Admin Law Part 2 of 7

Administrative Law Dean Carlota ASSOCIATION OF PHIL COCONUT DESSICATORS v PHIL COCONUT AUTHORITY 286 SCRA 109 MENDOZA;
February 10, 1998

FACTS - Nov. 5, 1992 APCD brought suit to enjoin PCA from issuing permits to applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants issuance would violate PCAs Admin. Order No.02 series of 1991 as applicants were seeking to operate in congested areas - Nov.6 trial court issued TRO enjoining PCA from ussiung licenses - Pending the case, PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No.018-93 providing for the withdrawal of the PCA from all regulation of coconut product processing industry; registration would be limited to the monitoring of their volumes of production and admin of quality standards - PCA then issued certificates of registration to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants ISSUE WON the PCA can renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating it for that is what the resolution in question actually is. HELD - The power given to the PCA to formulate and adopt a general program of devt for the coconut and other palms oil industry is not a roving commission to adopt any program deemed necessary to promote the devt of the coconut and other palm oils industry, but one to be exercised in the context of the regulatory structure. Reasoning - PCA was originally created by PD232 on June 30, 1973 to take over the powers and functions of the Coconut Coordinating Council, the Phil. Coco Admin, and the Phil. Coco Research Institute - By PD1468 on June 11, 1978, it was made an independent public corp...charged with carrying out States policy to promote the rapid integrated devt and growth of the coco and other palm oil industry and to ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants and beneficiaries through a regulatory scheme set up by law - Aug.28, 1982 by EO826 govt temporarily prohibited the opening of new coco processing
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plants and on Dec.6 phased out some of the existing ones--- because of overproduction in the industry resulting, ultimately, in the decline of the export performance of coco-based products - Oct.23, 1987 PCA adopted Resolution No.058-87 authorizing establishment and operation of additional DCN plants because of increased demand in world market - The above measures were adopted within the framework of regulation as established by law to promote rapid integrated devt and growth of coco and other palm oil industry and to ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants and beneficiaries - the questioned resolution allows not only indiscriminate opening of new plants, but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure - PD1468 Art.II Revised Coco Codethe role of the PCA is to formulate and adopt a general program of devt for the coco and other palm oil industry in all its aspects o By limiting the purpose of reg. to merely monitoring volumes of production and admin. Of quality standards, PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost completely to market forces how the industry will develop - Constitution Art.XII o Sec.6 ...duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands o Sec.19 State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires o Any change in policy must be made by the legislative dept of the govt. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it. Decision Petition GRANTED; resolution NULL and VOID appropriation of public funds by the president for the implementation of the AO is an unconstitutional usurpation of the exclusive right of congress to appropriate public funds for expenditure; 3) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy - Respondents: THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW; A.O. NO. 308 WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS; THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES; A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY. ISSUES 1. WON petitioner has standing 2. WON petition is ripe for adjudication 3. WON A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue 4. WON A.O No. 308 violates the right to privacy HELD 1. YES - As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the GSIS, petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. 2. YES - The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. 3. YES - A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is: "Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders." -An administrative order is an ordinance issued by
BLAS OPLE V RUBEN TORRES G.R. No. 127685 PUNO; JULY 23, 1998
FACTS - Senator Blas Ople sought to invalidate A.O 308 entitled Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on the grounds that: 1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate (bec the establishment of a National ID system requires a legislative act) 2) the
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Administrative Law Dean Carlota

the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. - It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies - the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. The said A.O. redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law. -Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand. -the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws." 4. YES -We prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. -A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. - The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Sec 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquet of options available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless. - The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. Disposition: the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 declared null and void for being unconstitutional. Separate Opinions: ROMERO concur So terrifying are the possibilities of a law such as Administrative Order No. 308 in making inroads into the private lives of the citizens, a virtual Big Brother looking over our shoulders, that it must, without delay, be "slain upon sight" before our society turns totalitarian with each of us, a mindless robot.
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VITUG concur I find it hard to peremptorily assume at this time that the administrative order will be misused and to thereby ignore the possible benefits that can be derived from or the merits of, a nationwide computerized identification reference system. The great strides and swift advances in technology render it inescapable that one day we will, at all events, have to face up with the reality of seeing extremely sophisticated methods of personal identification and any attempt to stop the inevitable may either be short-lived or even futile. The imperatives would instead be to now install specific safeguards and control measures that may be calculated best to ward-off probable ill effects of any such device. Here, it may be apropos to recall the pronouncement of this Court in People vs. Nazario that "As a rule, a statute or [an] act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle." Administrative Order No. 308 appears to be so extensively drawn that could, indeed, allow unbridled options to become available to its implementors beyond the reasonable comfort of the citizens and of residents alike. The subject covered by the questioned administrative order can have far-reaching consequences that can tell on all individuals, their liberty and privacy, that, to my mind, should make it indispensable and appropriate to have the matter specifically addressed by the Congress of the Philippines, the policy-making body of our government, to which the task should initially belong and to which the authority to formulate and promulgate that policy is constitutionally lodged. PANGANIBAN concur I concur only in the result and only on the ground that an executive issuance is not legally sufficient to establish an all-encompassing computerized system of identification in the country. The subject matter contained in AO 308 is beyond the powers of the President to regulate without a legislative enactment.
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I reserve judgment on the issue of whether a national ID system is an infringement of the constitutional right to privacy or of the freedom of thought until after Congress passes, if ever, a law to this effect. Only then, and upon the filing of a proper petition, may the provisions of the statute be scrutinized by the judiciary to determine their constitutional foundation. Until such time, the issue is premature; and any decision thereon, speculative and academic. KAPUNAN, dissent There is nothing in the whole breadth and length of Administrative Order No. 308 that suggests a taint of constitutional infirmity. 1st ISSUE: was the issuance of A.O No. 308 an exercise by the President of legislative power properly belonging to Congress? NO -The Administrative Code of 1987 has unequivocally vested the President with quasilegislative powers in the form of executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders and circulars and general or special orders. An administrative order, like the one under which the new identification system is embodied, has its peculiar meaning under the 1987 Administrative Code: SEC. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. - A.O. No. 308 was promulgated by the President pursuant to the quasi-legislative powers expressly granted to him by law and in accordance with his duty as administrative head. The contention that the President usurped the legislative prerogatives of Congress has no firm basis. -Being the "administrative head," it is unquestionably the responsibility of the President to find ways and means to improve the government bureaucracy, and make it more professional, efficient and reliable, specially those government agencies and instrumentalities which provide basic services and which the citizenry constantly transact with. -If we think of the separation of powers as carrying out the distinction between legislation and administration with mathematical precision and as dividing the branches of government into watertight compartments, we would probably have to conclude that any exercise of lawmaking authority by an agency is automatically invalid. Such a rigorous application of the constitutional doctrine is neither desirable nor feasible A mingling of powers among the three branches of government is not a novel concept. This blending of powers has become necessary to properly address the complexities brought about by a rapidly developing society and which the traditional branches of government have difficulty coping with. 2nd ISSUE: ripeness -Basic in constitutional law is the rule that before the court assumes jurisdiction over and decide constitutional issues, the ff requisites must first be satisfied: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; 2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; 3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and 4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of the case. -In this case, it is evident that the first element is missing. Judicial intervention calls for an actual case or controversy which is defined as "an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory." 3rd ISSUE: is AO violative of right to privacy -There is nothing in A.O. No. 308, as it is worded, to suggest that the advanced methods of the Biometrics Technology that may pose danger to the right of privacy will be adopted. -The standards set in A.O. No. 308 for the adoption of the new system are clear-cut and unequivocably spelled out in the "WHEREASES" and body of the order, namely, the need to provide citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities; the computerized system is intended to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services or social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentation -Again, the concerns of the majority are premature precisely because there are as yet no guidelines that will direct the Court and serve as solid basis for determining the constitutionality of the new identification system. The Court cannot and should not anticipate the constitutional issues and rule on the basis of guesswork. The guidelines would, among others, determine the particular biometrics method that would be used and the specific personal data that would be collected, provide the
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safeguards (if any) and supply the details on how this new system is supposed to work. The Court should not jump the gun on the Executive. MENDOZA, dissent I cannot find anything in the text of Administrative Order No. 308 of the President of the Philippines that would warrant a declaration that it is violative of the right of privacy.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 302 SCRA 241 QUISUMBING; Jan 28, 1999
Nature: Petition for review Facts: - Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first and second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00. The taxes due were settled by applying PBCom's tax credit memos and accordingly, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Tax Debit Memos. - Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered losses so that when it filed its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended Dec 31, 1986, it likewise reported a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year. - But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from leased properties. The lessees withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in 1986. - On Aug 7, 1987, petitioner requested the CIR, among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985. - On July 25, 1988, PBCom filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69. - Pending the investigation of the CIR, petitioner instituted a Petition for Review on Nov 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals. - On May 20, 1993, the CTA denied the request of PBCom for a tax refund or credit of P5,299,749.95, on the ground that it was filed beyond the twoyear reglementary period provided for by law. The
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petitioner's claim for refund in 1986 amounting to P234,077.69 was likewise denied on the assumption that it was automatically credited by PBCom against its tax payment in the succeeding year. Petitioners MFR was denied. - PBCom filed a petition for review with the CA, which affirmed in toto the CTA's resolution. - Petitioner: its claims for refund and tax credits are not yet barred by prescription relying on the applicability of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 issued on April 1, 1985. The circular states that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the two-year prescriptive period under the tax Code and that taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits for the excess quarterly income tax with the BIR within ten years under Art 1144 of the Civil Code. Citing ABS CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. Court of Tax Appeals petitioner claims that rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no retroactive effect if it would be prejudicial to taxpayers, as provided by Sec. 246 of the National Internal Revenue Code. - Respondent: the two-year prescriptive period for filing tax cases in court concerning income tax payments of Corporations is reckoned from the date of filing the Final Adjusted Income Tax Return. CIR also states that since the Final Adjusted Income Tax Return of the petitioner for the taxable year 1985 was supposed to be filed on April 15, 1986, the latter had only until April 15, 1988 to seek relief from the court. When the petitioner filed the case before the CTA on Nov 18, 1988, the same was filed beyond the time fixed by law, and such failure is fatal to petitioner's cause of action. Issues: WON CA erred in denying the plea for tax refund or tax credits on the ground of prescription, despite petitioner's reliance on RMC No. 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years Held: NO - Sec. 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1977 (now Sec. 229, NIRC of 1997) provides for the prescriptive period for filing a court proceeding for the recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. The rule states that the taxpayer may file a claim for refund or credit with the CIR, within two years after payment of tax, before any suit in CTA is commenced. The two-year prescriptive period provided should be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return and final payment of the tax for the year. - When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress. - Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to time by the CIR. The interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement. - In the case of People vs. Lim, it was held that rules and regulations issued by administrative officials to implement a law cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the latter. - The State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. The nullification of RMC No. 7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an administrative interpretation which is not in harmony with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC for being contrary to the express provision of a statute. Hence, his interpretation could not be given weight for to do so would, in effect, amend the statute. - Art. 8 of the Civil Code recognizes judicial decisions, applying or interpreting statutes as part of the legal system of the country. But administrative decisions do not enjoy that level of recognition. A memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not operate to vest a taxpayer with shield against judicial action. For there are no vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong construction of the law by the administrative officials and such wrong interpretation could not place the Government in estoppel to correct or overrule the same. Disposition Petition is DENIED. The decision of CA is AFFIRMED.
A2010 CHINA BANKING CORPORATION v MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND MAXIMA REALTY MANAGEMENT AND DEVT CORP v PARKWAY REAL ESTATE DEVT CORP 442 SCRA 572 YNARES-SANTIAGO; February 13, 2004
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - The subject of the controversy is Unit #702 of Heart Tower Condominium located along Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. Said unit was originally sold by Segovia Development Corporation (Segovia) to Masahiko Morishita, who in turn sold and assigned all his rights thereto in favor of Parkway Real Estate Development Corporation (Parkway) - Sometime in April 1990, Parkway and petitioner Maxima Realty Management and Development Corporation (Maxima) entered into an agreement to buy and sell, on installment basis, Unit #702 in consideration of the amount of 3 Million Pesos. It was further agreed that failure to pay any of the installments on their due dates shall entitle Parkway to forfeit the amounts paid by way of liquidated damages. - Maxima defaulted in the payment of the installments due but was granted several grace periods until it has paid a total of P1,180,000.00, leaving a balance of P1,820,000.00. - Meanwhile on May 10, 1990, Parkway, with the consent of Segovia, executed a Deed of Assignment transferring all its rights in the condominium unit in favor of Maxima. This Deed was intended to enable Maxima to obtain title in its name and use the same as security for P1,820,000.00 loan with RCBC, which amount will be used by Maxima to pay its obligation to Parkway. On the other hand, Segovia and Maxima agreed to transfer title to the condominium unit directly in Maximas name subject to the condition that the latter shall pay Segovia the amount of
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P58,114.00, representing transfer fee, utility expenses, association dues and miscellaneous charges. - RCBC informed Parkway of the approval of Maximas P1.82M loan subject to the submission of, among others, the Condominium Certificate of Title transferred in the name of Maxima and the Certificate of Completion and turn over of unit. - Maxima, however, failed to pay Segovia the amount of P58,114.00 for fees and charges. Thus, Segovia did not transfer the title of the condominium unit to Maxima. Since Parkway was not paid the balance of P1.82M, it cancelled its agreement to buy and sell and Deed of Assignment in favor of Maxima. - Maxima filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs of the HLURB, a complaint for specific performance to enforce the agreement to buy and sell Unit #702. - HLURB Arbiter sustained the nullification of the Deed of Assignment and ordered Parkway to refund to Maxima the amount of P1,180,000.00. Segovia was further ordered to issue the condominium certificate of title over Unit #702 in favor of Parkway upon payment by the latter of the registration fees. - Both Maxima and Parkway appealed to the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB. During the pendency of the appeal, Maxima offered to pay the balance of P1.82M, which was accepted by Parkway. The Board then ordered Maxima to deliver said amount in the form of managers check to Parkway; and directed Segovia to transfer title over the property to Maxima. The latter, however, failed to make good its offer, which compelled Parkway to file a Manifestation that the appeal be resolved. - the Board rendered judgment modifying the decision of the HLURB Arbiter by forfeiting in favor of Parkway 50% of the total amount paid by Maxima and ordering Segovia to pay Parkway the amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees. - Maxima appealed to the Office of the President which dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time. - Maxima filed a petition for review with the CA. - CA affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President. ISSUE WON petitioners appeal before the Office of the President was filed within the reglementary period. HELD NO. - In SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President it was settled that the period within which to appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners of HLURB to the Office of the President is 15 days from receipt of the assailed decision, pursuant to Section 1521 of Presidential Decree No. 957 (Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection Decree) and Section 222 of Presidential Decree No. 1344. - We find petitioners contention bereft of merit, because of its reliance on a literal reading of cited rules without correlating them to current laws as well as presidential decrees on the matter. Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure provides as follows: Section 27. Appeal to the Office of the President.Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the other party, appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners or its division to the Office of the President within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof pursuant to and in accordance with Administrative Order No. 18, of the Office of the President dated February 12, 1987. Decision of the President shall be final subject only to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari or on questions of law. On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, issued by public respondent reads: Section 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from. As pointed out by public respondent, the aforecited administrative order allows the aggrieved party to file its appeal with the Office of the President within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision complained of. Nonetheless, such thirty-day period is subject to the qualification that there are no other statutory periods of appeal applicable. If there are special laws governing particular cases which provide for a shorter or longer reglementary period, the same shall prevail over the thirty-day period provided for in the administrative order. This is in line with the rule in statutory construction that an administrative rule or regulation, in order to be valid, must not contradict but conform to the provisions of the enabling law. - there are special laws that mandate a shorter period of fifteen days within which to appeal a case to public respondent. First, Section 15 of PD 957 provides that the decisions of the National
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Housing Authority shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the decision. Second, Section 2 of PD 1344 states that decisions of the NHA shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen days from the date of its receipt. The latter decree provides that the decisions of NHA are appealable only to the Office of the President. Further, we note that the regulatory functions of NHA relating to housing and land development has been transferred to Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, now known as HLURB. Thus, said presidential issuances providing for a reglementary period of appeal of fifteen days apply in this case. - Accordingly, the period of appeal of thirty days set forth in Section 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules of Procedure no longer holds true for being in conflict with the provisions of aforesaid presidential decrees. For it is axiomatic that administrative rules derive their validity from the statute that they are intended to implement. Any rule which is not consistent with the statute itself is null and void. - In this case, petitioner received a copy of the decision of HLURB on October 23, 1995. Considering that the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen days, petitioner has only until November 7, 1995, to file its appeal. Unfortunately, petitioner filed its appeal 28 days from receipt of the appealed decision, which is obviously filed out of time. - In the case at bar, Maxima had until May 4, 1994 to appeal to the Office of the President. The appeal which was filed on May 10, 1994 was clearly beyond the reglementary period. Disposition WHEREFORE the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
2. Publication and affectivity PEOPLE v QUE PO LAY 94 Phil. 640 MONTEMAYOR; March 29, 1954
NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI finding Que guilty of violating CB Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of RA 265, and sentencing him to
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suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. FACTS - The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U. S. dollars, U. S. checks and U. S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. - The appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect. ISSUE WON the laws were effective despite lack of publication. HELD - NO. The laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing. However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. - Article 2 of the new Civil Code also provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. - Circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and especifically informed of said contents and its penalties. - although Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said Circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession within one day following his taking possession thereof. Disposition decision appealed from is reversed, appellant acquitted
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P2,520.00, paid by the employer corporation and the 6 Japanese employees, plus attorney's fees. - This claim was controverted by the SSS, alleging that Rule IX of the Rules and Regulations of the System, as amended, requires membership in the System for at least 2 years before a separated or resigned employee may be allowed a return of his personal contributions. Under the same rule, the employer is not also entitled to a refund of the premium- contributions it had paid. - After hearing, the Commission denied the petition for the reason that, although under the original provisions of Section 3 (d) of Rule I of the Rules and Regulations of the SSS, alien-employees (who are employed temporarily) and their employers are entitled to a rebate of a proportionate amount of their respective contributions upon the employees' departure from the Philippines, said rule was amended by eliminating that portion granting a return of the premium- contributions. This amendment became effective on January 14, 1958, or before the employment of the subject-aliens terminated. The rights of covered employees who are separated from employment, under the present Rules, are covered by Rule IX which allows a return of the premiums only if they have been members for at least 2 years. - The petitioners raise the issue that the amending rule violates the non-impairment of contracts clause. They also note that the amending rule was not published in the Official Gazette until November 1958. Since they were employed on October 1958, it follows that they were not yet covered by the new rule. The Commission on the other hand noted that its rules are effective upon approval of the President in January 1958. ISSUE WON the Commission erred in applying amended rules to the Japanese employees the
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS v SSS

17 SCRA 1077 BARRERA, J.: (1966) FACTS - The Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., a domestic corporation, since the start of its operations in 1957, has been employing Japanese technicians under a pre-arranged contract of employment, the minimum period of which employment is 6 months and the maximum is 24 months. - On October 7, 1958, the Assistant General Manager of the corporation, on its behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the Japanese technicians, filed a claim with the SSS for the refund of the premiums paid to the System, on the ground of termination of the members' employment. - As this claim was denied, they filed a petition with the Social Security Commission for the return or refund of the premiums, in the total sum of
HELD NO. RATIO. Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the date of publication of laws in the Official Gazette is material for the purpose of determining their effectivity, only if the statutes themselves do not so provide. [CAVEAT: THIS RATIO IS OBSOLETE, TANADA VS. TUVERA IS THE CONTROLLING DOCTRINE] REASONING In the present case, the original Rules and Regulations of the SSS specifically provide that any amendment thereto subsequently
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adopted by the Commission, shall take effect on the date of its approval by the President. Consequently, the delayed publication of the amended rules in the Official Gazette did not affect the date of their effectivity, which is January 14, 1958, when they were approved by the President. It follows that when the Japanese technicians were separated from employment in October, 1958, the rule governing refund of premiums is Rule IX of the amended Rules and Regulations, which requires membership for 2 years before such refund of premiums may be allowed. Disposition affirmed Held Yes. Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect . Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Sec of CA 638 provides: Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability, (3) decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published, [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law, and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. - The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. - The clear object of the quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever not even a constructive one. - Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance than at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa - and for the diligent ones,
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ready access to the legislative records - no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. - It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Disposition Court ordered respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
TANADA v TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 ESCOLIN; April 24, 1985

Nature Petition for Mandamus Facts - Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish. and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. - Respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: "Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, x x x Issue WON publication is a condition sine qua non for the effectivity of laws
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. v TORRES 212 SCRA 298 GRIO-AQUINO, J.; August 6, 1992
Nature Petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order Facts: - On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong". The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers: In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong, the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies is hereby temporarily suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such,
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the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose. - Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. - On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons: 1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; 2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and 3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with. Issue WON the assailed Department Order and circulars issued by both DOLE and POEA are legally valid Held NO. - Although Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities and the questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government, nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.) Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. -- The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation. Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.) Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rulemaking requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987). - As held in Taada vs. Tuvera: . . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.) Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the socalled letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.) We agree that publication must be in full or
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it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.) Disposition For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.
DE JESUS V COA (JAMORALIN) 294 SCRA 152 PURISIMA; August 12, 1998
NATURE Special civil action of certiorari FACTS - Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). On July 1, 1989, RA 6758 (prescribing a revised compensation and position classification system in the government) took effect. The said act provides, among others, for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. - to implement the law, the Dept. of Budget and Management (DBM) issued a circular, discontinuing without qualification effective Nov.1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary. Pursuant to the law and circular, corporate auditor Jamoralin disallowed on post audit the payment of honoraria to the petitioners - petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the validity and effectivity of the circular on 2 grounds: that the circular is inconsistent with the provisions of RA 6758, the very law it seeks to implement; and that it is without force and effect because it was not published in the Official Gazette. COA upheld the validity of the circular. Hence, this petition ISSUE WON the circular has legal force and effect despite the absence of publication HELD NO Ratio The Civil Code provides: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. xxx
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Reasoning In Tanada v Tavera, the court construed the above provision: all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders xxx. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. - the challenged circular in this case needs to be published. Following the doctrine, publication in the OG or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since the circular is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, the circular must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. - the circular, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the said circular may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the people concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of the circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency. Disposition Petition is granted.
A2010 REPUBLIC (NTC) V EXPRESS TELECOM G.R. No. 147096, G.R. No. 147210 YNARES-SANTIAGO ; Jan 15, 2002
NATURE Instant petition for review on certiorari FACTS December 29, 1992 > International Communications Corp (now Bayantel) filed an application with NTC a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA) - January 22, 1993 > NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 4-1-93 directing all interested applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their applications before NTC on or before February 15, 1993, and deferring the acceptance of any application filed after said date until further orders - May 6, 1993 > prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing by NTC wrt Bayantel's original application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended application. - May 17, 1993 > notice of hearing issued by NTC wrt this amended application was published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application and notice of hearing were mailed to all affected parties. Hearings were conducted on the amended application. - December 19, 1993 > before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, NTC issued an Order: In view of the recent grant of two (2) separate Provisional Authorities in favor of ISLACOM and GMCR, Inc., which resulted in the closing out of all available frequencies for the service being applied for by herein applicant, and in order that this case may not remain pending for an indefinite period of time, AS PRAYED FOR, let this case be, as it is, hereby ordered ARCHIVED without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available. - March 23, 1999 > Memorandum Circular No. 3-399 was issued by NTC re-allocating an additional five (5) MHz frequencies for CMTS service - May 17, 1999 > Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators - February 1, 2000 > NTC granted Bayantel's motion to revive the latter's application NTC noted that the application was ordered archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency shall become available. - Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of Bayantel's application arguing that: Bayantels application is outdated and should no longer be used as basis for the necessity for the proposed CMTS service and there is no public need for new CMTS operator as existing operators - Extelcom, Globe, Smart, Piltel, and Islacom- more than adequately addressed the market demand - March 13, 2000 > Bayantel filed a Consolidated Reply/Comment, stating that Extelcom cannot claim that frequencies were not available inasmuch as the allocation and assignment rest solely on the discretion of the NTC - May 3, 2000 > NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS service and denying the Motions for Reconsideration by SMARTCOM and GLOBE TELECOMS/ISLACOM and the Motion to Dismiss filed by EXTELCOM for lack of merit. The grant of the provisional authority was anchored on ensuring effective competition in the CMTS market considering the operational merger of (Smart-Piltel and Globe-Inslacom), new CMTS operators must be allowed to provide the service, the need to provide service to some or all of the remaining cities and municipalities without telephone service and documents in compliance with the technical requirements - In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a CMTS, NTC applied Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure, which provides: Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. --- Upon the filing of an application, complaint or petition or at any stage thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative, the relief prayed for, based on the pleading, together with the affidavits and supporting documents attached thereto, without prejudice to a final decision after completion of the hearing which shall be called within thirty (30) days from grant of authority asked for. (underscoring ours) - Extelcom contends that NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register on February 3, 1993. These Revised Rules deleted the phrase "on its own initiative;" accordingly, a provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission.
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- CA: Extelcom filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the annulment of the Order reviving the application of Bayantel and the Order granting Bayantel a provisional authority to construct, install, operate and maintain a nationwide CMTS - September 13, 2000 > CA granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition - MFRs filed by Bayantel and NTC but were denied for lack of merit ISSUES 1. WON 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure will still govern because there was a deficiency in the publication of the 1993 Revised Rules 2. WON NTCs rulings can be touched upon by the courts HELD 1. YES - NTC, through the Secretary of the Commission, issued a certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules. - The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 3 thereof merely states: Filing. --- (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copes of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain or disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. - The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. - Taada vs. Tuvera stated, thus: "We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative power or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative Rules and Regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws." - Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. This is explicit from Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code, and which states that: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. - The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act (C.A. 146), fall squarely within the scope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case Taada v. Tuvera. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
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- Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In the absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs. - In any event, regardless of whether the 1978 Rules or the 1993 Revised Rules should apply, the records show that the amended application filed by Bayantel in fact included a motion for the issuance of a provisional authority. Hence, it cannot be said that the NTC granted the provisional authority motu proprio. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred when it found that the NTC issued its Order of May 3, 2000 on its own initiative. 2. NO Ratio This Court has consistently held that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency. It has also been held that the exercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter that can best be discharged by the government agency concerned, and not by the courts. Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in the evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of its adjudicative functions. This latitude includes the authority to take judicial notice of facts within its special competence. Disposition Consolidated petitions are GRANTED
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS v ERC G.R. No 163935 Callejo, Sr., J; February 2, 2006
NATURE Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction FACTS - Meralco filed an application with the ERC to increase its generation charge from P3.1886 per kWh to P3.4664 per kWh which was approved by the latter on June 2, 2004. Petitioners filed the action - NASECORE, et al. forthwith filed with this Court
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the present petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the said June 2, 2004 ERC Order for lack of requisite publication of respondent MERALCOs amended application, thereby depriving the petitioners of procedural due process. In addition, they invoke Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) which provides for publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Hence they allege that said failure to comply with the publication requirement renders the assailed order null and void. - Respondent MERALCO, for its part, urges the Court to uphold the validity of the assailed ERC Order approving the increase of its generation charge. In essence, it contends that its amended application for the increase of its generation charge is excluded and/or exempted from the application of the publication requirement, among others, in Sec. 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA. The applicable rules are the GRAM Implementing Rules embodied in the ERC Order dated February 24, 2003. These rules govern any petition for the recovery of fuel and purchased power costs. (The subject is the additional cost being billed by Meralco to its customers to recover any increase in the cost of power it purchases from its electricity suppliers over a base rate. This is in effect a cost recovery mechanism since Meralco is just granted the ability to recover additional costs that its suppliers charge Meralco due to increase in fuel cost and such. To arrive at the additional cost to be charged, a formula was developed and discussed thoroughly in public hearing held for the purpose. The same formula was published in two newspapers of general circulation. Thereafter, this formula was used in computing the increase in the charges that Meralco can charge without the need of going through the publication, public hearing route as the method of computation has been clearly established. It became merely mathematical at that point. However, with the EPIRA the ERC replaced the ERB and hence new terminologies and methods had to be established. The old cost recovery mechanism was replaced by a new formula which also went through the process of public hearing. Hence, Meralco opined that since this new mechanism was essentially the same as the old one under the ERB, there was no need for it to go through the process every time they increase the rates to recover pure costs.) ISSUE/S WON ERC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the increase HELD Yes. Contrary to the stance taken by the respondents, the amended application of respondent MERALCO for the increase of its generation charge is covered by Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA. For clarity, the said provision is quoted anew: (e) Any application or petition for rate adjustment or for any relief affecting the consumers must be verified, and accompanied with an acknowledgement of receipt of a copy thereof by the LGU Legislative Body of the locality where the applicant or petitioner principally operates together with the certification of the notice of publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in the same locality. The ERC may grant provisionally or deny the relief prayed for not later than seventy-five (75) calendar days from the filing of the application or petition, based on the same and the supporting documents attached thereto and such comments or pleadings the consumers or the LGU concerned may have filed within thirty (30) calendar days from receipt of a copy of the application or petition or from the publication thereof as the case may be. Thereafter, the ERC shall conduct a formal hearing on the application or petition, giving proper notices to all parties concerned, with at least one public hearing in the affected locality, and shall decide the matter on the merits not later than twelve (12) months from the issuance of the aforementioned provisional order. This Section 4(e) shall not apply to those applications or petitions already filed as of 26 December 2001 in compliance with Section 36 of the Act. - There is another compelling reason why reliance by respondent MERALCO and the ERC on the GRAM Implementing Rules is unavailing. To recall, they advance the view that the June 2, 2004 ERC Order is valid, notwithstanding the fact that respondent MERALCOs amended application was not published in a newspaper of general circulation, because the same was issued in accordance with the GRAM Implementing Rules which does not require such publication. - It does not appear from the records, however,
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that the GRAM Implementing Rules, as set forth in the ERC Order dated February 24, 2003 in ERC Case No. 2003-44, has been published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. - Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code, provides that laws shall take after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. - The basic requirement of publication of statutes was explained in Taada v. Tuvera as follows: We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature, or at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the socalled letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. - A careful review of the procedural steps undertaken by the ERC leading to its issuance of the Order dated February 24, 2003 in ERC Case No. 2003-44, which set forth the GRAM Implementing Rules, as well as the Order dated June 2, 2004 in ERC Case No. 2004-112, which approved the increase of respondent MERALCOs generation charge purportedly in accordance with the GRAM Implementing Rules, shows that there was no publication of the same in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Disposition Petition is granted.
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ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987 BOOK VII CHAPTER 2 RULES AND REGULATIONS Section 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. inspection. (1) 4. Effectivity. - In Philippines SectionThe University of the addition to Law Center may omit other rule-making requirementsfrom the provided bulletin inconsistent with any Book, by law not or the codification this rule if its publication would be fifteen each rule shall become effective unduly (15)cumbersome, expensive or otherwise days from the date of filing as above inexpedient, but copies of that rule provided unless a different date is fixed shall be made available by law, or specified in the rule in cases on of application imminent dangerto publicagency safety to the health, which and adopted the existence of which must welfare, it, and the bulletin shall be contain a noticeinstating the general expressed a statement subject matter of The agency rule accompanying the rule. the omitted shall may be takeand new copies thereof to make appropriate measures obtained. (2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available
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- The appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect. ISSUE WON the laws were effective despite lack of publication. HELD - NO. The laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing. However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. - Article 2 of the new Civil Code also provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. - Circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
3. Penal Regulations PEOPLE v QUE PO LAY 94 Phil. 640 MONTEMAYOR; March 29, 1954
NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI finding Que guilty of violating CB Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of RA 265, and sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. FACTS - The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U. S. dollars, U. S. checks and U. S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20.
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provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and especifically informed of said contents and its penalties. - although Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said Circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession within one day following his taking possession thereof. Disposition decision appealed from is reversed, appellant acquitted said decision - petitioner claimed as a loss consisting of war damage claim which has been approved but has not been paid until the US Congress makes further appropriation. He claims that the said amount represents a business asset as defined in the said act to which he is entitled to deduct as loss in his 1951 returns HELD - The court held that assuming that said amount represents a portion of the 75% of his war damage claim not paid, the same would not be deductible as a loss in 1951 because, according to petitioner, the last installment he received from the War Damage Commission, together with the notice that no further payment would be made on his claim, was in 1950. Said amount would at most be a proper deduction from his 1950 gross income. - Secondly, said amount cannot be considered as a "business asset" which can be deducted as a loss in contemplation of law because its collection is not enforceable as a matter of right, but is dependent merely upon the generosity and magnanimity of the U. S. government. As of the end of 1945, there was no law under which petitioner could claim compensation for the destruction of his properties during the battle for the liberation of the Philippines. And under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946, the payments of claims by the War Damage Commission merely depended upon its discretion to be exercised in the manner it may see fit, but the non-payment of which cannot give rise to any enforceable right, for, under said Act, "All findings of the Commission concerning the amount of loss or damage sustained, the cause of such loss or damage, the persons to whom compensation pursuant to this title is payable, and the value of the property lost or damaged, shall be conclusive and shall not be reviewable by any court". (section 113). - Under the authority of section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code the Secretary of Finance, in the exercise of his administrative powers, caused the issuance of General Circular No. V-123 as an implementation or interpretative regulation of section 30 of the same Code, under which the amount of P12,837.65 was allowed to be deducted "in the year the last installment was received with notice that no further payment would be made until the United States Congress makes further appropriation therefor", but such circular was found later to be wrong and was revoked.
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- In line with this opinion, the Secretary of Finance, through the Collector of Internal Revenue, issued GC No. V-139 which not only revoked and declared void his previous Circular No. V 123 but laid down the rule that losses of property which occurred during the period of World War II from fires, storms, shipwreck or other casualty, or from robbery, theft, or embezzlement are deductible for income tax purposes in the year of actual destruction of said property. - "It seems too clear for serious argument that an administrative officer can not change a law enacted by Congress. A regulation that is merely an interpretation of the statute when once determined to have been erroneous becomes nullity. An erroneous construction of the law by the Treasury Department or the collector of internal revenue does not preclude or estop the government from collecting a tax which is legally due." (Ben Stocker, et al., 12 B. T. A., 1351.) "Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others." (Article 2254, New Civil Code.) Disposition affirmed
PEOPLE v MACEREN 4. Interpretative Rules HILADO V CIR 100 Phil 288 BAUTISTA ANGELO; October 31, 1956
NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the CTA FACTS - March Emilio Hilado filed his income tax return for 1951 with the treasurer of Bacolod City claimed a deductible item of P12,873 from his gross income pursuant to General Circular V-123 issued by the CIR. The Secretary of Finance, through the Collector, issued GC V- 139 which revoked and declared void Circular V-123; and laid down rules that the losses of property which occurred in WWII from fires, storms, shipwrecks or other casualty, or from robbery, theft or embezzlement are deductible in the year of the actual loss or destruction of said property. The deductions he claimed for were disallowed as deduction from the gross income of the petitioner for 1951. the petition for reconsideration and the appeal with the CTA were denied . This is an appeal from the
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC.vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION 114 SCRA 555 BARRERA; Mar 17, 1962
NATURE Appeal from a resolution of the SSC. FACTS The Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 informing the employers that all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration of the following tenor will comprise the Employees remuneration or earnings, upon which the SSS contributions will be based. Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular. The petitioners arguments are the following: a. Circular 22 is contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers'
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and employees' respective monthly premium contributions. b. The Circular is invalid for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. - Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. ISSUE WON Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act." HELD NO. It is a mere administrative interpretation. Ratio There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Reasoning Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in RA 1161 which was amended by RA 1792. Prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed. DISPOSITION The Resolution appealed from is affirmed.
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due process as it was not supported by law. CSC promulgated resolution 90-497, ruling that the deduction was in order, with the rationale that one who has no leave credits, being absent on either Monday or Friday, cannot be favorably credited with intervening days had the same been working days. Petitioner filed an MFR which the CSC denied hence this petition. -during the pendency of this petition, the CSC promulgated Resolution 91-540 which amended the questioned policy, resolving to instead adopt the policy that an employee, regardless of whether he has leave credits or not, is absent on a day immediately preceding/succeeding a Sat., Sun. or holiday shall not be considered absent. ISSUE WON CSCs policy mandating salary deductions is valid HELD -NO. Although from the developments brought by Resolution 91-540 the issue would appear to have become moot and academic, the Court has decided to render a formal ruling for reasons of public interest. -When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. -In promulgating the policy in question, the CSC interpreted the provision of RA 2625 amending Sec. 284 and 285-A of the Revised Administrative Code which grants 15 days of vacation leave and 15 days sick leave as referring only to government employees who have earned leave credits against which their absences may be charged with pay, as its letters speak only of leaves of absence with full pay. -In statutory construction, the intent or spirit of the law must prevail over the letter thereof. The intent in enacting RA 2625 may be gleaned from the second reading of HB 41 (which became RA 2625) which stated its purpose as being to exclude from the computation of the leave, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays because the employee is entitled not to go to office during those days and that it would
PERALTA V CSC 212 SCRA 425 Padilla; Aug. 10, 1992

FACTS -petitioner was appointed Trade-Specialist II in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Since he had no accumulated leave credits, DTI deducted from his initial salary the amount corresponding to his absences inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays. Petitioner sent a memorandum to Alvis (Chief of Gen. Administration Service), inquiring as to the law on said deductions. Alvis replied, citing Ch. 5.49 of the Handbook of Information on the Phil. Civil Service which states that when an employee is on leave without pay on a day before or immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, such Sat., Sun. or holiday shall also be without pay, unless such non-working days occur within the period of service actually rendered. -petitioner sent a letter to the CSC chairman questioning the cited provision alleging that such was tantamount to deprivation of property without
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be unfair and unjust to count such days in the computation of leaves. As such, the construction by the CSC of RA 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent. The fact remains that government employees cannot be declared absent and deprived of their salaries on non-working days. Furthermore, before RA 2625, Sec. 284 and 285-A applied to all govt employees without distinction and as such, the effect of the amendment should apply to all employees as well, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits. Disposition petition is GRANTED promulgation by the board of the 1967 rules and regulations. Assailed provision was declared void, illegal and had no effect against Respondent School and its graduates. ISSUES 1. WON the Board of Examiners have the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to deny admission to the nurses examination and registration as registered nurses to the graduates of schools that are found to be sub-standard 2. WON there was arbitrariness or oppression in the boards exercise of its powers as to amount to denial of substantive due process 3. WON the Court erred in holding that the said provision is void HELD 1. YES Reasoning. The Philippine Nursing Act, 2 Republic Act No. 877 as amended by Republic Act No. 4704 (approved June 18, 1966) expressly empowers in section 9 thereof the petitioner board "subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines [to] promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." -Section 3 of the cited Act specifically empowers petitioner board to inspect nursing colleges and schools and vests it with authority "to issue, suspend, revoke, or reissue certificates of registration for practice of nursing. The Board shall study the conditions affecting nursing education and the practice of the nursing profession in the Philippines, and shall exercise the powers conferred upon it by this Act with a view to the maintenance of an efficient ethical technical moral and professional standard in the practice of nursing. The Board shall likewise study and examine the facilities of hospitals or universities seeking permission to open new schools or colleges of nursing or departments of nursing education so as to see if the essential requirements therefor including qualified faculty and adequate budget are properly complied with. The authorization to open schools or colleges of nursing shall be based upon the written recommendation of the Board and the representative of the Government entity concerned with the granting of school permits or authorization." It further provides that "(T)he Board shall have the power to investigate violations of this Act . . . Board shall from time to time look into the conditions affecting the practice
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of nursing in the Philippines and whenever necessary, recommend or adopt such measures as may be deemed proper for the advancement of the profession and for the vigorous enforcement of this Act." -Section 20 of the Act expressly provides that "'In order to be admitted to the nurse examination, an applicant must, at the time of filing his or her application therefor, establish to the satisfaction of the Board that' he has all the requisite qualifications provided for by law." Sections 11 to 15 of the same Act ordain in connection therewith inter alia that schools and colleges of nursing should be established for the preparation qualified applicants for the profession of nursing, and should be operated as educational institutions (section 11); that adequate budget for the operation of said schools or colleges and their libraries, classrooms, teaching equipment and supplies should be provided (section 12); that clinical and public health nursing facilities should be established by said colleges or schools and provisions for required experience of students be made (section 13); and that the prescribed qualifications for faculty members and instructors in nursing be observed by all colleges, schools or institutes of nursing (section 14) and the general entrance requirements of students to said colleges or schools be followed (section 15). 2. NO Reasoning. Respondents contention that Boards Visitorial power was already conferred by law on the Bureau of Private Education and thus might result in a situation wherein the Board and the Bureau would have different and conflicting findings on the conditions and standards of these schools manifestly addresses itself to the wisdom of the provisions of the Act granting similar visitorial powers to the petitioner board as a specialized board composed of highly competent technical persons, viz, "registered nurses of recognized standing in the Philippines" whom the Congress deemed could be relied upon to maintain high standards for nursing education and the nursing profession. It is well settled that it is beyond the domain of the courts to inquire into the wisdom of the Act vesting the petitioner board with similar powers to that likewise entrusted to the Bureau of Private Education. -Respondents contention also is pure speculation. While nursing schools were placed under the general supervision of the Secretary of Education, the Congress likewise realized in line with progressive trends that a specialized agency such
5. Examples of various agencies
Rule-making
in
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v MUNOZ SAND V ABAD SANTOS EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION 58 SCRA 33 TEEHANKEE, July 18, 1974
NATURE Petition for Review and for a declaration of validity of the disputed rule FACTS -Petitioner Board of Examiners for nurses issued the contested rules and regulation which provided for periodic inspection of nursing schools and barring from admission to the nurses examination the graduates of schools that are duly found to be sub-standard during the period of the deficiency (Par5, Rule 69, Art VII of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the petitioner board). Respondent school filed an action for declaratory relief seeking a declaration that the said provision is void, illegal and ineffective and without force of law, which the respondent court granted TC: Board of Examiners has the full authority under Section 9 RA 877 to promulgate rules and regulations, the board may apply only the same to new schools or colleges established or opened after the promulgation of said rules and regulations and conversely may not be given retroactive effect and cannot be enforced on schools and colleges already duly accredit by the Bureau of Private Schools prior to the
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as petitioner board of examiners for nurses should likewise exercise close supervision directly over nursing schools since "the maintenance of an efficient ethical, technical, moral and professional standard in the practice of nursing" has to begin in the school where the nursing education is given. 3. YES. Respondent court's view that petitioner board's power of periodic inspection would apply only to new nursing schools opened after the promulgation of the rule and not to existing schools already accredited by the Bureau of Private Schools would lead to the absurd result whereby petitioner board would be utterly helpless with reference to existing schools (which would constitute a special class) and powerless to require them to maintain the minimum standards under pain of disqualifying their deficient graduates from the nurses' examination. Ratio. The cited regulation is one of the many forms of a proper exercise of police power by the State which is called upon to see to it and assure in the interest of public health and welfare that colleges and schools of nursing are properly conducted and maintained in accordance with the standards fixed; that they do not become substandard or fall below the standards; and that only qualified graduates are allowed to take the State examination and thereafter license to practice the noble profession of nursing. Disposition judgment under review of respondent court is reversed and set aside, and Article VIII, Rule 69, section 5 of the Rules and Regulations is declared valid partes" proceedings1. It likewise provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him." - Under the Trade-mark Law (RA 166), the Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over the above-mentioned cases. The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases were drafted and promulgated by the Director of Patents and approved by the then Sec of Agriculture and Commerce. Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of the Sec of Agriculture and Commerce, amended the Rule as mentioned above. - Under Sec 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations owned, controlled or operated by the Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Sec 78 of the same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office." - Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers delegated to hear their cases. ISSUE WON the amendment to Rule 168 is valid HELD YES Ratio While the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of administrative agency will be made. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.
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- Power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. There is no provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negating the existence of such authority, so far as the designation of hearing examiners is concerned. Reasoning This sub-delegation of power has been justified by "sound principles of organization" which demand that "those at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of detail." Disposition Petition is dismissed.
RABOR v CSC THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC. v POEA 243 SCRA 666 DAVIDE, JR.; April 21, 1995
NATURE Petition to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994 FACTS -Pertinent sections of Memorandum Circular No. 05: "Section C. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of US$50,000 and an additional amount of US$7,000 to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four children at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. Where the death is caused by warlike activity while sailing within a declared warzone or war risk area, the compensation payable shall be doubled.
AMERICAN TOBACCO V DIRECTOR OF PATENTS 67 SCRA 287 ANTONIO; October 14, 1975
NATURE Petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction FACTS - Petitioners (American Tobacco, GM, P&G, Warner Lambert, etc.) challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter
The proceedings affected refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office.
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The employer shall undertake appropriate warzone insurance coverage for this purpose." xxx xxx xxx III. The maximum rate provided under Appendix I-A shall likewise be adjusted to US$50,000 regardless of rank and position of the seafarer. IV. Upon effectivity, the new compensation and other benefits herein provided shall apply to any Filipino seafarer on board any vessel, provided, that the cause of action occurs after this Resolution takes effect. V. This Resolution shall take effect after sixty (60) days from publication in a newspaper of general circulation. -Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., and incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its copetitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign shipowner-principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994, on the grounds that The POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can. ISSUE WON the POEA has the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels HELD YES. Reasoning Well established in our jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. This is the principle of subordinate legislation which was discussed by this Court in People vs. Rosenthal, (68 Phil. 328 [1939]) and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service Commission, (70 Phil 22 [1940]). That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be disputed -The POEA mandate referred to as providing the reasonable standard for the exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority is found in the statement of powers and functions of the said office in paragraph (a), Section 4 of E.O. 797, to wit: (a) The Administration shall formulate and undertake in coordination where necessary with the appropriate entities concerned, a systematic program for promoting and monitoring the overseas employment of Filipino workers taking into consideration domestic manpower requirements, and to protect their rights to fair and equitable employment practices. It shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employeremployee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen. This adjudicatory function shall be undertaken in appropriate circumstances in consultation with the Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines. The governing Board of the Administration, as hereinunder provided, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration. Disposition Petition DISMISSED
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FACTS -Private respondent Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a lot for P307,800.00 as its purchase price. She paid P1,000.00 as partial reservation fee and completed payment of this fee by paying P4,000.00. -private respondent paid REVI full downpayment on the purchase price. However, she was advised by REVI to change her co-maker, which she agreed, asking for an extension of one month to do so. -For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of the appropriate documents under the terms of the original agreement, REVI, through its Vice-President for Marketing, informed respondent of the cancellation of the contract -private respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance against REVI with the office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) -the HLURB, whose authority to hear and decide the complaint was challenged by REVI in its answer, rendered its judgment in favor of Sendino and ordered REVI to continue with the sale of the house and lot and to pay Sendino damages -Revi appealed from this decision to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President ISSUE WON the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has Quasi-judicial functions, notwithstanding absence of express grant by Executive Order No. 90 of Dec 17, 1986 which created it. HELD YES. Reasoning As explicitly provided by law, jurisdiction over actions for specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner or developer, is vested exclusively in the HSRC, Section 1 of PD 1344, in no uncertain terms, provides: 'Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP AND/OR MAGDIWANG REALTY CORP v SENDINO G.R. No. 109703. KAPUNAN, JR.; July 5, 1994
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari
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'A. Unsound real estate business practices; 'B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and 'C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.' "This is reinforced by section 8 of EO 648 (otherwise known as the Charter of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission) which took effect on February 7, 1981, thus: "Section 8. Transfer of Functions. The Regulatory functions of the National Housing Authority pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos. 957, 1216, 1344 and other related laws are hereby transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. . . . Among the regulatory functions are . . . Hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices, claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen and cases of specific performance' "There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The constitutionality of such grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority (now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board) over cases involving the sale of lots in commercial subdivisions was upheld in Tropical Homes Inc. v. National Housing Authority (152 SCRA 540 [1987]) and again sustained in a later decision in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority (153 SCRA 399 [1987]) where We restated that the National Housing Authority (now HLURB) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the terms of PD No. 957 which defines the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers of said agency." Clearly, therefore, the HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioners with its adjudicative body, the OAALA, in ordering petitioners to comply with their obligations arising from the Reservation Agreement. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the agency's enabling act. In view of the Court's pronouncement in United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit, supra, recognizing the HLURB as the successor agency of the HSRC's powers and functions, it therefore follows that the transfer of such functions from the NHA to the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of 1981, thereby resulted in the acquisition by the HLURB of adjudicatory powers which included the power to "(h)ear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices . . . and cases of specific performance." Disposition Petition DISMISSED
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grounds: 1) That the Cebu Autobus Company holds a certificate of public convenience to operate an autobus service for the transportation of passengers and freight between all the principal points in the Province of Cebu; 2) That the establishment of sliding rate is repugnant to the fundamental principles of Public Utility Regulations; 3) That the granting of the above application will promote unnecessary and ruinous competition between the operators; and 4) That the granting of sliding rates will promote discrimination with regard to its enforcement, that is to say, one shipper of cargoes may be charged the maximum rates, whereas another shipper is charged a much lower rate. - A hearing on the petition in case No. 31724 was held. At the hearing Attorney Alvear appeared for the Cebu Autobus Co., and maintained that the commission could not grant the applicant the permission which is requested. Upon ascertaining that the application of the Philippine Railway Co. related to the Panay Division, Attorney Alvear reserved the right to file an opposition on behalf of the Panay Autobus Co., the petitioner and appellant herein. The only witness presented was Hancock. He testified that the applicant wished to reduce its freight rates because of the reduction in market prices and the competition which the Philippine Railway had to contend with; that a flexible tariff would in his opinion increase the earnings of the Railway Company; the order No. 3 of the Public Service Commission fixing the maximum rates for steamers has proved very satisfactory; that it was not the intention of the Philippine Railway Co. to violate in any way section 16 of Act No. 3108, and that any reduction in freight rates would be applied to all kinds of cargo without discrimination; that it was not his intention to enforce the reduced rates on the Cebu Division; that the fixing of the rates was to be left entirely to the discretion of the officials on the Railway Company, who would apply the rates without discrimination and notify the commission; that the present maximum rate from Iloilo to Capiz is P15 a ton, and he wished to reduce it to P5 or P6. - Subsequently the Panay Autobus Company filed its opposition to the applications of the Philippine Railway Co. in cases Nos. 31724 and 31827 on the following grounds: 1) the opponent company operates a bus service in the Island of Panay with the right and privilege to transport passengers and freight at schedule of rates fixed by this Honorable Commission; 2) The petition for flexible rates could not be granted by this Honorable as it is against
d. Fixing of Rates, Wages, Prices

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, BOOK VII
Section 9. Public Participation. (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least PANAY AUTOBUS CO. v PHILIPPINE
RAILWAY CO 57 Phil 172 VICKERS; FEB 17, 1933

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - R. R. Hancock, vice-president and general manager of the Philippine Railway Co., filed with the Public Service Commission in case No. 31724 a petition requesting the authority of the Commission to alter the freight rates of the Philippine Railway Company on the Cebu and Panay Divisions whenever in their judgment they find it necessary in order to meet the competition of road trucks and auto buses. He requested that the rates at present in effect be considered the maximum , and that we may fix other lower rates whenever in our opinion it will be to the advantage of the Railway Company to do so. - The petition was set for hearing, and the operators affected thereby were notified. The Cebu Autobus Company through its attorneys filed an opposition to said petition on the following
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the fundamental principles of public utility regulation; and 3) The granting of a flexible rate will work ruinous competition with other common carriers in the field"; and on the same date asked for a rehearing on the ground that the decision was contrary to law and the fundamental principles of public utility regulation. The motion for a rehearing was denied by the commission. - The appellant argues that the commission erred in dictating the decision because 1) it did not find and declare that rates lower than the maximum rate are just and reasonable; 2) it delegated to appellee its powers and duties to fix and determine what are just and reasonable rates; and 3) the authority granted to appellee is contrary to the fundamental rules of public utility regulation. ISSUE WON the Public Service Commission was authorized by law to delegate to the Philippine Railway Co. the power of altering its freight rates whenever it should find it necessary to do so in order to meet the competition of road trucks and autobuses, or to change its freight rates at will, or to regard its present rates as maximum rates, and to fix lower rates whenever in the opinion of the Philippine Railway Co. it would be to its advantage to do so. HELD NO. - The mere recital of the language of the application of the Philippine Railway Co. is enough to show that it is untenable. The legislature has delegated to the Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services, but it has not authorized the Public Service Commission to delegate that power to common carrier or other public service. The rates of public services like the Philippine Railway Co. have been approved or fixed by the Public Service Commission and any change in such rates must be authorized or approved by the Public Service Commission after they have been shown to be just and reasonable. The public service may, of course, propose new rates, as the Philippine Railway Co. did in case No. 31827, but it cannot lawfully make said new rates effective without the approval of the Public Service Commission, and the Public Service Commission itself cannot authorize a public service to enforce rates without the prior approval of said rates by the commission. The commission must approve new rates when they are submitted to it, if the evidence shows them to be just and reasonable, otherwise it must disapprove them. Clearly, the commission cannot determine in advance whether or not the new rates of the Philippine Railway Co, will be just and reasonable, because it does not know what those rates will be. - In the present case the Philippine Railway Co. in effect asked for permission to change its freight rates at will. It may change them every day or every hour, whenever it deems it necessary to do so in order to meet competition or whenever in its opinion it would be to its advantage. Such a procedure would create a most unsatisfactory state of affairs and largely defeat the purposes of the public service law. Section 16 of the Public Service Commission prohibits any public service from exacting any unjustly discriminatory rate, but if the Philippine Railway Co. is to alter its rates whenever it may be necessary to meet the competition of road trucks and autobuses, or to reduce its rates whenever it would be to the advantage of the Railway Company to do so, it cannot prevent its rates from being discriminatory. It may charge one shipper P5 a ton from Iloilo to Capiz, but immediately thereafter in order to meet competition it may be obliged to give another shipper a rate of P4 a ton. It can scarely be contended that such a rate would not be discriminatory. Under the order of the commission, there is no stability of rates. They may be varied at the will of the railroad officials, provided that they are not increased. The commission thereby gives up once of its most important functions, and leaves it to competition to fix the rates. - If the conditions complained of by Hancock exist, and we do not doubt that they do, it is the duty of the Public Service Commission to correct them by enforcing the law and its orders as to those operators responsible therefor, not by delegating its powers to the Philippine Railway Co. and authorizing it to reduce its rates whenever necessary to meet such unlawful competition. Dispositve Decision reversed NATURE: Certiorari
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KMU LABOR CENTER v GARCIA, JR., [LTFRB & PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES] 239 SCRA 386 KAPUNAN; December 23, 1994
FACTS: - DOTC Sec. Oscar M. Orbos, issued a memorandum to LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. - Finding the implementation of the fare range scheme "not legally feasible," Fernando replied to Orbos saying that xxxthe Public Service Act prescribes (a) the rates to be approved should be proposed by public service operators; (b) there should be a publication and notice to concerned or affected parties in the territory affected; (c) a public hearing should be held for the fixing of the rates; hence, implementation of the proposed fare range scheme without complying with the requirements of the PSA may not be legally feasible. xxx - Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase. (An across-the-board increase of P0.085 per km for all types of provincial buses with a minimum-maximum fare range of 15% over and below the proposed basic per km fare rate, with the said minimum-maximum fare range applying only to ordinary, first class and premium class buses and a P0.50 minimum per km fare for aircon buses, was sought.) - PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an across-the-board increase of P0.065 centavos per km for ordinary buses. The decrease was due to the drop in the expected price of diesel. - The application was opposed by the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. and Perla C. Bautista alleging that the proposed rates were exorbitant and unreasonable and that the application contained no allegation on the rate of return of the proposed increase in rates. - the LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase. - Sometime in March, 1994, PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. Said increased fares were to be made effective on March 16, 1994.
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- March 16, 1994: KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares. - March 24, 1994: the LTFRB issued one of the assailed orders dismissing the petition for lack of merit. - June 20, 1994: SC issued a TRO enjoining, prohibiting and preventing respondents from implementing the bus fare rate increase as well as the questioned orders and memorandum circulars. - A moratorium was likewise enforced on the issuance of franchises for the operation of buses, jeepneys, and taxicabs. KMUs contention: - First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. - Second, the establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a proposed transport service without having to prove public necessity, is illegal for being violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. PBOAP, DOTC & LTFRB claim that: - ALL 3 assert that the petitioner has no legal standing to sue or has no real interest in the case at bench and in obtaining the reliefs prayed for. - They further claim that it is within DOTC and LTFRB's authority to set a fare range scheme and establish a presumption of public need in applications for certificates of public convenience. ISSUE: 1. WON KMU has locus standi 2. WON the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid Held: 1. Yes. KMU has the standing to sue. KMUs members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders. Reasoning: - Principle of locus standi of a party litigant: One who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue. The rule therefore requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf. - KMU members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. - Even if KMU didnt have legal standing, SC will take cognizance because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised. 2. YES. The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. Ratio: (ON Fixing Rates Wages and Prices) The power to fix rates cannot be delegated to a common carrier or other public service. The latter may propose new rates, but these will not be effective without the approval of the administrative agency. Reasoning: - A further delegation of such power would constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who may increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever they deem it "necessary" to do so. - Rate making or rate fixing is not an easy task. Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate-fixing and its far-reaching effects on millions of commuters, government must not relinquish this important function in favor of those who would benefit and profit from the industry. Neither should the requisite notice and hearing be done away with. -The present administrative procedure, already mirrors an orderly and satisfactory arrangement for all parties involved. To do away with such a procedure and allow just one party, an interested party at that, to determine what the rate should be, will undermine the right of the other parties to due process. The purpose of a hearing is precisely to determine what a just and reasonable rate is. Discarding such procedural and constitutional right
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is certainly inimical to our fundamental law and to public interest. - LTFRB is vested with the same under EO No. 202. Sec. 5(c) of the said EO authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles." - Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary. - Given the task of determining sensitive and delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the power of subordinate legislation. With this authority, an administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Legislature may neither have time or competence to provide. - However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service. On Public need - A certificate of public convenience (CPC) is an authorization granted by the LTFRB for the operation of land transportation services for public use as required by law. The issuance of a CPC is determined by public need. The presumption of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's. (as per LTFRBs Memorandum) - The above-quoted provision is entirely incompatible and inconsistent with Sec 16(c)(iii) of the PSA which requires that before a CPC will be issued, the applicant must prove by proper notice and hearing that the operation of the public service proposed will promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner. On the contrary, the policy guideline states that the presumption of public need for a public service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail. - As one of the basic requirements for the grant of a CPC, public convenience and necessity exists
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when the proposed facility or service meets a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately supply. - The existence or non-existence of public convenience and necessity is therefore a question of fact that must be established by evidence, real and/or testimonial; empirical data; statistics and such other means necessary, in a public hearing conducted for that purpose. The object and purpose of such procedure, among other things, is to look out for, and protect, the interests of both the public and the existing transport operators. (Hence, the need for a public hearing where the applicant can establish such facts necessary.) -The establishment of public need in favor of an applicant reverses well-settled and institutionalized judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative procedures. It allows the party who initiates the proceedings to prove, by mere application, his affirmative allegations. Moreover, the offending provisions of the LTFRB memorandum circular in question would in effect amend the Rules of Court by adding another disputable presumption in the enumeration of 37 presumptions under Rule 131, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Such usurpation of this Court's authority cannot be countenanced as only this Court is mandated by law to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. Dispositive: Petition is GRANTED and the 10% increase became insufficient. The association filed amended declaration with Public Utility Commissioner praying for further raise of 10% on freight rates , and that from and after July 20, 1920, it would make a 15% increase. - The proposed 15% increase was suspended and hearing was ordered. Commissioner ordered that a representative of each shipowner should appear and submit operating account. - The rate allowed by the Commissioner was based on original cost of vessel and the 5% depreciation was allowed upon the original value of the vessel as opposed to the cost of replacement. ISSUE WON the rate allowed by the Commissioner is proper HELD NO. - There is a legal presumption that the fixed rates are reasonable. - The fixing of rates by the government through its agents involves exercise of reasonable discretion and unless theres abuse, courts will not interfere. - Although fixing of rates is a legislative and governmental power over which government has control, it has no power to fix rates that are unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily. - Whether a given rate is fair is a judicial question. Courts have control. - There are 4 theories of ascertaining what constitutes a reasonable rate: - original cost - cost of reproduction - outstanding capitalization - present value - The present market value of the plant or its worth as a going concern is the ultimate practical basis for determining the value of the investment upon which to fix a rate that will produce a fair return. - Public utility should have fair and reasonable return upon its property which is used by the public, and the rate is based upon physical valuation of the property. - When a public utility enters public service, it is no longer a free agent and the control of its property is subject to reasonable rules and regulations by the public, and to that extent it is a taking of the property by the public. - The purpose of the hearing was to determine what was a just rate. It should not be based upon original cost nor should it be based upon estimated cost. Original cost of vessel should only be considered for purpose of determining the
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present or market value. - Commissioner should have required proof of the present or market value. The basing of the rate on the original cost of the vessel was prejudicial, legal error. Disposition Cause reversed and remanded with instructions.
VIGAN ELECTRIC CO V PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 10 SCRA 46 CONCEPCION; January 30, 1964
NATURE Original action for certiorari to annul an order of respondent Public Service Commission FACTS - RA 316 granted Vigan Electric Light Company, Inc., a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric light, heat and/or power plant for the purpose of generating and distributing light, heat and/or power, for sale within the limits of several municipalities of the province of Ilocos Sur. Petitioner secured from respondent a certificate of public convenience for this purpose. - Petitioner, with respondent's approval, entered into a contract for the purchase of electric power and energy from the NPC, for resale, to its customers, in accordance with the schedule of rates. - About 5 years later, respondent advised petitioner of a conference for the purpose of revising its authorized rates. Soon thereafter, petitioner received a letter of respondent informing the former of an alleged letter-petition charging them of selling electric meters in the black market and accusing them that the meters installed in Vigan register excessive rates - An audit and examination of the books and other records of account" of said petitioner was ordered by the General Auditing Office "under the provisions of CA No. 325 and in accordance with the request of the PSC. - Respondent issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioner to produce, during a conference, certain books of account and financial statements specified in said process. Petitioner moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. The motion was not acted upon in the conference. However, it was then decided when the next
YNCHAUSTI S.S. Co v PHIL RAILWAY CO. 42 PHIL 624 JOHNS; January 9, 1922
FACTS - Petitioners are members of shipowners association. Because of decrease in volume of business, it filed with Public Utility Commissioner a declaration that it would make a 10% increase in shipping rates. This was allowed. - On account of low wages, seamen held a strike and it became necessary to increase wages paid
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conference will be. When petitioner's representatives appeared before respondent they were advised by the latter that the scheduled conference had been cancelled, that the petition to quash the subpoena duces tecum had been granted, and that respondent had issued an order for the petitioner to reduce the present meter rates for its electric service. Said order fixed the rates and gave regulations on how to bill customers. ISSUE WON said order of the PSC is valid HELD NO Ratio Consistent with the principle of separation of powers, which underlies our constitutional system, legislative powers may not be delegated except to local governments, and only to matters purely of local concern. However, Congress may delegate to administrative agencies of the government the power to supply the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by a which is complete in itself Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said Policy. Otherwise, there would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted within the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the power of legislation would eventually be exercised by a branch of the Government other than that in which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not only of the allocation of powers therein made, but, also, of the principle of separation of powers. Reasoning - By way of special defenses, respondent, alleged that the disputed order had been issued under its delegated legislative authority, the exercise of which does not require previous notice and hearing; and that petitioner had not sought a reconsideration of said order, and had, accordingly, failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. - Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to crossexamine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. - Sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, explicitly require notice and hearing before the Commission can fix and determine joint rates, tolls charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service. - Whether notice and a hearing in proceedings before a public service commission are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional provisions applicable to such proceedings, which make notice and hearing, prerequisite to action by the commission, and upon the nature and object of such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are, on the one hand, legislative and rule-making in character, or are, on the other hand, determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial, affecting the rights an property of private or specific persons. As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service commission. Disposition Writ prayed for is granted and the preliminary injunction issued by this Court hereby made permanent.
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services in the Philippines. The satellite services enable international carriers to serve the public with indispensable communication services, such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live TV in full color, and television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa. - Under Section 5 of RA 5514, it was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now NTC. However, pursuant to EO 196 issued in 1987, it was placed under the jurisdiction of NTC. Implementing EO 196, NTC required Philcomsat to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity. - It was granted a provisional authority to continue operating. This authority was valid for 6 months and was extended for another 6 months. After it expired, the NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional authority for another 6 months but it directed a reduction of 15% on the authorized rates. - Philcomsat argued that the enabling act (EO 546) of NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications does not provide the necessary standards, hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power. Assuming arguendo that the rate-fixing power was properly and constitutionally conferred, it violates procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice and hearing; and the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus a violation of substantive due process. ISSUES 1. WON the rate-fixing power of the NTC is a valid delegation of legislative power 2. WON the order of the Commissioner of the NTC violates procedural due process HELD 1. YES. Ratio Delegation of legislative power is valid only when some standard for its exercise is provided and the manner of its exercise is prescribed. Reasoning When an administrative agency establishes a rate, its act must both be nonconfiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe is that the rate be reasonable and just.
PHILCOMSAT V ALCUAZ 180 SCRA 218 REGALADO; December 18, 1989
NATURE Petition to annul an order of the Commissioner of the NTC FACTS - RA 5514, granted PHILCOMSAT a franchise to maintain and operate in the Philippines facilities for international satellite communications. Philcomsat was the only one rendering such
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However, even in the absence of an express requirement, this standard may be implied. - NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. 2. YES. Ratio Notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. Reasoning The order contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. It pertains exclusively to Philcomsat and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged - based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered as to the 15% rate reduction. Philcomsat was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which NTC based its order. - Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act provides: "Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. - The Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the roles and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary: (c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, xxx which shall be imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public service;" - There is no reason to assume that the provision does not apply to NTC, there being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in EO 546 and 196. Disposition Writ prayed for is GRANTED. Order of is SET ASIDE.
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19 years. In September, 1968 It requested authority to import from Japan on no-dollar basis $715K worth of fruits. It needed this because of the coming Christmas season. - The request was denied since only the transactions specifically enumerated in Central Bank Circular No. 247 are allowed as no-dollar importation - petitioner-appellant sought reconsideration from Central Bank. - Monetary Board of the Central Bank approved the request for Special Import Permit on No-Dollar Basis. but petitioner-appellant made his first importation from Japan in February, 1969. - in October, 1969, petitioner-appellant requested an amendment of the country of origin of their importations - In the response to the request, they told him that the authority granted by the Monetary Board earlier for importation was intended only for the Christmas season of 1968, and did not extend through 1969. - in 1970, the Collector of Customs issues warrants of seizure and detention against $17,568.49 worth of fruits for having beein imported in violation of a Central Bank Circular. - Petitioner-appellant instituted a petition for mandamus with damages, praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to direct the Central Bank to release the imported fruits and to provide the necessary release certificates therefor, and damages. ISSUE WON Special Import Permit granted in 1968 had already lost its validity when the later questioned importations were made in 1970. HELD YES Reasoning The series of correspondence exchanged between petitioner and respondent reveals that Special Import Permit granted covered only the Christmas season of 1968. The omission of an expiry date in the Permit affords no legal basis for petitioner-appellant to conclude that the permit is impressed with continuous validity. The totality of the petitioners representations which led to the issuance of the permit show that the purpose of the permit was really just for Christmas 1968. *** the authority of the Central Bank to regulate no-dollar imports, owing to the influence and
e. Licensing Function
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, Book VII Section 17. Licensing Procedure. (1) When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is required to be preceded by notice and hearing, the provisions concerning contested cases shall apply insofar as practicable. (2) Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and regulations or when public security, health, or safety require otherwise, no license may be withdrawn, suspended, revoked or annulled without notice and hearing. Section 18. Non-expiration of License. Where the licensee has made timely and
GONZALO SY V CENTRAL BANK 70 SCRA 570 MARTIN; April 30, 1976

NATURE Appeal from CFI decision FACTS - Petitioner-appellant is a trading company engaged in importation of fresh fruits for the last
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v AIRSPAIN CORP
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effect that the same may exert upon the satbility of our peso, cannot be seriously contested. Such authority clearly emanates from its broad powers to maintain our monetary stability and to preserve Section 2. That our currency as shall be a the internation value of the Commission well as its collegial body composed of a Chairman and two (2) Associate Commissioners who shall be appointed by the President and the tenure of the office of rules and regulations corollary power to issue sucheach member shall be seven (7) years: Provided, however, That the Chairman and the Members of the Commission first appointed by the President shall serve for a discharge of its responsibilities for the effective period of seven (7) years, five (5) years and three (3) years, as fixed in their respective appointments: Provided, further, That upon the expiration of his term, a Member powers. shall be filled except 2. Special Statutory Grantfor the as often portion and exercise of shall serve as such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified: and Provided, Finally, that no vacancy The Commission shall meet unexpired as may of the Judgment of the lower court annual salary of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and a monthly allowance of Two be necessary on such day and each Member Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos or days as the Disposition term. The Chairman shall receive an is Chairman may fix. Five Hundred (P1,500.00) PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 902-A shall receive an annual salary of Forty-Two Thousand Five Hundred (P42,500.00) Pesos and a monthly commutable allowance of One ThousandThe notice of the meeting affirmed. shall be given to all members of the Pesos. March 11, 1976 Section 12. Rules Commission shall have absolutecase: Commission who are the grantees least two Section 3. The of Evidence. - In a contested jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations, partnerships or associations, and the presence of atof primary (2) shall have the a quorum. In franchiseagency a license or permit issued by the government to operate in the Philippines; and in the exercise of its authority, itshall constitute poweraffairs. the absence (1) The and/or may admit and give probative valueREORGANIZATION OF THE SECURITIES to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their to enlist the aid and B. JUDICIAL FUNCTION of the Chairman, the more senior associate support of any and all enforcement agencies of the government, EXCHANGEexcerpts, if the original is not readily available. Upon request, the parties shall be AND copies or COMMISSION WITH (2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form ofcivil or military. Section 4. The Commission shall the copy with the original. If thePOWER AND PLACING THEthe agency. a public officer, a certified copy thereof may be staffing pattern of the Commission with of ADDITIONAL original and the official given opportunity to compare reorganize and restructure the present staff is in personnel of custody of The proposedcommissioner shall act as presiding officerthe the meeting. corresponding salary scale, attached as Annex "A" is hereby approved: Provided, That except asBOOK technical staff and such other positions as the Commission, with the SAID AGENCY UNDER 1987, to the VII ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OFTHE accepted. The Chairman shall the Civil Service Law approval of the President, may declare to be highly technical, policy-determining or primarily confidential, all positions in the Commission are subject to have the general ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF and CHAPTER 3 (3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against himTHE to submit rebuttal evidence. executive control, direction and supervision of and Rules. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ADJUDICATION (4) The 5. In addition take regulatory and adjudicative functions of the of generally Exchange Commission over corporations, within its operation of the Commission and the work and specialized knowledge. Section agency may to the notice of judicially cognizable facts and Securities andcognizable technical or scientific factspartnerships and other forms of associations Section parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunitydecrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction toor claims decide cases bodies, boards, personnel and involving The 10. with it as expressly granted under existing laws administrative proceedings noticed. conflicting rights hear andits members, involving: of and obviate expensive litigations, registered Compromise and Arbitration. - To expedite and to in line with the government's policy WHEREAS, contest the facts so every agency Subpoena. - public interest, encourage amicable settlement, the powerandrequire officers or partnership, amountingor the production of books, which Section 13. shall, in the Inemployed by or any acts,theof encouraging have business both domestic the attendance of witnesses administrativemisrepresentation agency of directors, comprise to arbitration. all of its to fraud and business. a) Devices or schemes any contested case, of the board shall investments, associates, its Sectionmay be detrimental other interest of the public and/or of the stockholder, partners,active during the hearing organizations registered with the Commission. 11. Notice and to the in Contested Cases. request of There of general relevance. Unless members of associations or upon showing shall be a Secretary of the Commission, papers, documents and Hearingpertinent data, upon-and foreign,any party before or and more public (1) In Controversies arising all parties shallin case participation inand hearing. The notice shall be Trial Court within whosebetween any the direction and five the control and b) provided by law, the agency may, be entitled to notice of them of the affairs among stockholders, members, or associates; jurisdiction the contested private otherwise any contested case out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and ofof the Regional served at leastunder (5) days before or alldate of the the of disobedience, invoke the aid Chairman, who shall be in charge of all the corporation, partnership date, time and place of the hearing. hearing and shall state Court may punish which they or stockholders, members or associates, corporations and enterprises case being heard falls. The theor association of contumacyare refusal as contempt. through whichrespectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association business of the Commission and the state insofar given opportunity to present agency in a to exist as caseall issues. If desirable activities may be on shall (2) The parties shall Every concerns rendered by franchise or right contested such entity; be in not precluded by law,administrative distinctly the be made of Section 14. Decision. - beas it decision their individualthe evidence and argument pursued for the writing and shall state informal disposition mayother duties and clearly and facts and and associations. c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managersand, to corporations, partnerships or shall perform such promotion of economic development; of such the any contested case based. The agency shall decide each case within thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties may be assigned to of the shall law on which it is by stipulation, agreed settlement or default. functions as shall be notified him. He promote a wider and more meaningful (3) The agency or by registered mail addressed proceedings. decision personally shall keep an official record of itsto their counsel of record,wealth, or to them. be the recorder and official reporter of the equitable distribution of if any, there is a Section 15. Finality of Order. - The decision of the agency shall agency of final government to be proceedings of a copy thereof by shall need for an become the and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the Commission and the have party adversely affected unless within that periodinvested with ample powers to or judicial review, if proper, hasauthorityperfected. Oneoath in all matters an administrative appeal protect such been to administer motion for coming under the jurisdiction of the reconsideration may be filed, which shall suspend theinvestment and the public; running of the said period. Commission. He shall be the custodian of all WHEREAS, to achieve these national records, profiles, reports, minutes and other objectives, it is necessary to reorganize and documents and papers filed with the restructure the Securities and Exchange Commission or entrusted to his care and shall Commission to make it a more potent, be responsible therefor to the Commission. responsive and effective arm of the There shall be an Executive Director of the government to help in the implementation of Commission who shall be responsible for the these programs and to play a more active role effective implementation of the policies, rules in national-building; and standards promulgated by the necessary and desirable to a.WHEREAS, it isto Issue Subpoena, Power Commission, to coordinate and supervise the professionalize such agency by investing it Declare Contempt activities of the different operating units; to with adequate powers so that it could avail 1.itself of the Statutoryhighly technical and General services of Provision report to the Chairman the operations of such units; to report to the Chairman the operations qualified men in the government service; of such units; and to perform such functions as NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, ADMINISTRATIVE of the OF 1987, may be assigned to him by the Chairman President of the RepublicCODE Philippines, by and/or by Commission. The position of the BOOK VII virtue of the powers vested in me by the Executive Director is hereby declared primarily Constitution, do Section 13.hereby order and - In that: Subpoena. decree any confidential in nature. Section 1. The administrative supervision of contested case, the agency shall have Section 3. The Commission shall have the Securities and Exchange attendance of Commission is the power to require the absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control hereby transferred from the Department of witnesses or the production of books, over all corporations, partnerships or Trade and shall hereafter be under the direct papers,supervision of the President. pertinent documents and other associations, who are the grantees of primary general data, upon request of any party shall be or franchise and/or a license or permit issued by Section 2. That the Commission before a during the hearing upon Chairman and the government to operate in the Philippines; collegial body composed of a showing of and in the exercise of its authority, it shall 53 generalAssociate Commissioners who shall be relevance. Unless otherwise two (2) have the power to enlist the aid and support of appointed by the the agency the tenure of provided by law,President and may, in case any and all enforcement agencies of the the disobedience,member shall be seven the of office of each invoke the aid of (7) government, civil or military. years: Provided, however, That the Chairman
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Section 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following powers: a) To issue preliminary or permanent injunctions, whether prohibitory or 5. in all to file in which it has mandatory, Failure cases by-laws within the required period; 6. and to which cases the jurisdiction, Failure in file required reports in appropriate forms as determined by the Commission within the prescribed period; j) provisions such Rules of Court pertinent To exerciseof theother powers as implied, necessary or incidental to the carrying out the express powers granted to the Commission or to achieve the objectives and purposes of this Decree. shall apply; exercise of contempt of the b) In thepunish for the foregoing authority and jurisdiction of the Commission, hearings shall be conducted by the Commission or by a Commissioner or by such other To bodies, boards, committees and/or any officer as may be created or designated by the Commission for the purpose. The decision, ruling or order of any such Commission, both direct and indirect, in Commissioner, bodies, boards, committees and/or officer may be appealed to the Commission sitting en banc within thirty (30) days after receipt by the appellant of notice accordance with the pertinent provisions of, of such decision, ruling or order. The Commission shall promulgate rules of procedures to govern the proceedings, hearings and appeals of cases falling within its and penalties prescribed by, the Rules jurisdiction. of Court; c) The aggrieved party may appeal the order, decision or ruling of the Commission sitting en banc to the Supreme Court by petition for petition for review in accordance with To compel the officers of any the pertinent provisions of the Rules it corporation or association registered byof Court. to Section 7. The Commission is authorized to recommend to the President the revision, alteration, amendment or adjustment of the charges and fees, which by law, it is call meetings of stockholders or authorized to under members thereofcollect.its supervision; d) Section 8.upon the approval of the President, the Commission is further authorized to create additional positions as it may deem necessary to carry out the provisions To pass With the validity of the and intents of this proxies issuance and use of Decree. and voting Section 9. So for absent stockholders trust agreements much amount as may be needed to implement the provisions of this Decree taken from the income of the Commission not to exceed twenty-five (25%) per cent thereof and any unexpended balance in the current appropriation is hereby authorized to be appropriated. or members; Section subpoena duces tecum and e) To issue 10. When the exigency of the service so requires and with the approval of the President, funds may be set aside from the appropriation provided for the Commission and/or from the fees any summon witnesses to appear in collected under existing laws, decrees, rules and regulations to defray expenses to be incurred by the Commission. Section of the Commission and in proceedings 11. The Commission shall submit an annual report to the President of the Philippines not later than January 31 of each year with such recommendations as may be necessary. appropriate cases order search and Section 12. the search and seizure of seizure or cause All laws, executive orders, decrees, rules and regulations or parts thereof, contrary to or inconsistent with the provision of this Decree are hereby repealed, all amended or modified files and records documents, papers, accordingly. This decree shall take effect any entity as well as books of accounts of immediately. Done in the City of Manila, as may be or person under investigationthis 11th day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-six. necessary for the proper disposition of the cases before it; f) To impose fines and/or penalties for violation of this Decree or any other laws being implemented by the Commission, the pertinent rules and regulations, its orders, decisions and/or rulings; g) To authorize the establishment and operation of stock exchanges, commodity exchanges and such other similar organization and to supervise and regulate the same; including the authority EVANGELISTA V JARENCIO to determine their number, size and location, in the light of national or regional 68 SCRA 99 requirements for such activities with the MARTIN; Nov. 27, 1975 view to promote, conserve or rationalize investment; NATURE h) To pass upon, refuse or deny, after Original action for certiorari and prohibition with consultation with the Board of Investments, Department of Industry, 54 National Economic and Development Authority or any other appropriate government agency, the application for registration of any corporation,

preliminary injunction FACTS Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities: b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines. c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... . h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency. - The President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. - Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of PARGO... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein." - Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed with CFI Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality. Respondent issued the assailed order which reads: IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code. ISSUE WON the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations. HELD YES. Ratio Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. Reasoning We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under subparagraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under subparagraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of
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law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant.
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, is reasonably relevant to the investigations. We are mindful that the privilege against selfincrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings. In the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge. He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the factfinding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges. Since the only purpose of
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investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against selfincrimination. Disposition order is set aside and declared of no force and effect. punish contempt exists, the same cannot be applied to the instant case, where the Commission is exercising a purely administrative function for purchasing ballot boxes; 3) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, said power cannot apply to the present case because the matter of purchasing the ballot boxes was already a closed case when the article in question was published. -COMELEC denied motion to quash. Hence the present appeal ISSUE: WON COMELEC has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against petitioner HELD: NO - Section 2, Article X of the Constitution states that the COMELEC "shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. Section 5 of the Revised Election Code supplements what other powers may be exercised by said Commission -under these two, it would therefore appear that COMELEC not only has the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. -The ministerial duties of the said Commissioner includes the first duty of the Commission to set in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election supplies, printing of election forms and ballots, appointments of members of the boards of inspectors etc. -it may also be reasonably said that the requisitioning and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is by the same token an imperative ministerial duty which the Commission is bound to perform if the elections are to be held. Such is the incident which gave rise to the contempt case -In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature -"The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the
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preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice" . And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid
CATURA TOLENTINO v INCIONG G.R. No. L-36385 FERNANDO; July 25, 1979
NATURE Petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction FACTS - A verified complaint the then National Labor Relations Commission was filed, charging petitioner Arcadio R. Tolentino with violating the constitution of the Batangas Labor Union by refusing, as its president, to call for the election of officers. National Labor Relations Commission issued an order directing the Batangas Labor Union to hold its election of officers within twenty (20) days from receipt thereof. - Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Secretary of Labor, praying at the same time that the pre-election conference and the election be suspended in the meanwhile. However, respondent National Labor Relations Commission, thru its then Chairman, Amado G. Inciong, informed the herein petitioner that the elections of officers of the Batangas Labor Union would proceed as scheduled. - The Batangas Labor Union filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Batangas a civil case for prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction, against the respondent Domingo Cinco and the National Labor Relations Commission and the Secretary of Labor, seeking to annul the order to hold elections. - On the same date as the filing of the case with the CFI, petitioner and Judge Delos Angeles were served with a copy of a subpoena issued by respondent Amado Inciong requiring them to appear before him to explain why he should not be held in contempt for trying to use old society tactics to prevent a union election duly ordered by
GUEVARRA v COMELEC G.R. No. L-12596 BAUTISTA ANGELO; JULY 31, 1958
FACTS: -The COMELEC, on May 4, 1957, after proper negotiations, awarded to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ACME), and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission ballot boxes. On May 8, 1957, both the NASSCO and the ASIATIC signed with the Commission on Elections the corresponding contracts thereon. On May 13, 1957, the Commission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the latter to sign the contract within the designated time and awarded to the NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, the 11,000 ballot boxes originally alloted to the ACME. -ACME filed three petitions, the first to of which were denied. Due to the seriousness of its allegations on the third petition, the COMMISSION ordered an investigation. Pending the investigation, an article entitled "Ballot Boxes Contract Hit", which tended to interfere with and influence the Commission on Elections and its members in the adjudication of a controversy was published in the Sunday Times and signed by petitioners. -COMELEC ordered petitioner cause why it should not be punished for contempt for having published said article. Petitioner filed motion to quash stating COMELEC: 1) cannot punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as neither in the Constitution nor in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so punish the same, for should Section 5 of Republic Act No. 180, vesting the Commission with "power to punish contempts provided for in Rule of the Court under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein," be applied to the case at hand; 2) Assuming that the Commission's power to
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the Commission under Presidential Decree 21. Hence, this petition. ISSUE/S WON Inciong can cite Tolentino and Judge Delos Angeles for contempt well as petitioner for contempt declared void and of no force or effect NATURE Appeal from a decision of CFI Manila
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FACTS - On In May 1952, Special Prosecutor Galang charged Qua Chee Gan et al before the HELD Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. NO dollars in the total sum of $130K, without the - The undeniable concern of respondent Inciong necessary license from the Central Bank, and of 1987 CONSTITUTION that the objectives of Presidential Decree No. 21 having clandestinely remitted the same to Article III be attained thus afforded no warrant for exercising Hongkong and other petitioners, with having a power not conferred by such decree. He ought to attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonablewarrant for and arrest of saidwhatever searches the seizures of have known that the competence, "to hold any U.S. Governments. A nature and for refusal to comply"be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be the any purpose shall person in contempt for aliens was issued by the presiding member of determined personally by the judge court of certainly cannot extend to a judge of the after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses Uponmay produce, and particularly Deportation Board. he their filing surety bond describing the place to be searched first instance. Correctly construed, it cannot cover and the persons or things to be seized. for P10K and cash bond for P10K, Qua Chee Gan et the case likewise of a party to a controversy who al were provisionally set at liberty. took the necessary steps to avail himself of a - Qua Chee Gan et al filed a joint MTD because the judicial remedy. It must ever be borne in mind by charges do not constitute legal ground for an administrative official that courts exist precisely deportation of aliens from this country, and that to assure that there be compliance with the law. said Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such That is the very essence of a judicial power. So the charges. MTC denied. So Qua Chee Gan et al filed rule of law requires. It is true that courts, like any a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition, other governmental agencies, must observe the which petition was given due course, but made limits of its jurisdiction. In this particular case, it is returnable to the CFI Manila. admitted that the then Judge Jaime delos Angeles, - Boards answer: Deportation Board, as an agent after hearing the arguments on the propriety of of the President, has jurisdiction over the charges 1973 CONSTITUTION issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed filed against petitioners and the authority to order Article IV for, reserved his resolution in view of the their arrest; and that, while petitioner Qua Chee intricacies of the legal questions raised. 18 The Gan was acquitted of the offense of attempted Section 3. The right of the people to be proper step for an administrative official then is to bribery of a public official, he was found in the secure in their persons, houses, papers, seek a dismissal of the case before the court same decision of the trial court that he did actually precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall offer money to an officer of the USAF in order that and effects against unreasonable within the domain of the powers conferred on it. the latter may abstain from assisting the Central searches and seizures of whatever nature Instead, respondent Inciong took the precipitate Bank official in the investigation of the purchase of and whatever purpose shall not be step of citing him for contempt. That was an $130K from the Clark Air Force Base, wherein Qua violated, and no search warrant or affront to reason as well as a disregard of wellChee Gan was involved. warrant of arrest shall issue except upon settled rules. Neither was there any contumacious - CFI upheld the validity of the delegation by the probable cause to be determined by the act committed by petitioner in seeking judicial president to the Board of his power to conduct judge, or such other responsible officer remedy. It would be a reproach to any legal investigations for determining whether the stay of as maybe authorized by law, after system if an individual is denied access to the an alien in this country would be injurious to the courts under these circumstances. The resort of security, welfare and interest of the State. CFI also examination under oath or affirmation of respondent Inciong to what has been derisively sustained the power of the Board to issue warrant the complainant and the witnesses he referred to as epithetical jurisprudence, seeking of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary may produce, and particularly describing shelter in the opprobrious term "old society release pending investigation of charges against the place to be searched, and the tactics," is an implied admission of his actuation him, on the theory that the power to arrest and fix persons or things to be seized. being devoid of support in law. As was so well the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is stated by Chief Justice Hughes: "It must be essential to and complement the power to deport QUA CHEE GAN V DEPORTATION conceded that departmental zeal may not be aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised permitted to outrun the authority conferred by Administrative Code. Hence, this appeal. . BOARD statute." 9 SCRA 27 Disposition the writ of prohibition is granted and ISSUES BARRERA; September 30, 1963 the assailed order citing Judge Delos Angeles as
b. Warrants of Administrative Searches
Arrest,
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1. WON the Board, as agent of the President, has power to investigate and deport undesirable aliens. 2. WON, conceding without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest of the alien complained of, such power can be delegated by him to the Deportation Board. HELD 1. YES Ratio Investigation and deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Sec.69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Act No. 2711)2, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Sec.337 of C.A. 613. Reasoning [1] While it may really be contended that Sec. 69 of Act No. 2711 did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of Immigration under C.A. No. 613, but merely lays down the procedure to be observed should there be deportation proceedings, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien which provision was expressly declared exempted from the repealing effect of the Immigration Act of 1940 is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. [2] The charges against Qua CHee Gan et al constitute an act of profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations an economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation under the provisions of R.A.
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to crossexamine the opposing witnesses."
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503 amending Sec.37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The President may therefore order the deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged. [3] The Deportation Board, being an agent of the Executive, may exercise such power by virtue of delegation. 2. NO - The exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the Constitution itself, as well as the statute relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the existence of which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same. - In other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is PERSONAL to the one upon whom the authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution4. If this is so, then guarantee a delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberty of the people. The guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation. - Thus, EO 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the
The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution).
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conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. Disposition Decision appealed is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.
VIVO v MONTESA (Calacday) 29 SCRA 155 Reyes ; July 29, 1968

NATURE Petition for certiorari preliminary injunction and prohibition with
Sec. 37 says to the effect that the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefore.
FACTS -The Calacdays, arrived in the Philippines from Hongkong, Upon their arrival, they sought admission as Filipino citizens. After investigation, a board of special inquiry found them to be the legitimate sons of a Filipino citizen, one Isaac Calacday, and thus admitted them into this country. The Bureau of Immigration then issued to each of them an identification certificate as a Filipino citizen. -In February, 1963 Isaac Calacday confessed before an immigration official that the seven respondents were not his sons but retracted his confession in March, 1963, in an investigation in the Department of Justice, with the explanation that, in a fit of anger, he disclaimed, under oath, paternity of the respondents because they refused to give him money. -Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano Vivo issued warrants of arrest against the herein private respondents, stating in said warrants their deportability under Section 37(a) (1) and Section 37(a) (2) in relation to Section 29(a) (17) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, for having entered the Philippines "by means of false and misleading statements and that they were not lawfully admissible at the time of entry, not being properly documented for admission". The warrants directed any immigration officer or officer of the law to bring the respondents before the Commissioner, for them to show cause, if any there be, why they should not be deported. -Manuel Calacday was subsequently arrested. The others remained at large. -Calacday filed before the CFI a petition asking to restrain the arrest of those petitioners who have
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not been arrested; to release Manuel Calacday who had been arrested; and to prohibit the deportation of all the petitioners, all upon the claim that they are Filipino citizens. ISSUES 1. WON CFI has jurisdiction 2. WON the Commissioner has the power to issue an arrest warrant Held 1. NO - These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the Immigration authorities under Sections 29 and 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act (C.A. No. 613). That jurisdiction is not tolled by a claim of Filipino citizenship, where the Commissioner or Commissioners have reliable evidence to the contrary; and said officers should be given opportunity to determine the issue of citizenship before the courts interfere in the exercise of the power of judicial review of administrative decisions. 2. No - Commissioners of Immigration has no jurisdiction to issue such solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1, of Article III (Bill of Rights, unreasonable searches and seizures and requirements for warrant of arrest) of the Constitution. It will be noted that the power to determine probable cause for warrant of arrest is limited by the Philippine Constitution to judges exclusively, unlike in previous organic laws and the Federal Constitution of the United States that left undetermined which public officials could determine the existence of probable cause. And in Qua Chee Gan, et al., vs. Deportation Board, L20280, promulgated on September 30, 1963, this Court pointed out that Executive Order No. 69 of July 29, 1947, issued by President Roxas, in prescribing the procedure for deportation of aliens, only required the filing of a bond by an alien under investigation, but did not authorize his arrest. Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas."
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to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation Disposition Decision affirmed
SANTOS V COMMISSIONER 74 SCRA 96 FERNANDO; November 29, 1976

FACTS - Petitioner was detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest on the ground that he is a Chinese citizen who entered the country illegally. - He filed a writ of habeas corpus before the lower court. The lower court granted the petition and ordered the respondent commissioner to produce the petitioner and to explain under what circumstances he was arrested and is being detained. - Respondent claims that the petitioner is a Chinese Citiizen; that there is a pending deportation proceedings against him; and that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. - The lower court, without passing upon the issue of citizenship, ordered the release of the petitioner ISSUE WON the warrant of arrest against the petitioner was valid HELD NO. Ratio Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation Reasoning - The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled
HARVEY v DEFENSOR G.R. No. 82544 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.; June 28. 1988
NATURE Petition for habeas corpus FACTS - Petitioners Andrew Harvey, John Sherman, and Adriaan Van Elshout were apprehended by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago. Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after 3 months of close surveillance. Only the 3 petitioners have chosen to face deportation. - Deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens under Sec. 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging that their health was being seriously affected by their continuous detention. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their provisional release, respondent ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioners, who certified that petitioners were healthy. Petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which respondent denied considering the certification that petitioners were healthy. Respondent ordered petitioners' transfer to the CID detention cell at Fort Bonifacio, but the transfer was deferred pending trial due to the
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difficulty of transporting them to and from the CID where trial was on-going. Petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country." The Board of Special Inquiry allowed provisional release of 5 days only under certain conditions. However, it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his copetitioners had already filed the present petition. - Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following grounds: 1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act nor under Sec. 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation. 2) Respondent violated Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision. 3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile. ISSUES 1. WON petitioners' right against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated 2. WON petitioners' arrest was valid 3. WON the Commissioner had authority to detain petitioners 4. WON petitioners should have been granted bail HELD 1. NO Ratio The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for 3 months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence 2. YES Ratio Even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them. Warrants of arrest were issued against them. A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal. It is a fumdamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning. 3. YES Ratio The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Sec. 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act, which empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens. The arrest is a step preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated the condition of their stay in this country. 4. NO Ratio The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail was in order because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Disposition The Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied
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and forwarded a complaint to CID Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag (respondent). Acting on the complaint, Liwag ordered a team of 7 CID agents to locate and bring petitioner to the Intelligence Division for proper disposition. - The agents sought the assistance of the WPD when the petitioner adamantly refused to be taken in. In the struggle that ensued, both petitioner and the lawmen were injured. Finally the petitioner was subdued and taken to the CID Intelligence Office. - A warrant of arrest was issued by Liwag, but there was nothing in the records showing that the agents served the warrant prior to his apprehension. - The French consul requested that the petitioner be transferred from his cell to the PGH for treatment of his injuries. This petition for habeas corpus was filed to avert the threat of petitioners detention. ISSUE WON the arrest and detention of petitioner prior to the deportation proceedings were legal. HELD NO Art. III, Sec. 2 no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce xxx - Particular circumstances obtaining in the case at bar have seriously placed on doubt the legality and propriety of petitioners apprehension. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent. HOWEVER, certain events have supervened to render the petition MOOT and ACADEMIC, curing the defects of the arrest. - Firstly, petitioner is no longer in confinement. Petitioner was released upon posting bail in the amount of P20K during the pendency of the administrative proceedings. GENERAL RULE: the release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic, unless there are restraints attached to his release which precludes freedom of action. - Secondly, records show that formal deportation proceedings have been initiated against petitioner before the Board of Special Inquiry of the CID. The restraint against petitioners person has become
LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA V LIWAG 175 SCRA 318 FERNAN; July 13, 1989
NATURE Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus FACTS - Lucien Tran Van Nghia (petitioner) is a French national with temporary address in Sta. Ana., Manila. Originally a temporary visitor, his status was changed to that of an immigrant based on his representation that he is financially capable and will invest in the Philippines (which he hasnt done). - Dionisio G. Cabrera, the petitioners landlord, accused petitioner of being an undesirable alien,
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legal, and the writ of habeas corpus has served its purpose. DISPOSITION The petition is dismissed. properties seized at Salazars residence be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof. The letter alleged violation of the due process clause (lack of prior notice or hearing) and the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure. It further alleged that the entry, the search and the seizure were done without her consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code. Said letter further stated that unless said personal properties (allegedly worth around P10k and already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within 24hours from receipt of the letter, Salazars camp shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to protect their interests. -Feb 2, 1988: before POEA could answer the letter, Salazar filed this petition for prohibition. POEA, on the other hand, filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal. NOTE: The acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late. But SC chose to consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved. ISSUE WON the POEA (or the Secretary of Labor) may validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code HELD NO. -Under Article III, Section 2 , of the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation. -1973 Consti: aside from judges, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" may conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. No such phrase in 1987 Consti. -Therefore, mayors and prosecuting bodies may no longer issue warrants. -History of Art. 38, par. (c) of the Labor Code: Under PD1693, the Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers. PD1920, with
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the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment, gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers. PD2018 gave the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well. The provisions of PD2018 has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code. -The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. -Morano v. Vivo is inapplicable. Deportation cases are exceptional; arrests (of undesirable aliens) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation are valid because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. -Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant [seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment] which is null and void, for a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized. Disposition Petition granted. Art. 38, par (c) of the Labor Code declared unconstitutional and null and void. Respondents ordered to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
SALAZAR V ACHACOSO 183 SCRA 145 SARMIENTO; March 14, 1990

FACTS -Oct 21, 1987: Rosalie Tesoro, in a sworn statement filed with the POEA charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar of illegal recruitment (refusal to release PECC Card, 9months of failure to deploy her to Japan). -Nov 3, 1987: Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to Salazar a telegram directing the latter to appear before the POEA Anti-Illegal Recruitment Unit. -On that same day, having ascertained that Salazar had no license to operate a recruitment agency, POEA Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged closure and seizure order. Invoking the powers vested in him under PD No. 1920 and EO No. 1022, he ordered the closure of Salazars recruitment agency and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment without prejudice to Salazars criminal prosecution under existing laws. -Jan 26, 1988: POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating three lawyers as members of a team tasked to implement the Closure and Seizure Order. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and two mediamen proceeded to Salazars residence. There it was found that Salazar was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. -Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. -Jan 28, 1988: Salazar filed with POEA a letter by her counsel requesting that the personal
CID V DELA ROSA 197 SCRA 853 BIDIN; May 31, 1991
NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS - William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong and sought admission as Filipino citizens. - After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision admitting William
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Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens. As a consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities. The then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William and others. - The new Board of Commissioner reversed the decision and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian. A warrant of exclusion was issued. - Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion case against them was assigned. - The Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda the reversal of the decision of the then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the warrants of arrest - Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him - The acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940 - The Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of Immigration for investigation and immediate action - Petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian. The latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo and was released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond. - William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa - Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order denying the motion to dismiss. ISSUE WON the arrest of respondent Gatchalian follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued. HELD NO - Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads: The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. - From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional - As held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish warrants between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable
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cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution). - A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of the suspects, William Gatchalian included. - Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion. As records indicate, which petitioners conveniently omitted to state either in their petition or comment to the counter-petition of respondent, respondent Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973. - The Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion for re-hearing, submitted a memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda recommending 1 the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against applicants. - Then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification Certificates. - The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis of which respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian. - There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. - Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the
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Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises." - Petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda. - The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time Disposition Petition Dismissed. William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen.
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Administrative Law Dean Carlota ASSOCIATION OF PHIL COCONUT DESSICATORS v PHIL COCONUT AUTHORITY 286 SCRA 109 MENDOZA;

February 10, 1998

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

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Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS v SSS

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

TANADA v TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 ESCOLIN; April 24, 1985

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

PERALTA V CSC 212 SCRA 425 Padilla; Aug. 10, 1992

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5. Examples of various agencies

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

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d. Fixing of Rates, Wages, Prices

RAILWAY CO 57 Phil 172 VICKERS; FEB 17, 1933

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

PHILCOMSAT V ALCUAZ 180 SCRA 218 REGALADO; December 18, 1989

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

GONZALO SY V CENTRAL BANK 70 SCRA 570 MARTIN; April 30, 1976

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v AIRSPAIN CORP

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Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

b. Warrants of Administrative Searches

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VIVO v MONTESA (Calacday) 29 SCRA 155 Reyes ; July 29, 1968

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

SANTOS V COMMISSIONER 74 SCRA 96 FERNANDO; November 29, 1976

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

SALAZAR V ACHACOSO 183 SCRA 145 SARMIENTO; March 14, 1990

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

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