Matthew Kaufman

1 October 2010

Paper 1: The Moral Obligation to Obey the Law

You are driving home at 3 AM. As you approach the intersection, the traffic light changes to red. Assume that you know the following for a fact. (a) The light will change again in ten minutes. (b) No vehicle, person, or animal is approaching. (c) Running the red light will pose no risk of harm to anyone. (d) Your moving violation will not be detected and you will not be punished. (e) You have a legal duty to stop at the red light (no legal excuse is available). Do you have a moral obligation to stop? Why or why not?

The recurring question in analyzing the duty to obey and its causes appears to be determining not why we obey, but why it is obligatory to obey in the first place. In the situation described above, a person runs a red light with no harmful effects to another being due to a variety of conditions. The only detrimental result of this action is that in running the red light, the person is breaking the law. The question posed from this situation is does one have a moral obligation to stop at the light, or essentially, does one have a moral obligation to obey the law? In order to formulate an answer to this question, it is necessary to first understand the reasons for obeying the law, and also to analyze the purpose or goal of the law itself. After considering these factors, in my opinion for the situation given the person does not have a moral obligation to obey the law stating that he or she must stop at the red light. In M.B.E Smiths text Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law? Smith describes a prima facie obligation in which one is obligated to obey the law unless they have sufficient moral reason for disobeying (Smith 215). In the previously described scenario it is unlikely that the person has sufficient moral reason for disobeying since they have no legal excuse available. Running the red light could be justified if the person had a legal excuse that gave them sufficient moral reason to do so, such as if they were attempting to rush a pregnant woman in labor to the hospital. Smith also outlines several factors which, in theory, give one

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reason to obey the law. These factors are organized into three categories- individual benefits, consent, and utility. There are two specific reasons for obedience stemming from the individual benefits one receives- gratitude and fairness. The theory of gratitude states that a person has an obligation to obey the law of his or her government out of thankfulness and appreciation for the benefits the government has bestowed upon them. Several issues arise when attempting to justify obedience for this reason. First of all, how can one be expected to repay a debt for a service they did not necessarily require or even desire? Also, often these benefits provided to us by the government only exist because they help the government in some way themselves. I agree with Smiths school of thought, that whenever government forces benefits on me for reasons other than my particular welfare, I clearly am under no obligation to be grateful to it (Smith 216). Take for example the case of the person running the red light. The government may have authorized the building of this road, and it undeniably does facilitate the lives of the citizens who use it. However, the road likely also serves to improve the infrastructure and therefore helps the government, not to mention the fact that much of funding for its development was probably acquired through the taxation of the citizens. Considering all of these factors, when contemplating the argument of gratitude as a basis for obedience, there is a strong claim that the person has no duty to express their appreciation to the government by following the law. The second aspect of individual benefits is the idea of fairness, which states that one should obey the law because they benefit from their neighbors obeying it. This argument is largely irrelevant in considering the red light scenario because the drivers actions will have no effect on anyone else. By running a red light when no one else is around, the person is not actually physically harming anyone, so in disobeying the law it could be argued they are not

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being unfair to their fellow citizens. It is much easier to decide that it is morally wrong to run a red light when doing so could possibly harm, or be unfair, to others who follow this rule. Another aspect commonly argued as a basis for obedience is the idea of consent, whether it is explicit, tacit, or indirect. These different types of consent can all be related to the red light scenario in different ways. Explicit consent is an openly stated agreement to follow some set of rules or conditions. In order to obtain his or her driving license the person may have explicitly agreed to follow the rules of the road, one of these being that it is necessary to stop at a red light. With tacit, or implied, consent and indirect consent, by simply living and voting in an area a person essentially agrees to follow the laws of the governing body there. This argument is flawed because residency is not an accurate indicator, or contract, that the person wishes to abide by the laws of the current regime. As Hume brings up in his essay Of the original contract, many people may not have the means or desire, or may be restricted from leaving their area of residence, so it is not just to force them to adhere to the rules of the government (Hume 193). Combining all of these ideas on consent, it is not right to assume that the person is obliged to follow the laws of the area for any reason, so therefore they do not have a moral obligation to stop at the red light. The final factor Smith discusses as an influence on the obligation to obey the law is utility, or the general good. There are two variants of utility, act utilitarianism, in which one obeys because this action has the best consequences, and rule utilitarianism, in which one obeys a rule because doing so brings order and improves the general good. Following this, a person who believes in act utilitarianism obeys the law solely for the reason of enjoying the good consequences of it, or rather avoiding the punishment for disobeying it. This person is demonstrating the first, or pre-conventional, level of Lawrence Kohlbergs stages of moral

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reasoning. At this stage a person obeys the law either because it personally benefits them or in order to avoid punishment. In the described scenario then, a person at the pre-conventional stage would not run a red light out of fear of getting in an accident and injuring themselves or of getting caught by the police. This person is demonstrating a poor moral composition and this type of reasoning is a weak foundation for the system of obedience in a country, so it could be argued that a country would be better off composed of citizens who demonstrate the highest, or post-conventional, level of Kohlbergs stages. At the post-conventional stage, a person follows their own moral beliefs regardless of their confliction with the law. However, if these beliefs significantly harm the greater good of the community, then it is difficult to justify this as an adequate solution. Someone at this stage might run the red-light because they believe that under the given conditions there is nothing inherently morally wrong with disobeying the law. In the red light scenario the statement that there is no moral obligation to obey the law can be justified by the fact that the decision of the driver ultimately has no effect on utility because no other people are affected in anyway by the drivers actions. A final aspect to consider in contemplating whether there is a moral obligation to stop at the red light is considering the purpose of the law. For instance, in the described scenario the law states that when approaching a traffic signal that is displaying a red light a driver must stop their car before the line and wait until the light turns green to proceed. The reason for the institution of this law is clearly to assist in the prevention of traffic accidents, and not because it is a morally heinous crime to drive through an intersection without stopping. Hence, in the given situation, in which the drivers action have absolutely no effect on the safety of themselves or other drivers, one can conclude that the purpose of the law is irrelevant and the law can therefore by ignored. There is no moral obligation to obey a law that, in the specific situation, serves no obvious

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purpose. If there was a chance of other drivers being on the road at the time, then not stopping at the light could jeopardize the safety of others, and therefore the purpose of the law would become relevant and the driver would have a moral obligation to obey. It is difficult to fully address the question of whether there is a moral obligation to obey the law because there are countless mitigating factors that can affect the morality and practicality of obeying a law in a given situation. Take for example the scenario of the driver at the red light; it is only after several conditions have been specified that one is able to accurately discuss this topic. As I have previously stated, sometimes the reason for obedience is more significant than whether someone actually obeys or disobeys a law. A person who obeys a law solely to avoid punishment is really exhibiting no better, or possibly a worse, moral composition than someone who disobeys a law because they truly feel it is unjust or immoral. The issues of consent and gratitude both do not have a strong enough argument to play a part in this scenario. This leaves only the argument of fairness as a compelling factor supporting the opinion that there is a moral obligation to obey the law. However, in this situation fairness seems to be irrelevant because no other people are even affected by the drivers decision to either stop at or run the red light. After considering all of the aforementioned factors, I feel that for the specified scenario the driver does not have a moral obligation to obey the law, because their disobedience does not harm anyone else in any way and because the purpose the law was designed for is already resolved or made irrelevant by the conditions of the situation. This is not to say that there is never a moral obligation to obey the law, only in certain situations is this a valid option. In order to obey effectively a delicate balance between respect for individual morals and concern for the greater good must be formed, something society has yet to achieve consistently.

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Works Cited Hume, David. "Of the Original Contract." Constitution Society Home Page. Web. 30 Sept. 2010. <http://www.constitution.org/dh/origcont.htm>. Smith, M.B.E. "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law." Philosophy of Law. By Joel Feinberg. Belmont, Calif. [u.a.: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008. 214-30. Print.