en Filipinas, se declara cancelado el certificado expedido a su favor para ejercer la profesion y se le ordena a que lo devuelva al Escribano de este Tribunal.