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Religious Peace ActivismThe Rational Element of Religious Elites Decision-making Processes

Alexander De Juan/Johannes Vllers


GIGA Research Programme: Violence and Security
___________________________

April 2010

www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers

No 130

GIGAWP130/2010 GIGAWorkingPapers Editedbythe GIGAGermanInstituteofGlobalandAreaStudies LeibnizInstitutfrGlobaleundRegionaleStudien The GIGA Working Papers series serves to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication in order to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate.Anobjectiveoftheseriesistogetthefindingsoutquickly,evenifthepresentations arelessthanfullypolished.InclusionofapaperintheGIGAWorkingPapersseriesdoes notconstitutepublicationandshouldnotlimitpublicationinanyothervenue.Copyright remainswiththeauthors.Whenworkingpapersareeventuallyacceptedbyorpublished inajournalorbook,thecorrectcitationreferenceand,ifpossible,thecorrespondinglink will then be included on the GIGA Working Papers website at <www.gigahamburg.de/ workingpapers>. GIGAresearchunitresponsibleforthisissue: ResearchProgrammeViolenceandSecurity

EditoroftheGIGAWorkingPapersseries:BertHoffmann <workingpapers@gigahamburg.de> Copyrightforthisissue:AlexanderDeJuanandJohannesVllers Englishcopyeditor:MelissaNelson Editorialassistantandproduction:SilviaBcke AllGIGAWorkingPapersareavailableonlineandfreeofchargeonthewebsite <www.gigahamburg.de/workingpapers>. Foranyrequestspleasecontact: Email:workingpapers@gigahamburg.de Phone:++49(0)4042825548 The GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies cannot be held responsible for errorsoranyconsequencesarisingfromtheuseofinformationcontainedinthisWorking Paper;theviewsandopinionsexpressedaresolelythoseoftheauthororauthorsanddo notnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheInstitute. GIGAGermanInstituteofGlobalandAreaStudies LeibnizInstitutfrGlobaleundRegionaleStudien NeuerJungfernstieg21 20354Hamburg Germany Email:info@gigahamburg.de Website:www.gigahamburg.de

GIGAWP130/2010

ReligiousPeaceActivismTheRationalElementof ReligiousElitesDecisionmakingProcesses
Abstract Religiouselitesareactiveforpeaceinmanyviolentconflicts.Normativeexplanationsof tendonotsufficetoexplaintheirengagement.Inthispaperwedrawonthefindingsof socialmovementresearchtoidentifythefactorsthatinducerationallyactingreligiousel itestobeactiveforpeace.Itistheirrelationshipstothegovernment,otherreligiouselites, and believers that can motivate them to call for peace. However, they will do so only if theyanticipatebasedontheoverallinfluenceofotherreligiouspeace(co)activists,the structure of the religious community, and the frame environmentthat they will not be penalizedfortheirengagement.Religiousnormsareanimportantmotivationbehindreli giouspeaceactivism,butrationaldecisionmakingalsohastobetakenintoaccountifreli giousengagementforpeaceistobeexplainedfully. Keywords: Religion,conflict,peace,elites,rationalchoice,framing Dr.AlexanderDeJuan waspreviouslyaresearchfellowintheGlobalChallengespostgraduateresearchprogram attheUniversityofTbingen.HeiscurrentlyworkingasaprojectmanageratKfWEnt wicklungsbank. Contact: JohannesVllers,M.A. isapoliticalscientistandaresearchfellowattheGIGAInstituteofAfricanAffairs. Contact: vuellers@gigahamburg.de Website: http://staff.gigahamburg.de/vuellers http://staff.en.gigahamburg.de/vuellers alexander.dejuan@web.de

Zusammenfassung ReligisesFriedensengagementDasRationaleElementinder EntscheidungsfindungreligiserEliten ReligiseElitenengagierensichinvielenGewaltkonfliktenfrFrieden.NormativeRecht fertigungenfrihrVerhaltenknnendiesoftmalsjedochnurunzureichenderklren.Zur IdentifizierungvonFaktorenfreinFriedensengagementrationalerreligiserElitenstt zenwirunsaufdieErkenntnissederSozialenBewegungsforschung.DieBeziehungreligi ser Eliten zur Regierung, zu anderen religisen Eliten und den Glubigen motiviert sie zuFriedensaufrufen,frdiesichjedochnurdannengagieren,wennsiedavonausgehen knnen, dass von anderen religisen Friedensaktivisten, der Struktur ihrer Religionsge meinschaftunddemFrameUmfeldkeineGefahrenfrihrEngagementzuerwartensind. Religise Normen sind zwar eine bedeutsame Grundlage fr religises Friedensengage ment,zurErklrungdesZustandekommensvonFriedensengagementsolltejedochdiera tionaleEntscheidungsfindungreligiserElitenbercksichtigtwerden.

ReligiousPeaceActivismTheRationalElementof ReligiousElitesDecisionmakingProcesses
AlexanderDeJuanandJohannesVllers

ArticleOutline 1 2 3 4 5 Introduction ReligiousEngagementforPeaceasaCounterframingMethod TheMotivesbehindReligiousEngagementforPeace TheRisksandOpportunitiesofReligiousFramesforPeace Conclusion

1 Introduction Inmanyviolentconflicts,religiousactorshaveeffectivelycontributedtopeace.Clericshave mediated between the parties to the conflict. Peace movements have gathered in churches, mosques,andtemples.Believershaveprotestedforhumanrights,democracyandpeaceunder thebannerofreligion.ThecommitmenttopeaceonthepartoftheGrandAyatollahSayyidAli alHusaynialSistaniinIraq;theDalaiLamainTibet;ortheinterreligiousnetworksinNige ria,Uganda,andthePhilippinesarebutafewcurrentexamples. Mostexistingstudiesonreligiousengagementforpeacearelimitedtotheanalysisof thepeaceactivitiesthemselves.Theyfocusondescribingthespecialpotentialaswellthedif ferenttypesofreligiousengagementforpeace.1Otherworksaremainlyempiricalinnature. Theyfocusondescribingreligiousactivitiesinsinglecases.2However,anobviousquestionis neglectedinallofthesestudies:underwhatcircumstancesisreligiousactivismforpeaceob servable?
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AbuNimer/KadayificiOrellana 2008; Carter/Smith 2004; Sampson 1997; Appleby 2001; Little/Appleby 2004; Harpviken/Roislien2008;Johnston/Cox2003;TerHaar2005. Cejka/Bamat2003;PalmDalupan2005;Steele2003;Wooster1994;Poethig2002;Sampson1994;Smock2006; Nichols1994;Johnston1994;Haynes2009;Little2007.

AlexanderDeJuan/JohannesVllers:ReligiousPeaceActivism

In answering this question, one can focus on various dimensions of religion such as identities,ideas,organizations,andelites(Harpviken/Rislien2008;Basedau2009).Wewill concentrateonthelatter.Religiouselitesarepeoplewhosestatusenablesthemtoinfluence religiousnormsettingprocessesmoreeffectivelythantheaveragebeliever.Membersofthe officialclergy,theleadersofreligiousmovementsandsects,andinfluentialmissionariesbe longtothereligiouselite.3Theyhaveincommonthatthebelieversacceptthemaslegitimate interpreters of the common religious scripts and traditions (Appleby 2003). Consequently, theyarecrucialindeterminingtherolereligionwillplayinagivenviolentconflict. Wefocushereonaspecialtypeofreligiousengagementonthepartofelitesthatisof ten neglected in academic debates: religious calls for peace, which can countervail violent propaganda and thus counteract mass mobilization. Such calls can be especially effective when they address religious calls for violence. If rebel groups are trying to use religious rhetoric to mobilize believers, clerics and their religious calls for peace can effectively con tributetopeace.4Thelatterfiguresaretheoneswhopossessthenecessaryreligiouscredibil ityamongthebelieverstochallengeradicalreligiousinterpretationsofconflict.5Againstthis background,wewillfocusonthefollowingquestion:underwhatcircumstancesdoreligious elitescallforpeaceasachallengetotheradicalreligiouspropagandaofrebelgroups?6 Itisoftentakenforgrantedthatsuchcallsforpeacearebasedonreligiouspeacenorms as well as the beliefs of individual religious elites (Gopin 2000; Butselaar 2005). No doubt such factors play a crucial role. They might help to explain the engagement of individuals suchasMahathmaGhandiorDesmondTutu.However,theydonotconstituteacomprehen siveexplanationofthecircumstancesunderwhichreligiouselitesbecomeactiveforpeace.In many conflicts, rapid changes occur in the behavior of large parts of the clerical establish ment.Religiouseliteswhohavebeenactiveinthedisseminationofradicalreligiousinterpre tations suddenly begin advocating peace when the social or political framework changes. SuchshiftshavetakenplaceinRwanda,Thailand,andIraq.Theycannotbeexplainedonthe basisofreligiousnormsandbeliefsalone.Instead,theyareindicationsofrationaldecision making.
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Usuallythetermeliteisusedtocharacterizeasuperlative(themostinfluential).However,wealsoinclude clericsoflowerranksinthecategoryofelites.Theessentialelementofthedefinitionisthedifferentiation fromthemasses.Duetotheirstatuswithinthereligiouscommunity,elitesinfluenceonreligiousnormset tingishigherthanthatofthemajorityofthebelievers(Appleby2000).

Besides,religiouselitescanbeactiveforpeaceindifferentways.Theycanactasneutralobserversorasme diators between the parties to the conflict, and they can provide organizational resources for peace move ments(seeSampson1997).

Religiousengagementforpeacereferstoalltheactivitiesofreligiouselitesthatareintendedtopreventorend violentconflicts,regardlessofwhethercontributetotheperpetuationofunjustsocialandpoliticalstructures. Inthisarticleweonlyconsiderthepeaceactivitiesofnationalreligiouselites.Wepresumethattheengage ment of international religious organizations is based on other mechanisms than the activities of religious communities that are involved in the conflict themselves are. Hence, these other forms of engagement for peacehavetobeanalyzedseparately.

AlexanderDeJuan/JohannesVllers:ReligiousPeaceActivism

Hence,wearguethatthesimplereferencetoreligiousaltruismandcharityisinmany casesnotapersuasiveexplanationofreligiousengagementforpeace.Oftenstrategicconsid erations make religious elites become advocates for peace. Their relationships to the gov ernment,tootherreligiouselites,andtobelieverscaninfluencetheirbehavior.Furthermore, therisksofpeaceactivitieshavetobetakenintoaccount.Inacuteviolentconflictsactivists forpeacemaybedenouncedastraitorsandthreatenedphysically.Thehighertheprobability that religious elites will prevail over religious calls for violence, the lower these risks. The probability of success will be especially high if religious calls for peace are supported by a broad coalition of local and highranking religious elites, if the religious congregations are connected through formal interlinkages, and if the various religious communities are stronglynetworked. Inordertoestablishthesetheses,wefirstelaborateontherelevanceofreligiouscalls for peace, drawing on social science research and the concept of collective action frames (CAFs).Thesuccessofrebelgroupsdependsontheirabilitytodisseminatepersuasivemobi lizingmessages.Accordingly,religiouscallsforpeacecanbeinterpretedascounterframesto suchmobilizingreligiousmessages.Inthiscontextwebrieflyoutlinethedifferentformsof religiousengagementforpeace.Subsequently,weidentifythefactorsthatcanmotivatereli giouselitestoactivelycounterreligiouscallsforviolence.Wedifferentiatebetweenthosefac tors that can motivate religious elites and those factors that can affectthe risks ofreligious callsforpeace.Theconcludingsectionsummarizesthecentralthesesandtheresults.

2 ReligiousEngagementforPeaceasaCounterframingMethod Thecurrentresearchonthecausesofcivilwarsfocusesonstructuralfactors;itconcentrates oneconomic,political,andethnicdeterminants(Fearon/Laitin2003;Hegre/Sambanis2006). However,ittendstoneglectthedynamicsofmobilization.Peoplesreadinesstosupportvio lentmovementsdoesnotdependsimplyonstructuralgrievances.Themajorityofapopula tion will only engage in violent conflict if its members have congruent perceptions of how theirsituationistobeinterpretedandhowitcanbechanged(Barkeretal.2001;Snowetal. 1986: 465466; Polletta/Ho 2006; Fearon/Laitin 2000). Such collective conflict interpretations only evolve simultaneously on a broad scale if they are formulated and spread centrally (Barkeretal.2001:45;Morris/Staggenborg2004:173).Insocialmovementresearchtheterm framingisusedforsuchinterpretationanddissemination.Itresultsinsocalledcollective actionframes(CAFs).CAFsareschemesofinterpretationthatexplainrealityinasimplified way in order to mobilize support and to demobilize antagonistic parts of the population (Snow2004:384;Benford/Snow1988;2000).ViolentmovementsuseCAFstomobilizepeople togotowar.Onlyiftheyareabletopersuadethepopulationoftheirinterpretationofthe conflict,iftheyconvincethepeoplethattheyareabletochangetheirsituationandthatvio lenceisthebestwaytodoso,willtheybeabletomobilizesupport.Againstthisbackground,

AlexanderDeJuan/JohannesVllers:ReligiousPeaceActivism

peacemaking can consist of a rhetorical act. Peace activists can challenge the mobilizing CAFs of violent movements and defend their own interpretation of the conflict. If their counterframes prevail, they will be able to demobilize people and to contribute to peace. Giventhestructuralfocusofthecurrentresearchonthecausesofviolentconflicts,suchrhe toricalpeaceactivismisoftenneglected. Religious peacemaking can be particularly important and effective in conflicts with a strongreligiousdimension.WhenincorporatedintoCAFs,religionscancontributetothees calationofconflicts.Otherwisefragmentedgroupscanbeunitedonthebasisofcommonre ligious beliefs, myths, and rituals. On the other hand, religious identities can mark insur mountable differencesbetweengroups.Hence,theycanbeeffective inthedefinitionofin groupsandoutgroups(Appleby2000:61;Seul1999:565).Further,ifconflictsareperceived asbeingreligiousinnature,theycanhardlyberesolvedinapeacefulway.Religiousbeliefsare nonnegotiableandindivisible.Ifconflictsareintegratedintoatranscendentalcontext,peaceful conflict resolution is practically ruled out (Hasenclever/Rittberger 2003; Svensson 2007). Fi nally,thepromiseoftranscendentrewardsandpunishmentscanincreaseindividualreadi nesstobearthesacrificesofviolentconflictandtouseviolence.Combatantswilltendtobe morereadytokillanddieforhigherreligiousgoalsthanforpoliticaloreconomicprograms (Appleby2003;Hasenclever/Rittberger2003). Religion will have such amplifying effects if believers are persuaded of the religious nature of a conflict.Analyses of the sociology of religion demonstrate that religious norm settingprocessesarestronglyinfluencedbyreligiouselites.Abstractandcomplexmyths,re ligiouswritings,andtraditionsneedtobecontinuouslyinterpretedinthelightofachanging reality.Otherwisetheycannotbeappliedtoconcreteeventsandsituations.Ineveryreligious communitytherearepeoplewhoareacceptedbythebelieversaslegitimateinterpretersof religiousdogmas.Theyexplainconcretesituationsinthelightoftheirspecificsystemsofbe lief.Theyapplyabstractreligiousideastorealityandprovidethebelieverswithconcretere ligiousnormsandguidelines(Appleby2000).Hence,religionswillcontributetoviolenceif thesereligiouselitesaresuccessfulindisseminatingradicalreligiousinterpretationsamong thebelievers.InsuchcasesreligionbecomesapartofCAFsandcontributestomobilization (DeJuan/Hasenclever2009).ThiscouldbeobservedinBosnia,wheremembersoftheCatho licChurchandtheSerbianOrthodoxChurchmobilizedbelieversonthebasisofradicalreli giousmessages.ManyBuddhistmonksinSriLankaplayedasimilarroleintheconflictwith the Tamil minority. In Nigeria, Muslim and Christian clerics have on several occasions in cited violent clashes between the two religious communities. In the Philippines and Thai land, Muslim clerics have supported rebel groups within the Muslim minorities through radical religious calls for violence against their respective central governments (Bartholo meusz2002;Ibrahim1991;Sells1996).

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Accordingly,religiousengagementforpeacecanconsistofreligiouselitesattemptsto prevent such radical religious norm setting.7 The elites try to counter the religious calls for violence uttered by radical rebel groups and their associated religious elites. Trough their engagementtheyaimtoprovidethebelieverswithalternative,moderateinterpretationsofa conflict.Themorepersuasivetheseinterpretationsare,thesmallertheradicalframeschance of a successful mobilization. Firstly, segregation among religious groups can potentially be counteractedthroughanemphasisoncommonreligiousvalues.Thiskindofcounteraction canbeobservedinIraq.ThecurrentcommunalviolenceisbasedontheradicalintraIslamic differentiation between Shiites and Sunnis. Among the latter, Abu Musab alZarqawi de claredtheShiitestobenonbelieversinordertosuccessfullymobilizetheSunnis.However, in2004hisformermentorAbuMuhhamedAlMaqdisistartedtopubliclyquestionhisinter pretation. Contrary to Zarqawi, AlMaqdisi emphasized that Shiites are Muslims and that anyattackonShiiteswouldbeillegitimate(Yehoshua2005).Secondly,religiousengagement forpeacecanconsistofthenegationofthereligiousnatureofconflictsandattemptstocall attentiontothepossibilitiesforpeacefulmeansofconflictresolution.InmanyMuslimcoun triestoday,religiouscontestsinwhichmoderateclericspubliclychallengeotherreligiousel itesdeclarationsofholywarcanbeobserved(Wiktorowicz2004;Snow/Byrd2007).Finally, religious peace activism can call religious legitimizations of violence into question by em phasizingthereligiousimperativeofnonviolenceandpeace.InSriLanka,forexample,the embeddingoftheconflictwiththeTamilminorityintothenarrativeofanuncompromising warfortheholylandhasbeenanessentialconditionforthesuspensionoftheBuddhistim perativeofnonviolence.Inthiscontext,engagedBuddhistshavechallengedthereligiousle gitimizationofviolenceandstressedthepriorityoftheimperativeof nonviolenceoverthe imperativeofdefendingthereligion(Bartholomeusz2002). Hence, religious elites can play a decisive role in fostering peaceful means of conflict resolutionwhentheychallengeradicalreligiouscallsforviolence.However,theyarenotac tive in this way in every conflict with a religious dimension. Under what circumstances, then,issuchreligiousengagementforpeaceobservable?

3 TheMotivesbehindReligiousEngagementforPeace The motives behind religious engagement for peace are rarely questioned in the academic debate.Manystudiesinsteadinvestigatethereasonsbehindreligiouscallsforviolenceand trytodevelopcausalmodelsthatexplainthecircumstancesunderwhichreligiouselitesbe comeactiveinfavorofviolentmovements(Appleby2000;DeJuan2009;Toft2007).Acade
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Religiouselitescanalsobeactiveforpeaceinapreemptiveway,forexample,byfosteringrelationsandcontact betweendifferentreligiouscommunitiestopreventthedevelopmentofstereotypes.However,inthisarticlewe concentrateontheengagementinviolentconflicts.

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mic interest in the causes of religious engagement for peace is limited. The reason for this seemstobeanoverlyoptimisticperspectiveonreligion.Whereasreligiouscallsforviolence areoftentracedbacktospecificstructuralfactorsaswellastheinstrumentalizationofreli gion by selfinterested elites, it seems to be agenerally accepted fact that religious engage mentforpeaceisalwaysgroundedinpersonalreligiousbeliefsandaltruism.Withoutdoubt thesefactorsplayadecisiveroleinmanycases.However,inmanyviolentconflictsreligious activitiesforpeacerestnotonpersonalconvictionsbutonstrategicconsiderations.Religious elitesareintegratedintodifferentrelationshipsthatmightinfluencetheirbehavior.Ofspe cialimportancearetheirrelationshipstothegovernment,tootherreligiouselites,andtobe lievers.Intheremainderofthissection,weillustratehowtheserelationshipscaninfluence clericsactions.Wedonotstrivetoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofdecisionmaking,but rathertodemonstratethatrationaldecisionmakingcaninfluencereligiouselitesbehavior.

ReligiousElitesRelationshiptotheGovernment Religionselitesneedmaterialandorganizationalresourcestofulfilltheirreligiousandsocial responsibilities. Proselytizing, offering religious education, operating churches, mosques or temples, and providing social services is costly. Furthermore, religious communities need specific legal conditions that enable believers to freely practice their religion. This legal frameworkisdeterminedbypoliticalelites(Philpott2007).Ifreligiouscommunitiesarede pendentonthegovernmentsgoodwillinordertoaccesstheseresourcesandiftheydonot expecttoprofitfromthevictoryoftheoppositionmovement(eitherbecauseitsmembersbe long to another religion or because a victory by the rebels does not seem likely), there is a significant probability that their religious elites will support the government when it is threatenedbyoppositionalmovements.Iftheydonot,theyruntheriskthatpoliticalactors willceasetheirsupporttothecommunity.Furthermore,theremightbeasubstantialriskthat thegovernmentcouldbeoverthrownandthatsupporttoreligiouseliteswouldendasare sult.Thus,ifreligiouselitesaredependentongovernmentsupport,theywilltrytocondemn everycallforviolenceagainsttherulingregimeandwillcallonbelieverstorefrainfromvio lenceandtoacceptthestatusquo(Hasenclever/DeJuan2007;Johnston/Figa1988). With the socalled Patronage of IslamAct, the government of Thailand has made the countrysMuslimreligiousestablishmentmoredependentonthestate:acentralized,state controlledreligiousstructurehasbeenestablished,andthereligiouseliteswithinthisstruc ture are paid by the state. Accordingly, in the conflict over the autonomy of the Malay Muslimstatesinthesouthofthecountry,manyoftheseclericshavesupportedthegovern mentagainsttherebels.Religiousinterpretationsoftheconflicthaveplayedamajorrolein themobilizingideologyoftheMuslimrebelgroups.MuslimclericswithintheofficialMus lim establishment have publicly challenged these religious interpretations and called for peace(CheMan1990;Yusuf1998;Gilquin2002).

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DuringthecolonialperiodinMozambiquetheCatholicChurchwashighlydependent on the governments financial and political support. When a growing independence move mentbegantochallengetheregime,Catholicclericsstartedtocondemnviolentprotestsand to preach submission to the colonial power. Supporting the independence movement was declared an act against Gods will. With these religious interpretations these clerics chal lengedthereligioussupportgiventothemovementbymanylocalclerics,whodrewonlib erationtheologytolegitimizeprotestsagainstthegovernment.Similarsituationscanbeob servedinmanyotherAfricanandLatinAmericancountries,forinstance,AngolaandNica ragua(Azevedo1992;McKenna1997;Schubert1997;Sawchuk1997). InIndonesianWestPapua,conflictsbetweenChristianandMuslimcommunitieshave onseveraloccasionsescalatedintoviolentclashes.WithinChristianmilitias,religiousinter pretationsoftheconflicthavegrowninimportance.Rebelgroupshavetriedtomobilizethe populationonthebasisofradicalreligiousinterpretations.However,outoffearofgovern mentpunishment,thereligiouselitesoftheCatholicChurchhavepubliclycondemnedany religiouslegitimizationofviolenceagainstthestate(May1991;Rutherford2005).

ReligiousElitesRelationshiptoOtherReligiousElites Within religious communities, different theological positions, worldviews and concepts of socialorderamongthevariousreligiouselitescanclash(Johnston/Figa1988:42;Haynes1996). Hence,clericswilltrytoprevailovercompetingreligiouselitesandtomaximizetheirown communitysaccesstomaterialandorganizationalresources.Suchintrareligiouscompetition canformthebackgroundtoreligiousengagementforpeace.Thiscompetitionmanifestsitself inmutualchallengesoftheotherstheologicalinterpretations.Competingreligiouselitestry to strengthen their own position by publicly challenging the religious interpretations and credibilityoftheirreligiousrivals.Ifoneofthesecompetingfactionsisengagedinreligious callsforviolence,engaginginreligiouscallsforpeacecanbeapromisingstrategyforitsop ponents(DeJuan2009).8 In Chechnya, intrareligious competition played a decisive role in the engagement of various religious elites for peace. Most Chechens belong to one of the major Sufi Tariqahs: QadiriyyaorNaqshbandiyya.BeforethefirstChechenwar,manyQadiriyyaclericssuppor ted Dschochar Dudajews nationalist government because they expected that Dudajew wouldstrengthentheirpositionagainsttheNaqshbandiyya.Intherunuptothewar,these clericsdisseminatedradicalreligiousinterpretationsoftheconflictandsupportedDudajews uncompromising stance towards the Russian government. Many Naqshbandiyya religious
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Engagementforpeaceisbutonestrategyinsuchintrareligiouscompetition.Analternativeoptionwouldbe callsforviolenceagainsttherebelgroupsandassociatedclerics.Therelativevalueofthesetwostrategiesde pendsontheindividualcontext(forexample,theinterestsofthepoliticalelitesinthegovernment).Hence,in trareligiousrivalriescanfosterpeaceengagementbutdonotdosoeverycase.

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elites openly challenged the religious interpretations and messages of their religious rivals andcalledforpeaceandcompromisewiththecentralgovernment(Gammer2000;Rotar2001; Yemelianova2001).ItwasonlywhentheactualRussianinvasionbeganthattheytoobegan callingforviolence. In many Muslim communities clerics have lost their traditional monopoly over reli giousinterpretation.Newcommunicationstechnologyhasprovidedbelieverswithdirectac cesstoreligiousknowledge.Inthisway,acrucialbasisforthetraditionalreligiousauthority of the clerics has been lost: the monopoly over the preservation and dissemination of reli gious knowledge (Robinson 1993). In many places a new stratum of religious intellectuals has emerged that has acquired its knowledge independently. These individuals do not rec ognizethetraditionalauthorities.SomearetryingtoforcefullyIslamizepoliticsandsociety; sometrytoachievethesegoalsbyviolentmeansandbymobilizingsupportamongbelievers. Membersofthereligiousestablishmenthavevehementlychallengedthereligiousinterpreta tions and worldviews of such radical groups. They condemn radical calls for violence and insteadcallforpeaceinordertoprotecttheirpersonalpositionwithinthereligiouscommu nity.Thiscanbeobserved,forexample,inAlgeriaandEgypt. Inmanyconflictsreligiouselitesengageforpeaceafterhavingsupportedforalong timethe radical religious interpretations of violent movements. Such shifts can be traced backtothefactthatrivalreligiouseliteshavestartedtosupportthesameviolentmovement. Inthissituationclericsmightreactbyabandoningtheirpreviouscallsforviolenceandpub liclychallengingthenewviolentinterpretationoftheirreligiousrivals.InThailand,forex ample,thefounderoftheMalayMuslimrebelmovementtheNationalRevolutionaryFront (BRN)distancedhimselffromthegroupin1984,onceotherreligiouseliteshadgainedinflu ence within the movement. He founded the socalled BRN Ulama and started to call for peace, summoning the rebels to lay down their arms. Similarly, in Iraq the militia leader Muqtada alSadr was supported by the influential cleric alHariri. However, when alSadr increasinglyclaimedthereligiousleadershipofthemovementhimself,alHariristartedtodis tancehimselffromalSadrandtocondemnhisviolentpolitics(Gilquin2002:119;ICG2006).

ReligiousElitesRelationshiptoBelievers The social influence of religious communities also depends on how many members they have.Themorepeoplebelongtoareligiouscommunity,thegreaterthecommunitysinflu enceontheconstitutionofsociety.Usuallybelieversandtheirreligiousdonationsformthe financialbackboneoftherespectivereligiouscommunityandreligiousestablishment(Miller 2002:438).Hence,acentralaimofreligiouselitesistosecurethesizeoftheirreligiouscom munity, especially if its religious influence is not artificially protected by the government. Theeliteswilltrytopreventanyconflictbetweentheirownreligiousinterpretationsandthe realityofbelievers.Religionsaremeanttoprovideexplanations.Ifreligiousmessagescon

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tradicttheperceptionsandlifesituationsofbelievers,religiouselitesruntheriskthatpeople willturntoalternativeclericsandtheirreligiousinterpretations(Silbermanetal.2005,Ben ford1993).Insuchasituationclericswilloftenactstrategically. In many conflictsafter years of violencea strong sense of war weariness develops amongthepopulation.Thepublicbeginstoincreasinglycondemnactsofviolenceandtheir perpetrators.Peopledistancethemselvesfromviolentmovements.Personalexperiencesand sufferingasaresultofthewarleadpeopletoquestionthenecessityandbenefitsofviolence andtocallforareturntopeace.9Religiouscondemnationsofviolenceandcallsforpeacecan be very influential in such an environment. This can be observed in Sudan, where, in the middleofthewar,Christianchurcheshavebeenimpressivelysuccessfulintheirproselytiz ing efforts. Within a few years they have massively gained in influence among the local populationthroughtheirreligiouspeacesermons(Wheeler1997;Hutchinson2001).Accord ingtotheextenttowhichreligiouscallsforpeacegainininfluence,thosereligiouseliteswho haveincitedviolenceoractedpassivelyinthepastthencomeunderpressure.Iftheydonot adapttheirbehaviorandtheirreligiousmessages,theyriskloosingtheirreligiousinfluence. AftertheRwandangenocidein1994,manybelieverslefttheCatholicChurch.Catholicclerics hadactivelysupportedtheHabyarimanaregimeanditspolitics.Manyofthemhadplayed an active role in the genocide. Others had watched the militias passively. Even after the genocide, highranking clerics were hesitant to condemn what had happened.As a conse quence, many people distanced themselves from the Catholic Church. Simultaneously, the MuslimcommunityandmanyPentecostalchurchesgrewrapidly(Klsener2006;Doughty/ Ntambara2005). TheconflictsinSudanandRwandademonstratethatreligiouselitesmighthavemuch towiniftheybecomeactiveforpeaceandmuchtoloseiftheydonot.Adaptingtheirreli giousmessagestochangingconflictinterpretationswithinthepopulationinordertoprevent alossofreligiousinfluenceduringoraftermanifestviolentconflictscanthusbeastrategic decisiononthepartofreligiouselites.Suchstrategicbehaviorcanbeobservedinmanycon flicts,especiallyinthepostconflictphasewhenmanifestviolencehasendedandmanypeo plelongtoreturntoapeacefullife(Fox2004:23).Onmanyoccasions,religiousactorswho havelongcontributedtotheescalationofaconflicthavethenreversedtheirreligiousinter pretationsofit.Theycallforpeaceandforgivenessandtrytoadapttheirreligiousmessages totheexpectationsofbelievers.InBosnia,forexample,manyclericshavebeenactiveinfos teringforgivenessandreconciliation,althoughtheypreviouslyincitedintoleranceandsup portedthesegregationofMuslims,CatholicsandSerbianOrthodox(Steele2003).Asimilar
9

ThiscanbeobservedinUgandaorinChechnya.Theprevioussupportforviolentmovementsonthepartofthe populationdecreasedinthecourseoftheconflict.Therebelgroupsevolvedfrommassmovementstoisolated guerrillagroups.However,violentconflictsdonotalwaysdevelopinthisway.Inmanyconflictscontraryde velopments take place and peoples acceptance of peaceful means of conflict resolution diminishes. In these casestheeffectonthereligiouseliteswouldbeexpectedtobecontrarytothatnamedabove(seeCole2007).

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situationcanbeobservedinIreland.ReligiouselitesintheCatholicandtheProtestantcom munities long contributed to the escalation of the conflict between the two denominations. However,astheviolenceended,thepositionofthechurchesbecamemuchmoremoderate andconstructive.Insteadofemphasizingtheinsurmountabledifferencesbetweenthecom munities,theybegantounderscorethepossibilityofpeacefulcoexistence.

4 TheRisksandOpportunitiesofReligiousFramesforPeace Ifreligiouselitesactrationally,theiractionsarealsoinfluencedbythepotentialcostsoftheir engagement for peace. Clerics who are committed to peace in violent conflicts take some risks.Thereisapossibilitythat,iftheycallforforgivenessandtoleranceinasettingwhere peopleareoppressedorviolated,theywillbestigmatizedastraitorsbythoseaffected(Little/ Appleby2004).Inadditiontophysicalthreats,thereisdangerthatbelieverswillabandonthe clerics because they do not believe in their peace appeals, or that other influential clerics fromwithintheircommunitywillcondemnthem.Finally,theriskexiststhatradicalpolitical groupswillthreatenthem.Clericsareawareoftheserisksandtakethemintoaccountinde cidingfororagainstactivepeaceengagement. Accordingly, the question of what influences the level of risk arises.10 It must be as sumedthattheriskswillbelowerifthesereligiouscallsforpeaceprevailoverreligiouscalls forviolence.Aslongasclericsradicalreligiousmessagesofviolencesucceedindominating theinternaldiscourseinareligiouscommunity,thegreateristhelikelihoodthatclericscall ingforpeacewillfacetheabovementionedrisks.Inviewofthis,clericswillespousepeace whentheyexpectthattheyareinapositiontosurmounttheopposingreligiouscallsforvio lence. Their chances of success are related especially to the strength of the religious peace coalition,thecharacteristicsofthereligiouscommunity,andtheempiricalcredibilityofreli giouscallsforpeace.

TheStrengthofPeaceCoalitions Therisksforindividualclericsareloweriftheydistributepeacemessageswithintheframe workofabroaderandinfluentialcoalitionofreligiouselites.Thisimpliesthatthemorecler ics of different hierarchical ranks are engaged in a coalition, the higher the possibility that theycaneffectivelychallengecallsforviolencefromotherreligiouselitesdirectedattheirbe lievers.Suchalliancesprovidecredibilityinvariouswaysandhavetheabilitytoeffectively
10

For religious calls for peace to be successful, they have toconsider several nonreligious surrounding condi tions,suchasthefurtherdevelopmentoftheconflictorthebehaviorofpoliticalandcivilelites.Inourview, thesefactorsarenotcrucialinthedecisionmakingprocessesofreligiouselites.Thefactorsmentionedinthe followingdiscussionarethemostimportantones,butitmustbenotedthatotherfactorscouldhaveaninflu enceuponthedecisionsofreligiouselitesinspecificcases.

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transmittheirmessagestobelieversthroughdiversechannels.Nevertheless,thisholdstrue forboththedominantframeandthecounterframewithinonereligiouscommunity. Theclericsarethevisiblefaceoftheirframes;theircredibilitydeterminesthecredibility oftheparticularframe(Wiktorowicz2004:161;Benford/Snow2000:621622).Theholdersof high holy offices are seen as the official spokespeople of their religious community due to theirformalposition.Theysymbolizetheologicalknowledgeandsacralauthority(Wiktoro wicz2004:161;DeJuan/Hasenclever2009;Carroll1981;Nepstad2004).Nevertheless,thehier archicallevelisonlyoneelementofthepotentialaccessibilityandcredibilityofaframe.Fur thermore,localreligiouselitessuchaspriests,imamsandgurusareoftenactiveoveralong timeperiodintheircommunityandthereforewellestablished.Theirdailycontactwithpeople andtheirlongtermcharitableengagementmakethemcredible(Appleby2001:826827). Religiouspeacemessagesprevailoverreligiouscallsforviolenceiftheyreachbeliev ers.Whatmattersisthatthemessagescanbetransportedtothelatter.Highrankingclerics normally have access to the communications infrastructure of their religious community. This infrastructure includes supraregional networks, important religious schools, churches, andmosques.Ontheotherhand,localclericshaveadifferentkindofaccesstobelievers.Often theyrepresenttheonlydirectcontactthatbelievershavetoaninstitutionalizedreligion.Lo cal religious elites thus have a unique capacity to deliver their religious interpretation di rectly to the people through religious worship, discussion groups or common prayers (Polletta/Ho2006:201;Johnston/Figa1988;Longman1998). Withincoalitionsofhighrankingandlocalreligiouselites,theriskforeachindividual clericthatbelieverswillrejecthis/hermessageofpeaceandabandonhim/herdecreases.In such a coalition the individual messages of peace and condemnations of violence are sup ported and witnessed by many other potentially credible clerics.Additionally, as the influ enceofthepeacecoalitiongrows,itsinfluencebecomesamotivationalfactorinitself:clerics willingness to support the messages of broad and influential peace coalitions grows as the former try to be part of the dominant religious discourse within their community. But the weakerthecoalition,thehighertheriskwillbefortheindividual cleric.Inmanyconflicts, for instance, in Thailand or the Philippines, similar processes can be observed: if religious peacecoalitionsachieveacertainstrengthandinfluence,moreandmorepassiveorviolence supportingclericsjoin. However, the idea that peace engagement will exist if peace engagement has already existed appears to be a circular argument. Nonetheless, two important conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the abovementioned motivational mechanisms must surpass a certain thresholdtooperateatall.Thatistosay,thegreaterthenumberofclericsfromdiversehier archical ranks who are affected by these motivational factors, the greater the number who willbepreparedtoengageforpeaceandthemorelikelyitisthatpeaceengagementwillbe observableatall.Secondly,astheimpactofapeacecoalitiongrows,thepeacecoalitionitself actsasamotivationalfactor.Believersacceptthecallsfor peace,andthusitbecomesmore

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difficult to defend opposing interpretations to believers. Correspondingly, it is more likely thatclericswillincreasinglyengageinpeaceeffortseventhoughtheythemselvesarenotaf fectedbytheoriginalmotivationalfactors.

TheStructureoftheReligiousCommunity The structure of the religious community has an ambivalent influence on possible peace frames.Religiouscallsforpeacecanbeextraordinarilyeffectiveininstitutionalizedreligious communities. The institutionalized character of the community can increase the above mentioned selfenergizing effect. Conversely, the institutionalized structure can also sup pressreligiouspeaceinitiativesbyincreasingtheriskofsuchengagementforreligiouselites. Believers have access to the diverse interpretations of the different religious elites if communities have formal structures to connect the various parishes among themselves. Structuressuchasnationalreligiousorganizations,regionalandlocalcouncils,andmiscella neoussupraregional,supraethnic,andsupradogmaticaffiliationscreateareligiouspublic sphere in which diverse interpretations must be justified and in which religious calls for peacecanchallengeradicalinterpretations(Hasenclever/DeJuan2007).Furthermore,iffor malmechanismsregulatetheaccesstofinancesandmaterialresourcesortheconfiguration of religious education in a religious community, religious peace coalitions can utilize these structurestoeffectivelychallengeradicalelites.Inthisregard,JohnstonandFigahavedem onstratedthattheabsenceofformalnetworkssimplifiesthepropagationofradicalinterpre tationsbylocalreligiouselitesbecausetheseelitesdonothavetofearsanctions(Johnston/ Figa1988:44).Likewise,Foxnoticedinhisstudythatreligiouscommunitieswithmarginal formalcontactsamongthemselvesareinvolvedmostofteninviolentconflicts(Fox2004:99). Thefactthattheseformalstructurescanincreasetheeffectivenessofreligiouscallsfor peaceisobvious,forinstance,inIraqorintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC).Ayatollah alSistanipropagatedhisreligiouscallsforpeaceoverawidenetworkinallregionsofIraq. Simultaneously, he used his influence to marginalize the radical elements within the tradi tionalstructures(Gleave2007:6570;Cole2003).IntheDRCtheCatholichierarchyusedthe churchs communications media network to disseminate its calls for peace. For example, it distributed its peace calls through pastoral letters which were distributed to all parishes in thecountry.Theimportanceoftheinternalstructureisobviousinthisspecialcase,asonlyin theeastoftheDRCwerereligiouscallsforviolencesuccessful.Inthisregiontheindividual parishesweremoreorlessisolatedfromthecentralstructureoftheCatholicChurchduring theongoingwar.Thus,thepeacepromotingcommunicationfromthecentralchurchdidnot reachthemeffectively(Longman2001). Furthermore,structureswhichprovidethebelieverswithaccesstodiversereligiousin terpretations may not only increase the efficiency of religious calls for peace but may also enhance the willingness for peace engagement within the religious community. They may

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advance the strength of the abovementioned selfenergizing effects of the peace engage ment.Otherclericsmotivationtojointhepeacecoalitionmayincreasewiththegrowingim pactofthereligiouspeacecoalitioninthecommunityandthegrowingassertivenessofthe peacepromotingmessages.Theimpactofthesemechanismsisespeciallygreatifthevarious parishes of one religious community are connected among themselves, and if the religious authorityofsingularclericsisallocatedthroughformalmechanisms.Thepeacecoalitioncan effectivelyuseitsgrowinginfluenceinthereligiouscommunitytomarginalizeradicalclerics and to distribute its calls for peaceas a credible alternative in every parish of the religious community. Furthermore, during these long processes the willingness of the clerics to be comepartofthepeacemessagesofthereligiousmajoritygrowsbecausetheydonotwantto losetheirownpositionwithintheircommunityortheloyaltyoftheirbelievers. Factorswhichincreasetheeffectivenessofreligiouscallsforpeacecouldalsodecrease theriskthataccompaniesthesecalls.Theinstitutionalintegrationofreligiouselitesactsina preventivemannerbecauseitallowsforthedissenting(radical)interpretationsofindividual clericstoberecognizedforwhattheyare.Otherreligiouselitescantheneffectivelycondemn theseradicalclericsand/orquestiontheminfrontoftheirbelievers.Inthismannertheim pactofindividualclericsdependsonthesupportorlackofsupportfortheirmessagesonthe partofotherreligiouselites.Butwhathappensifthereligiousmessagesofviolencearenota dissenting opinion in the religious community? If the violent discourse is dominant, then thesemechanismscouldhaveanequallysuppressiveeffectonindividualsengagementfor peace.Theythenmakeiteasierforthemainstreamtodiscredittherepresentativesofmoder atepeacepromotingmessages.Simultaneously,thepeacepromotingclericscouldeffectively be penalized: they could be either isolated from access to the religious communitys re sourcesordeposedfromtheirrank. Theimpactofthesemechanismshasbeenobviousinstronglyformalizedcommunities liketheSerbOrthodoxChurchinBosniaortheBuddhistcommunityinSriLanka.Sincethe 1950stheBuddhistcommunityinSriLankahasbeendominatedbymonkswhohaveadvo catedanuncompromisingapproachtowardstheTamilminority.Anumberofthemhavedis seminated these fundamental principles in their sermons and their teachings since inde pendence(DeSilva/Bartholomeusz2001).Thosemonkswhohavesuggestedconcessionsto theTamilsaselementsofreligiouspeaceinitiativeshavebeenbrandedastraitors.Duetothe hierarchical andstronglyformalizedstructure ofthecommunity,themoreradicalmajority ofmonkshasbeenabletooppressthepeacefulmessagesoftheminority.Furthermore,the overwhelming majority of the monks who have taken a moderate, conciliatory position to wardstheTamilminority,haveaccordingasurveyofBuddhistmonksfromthe1980shad aweakandunderprivilegedstatuswithintheBuddhistcommunity(Katz1988). AnanaloguesituationexistedwithintheSerbianOrthodoxChurch.Whenthechurch finallyescapedalongperiodofmanipulationandoppressionattheendofYugoslaviasTito era,ittriedtogainmoreinfluence.Inthecourseofthisprocess,aneoconservativeopposition

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securedinfluencewithinthechurch.Atthebeginningofthe1990sitthengrewtobecomethe dominant faction in the religious community and thus limited the role of the moderates within the church. During the war, this neoconservative wing played an important part in thereligiouslegitimizationofviolence.Here,too,individualclericalopponentsexisted,such asBishopHrizostominthenortheastofBosniaorthepriestmonkIgnatijeMidic.Bothcon demnedthealliancebetweenthechurchandthenationalistsandthedisplacementofMus limsinBosnia(Steele2003:136137;Radic1998:197).Nevertheless,thereligiousmajorityef fectivelyoppressedthesevoices. Theseexamplesraisethequestionofhowtheseradicalviewpointswereabletogainin fluenceintherespectivereligiouscommunitieswhenthestructuresshouldinfacthavesup portedthepreviouslydominantmoderateclerics.Bothcasesshowthatthisoccurredmainly via external political support. Nationalist politicians supported the radical clerics in Bosnia andSriLanka.Thispoliticalinterferencediminishedtheeffectofthepeacefavoringreligious communitys structure. Similar mechanisms have been observed in other countries, for in stance,inRwandapriortothegenocideorinChechnyaatthebeginningofthe1990s(Radic 1998;DeSilva/Bartholomeusz2001;VanHoyweghen1996;Rotar2002).

TheCharacteristicsoftheFrameEnvironment Interpretations of conflict are never propagated in a vacuum but are rather integrated in a specific structural and cultural context (Benford/Snow 2000; Williams/Kubal 1999; Swidler 1986; Polletta/Ho 2006: 194; Williams 2004). People will believe in religious messages more easilywhenthesemessagescorrespondtotheirstructuralandculturalcontextandthustheir dailyreality.Accordingly,theempiricalcredibilityofreligiouscallsforviolenceorpeaceis predominantlyaffectedbytheattitudeofbelieverstowardsbelieversofanotherreligion.Re ligiouscallsforviolenceareusuallybaseduponareligiousdefinitionofinandoutgroup,of friendandfoe(Seul1999).Therefore,religiousframesforpeacewillbemoresuccessfulun derconditionsinwhichthelivedrealityofbelieversdoesnotcorrespondtosuchadistinc tion.Incontrast,aframeenvironmentwithaningroup/outgroupdistinctionbetweenreli gious communities favors religious frames for violence. In such a situation there is a great riskthatbelieverswilldistancethemselvesfromclericsandtheircallsforpeacesimplybe cause the peace message stands in contrast to daily experiences with or perceptions of the otherreligiouscommunity.Asclericstrytopreventsituationsinwhichthereisasubstantial riskthatbelieverswilldistancethemselvesfromtheirinterpretations,theywillthereforebe reluctant to engage for peace themselves in communities with weak relations to other reli gious communities. Accordingly, the likelihood of religious calls for peace decreases the moretherespectivereligiouscommunitiesareisolatedfromeachother. Conversely,religiouscallsforviolencewillbeatoddswiththedailylifeofbelieversif, forexample,institutionalizedinterreligiousdialogueforumsexistatthelevelofthebelievers

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andattheleveloftheclerics;ifthecommunitiessharecommonreligioustraditionsorritu als;orifahighlevelofsocialcrosslinkagesbetweenreligiouscommunitiesexists,forexam ple,familiarrelationsandmixedmarriages.Thelatterincreasethelikelihoodthatreligious callsforpeacewillbeenforced. In Thailand the interreligious relationship between Muslims and Buddhists was rela tively harmonious over a long period of time. The religious communities shared local cus tomsandrituals;reciprocaldistinctionsandisolationsweretheexception(Haemindra1977; Horstmann 2004). These traditionally positive relations between the religious communities hampered the success of radical messages atthebeginningoftherebellioninthe1960s.In Chechnyatheoppositesituationexisted.Here,theinterreligiousrelationshipbetweenMus lims and Christians was not deeply rooted. The dominant Sufi brotherhoods were mainly private organizations. Many of their supporters cut themselves off from Soviet society and avoided contact with nonbelievers (LemercierQuelquejay 1983; Khalilov 2002). Thus the number of ethnically mixed families in predominantly Chechen regions was exceptionally small(Bryan1992:197).Likewise,theinterreligiousdialoguebetweentheMuslimandChris tianOrthodox communities was little developed and hardly institutionalized. Cooperation wasofapragmaticnatureandaboveallspontaneous.Underthesecircumstances,theradical messages of religious distinction from rebels and clerics in the second Chechen war had a highlevelofempiricalcredibilityamongthebelievers. Thelargersocialenvironmentalsoplaysasignificantroleinthedecisionmakingproc essesofreligiouselites.Oneimportantdimensioniscivilsociety.Theconfigurationofcivil society in relation to the religious demography is important for religious frames for peace. Institutionalizedcivilsocietieswithoverlappingreligiousboundariesareabletoincreasethe effectivenessofsuchframes.Theycontributetointerreligiousunderstanding,enhancecon tact, and create forums for exchange between believers (Varshney 2001: 375). Under such conditionsreligiouselitescancrediblypointtocommonalitiesandcanrebutstereotypesby referringtoexistingcontactsbetweenthedifferentreligiouscommunities.Theimportanceof civilsocietyhasbeenimpressivelydemonstratedinastudybyVarshney.Atthebeginningof the1990s,manycitiesinIndiaexperiencedviolentriotsbetweenHindusandMuslims.Yetin otherIndiancitieswithcomparabledemographicconditionsnoviolenceoccurred.Varshney plausiblylinksthesefindingstothedifferentstructuresofthevariouscivilsocieties.Novio lenceoccurredincivilsocietieswithcloseformalizedcontactsbetweenbelieversfromdiffer entreligiouscommunities(Varshney2001).Undertheseconditionsthepeaceframehadthe highestlevelofempiricalcredibilityandalsocorrespondedtotheinterestsofthemajorityof thepopulation. Inlightoftheimportanceoftherelationshipbetweenreligiouscommunities,thecru cialroleplayedbythespecificmomentoftheengagementforpeaceisclear.Sustainedperi odsofpeacecanresultinthedevelopmentofpositivegrouprelations,bothatthecivilsoci etylevelandattheinterreligiousrelationslevel,andcansubsequentlyreducetheempirical

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credibilityofreligiouscallsforviolence.However,onceexistingconflictshaveescalatedinto violence,thedangerexiststhatcivilsocietystructuresandtherelationshipbetweenvarious believers will change rapidly. Mixed marriages become more rare; interreligious dialogue breaksoff;andcivilsocietystructuresarereducedtoindividualcommunities.Furthermore, the daily life of people then corresponds with the religiously delimiting and violence supportingmessages.Insuchaphase,religiouscallsforpeacewillbelesslikelytosucceed. Fromtheperspectiveofclerics,theinevitablerisksofengagingforpeacewillincrease;reli gious calls for peace will thus become rare. Only after long periods of violence do the chances of success once again increase. A hurting stalemate (Zartman 1985) may increase peoplescallsforapeacefulsettlementoftheconflict,asexplainedabove.Insuchasituation notonlytheclericsmotivationtoadvocateforpeacebutalsothechancesofsuccessofthe correspondingcallsforpeacewillincrease(Jessopetal.2008;Kelleher/Johnson2008).

5 Conclusion In contrast to the extensive studies on religious escalation, religious engagement for peace has previously received little academic attention. This is especially true with respect to the causalexplanationsforsuchengagement;thatis,thequestionofwhyreligiouselitesengage inpeacefulconflictresolution.Intherecentdebatetheimplicitassumptionthatthebehavior ofreligiouselitesisbasedupontheirnormativeconvictionshasdominated.Thus,clericses pouse peace because this complies with the peaceful imperative of their religion. From the perspectiveofsocialscience,however,asolelinktoindividualreligiousbeliefsisnotasatis factoryexplanation.Furthermore,thejustificationforthecompleteomissionofrationalele mentsintheanalysisofreligiouselitesdecisionmakingprocessesisnotclear.Oftenclerics areexcludedfromrationalanalysisbecauseitisassumedthattheyactupontheirreligious beliefs and moral considerations. Nevertheless, elites may also act rationally and purpose fully in pursuit of their religious goals. It is conceivable that religious elites, regardless of their underlying religious beliefs, decide to engage for peace because it mayseemstrategi callyusefulinagivensituation.Moreover,itisnotplausiblethattherelationshipsinwhich believersareintegratedarenottakenintoconsiderationbyreligiouselites. Given these shortcomings, our argument in this article has been that rational consid erationscouldplayaroleinreligiousengagementforpeace.Inourview,religiouselitesof tenappealforpeacewhentheyareunilaterallydependentonpoliticaleliteswhoarebeing attacked by rebels. Additionally, religious competition within a religious community may causepeaceframingtoberegardedasapromisingtoolforwinningbelievers.Finally,believ erscouldalsopersuadereligiouselitestoundertakepeaceframingbyexertingahighlevelof pressure.Whenweassumethatreligiousleadersactinarationalway,itseemsplausiblethat they assess the chances of success and the risks of a possible peace engagement as part of their decisionmaking process. Their decision to support peace or violence will largely de

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pendontheframeenvironment.Insituationsinwhichclericsanticipatethattheirmessages will be effectively challenged by other clerics and that their engagement will reduce their ownreligiousinfluence,thelikelihoodthatreligiouscallsforpeacewillbemadedecreases. Crucialinthisregardistherelativestrengthofthereligiouspeacecoalition,thestructureof thereligiouscommunity,andtheparticularframeenvironment. None of the abovementioned factors (the elites relationships to the government, to other religious elites, and to the believers; the strength of the religious peace coalition; the structureofthereligiouscommunity;theframeenvironment)worksinisolation.Theyinflu enceeachotherandtogetheraffectthebehaviorofreligiouselites.Theycanreinforceorop poseeachotherforexample,whenthemotivationforactionemanatesfromthethreelevels oftheelitesrelationshipsmentionedabovebuttherisksofpeaceengagementareextremely high.Thisleadsustotheconclusionthat,ineverysinglecase,theimportanceofallfactors andtheirinteractionwithoneanotherneedstobetakenintoaccount.Onlyinthismanner can we understand how rational decisionmaking processes influence the behavior of reli giouselites. This does not mean that normative aspects are irrelevant. Undoubtedly, many clerics areengagedforpeacebecausethisisinkeepingwiththeirinherentreligiousbeliefs.None theless,ourargumentisthatthisexplanationonlyappliesinsomecases.Oftenthebehavior ofreligiouselitescanonlybeunderstoodifitisacknowledgedthatstrategicconsiderations alsoinfluencetheirdecisions.Whenoneacknowledgesthisrationalityonthepartofclerics, theirreligiousengagementforpeaceinmanyconflictscanbeaccuratelyexplained.

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