Prof. V. A.

Avena Evidence
Hearsay PEOPLE v. CUSI G.R. No. L-20986 DIZON; August 14, 1965 (ricky) NATURE Petition for certiorari praying that the ruling of Judge Cusi be declared erroneous and to order him to allow witness Sgt. Lucio Bao to answer the question in full FACTS - Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged with robbery in band with homicide in the CFI of Davao, to which they pleaded not guilty. - During the trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Bao, of the Police Force of Digos, Davao, was testifying as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by Arcadio Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and everyone of them. - The prosecutor asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned. Judge Vucente Cusi resolved the objection by directing the witness to answer the question but without mentioning the names of the accused who had interposed the objection. In other words, the witness was allowed to answer the question and name his coconspirators except those who had raised the objection. The prosecutor's MFR of this ruling was denied. ISSUE WON Judge Cusi erred in resolving the objection. HELD YES. Ratio There is no question that hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Reasoning The purpose of the prosecutor is nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bao the names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bao would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, the question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and took part in the commission of the offense. Disposition The writ is granted. ESTRADA V DESIERTO 356 SCRA 108 PUNO; March 2, 2001 (joey) NATURE Consolidated cases: GR No. 146710-15- Petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, GR No. 146738 - Quo Warranto FACTS - This case concerns Eraps fall from power. You know the story - January 18, 2001 start of EDSA II - January 20, 2001 [midnight] first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power between Estradas and Arroyos camps; [noon] Davide administered the oath to Arroyo as President of the Philippines; [2:30 p.m] Estrada and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace and issued a press statement saying that he has strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President but he was nevertheless leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. - Still on January 20, Estrada signed a letter with the following tenor: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby

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transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the VicePresident shall be the Acting President. Copies of this were received by former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. and by Senate President Pimentel at 9 p.m. - January 22 - Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency; SC issued Resolution in A.M No. 01-1-05-SC, wherein the court resolved unanimously to confirm the authority given by the 12 members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Arroyo as President - Arroyo was recognized by more than a hundred foreign diplomats and by the House of Representatives (through Resolution No. 175) as the new President. She appointed cabinet members, ambassadors and special envoys, signed bills into laws, and nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. as VP. Surveys to the public also showed high rate of acceptance. - February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated. - Several cases were filed against Estrada in the Office of the Ombudsman. A special panel of investigators was created to investigate the charges against the petitioner. - Petitioner filed these petitions, the first one seeking to enjoin the Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted, and the second praying for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. ISSUES 1. WON the cases at bar involve a political question 2. WON Estrada resigned as President 3. WON petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President. 4. WON petitioner enjoys immunity from suit 5. WON the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

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HELD 1. NO Ratio Prominent on the surface on any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretions; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political questions presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of political questions, not of political cases. Reasoning - Tanada v. Cuenco: Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. - The 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. - Reliance on of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino is erroneous. There is a clear legal distinction between EDSA I and EDSA II. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. 2. YES Ratio To be considered as a resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. Reasoning - The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution as petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. - Petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang. Consequently, whether or not he resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. (totality test) - Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the diary of Exec. Sec. Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was used as an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. - Among others, it stated that that on January 20, the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The SC considered this as an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. The diary also stated that Estrada expressed no objections to the plans for a graceful and dignified exit. To the SC, this was proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. - SC also noted that the first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power was limited to 3 points, which did not include the resignation of petitioner because at this time, this was not a disputed point. - Angaras diary quotes Estrada saying, Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. To the SC, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.

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- During this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. - The resignation of the petitioner was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. - It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave of absence due to his inability to govern and cites the letter transmitted to the Senate President and House Speaker as support. However, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. Petitioners resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. - Petitioner also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which states that no public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the RPC on bribery.

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- The intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right. A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. - Also, when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, there were cases filed against him before the Ombudsman but they were not technically pending as the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. The Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked. - Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. However, the exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. Even assuming that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned. 3. NO Ratio Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII Reasoning - The Congress has through various acts confirmed GMAs presidency. They passed the following resolutions: House Resolution No. 176 (Resolution Expressing The Support Of The House Of Representatives To The Assumption Into Office By Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo As President Of The Republic Of The Philippines, Extending Its Congratulations And Expressing Its Support For Her Administration As A Partner In The Attainment Of The Nations Goals Under The Constitution); House Resolution No. 178 (Resolution Confirming President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos Nomination Of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. As Vice President Of The Republic Of The Philippines); Senate Resolution No. 82(Resolution Confirming President Gloria MacapagalArroyos Nomination Of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. As Vice President Of The Republic Of The Philippines); Senate Resolution No. 83 (Resolution Recognizing That The Impeachment Court Is Functus Officio); Senate Resolution No. 84 (Certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.). Both houses of Congress also started sending bills to be signed into law by Arroyo as President. - Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. - The Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. - Even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court. 4. NO Ratio Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Moreover, unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser; he is not immune from suit for criminal acts. Reasoning - Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman should be

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prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. - The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco tiaco it was held: the [Governor-General] is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercise discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, he acts, not as GovernorGeneral but as a private individual, and, as such, must answer for the consequences of his act. - Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him. - The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. 5. NO Ratio To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by

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the barrage of publicity. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. (Martelino v Alejandro) Reasoning - 2 principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. (1) British- presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury; courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. (2) American- skeptical about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial; employ different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc. - Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other offcourt publicity of sensational criminal cases. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. - There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. - The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioners submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs." News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior. - Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors. They can be reversed but they can not be compelled to change their recommendations nor can they be compelled to prosecute cases which they believe deserve dismissal. Dispositive Petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED SEPARATE OPINION Vitug [concur] - Resignation is an act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he renounces his office indefinitely. In order to constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by an act of relinquishment. Resignation implies, of the intention to surrender, renounce, relinquish the office. - Mr. Estrada imports that he did not resign from the presidency because the word "resignation" has not once been embodied in his letters or said in his statements. However, the contemporary acts of Estrada during those four critical days of January are evident of his intention to relinquish his office. Scarcity of words may not easily cloak reality and hide true intentions. - Abandonment of office is a species of resignation, and it connotes the giving up of the office although not attending by the formalities normally observed in resignation. Abandonment may be effected by a positive act or can be the result of an omission, whether deliberate or not.

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- Mr. Joseph Estrada invokes "temporary incapacity" under Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution. This assertion is difficult to sustain since the temporary incapacity contemplated clearly envisions those that are personal, either by physical or mental in nature, 7 and innate to the individual. - Neither can it be implied that the takeover has installed a revolutionary government. A revolutionary government is one which has taken the seat of power by force or in defiance of the legal processes. Within the political context, a revolution is a complete overthrow of the established government. In its delimited concept, it is characterized often, albeit not always, by violence as a means and specificable range of goals as ends. In contrast, EDSA 2 did not envision radical changes. The government structure has remained intact. Succession to the presidency has been by the duly-elected Vice-president of the Republic. The military and the police, down the line, have felt to be so acting in obedience to their mandate as the protector of the people. Mendoza [concur] - The legitimacy of a revolutionary government cannot be the subject of judicial review. In contrast, these cases do not involve the legitimacy of a government. They only involve the legitimacy of the presidency of Arroyo. - The events that led to the departure of petitioner Joseph E. Estrada from office are well known and need not be recounted in great detail. Justice Mendoza quoted excerpts from the Far Eastern Economic Review and Time Magazine as quoted in the submitted Memorandum. - The permanent disability referred to in the Constitution can be physical, mental or moral, rendering the President unable to exercise the powers and functions of his office. As his close adviser wrote in his diary of the final hours of petitioner's presidency: The President says: "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko namasyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. Angara himself shared this view of petitioner's inability. He wrote in his diary: "Let us be realistic," I counter. "The President does not have the capability to organize a counter-attack. He does not have the AFP or the Philippine National Police on his side. He is not only in a corner; he is also down. - This is the clearest proof that petitioner was totally and permanently disabled at least as of 11 P.M. of

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Friday, January 19, 2001. Hence the negotiations for the transfer of power to the respondent Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It belies petitioner's claim that he was not permanently disabled but only temporarily unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office and therefore can only be temporarily replaced by respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo under Art. VII, Sec. 11. - From this judgment that petitioner became permanently disabled because he had lost the public's trust. - The only question left for resolution is whether there was massive prejudicial publicity attending the investigation by the Ombudsman of the criminal charges against petitioner. The test in this jurisdiction is whether there has been "actual, not merely possible, prejudice"19 caused to petitioner as a result of publicity. There has been no proof of this, and so I think this claim should simply be dismissed. Motion for reconsideration PUNO; April 3, 2001 ISSUES 1. WON prejudicial publicity has affected petitioners right to fair trial 2. WON petitioner resigned or should be considered resigned 3. WON the Angara Diary is inadmissible for being violative of the following rules on evidence: hearsay, best evidence, authentication, admissions and res inter alios acta, and WON reliance on newspaper acounts is violative of the hearsay rule 4. WON Congress post facto can decide petitioners inability to govern considering Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution 5. WON petitioner must be first convicted in the impeachment proceedings before he can be criminally prosecuted. 6. WON there was double jeopardy 7. WON petitioner was immune from suit 8. WON the SC Justices who went to EDSA should inhibit themselves from the proceedings HELD 1. NO - Petitioner assails the Decision for adverting to newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In our Decision, we used the totality test to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned. We referred to and analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. All these events are facts which are wellestablished and cannot be refuted. All these prior events are facts which are within judicial notice by this Court. There was no need to cite their news accounts. The reference by the Court to certain newspapers reporting them as they happened does not make them inadmissible evidence for being hearsay. The news account only buttressed these facts as facts. Even then, petitioner has not singled out any of these facts as false. - We used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the petitioner. It is not unusual for courts to distill a persons subjective intent from the evidence before them. Everyday, courts ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law cases involving last wills and testaments, in commercial cases involving contracts and in other similar cases. - Petitioner pleads that we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Under the res ipsa loquitur rule in its broad sense, the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. It is not a rule of substantive law but more a procedural rule. Its mere invocation does not exempt the plaintiff with the requirement of proof to prove negligence. It merely allows the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. - It is inappropriate to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitur, a rule usually applied only in tort cases, to the cases at bar. Indeed, there is no court in the whole world that has applied the res ipsa loquitur rule to resolve the issue of prejudicial publicity. - Petitioner keeps on pounding on the adverse publicity against him but fails to prove how the impartiality of the panel of investigators from the Office of the Ombudsman has been infected by it. This fact must be established by clear and convincing evidence and cannot be left to loose surmises and conjectures.

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- We cannot replace this test of actual prejudice with the rule of res ipsa loquitur. The latter rule assumes that an injury (i.e., prejudicial publicity) has been suffered and then shifts the burden to the panel of investigators to prove that the impartiality of its members has been affected by said publicity. Such a rule will overturn our case law that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. - Petitioner suggests that the Court should order a 2month cooling off period to allow passions to subside and hopefully the alleged prejudicial publicity against him would die down. There is no assurance that the so called 2-month cooling off period will achieve its purpose. Petitioner cannot avoid the kleiglight of publicity. What is important for the petitioner is that his constitutional rights are not violated in the process of investigation. 2. YES Ratio In determining whether a given resignation is voluntarily tendered, the element of voluntariness is vitiated only when the resignation is submitted under duress brought on by government action. The threepart test for such duress has been stated as involving the following elements: (1) whether one side involuntarily accepted the others terms; (2) whether circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite side. - A resignation may be found involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances it appears that the employers conduct in requesting resignation effectively deprived the employer of free choice in the matter. Factors to be considered, under this test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the choice he or she was given; (3) whether the employee was given a reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she was permitted to select the effective date of resignation. In applying this totality of the circumstances test, the assessment whether real alternatives were offered must be gauged by an objective standard rather than by the employees purely subjective evaluation; that the employee may perceive his or her only option to be resignation - for example, because of concerns about his or her reputation - is irrelevant. Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives - for example, resignation or facing

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disciplinary charges - does not of itself establish that a resignation was induced by duress or coercion, and was therefore involuntary. This is so even where the only alternative to resignation is facing possible termination for cause, unless the employer actually lacked good cause to believe that grounds for termination existed. - A resignation resulting from a choice between resigning or facing proceedings for dismissal is not tantamount to discharge by coercion without procedural view if the employee is given sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation of the choice posed. Futhermore, a resignation by an officer charged with misconduct is not given under duress, though the appropriate authority has already determined that the officers alternative is termination, where such authority has the legal authority to terminate the officers employment under the particular circumstances, since it is not duress to threaten to do what one has the legal right to do, or to threaten to take any measure authorized by law and the circumstances of the case. Reasoning - Petitioners issuance of the press release and his abandonment of Malacaang Palace confirmed his resignation. These are overt acts which leave no doubt to the Court that the petitioner has resigned. - Petitioner had several options available to him other than resignation-- the holding of snap elections, written declaration of temporary inability, etc. Immediately before he left Malacaang, he asked Secretary Angara: "Ed, aalis na ba ako?" which implies that he still had a choice of whether or not to leave. - To be sure, pressure was exerted for the petitioner to resign. But it is difficult to believe that the pressure completely vitiated the voluntariness of the petitioners resignation. Certainly, there were no tanks that rumbled through the Palace, no attack planes that flew over the presidential residence, no shooting, no large scale violence, except verbal violence, to justify the conclusion that petitioner was coerced to resign. 3. NO - The Angara diary is not an out of court statement but is actually part of the pleadings. It was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. Furthermore, the three parts of the Diary published in the PDI were attached as Annexes A-C of the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T. Capulong, et al. The second and third parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of same respondents. Petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second and third parts of the diary. It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so. - Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. - Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity. The decided historical trend has been to exclude categories of highly probative statements from the definition of hearsay, and to develop more class exceptions to the hearsay rule. - A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. - Wigmore: The partys declaration has generally the probative value of any other persons asssertion, and it has a special value when offered against the party. In that circumstance, the admission discredits the partys statement with the present claim asserted in pleadings and testimony, much like a witness impeached by contradictory statements. Moreover, admissions pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded if there was no opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine because it is the opponents own declaration, and he does not need to cross examine himself. The Hearsay Rule is satisfied since the party now as opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his former assertion.

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- Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests not upon any notion that the circumstances in which it was made furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of litigation. A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath. A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. - The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party. - Even if the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, it is binding on him under the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. - Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta (see Section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court) However, the rule has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. - Executive Secretary Angara was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacaang Palace. The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara. - Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent are binding on the principal. The reason behind this is "What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. - Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. These are statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to two classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which are

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circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class includes the following: a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions; b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like; c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter; d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness. - Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro, which frowned on reliance by courts on newspaper accounts. However, in the Muro case, Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a newspaper account without affording the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument. In the instant cases, however, the petitioner had an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his pleadings. He was therefore not denied due process. Petitioner had "been given an opportunity to inspect" the Angara Diary but did not object to its admissibility. On the Rule on Proof of Private Writings - Sec. 20 Rule 132 provides that before any private writing offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. - A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably established as a pre-requisite to its admission. However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of a proffered instrument may not object that it was not properly identified before it was admitted in evidence. On the Best Evidence Rule - It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. - Wigmore: Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production. - Francisco: an objection by the party against whom secondary evidence is sought to be introduced is essential to bring the best evidence rule into application; and frequently, where secondary evidence has been admitted, the rule of exclusion might have successfully been invoked if proper and timely objection had been taken. No general rule as to the form or mode of objecting to the admission of secondary evidence is set forth. Suffice it to say here that the objection should be made in proper season that is, whenever it appears that there is better evidence than that which is offered and before the secondary evidence has been admitted. The objection itself should be sufficiently definite to present a tangible question for the courts consideration. Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be received in evidence if no objection is made to its reception. 4. YES - Petitioner argues that Congress can only decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of opinion between a majority of the Cabinet and the President. It is also urged that the presidents judgment that he is unable to govern temporarily which is thereafter communicated to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate is the political question which this Court cannot review. - Petitioner himself made the submission that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII." If petitioner now feels aggrieved by the manner Congress exercised its power, it is incumbent upon him to seek redress from Congress itself. - Petitioner now argues that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial question. Petitioners change of theory, ill disguised as it is, does not at all impress. The cases at bar do not present the general issue of whether the respondent Arroyo is the de jure or a de facto President. Specific issues were raised to the Court for resolution and we ruled on an issue by issue basis. Petitioner cannot blur these specific rulings by

A2010
the generalization that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial question. - Petitioner asserts that these acts of Congress of passing Resolutions should not be accorded any legal significance because: (1) they are post facto and (2) a declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied. There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which states that the declaration by Congress of the Presidents inability must always be a priori or before the Vice-President assumes the presidency. Special consideration should be given to the fact that the events which led to the resignation of the petitioner happened at express speed and culminated on a Saturday. Congress was then not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on petitioners letter claiming inability to govern. - Petitioner cannot strictly maintain that the President of the Senate, the Honorable Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Honorable Arnulfo P. Fuentebella, recognized respondent Arroyo as the "constitutional successor to the presidency" post facto. Before the oath-taking, Senate President Pimentel, Jr. and Speaker Fuentebella had prepared a Joint Statement which states their recognition of Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the Presidency. This a priori recognition by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives was followed post facto by various resolutions of the Senate and the House, in effect, confirming this recognition. These acts of Congress, a priori and post facto, cannot be dismissed as merely implied recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President of the Republic. - The Constitution clearly sets out the structure on how vacancies and election contest in the office of the President shall be decided. Thus, section 7 of Article VII covers the instance when (a) the President-elect fails to qualify, (b) if a President shall not have been chosen and (c) if at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled. Section 8 of Article VII covers the situation of the death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President. Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. In each case, the Constitution specifies the body that will resolve the issues that may

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arise from the contingency. In case of election contest, section 4, Article VII provides that the contests shall be resolved by this Court sitting en banc. In case of resignation of the President, it is not disputed that this Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue. In case of inability to govern, section 11 of Article VII gives the Congress the power to adjudge the issue and petitioner himself submitted this thesis which was shared by this Court. 5. NO. - A plain reading of the section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution will not yield petitioners conclusion. The provision conveys two uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells us that judgment in impeachment cases has a limited reach. . .i.e., it cannot extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, and second, it tells us the consequence of the limited reach of a judgment in impeachment proceedings considering its nature, i.e., that the party convicted shall still be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. No amount of manipulation will justify petitioners non sequitur submission that the provision requires that his conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition sine qua non to his prosecution, trial and punishment for the offenses he is now facing before the Ombudsman. 6. NO. Ratio Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid complaint; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Reasoning - Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors walk out from the impeachment proceedings "should be considered failure to prosecute on the part of the public and private prosecutors, and the termination of the case by the Senate is equivalent to acquittal." He explains "failure to prosecute" as the "failure of the prosecution to prove the case, hence dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits." He then concludes that "dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute amounts to an acquittal for purposes of applying the rule against double jeopardy." - Assuming that the first four requisites of double jeopardy were complied with, petitioner failed to satisfy the fifth requisite for he was not acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent. Petitioners claim of double jeopardy cannot be predicated on prior conviction for he was not convicted by the impeachment court. - At best, his claim of previous acquittal may be scrutinized in light of a violation of his right to speedy trial, which amounts to a failure to prosecute. As Bernas points out, a failure to prosecute, which is what happens when the accused is not given a speedy trial, means failure of the prosecution to prove the case. Hence, dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits. However, petitioner was not able to prove that his case was dragged to an unreasonable length of time. - Nor can the claim of double jeopardy be grounded on the dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused. The impeachment proceeding was closed only after the petitioner had resigned from the presidency, thereby rendering the impeachment court functus officio. By resigning from the presidency, petitioner more than consented to the termination of the impeachmment case against him, for he brought about the termination of the impeachment proceedings. We have consistently ruled that when the dismissal or termination of the case is made at the instance of the accused, there is no double jeopardy. 7.. NO - Petitioner avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. 8. NO. - There is no ground to inhibit the12 members of the Court who merely accepted the invitation of the Arroyo to attend her oath taking. As mere spectators of a historic event, said members of the Court did not prejudge the legal basis of the claim of Arroyo to the presidency at the time she took her oath.

A2010
- It is clear from A.M. No. 01-1-05 SC, that the Court did not treat the letter of respondent Arroyo to be administered the oath by Chief Justice Davide, Jr., as a case but as an administrative matter. If it were considered as a case, then petitioner has reason to fear that the Court has predetermined the legitimacy of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency. To dispel the erroneous notion, the Court precisely treated the letter as an administrative matter and emphasized that it was "without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party." - In further clarification, the Court on February 20, 2001 issued another resolution to inform the parties and the public that it "did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution." - To disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices. Dispositive MR denied for lack of merit CORNEJO, SR. V SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. L-58831 FERNAN; July 31, 1987 (mini) NATURE Petition for certiorari to review Sandiganbayan decision FACTS - Cornejo seeks a review on certiorari of a decision in a Criminal case wherein the Sandiganbayan found him guilty for the crime of Estafa - facts of the criminal case: Accused represented himself to be connected

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with the City Engineer, to the complainant, Beth Chua. He said that he was empowered to inspect private buildings and that the Metro Manila Commission requires that the floor area of all houses be measured, a service which usually costs P3/square meter, but for which he would only charge P0.50/square meter if he were to be hired. Although Beth Chua initially was doubtful about the personaility of the accused Engineer, she eventually believed him and hired him for the premises she had been renting. Beth Chua saw the accused Engineer go into the house of her neighbor, Mrs. Bernal, and found out he was there for the same purpose. Mrs. Bernal had apparently had similar doubts as to the identity of the accused Engineer, so both she and Chua went to the Barangay Captain, who went with them to Pasay City Hall. There, City Engineer Jesus Reyna told them that the accused Engineer was not authorized to conduct inspection and investigation of privately owned buildings. This fact was later confirmed by a certification issued to that effect by said City Engineer. Accused Engineer was eventually cought by the cops in some entrapment plan. - Cornejo objects to the admissibility of the certification issued by City Engineer Jesus Reyna to the effect that Cornejo was not authorized to inspect and investigate privately-owned buildings ISSUE 1. WON the certification issued by City Engineer Jesus Reyna is covered by the hearsay rule HELD 1. NO Ratio Where the statement or writings attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand are being offered to prove that such statements were actually made or such writings were executed, such evidence is not covered by the hearsay rule. Reasoning The certification was not presented as independent evidence to prove the want of authority of petitioner to inspect and investigate privately-owned buildings, but merely as part of the testimony of the complainant that such certification was issued in her presence and the declaration of Assistant City Engineer Ceasar Contreras that the signature appearing thereon was that of Engineer Reyna. Besides, the finding ot the trial court that petitioner had no authority to conduct inspections and investigations was reached, not solely on the basis of the certification, but principally from a consideration and study of the law which first allowed the city governments to create the position of City Public Works Supervisor, in relation to the law which placed the city public works supervisors under the supervision of the city engineers. Disposition instant petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed.

A2010
long before respondents went to Hawaii; Dominga erected a house on the land long before the outbreak of World War II; Dominga financed out of her own money the construction of the house and subsequent improvements thereof, she being a merchant when she could still travel to Cagayan Valley; granting that respondents had been sending money to Dominga, said money already belonged to her; if Dominga used said money for improving the house, respondents have no right over the house. - During the pendency of the case and before she could take the witness stand, Dominga died. Following pretrial, trial on the merits ensued. Witnesses for the plaintiffs were respondents and their aunt, Margarita Burcena (Margarita); while petitioner testified on his own behalf. - RTC held that the donation is void because Dominga could not have validly disposed of the subject property since it was bought with the money sent by respondents while working abroad, although declared for taxation purposes in Dominga's name. (petitioner found in good faith -only has to turnover property) - Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. The CA found no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC, as well as the latter's assessment of the credibility of witnesses. The CA held that the case involves an implied trust known as purchase price resulting trust under Article 1448, CC where property sold is granted to one party but the price is paid for by another; that the evidence presented by the respondents convincingly show that the subject property was bought with money belonging to respondents but declared in Dominga's name as administrator thereof; and that Dominga's act of donating the property to petitioner was beyond her authority and capacity, done without the consent of the real owners, herein respondents. Thus, the CA sustained the conclusion of the RTC that the donation is void. - Petitioner's MFR was denied. ISSUE/S 1. WON CA erred in discussing an issue not brought before it (implied trust) 2. WON Margarita's statement on the witness stand (that Dominga told her that the respondents sent her money to buy the subject property) should not have been given weight or credence by the RTC and the CA because it is hearsay and has no probative value.

COMILANG V BURCENA GR 146853 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; Feb13, 2006 (bauza) FACTS - Francisco and Mariano Burcena (respondents), together w/ their mother, Dominga Reclusado Vda. de Burcena (Dominga), filed a complaint for annulment of document w/ damages against Salvador Comilang (petitioner). - The complaint alleges that: respondents are the owners of a 918-sqm parcel of land located in Manueva, Santa, Ilocos Sur and the house with a floor area of 32 sqm built thereon; respondents acquired the subject property through their earnings while working abroad; the subject property was declared for taxation purposes in Dominga's name as administrator thereof; petitioner caused the execution of a Deed of Donation over said property by taking advantage of Dominga's blindness, old age and physical infirmity; the said Deed of Donation is null and void because: (a) Dominga had no right to donate the same since she is not its owner, (b) Dominga did not give her consent and was misled to the execution of such document, (c) granting Dominga had authority to donate, the donation is void because the property donated is the only property declared in her name and therefore she could not have reserved for herself in full ownership sufficient property to support herself; petitioner is in possession of the subject property, depriving respondents of its ownership and enjoyment of its fruits. - In his Answer, petitioner contends that: the Deed of Donation was freely and voluntarily executed by Dominga in consideration of her love and affection for him; the subject property was acquired by Dominga together w/ her 2 sisters, Aniceta and Juana Reclusado,

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HELD 1. NO. Reasoning An appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. (See R51, sec 8, ROC) In this case, since the petitioner directly brought in issue on appeal in his Appellants Brief the declaration of the RTC that Dominga could not have validly disposed of the subject property because respondents are the real owners of the subject property since it was bought with money sent by them, it was well-within the CAs authority to review and evaluate the propriety of such ruling. In holding that an implied trust exists between respondents and Dominga in relation to the subject property and therefore Dominga had no right to donate the same to petitioner, the CA merely clarified the RTC's findings. The trust created under the 1st sentence of Art 1448, CC is sometimes referred to as a purchase money resulting trust, the elements of which are: (a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; and (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust. Respondents have shown that the two elements are present in the instant case. Dominga was merely a trustee of the respondents in relation to the subject property. Therefore, Dominga could not have validly donated the subject property to petitioner, as expressly provided in Article 736, CC (guardians and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them.) 2. NO. Ratio While it is true that the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. Reasoning What was sought to be admitted in evidence, and what was actually admitted in evidence, was the fact that the statement was made by Dominga to Margarita, not necessarily that the matters stated by her were true. The statement attributed to Dominga regarding the source of the funds used to purchase the subject property related to the court by Margarita is admissible if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the tenor thereof. Besides, the testimony of Margarita is not the main basis for the RTC decision. In fact, her testimony is not indispensable. It merely serves to corroborate the testimonies of the respondents on the source of the funds used in purchasing the subject property. The testimonies of all three witnesses for the plaintiffs were found to be convincing and credible by the RTC. This Court will not alter the findings of the RTC on the credibility of witnesses, principally because trial courts have vastly superior advantages in ascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood as they have the opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of witnesses while testifying. Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. Dying Declaration PEOPLE V. MOLAS G.R. Nos. 97437-39 GRIO-AQUINO, February 5, 1993 (cha) NATURE Appeal

A2010

FACTS -Josue Molas (accused-appellant) and Dulcesima Resonable (Dulcesima, victim) were sweethearts and were engaged to be married. Dulcesima was the daughter of Bernardo and Soledad Resonable, and the sister of Nicolas and Abelardo Resonable -on Feb 2, 1983, at about 6:00 pm after farm work, Bernardo arrived at their house and found 8-y.o. Abelardo at the doorway of their house bathed in his own blood. Bernardo carried Abelardo into their house. Abelardo informed his father that Josue Molas was the person who not only inflicted his injuries but also stabbed Dulcesima and Soledad. Bernardo then looked for Dulcesima, who he found dead in a dried carabao mud pool 3-arms length from the house, and Soledad, who he found near the bench by the door of the house. Bernardo ran to the barangay captain and sought help from authorities. Abelardo was brought to the Provincial hospital but died the next day. -dawn of Feb 3, Josue Molas, with blood-stained clothes, surrendered to Patrolman Geronimo Vallega, together with the hunting knife I used in killing the mother, the daughter and the boy. Patrolman Vallega then lodged Molas in jail. Molas was transferred to Valencia Police Station later. -next morning, after being informed of his Constitutional rights, refused to give any statement to the police. Eventually, Molas freely and voluntarily related the whole story, as taken down by Patrolman Fetalvero. The following are contained in Molas sworn statement: In our arrival to their house at sitio Inas, Barangay Dobdob, from Kabangogan, * this Soledad Resonable lighted a gas lamp in their store and said, "maayo kay naabot na ta walay makaboot nako ug patyon nako ang akong anak." [It's good that you have arrived, no one can stop me if I kill my own daughter] at the same time went near Dulcesima, her daughter and grabbed her hair and boxed her to the different parts of her body. Because of faith and sympathy, I stopped Solidad by holding her hands to prevent her boxing Dulcesima, but on my intervention, Soledad boxed me hitting my head and arms. Due to blocks I made she was tired and again went back to Dulcesima and again boxed her to the different parts of her body. Because I was hurt on the part of Dulcisima, my wife-tobe and no other means to prevent Solidad, I was able to

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grab the weapon on my waist and stabbed Solidad hitting her first on the breast, then on the back after which I saw Abelardo, Dulcisima's younger brother at my back holding and boxing my buttock. I stabbed him on the breast and followed again at the back causing him to fall down on the ground, leaving therein the weapon I used causing incised wound on my right little finger and ran away but Dulcisima stopped me by holding my left hand and said, "puslang nabuhat sa akong ginikanan, patya lamang ko ug layhan ka mag onong ta sa kamatayon." [How could you do this to my parent, kill me also so we'll all die together]. Hearing such words, I responded, "papatay ka diay kanako," [You'll kill me after all?] I went back where Abelardo was and pulled the penetrated weapon and stabbed Dulcisima who at that time was following me hitting her breast and caused her life to end. When I saw Solidad her mother walking towards the seat of their store and sat down, I followed her and slashed her neck and stabbed her stomach and immediately ran home. The said confession was signed before Judge Tayrosa of the MTC fo Valencia after it was translated to Cebuano. Molas did not object to any of the contents of his affidavit as translated. He signed the document willingly. -3 separate information for murder were filed against Molas, to which he pleaded not guilty. -for the defense, only Molas was presented. In essence, he testified that at about 6 pm on Feb 2, he saw his fianc lifeless beside the dried mud pool 3 fathoms away from the store/house. He hugged Dulcesima but she was dead so he ran to the store. There, he saw Soledad wounded in the neck and bathed with blood. He also saw Abelardo under a table with a hunting knife in his back which he pulled from Abelardo. He shouted for help then suddenly a voice from behind the store said Dont shout, Bay, if you dont want to die! 3 unidentified men started chasing him afterwards. During the said flight he stumbled, causing the injury in his hands. He informed his mother regarding what happened, and with his blood-stained clothes, he proceeded to the police station. While he was being investigated, Patrolman Vallaga arrived and informed Patrolman Renzal that Abelardo tagged him as the killer. He also alleged, though unsubstantiated, that Patrolman Quitoy manhandled him. He denied knowing the contents of the affidavit because it was written in English and was not translated to him. -RTC: GUILTY ISSUES 1. WON the court erred in giving credence to Abelardos dying declaration 2. WON his extrajudicial admission was validly admitted by the court HELD 1. NO. Correct in giving credence to it as a dying declaration. Ratio. To be admissible, a dying declaration must: (1) concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) that he was a competent witness; and (d) that his declaration is offered in evidence in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the declarant is the victim (Sec. 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court; People vs. Saliling, 69 SCRA 427). Reasoning. Abelardo's statement that it was Josue Molas who inflicted his injuries and also stabbed his mother and sister was given to his father, while he (Abelardo) lay at death's door, bleeding from stab wounds in his colon and spinal cord, as a result of which he expired a few hours later. It was indubitably a dying declaration. All of the circumstances required were present when Abelardo made his dying declaration. 2. YES Ratio. While it is true that the appellant's extrajudicial confession was made without the advice and assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible as evidence, it could be treated as a verbal admission of the accused established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused (People vs. Carido, 167 SCRA 462; People vs. Feliciano, 58 SCRA 383; People vs. Fontanosa, 20 SCRA 249). Reasoning. The Valencia Police Station investigator, Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, testifying before the trial court on October 16, 1984, quoted the admissions of the accused. The trial court, which observed his deportment on the witness stand, found him credible. - the trial court did not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of the accused. Even if that confession were disregard, there was more that enough evidence to support his conviction. His act of giving himself up to the police of Pamplona with the murder weapon, his

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blood-stained clothing at the time of the surrender only hours after the killings, Abelardo's dying declaration, and the testimonies of the policemen in the police stations in Pamplona and Valencia to whom he admitted his guilt constitute an unbroken chain proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was he who murdered Abelardo, Dulcesima and Soledad Resonable. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment convicting Josue Molas for the murders of Dulcesima Resonable, Soledad Resonable and Abelardo Resonable and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of said murders is AFFIRMED, with modification of the death indemnity which is hereby increased to P50,000.00 for each case. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE VS GUMIMBA 517 SCRA 25 TINGA; February 27, 2007 (athe) NATURE APPEAL from the decision of the CA FACTS - Gumimba and co-accused Abapo were charged with the crime of rape with homicide of an eight-year old child. - Both entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment. The prosecution presented two witnesses: Magallano and Arenas. They testified that Gumimba went to Magallanos home and confessed to him that he alone and by himself raped and killed his niece in Ozamis City. He even repeated his narration and confessed to the baranggay captain that he had raped and killed the victim. - Gumimba later on changed his plea of not guilty to GUILTY. - Both were found guilty of the crime. However, on appeal the appellant raises the issue that the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant on the basis of his improvident plea of guilty and his alleged confessions to Magallano and Aranas, the latter being hearsay. ISSUE WON the testimonies of Magallano and Aranas are inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay HELD

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NO. The testimonies are independently relevant statements which are not barred by the hearsay rule. Ratio Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity is immaterial. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. DISPOSITION Decision of the RTC and CA affirmed. approached the dancing pair of Rowena and Dante. Then Ricardo and Miguelito ganged-up on Dante. Maramara, rushed to the scene to pacify the trio. Ricardo held accuseds hands at his back and then Miguelito repeatedly stabbed him on different parts of his body. Accused regained consciousness at the hospital where Dr. Gil Georga treated him for a few days. There was no way accused couldve resisted Miguelitos attack, much less was he capable of inflicting injury on Miguelito, since the stronger Ricardo was holding accuseds hands and was dragging him away while Miguelito kept lunging a 6-inch bladed weapon at him. Dr. Georga, accuseds attending doctor, never asked the details of the stabbing incident nor the identity of assailant. ISSUES 1 WON testimonies of prosecution witnesses are credible 2 WON Regarder Donatos testimony regarding Miguelitos identification of the accused as his assailant certainly qualifies as a dying declaration that is worthy of credence HELD 1 YES - The issue of credibility requires a determination that is concededly best left to the trial court with its unique position of having been enabled to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the deportment of witnesses on the stand. In the absence of any showing that the trial courts calibration of credibility is flawed, SC is bound by its assessment. Guided by these long standing doctrinal pronouncements, we find no reason to disturb the trial courts assessment of (1) Ricardos eyewitness account of how accused shot Miguelito and (2) Regarders recollection of his son Miguelitos dying declaration, as truthful testimonies coming from credible witnesses. The fact of relationship of prosecution witnesses Ricardo and Regarder Donato to the victim Miguelito does not necessarily place them in bad light. Relationship per se does not give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto impair the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness. - Where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that

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they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 2 YES - For a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, these requisites must concur: (1) that death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) that the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) that the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to; (4) that the declarant thereafter dies; and (5) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject of inquiry. - The degree and seriousness of the wounds suffered by the victim Miguelito and the fact that his death supervened shortly thereafter may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by him with the full realization that he was in a dying condition. The victim Miguelitos dying declaration having satisfied all these requisites, it must be considered as an evidence of the highest order because, at the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabrication are stilled. A victims utterance after sustaining a mortal wound may be considered pure emanations of the incident. Note: The Court found that the appreciation of treachery by RTC to qualify the offense to murder is reversed. Disposition: RTC Decision MODIFIED. Accused guilty of HOMICIDE and NOT MURDER. PEOPLE V. MOLO G.R. No. L-44680 Per Curiam; 11 January 1979 (ice) Nature Automatic Review Facts Molo was accused of Murder. He allegedly attacked and assaulter Gapisa in Romblon with a bolo. -Venancio Gapisa and Simeona Rapa-Gapisa, husband and wife, retired to sleep. The couple lived in a typical hut made of bamboo flooring and dilapidated buri walling surrounded by fruit bearing banana plants. Simeona, who had not yet fallen asleep, heard an

PEOPLE V MARAMARA G.R. No. 110994 PARDO; October 22, 1999 (rean) NATURE Appeal from RTC Decision FACTS - Cresencio Maramara was convicted of murder for killing Miguelito Donato. He now appeals to SC. - Prosec Version: At a benefit dance held in the yard of accused Maramaras house in the evening of Nov. 18, 1991 and at about 12 mn, while Ricardo Donato was dancing with a certain Rowena, Dante Arce, a friend of accused, approached Ricardo and boxed him on the chest. Rowena ran away while Ricardo scampered toward the fence for safety. Miguelito Donato was about 2 meters away from where Ricardo Donato stayed at the fence. Accused took his handgun tucked in his waist and fired at victim Miguelito, hitting the latter on the left breast. Ricardo tried to help his fallen brother but somebody struck Ricardos head with an iron bar which knocked him out for about 3 minutes. When Ricardo regained consciousness, he hurried home and informed his parents of what happened to their son Miguelito. - Miguelitos father, Regarder, immediately went to the crime scene and rushed Miguelito to the Hospital where the latter died. Before Miguelito expired, Regarder asked who shot him and Miguelito replied that it was accused. - Defense Version: At about 11p,pm., brothers Ricardo and Miguelito arrived at the benefit dance and

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indistinct sound of murmur and gnashing of teeth. She saw accused Dominador Molo by peeping in a hole. She immediately lighted a kerosene lamp and placed it on top of the trunk nearby. She tried to awaken her husband, but the latter did not respond. The accused had already climbed up the house which was only a flight of two steps. The accused forcibly pushed the sliding door and barged into the house. He inquired from Simeona where Venancio was and she replied that he was asleep. Finding Venancio sleeping near the door, he immediately grabbed his left wrist and started hacking at the sleeping old man. Rudely awakened, Venancio quickly stood up and with his right hand reached for his bolo which was atop the table nearby; but he was not able to retaliate in as much as Dominador Molo was quick to hack at him again. Fearing for her own life, Simeona rushed out of the house through the door of the unfinished kitchen to summon help from her son, Alejandro Gapisa, who was at Roman Mangaring's house some 100 meters away. Trembling, she told him that his father was boloed by Boslo, the name by which accused-appellant was known in their locality. Upon being informed, Alejandro and Roman ran towards the house of Venancio, followed by Simeona. Upon arrival. they saw Venancio bleeding profusely and in weakened condition. He was sitting in the floor of the kitchen, defecating in his pants. When Alejandro took him in his arms, Venancio told him that he was boloed by Boslo. Roman Mangaring who was present also inquired from Venancio who his assailant was and elicited the answer, "Boslo". Venancio was then rushed to the hospital and arrived there at about 1:50 a.m. He expired a few minutes after. -Testimonies were presented from (1) the victim's wife, Simeona Gapisa, an eye witness to the alleged murder; (2) Alejandro Gapisa, a son of the victim who went to the rescue of his father after he was stabbed by accused-appellant and was able to talk with him before he succumbed to several bolo wounds; (3) Roman Mangaring, a neighbor of Alejandro; and (4) Dr. Victorio Benedicto, who performed the autopsy and accomplished the Autopsy Report. PC soldiers and policemen were dispatched to the house of Dominador Molo some one and a half (1-1/2) kilometers away from the scene of the killing Dominador Molo was placed under arrest and brought by the arresting officers to the poblacion. Investigated at the PC barracks. Trial Court relying on the testimony of Simeona Gapisa who was an eye-and ear-witness to the incident and the corroborating testimonies of Alejandro Gapisa and Roman Mangaring, who testified on the ante-mortem statements of the victim identifying accused as the assailant; discounting the defense of alibi put forth by the accused and his wife; appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, recidivism and reiteration alleged in the Information, and a mitigating circumstance, voluntary surrender, sentenced the accused. Issues (The court tried to answer each allegations of Molo) WON there is no proof of motive on appellant's part. Motive need not be shown where there is positive Identification. Even in the absence of proof of motive, the conviction of accused- appellant can stand inasmuch as he had been positively Identified by Simeona Gapisa and by the deceased himself through his dying declaration. Motive need not be shown when there is positive Identification. (People vs. Feliciano, 58 SCRA 383; People vs. Dorico, 54 SCRA 172). WON Molos Identity as assailant was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The alleged inconsistent statement given to the police was neither offered as evidence nor shown to witness in order to enable her to explain the discrepancies if any in accordance to Section 16, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The proper bast was, therefore, not laid to impeach Simeona's testimony on the basis of alleged inconsistent statements which she allegedly made before the police. Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies inconsequential. Inconsistencies on minor details or on matters that are not of material consequence as to affect the guilt or the innocence of the accused do not detract from the credibility of the witnesses. The discordance in their testimonies on collateral matters heightens their credibility and shows that their testimonies were not coached or rehearsed. Far from being evidence of falsehood, they could justifiably be regarded as a demonstration of good faith. On the alleged inconsistent averments regarding the presence of light. A review of the transcript of the testimony shows that the foregoing is an inaccurate representation of Simeona's testimony. For she clarified

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that her husband was already boloed before the light was snuffed out. With regard to alleged incredible assertions, i.e. that it was very unusual that she remained silent while witnessing the attack on her husband. The transcripts showan answer to the misgivings by showing that she was scared of being boloed as well which the court finds reasonable. With regard to the assertion that Simeona only pointed to the accused as the killer because he was a hated criminal in the locality No. There was certainty in the identification of Molo. WON Simeona's account is contrary to physical facts (i.e how Molo stabbed her husband) No it is not. To simply thrust a bolo at a lying person is not as forceful as to hack him with it. The first is an awkward if not difficult movement, but the second is natural and can be done with facility. WON Simeona could have been able to recognize Molo (given that he was at the foot of the stairs and there is a banana plant obstructing the moonlight) Yes. Simeona testified that the banana plants did not obstruct the light cast by the moon and the defense did not disprove this fact. Indeed, Simeona had no difficulty in recognizing the accused, considering that their house was only elevated by two steps and at the time she saw him through the dilapidated burl wall he was already at the foot of the stairs. WON the dying declarations should not be accorded credence because the victim could not have recognized his assailant, since as testified by Simeona he was asleep when attacked No, it was only at the initial stage of the attack when the victim was asleep, because he was awakened by the first blows and stood up to defend himself. The statements of Venancio Identifying Dominador Molo as his assailant to Alejandro, his son, and Roman, his neighbor are dying declarations. Considering the nature and extent of the wounds, eight in all, Venancio must have realized the seriousness of his condition and it can therefore be inferred that he made the incrimination under the conciousness of impending death, which, in fact, supervened barely 41/2 hours after he was boloed. Disposition

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Affirmed PEOPLE V BAUTISTA GR No. 117685 KAPUNAN; June 21, 1999 (monch) NATURE Appeal from the decision of the RTC convicting Bautisa FACTS - Leticia Bandarlipe was sitting on a sled near a kamias tree by her house, waiting for her husband Cipriano to arrive. She heard a gunshot and the ensuing shout of her husband that he was shot. She approached him and saw Bautista pointing a firearm at her husband. Leticia then asked her husband who shot him and the latter identified the appellant, Poldo Bautista. Cipriano was rushed to the hospital by Leticias sister-in-law, Barangay Captain Felipe M. Solis, Jose C. Gagaza, Jr., Barangay Tanod De Leon. There, he expired. - Gagaza and Solis proceeded to police station to report the incident. Gagazas report was entered into the police blotter. It was alleged therein that Cipriano told Gagaza that he was shot by one Domy Ferreamil. Feriamil is a business partner of Bautista in a tobacco plantation which the former operated. ISSUE/S 1. WON the dying declaration should be admitted. 2. WON the Bautista is guilty HELD 1. NO Ratio A dying declaration, also known as an ante mortem statement or a statement in articulo mortis, is admissible under the following requisites: (1) that death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) that the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) that the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to; and (4) that the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarant's death is the subject of the inquiry Reasoning The TC correctly rejected the ante mortem statement since Gagaza, who heard the statement, was not presented to testify. The entry in the police blotter is not enough. 2. No. Reasoning In her direct testimony, Leticia claimed that the victim identified his killer. In her cross examination,, she claimed that she ws not able to talk to him anymore. This testimony has left the Court baffled as to whether or not the victim indeed identified appellant as his assailant. Likewise, the Court cannot see its way clear why Leticia should still ask her husband who shot him when she allegedly saw appellant still pointing the gun at him - It is also worthy to note that whereas Leticia initially denied having talked to the local officials who accompanied her to the hospital she subsequently admitted that Barangay Captain Solis, et al. went to her house the day after the incident and talked to her about filing a case in connection with her husband's murder, which she refused to do. - If it is true that Leticia Bandarlipe actually saw her husband being shot by appellant, or that her dying husband told her that it was appellant who shot him, why did she not report what she saw and heard to the two barangay tanods, Gagaza and de Leon, who responded to her shouts for help; and, why was she reluctant to file a complaint against the gunman whom she allegedly saw shoot her husband. Her acts are contrary to the natural tendency of a witness closely related to the victim, to report a crime and describe the malefactor at the earliest possible opportunity. - As to prosecution witness Peralta, he merely learned of the shooting of Cipriano from the people who rushed to the scene of the crime. He did not in fact witness the shooting, but merely presumed it was appellant who shot the victim because he saw appellant carrying a gun near the vicinity of the crime scene - Given the alleged knowledge of Gagaza of certain vital facts surrounding the crime, it is highly surprising why the prosecution did not call him to testify if only to clarify why on the day the crime was committed, he caused the entry in the police blotter naming Feriamil as the main suspect in the murde - In the case at bar, there are pieces of evidence on record which, if properly considered, would certainly raise questions consistent with the proposition that the prosecution might have accused the wrong person, foremost of which is Barangay Captain Solis' testimony that Feriamil was the original suspect in the murder, and Leticia Bandarlipe's admission that Solis and Gagaza went to her house the day after her husband's murder to solicit her cooperation in the prosecution of Feriamil. Disposition Decision reversed

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PEOPLE V BASAY G.R. No. 86941 DAVIDE, JR.; March 3, 1993 (anton) NATURE Automatic appeal to the SC for penalty of life imprisonment (case: life imprisonment not provided in the RPC. It is not the same as reclusion perpetua) FACTS - Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez were charged with Multiple Murder with Arson in a criminal complaint filed on March 24, 1986 with the MCTC of Pamplona in Negros Oriental for allegedly killing the spouses Zosimo and Beatrice Toting and their six-year old daughter, Bombie, and for burning the said spouses' house to conceal the crime, resulting in the death of another daughter, Manolita. - April 15, 1986: the accused filed a Waiver of Preliminary Investigation, prompting the MCTC to forward the records to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. - August 14, 1986: the Integrated National Police (INP) Station Commander of Pamplona amended the complaint by including the name of another victim, Manolo Toting, who suffered second and third degree burns because of the burning of the house. - December 11, 1986: the Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental an Information for Multiple Murder and Frustrated Murder with Arson against the accused. - After both accused entered a not guilty plea during their arraignment on 23 February 1987, trial on the merits ensued. - December 15, 1988: the RTC promulgated its Decision acquitting accused Basay but convicting Ramirez. - The evidence for the prosecution upon which the decision is based is summarized in the RTCs decision, and contains the following: Zosimo Toting, Sr. Beatrice Toting, Manolita Toting and Manolo Toting were found near the vicinity of the burned house. About 40 meters away, the investigating officers found six year old Bombie

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Toting suffering from serious hack wounds (TSN, January 20, 1988, p. 18). The young girl said that she had been in this condition for one and a half days already. Bombie Toting related to Sgt. Tabanao that on March 4, 1986 at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant and Teodoro Basay killed her parents and burned their house (TSN, January 20, 1988, p. 18, Records, p. 9). Bombie died on March 7, 1986. Investigating Officers went to the appellants house, and when the latter saw them, he tried to run away. - Appellant was brought into the chamber of Judge Teopisto Calumpang, the MCTC judge of Pamplona on March 14, 1986. He was accompanied by Mr. Elpedio Catacutan who acted as appellant's counsel. They brought with them an affidavit previously typed by a police investigating officer. The Judge then made the court interpreter translate the allegations of the sworn statement into the local dialect for appellant. Thereafter, in the presence of the Judge, appellant and Mr. Catacutan signed the affidavit. Appellant and counsel also signed the vernacular translation of Exhibit F. - Queried on the joint waiver, Ramirez said he could not have read it because hes illiterate. When the waiver was read to him, he did not understand it because it was read in English. He reached only Grade II and knows only how to write his name. - The Exhibit "F" referred to is the Sworn Statement (in English) of accused Jaime Ramirez taken in the Pamplona police station on March 7, 1986 and subscribed and sworn to only on March 14, 1986 before Judge Teopisto L. Calumpang of the MCTC of Pamplona. The trial court described this document as the Extra-Judicial Confession of Ramirez. - The Joint Waiver mentioned in the testimony of Jaime Ramirez is in the Cebuano dialect and was signed by accused Basay and Ramirez on March 7, 1986. Both accused state therein that for their safety and security, they voluntarily decided to be detained and that they killed the spouses Zosimo Toting and Betty Toting and thereafter burned the spouses' house; that the fire resulted in the death of one and the hospitalization of two Toting children. - The trial court disregarded this Joint Waiver insofar as it tended to incriminate the accused "because when they signed said Joint Waiver, they were not represented by counsel. HOWEVER, it admitted in evidence the so-called extra-judicial confession of Jaime Ramirez, and considered as flight (which is indicative of guilt) when Ramirez ran away. It further ruled that the latter signed the extra-judicial confession voluntarily and in the presence of Elpedio Catacutan. - On the other hand, the trial court did not admit the statement of Bombie Toting as a dying declaration but merely as part of the res gestae because the prosecution failed to prove of the requisites for the admissibility of a dying declaration: that (1) the statement was given under consciousness of an impending death; and (2) that Bombie Toting is a competent witness. Appellants Claim - The so-called extra-judicial confession Exhibit "F" was executed in blatant disregard of his constitutional right to counsel and to remain silent during custodial investigation. It is therefore inadmissible in evidence; - Bombi Totings statement is "very doubtful and . . . no reasonable mind would conclude that she was candidly truthful. Prosecution - The appellant executed the extra-judicial confession voluntarily and without duress; - Bombies statement must be considered a dying declaration. ISSUE(S) 1. WON the extra-judicial confession signed by Ramirez is admissible. (NO) 2. WON Bombie Totings statement should be considered a dying declaration, and therefore admissible. (NO) 3. WON flight by Ramirez is indicative of guilt. (NO) HELD 1. NO Ratio Statements made during the period of custodial interrogation to be admissible require a clear intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. Reasoning Article III, Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the

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services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. - The purported extra-judicial confession belonging to appellant Jaime Ramirez and obtained during custodial interrogation was taken in blatant disregard of his right to counsel, to remain silent and to be informed of such rights, guaranteed by Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 (and 1987) Constitution. - No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it is in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. - Elpedio Catacutan was not yet a lawyer, only a barrister. Even if he were called on as counsel, he was not present during the custodial investigation. Securing counsel to help the accused when the latter subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late and had no palliative effect; it did not cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial investigation when the extra-judicial statement was being taken. 2. NO Ratio The trial court itself ruled that Bombie was not a competent witness. Her condition at the time she supposedly gave her statement made it impossible for her to have communicated effectively. Reasoning - Bombie suffered the following injuries: Infected hack wound from the right anterior lumbar area transecting mid abdomen, inguinal area left to the medial thigh left through and through, with necrotic transected muscle. - She was taken from the crime scene only on 6 March 1986, or 2 days after the commission of the crime, and died in the hospital on March 7, 1986. Dr. Edgar Cantalao (doctor who attended to Bombie before she died) testified that when he last saw Bombie alive, she could not talk. It was this inability to talk which led the trial court to express its doubts on the veracity of the latter's supposed statement. RTC:

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. . . Although persons of tender age are prone to tell the truth, however, the Court must be cautious in appreciating said testimony where the person had a serious wound and had not eaten for one day and one night. There is no evidence to show that Bombie Toting told the doctor as to who were the perpetrators of the crime; neither did she tell her own brother, Zosimo Toting, Jr. that it was the accused, Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez who killed her parents and her brother and sisters and burned their house. XXX Had the statement of Bombie Toting been made to the doctor or to the barangay captain or to any reputable member of the community where the incident happened, the Court will have to put weight and consider her statement as a dying declaration. Our experience has shown that persons in authority are prone to fabricate or misrepresent the facts to serve their own purpose. - Lastly, as a result of the foregoing observations, the trial court completely disregarded Bombie Toting's socalled statement as against Teodoro Basay. Therefore it should also not held against Jaime Ramirez. 3. NO Ratio While it may be true that the appellant ran away when he first saw the armed law officers, he did so merely out of fear of them. Reasoning - This act should not be considered as the flight which is indicative of guilt. The appellant had not left his house or barangay since 4 March 1986, the day the crime was committed. If he were indeed one of the perpetrators and had the intention to flee in order to avoid arrest, he should have vanished sooner and should not have remained in his house. - If indeed his running away could be construed as flight, it could only be considered as circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would still be insufficient for a conviction. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in order that circumstantial evidence may sustain a conviction, there must be, inter alia, more than one (1) circumstance. No other circumstance was established in this case. DISPOSITION Decision of the RTC is reversed, and Jaime Ramirez is acquitted. MARTURILLAS V PEOPLE G.R. No. 163217; PANGANIBAN; Apr 18, 2006 (marge) NATURE Petition for Review seeking to set aside [1] CA Decision affirming (with modifications as to the award of damages) the RTC Davao City Decision finding Celestino Marturillas (former Brgy Capt of Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City) guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 42091-98; and the CA resolution denying MR. FACTS [Yeah, I know this digest is very long. Sorry, but I assure you the case is even longer. The portions of the Courts ruling relevant to the topic in the outline have been italicized for easier reference. ^_^] Version of the Prosecution -Nov 4, 1998, abt 6pm: Cecilia Santos called her husband Lito and their neighbor and kumpare Artemio Pantinople for supper. After eating, Artemio returned to the bench in front of the Santos store and sat on it together with his three children. Lito was still eating supper in their kitchen when he heard a gunshot. From a distance of about 10meters, he also noticed smoke and fire coming from the muzzle of a big gun. Moments later, he saw Artemio clasping his chest and staggering backwards to the direction of Litos kitchen. Artemio shouted to him, Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan, (Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain). Lito did not approach Artemio right after the shooting incident because Cecilia warned him that he might also be shot. Lito did not see the person who shot Artemio because his attention was then focused on Artemio. -Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from her house towards the direction where Artemio was sprawled on the ground. Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting, Kapitan, bakit mo binaril and aking asawa. She also repeatedly cried for help. Lito then went out of their house and approached Artemio who was lying dead near a banana trunk more than 5meters from his house. Some of their neighbors answered Ernitas call for help and approached them. -When the shooting incident happened [abt 7:30pm], Litos house was illumined by a lamp. Their open-type kitchen (no walls) gave him an unobstructed view of Artemio who was about 5meters away from where he

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was positioned at that time. Although there was a gemilina tree growing in the space in between his house and the store of Artemio, the same did not block his view of Artemio. Likewise, the coconut trees and young banana plants growing at the scene of the crime did not affect his view. -At the same instance, Ernita was also in their kitchen preparing milk for her baby who was then lying on the floor of their kitchen. When she was about to put the bottle into the babys mouth, she suddenly heard the sound of a gunburst followed by a shout, Help me Pre, I was shot by the captain. She immediately pushed open the window of their kitchen and saw the accused wearing a black jacket and camouflage pants running towards the direction of the back portion of Litos house. From there, the accused crossed the street and disappeared. Ernita saw the accused carrying a long firearm which looked like an M-14 rifle and also sensed that accused had some companions with him because she heard the crackling sound of the dried leaves around the place. She had a clear view of accused at that time because their place was well-illumined by the full moon that night and by the two (2) fluorescent lamps in their store. She immediately went out of their house and ran towards Artemio who tried to speak to her but could not do so because his mouth was full of blood. She repeatedly called her neighbors for help; a few responded to her calls and approached them; no brgy tanod or any member of the CFO and CAFGU came to help. -While waiting for the police, Ernita did not allow Artemios body to be touched by anybody. After more than 2hours, [around 10pm] the police arrived, together with a photographer named Fe Mendez who took pictures of the crime scene. Ernita and Lito then approached PO2 Operario and informed him that accused was the one responsible for the shooting. PO2 Operario stayed at the crime scene for about 1hour and waited for the funeral vehicle to pick up the body of Artemio. When the funeral hearse arrived, PO2 Operario told the crew to load Artemios body into the vehicle. Thereafter, he then boarded again their mobile car together with Lito Santos. -Armed with the information that accused was the one responsible for the shooting of Artemio, PO2 Operario proceeded to the house of accused and informed him that he was a suspect in the killing of Artemio. He then invited accused to go with him to the police station and also to bring along with him his M-14 rifle. Accused did

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not say anything. He just got his M-14 rifle and went with the police to the police station where he was detained the whole night of Nov 4, 1998. Accused did not also give any statement to anybody about the incident. The following day, accused was transferred by the police to Tibungco Police Station where he was detained. -Alicia Pantinople, the 44-year old sister of Artemio, after learning about the incident and seeing his brother sprawled lifeless on the ground went around the Bunawan Police Station and noticed a locked door. When she peeped through the hole of the said door, she saw accused reclining on a bench about 2 meters away from the door. He was wearing a brown shirt, black jacket and a pair of camouflage pants. He was also wearing brown shoes but he had no socks on his feet. Seeing that the accused was tapping the floor with his right foot, Alicia confronted him, asking Nong Listing I know that you can recognize my voice. It is me. Why did you kill my brother? What has he done wrong to you? Accused did not answer her. -Nov 5, 1998: Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal officer of the Davao City Health Department, conducted an autopsy on Artemios cadaver. His Necropsy Report No. 76 summarized his findings to the effect that the cause of death was a gunshot wound entering at the anterior right side of the chest, perforating the body of the sternum, the heart and the upper lobe of the left lung, and forming an irregular exit at the posterior chest wall left side. During the trial, Dr. Ledesma explained that the trajectory of the bullet indicates that his assailant was in a lower position than Artemio when the gun was fired. Since the wound was negative of powder burns, the assailant must have been at a distance of more than twenty-four (24) inches when he fired his gun at Artemio. He did not also find any bullet slug inside the body of Artemio indicating that the bullet went through Artemios body. Artemios heart and lungs were lacerated and his stomach contained partially digested food particles indicating that he had just eaten his meal when he was shot. Version of the Defense: -Nov 4, 1998, abt 8:30 pm: Marturillas was roused from his sleep by his wife since two brgy kagawads wanted to see him. Dazed after just having risen from bed, he was rubbing his eyes when he met the two Kagawads inside his house. He was informed that a resident of his barangay, Artemio Pantinople, had just been shot. At once, he ordered his Kagawads to assemble the members of the SCAA (Special Civilian Armed Auxiliary) so that they could be escorted to the crime scene some 250 meters away. As soon as the SCAAs were contacted, they then proceeded to the crime scene to determine what assistance they could render. -While approaching the store owned by the Pantinoples and not very far from where the deceased lay sprawled, Marturillas and his team was met by Ernita Pantinople who was very mad and belligerent, immediately accusing him of having shot her husband instead of Lito Santos who was his enemy. Marturillas was taken aback by the instant accusation against him. Not being able to talk sense with Ernita, he and his companions backed off to avoid a heated confrontation. They decided to go back to his house. -Upon reaching his house, he instructed Kagawad Jimmy Balugo to contact the Bunawan Police Station and inform them what transpired. Not knowing the radio frequency of the local police, Kagawad Balugo instead radioed officials of nearby Brgy San Isidro requesting them to contact the Bunawan PNP for police assistance since someone was shot in their locality. Moments later, PO2 Mariano Operario and another police officer arrived at Marturillas house, informing him that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio Pantinople. Upon their invitation, Marturillas immediately went with the said police officers for questioning at the Bunawan Police Station, taking with him his government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition which he turned over for safe keeping with the Bunawan PNP. Such fact is reflected in Bunawan PNPs police blotter to have occurred at around 10:45 pm, Nov 4, 1998. -Nov 5, 1998: Marturillas was subjected to paraffin testing by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Davao City. The next day, the PNP Crime Laboratory released Physical Sciences Report No. C-074-98 finding Marturillas NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates. -On this same day, PO2 Operario, after preparing all the affidavits of Ernita Pantinople and her witnesses, prepared and transmitted a Complaint to the City Prosecution Office recommending that Marturillas be indicted for Murder. [see case for full text of the affidavits]. On the basis of these affidavits, then 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Raul B. Bendigo issued a Resolution finding sufficient evidence to indict Accused for the crime of Homicide and not Murder as alleged in the Affidavit-Complaint.

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-Defense witness Ronito Bedero testified that on the night Artemio Pantinople was shot, he was at his house and he saw an unidentified armed man flee from the crime scene who later joined two other armed men near a nangka tree not far from where deceased was shot. All three later fled on foot towards the direction of the Purok Center in Brgy Gatungan. He noticed that one of the three men was armed with a rifle but could not make out their identities since the area where the three men converged was a very dark place. After the three men disappeared, he saw from the opposite direction Marturillas and his team of kagawads and 3 SCAA members going to the scene of the crime but they did not reach the crime scene. A little later, he saw the Marturillas group return to where they came from. -Dominador Lapiz testified that he was one of the first persons who went to the crime scene where he personally saw the body of deceased lying at a very dark portion some distance from the victims house and that those with him at that time even had to light the place with a lamp so that they could clearly see the deceased. He also testified that there were many coconut and other trees and bananas in the crime scene. He also testified that the house of Lito Santos was only about 4meters from the crime scene, while the house of victim-Artemio Pantinople was about FIFTY (50) meters away. He testified that there was no lighted fluorescent at the store of deceased at the time of the shooting. His testimony also revealed that when the responding policemen arrived, Lito Santos immediately approached the policemen, volunteered himself as a witness and even declared that he would testify that it was Marturillas who shot Artemio Pantinople. He further testified that immediately after he went to the crime scene, the widow of the victim and the children were merely shouting and crying and it was only after the policemen arrived that the widow uttered in a loud voice, Kapitan nganong gipatay mo ang akong bana? Ruling of RTC and CA: -The guilt of petitioner had been established beyond reasonable doubt. He was positively identified as the one running away from the crime scene immediately after the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of the victim himself that he had been shot by the captain, clearly established the latters complicity in the crime. -No ill motive could be ascribed to the prosecution witnesses. Thus, their positive, credible and unequivocal testimonies were accepted as sufficient to

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establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. -Both courts also rejected Marturillas defenses of denial and alibi, saying these were necessarily suspect, especially when established by friends or relatives, and should thus be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. At any rate, alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses found to be more credible. Hence, this Petition. ISSUES 1. WON the prosecutions evidence is credible. 2. WON the evidence is sufficient to convict him of homicide. HELD 1. YES. Basic is the rule that the Supreme Court accords great weight and a high degree of respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA. Although there are recognized exceptions to the conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the trial and the appellate courts, petitioner has not convinced this Court of the existence of any. Re: Positive Identification -Ernitas testimony that she saw Marturillas at the crime scene is credible because the spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from her house. Undoubtedly, Ernita is familiar with the accused, who is her neighbor, and a long-time brgy capt of the locality when the incident took place. Ernita was also able to see his face while he was running away from the crime scene. The identification of a person can be established through familiarity with ones physical features. Once a person has gained familiarity with one another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance. Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural communities generally know each other both by face and name, and can be expected to know each others distinct and particular features and characteristics. -Ernitas recognition of the assailant was made possible by the lighted two fluorescent lamps in their store and by the full moon. In corroboration, Lito testified that the place where the shooting occurred was bright. The trees and plants growing in between Ernitas house and the place where Artemio was shot to death did not impede her view of the assailant. To be sure, the prosecution presented photographs of the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinities. These photographs gave a clear picture of the place where Artemio was shot. Admittedly, there are some trees and plants growing in between the place where the house of Ernita was located and the spot where Artemio was shot. Notably, however, there is only one gemilina tree, some coconut trees and young banana plants growing in the place where Artemio was shot. The trees and banana plants have slender trunks which could not have posed an obstacle to Ernitas view of the crime scene from the kitchen window of her house especially so that she was in an elevated position. -Given the proper conditions, the illumination produced by a kerosene lamp, a flashlight, a wick lamp, moonlight, or starlight is considered sufficient to allow the identification of persons. In this case, the full moon and the light coming from two fluorescent lamps of a nearby store were sufficient to illumine the place where petitioner was; and to enable the eyewitness to identify him as the person who was present at the crime scene. Settled is the rule that when conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Even where the circumstances were less favorable, the familiarity of Ernita with the face of petitioner considerably reduced any error in her identification of him. Neither was there any indication that Ernita was impelled by ill motives in positively identifying petitioner. Re: Inconsistency Between Affidavit and Testimony -Although Ernita stated in her testimony that she had recognized the victim as her husband through his voice, it cannot necessarily be inferred that she did not see him. Although she recognized him as the victim, she was still hoping that it was not really he. Thus, the statement in her Affidavit that she was surprised to see that her husband was the victim of the shooting. Ex parte affidavits are usually incomplete, as these are frequently prepared by administering officers and cast in their language and understanding of what affiants have said. Nevertheless, the alleged inconsistency is inconsequential to the ascertainment of the presence of petitioner at the crime scene. They referred only to that point wherein Ernita ascertained the identity of Artemio as the victim. They did not relate to Ernitas identification of petitioner as the person running away from the crime scene immediately after she heard a gunshot.

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Re: Statements Uttered Contemporaneous with the Crime -It was to be expected that, after seeing the victim stagger and hearing the cry for help, Santos would shift his attention to the person who had uttered the plea Help me pre, I was shot by the captain. A shift in his focus of attention would sufficiently explain why Santos was not able to see the assailant. Santos never pointed to petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime. His statements corroborated those of Ernita and therefore simply added credence to the prosecutions version of the facts. If it were true that he had an ulterior motive, it would have been very easy for him to say that he had seen petitioner shoot the victim. Re: Dying Declaration -Rule 130.37: The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. -Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of death, are entitled to the highest degree of credence and respect. Persons aware of an impending death have been known to be genuinely truthful in their words and extremely scrupulous in their accusations. The dying declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who knows of ones impending death will make a careless and false accusation. Hence, not infrequently, pronouncements of guilt have been allowed to rest solely on the dying declaration of the deceased victim. -To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarants death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death; 3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that person been called upon to testify. -The law does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death. The perception may be established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the declarants injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of impending death. Even if

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the declarant did not make an explicit statement of that realization, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full consciousness of being in a dying condition. -As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the victim was complete, as it was a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning. It [was] complete and [was] not merely fragmentary. Testified to by his wife and neighbor, his dying declaration was not only admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and telling piece of evidence. Re: Res Gestae -The fact that the victims statement constituted a dying declaration does not preclude it from being admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of both are present. -Rule 130.42: Part of the res gestae. -- Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. -Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation. -A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, when the following requisites concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. -All these requisites are present in this case. The principal act, the shooting, was a startling occurrence. Immediately after, while he was still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, the victim made the declaration without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating petitioner. Also, the declaration concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the latters statement was correctly appreciated as part of the res gestae. -Aside from the victims statement, that of Ernita -Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akong bana? (Captain, why did you shoot my husband?) -- may be considered to be in the same category. Her statement was about the same startling occurrence; it was uttered spontaneously, right after the shooting, while she had no opportunity to concoct a story against petitioner; and it related to the circumstances of the shooting. 2. YES. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain the conviction of petitioner. The dying declaration made by the victim immediately prior to his death constitutes evidence of the highest order as to the cause of his death and of the identity of the assailant. This damning evidence, coupled with the proven facts presented by the prosecution, leads to the logical conclusion that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. SC considered the ff: a. Santos testified that he had heard a gunshot; and seen smoke coming from the muzzle of a gun, as well as the victim staggering backwards while shouting, Help me pre, I was shot by the captain. b. Ernita testified that she had heard a gunshot and her husbands utterance, Help me pre, I was shot by the captain, then saw petitioner in a black jacket and camouflage pants running away from the crime scene while carrying a firearm. c. Ernitas statement, Captain, why did you shoot my husband? was established as part of the res gestae. d. The version of the events given by petitioner is simply implausible. As the incumbent barangay captain, it should have been his responsibility to go immediately to the crime scene and investigate the shooting. If he were really innocent, he should not have simply left. e. The prosecution was able to establish motive on the part of petitioner. The victims wife positively testified that prior to the shooting, her husband was trying to close a real estate transaction which petitioner tried to

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block. This showed petitioners antagonism towards the victim. -These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was petitioner who shot and killed the victim. Where an eyewitness saw the accused with a gun seconds after the gunshot and the victims fall, the reasonable conclusion is that the accused had killed the victim. -To be sure, conviction in a criminal case does not require a degree of proof that, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. That some pieces of the above-mentioned evidence are circumstantial does not diminish the fact that they are of a nature that would lead the mind intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, toward the conviction of petitioner. Circumstantial, vis--vis direct, evidence is not necessarily weaker. Re: Paraffin Test & Corpus Delicti - The negative paraffin test result and the prosecutions failure to present the gun used in the shooting is not enough to exculpate the accused from the crime. The choice of what evidence to present, or who should testify as a witness is within the discretionary power of the prosecutor and definitely not of the courts to dictate. -A negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. It is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when culprits wear gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or are bathed in perspiration. -The prosecution was able to give sufficient proof of the corpus delicti -- the fact that a crime had actually been committed. [Corpus delicti] is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide with the use of unlicensed firearms, to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom, or x x x to the seized contraband cigarettes. Re: Alibi -As held by the CA: [Petitioners] alibi is utterly untenable. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Here, the locus criminis was only several meters away from [petitioners] home. In any event, this defense

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cannot be given credence in the face of the credible and positive identification made by Ernita. Disposition Petition is denied. Assailed Decision and Resolution are affirmed with modifications. [SC reviewed amount of damages, since an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review. SC awarded P50k as indemnity ex delicto, P25k for temperate damages, P50k for moral damages, P312k for loss of earning capacity, P20k for attorneys fees, plus costs.] Declaration Against Interest PEOPLE V TOLEDO August 6, 1928; MALCOLM, J. (lora) NATURE Appeal taken by Eugenio Toledo from a judgment of the CFI of Mindoro, finding him guilty of the crime of homicide. FACTS - Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation of certain land situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. - One morning, the two men happened to meet. The argument was renewed, and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales, who was killed almost instantly. - Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. From there Sisenando Holgado was taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn statement before the municipal president, in which he declared that only he and Filomeno Morales fought. About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight. - The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined. The disputable point is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno Morales. For the prosecution, there was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified to the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave. - On the other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo was in another place when the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only participation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of the accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado. The defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the municipal president of Pinamalayan. ISSUE WON the lower court erred in not admitting the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado HELD - The discussion of the case in court has revealed three different points of view among the members participating, all leading to the same result of acquittal. - Chief and Mr. Justice Villamor: Disregarded and refrained from all discussion relative to the admissibility of Exhibit 1. Confining themselves exclusively to an analysis of the evidence other than Exhibit 1, they find that Eugenio Toledo has not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In reality, there being but one witness for the prosecution who, on account of her relations with Filomeno Morales, and the land troubles, might be expected to exaggerate, and there being on the contrary exculpatory evidence for the defense, even without Exhibit 1, the Government has not made out its case. - Justices Romualdez and Villa-Real: Exhibit 1 should have been admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae, and that giving it effect, in relation with the other evidence, the accused has not been proved guilty. Exhibit 1 was made by Sisenando Holgado on the same morning that the fight occurred and without the interval of sufficient time for reflection. The declaration of Sisenando Holgado fulfilled the test of the facts talking through the party and not the party talking about the facts. There was such a correlation between the statement and the fact of which it forms part as strongly tends to negative the suggestion of fabrication or a suspicion of afterthought. The nature and circumstances of the statement do not disclose intrinsic evidence of premeditation as revealed in a long, coherent, closely connected story. The modern

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tendency is toward the extension of the rule admitting spontaneous declarations to meet the needs of justice when other evidence of the same fact cannot be procured. - Justices Street, Malcolm, and Ostrand: the court erred in not admitting Exhibit 1 as the statement of a fact against penal interest. Had Exhibit 1 been received, it is believed that its influence would have been felt by the trial court. Without Exhibit 1, the appellate court is bound by the appreciation of the evidence made in the trial court, and could, with little propriety, set aside the findings made by a learned trial judge. The case calls for an examination of the right of the courts to receive in evidence documents of the character of Exhibit 1. - Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said on high authority, is excluded by courts in the United States that adhere to the principles of the common law. One universally recognized exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits the reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to their own pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be that the declarations of a person other than accused confessing or tending to show that he committed the crime are not competent for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine. - Professor Wigmore attempted to demonstrate the false premises on which the arbitrary limitation to the hearsay rule rests. He shows that the limitation is inconsistent with the language originally employed in stating the principle and is unjustified on grounds of policy. - Donnelly vs. United States: The rues of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common sense, less hampered by history than some parts of the substantive law. There is no decision by this court against the admissibility of such a confession; the English cases since the separation of the two countries do not bind us; the exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations against interest is well known; no other statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder; it is far more calculated to convince than dying declarations, which would be let in to hang a man; and when we surround the accused with so many safeguards, some of which seem to me excessive; I think we ought to give him the benefit of a fact that, if proved, commonly would have such weight. The history of the law and the arguments against the

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English doctrine are so well and fully stated by Mr. Wigmore that there is no need to set them forth at greater length. - In the Philippine jurisdiction, the Court have never felt bound to follow blindly the principles of the common law. A reexamination of some of those principles discloses anomalies. - A dying declaration is admitted of necessity in order, as the Supreme Court of Mississippi states, "to reach those man slayers who perpetrate their crimes when there are no other eyewitnesses." But the person accused of a crime, under the same principle of necessity, is not permitted to free himself by offering in evidence the admission of another under oath that this other committed the crime. Again admissions are receivable against either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, but not against a penal interest. We fail to see why it can be believed that a man will be presumed to tell the truth in the one instance but will not be presumed to tell the truth in the other instance. Again the exhibit would have been admitted against its maker at his trial, if he had not died. But the document is held inadmissible to exonerate another. Yet the truth of the exhibit is not different in the first case that in the second. - A study of the authorities discloses that even if given application they are not here controlling. Most of them do not concern the confessions of declarants shown to be deceased. Practically all of them give as the principal reason for denying the admission of a confession of a third person that he committed the crime with which the accused is charged, that it was not made under oath. Here the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath. They also read in such a way as to ring with the truth. When Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody present," it was at the end of just such a rambling statement as a wounded man would be expected to make. When Sisenando Holgado declared "I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by the municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been received not as conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection with the other proven facts. - Professor Wigmore: PAR. 1476. History of the Exception; Statement of Fact against Penal Interest, excluded; Confessions of Crime by a Third Person. It is today commonly said, and has been expressly laid down by many judges, that the interest prejudiced by the facts stated must be either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, and not a penal interest. What ground in authority there is for this limitation may be found by examining the history of the execution at large. The exception appears to have taken its rise chiefly in two separate rivulets of rulings, starting independently as a matter of practice, but afterwards united as parts of a general principle. . . . - These lines of precedent proceeded independently till about the beginning of the 1800s, when a unity of principle for some of them came gradually to be perceived and argued for. This unity lay in the circumstance that all such statements, in that they concerned matters prejudicial to the declarant's selfinterest, were fairly trustworthy and might therefore (if he were deceased) be treated as forming an exception to the hearsay rule. - This broad principle made its way slowly. There was some uncertainty about its scope; but it was an uncertainty in the direction of breadth; for it was sometimes put in the broad form that any statement by a person "having no interest to deceive" would be admissible. This broad form never came to prevail. But acceptance was gained, after two decades, for the principle that all declarations of facts against interest (by deceased persons) were to be received. What is to be noted, then, is that from 1800 to about 1830 this was fully understood as the broad scope of the principle. It was thus stated without other qualifications; and frequent passages show the development of the principle to this point. - But in 1884, in a case in the House of Lords, not strongly argued and not considered by the judges in the light of the precedents, a backward step was taken and an arbitrary limit put upon the rule. It was held to exclude the statement of a fact subjecting the declarant to a criminal liability, and to confined to statements of facts against either pecuniary or proprietary interest. Thenceforward this rule was accepted in England; although it was plainly a novelty at the time of its inception; for in several rulings up to that time such statement had been received. - The same attitude has been taken by most American courts, excluding confessions of a crime, or other statements of facts against penal interest, made by third persons; although there is not wanting authority in favor of admitting such statements.

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- PAR. 1477. Same: Policy of this Limitation. It is plain enough that this limitation, besides being a fairly modern novelty, is inconsistent with the broad language originally employed in stating the reason and principle of the present exception (ante, pars. 1457, 1476) as well as with the settled principle upon which confessions are received (ante, par. 1475). - But, furthermore, it cannot be justified on grounds of policy. The only plausible reason of policy that has ever been advanced for such a limitation is the possibility of procuring fabricated testimony to such a admission if oral. This is the ancient rusty weapon that has always been drawn to oppose any reform in the rules of evidence, viz., the argument of danger of abuse. This would be a good argument against admitting any witnesses at all, for it is notorious that some witnesses will lie and that it is difficult to avoid being deceived by their lies. The truth is that any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerating himself is a bad rule, even if it also hampers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent. - The only practical consequences of this unreasoning limitation are shocking to the sense of justice; for, in its commonest application, it requires, in a criminal trial, the rejection of a confession, however well authenticated, of a person deceased or insane or fled from the jurisdiction (and therefore quite unavailable) who has avowed himself to be true culprit. The absurdity and wrong of rejecting indiscriminately all such evidence is patent. - The rulings already in our books cannot be thought to involve a settled and universal acceptance of this limitation. In the first place, in almost all of the rulings the declarant was not shown to be deceased or otherwise unavailable as a witness, and therefore the declaration would have been inadmissible in any view of the present exception (ante, par. 1456). Secondly, in some of the rulings (for example, in North Carolina) the independent doctrine (ante, pars. 139-141) was applicable that, in order to prove the accused's noncommission of the offense by showing commission by another person, not merely one casual piece of evidence suffices but a "prima facie" case resting on several concurring pieces of evidence must be made out. Finally, most of the early rulings had in view, not the present exception to the hearsay rule, but the doctrine of admissions (ante, pars. 1076, 1079) that the admissions of one who is not a co-conspirator cannot affect others jointly charged.

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- It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to discard this barbarous doctrine, which would refuse to let an innocent accused vindicate himself even by producing to the tribunal a perfectly authenticated written confession, made on the very gallows, by the rule culprit now beyond the reach of justice. Those who watched (in 1899) with self-righteous indignation the course of proceedings in Captain Dreyfus' trial should remember that, if that trial had occurred in our own courts, the spectacle would have been no less shameful if we, following our own supposed precedents, had refused to admit what the French court never for a moment hesitated to admit, the authenticated confession of the escaped Major Esterhazy, avowing himself the guilty author of the treason there charged. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., secs. 1476, 1477.) - Editor of L. R. A. in his note in volume 37: The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence. So long therefore as a declarant is available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard. Where, however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on other grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable, something else is necessary. One fact which will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's interest, and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment. - Again, if, seems indisputable, the desire to close the door to falsehood which cannot be detected dictates the exclusion of such testimony, the question as to the effect to be given to such a confession is solely one of weight and credibility. . . . - Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence, and cumulative authority, would say that if a man deliberately acknowledged himself to be the perpetrator of a crime and exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there was other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused man should not be permitted to go to prison or to the electric chair to expiate a crime he never committed. Shall Judges trained and experienced in the law display less discerning common sense that the layman and allow precedent to overcome truth? Disposition Judgment appealed reversed and defendant acquitted and an order will immediately issue directing his release. FUENTES JR. VS CA G.R. No. 111692 Bellosillo; February 9, 1996 (mel) NATURE Petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder. FACTS At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair." 2 Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him. The victim, as per report of the Rural Health Physician, died out of the stab wound (at the left lumbar region). Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that when the victim was killed he was conversing with him; that he was compelled to run away when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear would "kill all those from San Isidro" because "Jonie," the killer, was from that place; that since he was also from San Isidro he sought refuge in his brother's house where he met "Jonie;" that "Jonie" admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match before the latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were many persons milling around the house "Jonie" jumped out and escaped through the window; that he was arrested

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at eight o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay. The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. *In this case, Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against penal interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo testified that on 24 June 1989 while he was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed Malaspina in "retaliation;" that he even showed him the knife he used and asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives of the deceased. The following day however he learned that the selfconfessed killer was gone and that petitioner had been arrested for a crime he did not commit. For his part, Station Commander P/Sgt. Conde, Jr., testified that after the criminal information for murder was filed on 26 July 1989, petitioner met Felicisimo who informed him of the disclosure by Zoilo. Conde then advised Felicisimo that if it was true that it was Zoilo who fatally stabbed Malaspina Felicisimo must persuade Zoilo to surrender. Conde then personally went to Barangay San Isidro to investigate. There he was told by the townsfolk that Zoilo had already fled. ISSUE WON the admission against penal interest allegedly made by Zoilo Fuentes can be accepted in this case HELD NO RATIO One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true,

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may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness. There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed. REASONING For all its attempt to demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the rejection in certain cases of declarations against penal interest, the Toledo case (SUPRA) cannot be applied in the instant case which is remarkably different. Consider this factual scenario: the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accusedappellant, verbally admitted to the latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the victim because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking feature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to accusedappellant had every motive to prevaricate. The same can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo. Secondly, we need not resort to legal rhetorics to find that the admission of such a statement may likewise be, according to Wigmore, "shocking to the sense of justice." Let us assume that the trial court did admit the statement of Zoilo and on that basis acquitted accused-appellant. Let us assume further that Zoilo was subsequently captured and upon being confronted with his admission of guilt readily repudiated the same. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that can bind Zoilo legally to that statement. But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify. Thus, for this case at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse as explained in Toledo The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from finding petitioner ALEJANDRO FUENTES JR. guilty of MURDER and directing him to indemnify the heirs of Julieto Malaspina in the amount of P50,000.00 plus costs is AFFIRMED

A2010

The defense asserts that Openda, Jr. was a drug-pusher who was arrested by the police, and thus not kidnapped. TC: Bernal guilty beyond kidnapping Openda, Jr. reasonable doubt weight of to

Bernal: TC committed error in giving prosecutions witnesses testimony. SC: No error. TC affirmed.

Bernal conspired with the two Does. Proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only. The circumstances here sufficiently indicate Bernals participation. Circumstance A Testimony of Sagario, Bernals childhood friend and neighbor: He saw Bernal at the billiard hall at 11am with two companions. He overheard Bernal dispatch one of his companions to Tarsings Store to check if a certain person is still there, which person turned out to be Openda, Jr. Upon confirmation of Openda, Jr.s presence, the three men left the billiard hall. Minutes later, a handcuffed Openda, Jr. passed by the billiard hall with Bernals companions. Circumstance B Testimony of Racasa, Bernals neighbor and compadre, who narrated the facts as found by the TC. Circumstance C Testimony of Enriquez, a tailor and Openda, Jr.s friend: That sometime in January 1991 Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernals wife Naty were having an affair. SC: Natys infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge. Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction. Openda. Jr.s revelation to Enriquez is admissible in evidence as a declaration against interest which has the following requisites:

PEOPLE V THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN & PETER DOE (June 19, 97) Romero [maem] Facts accdg to TC: Around 11:30am of August 1991 Rasaca and Openda, Jr. are drinking. The two invited Bernal who was passing by. After a few minutes Bernal leaves, saying he has to fetch his son. After Bernal left, two men (the Does) arrived, approached Openda, Jr. asking him if he was Payat. When Openda, Jr. said yes, one of the two men suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other handcuffed Openda, Jr. who was told not to run because theyre policemen and he had a score to settle with them. With that they hastily took him away. The prosecution established through Enriquez testimony (which includes Openda, Jr.s declaration against his own interest) that Bernal kidnapped Openda, Jr. because the latter had an illicit affair with Bernals wife Naty.

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That the declarant is dead or unable to testify; [Here, Openda, Jr. had been missing since abduction, thus he is deemed unable to testify.] his parents (the late Florentino and Susana) to move in so that the couple could supervise the construction of the house and to safeguard the materials. When the second storey was completed, he allowed the Parels and their children to temporarily live in the house out of sheer magnanimity because Florentino was his brotherin-law. - November 1985 Prudencio wrote Florentino, asking the latter to vacate the house as the former was due for retirement. This request was acceded to by Florentino and Susana when they migrated to the US in 1986. - Without Prudencios knowledge, Parel and family unlawfully entered the house and took possession of the ground floor. They refused to leave despite Prudencios demands which prompted the respondent to institute an action for recovery. Prudencio also asked for a monthly rental of P3,000 from April 1988 until Parel vacates the house. - In his counterclaim, Parel alleges that his parents are the co-owners of the said house. He claim that he occupied the ground floor of the house with his father Florentinos knowledge. - The RTC found that the house was co-owned by Florentino and Prudencio thus the latter cannot evict Parel. The RTC found that: - Florentino was an allocatee of the land on which the subject house was erected, as one of the lowly-paid government employees at that time when then Mayor Luis Lardizabal gave them the chance to construct their own house on said reservation. - Prudencio failed to show proof of any contract, written or oral, express or implied, that Florentino and his family stayed on the house not as co-owners but as mere lessees, nor any other proof that would clearly establish his sole ownership of the house. - Prudencio and Florentino agreed to contribute their money to complete the house. Since the land on which said house was erected has been allocated to Florentino, the parties had the understanding that once the house was completed, Florentino could keep the ground floor while Prudencio could have the second floor. - The RTC did not give credence to the tax declaration as well as the several documents showing the City Assessors assessment of the

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property all in Prudencios name since tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership. - Upon appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC decision. The CA found as meritorious Prudencios contention that since petitioner failed to formally offer in evidence any documentary evidence, there is nothing to refute the evidence offered by respondent. - It ruled that the trial courts statement that Parels occupancy of the house is due to a special power of attorney executed by his parents most specially the deceased Florentino Parel who is in fact a co-owner of said building" is wanting of any concrete evidence on record. - The said power of attorney was never offered, hence, could not be referred to as evidence to support Parels claim. - Except for the bare testimonies of Candelario Regua, the carpenter-foreman, that it was Florentino who constructed the house and Corazon Garcia, the former barangay captain, who testified that the lot was allocated to Florentino, there was no supporting document which would sufficiently establish factual bases for the TCs conclusion; and that the rule on offer of evidence is mandatory. - An affidavit dated September 24, 1973 was issued by Florentino. The said affidavit stated that Prudencio, not Florentino, was the owner of the house. The CA found the affidavit to be conclusive proof of Prudencios sole ownership of the house since it was a declaration made by Florentino against his interest. - The CA also found the tax declarations and official receipts representing payments of real estate taxes of the questioned property covering the period 1974 to 1992 sufficient to establish Prudencios case which constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. ISSUES WON Parel was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that his father was a co-owner of the subject two-storey residential house HELD YES

That it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; [With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present provision, it is safe to assume that interest has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal here, the affair with Naty was a crime.] That at the time he made said declaration, the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his interest; [Openda, Jr. advised Naty not to do it {giving him money for motel} again because she was a married woman.] That the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true. [No sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.] Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself.

PAREL V PRUDENCIO G.R. 146556 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; April 19, 2006 (aida) NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - February 27, 1992 Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Parel. Prudencio alleged that he owned a two-storey residential house in Baguio City, the construction of which was funded by his own money and declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 47048. The construction began in 1972 and was completed after three years. - In 1973, when the second storey of the house was undergoing construction, Prudencio allowed Parels

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Reasoning - The building plan of the residential house dated January 16, 1973 was in the name of respondent and his wife. It was established during petitioners crossexamination that the existing structure of the twostorey house was in accordance with said building plan. - Court reasoning relevant to declaration against interest - The rule on declaration against interest is in Rule 130, Sec. 38. - The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest. - In said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that while he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who is residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his childrens interests as his heirs. A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. - Notably, during Florentinos lifetime, from 1973 (the year he executed said affidavit) until 1989 (the year of his death), there is no showing that he had revoked such affidavit even when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed by respondent against him and his son. - While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The house which Parel claims to be coowned by Florentino had been consistently declared for taxation purposes in the name of Prudencio, and this fact, taken with the other circumstances abovementioned, inexorably lead to the conclusion that respondent is the sole owner of the house subject matter of the litigation. - Court reasoning as to offer of evidence - The rule on offer of evidence is in Rule 132, Sec. 34. - The records show that although Parels counsel asked that he be allowed to offer his documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file the same. Thus, the CA did not consider the documentary evidence presented by petitioner. - A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a settled rule that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. Petitioner insists that although his documentary evidence were not formally offered, the same were marked during the presentation of the testimonial evidence, thus it can properly be taken cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v. Borja. - The reliance in Bravo v. Borja is misplaced. In Bravo, the Court allowed evidence on minority by admitting the certified true copy of the birth certificate attached to a motion for bail even if it was not formally offered in evidence. This was due to the fact that the birth certificate was properly filed in support of a motion for bail to prove petitioners minority which was never challenged by the prosecution and it already formed part of the records of the case. The rule referred to in the Bravo case was Section 7 of Rule 133 of the RoC and not Section 34 of Rule 132. - The testimonies of Parel and his witnesses failed to show that the subject house is co-owned by Florentino and respondent. Disposition Judgment affirmed.

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Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 ROC FACTS: - PFPI is a domestic corporation engaged in the publication of Philippine Free Press Magazine, a widely circulated political magazine. It enjoyed considerable prestige and a high profit margin prior to the declaration of Martial Law. Its main office was in Pasong Tamo, Makati. - During the 1965 elections, PFPI supported Diosdado Macapagal against Ferdinand Marcos. Upon the election of Marcos and prior to Martial law, PFPI printed numerous articles highly critical of the Marcos administration, exposing the corruption and abuses of the regime. PFPI likewise ran a series of articles exposing the plan of the Marcoses to impose a dictatorship in the guise of Martial Law. - In the evening of Sept 20, 1972, soldiers surrounded the Free Press Building, forced out its employees at gunpoint and padlocked the said establishment. The soldier in charge informed Teodoro Locsin, Jr., son of Teodoro Locsin, Sr., President of PFPI, that Martial Law had been declared and that they were to take over the building and to close the printing press. - On Sept 21, 1972, Locsin, Sr. was arrested, brought to Camp Crame, and subsequently transferred to Fort Bonifacio. - In Dec, 1972, Locsin, Sr. was informed that no charges were to be filed against him and that he was to be provisionally released subject to the following conditions: (1) he remained (sic) under city arrest; xxx (5) he was not to publish the Philippine Free Press nor was he to do, say or write anything critical of the Marcos administration. - Consequently, publication of the Philippine Free Press ceased. The building remained padlocked and under heavy military guard. This led to the financial ruin of PFPI. Its situation was further aggravated when its employees demanded the payment of separation pay. Its minority stockholders also made demands that Locsin, Sr. buy out their shares. - On separate occasions in 1973, Locsin, Sr. was approached by Atty. Crispin Baizas with offers from Pres Marcos for the acquisition of PFPI. Locsin, Sr. refused. A few months later, Sec Guillermo De Vega, reiterated Marcoss offer to purchase the name and the assets of PFPI. - mid-1973, Brig. Gen. Hans Menzi, former aide-decamp of Pres Marcos, contacted Locsin, Sr. concerning

PHILIPPINE FREE PRESS, INC v CA (LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING, INC) G.R. No. 132864 GARCIA; Oct 24, 2005 (kooky) NATURE:

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the sale of PFPI. A meeting was held inside the PFPI Building, wherein Menzi reiterated Marcoss offer to purchase both the name and assets of PFPI, adding that Marcos cannot be denied. Locsin, Sr. refused but Menzi insisted that he had no choice but to sell. Locsin, Sr. then made a counteroffer that he will sell the land, building and all the machineries and equipment but he will be allowed to keep the name of PFPI. Menzi thereafter informed Locsin, Sr. that Pres Marcos was amenable to his counteroffer, and is offering P5.75M on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. - Aug 22, 1973, Menzi tendered to Locsin, Sr. a check for P1M, downpayment for the sale. Locsin, Sr. accepted the check, subject to the condition that he will refund the same in case the sale will not push through. On Aug 23, 1973, the Board of Directors of PFPI held a meeting and reluctantly passed a resolution authorizing Locsin, Sr. to sell the assets of its to Menzi minus the name Philippine Free Press. - On Oct 23, 1973, the parties met and executed two notarized Deeds of Sale covering the land, building and the machineries of the PFPI. Menzi paid the P4.75M balance. - Locsin, Sr. thereafter used the proceeds of the sale to pay the separation pay of PFPIs employees, buy out the shares of the minority stockholders as well as to settle all its obligations. - On Feb 26, 1987, PFPI filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale against Liwayway and PCGG before RTC on the grounds of vitiated consent and gross inadequacy of purchase price. On motion of PCGG, complaint was dismissed on Oct 22, 1987. - On Oct 31, 1995, TC dismissed PFPIs complaint and granted Liwayways counterclaim of attorneys fees. - CA affirmed w/ modification, deleting award of attorneys fees. ISSUES: WON the lower court erred in dismissing PFPIs complaint a. WON PFPIs cause of action has already prescribed b. WON PFPI was able to establish the force, intimidation, duress and undue influence which vitiated its consent c. WON the purchase price was grossly inadequate such as to show vitiation of consent d. WON PFPIs use of the proceeds of the sale constitute an implied ratification HELD NO a. On Prescription: YES, the action has prescribed. - CA ruled the 4-year prescriptive period started to run when the deeds were executed (Oct 1973). PFPI contends, however, that it should start on Feb 25, 1986 (People Power), on the theory that martial law has the effects of force majeure, which works to suspend the running of the prescriptive period. - SC: Martial Law did not suspend the running of the period. PFPI has failed to convincingly prove that it was so circumstanced that it was well-nigh impossible for it to successfully institute an action during the martial law years. b. On vitiation of consent: NO, PCPI has not established it. - PFPI ascribes the following errors to CA: 1. in considering as hearsay the testimonial evidence that may prove the element of "threat" against petitioner or Locsin, Sr., and the dictatorial regime's use of Liwayway as a corporate vehicle for forcibly acquiring petitioners properties; 2. in concluding that the acts of then President Marcos during the martial law years did not have a consentvitiating effect on PFPI 3. in resolving the case on the basis of mere surmises and speculations. - The evidence referred to as hearsay pertains mainly to the testimonies of Locsin, Sr. and Locsin, Jr., which, in gist, established the following facts: 1) the widely circulated Free Press magazine, which, prior to the declaration of Martial Law, took the strongest critical stand against the Marcos administration, was closed down on the eve of such declaration, which closure eventually drove petitioner to financial ruin; 2) upon Marcos orders, Locsin, Sr. was arrested and detained for over 2 months without charges and, together with his family, was threatened with execution; 3) Locsin, Sr. was provisionally released on the condition that he refrains from reopening Free Press and writing anything critical of the Marcos administration; and 4) Locsin, Sr. and his family remained fearful of reprisals from Marcos until the 1986 EDSA Revolution. - Per the Locsins, it was amidst these circumstances that PFPIs property was sold to Liwayway, represented by Menzi, who, before the sale, allegedly applied the squeeze on Locsin, Sr. thru the Marcos cannot be denied and [you] have no choice but to sell lines.

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- CA, in rejecting PFPIs posture of vitiation of consent, observed: xxx the testimonies of Locsin, Sr. and Locsin, Jr. regarding Menzis alleged implied threat that Marcos cannot be denied and that Liwayway was to be the corporate vehicle for Marcoss takeover of the Free Press is hearsay as Menzi already passed away and is no longer in a position to defend himself It is clear from the provisions of Sec 36, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence that any evidence, . . . is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand. Consequently, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule - SC: Evidence of statement made or a testimony is hearsay if offered against a party who has no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Hearsay evidence is excluded precisely because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to cross-examine the persons to whom the statements or writings are attributed. - Sec 38, Rule 130 ROC, an exception to the hearsay rule, reads: Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successorsin-interest and against third persons. - In assessing the probative value of Menzis supposed declaration against interest, i.e., that he was acting for Pres Marcos when he purportedly coerced Locsin, Sr. to sell the Free Press property, it cannot be given evidentiary weight as PFPI wants. The Locsins can hardly be considered as disinterested witnesses. They are likely to gain the most from the annulment of the subject contracts. Moreover, allegations of duress or coercion should, like fraud, be viewed with utmost caution. They should not be laid lightly at the door of men whose lips had been sealed by death. Francisco explains why: It has been said that of all evidence, the narration of a witness of his conversation with a dead person is esteemed in justice the weakest. One reason for its unreliability is that the alleged declarant can not recall

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to the witness the circumstances under which his statement were made. The temptation and opportunity for fraud in such cases also operate against the testimony. Testimony to statements of a deceased person, at least where proof of them will prejudice his estate, is regarded as an unsafe foundation for judicial action except in so far as such evidence is borne out by what is natural and probable under the circumstances taken in connection with actual known facts. And a court should be very slow to act upon the statement of one of the parties to a supposed agreement after the death of the other party; such corroborative evidence should be adduced as to satisfy the court of the truth of the story which is to benefit materially the person telling it. - PFPI insists that the testimonies of the Locsins are not hearsay because hearsay evidence has been defined as the evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others. xxx Thus, the mere fact that the other parties to the conversations testified to by the witness are already deceased does [not] render such testimony inadmissible for being hearsay. Xxx Teodoro Locsin, Sr. and Teodoro Locsin, Jr. were in fact testifying to matters of their own personal knowledge because they were either parties to the said conversation or were present at the time the said statements were made. - Even if petitioner succeeds in halving its testimonial evidence, one-half purporting to quote the words of a live witness and the other half purporting to quote what the live witness heard from one already dead, the other pertaining to the dead shall nevertheless remain hearsay in character. - The all too familiar rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge. PFPI witnesses cannot testify respecting what Pres Marcos said Menzi about the acquisition of PFPI, if any there be, precisely because none of said witnesses ever had an opportunity to hear what the two talked about. - Neither may PFPI circumvent the hearsay rule by invoking the exception under the declaration-againstinterest rule. In context, the only declaration supposedly made by Menzi which can conceivably be labeled as adverse to his interest could be that he was acting in behalf of Marcos in offering to acquire the physical assets of petitioner. Far from making a statement contrary to his own interest, a declaration conveying the notion that the declarant possessed the authority to speak and to act for the President of the Republic can hardly be considered as a declaration against interest. - As regards the second error imputed by PFPI to the CA, SC held this is a rehash of PFPIs bid to impute on Liwayway acts of force and intimidation that were made to bear on PFPI or Mr. Locsin, Sr. during the early years of martial law. - As regards the third error, SC held that PFPI is oblivious that it itself can only offer, as counterpoint, also mere surmises and speculations. - To further illustrate that PFPI was not able to establish vititation of consent: Locsin, Sr refused to sell PFPI a number of times, even if the threat of arrest hung over his head, rejecting the offers of Baizas and De Vega. He even testified that the initial offer of Menzi was rejected even though it was supposedly accompanied by the threat that Marcos cannot be denied. Locsin, Sr. was, moreover, even able to secure a compromise that only the assets of the Free Press will be sold. It is thus quite possible that PFPIs financial condition, albeit caused by the declaration of Martial Law, was a major factor in influencing Locsin, Sr. to accept Menzis offer. c. On the gross inadequacy of the price: NO - gross inadequacy of the purchase price does not, as a matter of civil law, per se affect a contract of sale. (Art 1470 CC) - Following this provision, it behooves petitioner to first prove a defect in the consent, failing which its case for annulment contract of sale on ground gross inadequacy of price must fall. d. On use of the proceeds constituting implied ratification: YES - The ruling of the CA on the matter is well-taken: It need not be overemphasized that by using the proceeds in this manner, Free Press only too clearly confirmed the voluntaries of its consent and ratified the sale. Needless to state, such ratification cleanses the assailed contract from any alleged defects from the moment it was constituted. Disposition Petition denied (eva) NATURE Certiorari

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Pedigree
MENDOZA VS CA
201 SCRA 675 CRUZ; September 24, 1991

FACTS - The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day. The trial court believed him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court. - The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child. - Casimiro, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiffs allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees. - Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. When she married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. - Lolito corroborated his mother and said he considered Casimiro his grandfather because Teopista said so. - Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro. Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro. Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at Teopista's baptism. Casimiro also gave him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida.

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Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would also give him various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00 to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give certain properties to Teopista. - Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age, but Vicente Toring took the stand to resist Teopista's claim. The last statement was shared by the other defense witness, Julieta Ouano, Casimiro's niece, who also affirmed that Vicente Toring used to work as a cook in Casimiro's boat. She flatly declared she had never met Teopista but she knew her husband, who was a mechanic. 6 - the trial court judge rejected plaintiff' s claim that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family. - On appeal, however, the respondent court reversed. - Casimiro died on May 1986. Counsel, now acting for Vicente Toring, then asked this Court to substitute the latter for the deceased Casimiro Mendoza in the present petition. ISSUES 1. WON the substitution of Casimiro Mendoza pro haec vice and nunc pro tunc by Vicente Toring, who appears to be the former's illegitimate son is allowed. 2. WON Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza. 3. WON Teopista has nevertheless established the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro by another method. HELD 1. In Masecampo vs. Masecampo, it was held that The subsequent death of the father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one who pretended to be his natural son. It may survive against the executor, administrator, or any other legal representative of the testate or intestate succession. We hereby allow the substitution of Casimiro Mendoza pro haec vice and nunc pro tunc by Vicente Toring, who appears to be the former's illegitimate son. This disposes of the private respondent's contention that the lawyer-client relationship terminated with Casimiro's death and that Vicente has no personality now to substitute him. 2. NO Ratio To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been in continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. Reasoning The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they were both residents of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is not unusual for a father to take his illegitimate child into his house to live with him and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in this case. Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this is, of course, not decisive of one's status. The regularity of defendant's act of giving money to the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not been sufficiently established. 3. YES Ratio What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. - The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio

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Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light of Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows: Sec. 39 Act or declarations about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. - To set the record straight, it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's illegitimate daughter. - Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because "it is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. Nevertheless, precisely because of its nature as hearsay evidence, there are certain safeguards against its abuse. - Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates the following requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence: 1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify. 2. The pedigree must be in issue. 3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue. 4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose. 5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration. - All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the

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complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs. - If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private respondent and her witnesses (the truck, house, joint account) we can reasonably conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza. DISPOSITIVE WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuacao to be the illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status. illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as such. In his answer, FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then; further, he never recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, FRANCISCO contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint. At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11) witnesses, namely: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz and Lope Amolar. These witnesses explained individual circumstances, which induced them to believe that MONINA was Franciscos daughter. On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time, she was 40 years old and a Central Bank Examiner. She affirmed that as evidenced by certifications from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar and baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D), she was born on 6 August 1946 in Barangay Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to Esperanza Amolar (who passed away on 20 April 1965) and FRANCISCO. MONINA first studied at Sagrado where she stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado from 1952 until 1955 (up to Grade 4), her father, FRANCISCO, paid for her tuition fees and other school expenses. She either received the money from FRANCISCO or from Mr. Lagarto, or saw FRANCISCO give money to her mother, or Mr. Lagarto would pay Sagrado directly. After Sagrado, MONINA studied in different schools, but FRANCISCO continuously answered for her schooling. For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University of Iloilo, but she later dropped due to an accident which required a week's hospitalization. Although FRANCISCO paid for part of the hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered most of them. In 1963, she enrolled at the University of San Agustin, where she stayed with Mrs. Franco who

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paid for MONINA's tuition fees. However, expenses for books, school supplies, uniforms and the like were shouldered by FRANCISCO. At the start of each semester, MONINA would show FRANCISCO that she was enrolled, then he would ask her to canvass prices, then give her the money she needed. After finishing two semesters at University of San Agustin, as evidenced by her transcript of records she transferred to De Paul College, just in front of Mrs. Francos house, and studied there for a year. Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at Western Institute of Technology (WIT), where she obtained a bachelors degree in Commerce in April 1967. During her senior year, she stayed with Eusebio and Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She passed the CPA board exams in 1974, and took up an M.B.A. at De La Salle University as evidenced by her transcript (Exh. AA), wherein FRANCISCO was likewise listed as Guardian In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge Romeo Callejo of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48. As additional witnesses, FRANCISCO presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iigo Supertisioso, Lourdes Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal. FRANCISCO declared that Pansays employment ceased as of October, 1944, and that while employed by him, Pansay would sleep with the other female helpers on the first floor of his residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept in a room on the second floor. At that time, his household staff was composed of three (3) female workers and two (2) male workers. After Pansay left in October 1944, she never communicated with him again, neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly denied having had sexual relations with Pansay and disavowed any knowledge about MONINAs birth. In the same vein, he denied having paid for MONINAs tuition fees, in person or otherwise, and asserted that he never knew that Mr. Lagarto paid for these fees. Moreover, FRANCISCO could not believe that Lagarto would pay for these fees despite absence of instructions or approval from FRANCISCO. He likewise categorically denied that he told anyone, be it Danthea Lopez, Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or Remedios Franco, that MONINA was his daughter.

FRANCISCO L. JISON, vs. CA and MONINA JISON G.R. No. 124853 1998 J. DAVIDE, JR. (SJ) NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS In her complaint filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her

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The trial court ruled against Monina but the Court of Appeals reversed. ISSUE Whether or not the CA erred in holding that Moninas filiation was sufficiently established. HELD NO. RATIO Under Article 1751 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established, thus: ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing legitimate filiation shall be proved by: evidence, the For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a high standard of proof is required. Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. By continuous is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular length of time. The foregoing STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH ONES FILIATION IS FOUNDED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT AN ORDER FOR RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT MAY CREATE AN UNWHOLESOME ATMOSPHERE OR MAY BE AN IRRITANT IN THE FAMILY OR LIVES OF THE PARTIES, SO THAT IT MUST BE ISSUED ONLY IF PATERNITY OR FILIATION IS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules on evidence, in light of the burden of proof in civil cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence, and the shifting of the burden of evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept of preponderance of

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evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth. REASONING (FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE RATIO) With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant controversy. FRANCISCOs arguments that he could not have had sex with MONINAs mother deserve scant consideration. While it has been observed that unlawful intercourse will not be presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for such indulgence, this does not favor FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances, the only witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victims or mothers word, as against the accuseds or putative fathers protestations. In the instant case, MONINAs mother could no longer testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed away long before the institution of the complaint for recognition. But this did not mean that MONINA could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of her birth and her parentage may be established by evidence other than the testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is whether MONINAs evidence is coherent, logical and natural. The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay by about the end of 1945. We agree with MONINA that this was broad enough to cover the fourth quarter of said year, hence her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to sexual relations between FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother. In any event, since it was established that her mother was still in the employ of FRANCISCO at the time MONINA was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother was not at all impossible, especially in light of the overwhelming evidence, as hereafter shown, that FRANCISCO fathered MONINA, has recognized her as his daughter and that MONINA has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter.

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the Civil Code.
1

NOTE THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE FAMILY CODE HERE. THE COURT SAID THAT IT MAY BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED SINCE IT WILL NOT PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES AS THEY ARE BOTH ALIVE AND HENCE, IN THE POSITION TO DEFEND THEMSELVES ADEQUATELY.

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copied, respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included. Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C") showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members of the deceased. -Petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit "8", indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already used before respondent's birth. This scenario dearly suggests that Exhibit "D" was falsified. Petitioners presented as witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He testified that the signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") are forgeries. He thus concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious document surreptitiously inserted into the bound volume of birth records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. ISSUE: WON Juan E. Locsin Jr is an interested party and is qualified to be granted letters of administration (Which of the two documents is genuine) HELD: Juan E. Locsin, Jr is not an interested person within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled to the issuance of letters of administration since he failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. (Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious) Reasoning:

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Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the persons preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus: Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; XXX Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person, thus: Sec. 2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters of administration, respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased, implying that he is an interested person in the estate and is considered as next of kin. But has respondent established that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased? On this point, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, held: "The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a

SOLINAP V LOCSIN G.R. No. 146737 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ: December 10, 2001 (da) FACTS: -Eleven (11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed a "Petition for Letters of Administration" praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He allegedthat he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin and that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent. -January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondent's petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name. -January 5, 1993 , another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations. -The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition dated January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent and the deceased. -To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D") of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D" contains the information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was machine

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record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgment." (Emphasis ours) Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the deceased, presented to the trial court his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and a photograph (Exhibit "C") taken during the burial of the deceased. Exhibit D spurious: -Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Register), the records of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records of births cover several decades and come from all parts of the country, to merely access them in the Civil Registry General requires expertise. To locate one single birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City. With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence than those considered by the trial court should have been presented by respondent. -Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "x x x during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form." -Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No 102, revised in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely. -The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries. -The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and business. The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and other details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up. -There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the volume. The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given more faith and credence by the courts below. -The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar to send copies of registrable certificates and documents presented to them for entry to the Civil Registrar General.A copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals and should have impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a spurious document. Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo

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Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not appear. -In Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar: "Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child." (Emphasis ours) -The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeal where this Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity." -A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.18 Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth. At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General. -Respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not

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constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased. - According to Fornier, FPJs parents were foreigners his mother Bessie Kelley Poe was an American and his father Allan F. Poe was a Spanish national being a son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate (illegitimate children follow the citizenship of the mother) since Allan Poe contracted a prior marriage to Paulita Gomez before marrying Bessie Kelley according to an uncertified copy of a supposed certification of the marriage in July 5, 1936. Further, even if no such prior marriage existed, Allan F. Poe married Bessey Kelley only a year after the birth of FPJ. The marriage certificate of their marriage reflected the date of their marriage to be on September 16, 1940 where Allan was 25, unmarried and Filipino, and Bessie was 22, unmarried and American. - FPJs earliest established ascendant was his grandfather Lorenzo Pou. No birth certificate for Lorenzo but his death certificate issued upon his death in September 11, 1954 at age 84 identified him as a Filipino residing in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their son Allan was born on May 17, 1915. The birth certificate of Allan showed that his father was an Espaol and mother a mestiza Espaol. Procedure - In the hearing before the COMELEC, Fornier presented the following: -Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ -Certified photocopy of an affidavit by Paulita GomezPoe attesting that she had filed a bigamy case against Allan F. Poe because of his relationship with Kelley (in Spanish) and its English translation -Certified copy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe -Certification from the director of the Records Management and Archives Office stating that a Lorenzo Poe/Pou resided in the Phils before 1907 -Certification from OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives stating that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe - FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among others: - Certification that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan

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- Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there was no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez - Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Poe - Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds of Pangasinan in the name of Lorenzo Pou, - Copies of tax declarations under the name of Lorenzo Pou - Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou - Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley -Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos, Pangasinan stating that the records of the birth of the said office from 1900 to May 1946 were destroyed during World War II - January 23, 2004 COMELEC dismissed the Fornier petition for lack of merit. Fornier filed MFR (denied) ISSUE/S 1. WON FPJ can be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino HELD 1. NO Ratio While the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Phils., the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. Reasoning Quick version: In ascertaining whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Phils. was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have

TECSON V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GR 161434 VITUG; March 3, 2004 (maia) NATURE This is a consolidation of 3 petitions, all assailing the citizenship of Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). The two petitions (Tecson v COMELEC and Velez v Poe, Jr.) were dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction (the petitions were filed in the SC, without going through the COMELEC). Thus, only one petition was considered by SC (Fornier v COMELEC). Such petition was filed under Rule 64 of ROC (Review of Decision of COMELEC) FACTS - Quick Facts: FPJ was allegedly disqualified from being a candidate for President because he was not a naturalborn citizen. Allegedly, he was born to an American mother and a Spanish father. Alternatively, even granting that the father was Filipino, FPJ could not have inherited the Philippine citizenship because he was illegitimate (father had a prior subsisting marriage, thus marriage to mother was bigamous; or even granting there was no prior marriage, FPJ was born one year prior to the marriage of his parents, thus still illegit). Long Facts: On Dec.31, 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for President under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP). In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen. His real name was stated to be Fernando, Jr. or Ronald Allan Poe, born in Manila on August 20, 1939. - Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen.

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well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. - thus, following jus sanguinis, FPJ was Filipino - Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. *For discussion on Pedigree, see long version, its really obiter lang. Long version: - Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino? Obiter: Concept of citizenship (baka lang magtanong si maam about this) - earliest understanding was given by Aristotle who described a citizen as a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office and the state would be composed of such individuals in order to achieve a self-sufficient existence. Citizenship was deemed to deal with rights and entitlements on the one hand and with concomitant obligations on the other. - concept of citizenship underwent changes in the 18th to 20th centuries: 18th century: limited to civil citizenship, established rights necessary for individual freedom [i.e. Rights to property, personal liberty and justice]; 19th century: concept expanded to include political citizenship, encompassing right to participate in exercise of political power; 20th century: developed to social citizenship, emphasized right of citizen to economic well-being and social security). Now, it seems that movement internationalization of citizenship is towards

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- 1935 Constitution provided jus sanguinis (blood relationship) as basis for citizenship, as indicated in Sec. 1, Art. 3 (defining citizens): (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Phils (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Phils and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law - 1973 Constitution Corrected Sec. 1, Art. 3 (4) of the 1935 Constitution, which, when taken together with the existing civil law provisions would provide that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands. This was deemed discriminatory in that it incapacitated the Filipino woman from transmitting her citizenship to her legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. 3, 1973 Constitution state that the ff are citizens of the Phils: - Those who are citizens of the Phils at the time of the adoption of this Constitution - Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Phils - Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the 1935 Constitution - Those who are naturalized in accordance with law - Add Sec. 2 of the same article which provided that a female citizen of the Phils who marries an alien retainers her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission she is deemed to have renounced her citizenship under the law. - 1987 Constitution aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution and outlines in Article 4, Sec. 1 that the following are Filipino citizens: - Those who are citizens of the Phils at the time of the adoption of this Constitution - Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Phils - Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority - Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Concept of Citizenship in the Phils from the Spanish times to the present - Spanish period: no such term as Philippine citizens, only Spanish subjects. In church records, natives were identified as indios. Although there were a lot of Spanish laws on citizenship, not all these were extended to the Phils. It was only in the Civil Code of Spain (which became effective in the Phils 1889) where a categorical enumeration of Spanish citizens were made, viz: a. Persons born in Spanish territory b. Children of a Spanish father or mother even if they were born outside Spain c. Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers d. Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy - Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris stated that the civil and political status of the native inhabitants would be determined by the US Congress. Spanish subjects and natives who choose to remain in the territory may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making a declaration of their decision within a year from the date of the ratification of the treaty. If no such declaration is made, their allegiance shall be held renounced and they would have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside. Upon ratification of the treaty, the native inhabitants of the Phils ceased to be Spanish subjects. They did not become American citizens either but were issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Phils entitled to protection of the US. - in the Philippine Bill of 1902, it was provided that all inhabitants of the Phil. Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects in the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in said islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Phil Islands (this is what they call the Filipinization en masse) -under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of Phils was deemed to be a citizen as of 11 April 1899 if he was (1) a subject of Spain on said date, (2) residing in the Phils on said date, and (3) since that date, not a ctizen of some other country.

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The Case of FPJ - The Constitution requires that the President of the Phils should be a natural-born citizen of the Phils (Art. 7, Sec. 2). [Natural born citizen citizens of the Phils from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship (Art. 4 sec.2)] - Allan F. Poe was a Filipino because his father Lorenzo was also Filipino. The ff can be drawn with some degree of certainty from the evidence: - The parents of FPJ were Allen Poe and Bessie Kelley. - FPJ was born to them on August 20, 1939 (governed by 1935 consti). - Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on September 16, 1940. - The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Pou. - At the time of his death on September 11, 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old, a Filipino, and resident of Pangasinan. - The public documents submitted are deemed trustworthy. The three documents (birth certificate of FPJ, marriage certificate of Bessie and Allan and the death certificate of Lorenzo) were certified true copies of the originals. As public documents, the 3 documents are prima facie proof of their contents as stated in the ROC (130, Section 44) that the entries in official records made by a public officer in the performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. - It is safe to assume that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in 1870, when Phils was still a Spanish colony (since he died at 84 in 1954) and that his place of residence at the time of death was the same as his residence before death in the absence of evidence that would attest otherwise. In that case, Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill effected in 1902. This citizenship would then extend to his son Allan F. Poe, FPJs father. Proof of Paternity and Filiation under Civil Law - For proof of filiation (relationship or civil status of a child to either parent) or paternity (relationship or civil status of father to child), the mandatory rules of civil law would not apply in this case. The duly notarized declaration by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, FPJs maternal aunt and sister of his mother Bessie, proving the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ (living with Bessie and the children in one house as one family) would be accepted. - Acknowledgement needed to establish paternity (eg. Acknowledgement in the birth certificate by signing name of father). Absence of this renders the birth certificate useless as being an authoritative document or recognition - In the FPJ case, there was no signature of Allan F. Poe in the birth certificate of FPJ. Thus, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be some other public document - 1950 Civil Code 3 types of acknowledgement of illegitimate children which had to be done during the lifetime of the presumed parent: (a) Voluntary (expressly made in record birth, will or a statement before the court in authentic writing) (b) Legal (in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized as natural) (c) Compulsory (demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation) - The Family Code has liberalized the rules as stated in Articles 172, 173 and 175 and the rules have retroactive effect (Article 255). These provisions are there to govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law(that branch of law which is concerned with the organization of the family and regulation of property). The relevance of citizenship is exemplified in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, which provides that laws relating to family rights and duties, or status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the phils, even though living abroad. Thus, the need to reiterate the consti provisions on citizenship The ONLY item relevant to pedigree: - The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The CC and FC provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily

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precluded from being applicable by the CC or FC provisions. Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court: Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. - For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. - Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, do hereby declare that: 3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the Phils. as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ. 9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944. 18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

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- Conclusion (digesters take): the affidavit of Ruby Mangahas was sufficient to establish that there was recognition of the child FPJ, thus he may take the citizenship of his father. DNA Testing - DNA testing to prove paternity could also be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity Re: contention that being illegitimate prevents a child from inheriting the citizenship of the father - FPJ was alleged to be illegitimate because of the bigamous marriage between his parents Allan and Bessie for the reason that Allan allegedly had a prior existing marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez. The Court held that the veracity of this marriage between Paulita and Allan is doubtful. - The pronouncement that an illegitimate child cannot inherit the fathers citizenship has no textual basis in the Constitution and violates the equal protection clause. Citing Bernas: What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated. - when jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child to inherit the mothers citizenship, it to ensure a Filipino nationality for the child in line with the assumption that the mother would gain custody. - The 1935 Constitution applies to FPJ since he was born during that time period and it states that Filipino citizens include those whose fathers are citizens of the Phils., which Allan Poe was DISPOSITION 1. The evidence does not establish conclusively FPJs citizenship but the evidence preponderates in his favor to hold that he could not be guilty of misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. Fornier v. COMELEC DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for dismissing the original petition. 2. Tecson v. COMELEC and Velez v, Poe DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction. GRAVADOR V MAMIGO G.R. No. L-24989 CASTRO; July 21, 1967 (owen) FACTS - The controversy arose because of conflicting records of Gravadors date of birth which is the basis of computation of retirement annuities and the number of years of service of a retiree. - Pedro Gravador, principal of Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Negros Oriental, was advised by Superintendent of Schools Salazar of his separation from the service because he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 as according to (1) pre-war records as a teacher in the public schools and (2) his Insular Teacher's Cards and Employee's Record Card, which has just been found in connection with the verification of his service that he was born on November 26, 1897 (TF he is 66 years, 8 months, and 22 days old) unless he can show valid proof in the form of a baptismal or birth certificate that he was below 65 year old. Mamigo was designated teacher-in-charge of the said elementary school. - Gravador wrote the Director of Public Schools and the Division Superintendent of Schools protesting his forced retirement because the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. Attached to his letter was (1) the affidavit of Bandoquillo and Sienes, both of Amlan, Negros Oriental, that they knew him to be born on December 11, 1901, in Amlan, formerly known as New Ayuquitan, Negros Oriental because they were the neighbors of Gravadors parents and they were present when Gravador was born and that they were also invited in Gravadors baptismal party; (2) post-war records, consisting of an Elementary Teacher's Report Card, an Employee's Record Card and an Employee's Record of Qualifications which state that Gravadors birth date is December 11, 1901. - problem is aggravated by two uncontroverted facts, namely, that the records of the church where Gravador was baptized were destroyed by fire, and that the

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municipal civil register contains no record of the Gravadors birth. - Gravador filed a suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in CFI Negros Oriental as he asked the court to adjudge him entitled to the office of principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School and to order payment of not only his back salaries but also damages in the total amount of P52,400. - TC: (1) concluded that the post-war records were intended to replace the pre-war records and therefore the correct date of birth is December 11, 1901; (2) took into account the verified answer in a cadastral proceeding in CFI Negros Oriental, dated March 15, 1924, filed by the Gravadors brother where it was stated that he was one of the co-owners of a piece of land and at the time he was 23 years old. TC granted his petition - Respondents Claim: (1) TC erred in placing full reliance on the post-war records because these records were made only because it was thought that the prewar records had been lost or destroyed, but as some pre-war records had since been located, the date contained in the pre-war records should be regarded as controlling; and (2) the finding of the Superintendent of Schools that Gravador was born on November 26, 1897 is an administrative finding that should not be disturbed by the court. ISSUE WON TC erred in giving full reliance on post war records and verified answer by Gravadors brother in a cadastral proceeding (PEDIGREE) HELD NO - The findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by substantial evidence is a settled rule of administrative law. But where there is substantial evidence supporting the finding of the Superintendent of Schools is precisely the issue in this case. - Cogent Reasons why TC did not err in its findings (1) although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition. Even in his application for back pay which he filed with the Department of Finance, through the

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Office of the Superintendent of Schools, on October 7, 1948, Gravador stated that the date of his birth is December 11, 1901. He repeated the same assertion in 1956 and again in 1960 when he asked GSIS and the CSC to correct the date of his birth to December 11, 1901. (2) the import of the declaration of Gravadors brother, contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that Gravador was then 23 years old, cannot be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of Gravador only by evidence of family tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative. (3) Gravador has a brother, Constantino, who was born on June 10, 1898 and who retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. Gravador could not have been born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as the pre-war records indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than he. Disposition Judgment Affirmed could alter the decision previously promulgated. The evidence proposed to be presented consisted of (1) an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that Estaben Mallare (respondent's father) is the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino; and (2) testimonies of certain persons who had a known Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime. - Respondent's petition to set aside the decision of this Court of April 29, 1968, as well as the resolution of January 10, 1969, is premised upon three basic arguments, to wit: (a) Respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, being the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino, was a Filipino citizen; (b) Esteben Mallare, the son of a Filipino mother, by his own overt acts, had chosen Philippine citizenship; and (c) respondent, a legitimate son of Esteban Mallare, is a Filipino citizen. ISSUE WON Esteban Mallare (respondents father) is a Filipino as respondent claims. HELD - YES. Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with qualification and right to continue the practice of law in the Philippines. - In Our decision of April 29, 1968, respondent's claim that he is a Filipino was denied for lack of evidence proving the Philippine citizenship of his father, Esteban Mallare. It was ruled that Ana Mallare (Esteban's mother) can not be considered a Filipino, there being no proof that she was "an inhabitant of the Philippines continuing to reside therein who was a Spanish subject on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine"; that the landing certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration which referred to respondent's mother, Te Na, as "wife of Dy Esteban, P.I. citizen", was based upon an ex parte determination of the evidence presented by therein applicant and consequently carries little evidentiary weight as to the citizenship of her said husband; and that the affidavit of Esteban Mallare, executed on February 20, 1939, to the effect that he had chosen to follow the citizenship of his Filipino mother was not only self-serving, but also it can not be considered a re-affirmation of the alleged election of citizenship since no previous election of such citizenship has been proved to exist. - With the additional evidence submitted by respondent pursuant to the authority granted by this Court, the

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aforementioned void in the proof of respondent's citizenship has been duly filled. - The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare. - Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive. Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from persons who are not members of the family - the reason for the distinction is the public interest that is taken in the question of the existence of marital relations. - The public reputation in Macalelon that Esteban was Ana's natural child, testified to by the witness, would constitute proof of the illegitimacy of the former. Besides, if Estaban were really born out of legal union, it is highly improbable that he would be keeping the surname "Mallare" after his mother, instead of adopting that of his father. And it would be straining the imagination to perceive that this situation was purposedly sought by Esteban's parents to suit some ulterior motives. In 1903, we can not concede that alien inhabitants of his country were that sophisticated or legally-oriented. - The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog (and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as being mere conclusions devoid of evidentiary value. The declarations were not only based on the reputation in the community regarding her race or race-ancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but they must have certain factual basis. - And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. Dispositive Upon the foregoing considerations, and on the basis of the original and additional evidence herein adduced the decision of this Court dated April 29, 1968, is hereby definitely set aside, and the complaint in this case is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

Common Reputation
IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE A.M. No. 533 FERNANDEZ; September 12, 1974 (glaisa)

FACTS - A decision was rendered by this Court on April 29, 1968, holding that by preponderance of evidence, it appeared that respondent Mallare's father, Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his mother admittedly being a Chinese, respondent is likewise a Chinese national. Consequently respondent Florencio Mallare was declared excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revoked, and he was ordered to return to this Court, the lawyer's diploma previously issued to him. - Respondent petitioned the Court for the reopening of the case and for new trial on the ground, inter alia, of newly discovered evidence, the introduction of which

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Res Gestae
PEOPLE V DELA CRUZ G.R. No. 139150 KAPUNAN; July 20, 2001 (giulia) medico-legal concluded that Fr. Garabato died of "(h)emorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds of the body". The victim sustained six (6) gunshot wounds spread over his head and body. Four (4) of these wounds were diagnosed to be fatal. -On June 19, 1993, petitioner gave himself up to Superintendent Efren Santos, Chief of Police of Sangandaan Police Station and other police officers in the presence of a tabloid reporter and with the assistance of his counsel, Atty. Constante A. Ancheta. -At the Police Station, prosecution witnesses, Abundio Tad-y Benito and Mario Mascardo positively identified petitioner Pablo De La Cruz as the person who shot Fr. Garabato. -For his part, petitioner interposed the twin defense of denial and alibi. The trial court summed up his version of the case as follows: Accused firmly disclaims knowledge or participation in the aforesaid shooting incident. He denies having known or seen Fr. Garabato on June 16, 1993. He claims that at the time and date Fr. Garabato was shot, he was in Gagalangin Health Center in Tondo, Manila; that he and his two children, Carmela and Pamela, went to fetch his wife, Cornelia, who was employed therein as a midwife. From there, they would proceed to Baclaran Church to hear mass. This point was corroborated by defense witnesses, Cornelia de la Cruz (Pablo's wife) and Romeo Mabahagi (a janitor/utility man at Gagalangin Health Center). The Accused's defense is further corroborated by the testimony of witness, Ricardo Cuadra, who categorically stated that he witnessed the shooting incident, and that he actually saw the face of the assailant, and he was certain that the assailant was NOT Pablo de la Cruz. -TC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of homicide, not murder as was charged in the Amended Information. It ruled that the qualifying circumstance of alevosia was not sufficiently established by the prosecution and appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. -On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of petitioner for homicide but modified the penalty as it held that the trial court erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. ISSUE WON the petitioner was guilty

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HELD In this case, the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses. These two witnesses were with the victim at the time that he was shot and they positively identified petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime. Their testimonies were corroborated by the testimony of another prosecution witness, SPO3 Jesus Patriarca, the police officer who investigated the incident. -Contrary to petitioners contention, the fact that Mascardo and Tad-y Benito worked for the victim does not in any way render their testimonies incredulous. Petitioner has not ascribed any ill motive on their part to wrongfully accuse him of the crime. In the absence thereof, their respective testimonies are not affected by their relationship to the victim. -Considering the positive identification of petitioner as the assailant of the victim by eyewitnesses to the crime, both the TC and CA gave scant consideration to petitioner's defense of denial and alibi. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. -Moreover, for alibi to prosper, petitioner must prove not only (1) that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but (2) it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. -To the mind of the Court, the distance between Sangandaan, Quezon City and Tondo, Manila does not preclude the possibility that petitioner could have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at or about the time of its commission. -Alibi is a defense invariably viewed by the Court as weak. It is treated with disfavor simply because it is easily fabricated on the part of the accused, his friends, relatives and supporters. Petitioner's defense of alibi is thus unavailing especially in light of the clear and positive identification of him as the assailant by two credible eyewitnesses who had no motive to lie. The testimony of prosecution were alleged to be fraught with inconsistent and incredulous statements. The prosecution allegedly tried to portray the victim as a "pacifist" and that he was "meek as a lamb" when in fact he was a Lieutenant Colonel assigned to the headquarters of the Armed Forces. The victim was not

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decisionof the CA. FACTS -RTC of QC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. -Initially, the Information filed against petitioner charged him with homicide. Subsequently, the Information was amended charging petitioner with murder. At his arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. -Fr. Garabato, the deceased, hired Abundo Tad-y and Mario Mascardo in the construction of his house. On June 16, 1993, the two workers were unloading construction materials from a Ford Fiera owned and driven by Fr. Garabato. -The vehicle was parked in front of the house of the petitioner, SPO4 Pablo De La Cruz where another vehicle was also parked behind it. -The petitioner got upset with the deceased because he could not get his jeep out. Fr. Garabato moved the vehicle. At that moment, the two workers were standing behind the Ford Fiera, and they heard successive shots of gunfire. They instinctively turned their sights towards the origin of the gunshots; such that they saw smoke coming from the side of petitioner's jeep and saw petitioner seated in the driver's seat still holding his gun pointing towards the Ford Fiera. -Petitioner alighted from his jeep, walked towards Fr. Garabato's position, re-loaded his gun with another magazine and shot Fr. Garabato anew. Petitioner immediately left the scene on board his jeep. -Out of fear of their lives, the two workers ran to the house being constructed. About half an hour later, Mario Mascardo went back to the locus criminis and there he saw the helpless body of Fr. Garabato surrounded by several curious spectators and police officers. -Fr. Garabato's body was rushed to Quezon City General Hospital where he was pronounced DOA. The

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allegedly constructing his own residence in the area, as claimed by the prosecution, but was just renovating a house. The eyewitnesses allegedly claimed to have heard ten (10) gunshots but only six (6) gunshots were established. Petitioner denies owning a .45 caliber pistol and faults the prosecution for not presenting the same as evidence. He also claims that it would be inconceivable for him to kill the victim in the presence of his two (2) children, as narrated by the prosecution. These alleged inconsistent and incredulous statements pertain merely to minor details and do not detract from the crux of the testimonies of Mascardo and Tad-y Benito that they witnessed the killing of the victim by petitioner. Even if the trial court found certain imputations made by the prosecution witnesses "exaggerated," still, these do not per se render the entire testimony unworthy of credence. "Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" is not a strict legal maxim in our jurisprudence. It is neither a test of credibility nor a positive rule of universal application. Therefore, it should not be applied to portions of the testimony corroborated by other pieces of evidence. -With respect to the non-presentation of the .45 caliber pistol, the presentation of the weapon is not a prerequisite for conviction. On Res Gestae -Petitioner further puts in issue the admission by the trial court of the statement made by the bystanders imputing the crime to petitioner as res gestae. SP03 Jesus Patriarca, a prosecution witness, testified that when he conducted the investigation immediately after the incident occurred, he questioned those people at the scene of the crime if they know who shot the victim. The response he got was: "yun hong pulis na nakatira sa tapat" referring to petitioner. The trial court admitted this statement as part of res gestae. According to the TC: [A]lthough the people who gave this information were not presented on the witness stand, this Court still resolved to admit and consider this spontaneous exclamation from the spectators competent as "PART OF RES GESTAE". Records of this case reveal that the incident was reported to SPO3 Patriarca at around 2:45 in the afternoon of June 16, 1993, while the latter was on duty, and immediately, they rushed to the scene of the crime to investigate. It was at that instance that he gathered the aforesaid information. "RES GESTAE" refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, the victim(s) or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. As borne by evidence on record, all the elements of res gestae are sufficiently established, insofar as the aforequoted spontaneous utterance is concerned: a) the principal act (res gestae) the killing of Fr. Garabato in broad daylight is a startling occurrence; b) the statements were made before the declarants had time to contrive or devise that is, within several minutes after the victim was shot; and c) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances the identity of the assailant is a material and vital information that concerns the aforementioned startling occurrence.22

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DAVIDE, JR.; Sep 27, 1999 (athe) NATURE: Appeal FACTS AVA (mother of Ethel) and LEEZEL (live-in partner of Ava; not the father of Ethel) were initially charged with serious physical injuries under Section 10, Article VI of R.A. NO. 7610.3 (Otherwise known as "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.") but later on the information was amended to charge them with the crime of parricide when the victim, ETHEL died. Ethel was beaten and mauled in the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her death. Among the witnesses presented by the prosecution were Lilia Gojul (Avas sister), Michelle Torente (neighbor), Theresa Castillo (neighbor). Lilia Gojul used to live with her sister but was forced to leave as Avas household was not at all peaceful. One day Lilia visited Ava and her niece but she was shocked to see Ethel's appearance; her hair was shaven, her face was full of contusions, her neck had faded cigarette burns while her arms and legs had traces of pinching and maltreatment. She also had marks of "black-eye" on both eyes. Lilia also noticed Ethel's knees with contusions due to prolonged kneeling. When Lilia asked the little girl to identify who inflicted the injuries on her body, Ethel tearfully pointed to Ava and Leezel. Lilia confronted Ava about her and Leezel's treatment of Ethel The second witness, Michelle Torrente, testified that she was aghast to see Ethel shaven, with bruises all over her body and wounds in her arms and legs. Ethel also had cigarette burns, and when Michelle asked what happened, Ethel replied: "pinaso po ako." When Michelle further asked who burned her and caused her bruises, Ethel said, "Papa ko po," referring to Leezel Franco. The little girl's shaven head and bruises were also noticed by Theresa Castillo, an occupant of unit 115, adjacent to Ava's residence. When she asked Ethel's "yaya" why this was done to the little girl, the "yaya" answered, "parusa". AVA and LEEZEL were the witnesses presented by the defense.

-Even if the declaration was not to be considered as res gestae, the testimonies of Mascardo and Tad-y Benito positively identifying petitioner is sufficient to establish the latter's guilt. -CA correctly held that petitioner cannot avail himself of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. When petitioner went to the Sangandaan Police Station, he did so purportedly to clear his name. It was not his intention to submit himself to the authorities and assume responsibility for the death of the victim. To be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the voluntary surrender must be spontaneous. DISPOSITION WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. PEOPLE vs. CARIQUEZ GR 129304

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Ava offered two versions. She testified in open court that Ethels death was due to an accident. Ethel fell from the stairs. The second was narrated in her affidavit and reply-affidavit where she pointed Leezel as the culprit. Leezel, on the other hand, claimed that he had no idea as to what happened to Ethel; all that he saw was the child lying on the floor, and then he helped Ava bring the child to the hospital. He further claimed that the testimony of Lilia is not true. The trial court found Ava and Leezel guilty of parricide and homicide respectively. They both appealed. Their contention, among others, was the prosecutions witnesses are purely hearsay and that they were convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence. ISSUES 1. WON the declarations of Lilia, Michelle and Theresa as to what they observed from Ethel were hearsay, therefore inadmissible 2. WON the TC erred in convicting Ava and Leezel based on circumstantial evidence HELD 1. NO. They saw her and personally noticed the injuries and telltale marks of torture. While the answer of ETHEL as to who inflicted the injuries may have been, indeed, hearsay because ETHEL could not be confronted on that, yet it was part of the res gestae and, therefore, an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.2 Ratio There are three requisites to the admission of evidence as constituting part of the res gestae. (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that
2

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the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. Reasoning In this case the startling occurrences were the tortures inflicted on ETHEL, who when asked who caused them spontaneously pointed to AVA and LEEZEL. That some time may have lapsed between the infliction of the injuries and the disclosure, it must however, be pointed out that there has been no uniformity as to the interval of time that should separate the occurrence of the startling event from the making of the declarations. What is necessary is that the injuries sustained by ETHEL prior to the incident on 27 May 1996 were inflicted by AVA and LEEZEL. 2. NO. Ratio Circumstancial evidence is sufficient to convict provided the following requisites are present, namely: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived from are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.17 [Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court.] The circumstantial evidence must constitute an unbroken chain of events so as to lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the guilt of the accused. Reasoning In the Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General enumerates seven (7) circumstantial evidence which the trial court took in to account and relied upon as bases for its finding that AVA and LEEZEL, were criminally responsible for the death of ETHEL (testimony of Lilia, Michelle, Theresa, Dr Bienvenida, etc.) DISPOSITION : Decision of RTC finding Ava and Leezel guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Parricide and Homicide respectively is AFFIRMED. PEOPLE v VELASQUEZ G.R. Nos. 132635 & 14387275 MENDOZA; February 21, 2001 (jojo) NATURE An appeal from the decision of the RTC of Angeles City, convicting Lamberto Velasquez of (1) acts of lasciviousness committed against his granddaughter Aira Velasquez; and (2) rape of his stepdaughter Mary Joy Ocampo FACTS Velasquez was charged with acts of lasciviousness upon the person of AIRA VELASQUEZ, MARY JOY OCAMPO and KIMBERLY VELASQUEZ; and rape of MARY JOY OCAMPO. Velasquez pleaded not guilty to the charges against him, whereupon the cases were consolidated and jointly tried. The evidence for the prosecution: In October 1994, Mary Joy (stepdaughter of accused), then 13 years of age, slept in a room she shared with Velasquez, her mother Angelina, and her two half-brothers. When she woke up in the morning, she found the accused beside her on the floor, her mother having left for the market. He kissed her on the mouth and the breasts. Then he raised her shirt, pulled down her shorts and underwear, and kissed her private parts. Afterward, he inserted his middle finger into Mary Joys vagina. Mary Joy felt a sharp pain and tried to resist by kicking him, which made the latter remove his finger although he continued kissing her. He then left, but not before warning her to keep quiet and not to tell anyone what he had done to her. - 2 weeks later, still in October, while Mary Joy was watching television alone in the living room, Velasquez approached her and, though she tried to evade him, he succeeded in forcing her to their room. He lowered her shorts and underwear, raised her shirt and bra, and started kissing her. Then he inserted his middle finger into her vagina and later had sexual intercourse with her. Up to April 1997, Velasquez continuously molested Mary Joy, sometimes forcing her to masturbate him and at other times licking her vagina. - Regail (daughter of accused) has a daughter named Aira, 2 years old. On April 16, 1997, at 3PM, while Regail was folding clothes, Aira walked into the room crying. Aira complained that her grandfather did something to her, which she demonstrated by opening her right leg and moving one of her right fingers toward her vagina. Regail did not want to believe her daughter and thought that her father was just joking with the latter. However, Aira started to cry. In the days that followed, she noticed that Aira complained of pain in her vagina while taking a bath. When Regail asked her why her vagina hurt, Aira said it was because of the things her grandfather had been doing to her vagina, showing her mother what had been done to her.On

SEC. 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequently thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

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April 28, 1997, Regail noticed pus coming out of Airas vagina. She also noticed that her daughter was running a fever, and that her vagina was red and swollen. She took Aira to Dr. Lydia Buyboy, who told her that her daughter had lacerations in her vaginal area and that she had probably been fingered. However, the doctor declined to give a medical certificate as she did not want to get involved in any case. Mary Grace Ocampo( stepdaughter of accused), Angelinas daughter, married Ranold, accuseds son by first wife Caridad and Regails brother. Mary Grace testified that she had been molested by her stepfather when she was 9 years old. She recalled when, as a new couple, Angelina and accused spent the night at an aunts house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Mary Grace was with them. According to Mary Grace, accused went to her side, raised her clothes, and fondled her breasts. His hands went lower. She was unable to resist accuseds advances because of his strength and threats. To prevent a recurrence of the event, Mary Grace moved out of their house and went to live with her aunt in Angeles City. Kimberly was around Airas age, and Regail remembered hearing that pus had also come out of the childs vagina. When she told her about Dr. Buyboys findings, Mary Grace lost no time and took Kimberly to Dr. Buyboy, who made the same findings. - Angelina and Loida went to the police station to make a report and brought the children to the Ospital ng Angeles for physical examination. They went back to the Mabalacat Police Station and gave their statements. They went to the NBI for another physical examination. The evidence for the defense: - Accused denied the allegations against him. He said there were always several people in their house at any time, and so it was impossible for him to have an opportunity to molest any of the complainants. He believed that Mary Joy had accused him because he always noticed whenever she came home late and scolded her. As for Mary Graces complaint, he claimed he was in fact the one who caught Kimberly playing with her organ and that he reported this to Kimberlys parents. He believes that Regail filed the complaint against him because he had scolded her and punished her when she went out on a date with a married man, and again when she went out with her cousin after she had married Meryll Robertson. As to Roan, he claimed he never molested her. Of his granddaughter Aira, accused-appellant said that she was a liar and a naughty child. - On April 30, 1997, during Loida Kellows despedida, he was drinking with his friends when he developed a headache and decided to sleep. At around 10PM, he was awakened by his son Renel who gave him glass of bitter liquid to drink. The drink contained sleeping pills. After taking one sip, he set it aside. When he woke up the next morning, he looked for his family, but they were not around. He got home at 8PM, but there was still no sign of them. - The following day, he went to Manila. He pawned his watch and ring and bought a ticket on the Super Ferry 10. At 9PM, he sailed for Cebu and stayed with his eldest son, Rolando Velasquez. Three weeks later, he learned of the cases filed against him from the newspapers and television. However, because he had no job and no money, he was unable to return to Pampanga to clear his name. He was found in Cebu and arrested in July. The accused presented several witnesses to testify that he is a man of good repute, and to corroborate his story. TC RULING: The accused was convicted of (1) acts of lasciviousness committed against his granddaughter Aira Velasquez; and (2) rape of his stepdaughter Mary Joy Ocampo ISSUES 1. WON the trial court erred in denying the accused of his right to preliminary investigation. 2. WON the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Regail Velasquez 3. WON the trial court erred in giving credibility to Mary Joy Ocampos testimony HELD 1. NO. It is an established jurisprudence that the issue of lack of or a defective preliminary investigation should be raised before or during trial and such statutory right to a preliminary investigation is deemed waived when appellant, as in this case, failed to claim it before plea. Moreover, in appellants arguments, it is unclear whether this alleged motion for preliminary investigation which was denied by the trial court was anchored on the lack of it or merely a defect thereon or a mere motion for reinvestigation. When it does not appear from the record that a preliminary investigation was not granted the accused, it must be presumed that

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the proceedings in the trial court were in accordance with law. So that where no objection has been made at the trial, appellant must be taken to have waived his right to a preliminary investigation if in fact he was not given the benefit thereof. Failing to raise the issue of lack of preliminary investigation during the trial, appellant is now estopped to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. At any rate, absence of preliminary investigation merely affects the regularity of the proceedings but does not affect the trial courts jurisdiction or impair the validity of the information. 2. NO. The trial court based its conviction of accusedappellant for acts of lasciviousness against Aira Velasquez on the testimony of Regail Velasquez, Airas mother, who testified on what her daughter had told her. Aira herself was not presented in court, being a mere child of two and a half years old. (pls see orig copy re testimony) - As the SolGen contends, Airas acts and statements constitute exceptions to the hearsay rule because they were part of the res gestae. The inculpatory and spontaneous statements were: (1) Si Tatang kakayan na ku pu. (Tatang (accused-appellant) has been doing something to me.) (2) I-tatang kasi, kinayi ne pu ing pekpek ku kaya masakit ya. (Because Tatang has been doing something to my private part, that is why it hurts.) (3) She showed her mother her private part, which was swollen and oozing with pus, and then she gestured, by slightly opening or raising her right foot and using her right finger, to show what accusedappellant had done to it. We hold that Airas statements and acts constitute res gestae, as it was made immediately subsequent to a startling occurrence, uttered shortly thereafter by her with spontaneity, without prior opportunity to contrive the same. Regails account of Airas words and, more importantly, Airas gestures, constitutes independently relevant statements distinct from hearsay and admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been thus uttered. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement

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itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. - Accused also questions the fact that when Aira was examined on May 9, 1997, Dr. Aguda discovered an old healed laceration, which usually indicates that the injury was inflicted more than one month prior to the examination, whereas the date of the alleged molestation was on April 16, 1997, one week short of a month. This discrepancy was already explained by Dr. Aguda to the satisfaction of the trial court. According to the doctor, the medical classifications and periods were based on adult cases, whereas Aira was a little child with a very small hymen, and the laceration was very superficial. Understandably, then, the results varied slightly. The Court is not unaware of the caution to be observed when circumstantial evidence is to be considered as inculpatory indicia in a criminal prosecution. That is why it has spent an unusual amount of time and effort to reflect upon all the circumstances which the lower court accepted as an unbroken chain of events, reinforced by corroboration and yielding a conclusion of guilt, all consonant with the requisites therefor.But, in this case, the chain of facts cannot but produce an inference consistent with guilt and not with innocence. It is highly unlikely that a child of Airas age would be able to concoct such a depraved tale and compliment it with such disturbing gestures with only the fantastic intention of implicating her grandfather. To sum up, the following circumstances establish accuseds guilt: Regails account of her daughters words and actions, her personal knowledge of the pus discharged from her daughters vagina and the NBI medico-legal report confirming it, and accuseds bare denials, compounded with his unexplained flight to Cebu, bringing little more with him than the clothes on his back. Taken together, these are sufficient to convince us of the truth of the allegations against accused. - The rule is settled that we give due deference to the observations of trial courts on questions of credibility of witnesses since they have a better opportunity for observation than appellate courts. For this reason, the trial courts evaluation of testimonial evidence is accorded great respect. Aira is a two-year old child. The penalty imposable for acts of lasciviousness against children under 12 years of age should be that provided by R.A. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Accused-appellant is Airas grandfather. His relationship to his victim aggravates the crime, and, as provided by R.A. 7610, Section 31, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity. Hence, the maximum period of reclusion temporal medium should be imposed. Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty to be imposed should be reclusion temporal minimum. 3. YES - The accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the rape victim, if such testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. We adhere to this principle in the case at bar. Accused questions the credibility of Mary Joy Ocampo because of a three-year delay in reporting the alleged rape. Delay in reporting an incident of rape is not necessarily an indication that the charge is fabricated. [69] In these cases, the delay was caused by fear. It is apparent from the testimony of witnesses, both of the prosecution and of the defense, that accused-appellant was a man to be feared. He brooked no disobedience even from his own brothers and sisters and was so feared that, even when his life and his freedom were gravely threatened, nobody, not even his own brother, was willing to wake him and confront him with the accusations. His wife, his children, and close relatives fled their home and lived in a hotel for four days to escape his ire. Physically, he was intimidating. He is a black belter in karate and, according to his own sisters testimony, he could hurt a person merely by holding his hand. In fact, accused threatened Mary Joy with harm if she told anyone what accused-appellant had done to her.[70] It is, therefore, easy to see why Mary Joy kept her silence. - Mary Joys alleged inconsistent testimonies as to whether or not she knew Jesus Tootsie Mendoza or Robertson is inconsequential. At any rate, Mary Joy clarified these points. Also, Mary Joys alleged inconsistent testimony as to whether her mother was in the market or asleep in the house when she was raped is readily explicable or reconcilable. Mary Joy testified that the first time Lamberto inserted his finger on her

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sexual organ, her mother was in the market and when appellant finally succeeded in inserting his sexual organ into Mary Joys, nobody was at home except her other brothers who were asleep. Evidently, in both instances, Mary Joys mother was not in the house. - Inconsistencies on minor or inconsequential matters do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecutions evidence as a whole, nor detract from the witnesses testimony. On the contrary, they strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the prosecution witnesses because they erase the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. A rape victim cannot be expected to keep an accurate account of her traumatic experience. Discrepancies could be caused by the natural fickleness of human memory. Mary Joys testimony is corroborated by medical findings of hymenal lacerations, which the trial court found meritorious. On the other hand, accused merely makes a bare denial of the charges against him. Accused said that there was always a large number of people in their house, such that he would have had no opportunity to commit the crimes charged against him. Rape has been known to be committed in places ordinarily considered as unlikely. The scene of the rape is not always nor necessarily isolated or secluded. It can be committed in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside an occupied house, and even in a room where other members of the family are sleeping. Among couples with big families who live in cramped quarters, the presence of other members of the family is not necessarily a deterrent to the commission of this crime. In this case, it is not impossible for the rape to have taken place inside a small room with five occupants therein, including accused-appellant and Mary Joy. DISPOSITION: Decision of RTC of Angeles finding Velasquez guilty of acts of lasciviousness and of rape is affirmed.

ABALLE v PEOPLE FERNAN; March 15, 1990 G.R. No. 64086 (jojo) NATURE Direct appeal from the decision of the CFI of Davao City, finding petitioner Peter Paul Aballe guilty of homicide.

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FACTS At around 7PM of Nov.7, 1980 in Saypon, Toril, Davao City, Quirino Banguis, a 42-year old driver, attended a birthday party at the residence of his neighbor Aguilles Mora. He brought along his wife and other children, leaving his 12-year-old daughter Jennie alone in their house. Upon their return at around 8:30 that same night, Quirino found Jennie in the sala, lying prostrate, bathed in her own blood with multiple wounds on different parts of her body. There were no eyewitnesses to the bizarre killing. The postmortem report disclosed that Jennie sustained a total of 32 stab wounds. Cause of death was attributed to hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds. - At daybreak of the following day, Nov. 8, acting on information furnished by the victim's father, a police team headed by Sgt Marante sought the accused for questioning. They found him just as he was coming out of the communal bathroom in Saypon and wearing what appeared to be a bloodstained T-shirt. Upon seeing Sgt. Marante, the accused without anyone asking him, orally admitted that he killed Jennie Banguis. Sgt. Marante subsequently brought him to the Toril police station for interrogation. - While under custodial investigation, Aballe, 17 years old, a school dropout (he finished second year high school) and next door neighbor of the victim, brought the police to his house and pointed to them the pot at the "bangera" where he had concealed the death weapon which was a 4-inch kitchen knife. Also taken from Aballe was the bloodstained red and white striped T-shirt which he claimed he wore during the commission of the crime. Aballe also made an extrajudicial confession admitting his guilt in killing Jennie while under the influence of liquor and marijuana. ( Pls. see original copy re sworn affidavit) Thereafter, an information was filed against Aballe, charging him with homicide penalized under Article 249 of the RPC. At his arraignment on Apr. 13, 1981, he pleaded not guilty. He also disavowed his extrajudicial confession on the ground that it was obtained through coercion and in the absence of counsel. Notwithstanding the repudiation of his earlier confession, Aballe was convicted of the crime of homicide. ISSUES 1. WON the trial court erred in giving full weight to Aballes extrajudicial confession taken during custodial investigation and in imposing a penalty which was not in accordance with law. 2. WON the guilt of the accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt HELD 1. YES Aballe's extrajudicial admission should have been disregarded by the lower court for having been obtained in violation of Aballe's constitutional rights. Throughout the custodial interrogation, the accused's parents and relatives were almost always around but at no stage of the entire proceedings was it shown that the youthful offender was ever represented by counsel. Since the execution of the extrajudicial statement was admittedly made in the absence of counsel, whether de oficio or de parte, and the waiver of counsel was not made with the assistance of counsel as mandated by the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, said confession should have been discarded by the lower court. - Equally inadmissible is the kitchen knife recovered from Aballe after his capture and after the police had started to question him. Together with the extrajudicial confession, the fatal weapon is but a fruit of a constitutionally infirmed interrogation and must consequently be disallowed. The bloodstained T-shirt, however, is admissible, being in the nature of an evidence in plain view which an arresting officer may take and introduce in evidence. The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction is that "an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the cause. . ." 2. YES It is well to note that even before the taking of the extrajudicial confession, the accused, upon being picked up in the morning of Nov. 8, 1980 as he was coming out of the communal bathroom and wearing a T-shirt covered with bloodstains which he tried to cover with his hands, suddenly broke down and knelt before Sgt. Marante and confessed that he killed Jennie Banguis. The testimony of Sgt. Marante on Aballe's oral

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confession is competent evidence to positively link the accused to the aforesaid killing. ( Pls see orig copy re testimony) The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offenses charged may be given in evidence against him. The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance. Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is not applicable to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner, whereby the accused orally admitted having slain the victim. - Inappropriateness of penalty discussed

PEOPLE VS. TAMPUS G.R. No. L-44690 AQUINO, March 28, 1980 (cha) NATURE Automatic review of CFI judgment convicting Tampus of murder, sentencing him to death; co-accused Avila was also sentenced to death in another case but did not appeal in this case because his sentence was already under review FACTS -Tampus and Avila, members of the Oxo gang, avenged the stabbing of their co-gang member Rosales by stabbing Saminado, a member of the Batang Mindanao gang which was a hostile group to the Oxo gang. The accused and the victims were all prisoners in the national penitentiary and are in the emergency ward. -How it happened: at around 10 am, Saminado went to the toilet. Tampus and Avila followed Saminado and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Tampus inflicted 8 incised wounds while Avila stabbed Saminado 9 times. Afterwards, the two surrendered to a prison guard their knives, saying "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami." Saminado died 11am upon arrival in the prison hospital. -the officer of the day investigated the incident right away. 2 days after the killing, another prison guard

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investigated the two and obtained their extradjudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado. -at the arraignment, they pleaded guilty even after they were told regarding the gravity of the charge and informed them that the death penalty might be imposed upon them. When the prosecution presented evidence, the two accused took the witness stand, affirmed their confessions and testified as to the manner in which they repeatedly wounded Saminado. The trial was held at the state penitentiary. ISSUES 1. WON Tampus was denied his right to a public trial because the arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary 2. WON the extrajudicial admissions of Tampus and Avila were admissible HELD 1. NO. Ratio. For the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction. The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial court may motu proprio exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of the defendant, exclude from the trial every person except the officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution and defense. (Sec. 14, Rule 119, Rules of Court. See 21 Am Jur 2d 305, sec. 270). Reasoning. The New Bilibid Prison was the venue of the arraignment and hearing, and not the trial court's session hall at Makati, Rizal, because this Court in its resolution of July 20, 1976 in L-38141, where Rodolfo Avila was one of the accused-appellants, refused, for security reasons, to allow him to be brought to Makati So, this Court directed that the arraignment and trial in the instant case, where Avila was a co-accused of Tampus, be held at the national penitentiary in Muntinlupa. No showing that the public was actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial in the national penitentiary. 2. YES Reasoning. (1) Confession was voluntarily made. The investigator in taking it endeavored, according to his understanding, to comply with section 20 of the 1973 Constitution (refer to the case for the salaysay); (2) Res Gestae: even if there was an initial investigation before the extrajudicial confession was obtained (where the right against self-incrimination may not have been told to the accused), Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they surrendered to Reynaldo S. Eustaquio, the first guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge; (3) they already waived their right to remain silent and to have the right to counsel when they gave freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion; Admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court. They did not appeal from the judgment of conviction; ***other issues are criminal issues*** Disposition. WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment as to Jose Tampus is modified. He is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The lower court's judgment as to his civil liability is affirmed. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. (lacked 10 votes required) Separate Opinions BARREDO, J., concurring: I concur, but I believe it is best that the court should inform the accused of his right to remain silent and not wait for the lawyer to make the objection. TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: - The extra-judicial confession of the accused, having been taken after the 1973 Constitution is manifestly barred from admission under section 20 of the Bill of Rights (Article IV) thereof. -grave doubts as to the alleged waiver by the accused of his constitutional right to counsel and to remain silent given in the middle of his "voluntary" extrajudicial confession during his custodial interrogation by the prison investigator -it was the trial courts duty to apprise and admonish the accused of his consti right to remain silent and against self-incrimination. Any confession or

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incriminatory statement obtained in violation thereof is expressly declared "inadmissible in evidence."

PEOPLE V REYES G.R. No. L-1846-48 BENGZON; January 18, 1948 (aida) NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI Pampanga FACTS - Vicente Gatchalian, Severino Austria, Pedro Reyes, Eusebio Perez, Gervasio Due and Marcelo Due were charged in two separate cases with the deaths of Benjamin Nery and Alfredo Laguitan. In another case, they were accused of causing physical injuries to Francisco Orsino. - April 19, 1946, Good Friday in Cacutud, Arayat, Pampanga While the pabasa was being performed, the appellants, assisted by Marcelo Due, Gervasio Due and one Peping and carrying pistols, approached Nery, Laguitan and Orsino who were members of the military police. - The three MPs were sitting on one corner, watching the proceedings. At gunpoint, the three MPs were driven to the road and when they were about ten meters away from where the pabasa was being done, they were shot from behind. Nery and Laguitan were killed instantly while Orsino fractured a leg which took 6 months to heal. - The motive for the killing was the conflict between the MPs and the Huks, the attackers being Huk members. - Six people testified for the prosecution, including Reyes. - Eusebio Perez said he was attending the pabasa and when he heard gunshots, he grabbed his wife and ran. The next day he saw three of the assailants including Maximo Austria and they said they were going into hiding because they had taken part in the shooting the night before. Perez did not mention Gatchalian. - Lt. Martinez testified that in the investigation conducted by Quintans, Gatchalian stated that each of them approached an MP and fired at them and that he was sure they would die. - Witnesses for the defense gave their own testimonies. - Segundo Guevara saw Gatchalian during the pabasa and when gunshots were heard, he saw Gatchalian run

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carrying his child and then the latter lay in a pile of palay. Gatchalian remained in Guevaras house the whole night. This was corroborated by a testimony by Evaristo Paras. - The fiscal filed a motion for the dismissal of the case against Eusebio Perez for insufficiency of evidence. This was granted. He also asked that the accused Pedro Reyes be discharged so that the latter may be used as prosecution witness. This was also granted. - The CFI judge found the accused Maximino Austria alias Severino Australia alias Big Boy and Vicente Gatchalian alias Magallanes guilty of the offenses set forth in the different informations. They were sentenced to reclusion perpetua and indemnity for the deaths of Nery and Laguitan. - Reyes did become a state witness but he did not confirm every statement he had previously made at the fiscal's investigation. He testified that before the crime was committed, Gervacio had asked him to talk to the MPs but he refused. Later on, he heard gunshots and when he ran to the ricefield, he saw and heard Gervacio saying that the MP he shot would surely die and Gatchalian assuring him that the MO would indeed die. - Orsino narrated a similar incident but could not identify the assailants except Austria. Lts. Martinez and Quintans declared under oath that Gatchalian admitted to them during the investigation that he had shot one of the MPs. Gatchalian even demonstrated how he shot the victim whih was captured in a photograph. - Lt. Quintans also testified that Austria had voluntarily signed the confession. - Gatchalian denies that he made a confession before Lt. Quintans. He denied that he had taken part in the killing and that he was merely threatened to be killed lest he reenact the crime as shown in the photograph. He alleged that he was maltreated and even showed his supposed injuries in court. ISSUE WON the judgment appealed from should be reversed HELD NO Reasoning - The picture of the reenactment of the crime is convincing enough to show the guilty participation of the appellants. - Their defense of alibi is weak and untenable. The Solicitor General's brief substantially proves conspiracy between them and their other co-accused who are still at large. Disposition Judgment affirmed SEPARATE OPINION PERFECTO [dissent] - Appellants' guilt not having been proved beyond all reasonable doubt, they are entitled to acquittal. - The testimony of Eusebio Perez to the effect that on April 20, 1946, appellants told him that they wanted to hide because of their participation in the shooting the previous night, is absolutely incredible. If appellants had wanted to hide, it is incomprehensible that they should start by admitting to Eusebio Perez that they took part in the shooting affray and then confiding to him their intention to hide. - The testimony of Pedro Reyes cannot be taken seriously, not only because it comes from a polluted source, but because it is inherently unbelievable that the authors of the shooting could have been so reckless enough to make comments on the results of the shooting in the field, near the scene, and at the hearing distance of Pedro Reyes. According to the latter, everybody, including the assailants, ran away afield; but it is unbelievable that the assailants should stop in their flight just to make comments and seemingly should to afford Pedro Reyes the opportunity to overhear their conversation. - The testimonies of Fidel Martinez and Segundino S. Quintans as to the supposed oral admission of Vicente Gatchalian and the written statement signed by Severino Austria, are completely valueless because of the uncontradicted testimonies of the two appellants to the effect that they were maltreated, tortured and threatened to be killed. - Orsino testified that the shooting took place in front of the place where the pabasa was being held in the presence of many people. Not one of those many had witnessed the shooting was called by the prosecution to testify as to who did the shooting and how it took place, with the single exception of Orsino.

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PEOPLE V TULAGAN G.R. No. L-68620 NARVASA; July 22, 1986 (rach)

FACTS - May 19, 1979: at about 11pm, Marlon Catungal, 19, died a violent death, succumbing to "Shock, due to severe hemorrhage, secondary to stab wound, anterior chest." - No one saw precisely how, where and when that single stab wound was inflicted, or by whom, but there seems to be no question (both prosecution and defense agreeing on this point) that the deceased was killed while attempting to flee from at least 2 men, identified as Freddie Eding Tulagan and Valentin "Satsoy" de Guzman. The chase began at or near the public hall of Bgy. Don Pedro, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, where a dance was being held on the occasion of the barrio fiesta, and ended, tragically for Catungal, at the porch (azotea) of the house of a certain Cesar Evangelista, some 300m away. The deceased appeared to have been carried, after he had been fatally stabbed, from the house of Evangelista to the shoulder of the provincial road about 10m away, where his corpse was later found by police investigators and barangay officials. - The only person with any claim to some sort of direct observation of the pursuit and its sanguinary ending is Bonifacio Ulanday, who gave a sworn statement before the provincial Fiscal at Dagupan City on June 6, 1979 and later testified before the TC. His version is as follows: 1. The chase began at the dance hall, at about 10pm, after Catungal was accosted by Satsoy and 3 other persons. 2. Catungal ran away when he saw Satsoy receive a "balisong" about a foot long from one of his companions. 3. Satsoy chased Catungal. His 3 other companions also chased Catungal. 4. Ulanday followed in such a way as to avoid being noticed by the pursuers, staying about 15m behind them. 5. Ulanday only lost sight of the 4 persons running after Catungal when said Catungal entered a certain yard; he did not witness how the 4 allegedly overtook Catunga;.he did not see any person who stabbed or killed Catungal. 6. Ulanday only saw 4 persons who lifted Catungal and placed him in front of a big house, at w/c time Catungal was motionless and blood was oozing from the body of Catungal; Ulanday also said in his statement before the Provincial Fiscal:

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While I was running towards the North (following the pursuers) I saw Satsoy and his companions carrying the cadaver of Catungal from the azotea of a house located around 10m away from the road to Bayambang. They placed the cadaver of Catungal on the left side of the road from Malasiqui. - On the basis of this sworn statement, and those of Bgy Capt. Jose B. Macaraeg and his daughter, Natalia Macaraeg, an information was filed with the Circuit Criminal Court at Dagupan City charging Freddie Tulagan alias "Eding," Valentin de Guzman alias "Satsoy," Romie Mendoza and Ramon Mendoza with the crime of murder. - As may at once be perceived, there is no direct evidence to establish that Satsoy stabbed Marlon Catungal while the latter was being held "helpless and defenseless" by the 3 other accused. Neither before the Investigating Fiscals nor before the TC was any proof adduced directly and positively demonstrating precisely how and by whom the single fatal wound was inflicted. - Of the 4 thus charged, only Mendoza was arrested. Arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. After trial, he was found guilty of murder with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. - Case now before SC on automatic review. The decision under review lays stress on Natalia Macaraegs testimony of a statement by de Guzman deemed to be part of the res gestae or an "oral confession.": Natalia asked de Guzman, Tulagan and Mendoza what they did to her neighbor, accused de Guzman, while standing side by side with Tulagan and Mendoza told her that they killed Marlon Catungal, her neighbor, an employee of PNR. ISSUE/S 1. WON said statement constitutes res gestae 2. WON TCs other conclusions were correct HELD 1. NO Ratio Not every statement made on the occasion of a startling occurrence is admissible as part of the res gestae; only such are admissible as appear to have been involuntarily and spontaneously wrung from an observer by the shock or impact of the occurrence such that, as has aptly been said, it is the event speaking through the witness, not the witness speaking of the event. The startling occurrence must produce so powerful an effect or influence on the observer as to extract from his lips some description of the event practically without being conscious of his utterance. Reasoning Actually, it was Vicente de Guzman who supposedly volunteered information, without initially having to be asked by Natalia. - TC opined that the statement made by Satsoy is admissible against accused Romeo Mendoza as part of the res gestae. R130, sec 36 provides that statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. Besides, the statement of de Guzman partakes of an oral confession or part of the res gestae. The testimony of Natalia Macaraeg on this point is competent evidence. THIS IS ERROR. - There is no evidence whatsoever that the statement attributed to de Guzman was made by him "immediately subsequent" to the startling occurrence which the TC had in mind: the slaying of Catungal. On the contrary, if account be taken of the claim of another prosecution witness, Ulanday, that he had followed the 4 persons pursuing the deceased for almost 1 hour, it would most certainly have taken de Guzman and his companions that length of time to return from the crime scene to where the chase had started, or to Natalia's store. Natalia herself testified that the 3 accused returned to her store at about 10:30pm or after more or less 1 hours. - There is no indication in the record that de Guzman was so affected when he made the statement in question under the circumstances related by Natalia Macaraeg. Indeed, it may reasonably be inferred from Natalia's testimony that he was in nowise agitated, stunned or shocked but was, on the contrary, calm, imposed, in full possession of his faculties and fully aware of what he was doing and saying. His statement regarding the killing of Marlon Catungal is not admissible as part of the res gestae, contrary to the view of the court a quo. - Considered as an "oral confession," de Guzman's statement is, of course, admissible against him, but its use against others for any purpose is proscribed by the well known rule res inter alios acta. 2. NO

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Reasoning TC also said that: Aside from the evidence that accused Romeo Mendoza, Freddie Tulagan and Valentin de Guzman chased Marlon Catungal at May 19, 1979 at around 9pm, it was shown that upon the return of the three accused to the store at about 10:30pm, Natalia noticed blood stains on their hands and bodies. These circumstances and pieces of evidence have not been denied by accused Romie Mendoza. These constitute conclusive and decisive evidence of the guilt of accused Romeo Mendoza as one of the authors of the death of Marion Catungal. - This is completely contrary to the record. It is belied by the very decision itself, which in a later part states that Romie Mendoza DENIED that he appeared at Natalias store with Tulagan and de Guzman; and that he took part in the pursuit of the deceased. His counsel presented 2 witnesses who substantiated his denial. - TC also considers as an indication of guilt" the fact that Mendoza was arrested only 2yrs. after issuance of the warrant. - SC said that this signifies nothing insofar as the guilt of person arrested and his denial of complicity in the crime charged are concerned. Such circumstance can just as plausibly suggest that the officers charged with serving the warrant exhibited less than a desirable diligence and concern in the performance of that duty as that the accused person sought to hide himself and evade arrest. - Certain relevant and significant considerations prevent this Court from giving faith and credit to the evidence given by Natalia Macaraeg (failed to mention de Guzmans we killed him statement on either of her 2 sworn statements); and the same is true with respect to Bonifacio Ulanday (who claims to be a friend yet after seeing lifeless body did nothing and saw no cause to inform Catungal's family about the death of their son or to report that matter to Macaraeg. He kept silent about what he knew until he chanced to meet Catungal's father in Dagupan City 2 weeks after the event). The Court cannot bring itself to accept the testimonial declarations of these two witnesses, which form the pillars of the prosecution's case, and this, particularly in view of the firm denials of the accused and the exculpatory testimony of Victoriano Deldio and Andres Nevado, as to whom no clear motive or reason to subvert the truth to favor said accused has been shown. - Given the fact that the victim's last moments are veiled in obscurity insofar as what evidence has been

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offered is concerned, there being no direct evidence of how the killing was done, no evidence of whether or not authorities the pursuers took part in the final assault or of what role each played therein, and no evidence of which of them inflicted the single fatal stab wound, and what the others were doing while the deceased was being stabbed, said conclusion, lacking any kind of support in the record, is nothing but pure and simple speculation. Disposition The guilt of the accused Romeo ("Romie") Mendoza not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the decision under review is reversed and said accused is acquitted. class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene." Carrascoso, during trial, included this incident in his testimony. ISSUES 1. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims 2. WON the CA erred in finding that the purser madean entry in his notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence which is incompetent, therefore not admissible (because the defendant was saying that the best evidence in this case is the entry and not the testimony) HELD 1. YES. The testimony of the defendants witnesses that the issuance of first class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger would have a first class ride, but such would depend upon the availability of first class seat cannot hold water. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, in this case, the first class tickets of the plaintiff without any reservation whatever and even marked with OK, meaning confirmed. 2. NO. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae. Moreover, if it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter. DISPOSITION: Decision of CA affirmed.

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BORROMEO V CA G.R. No. L-31342 BARREDO; April 7, 1976 (apple) NATURE Cross-petitions for the review of the per curiam resolution of the CA FACTS -The main controversy here centers on the true nature of the three documents, Exhibits A, B and C, which on their faces are unquestionably deeds of absolute sale of the real properties therein described executed by the deceased Simeon Rallos on various dates in favor of Emmanuel Aznar, in Exhibits A and C, and his sister, Alma Aznar, in Exhibit B. -In his complaint in the court below, Juan T. Borromeo, as administrator of the estate of Simeon Rallos, alleged that these documents were in fact equitable mortgages to secure loans granted to Rallos by Matias Aznar, deceased father of Emmanuel and Alma -The trial court dismissed the said complaint and on appeal, said dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its original decision -Crispina Rallos Alcantara, who claimed to have been present when the transactions took place, testified to the effect that her deceased father merely borrowed money from the late Matias Aznar in the sums of P6,000.00 and P35,000.00 and to secure the repayment thereof mortgaged to the latter the properties described in Exhibits A, B and C. She testified that the transactions were disguised as absolute sales and Rallos was assured by Matias Aznar that he could exercise the right to repurchase the lots and would deliver to him the corresponding options in writing. -According to Borromeo (appellant), Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5, which, according to Crispina Rallos Alcantara, were her notations allegedly representing the deductions made by Matias Aznar for advance interest, attorney's fees and miscellanous expenses are corroborative of her testimony that the transactions in controversy were really loans with mortgages. -The CA, in its original decision, found the testimony of Crispina Rallos Alcantara unreliable and insufficient to justify the reformation of the instruments in question. The CA stated: While it is true that relationship does not disqualify a witness, it calls for a close scrutiny of

AIR FRANCE vs. CARRASCOSO 18 SCRA 155 SANCHEZ; Sep 28, 1966 (athe) NATURE: Review on certiorari FACTS Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a 'first class' round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff traveled in 'first class', but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who, the Manager alleged, had a 'better right to the seat. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued; plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane. After transferring to the tourist class seat, one flight attendant approached him and requested from him his ticket and said that she will note of his transfer. He refused because for him it is tantamount to accepting his transfer. Later, he went to the pantry that was next to him and the purser was there. He told him that he recorded the incident in his notebook. He read it and translated to him because it was recorded in French. "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist

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his testimony. As correctly observed by the trial court, her testimony cannot be considered as absolutely unbiased or impartial, as she was naturally interested in an outcome of the case favorable to the plaintiff. The fact remains that Exhibits A, B and C were signed by Rallos himself as a party thereto. His successors-ininterest cannot now be heard to complain that the parties to said exhibits intended the same to be loans with mortgages contrary to what are clearly expressed therein. -The CA likewise found Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3, and C-5 weak and unsatisfactory as evidence of the facts asserted. They are clearly self-serving, as they were admittedly prepared by the declarant herself, who was a daughter of the deceased Rallos and who cannot, therefore, be said to be disinterested witness. -However, in its per curiam resolution, this rather strong position taken by the appellate court was completely reversed by itself as follows: While it is true that in our decision rendered in this case, we held that the notations or memoranda of Crispina Rallos Alcantara marked as Exhibits A-2, A-3, B3 and C5 were self-serving and unsatisfactory as evidence of the facts asserted, the same, however, may be considered as constituting part of the res gestae, and as such, are admissible in evidence to show the nature of the contracts in question and the relation of the parties involved. Statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main action as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate or qualify the act, are admissible as part of the res gestae. Accordingly, the attendant circumstances and the statements then made are admissible as part of the res gestae to show the execution of a contract, and, relevant matters said and done which are parts of the res gestae of the negotiation and execution of a contract are admissible to show the existence and nature of the contract and the relation of the parties. Matters attendant upon a sale or conveyance may also be admissible as part of the res gestae. -Thus the CA reversed first its rulings on the admissibility of the relevant evidence by admitting those it had rejected in its original decision and then premised the reversal of its conclusions therein on these newly admitted evidence. Indeed, it appears that had that court found no reason to admit and take into account said evidence, it would not have reversed its previous finding that the subject deeds are absolute sales. ISSUE WON the Court of Appeals committed a legal error in admitting the evidence it had originally held to be incompetent HELD Yes. -We cannot see how the disputed notes and memoranda can be considered in any sense as part of the res gestae as this matter is known in the law of evidence. It must be borne in mind, in this connection, that Crispina was not a party to the transaction in question. Only Simeon Rallos, on the one hand, and Matias Aznar, if she is to be believed, or Emmanuel and Alma Aznar, as the documents show, on the other, were the parties thereto. -The record does not reveal why Crispina was with her father at the time, hence, there can be no basis for holding that she actually took part in the transaction. That she allegedly took notes thereof while there present made her at best only a witness not a party. It cannot be said, therefore, that her taking down of her alleged notes, absent any showing that she was requested or directed by the parties to do so or that the parties, more particularly the Aznars, who are being sought to be bound by them, knew what she was doing, constitute part of the transaction, the res gestae itself. -If such alleged taking of notes by Crispina has to be given any legal significance at all, the most that it can be is that it is one circumstance relevant to the main fact in dispute. In other words it could at the most be only circumstantial evidence. -The trouble however is that the admission of said notes and memoranda suffers from a fatal defect. No witness other than Crispina has testified as to the veracity of her testimony relative to her alleged notes and memoranda. Not even her husband who, according to her, was present on one of the occasions in issue, was called to testify. It cannot be denied that Crispina is interested in the outcome of this case. In the words of the Court of Appeals itself in its original decision, "her testimony cannot be considered as absolutely unbiased or impartial", hence, "unreliable and insufficient to justify the reformation of the instruments in question." -Such being the case, how can the notes and memoranda in dispute add any weight to her testimony, when she herself created them? Surely, they

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cannot have anymore credibility than her own declarations given under oath in open court. -The extensive and repeated arguments of the parties relative to the issue of whether or not self-serving statements may be admitted in evidence as parts of the res gestae are very interesting and illuminating, but they are rather off tangent. The notes supposedly prepared by witness Alcantara during the transaction between her father and the Aznars do not partake at all of the nature of hearsay evidence. If anything, they constitute memoranda contemplated in Section 10 or Rule 1323 which provides: -As may be observed, this provision applies only when it is shown beforehand that there is need to refresh the memory of the witness, which is not the case here. -It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he support his open-court declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence, which is exactly the case of Crispina Alcantara. Disposition Petition dismissed. The per curiam resolution of the CA appealed is hereby reversed and the original decision of that court is affirmed.

SEC. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.

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DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE COMPANIES V RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK,INC G.R. No. 147039 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; January 27, 2006 (owen) NATURE Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 RoC seeking the review of the CA Decision affirming RTC Makati Decision reducing interest rate to 6% per annum FACTS - Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RADIO), who owns several broadcasting stations all over the country, filed a civil case against DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies (DBP) and Provident Insurance Corporation (PROVIDENT) for recovery of insurance benefits. PROVIDENT covered RADIOs transmitter equipment and generating set for P13,550,000.00 under a Fire Insurance Policy, while DBP covered RADIOs transmitter, furniture, fixture and other transmitter facilities for P5,883,650.00 under a Fire Insurance Policy. - July 27, 1988 evening, RADIOs station in Bacolod City was razed by fire causing damage in the amount of P1,044,040.00. RADIO sought recovery under the two insurance policies but the claims were denied on the ground that the cause of loss was an excepted risk excluded under condition no. 6 (c) and (d) 6. This insurance does not cover any loss or damage occasioned by or through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the following consequences, namely: (c) War, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities, or warlike operations (whether war be declared or not), civil war. (d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power. The insurance companies denied the claims by maintaining that the evidence showed that the fire was caused by members of CPP/NPA. Hence, the civil case. - RTC Makati: in favor of RADIO. PROVIDENT to pay P450,000.00 plus 12% legal interest from March 2, 1990 the date of the filing of the Complaint. DBP to pay P602,600.00 plus 12% legal interest from March 2, 1990. - CA: affirmed the decision, with the modification that the applicable interest rate reduced to 6% per annum. MFR denied. - DBP assails: factual finding of both RTC and CA that its evidence failed to support its allegation that the loss was caused by an excepted risk, (members of the CPP/NPA) RTC + testimony of witnesses Lt. Col. Torres and SPO3 Rochar, who were admittedly not present when the fire occurred, was limited to the fact that an investigation was conducted and in the course of the investigation they were informed by bystanders that heavily armed men entered the transmitter house, poured gasoline in it and then lit it. After that, they went out shouting Mabuhay ang NPA. + persons whom they investigated and actually saw the burning of the station were not presented as witnesses + documentary evidence, which includes a letter released by the NPA merely mentions some dissatisfaction with the activities of some people in the media in Bacolod, do not satisfactorily prove that the author of the burning were members of the NPA.. CA + police blotter of the burning of DYHB + certification of the Negros Occidental Integrated National Police, Bacolod City regarding the incident + letter of alleged NPA members Magsilang claiming responsibility for the burning of DYHB + fire investigation report dated July 29, 1988 + testimonies of Lt. Col. Torres and SFO III Rochas ISSUES 1. WON police blotter of the burning of DYHB, the certification issued by the Integrated National Police of Bacolod City and the fire investigation report prepared by SFO III Rochas is deemed sufficient (Entry in Official Records) 2. WON the testimony of Lt. Col. Torres is admissible 3. WON the letter of Magsilang, who claims to be a member of NPA-NIROC, being an admission of person which is not a party to the present action, is admissible (Admission & Confessions) 4. WON the excepted risk was not proven by DBP 5. WON the reports of witnesses Lt. Col Torres and SFO II Rochar that the bystanders they interviewed claimed that the perpetrators were members of the CPP/NPA is

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an exception to the hearsay rule as part of res gestae (Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence) HELD 1. NO - The documentary evidence may be considered exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official records, nevertheless, none of these documents categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of the CPP/NPA. > police blotter: a group of persons accompanied by one (1) woman all believed to be CPP/NPA more or less 20 persons suspected to be CPP/NPA, > certification from the Bacolod Police station: some 20 or more armed men believed to be members of the New Peoples Army NPA, > fire investigation report: (I)t is therefore believed by this Investigating Team that the cause of the fire is intentional, and the armed men suspected to be members of the CPP/NPA were the ones responsible - All these documents show that indeed, the suspected executor of the fire were believed to be members of the CPP/NPA. But suspicion alone is not sufficient, preponderance of evidence being the quantum of proof. 2. NO - The only person who seems to be so sure that that the CPP-NPA had a hand in the burning of DYHB was Lt. Col. Torres. However, though his testimony is persuasive, it cannot be admit as conclusive proof that the CPP-NPA was really involved in the incident considering that he admitted that he did not personally see the armed men even as he tried to pursue them. Note that when Lt. Col. Torres was presented as witness, he was presented as an ordinary witness only and not an expert witness. Hence, his opinion on the identity or membership of the armed men with the CPP-NPA is not admissible in evidence. 3. NO - Under Section 22, Rule 130 RoC. An admission is competent only when the declarant, or someone identified in legal interest with him, is a party to the action. 4. YES - In insurance cases, where a risk is excepted by the terms of a policy which insures against other perils or hazards, loss from such a risk constitutes a defense which the insurer may urge, since it has not assumed that risk, and from this it follows that an insurer seeking

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to defeat a claim because of an exception or limitation in the policy has the burden of proving that the loss comes within the purview of the exception or limitation set up. If a proof is made of a loss apparently within a contract of insurance, the burden is upon the insurer to prove that the loss arose from a cause of loss which is excepted or for which it is not liable, or from a cause which limits its liability. - Consequently, it is sufficient for RADIO to prove the fact of damage or loss. Once RADIO makes out a prima facie case in its favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to DBP to controvert RADIOS prima facie case. In this case, since DBP alleged an excepted risk, then the burden of evidence shifted to DBP to prove such exception. It is only when petitioner has sufficiently proven that the damage or loss was caused by an excepted risk does the burden of evidence shift back to respondent who is then under a duty of producing evidence to show why such excepted risk does not release petitioner from any liability 5. NO - A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, which means those facts which are derived from his perception. A witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. The hearsay rule is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not given under oath or solemn affirmation and, more importantly, have not been subjected to crossexamination by opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the out-of-court statement depends. - Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The rule in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did not testify and provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant complies with the following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances. - It is reasonable to assume that when these statements were noted down, the bystanders already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and exchange information, not to mention theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether these utterances were the products of truth. That the utterances may be mere idle talk is not remote. At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres that these statements were made may be considered as independently relevant statements gathered in the course of their investigation, and are admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been thus uttered. - Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with its weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. - Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders that it was the members of the CPP/NPA who caused the fire may be admitted as evidence, it does not follow that such declarations are sufficient proof. These declarations should be calibrated vis--vis the other evidence on record. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.

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[Yeah, I know this digest is very long. Sorry, but I assure you the case is even longer. The portions of the Courts ruling relevant to the topic in the outline have been italicized for easier reference. ^_^] Version of the Prosecution -Nov 4, 1998, abt 6pm: Cecilia Santos called her husband Lito and their neighbor and kumpare Artemio Pantinople for supper. After eating, Artemio returned to the bench in front of the Santos store and sat on it together with his three children. Lito was still eating supper in their kitchen when he heard a gunshot. From a distance of about 10meters, he also noticed smoke and fire coming from the muzzle of a big gun. Moments later, he saw Artemio clasping his chest and staggering backwards to the direction of Litos kitchen. Artemio shouted to him, Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan, (Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain). Lito did not approach Artemio right after the shooting incident because Cecilia warned him that he might also be shot. Lito did not see the person who shot Artemio because his attention was then focused on Artemio. -Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from her house towards the direction where Artemio was sprawled on the ground. Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting, Kapitan, bakit mo binaril and aking asawa. She also repeatedly cried for help. Lito then went out of their house and approached Artemio who was lying dead near a banana trunk more than 5meters from his house. Some of their neighbors answered Ernitas call for help and approached them. -When the shooting incident happened [abt 7:30pm], Litos house was illumined by a lamp. Their open-type kitchen (no walls) gave him an unobstructed view of Artemio who was about 5meters away from where he was positioned at that time. Although there was a gemilina tree growing in the space in between his house and the store of Artemio, the same did not block his view of Artemio. Likewise, the coconut trees and young banana plants growing at the scene of the crime did not affect his view. -At the same instance, Ernita was also in their kitchen preparing milk for her baby who was then lying on the floor of their kitchen. When she was about to put the bottle into the babys mouth, she suddenly heard the sound of a gunburst followed by a shout, Help me Pre, I was shot by the captain. She immediately pushed open the window of their kitchen and saw the accused wearing a black jacket and camouflage pants running towards the direction of the back portion of Litos

MARTURILLAS V PEOPLE G.R. No. 163217; PANGANIBAN; Apr 18, 2006 (marge) NATURE Petition for Review seeking to set aside [1] CA Decision affirming (with modifications as to the award of damages) the RTC Davao City Decision finding Celestino Marturillas (former Brgy Capt of Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City) guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 42091-98; and the CA resolution denying MR. FACTS

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house. From there, the accused crossed the street and disappeared. Ernita saw the accused carrying a long firearm which looked like an M-14 rifle and also sensed that accused had some companions with him because she heard the crackling sound of the dried leaves around the place. She had a clear view of accused at that time because their place was well-illumined by the full moon that night and by the two (2) fluorescent lamps in their store. She immediately went out of their house and ran towards Artemio who tried to speak to her but could not do so because his mouth was full of blood. She repeatedly called her neighbors for help; a few responded to her calls and approached them; no brgy tanod or any member of the CFO and CAFGU came to help. -While waiting for the police, Ernita did not allow Artemios body to be touched by anybody. After more than 2hours, [around 10pm] the police arrived, together with a photographer named Fe Mendez who took pictures of the crime scene. Ernita and Lito then approached PO2 Operario and informed him that accused was the one responsible for the shooting. PO2 Operario stayed at the crime scene for about 1hour and waited for the funeral vehicle to pick up the body of Artemio. When the funeral hearse arrived, PO2 Operario told the crew to load Artemios body into the vehicle. Thereafter, he then boarded again their mobile car together with Lito Santos. -Armed with the information that accused was the one responsible for the shooting of Artemio, PO2 Operario proceeded to the house of accused and informed him that he was a suspect in the killing of Artemio. He then invited accused to go with him to the police station and also to bring along with him his M-14 rifle. Accused did not say anything. He just got his M-14 rifle and went with the police to the police station where he was detained the whole night of Nov 4, 1998. Accused did not also give any statement to anybody about the incident. The following day, accused was transferred by the police to Tibungco Police Station where he was detained. -Alicia Pantinople, the 44-year old sister of Artemio, after learning about the incident and seeing his brother sprawled lifeless on the ground went around the Bunawan Police Station and noticed a locked door. When she peeped through the hole of the said door, she saw accused reclining on a bench about 2 meters away from the door. He was wearing a brown shirt, black jacket and a pair of camouflage pants. He was also wearing brown shoes but he had no socks on his feet. Seeing that the accused was tapping the floor with his right foot, Alicia confronted him, asking Nong Listing I know that you can recognize my voice. It is me. Why did you kill my brother? What has he done wrong to you? Accused did not answer her. -Nov 5, 1998: Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal officer of the Davao City Health Department, conducted an autopsy on Artemios cadaver. His Necropsy Report No. 76 summarized his findings to the effect that the cause of death was a gunshot wound entering at the anterior right side of the chest, perforating the body of the sternum, the heart and the upper lobe of the left lung, and forming an irregular exit at the posterior chest wall left side. During the trial, Dr. Ledesma explained that the trajectory of the bullet indicates that his assailant was in a lower position than Artemio when the gun was fired. Since the wound was negative of powder burns, the assailant must have been at a distance of more than twenty-four (24) inches when he fired his gun at Artemio. He did not also find any bullet slug inside the body of Artemio indicating that the bullet went through Artemios body. Artemios heart and lungs were lacerated and his stomach contained partially digested food particles indicating that he had just eaten his meal when he was shot. Version of the Defense: -Nov 4, 1998, abt 8:30 pm: Marturillas was roused from his sleep by his wife since two brgy kagawads wanted to see him. Dazed after just having risen from bed, he was rubbing his eyes when he met the two Kagawads inside his house. He was informed that a resident of his barangay, Artemio Pantinople, had just been shot. At once, he ordered his Kagawads to assemble the members of the SCAA (Special Civilian Armed Auxiliary) so that they could be escorted to the crime scene some 250 meters away. As soon as the SCAAs were contacted, they then proceeded to the crime scene to determine what assistance they could render. -While approaching the store owned by the Pantinoples and not very far from where the deceased lay sprawled, Marturillas and his team was met by Ernita Pantinople who was very mad and belligerent, immediately accusing him of having shot her husband instead of Lito Santos who was his enemy. Marturillas was taken aback by the instant accusation against him. Not being able to talk sense with Ernita, he and his companions backed off to avoid a heated confrontation. They decided to go back to his house. -Upon reaching his

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house, he instructed Kagawad Jimmy Balugo to contact the Bunawan Police Station and inform them what transpired. Not knowing the radio frequency of the local police, Kagawad Balugo instead radioed officials of nearby Brgy San Isidro requesting them to contact the Bunawan PNP for police assistance since someone was shot in their locality. Moments later, PO2 Mariano Operario and another police officer arrived at Marturillas house, informing him that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio Pantinople. Upon their invitation, Marturillas immediately went with the said police officers for questioning at the Bunawan Police Station, taking with him his government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition which he turned over for safe keeping with the Bunawan PNP. Such fact is reflected in Bunawan PNPs police blotter to have occurred at around 10:45 pm, Nov 4, 1998. -Nov 5, 1998: Marturillas was subjected to paraffin testing by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Davao City. The next day, the PNP Crime Laboratory released Physical Sciences Report No. C-074-98 finding Marturillas NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates. -On this same day, PO2 Operario, after preparing all the affidavits of Ernita Pantinople and her witnesses, prepared and transmitted a Complaint to the City Prosecution Office recommending that Marturillas be indicted for Murder. [see case for full text of the affidavits]. On the basis of these affidavits, then 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Raul B. Bendigo issued a Resolution finding sufficient evidence to indict Accused for the crime of Homicide and not Murder as alleged in the Affidavit-Complaint. -Defense witness Ronito Bedero testified that on the night Artemio Pantinople was shot, he was at his house and he saw an unidentified armed man flee from the crime scene who later joined two other armed men near a nangka tree not far from where deceased was shot. All three later fled on foot towards the direction of the Purok Center in Brgy Gatungan. He noticed that one of the three men was armed with a rifle but could not make out their identities since the area where the three men converged was a very dark place. After the three men disappeared, he saw from the opposite direction Marturillas and his team of kagawads and 3 SCAA members going to the scene of the crime but they did not reach the crime scene. A little later, he saw the Marturillas group return to where they came from.

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-Dominador Lapiz testified that he was one of the first persons who went to the crime scene where he personally saw the body of deceased lying at a very dark portion some distance from the victims house and that those with him at that time even had to light the place with a lamp so that they could clearly see the deceased. He also testified that there were many coconut and other trees and bananas in the crime scene. He also testified that the house of Lito Santos was only about 4meters from the crime scene, while the house of victim-Artemio Pantinople was about FIFTY (50) meters away. He testified that there was no lighted fluorescent at the store of deceased at the time of the shooting. His testimony also revealed that when the responding policemen arrived, Lito Santos immediately approached the policemen, volunteered himself as a witness and even declared that he would testify that it was Marturillas who shot Artemio Pantinople. He further testified that immediately after he went to the crime scene, the widow of the victim and the children were merely shouting and crying and it was only after the policemen arrived that the widow uttered in a loud voice, Kapitan nganong gipatay mo ang akong bana? Ruling of RTC and CA: -The guilt of petitioner had been established beyond reasonable doubt. He was positively identified as the one running away from the crime scene immediately after the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of the victim himself that he had been shot by the captain, clearly established the latters complicity in the crime. -No ill motive could be ascribed to the prosecution witnesses. Thus, their positive, credible and unequivocal testimonies were accepted as sufficient to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. -Both courts also rejected Marturillas defenses of denial and alibi, saying these were necessarily suspect, especially when established by friends or relatives, and should thus be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. At any rate, alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses found to be more credible. Hence, this Petition. ISSUES 1. WON the prosecutions evidence is credible. 2. WON the evidence is sufficient to convict him of homicide. HELD 1. YES. Basic is the rule that the Supreme Court accords great weight and a high degree of respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA. Although there are recognized exceptions to the conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the trial and the appellate courts, petitioner has not convinced this Court of the existence of any. Re: Positive Identification -Ernitas testimony that she saw Marturillas at the crime scene is credible because the spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from her house. Undoubtedly, Ernita is familiar with the accused, who is her neighbor, and a long-time brgy capt of the locality when the incident took place. Ernita was also able to see his face while he was running away from the crime scene. The identification of a person can be established through familiarity with ones physical features. Once a person has gained familiarity with one another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance. Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural communities generally know each other both by face and name, and can be expected to know each others distinct and particular features and characteristics. -Ernitas recognition of the assailant was made possible by the lighted two fluorescent lamps in their store and by the full moon. In corroboration, Lito testified that the place where the shooting occurred was bright. The trees and plants growing in between Ernitas house and the place where Artemio was shot to death did not impede her view of the assailant. To be sure, the prosecution presented photographs of the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinities. These photographs gave a clear picture of the place where Artemio was shot. Admittedly, there are some trees and plants growing in between the place where the house of Ernita was located and the spot where Artemio was shot. Notably, however, there is only one gemilina tree, some coconut trees and young banana plants growing in the place where Artemio was shot. The trees and banana plants have slender trunks which could not have posed an obstacle to Ernitas view of the crime scene from the kitchen window of her house especially so that she was in an elevated position. -Given the proper conditions, the illumination produced by a kerosene lamp, a flashlight, a wick lamp, moonlight, or starlight is considered sufficient to allow

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the identification of persons. In this case, the full moon and the light coming from two fluorescent lamps of a nearby store were sufficient to illumine the place where petitioner was; and to enable the eyewitness to identify him as the person who was present at the crime scene. Settled is the rule that when conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Even where the circumstances were less favorable, the familiarity of Ernita with the face of petitioner considerably reduced any error in her identification of him. Neither was there any indication that Ernita was impelled by ill motives in positively identifying petitioner. Re: Inconsistency Between Affidavit and Testimony -Although Ernita stated in her testimony that she had recognized the victim as her husband through his voice, it cannot necessarily be inferred that she did not see him. Although she recognized him as the victim, she was still hoping that it was not really he. Thus, the statement in her Affidavit that she was surprised to see that her husband was the victim of the shooting. Ex parte affidavits are usually incomplete, as these are frequently prepared by administering officers and cast in their language and understanding of what affiants have said. Nevertheless, the alleged inconsistency is inconsequential to the ascertainment of the presence of petitioner at the crime scene. They referred only to that point wherein Ernita ascertained the identity of Artemio as the victim. They did not relate to Ernitas identification of petitioner as the person running away from the crime scene immediately after she heard a gunshot. Re: Statements Uttered Contemporaneous with the Crime -It was to be expected that, after seeing the victim stagger and hearing the cry for help, Santos would shift his attention to the person who had uttered the plea Help me pre, I was shot by the captain. A shift in his focus of attention would sufficiently explain why Santos was not able to see the assailant. Santos never pointed to petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime. His statements corroborated those of Ernita and therefore simply added credence to the prosecutions version of the facts. If it were true that he had an ulterior motive, it would have been very easy for him to say that he had seen petitioner shoot the victim. Re: Dying Declaration

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-Rule 130.37: The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. -Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of death, are entitled to the highest degree of credence and respect. Persons aware of an impending death have been known to be genuinely truthful in their words and extremely scrupulous in their accusations. The dying declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who knows of ones impending death will make a careless and false accusation. Hence, not infrequently, pronouncements of guilt have been allowed to rest solely on the dying declaration of the deceased victim. -To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarants death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death; 3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that person been called upon to testify. -The law does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death. The perception may be established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the declarants injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of impending death. Even if the declarant did not make an explicit statement of that realization, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full consciousness of being in a dying condition. -As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the victim was complete, as it was a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning. It [was] complete and [was] not merely fragmentary. Testified to by his wife and neighbor, his dying declaration was not only admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and telling piece of evidence. Re: Res Gestae -The fact that the victims statement constituted a dying declaration does not preclude it from being admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of both are present. -Rule 130.42: Part of the res gestae. -- Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. -Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation. -A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, when the following requisites concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. -All these requisites are present in this case. The principal act, the shooting, was a startling occurrence. Immediately after, while he was still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, the victim made the declaration without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating petitioner. Also, the declaration concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the latters statement was correctly appreciated as part of the res gestae. -Aside from the victims statement, that of Ernita -Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akong bana? (Captain, why did you shoot my husband?) -- may be considered to be in the same category. Her statement was about the same startling occurrence; it was uttered spontaneously, right after the shooting, while she had

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no opportunity to concoct a story against petitioner; and it related to the circumstances of the shooting. 2. YES. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain the conviction of petitioner. The dying declaration made by the victim immediately prior to his death constitutes evidence of the highest order as to the cause of his death and of the identity of the assailant. This damning evidence, coupled with the proven facts presented by the prosecution, leads to the logical conclusion that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. SC considered the ff: a. Santos testified that he had heard a gunshot; and seen smoke coming from the muzzle of a gun, as well as the victim staggering backwards while shouting, Help me pre, I was shot by the captain. b. Ernita testified that she had heard a gunshot and her husbands utterance, Help me pre, I was shot by the captain, then saw petitioner in a black jacket and camouflage pants running away from the crime scene while carrying a firearm. c. Ernitas statement, Captain, why did you shoot my husband? was established as part of the res gestae. d. The version of the events given by petitioner is simply implausible. As the incumbent barangay captain, it should have been his responsibility to go immediately to the crime scene and investigate the shooting. If he were really innocent, he should not have simply left. e. The prosecution was able to establish motive on the part of petitioner. The victims wife positively testified that prior to the shooting, her husband was trying to close a real estate transaction which petitioner tried to block. This showed petitioners antagonism towards the victim. -These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was petitioner who shot and killed the victim. Where an eyewitness saw the accused with a gun seconds after the gunshot and the victims fall, the reasonable conclusion is that the accused had killed the victim. -To be sure, conviction in a criminal case does not require a degree of proof that, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. That some pieces of the above-mentioned evidence are circumstantial does not diminish the fact that they are

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of a nature that would lead the mind intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, toward the conviction of petitioner. Circumstantial, vis--vis direct, evidence is not necessarily weaker. Re: Paraffin Test & Corpus Delicti - The negative paraffin test result and the prosecutions failure to present the gun used in the shooting is not enough to exculpate the accused from the crime. The choice of what evidence to present, or who should testify as a witness is within the discretionary power of the prosecutor and definitely not of the courts to dictate. -A negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. It is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when culprits wear gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or are bathed in perspiration. -The prosecution was able to give sufficient proof of the corpus delicti -- the fact that a crime had actually been committed. [Corpus delicti] is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide with the use of unlicensed firearms, to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom, or x x x to the seized contraband cigarettes. Re: Alibi -As held by the CA: [Petitioners] alibi is utterly untenable. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Here, the locus criminis was only several meters away from [petitioners] home. In any event, this defense cannot be given credence in the face of the credible and positive identification made by Ernita. Disposition Petition is denied. Assailed Decision and Resolution are affirmed with modifications. [SC reviewed amount of damages, since an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review. SC awarded P50k as indemnity ex delicto, P25k for temperate damages, P50k for moral damages, P312k for loss of earning capacity, P20k for attorneys fees, plus costs.] G.R. No. 170491 CHICO-NAZARIO; April 4, 2007 (edel) Nature: Certiorari under Rule 45 Facts: -M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by Bangpai allegedly bumped and damaged NAPOCORs Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port. -NAPOCOR then filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against Bangpai for the alleged damages caused on the power barges. -NAPOCOR filed an Amended Complaint dated 8 July 1996 impleading Wallem as additional defendant, contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai. -Bangpai & Wallem filed their respective Motions to Dismiss which were denied by J. Codilla. -NAPOCOR after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, Bangpai and Wallem filed their respective objections to said formal offer of evidence. - J. Codilla denied (through an order) the admission and excluding from the records NAPOCORs Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-markings. -According to the court a quo: The record shows that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced the originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies by contending that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the document" xxxthe Xerox copies do not constitute the electronic evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidencexxx However, these excluded evidence should be attached to the records of this case to enable the appellate court to pass upon them should an appeal be taken from the decision on the merits to be rendered upon the termination of the trial of this case. - NAPOCORs MR was denied and so the filed a petition for Certiorari via R64 before the Court of Appeals maintaining that J. Codilla acted with GAD amounting to

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lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the admission of its exhibits and its sub-markings. - CA dismissed the petition as it appeared that there was no sufficient showing by NAPOCOR that there was GAD. It appeared that the pieces of documentary evidence which were denied admission were not properly identified by any competent witness. Also, they found that the judge acted within the pale of his discretion when he denied admission of said documentary evidence for in Sec 3 of Rule 130 of the RoC, when the subject of inquiry are the contents of documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original documents themselves, except in certain cases specifically so enumerated therein, and the petitioner has not shown that the non-presentation or non-production of its original documentary pieces of evidence falls under such exceptions. Lastly, the CA said that the information (in said exhibits) were not received, retrieved or produced electronically and that NAPOCOR had not properly authenticated such evidence as electronic documents. - Hence, the instant petition wherein NAPOCOR insists that the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own premise that an "electronic document" as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Rather, "electronic document" can also refer to other modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the sections catch-all proviso: "any printout or output, readable by sight or other means". ISSUE: WON the photocopies are indeed electronic documents as contemplated in RA No. 8792 or the IRR of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence/ WON said electronic documents qualify under the one of the exceptions of Best Evidence Rule so that those may be admitted as documentary evidence HELD: NO/NO. Reasoning: -A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by NAPOCOR will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may

NAPOCOR v. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR. [BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, & WALLEM SHIPPING, INC.]

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be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a persons signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. - According to the SC, the TC did not commit an error when it denied the admissibility of the photocopies as documentary evidence as Napocor failed to establish that its offer falls under the exceptions (as herein enumerated). Best Evidence Rule under Rule 130 (as discussed by the SC): When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places. - History of BER: Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the originals. But the modern justification for the rule has expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule. (Lee v. P of the Phils) -DEFINITION: "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. -The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. * NOTE: It was also said that NAPOCOR continued to obdurately disregard the opportunities given by the TC for it to present the originals of the photocopies it presented BUT at the SC it prayed that it be allowed to present the originals of the exhibits that were denied admission or in case the same are lost, to lay the predicate for the admission of secondary evidence. However, SC denied said prayer. DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED. CA DECISION of 9 November 2005 AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

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guard on duty, on the nape and ordered Lani and Ariel to lie face-down. The robbers took the duffel bags and the gun of Dimas. - Right after the robbery, Dimas told Ariel that one of the robbers is his fellow guard, Pepito Capila. He then called reported the incident to the police, the Meralco security division, and the security agency. - The police arrived at the scene 10 min after the call. When questioned by SPO4 Maximo, Dimas said that one of the robbers is Pepito Capila, his fellow sekyu. - A criminal case for robbery was filed with the RTC against Pepito and Dimas and 4 others. The prosecution evidence included of the testimony of SPO4 Maximo and Ariel, but not of Dimas. RTC acquitted everyone except Pepito. Pepito appealed to CA on the ground that the RTC erroneously admitted in evidence Dimas statement that Pepito is one of the robbers for being hearsay and that he was denied due process for not being given a chance to cross examine Dimas because Dimas didnt testify. CA affirmed RTC decision. ISSUES 1. WON the statement of Dimas is admissible 2. WON Pepito was denied due process HELD 1. YES. The statement of Dimas is part of the res gestae. - Res gestae is a Latin phrase which literally means things done. As an exception to the hearsay rule, it refers to those exclamations and statements by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as spontaneous reactions or utterances inspired by the excitement of the occasion, and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and fabricate a false statement. - The reason for the rule is human experience. It has been shown that under certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, the state of nervous excitement which occurs in a spectator may produce a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions produced by the external shock. As the statements or utterances are made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, such statements or utterances may be taken as expressing

CAPILA v. PEOPLE GR No. 146161. July 17, 2006. Sandoval-Gutierrez (ina) FACTS - Lani and Ariel, employees of Pilipinas Bank, went to the Meralco collection office in JP Rizal, Makati to get the collection totaling around P1.3M. They packed the money in duffel bags and padlocked them. While waiting for the armored van, two armed men approached them. The robbers hit Dimas dela Cruz, the

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the real belief of the speaker as to the facts he just observed. The spontaneity of the declaration is such that the declaration itself may be regarded as the event speaking through the declarant rather than the declarant speaking for himself. The requisites for the admission of res gestae in evidence are (with corresponding compliance in this case): (1) that the principal act or the res gestae be a startling occurrence (The principal act, which by any measure is undoubtedly a startling occurrence, is the robbery); (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and the statement is made during the occurrence or immediately or subsequent thereto (Dimas informed Ariel and SPO4 Maximo right away. When questioned by SPO4 Maximo, Dimas, who was still shocked, named petitioner herein as one of the robbers. His statements to Ariel and SPO4 Maximo were made before he had the time and opportunity to concoct and contrive a false story.); and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances (The statement of dela Cruz refers to the robbery or incident subject matter of this case.). 2. NO. Even though the declarant is not presented as witness, the statement is not hearsay since it forms part of the res gestae.

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