FPSO Lessons Learnt

OLF FPSO Lessons Learned Project 2002
Summary of Key Issues, Lessons Learned & Challenges Database of Norwegian FPSO Key Issues & Lessons Learned Norwegian FPSO successes Most widely reported issues/problems relating to UKCS FPSOs UK FPSO Checklist
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OLF FPSO Project 2002
Table 1: Summary of Key Issues, Lessons learned and Challenges

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CATEGORIES OF FPSO ISSUES
Overall Level of Importance
Underlying cause Issues/Problems Green water has affected 4 of 5 FPSOs. Waves over the bows have damaged structure and broken accommodation windows. Waves along the side have damaged ancillary equipment including fire stations, cable trays and pipework. Model testing and environmental predictions appear to have been inadequate to allow designers to eliminate these green water effects. 3 of 5 FPSOs have experienced internal cracks between tanks. Cracks were detected through minor leaks. No leakage has occurred outside the hull. In each case a programme of inspection and repair has been initiated. This involves taking the tanks and adjacent tanks out of service, making a manned entry and after cleaning, fitting appropriate stiffeners. The turret location is a key design issue. With the turret at greater than 75% of overall hull length from the stern, the vessel weathervanes free. At around 65% (4 of 5 FPSOs), thrusters are required to maintain/control heading. The controlled heading FPSOs have the advantage of being able to lock the turret and thereby reduce bearing and swivel wear. However this places a demand on the thrusters (which are safety critical) and the crew to mange turret repositioning. 3 types of turret bearings are used by the 5 FPSOs. 2 of 3 types have been troublesome. The wheel and rail type have proven unsatisfactory due to high point loading from the wheels, excess construction tolerances, vessel deflection, poor rail heat treatment leading to surface cracking and inadequate wheel lubrication. The hydraulic turret bearings have suffered from pad wear, high starting friction, gripper failures, hydraulic imbalance and difficulty to access and repair components. The layout of equipment on an FPSO is a critical design phase. Concerns noted include placing main generators too close to the accommodation, poor mechanical handling solutions, exhaust and flare radiation problems, module overcrowding when others are very spacious, poorly placed vents, access and escape routes restricted by cable and pipework, poor workshop and store locations.
Design (D), Construction (CN), Commissioning (CM), Operational (O)
Remedial Actions / Lessons Learned Retroactive repairs/redesign including the fitting of side panels, raising bow walls and moving sensitive equipment appear to have reduced the problem. In some cases cargo limits have been imposed. A joint North Sea workgroup including the authorities and classification societies has now led to a greater understanding of green water design requirements. Conventional hull design and basic fatigue analysis has been unable to eliminate FPSO hull cracking in service. While this is not unusual for trading vessels the operational problems and costs of offshore repair make this situation undesirable. Future hull designs should make use of fatigue analysis in all critical and high risk areas with construction detail subject to high levels of control Experience to date from the single Norwegian FPSO with a free turret indicates lower maintenance and crew involvement than with the other FPSOs. In addition that FPSO has managed to achieve adequate safety of the accommodation forward of the turret, by using a firewall. Current experience suggests that a free turret with swivel and thrusters used for offloading only, results in the lowest Opex. Turret bearing design has evolved over time. While simple rails and wheels have proven inadequate, heavy duty rails and multiple bogies with rubber pads to spread the load have proven an effective solution. Hydraulic pads were selected to deal with high mooring loads on a large turret. While this has been effective leading to no downtime, maintenance has been excessive. A key learning from all designs is the need to make all components easily serviceable and replaceable. It is recommended that when a basic FPSO layout is outlined more time is spent with all interested parties both informally and through formal design reviews to ensure the best compromises are achieved. Capex, Opex and Safety issues must all be carefully considered by relevant specialists.
Green water SUMMARY
Hull - Strength SUMMARY
Turret Location SUMMARY
Turret Design SUMMARY
Layout
SUMMARY
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Underlying cause Issues/Problems On only one FPSO capex over-runs were avoided. In this case contract terms were followed with minimum change. This kept costs under control, however the Operator admits quality was poorer than expected and opportunities to improve the design at low cost were missed. On the remaining projects costs over-ran significantly but the quality was higher than the original specification and design improvements implemented. 3 of 5 FPSOs had serious compression problems (gas seal failures, repeated bundle change-outs and cracked pistons) due to undersized scrubbers and liquid carry-over. Problems were solved by upgrades, improved instrumentation and online equipment monitoring. The cost of these failures which includes; service costs, spares, CO2 tax, substitute diesel fuel, and lost gas export income was substantial. The FPSO accommodation has insufficient beds (4 of 5 FPSOs). The situation is worsened by recent proposals from the unions that two people should not sleep in the same cabin simultaneously. This lack of beds seriously hampers summer maintenance programmes and delays major repairs or upgrades. Overall performance has been excellent. 4 of 5 FPSOs are delivering 95% or more of available volumetric production. While these figures were lower in the first 18 months production, regularity has generally exceeded industry expectations. There is no evidence that FPSOs are less safe than other installations. A number of FPSOs reported that with a smaller crew than a platform, relationships, communication and morale are better. FPSOs are placed on location for the duration of field life typically 720 years. This means that all major repairs, inspections and maintenance must be carried out in situ. Marine standards and codes assume periodic visits to port and occasional dry-docking.
Remedial Actions / Lessons Learned
Capex Over Runs SUMMARY
Almost all FPSO projects in the 90s were underbid by the main contractor. The Operator can either participate actively implementing upgrades when poor quality or low cost solutions are offered, or impose the contractual terms. In general an optimum balance can be struck by working with the contractor to maintain quality and provide assistance to improve efficiency. A number of factors contributed to these problems, poor instrumentation, vessel movement reducing efficiency of separation train, liquid hold up in pipes and slugging and poor performance of internals. It would seem a good investment to install larger scrubbers than normal to provide a safety factor for unknowns. The economic impact of limited accommodation on operations and project(start-up and upgrades) is likely to be significantly greater than the cost of the extra beds and facilities. Future FPSOs should have 100+ usable beds and/or have provision for temporary expansion. There is a lack of fully objective data and it is too early to fully evaluate the success or failure of different FPSO designs and operating strategies. To date high performances have been achieved but often at the expense of major modification and/or ongoing repair programmes. Opex data was not available for the review. There is evidence that active attention to and reporting of hazards improves safety awareness and thereby performance. The challenge is to revise all aspects of marine standards incl. quality control, material specifications, coatings, fatigue analysis, subcontractor management, and mechanical handling to take account of the need for minimum maintenance and in field repair.
Compression SUMMARY 1
SUMMARY Accommodation
Uptime Performance SUMMARY
Safety - General SUMMARY In Situ Repairs and Modifications CHALLENGE
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Crew SUMMARY
Underlying cause Issues/Problems All FPSOs operate with a base crew of 35-40. This required a number of staff particularly crane operators and mariners to be multi skilled. However most FPSOs carry typical POB levels of 5570. This can cause significant problems for major maintenance or upgrade projects. A means is required to increase FPSO accommodation for short periods (say 2-6 months) for project or major repair/remedial work. The upgrade would have to meet all applicable safety requirements including the provision of recreation space, lifeboat, refuge and escape facilities. Construction standards for cargo and ballast pipework have proven inadequate for FPSOs. Problems have included weld failures, leaks and corrosion. GRE pipework has had to be reinforced due to inadequate jointing Placement of sea water pumps deep in the hull (forward or aft of the main tanks) presents three main problems, cavitation when the vessel is at shallow draft or in rough weather, cost of installation in the hull and difficulties with access and maintenance of the engine. Coatings are required in the base of tanks to minimise corrosion from free water. If this coating fails or cracks SRB can build up causing significant pitting. This is a very difficult area to inspect, so damage might become quite extensive before detection. The choice of cranes - solid boom for 4 of 5 FPSOs was not optimum. These heavily built booms are strongly affected by the wind and due to their weight, are insufficiently responsive when offloading a supply vessel or for working on equipment. The general view is that these cranes were not designed for active load handling but for in-port offloading. Mechanical handling for all operation and maintenance activities has been strongly criticised on all 5 FPSOs. Cranes are not optimum for working on FPSO equipment. "As built" handling systems for equipment in the hull are often inadequate. In general the vessel layouts are poorly optimised for equipment handling and storage.
A significant realisation has been importance of carrying multiskilled mariners within base crew. Their experience is particularly important for emergency situations, cargo management/offloading and maintaining equipment exposed to sea spray and corrosion. The design option selected is likely to be different for each FPSO these may range from an additional deck mounted module to beds installed in unused rooms. Lifeboat and escape facility upgrades will also be required. Close and early consultation with the workforce will also be essential. Since experiencing a number of failures in Cargo/Ballast pipework built to marine standards in the Far East, DNV have tightened their inspection standards. This combined with more attention to material selection, inspectability and access should mitigate the problem. An evaluation should be conducted into the practicality of using inboard mounted caisson installed pumps for delivery of seawater direct to the end user. The advantages would be reduced pipework, easy access to fire pumps, less cavitation and simpler pump maintenance and marine growth removal. Operators should have an ongoing inspection programme of tank bottom coatings and wall thickness measurement. Highest risk areas are slops tanks, areas under solids build up and locations where coatings may crack as a result of hull strains. A number of upgrades have been made or considered - increased hydraulic power, installation of coolers, emergency power pack, boom arc limit switches. However these modifications have only partially solved the problem. It is suggested that the best practices developed from experience with - choice of cranes, use of forklifts, layout, storage and landing areas and protection, hydraulic manipulators, lifting beams and appliances in the hull should be documented in a "code of practise" so in future contractors can design and optimise handling systems from the outset.
Accommodation CHALLENGE
Ballast & Cargo Pipework SUMMARY
CN
Caisson systems CHALLENGE
Corrosion and Coatings SUMMARY
Cranes SUMMARY
Mechanical Handling CHALLENGE
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Underlying cause Issues/Problems

Remedial Actions / Lessons Learned Installation of large helidecks on certain FPSOs and provision of high powered lighting has helped pilots. FPSOs can often turn across the wind to facilitate a 45 degree approach upwind. Reliable weather and heave monitoring equipment should always be selected. Future FPSO Helidecks should be designed and specified in consultation with helicopter operators to take account of lessons learned on existing FPSOs. Lessons have been learned with the compromises in hull shape for harsh environment FPSOs. These lessons need to be documented and in combination with improved model testing and environmental data used to design and specify the optimum FPSO shape for each situation.
Helicopters SUMMARY
The forward positioned accommodation and helideck on all Norwegian FPSOs is not optimum for helicopter landing - misaligned approach, no forward visual reference point and increased vertical movement (cf. aft helidecks) However it does have the advantage of clean air (no vessel induced turbulence and no take off obstructions. Hull shape involves a number of compromises. A sharp bow increases green water as the hull cuts through the waves, but it reduces mooring loads. However a sharp bow leaves little space for machinery, reduces storage volumes and increases complexity for building. The transition zone has also been a source of cracking. Alternatively a blunt a bow increases spray and wave impact and mooring loads. Typical shuttle tanker (ST) capacities are 900,000bbls. For commercial reasons and to make best use of the ST, Operators have wanted to fill the shuttle tanker. In several cases the storage capacity of the FPSO requires the ST to wait and complete loading with a second hook up. As well as risking failure to connect due to weather, the extra waiting time is expensive. One FPSO was designed with Hydrocarbon blanketing to replace inert Gas. Following successful proof of concept, this is now being extended to others. As well as eliminating venting or flaring, it reduces use/maintenance of the inert gas generator. Different approaches have been taken by Norwegian FPSOs. Use of individual anchor winches has the advantage of facilitating winter installation, allowing active management of the mooring system and enabling movement of the chain wear point. The permanently stopped design is simpler with reduced maintenance and lower capex. Motion has not been a significant problem for production regularity in Norwegian FPSOs. The key has been selection of effective level control instrumentation. Longitudinal separator placement has been successful. One FPSO was able to maintain full production in 12m significant wave heights.
Hull Shape CHALLENGE
Hull Capacity SUMMARY
The cost benefits of increased FPSO storage volumes should be considered at the earliest opportunity in the design phase. It is likely that matching storage volumes to the size of the planned shuttle tanker will prove the most cost effective option. This newly introduced technology has proven successful. Note: a key aspect of hydrocarbon blanketing is O2 detection. This instrumentation must be kept in service and backed up at all times. It is not yet known if wear will be a problem for the permanently stopped design, however there is as yet no straightforward method to inspect the top of the chain and service the fairlead. Good experience with such a design may lead to increased use of this lower cost approach. To date (other than minor drilling rig damage better monitoring is required here) there have been no problems with the mooring lines and anchors. However operating experience for at least one FPSO has shown roll limits to be under-estimated. This has required an upgrade of the topsides fatigue design.
Inert gas system SUMMARY
Moorings SUMMARY
Motion assumptions SUMMARY
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Painting CHALLENGE 1
All 5 FPSOs have suffered from inadequate paintwork. The underlying problem is lack of priority and time allocated to this activity. Quality control of preparation and finishing has also been lacking. Painting in Singapore has been particularly poor due to the humid conditions. There has been a serious problem on several FPSOs with a topsides paint system failure in Norway - premature thickening of the paint, that has led to extensive remedial work. There have been a number of problems with PAU supports. These include excessive vibration of reciprocating compressors and pumps transferring noise too the hull, flexing of compressor supports, excessive PAU stiffness leading to cracks in the deck, pipework stresses due to moving independently from the PAU. Each FPSO has a different engine combination. Wartsilla diesels while reliable and flexible have the disadvantage of design challenges for dual fuelling, high levels of maintenance and noise. LM 2500 engines have been the most successful for FPSOs. The larger and newer LM 6000s have proven inappropriate for offshore use with variable loads (from thrusters) and the demands of low nox emissions and dual fuel use. Service or repair of thrusters is a major challenge, particularly as reliability has not been as high as expected. Most FPSOs require thrusters at all times; a failure in winter could impact safety and production. Most thrusters have to be withdrawn externally and ROV work is weather sensitive and high risk. Use of FPSO cranes while helpful, is not always feasible due to thruster weights and position. Risers are a critical component of the FPSO system. Damage to the outer sheath and seawater ingress can reduce fatigue life significantly. Gas permeation can have unexpected effects including collapse, and HP gas flow can cause vibration or loosening of the inner carcass. To date however, there have been no catastrophic failures of risers. Overall the performance of swivels on the 3 FPSOs has been good. There have been no significant leaks, the only major problem was two failures and an explosion in the oil filled 11KV power transfer swivel. This was due to water entering the insulation oil medium.
CN
Painting of FPSO's is a critical area to ensure a low maintenance facility over a long period offshore. The inability to dry dock the vessel and its limited accommodation demand that the initial paint finish is to the highest standard. However this work is often conducted late when the pressure for sailaway is high. The challenge is to develop painting technology and methods compatible with project demands and a 20-year offshore life. PAU design, supports and associated pipework are a critical area. Design must take full account of vessel movement, machinery vibration, vessel role, wind and live liquid loading and construction tolerances. 2 of 4 FPSOs have either inadequate power or incorrect engine sizes for efficient running. The best solution seems to lie in smaller gas turbine packages in combination with a large back-up diesel generator. Gas turbines also provide ample waste heat for crude heating. The use of reciprocating diesels for main power has only been considered appropriate for smaller FPSOs. Methods for removal and repair of thrusters in field need to be developed and shared. One solution for the future is that thrusters are not safety critical (this is true of one FPSO), and thrusters should be designed for internal retrieval and service. This design has been achieved on one FPSO.
PAU Structures, Supports and Interfaces SUMMARY
Power generation SUMMARY
Thrusters CHALLENGE
Risers
SUMMARY
Good riser design and operational management is a key success factor. Monitoring systems, the ability to flush the annulus and protect the riser from damage, particularly on installation are needed to ensure long and trouble free life. Initial worries about swivel reliability have now been reduced. However, only one FPSO has continuous swivel movement (free turret) and this has only been in service two years, so long term wear concerns and repair methods remain untested.
Swivels SUMMARY
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Drag chains SUMMARY

2 of the 5 FPSOs has Drag chains as an alternative to a swivel. Specific problems experienced include hose and electric cable failure due to wear from bending and difficulty of access. In addition the drag chain limits the free rotation of the vessel requiring thrusters to be serviceable at all times. In several cases the build contract specified functional requirements, however the design contractor and shipyard were unable to interpret these correctly. In addition they failed to manage builders and suppliers to adequate quality standards, or to keep within budget or time schedule. It is agreed that Operations input a key to good design, however on 4/5 FPSOs staff consider operations input inadequate. Reasons are lack of an operating organisation, lack of operations experience, concern at capex over-runs, lack of data for operations to justify more expenditure and information provided too late. There is evidence that builders and contractors learn a great deal during projects. There is therefore a real advantage in building a second or third vessel in a yard, where many of the original problems have been worked out. However this learning appears to be short term, as people and teams are often moved to other areas of activity. Vibration from reciprocating compressors can be a serious problem. On one FPSO poor mounting of the compressors and failure to fit bellows and flexible hoses has led to an ongoing sequence of high potential leaks and failures. Vibration has also affected the drive motors with isolating pads coming loose and damaging rotors. Noise is also a problem for personnel. Failure of separator or coalescer internals due to sloshing is a common problem of FPSOs (reported by 3 of 5). Reason is fatigue of internals due to poor support. The cost of such failures is very high - shut down and repair costs. Primary equipment vendors have little involvement in the operation of equipment. This has two drawbacks, the Operator has difficulty accessing adequate specialists to assist in problem resolution and the supplier has little opportunity to learn for operational experience.
While simpler than swivels, high maintenance and operability problems have indicated that swivels would have been a better option. This is endorsed by one FPSO where the operator has elected to replace the gas transfer hose with a swivel. Functional specifications generally give the yard and designers too little guidance. More work should be done up front on the selection of key equipment and specification of quality. In all 4 cases the operator has had to provide significant resources to support the project or in 2 cases take over responsibility for completing the project. The challenge for operations staff is to be able to provide a reasoned justification for Capex vs. Opex trade offs based on past operating experience. Data must be presented in a quantitative way and early enough to support investment decisions in appropriate design and quality requirements. There are advantages in repeat orders due to organisational learning, however if workloads are high, there is the risk that a new team with little experience will have to start at the bottom of the learning curve again.
Construction Management
Design Input from Operations CHALLENGE
Project Input from other groups SUMMARY
CN
Reciprocating compressor vibration is a key design issue. Only a competent supplier with experience of packaging such units offshore should design such systems. An independent review of noise and vibration levels is recommended. It appears that suppliers have not adequately understood loads associated with separators on FPSOs. Work is required to define fluid loading and build an industry specification for moving separation equipment to eliminate the problem. The challenge is to secure a commitment for technical support or a minimum performance level when the equipment is competitively bid and purchased. This requires expectations to be set up front by the Operations team. If the supplier refuses to offer a performance level, another supplier should be preferred.
Process CHALLENGE
Role of Vendors / OEM CHALLENGE
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Shuttle tanker / offloading SUMMARY

FPSO/Shuttle tanker offloading has been very successful. Only two minor incidents occurred out of approx. 1000 offloadings - one contact when some light structural damage was sustained and one rope round the thruster. Incidents of missed loadings due to weather have also been very few. While all FPSOs were built to Class, 4/5 have now dropped Classification. Their view is that there is little to be gained from remaining within the "marine" inspection and approval regime offered by leading classification societies. NPD do not require ongoing classification. Increasingly opportunities to tie back new fields are being considered. This allows volumes to be maintained while the primary field reaches tail end production. There are a number of constraints including available riser slots, swivel capacity or paths, ability to produce separate streams, metering and control upgrades. Many Problems were experienced with hydraulic submersible pumps in the early phases of operation. Problems were related to debris in the tanks and pipework and pipework leaks. Entry to tanks for inspection and repair is proving very costly both the time and resources. Primary problems include tank washing, gas freeing, solids removal, tank and pipework isolation, personnel access, repair and recoating methods. Produced water with 20ppm oil content ( within allowable limits) can create a sheen when discharged from an FPSO in still water. This is in conflict with industry aspirations of minimum environmental impact. Marine growth in sea chests is a problem on all FPSOs. It is an ideal location for marine growth and is difficult to clean. The ability to blank off the sea chests is also required in the event of a leaking main seawater valve. Fitting blanking plates is also time consuming and weather sensitive. In addition the safety risks of relying on a single blanking plate may be considered unacceptable.
Lessons learned include the need to identify contact zones at the rear of the FPSO to ensure damage escalation risk is minimised, improvements to hose care when sliding in and out of the shute, better procedures for handling the messenger line and identification of critical components for maintenance/sparing. There is potential value classification, but there is a view that the societies have not kept up with the demanding design, build and manning requirements of FPSOs. The challenge is for Classification Societies and Operators to tighten FPSOs class specifications so they become fully effective both for Operators, builders and regulators, in both build and operation phases. Typically the swivel and turret are the most challenging areas for upgrade. A low cost method is required to upgrade swivel capacity and pull in new risers with minimum shut down time. Hydraulic submersible pumps are highly sensitive to debris and any weaknesses in the pipework. This should be an area of special focus during commissioning. Simpler methods to access and repair submersible pumps should be also implemented. Crude and ballast tanks should be designed to facilitate maintenance. This involves special provisions for cleaning, venting and access. For existing FPSOs, tools and methodologies should be developed to improve the safety and efficiency - best practise should be shared. Work is required into the emulsification of produced oil in seawater and reasons for the formation of a free oil sheen. Studies should indicate an appropriate mitigation and provide guidelines on when it's use should be necessary. The need for sea chests (normally used in vessels underway) needs to be reconsidered. Options that reduce opportunities for marine growth and allow blanking off in the event of valve failure are required. Consideration should also be given to submersible pumps in a caisson - (see above).
Approvals and Safety Verification CHALLENGE
D/O
Swivels/Tie Backs CHALLENGE 1
Submersible Offloading Pumps SUMMARY
CM
Tank Entry CHALLENGE
Produced Water Disposal CHALLENGE
Sea Chests CHALLENGE
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Painting CHALLENGE 2

Painting the hull in the area of the water line will present a challenge as this is normally done at 5-year dry dock. The vessel can be raised under light ballast however the work, if required, will be very exposed with no provision for scaffolding. There have been a number of examples of poor HVAC design. The most serious was the level of noise which, failed to meet Working Environment rules. Modifications after construction are expensive and disruptive. Other problems are balancing difficulties, lack of external air locks; poor access for maintenance, stuck dampers and excessive dryness in the air. Warstilla diesels are required to run on diesel and gas. This has proven difficult in practice. Main concerns have been safety related, whereby HP gas has to be routed into an engine room where the risk of fire is already high. HP fuel gas compressor design and reliability has also been a concern. Shipyards will normally fit butterfly valves on penetrations through the hull, however their life is limited and they are easily damaged by marine growth. Disposal of high solids content fluids is always a problem on an FPSO. The ability to clean up a new or treated well via the FPSO would add value over field life. In the event of paint stripping or tank cleaning these solids could also be routed to the solids tank. Workshop design and locations vary on the FPSOs. The most successful are accessible via forklift, on the same level and close to stores, well equipped with mechanical handling equipment, separate from the accommodation ( for noise) and in a safe area allowing welding (forward). While swivel repairs have not yet been required, a methodology to simplify repair and seal replacement is required. At present a repair to a key seal may take up to 5 days. All FPSOs have had problems with cold venting of hydrocarbons tripping the process. Modifications have involved routing all vents up the flare stack or, on the thruster controlled FPSOs, on the downwind side. One FPSO achieved Gas Compression start-up 7 days after first oil. This is probably an industry record. This was achieved through comprehensive pre-start-up commissioning work and operator training.
The challenge is to devise a methodology to safely clean, prepare and paint FPSO hulls at the splash zone while the vessel is on location and in production. The work must be conducted by a small crew so minimising impact on other summer maintenance activities. HVAC design is a key area of design as a safety critical system. A contractor familiar with North Sea conditions and Norwegian Working Environment legislation should manage the work.
HVAC
SUMMARY
Power generation CHALLENGE Selection of marine equipment SUMMARY Solids disposal CHALLENGE
A solution is required to fundamentally improve the safety and reliability aspects of running diesel engines on Natural gas.
On FPSOs these should all be replaced by gate valves, and provision made to blank these off externally for service Consideration should be given to a third slops tank specifically designed for high solids fluids and solids drop out. The tank would have easy cleanable surfaces with jetting lines and solids/slurry handling pumps. Getting the workshop design right is important for maintenance efficiency and crew morale. The working environment, access and conditions in the workshop will reduce repair costs, as the crew becomes confident to repair and service equipment on board.
Workshops SUMMARY
Swivels CHALLENGE 2
Vents and exhausts SUMMARY
More attention should be paid at the design stage to any source of hydrocarbon venting. This requires a significantly different approach from a trading tanker. Minor releases can be cold vented but lines need to be located and sized to minimise any risk of explosion or tripping gas detectors under any weather conditions. Gas plant commissioning should be fully completed before sailaway. Equipment should be run on load with simulated gas. Operations staff involvement with commissioning, use of plant tuning simulators also with a rapid start-up.
CM
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Documentation CHALLENGE
Every Operator has complained of inadequate documentation. Primary problems have been late documentation from suppliers, missing data from subcontractors (particularly marine suppliers), inability to get paperless systems up and running even one year after start-up, missing as built drawing and loop diagrams, incompatible tags and poor links to maintenance databases. There is often inadequate provision for sand and solids in the separation system. Although wells are predicted to be sand free, when water arrives they often produce sand. It is also useful to be able to clean up wells directly through the test separator which should have sand jetting installed. All FPSOs are using SBVs in different ways, including storage, firefighting, ROV inspections, tug support during offloading and one FPSO is sharing with a Platform 60kms away - and holds a large daughter craft on board. Seasickness has not been reported as a major problem. People suffer for a day or so but seem to adapt. Many people use stick-on patches as a cure. It can be more of a problem however for visiting service personnel, and crews sent out to work in enclosed spaces such as tank cleaning.
The problem appears to arise from inadequate specification of documentation requirements at order placement. It is also a low priority for suppliers after the equipment is delivered and paid for. Follow up is often inadequate. Different specifications from Operators are also a problem. This is an opportunity for a joint industry initiative, perhaps building further on Norsok standards. Provision for sand and solids' handling is generally a good long-term investment, despite optimistic predictions from the reservoir engineers. The challenge is to share best practices and agree a common role for the vessel and it's specifications so that every FPSO can get best value from the vessel and achieve appropriate standby cover at most economical price. FPSO management must continue to be sensitive to the problem this can pose for certain individuals. Again this underlines the importance of having a core crew of mariners on board.
Process SUMMARY
Standby vessel CHALLENGE
Motion effects on people
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OLF FPSO PROJECT 2002
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Table 3: Norwegian FPSO Successes

Summary Comments
Category Inert Gas system Risers Motion assumptions Swivel Performance Reported Success Story Hydrocarbon blanketing to replace inert Gas Good riser design and operational management FPSO/Shuttle tanker offloading
Combined Database Comments

Category Hull & Marine Project management Operations & Support Reported Success Story Material selection Motion assumptions Selection of materials Compression Start-up Onshore offshore rotation Organisation structure Performance Crew organisation Working environment
Manning & Safety
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Home Category Design
Table 4: Most widely reported issues/problems relating to UKCS FPSOs

Subcategory Problem Emphasis on initial capital rather than whole life cost. Much incomplete construction and or testing at sailaway. Designed lay-down areas and bumper bars were inadequate. Insufficient design attention paid to total mechanical handling requirements. Carry over of construction work and limited POB gives operational problems. Specifications not sufficiently clear. Number of Mentions 7 7 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Design management problems Vessel not complete or fully Commissioning tested at sailaway Crane design & mechanical Design handling Crane design & mechanical Design handling Miscellaneous operations Operations problems Inappropriate use of Design functional specifications Design Construction Construction Construction Operations Operations Contractual Relationships Design Design Design Design Design Design Design Design Design Design Design Design Construction Construction Construction Construction Construction Construction Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Contractual Relationships Lack of experience QA/QC inspection and testing issues QA/QC inspection and testing issues Swivel or turret operation problems Turbines, compressors & power generation problems
Pipework and valves design Inadequate valve isolations. Construction managers were inexperienced. Marine construction and inspection standards were not as stringent as those of the process industry. QA/QC during construction was generally poor. Leakage occurred in swivel. General compressor-related problems. Contractual relationship inhibited remedial work being done onshore. The design number for persons on board was too low to allow for commissioning and remedial work Operations suggestions were discounted. Insufficient gas compression capacity. Functional specs not clarified down the supply chain Too much faith in the knowledge of the supplier. Designed pipework not sufficiently flexible. Insufficient attention to effects of sloshing inside process vessels. Weather conditions considered were not sufficiently extreme. Differing standards for marine and process pipework. Deck pipe work was not designed to operations standards. Inappropriate specification of compact heat exchanger Hull coatings and corrosion protection not designed for long periods at sea. Problems managing interfaces between vessel design and build and topsides design and build. Construction time greatly underestimated. Constructors assumed that ship would be dry-docked within three years. Systems and pipework were not properly cleaned. Paintwork not finished properly before sailaway. Marine NDT codes less stringent than process industry codes. Cranes - operations limited by sea state. Separator internals damage. High levels of flaring needed because of design or process problems. General power generation problems.
Accommodation design issues Communications problems in the design process Design of compressors Inappropriate use of functional specifications Inappropriate use of functional specifications Insufficient attention to motion effects Insufficient attention to motion effects Insufficient attention to motion effects Marine standards vs. oil industry standards Process design problems Process design problems Vessel not designed for extended period at sea Conflict and poor communication Construction planning Miscellaneous construction management issues Poor quality construction Poor quality paintwork QA/QC inspection and testing issues Cranes and mechanical handling problems Motion problems Process operations problems Turbines, compressors & power generation problems
Vessel orientation problems Exhausts or other emissions were blown over the vessel. Contractual relationship can inhibit beneficial communication between the parties involved.
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Table 5: UK FPSO Checklist

Home This checklist was derived from information collected during interviews with UK operators of FPSOs in September and October 2000. The checklist might be a useful basis for avoiding decisions and actions, which could lead to problems during start-up and operations.
Design Phase
Topic Access routes Issue to consider Are the access routes to spaces within the hull sized to process standards ? How will the noise from closing steel doors be minimised ? How will transmission of noise to the sleeping accommodation be minimised ? Is the accommodation located where it will be most comfortable for the occupants ? Is the accommodation located where it will be safest for the occupants ? Will the accommodation and lifeboat provision allow sufficient POB for outstanding construction and remedial work ? Is the installation of cabling within the ship specified to process standards rather than marine standards ? Are design decisions being overly driven by the desire to reduce initial costs ? Do design decisions take account of operating costs as well as capital costs ? Is there adequate filtration of process fluids to prevent damage by contaminants ?
Accommodation
Cabling installation Capex reduction Cleanliness
What actions will be taken to ensure that operations people are informed of design changes ? What actions will be taken to ensure that operations people have sufficient time to Communication - Input from comment on the designs ? What actions will be taken to ensure that the views of operations people are acted operations upon even if it increases the initial costs ? What actions will be taken to ensure that the views of operations people can be captured ? Are the construction and commissioning teams able to review and influence the Communication - Input from design ? Are there other groups of people with valid input to the design process, who should other groups be consulted ? Are the designers fully conversant with the regulations and working practices of the country where the vessel will be operated ? Compliance with regulations Does the design comply with ALL the relevant regulations ? Have the regulations changed during the course of the design ? Are the cascade trips built in to the control system overly complex ? Are the level trips on process vessels designed so that they cannot be exceeded as a result of normal motion of the FPSO ? Is the reservoir of instrument air sufficiently large ? Is there likely to be incompatibility or unexpected interactions between the process Control system control system and the ship's control system ? Will the cascade trips built in to the control system cause excessive spurious trips or total loss of power ? Will the control system have a look and feel which is familiar to process operators ? Control system - subsea well Do the controls of subsea valves have sufficient functionality to allow fault-finding ? Is there design of communications with subsea well heads adequate to make fault heads finding straight forward ?
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Design Phase
Topic Issue to consider Are the specified cranes sufficiently fast ? Has provision been made to move heavy loads within the FPSO without the need to lift them ? Have adequate laydown areas and bumper bars been specified ? Have ALL mechanical handling and access requirements, which might arise during maintenance and operations, been taken into account ? What actions will be taken to ensure that cranes are specified for offshore ship to ship working ? Will the coverage of FPSO areas by the cranes be sufficient to prevent mechanical handling problems ? What steps are in place to ensure that the data and documentation required by the operations group will be prepared and delivered ? Do the process design engineers appreciate the differences in requirements when designing for an FPSO rather than a fixed platform ? Do the process design engineers have sufficient experience of designing for an FPSO ? What actions will be taken to ensure that exhaust fumes from gas turbines will not blow over the FPSO ? Will the exhaust stacks keep the fumes away from the vessel ? What actions will be taken to ensure that inert gas will not be blown back over the FPSO during shuttle tanker loading operations ? What actions will be taken to ensure that the flare flame will not blow over the FPSO ? Does the design allow fuel gas to be available when the gas compressors are not in operation ? Does the customer have some specialist knowledge which should be made available to the supplier of equipment or material ? Does the final supplier of equipment or material fully understand that it is to be deployed on an FPSO, and the implications of that ? Is it clear who has responsibility for the DETAILED specification of equipment and material ? Is the gas compression capacity sufficient to cope with all the gas which is likely to be available ? Is there sufficient flexibility and redundancy in the gas compression system to enable turn down, and to enable operation when one item of equipment is out of commission ? Is the chosen model of gas turbine suitable for a marine environment ? Remember that diesel fuel for aero derivative gas turbines must be high quality. Marine diesel will not be good enough. Are the cable trays on the process equipment sufficiently strong to withstand the impact of green water ? Have adequate tank tests been conducted so that vulnerability to green water impact is understood ? Is the configuration of the FPSO such that it is vulnerable to the impact of green water ? Could it become more vulnerable in a different location ? Is the process equipment and pipework sufficiently strong to withstand the impact of green water ? Is the utility pipework sufficiently strong to withstand the impact of green water ? HVAC Inert gas system Are the HVAC systems specified to process Be aware that an inert gas system on an FPSO will be used much more intensively than on an ordinary tanker. Does the inert gas system have sufficient redundancy and flexibility to avoid interruption of production or tanker loading ?
Cranes and mechanical handling
Documentation Experience of FPSO design
Flares and exhausts
Fuel gas
Functional specification
Gas compression
Gas turbine
Green water
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Design Phase
Issue to consider Are the shutdown systems too complex for ease of operation ? Is the fire and gas system a tried and tested design ? Is the instrumentation and control system a tried and tested design ? Is the instrumentation and control systems of a type with which process operations Instrumentation and control people are familiar ? Is there sufficient instrumentation to enable the plant to be operated and faults diagnosed ? What actions will be taken to prevent proliferation of instrument types and suppliers ? Has direct access been provided between pre-assembled modules ? Has sufficient thought been given to integration of the designs of the pre-assembled Integration of design units ? What steps will be taken to ensure that there is no misunderstanding between the process engineers and the marine engineers ? Can all valves and instruments be adequately isolated? Isolations Is the provision of block and bleed valves adequate Does the location of vital equipment on the FPSO make it vulnerable to damage Location of equipment from collision ? Maintainability Has sufficient attention been paid to maintainability of equipment and systems ? Are all hull penetrations designed taking into account that the ship cannot be drydocked for maintenance ? Can all marine equipment be accessed and maintained while the FPSO is on location ? Maintainability in marine environment Can sea water intakes be inspected and maintained while the FPSO is on location ? Can the thrusters be accessed and maintained while the FPSO is on location ? Is the design of cargo tanks such that one tank can be isolated for maintenance while others are still in operation ? Remember that the ship must be designed for an extended period at sea and that it cannot be dry-docked for maintenance. Can the man-hours implied by the proposed maintenance schedule be delivered ? i.e. is the maintenance schedule realistic ? What steps have been taken to ensure that a fully-functional maintenance management system is in place before start-up ? Have the long term results of design decisions aimed at reducing initial costs been evaluated ? How will the total design be checked for inconsistencies introduced by separate design groups ? How will changes to design after it has been approved for construction be controlled ? If there is a late demand for design changes is senior management fully aware of the implications for cost and schedule ? If there is a late demand for design changes what will be the impact on the schedule and cost ? What actions will be taken to ensure that changes to the design are controlled ? Does the project manager have knowledge and control of the WHOLE project ? Does the project manager have sufficient experience of FPSO projects ? Management - FPSO project Does the senior management team appreciate the additional complexities involved in an FPSO project ? What problems are foreseen as a result of differences in standards of design and construction between the marine and process parts of the FPSO ? Management Are the responsibilities for specification and design clearly understood by the design responsibilities groups (including the customer) ? Are choices of equipment being influenced by nationality of suppliers ? Management - selection of Is there clear accountability for equipment selection ? equipment or materials What actions will be taken to avoid "preference engineering" ? Topic
Maintenance schedule
Management
Management - change control
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Design Phase
Topic Module support Issue to consider Has construction of strong areas on the deck been considered, rather than construction of strong points to support individual modules ? Have the support stools been designed taking account of the effects of ship's motion on the equipment they are supporting ? Are all the groups involved in design aware of the effects of FPSO motion and the design assumptions which should be used ? Are the assumptions made about extremes of FPSO motion for process equipment design sufficiently realistic ? Have adequate tank tests on hull design been conducted to ensure that likely extremes of motion Are large pieces of rotating equipment located where they will be least affected by the motions of the ship or by flexing of the deck ? Are the sizes of process vessels sufficient to prevent liquid carryover due to motion of the FPSO ? Are there any sliding doors included in the design which could cause injury during violent motion of the ship ? Does the design of pipework, supports, process vessels and cable trays take account of the possible effects, flexing and accelerations due to FPSO motion ? Does the design of process vessels take sufficient account of the likely effect of waves in gas liquid interfaces ? Has the antenna system been designed to be robust to motion of the ship ? Have long runs of pipework, walk ways and cable trays been designed to allow for expansion and contraction and for flexing due to ship's motion ? Is there provision in the FPSO design for lashing down ALL movable objects ? Operability Operability in marine environment Will there be unexpected loads on the ship's rudder when it is moored on location? Has sufficient attention been paid to operability of equipment and systems ? Are hull coatings and corrosion protection designed for long periods at sea ? Is the design of each piece of equipment or system sufficiently simple and rugged for use in a marine environment ? Are modules connected via a central pipe rack ? Are the marine pipework and the process pipework specified to compatible standards? What actions will be taken to ensure that module suppliers use compatible pipework and fittings ? Will the firewater system (pipework, couplings, supports, etc) cope with likely pressure surges ? Are the couplings used for pipework appropriate for the duty ? Are the materials selected for seawater duties appropriate to withstand fouling ? Pipework material Could the pipework be exposed to heat from the flare ? Will it withstand heat from the flare ? Is the material selected for pipework appropriate to avoid corrosion by the fluids inside or outside them? Is the material selected for process and utility pipework sufficiently flexible to absorb the bending caused by hogging and sagging of the FPSO ?
Motion assumptions
Motion effects
Pipework
Pipework couplings
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Design Phase
Topic Issue to consider Does the power management system allow sufficient flexibility and cross connections between power sources and loads ? Is there likely to be unexpected incompatibility or interaction between the main power system and the ship's power system ? Is there sufficient flexibility and to enable operation when one item of equipment is redundancy in the power generation equipment to enable turn down, and out of commission ? Is there sufficient power generation capacity to enable all equipment to be started up ? Will the design ensure a stable, resilient power supply during commissioning and start-up ? Will the power generation capacity be sufficient to handle transient peak demands? Processes Product storage Safety - electrical Safety - general Are the FPSO processes excessively interconnected so as to cause operational problems ? Does the produced water system have sufficient capacity to prevent accumulation of cold wet crude in the FPSO cargo tanks ? Is there sufficient product storage to allow for likely waiting on weather ? Are there sufficient mechanical interlocks on the electrical systems ? Are there safer alternatives for producing this field other than FPSO and shuttle tanker ? Has the safety case considered all reasonable alternatives for mitigating the identified hazards ? Have all the possible effects of hull penetration for sea water intake been considered (accessibility, maintainability, corrosion effects, corrosion protection)? How will clogging of sea water intakes by biological activity be avoided ? Will the sea water near the surface be too warm for cooling purposes ? Does the design of crude oil heaters allow sufficient reliability and flexibility of operation ? Has sufficient thought been given to using marine equipment such as power generators or gas compressors ? If gas-fired marine diesels are to be located in the hull of the ship what are the safety implications of transporting high pressure gas within the ship ? If novel designs of equipment are specified, will they function properly under conditions experienced on an FPSO ? Are the selected materials of construction of pipework and vessels resistant to corrosion which would result from inadvertent contamination by sea water or other non-design fluids ? Does the shuttle tanker have dynamic positioning ? Has the implication of this been fully considered ? What effect will shuttle tanker operations have on the operation and safety of the FPSO ? Have sufficient spare parts been specified to support commissioning and early operations ? Does the FPSO have a double hull ? Have the implications for ship's stability been properly investigated ? Have stability issues and free liquid effects been properly taken account of in the design of cargo and ballast tanks ? Has a standby vessel been specified with sufficient power to change the orientation of the FPSO if required ?
Power generation
Sea water intake
Selection of equipment
Selection of materials
Shuttle tanker Spare parts Stability Stand by vessel
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Topic
Design Phase
Issue to consider Are the fittings on the turret compatible with those on the risers ? Can flexible hoses associated with the swivel be changed out easily ? If the FPSO is limited to less than 360 degrees weathervaning, what will the implications be ? Is the bolting design of the swivel resilient to the effects of vibration ? Is the design of the swivel pipework and instrumentation such that it will be possible to detect which swivel is leaking ? Is the layout of the hoses associated with the swivel such that tangling and chafing will be avoided ? On a drag-chain style turret, are the bearings, wearpads and grippers sufficiently strongly designed ? Will hoses attached to swivel put undue loads on the swivel or its fittings ? Has the stiffness of the hoses been taken into account ? Will the seals of the swivels cope with sand ? Will the swivel and associated pipework withstand the loads caused by slugging within the pipes ? Can the FPSO alter its orientation in conditions of light wind or when wind and current combine to move the bow of the vessel away from the wind ? Does the FPSO have sufficient thruster power to enable it to maintain an appropriate orientation in all situations ? If the FPSO has been specified without thrusters, it is important to consider carefully why that should be. Does the design of equipment and systems allow the ship to function properly during start-ups, shut-downs, transients or periods of reduced production ? Are all specified valve types appropriate for their purpose ? What actions will be taken to prevent proliferation of valve types and suppliers ? Are sumps deep enough and suctions low enough to allow for effects of motion ?
Swivel or turret
Thrusters
Transients Valves
Vents and drains
Vibration
Waste Water treatment Wax
Are the sizes of knock-out drums sufficient to accommodate fluctuations in fluid arrival caused by drainage rates varying with ship motion ? Does the design of vents and drains take sufficient account of the effects of the likely motion of the FPSO ? Has the design taken account of the potential effect of vibration on pipework and fittings ? Is there sufficient capacity for storage and disposal of waste ? Is the capacity of the produced water treatment plant adequate ? Is there a potential for wax build-up in flowlines ? Does the design minimise wax build-up under all conditions ?
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Construction Phase
Issue to consider Has topsides construction schedule taken account of the restricted access to a Access for construction vessel at the quayside ? What actions will be taken to ensure open communication and lack of conflict between the customer and the construction contractor ? Communication What actions will be taken to ensure open communication and lack of conflict between the groups involved in constructing the hull and the topsides ? If the ship is built under a turnkey project, what actions will be taken to ensure that Communication - input from requirements of the field owner can be taken into account ? What actions will be taken to ensure that the operations group comments and operations requests are heeded during the construction of the vessel and topsides Do the contract terms encourage construction people to delay proper completion of Contract terms tasks needed to deliver a working FPSO ? Experience of FPSO construction Maintainability in marine environment Are the construction managers sufficiently experienced with constructing FPSOs ? Is the construction workforce sufficiently experienced with FPSO construction ? Are the FPSO construction companies aware that the ship must be fabricated and finished to high quality standards because it cannot be dry-docked for maintenance ? Does the FPSO owner company have sufficient experience of managing large projects ? Is the FPSO owner monitoring the progress of the construction project sufficiently closely ? What actions will be taken to ensure that all groups have sufficient motivation to complete ALL the tasks needed to deliver a working FPSO ? What actions will be taken to ensure that remedial work is given sufficient priority ? What actions will be taken to ensure that the construction contractor pays sufficient attention to quality issues ? Have the implications been fully explored of a decision to make major modifications to the FPSO while it is on location ? If the FPSO is due to sail to its location without completion of construction work or without fully testing its systems, have the consequences of this decision been fully discussed by all concerned. Is the decision to sail FPSO incomplete or untested being taken on contractual or Management - sailaway revenue driven grounds? Have all concerned parties been consulted ? Is there sufficient accommodation and lifeboat provision on the FPSO to enable decision construction work to be completed at an acceptable rate, while the FPSO is on location ? Will the construction of the ship be finished before it sails to its location ? Will the ships systems all be fully tested before it sails to its location ? Will the start of production reduce the rate at which construction work can be completed while the FPSO is on location ? Has cabling been installed to a high enough standard ? QA/QC - cable installation Has the fire and gas system been properly installed and tested ? QA/QC - control systems Are equipment supports correctly located ? QA/QC - dimensional control Is deck equipment properly installed over its supports ? Topic
Management
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Construction Phase
Topic Issue to consider Are sufficient resources being deployed to ensure adequate inspection during construction ? Are the shipyard inspectors aware of the more stringent standards for process industry inspection stringent standards for process industry inspection and testing ? QA/QC - general Has the thermal insulation to pipework and process vessels been properly installed ? Have flexible hoses been installed in such away that Have long runs of pipework, walk ways and cable trays been properly constructed to allow for expansion and contraction and for flexing due to ship's motion ? Have the thrusters been properly installed ? What steps will be taken to prevent contamination of dry gas seals during pressure testing ? QA/QC - pipework Are pipework and valves properly installed and supported ? Has the painting of the hull and topsides been executed to a sufficiently high quality QA/QC - protective coatings ? Is the painting of the hull and topsides complete ? QA/QC - testing of Has the functioning of all installed equipment been properly tested ? equipment functions
Commissioning Phase
Topic Documentation
Management
QA/QC - cleaning of pipework and equipment QA/QC - general QA/QC - testing of equipment functions
Issue to consider What actions will be taken to ensure that adequate project documentation is handed over to the operations group ? What actions will be taken to ensure that as much commissioning work is done at the quayside as possible ? What actions will be taken to ensure that the commissioning process is properly monitored and managed ? What actions will be taken to ensure that the time required for commissioning is estimated correctly ? Have pipework, equipment and systems been thoroughly cleaned and flushed ? How will contamination of process equipment by well completion fluid be prevented ? Are the teams located at the construction sites sufficiently resourced to ensure that the FPSO is delivered to the specified design and with the specified quality ? Have large items of equipment (gas turbines, power generators, gas compressors) been tested to FULL LOAD before the FPSO goes on location ?
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General Considerations
Topic Contract terms Issue to consider Are the terms of the contract likely to cause unintended outcomes or to inhibit desirable behaviour ? Does the customer have the contractual right to some accommodation on the FPSO ? Are there sufficient operators in the core crew to cope with the operations work load ? Are there sufficient people with marine experience in the operations team ? Does the OIM have sufficient knowledge of oil production operations ? How will crane operators with FPSO experience be obtained ? How will new crane operators be trained for FPSO operations? How will the vulnerability of the project be reduced to reluctance of contract engineers to relocate to shipyard or topsides construction yard ? What provision is made for training the process operators ? Are roles and responsibilities clearly understood across the project ? Are the responsibilities for QA/QC clearly allocated ? Has the project management team considered the lessons which have been learned from previous FPSO projects and how they apply to the current project ? What actions will be taken to ensure continuity of engineering support from design through to operations ? What actions will be taken to ensure that "stretch" targets are not written into contracts ? What actions will be taken to ensure that information flows freely between the groups involved in the FPSO design, construction, commissioning and operation ? What actions will be taken to ensure that lessons learned during the project are recorded ? What steps are being taken to avoid starting up the FPSO during the winter period ? Top
Human resources
Management
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FPSO Lessons Learnt

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FPSO Lessons Learnt

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OLF FPSO Lessons Learned Project 2002

OLF FPSO Project 2002

Table 1: Summary of Key Issues, Lessons learned and Challenges

CATEGORIES OF FPSO ISSUES

Overall Level of Importance

Green water SUMMARY

Hull - Strength SUMMARY

Turret Location SUMMARY

Turret Design SUMMARY

The Offshore Management Centre, RGU

OLF FPSO Project 2002

CATEGORIES OF FPSO ISSUES

Overall Level of Importance

Remedial Actions / Lessons Learned

Capex Over Runs SUMMARY

Uptime Performance SUMMARY

Safety - General SUMMARY In Situ Repairs and Modifications CHALLENGE

The Offshore Management Centre, RGU

OLF FPSO Project 2002

CATEGORIES OF FPSO ISSUES

Overall Level of Importance

Remedial Actions / Lessons Learned

Ballast & Cargo Pipework SUMMARY

Caisson systems CHALLENGE

Corrosion and Coatings SUMMARY

Mechanical Handling CHALLENGE

The Offshore Management Centre, RGU

OLF FPSO Project 2002

CATEGORIES OF FPSO ISSUES

Overall Level of Importance

Underlying cause Issues/Problems

Hull Shape CHALLENGE

Hull Capacity SUMMARY

Inert gas system SUMMARY

Motion assumptions SUMMARY

The Offshore Management Centre, RGU

OLF FPSO Project 2002

CATEGORIES OF FPSO ISSUES

Overall Level of Importance

Underlying cause Issues/Problems

Remedial Actions / Lessons Learned

PAU Structures, Supports and Interfaces SUMMARY

Power generation SUMMARY

The Offshore Management Centre, RGU

OLF FPSO Project 2002

CATEGORIES OF FPSO ISSUES

Overall Level of Importance

Underlying cause Issues/Problems

Remedial Actions / Lessons Learned

Design Input from Operations CHALLENGE

Project Input from other groups SUMMARY

Role of Vendors / OEM CHALLENGE

The Offshore Management Centre, RGU

OLF FPSO Project 2002

CATEGORIES OF FPSO ISSUES

Overall Level of Importance

Underlying cause Issues/Problems

Remedial Actions / Lessons Learned

Approvals and Safety Verification CHALLENGE

Swivels/Tie Backs CHALLENGE 1

Submersible Offloading Pumps SUMMARY

Tank Entry CHALLENGE

Produced Water Disposal CHALLENGE

Sea Chests CHALLENGE