OCTOBER 2011

Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in crisis through knowledge and practice

Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises:

Four Case Studies

Daniel Maxwell and John Parker

Table of Contents
Acronyms 3 IntroductiontotheCaseStudies 5 Haiti 6 Pakistan 13 Kenya 21 CtedIvoire 29 References 34

Cover photograph byThe CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change,Agriculture and FoodSecurity(http://wwwflickrcom/photos/cgiarclimate/6149769051/)

Acronyms
ACF ALRMP CERF CFS CNSA  CRC CWGER DCO EFSA EHAP ERC FAC FAO FATA FEWSNET M&E GFSC GOH GOP HC HRR IASC IDP IFRC  ActionContrelaFaim(ActionAgainstHunger) AridLandsResourceManagementProject CentralEmergencyResponseFund CommitteeonWorldFoodSecurity CoordinationNationaledelaScuritAlimentaire (NationalCoordinationforFoodSecurityinHaiti) CrisisResponseCenter ClusterWorkingGrouponEarlyRecovery DistrictCoordinatingOfficer EmergencyFoodSecurityAssessment EmergencyHumanitarianActionPlan EmergencyReliefCoordinator FoodAidConvention FoodandAgricultureOrganization FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas FamineEarlyWarningSystemsNetwork MonitoringandEvaluation GlobalFoodSecurityCluster GovernmentofHaiti GovernmentofPakistan HumanitarianCoordinator HumanitarianResponseReview Inter-AgencyStandingCommittee InternallyDisplacedPerson InternationalFederationofRedCrossandRed CrescentSocieties

Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

INGO IOM IPC KFSM KFSSG KHPF KRCS MCRAM

InternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganization InternationalOrganizationforMigration IntegratedFoodSecurityPhaseClassification KenyaFoodSecurityMeeting KenyaFoodSecurityMeeting/SteeringGroup KenyaHumanitarianPartnershipForum KenyaRedCrossSociety Multi-ClusterRapidAssessmentMission

MINUSTAH UnitedNationsStabilizationMissioninHaiti MT NDMA OCHA OHCHR SAM SIDA UNDAC UNDP UNHCR UNICEF USAID WASH WFP WHO MetricTon NationalDisasterManagementAuthority OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights SevereAcuteMalnutrition SwedishInternationalDevelopmentCooperationAgency UnitedNationsDisasterAssessmentandCoordination UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees UnitedNationsChildrensFund UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment Water,Sanitation,andHygiene WorldFoodProgram WorldHealthOrganization

Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

Introduction to the Case Studies

Thefollowingcasestudieswerebasedondocumentaryreviewand interviewswithkeyinformantsinfourcountriesTheyarenotabout theactivitiesoftheglobalFoodSecurityClusterperse,becausemost ofthecasespredatethelaunchoftheglobalclusterRather,thecases explore a range of issues related to coordination, around the backgroundtotheformationofthecluster,andtheplethoraofissuesthat ariseonthegroundinafoodsecuritycrisis Asaresult,thecasestudieshighlightsomeissuesthatdirectlyrelate totheoperationofclustersatthecountrylevel,andsomethatrelateto clusterleadagencyresponsesandclustermemberresponsesTheseare differentfromtheactualactionsoftheglobalFSCitself,buthighlight thekindsofissuesonthegroundthattheglobalFSCwillhavetoeitheraddressdirectly,orprovideguidancetocountryclustersattempting to address themThe purpose of the case studies is therefore to highlighttheseissuesassomeofthechallengesfacingtheglobalFSC andtodrawattentiontosomeofthelearningfromthesecontextsthat theglobalFSCcanbeinstrumentalintransmittingtoothercontexts Thecasesgiveaquickoverviewofthecrisis,thebackground,the food security impacts of thecrisis, theresponse, coordination issues, andlessonslearnedfromtheexperienceThecoordinationissuesarisingandthelessonslearnedweretheprimarydatafortheanalysisin thefirstpaperontherole,mandate,andchallengesoftheglobalFood SecurityCluster

Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

Haiti
On January 12, 2010, a magnitude 70 earthquake struck Haitis OuestProvince,approximately16kilometersfromthecapital,Portau-PrinceTheearthquakedevastatedPort-au-Princeandsurrounding areas,displacingmorethanonemillionpeople,causing$8billionto $14billionineconomicdamages,andresultinginanestimated230,000 deaths(althoughtheexactnumberofcasualtiesfromtheearthquake remainsdisputed)(GoH2011,IOM2010,Cavalloetal2010)While the earthquake was the most devastating natural disaster ever to hit Haiti,itwasjustoneofmore-thantwentyinternationallyrecognized naturaldisasterstoafflictthecountryoverthepasttwodecades(Faubert2006)Haitisgeographiclocationandsteeptopographyexposeit toavarietyofnaturalhazards;however,recurringnaturaldisastersin Haiticomeagainstabackdropofprotractedandinterconnectedpolitical,economic,livelihoods,andenvironmentalcrises,whichmakeHaiti particularly vulnerable to the effects of all kinds of shocks (Faubert 2006,Rencoretetal2010,PellingandUitto2001) Background Evenpriortotheearthquake,thefoodsecuritysituationinHaiti wasprecariousBeginninginthemid-1980s,Haitisagriculturalsector beganaperiodofsteadydeclineafteritwasopeneduptointernational trade without accompanying support to enhance the sectors competitiveness(ConceicoandMendoza2009,Mazzeo2009)When riceimporttariffswerereducedinthemid-1990s,Haitigrewincreasinglydependentonimportedriceandultimatelyshiftedfrombeing anetexporteroffoodtobeingalargenetimporter(AriasandCarneus 2010, Mazzeo 2009) From 1980 to 2004, Haitis rice imports increased from approximately 16,000 metric tons per year to over 270,000metrictonsperyearOverthissametimeperiod,domestic riceproductionremainedstagnantatanestimated70,000metrictons peryearandthepercentageofHaitisdomesticallyproducedricesupplydeclinedfrom47percentoftotalriceconsumptionin1988to15 percentin2008(ConceicoandMendoza2009,Weisbrotetal2010, SuarezandRubio2010)AsHaitisrelianceonimportsforbasicfood commoditiesincreased,itbecamesubjecttovolatilityinglobalfood pricesThis vulnerability was highlighted during the 200708 food price crisis, when global rice prices rose 141 percent over a threemonthperiodbetweenJanuaryandApril2008,settingoffsocialunrest inHaitithatculminatedinaseriesofviolentfoodriotsinseveralcities

andtheoustingoftheprimeministerTocontrolinstability,theHaitiangovernmentanddonorcommunityrespondedbyimplementing aricesubsidyprogram1andprovidingemergencyfoodaidassistance and short-term employment programs (Seelke and Hornbeck 2008, AriasandCarneus2010) OntheheelsofHaitisfoodpricecrisis,threetropicalstormsand onehurricanehitbetweenAugustandSeptember2008,causingover 700deathsandaffectingover800,000peopleinnineofitstenregions (Boutroue2008)InAugust2008,theclusterapproachwasrolledout for the first time in Haiti to coordinate the humanitarian response to the stormsThe food response was coordinated by two separate clusters:theFoodAidCluster,ledbyWFP,andtheAgricultureCluster,ledbyFAOThefoodaidresponseinvolveddistributingfoodto morethan500,000beneficiaries(Boutroue2008)WhiletheFoodAid Clusterwasfacedwithchallengesrelatedtofooddistributioninthe urbansettingofGonaives,includinghighlevelsofviolence,longwaitinglines,thepoliticizationoffoodaidforlocalelectioncampaigns,and theexistenceofaparallelfoodaidcoordinationsystemledbyUSAID, theclusterwasconsideredwellorganizedandcommitted(Binderand Grunewald2010)Theagricultureresponsetothestormsmainlyinvolvedthedistributionofseedsandtoolstoaffectedruralhouseholds (Boutroue2008)ActivitiesintheAgricultureClusterwerenotvery effective,inpartbecauseofhumanresourceissuesandinpartbecause theglobalAgricultureClusterprovidedminimalsupportandguidance (BinderandGrunewald2010) In 2009, the food security situation in Haiti improvedA milder hurricaneseasonandmoreevenlydistributedrainfallcontributedto betterharvests,whichhelpedtoincreasetheavailabilityoflocalproductsinmarketsandlowerfoodprices(FEWSNET2009) Food Security Impacts Therelativeimprovementsinfoodsecuritywereshort-lived,however, as the January 12, 2010, earthquake caused immediate and severefoodsecurityimpactsinbothearthquake-affectedareasandthe countrysideInthedaysfollowing,accesstofoodandwaterbecame particularly difficult in affected areasThe destruction of vital infrastructure,includingroads,bridgesandfoodstoragefacilities,aswellas ashortageofgasandvehiclesfortransportation,shutdownfoodsupplychainsTheearthquakedestroyedHaitismajorport,whichtem1 The rice subsidy program was designed to maintain the selling price from rice importerstodistributorsatUS$43per50kgbag(AriasandCarneus2010)

Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

porarily halted food import and distribution systems (Food Cluster 2010)Thelossofproductiveassetsandincome-generatingactivities deterioratedhouseholdpurchasingpower There was an immediate sharp rise in staple food prices shortly after the earthquake and by the end of January the price of wheat flourhadrisenbynearly70percent,localmaizeandblackbeansby 3035 percent, and imported rice by 2030 percent (CNSA 2010) Priceseventuallybegantostabilizeafterthewidespreaddistribution of emergency food aid (FEWS NET 2010)An estimated 598,000 peopleleftareasaffectedbytheearthquakeforthecountryside,which increasedtheburdenonregionsthatwerealreadyfoodinsecureand environmentallydegradedandcausedsomehosthouseholdstoresort toextremecopingmechanisms(FAO2010,CNSA2010,Grunewald andRenaudin2010)ArapidEmergencyFoodSecurityAssessment (EFSA)carriedoutbytheCoordinationNationaledelaScuritAlimentaire (CNSA), in coordination withACF, Oxfam, FEWS NET, FAO andWFP, identified a total of 1,280,000 food-insecure people inaffectedareas,theequivalentof52percentofhouseholdssurveyed (CNSA2010) The Response The first responders to the earthquake mainly consisted of local civil society, but within 24 hours, UNDAC and urban search and rescueteamsarrivedinPort-au-Prince,followedshortlybytheUS military,otherUNagencies,andalargeinfluxofinternationalNGOs (GrunewaldandBinder2010)Withinthefirsttwodays,thecluster systemwasactivatedandfivekeyclustersweremobilized,including the Food ClusterWhile the quick mobilization of the response has been applauded, the initial food distributions of ready-to-eat meals, deliveredfromthebackoftrucksorairdroppedfromhelicoptersor parachute, were criticized as being poorly planned and coordinated while potentially endangering beneficiaries (Grunewald and Binder 2010, Grunewald and Renaudin 2010) Once the general food distribution system was set up, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)andUSmilitarysubsequentlyplayedalargerrolein providinglogisticalsupportThegoalofthegeneralfooddistributions wastomeetimmediateneedsbyprovidingready-to-eatmeals,rice, andfullfoodrations(IASC2010)Inadditiontogeneraldistributions, targetedfoodassistancewasprovidedinhospitalsandorphanagesand throughmobiledistributionsandcommunitykitchens(IASC2010) At the end of March, the Haitian government called for general fooddistributionstocease,duetotheirperceivednegativeimpacton

Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

Haitisagriculturaleconomyandlocalmarkets(Atkisson2010,IASC 2010) Members of the Food Cluster had some concern about this decisionduetouncertaintiesabouttheavailabilityoflocalproductsin marketsandtheabilityofHaitianstoaccessthemduetohigherprices (FoodCluster2010)BytheendofMarch,anestimatedfourmillion peoplehadreceivedfoodaidAfterfooddistributionswerephasedout attherequestoftheHaitiangovernment,thetransitiontootherfoodrelatedinterventionswasdelayed,resultinginatwoorthreemonth gapbetweeninterventionsThistransitiongapwasnotduetoalackof resources,butmainlytoinadequateplanning(Interview2011) The agriculture response involved mainly the provision of seeds, toolsandfertilizer,butalsosupportedpreparednessactivities,including cash-for work activities related to watershed management and reforestation(IASC2010)TheAgricultureCluster,ledbyFAO,sufferedfromlimitedfundingandthefundingitdidreceivewasdelayed (Chan2010,GrunewaldandBinder2010)BytheendofFebruary, thefundingforAgricultureClusteractivitieshadonlyreceived8percentofitsrequest,makingitdifficultforclusterpartnerstorefillseed stocks in time for the planting season (Chan 2010, Grunewald and Binder2010)TheEarlyRecoveryCluster,ledbyUNDP,coordinated cash-for-workprogramsandemployedapproximately200,000people (IASC2010)Negativesideeffectsofthecash-for-workprogramswere uniformsthatbeneficiarieswererequiredtoweartodistinguishdifferentcash-for-workprogramsTheuniformswereoftencolor-coded orbrandedwithNGOlogosandhavebeencriticizedforstigmatizing beneficiaries and undermining government legitimacy (Grunewald andBinder2010) Coordination Issues Benefitingfromtheexperienceofthe2008hurricaneresponse,the clustersysteminHaitiwasquicklymobilizedaftertheearthquakeand activated five key clusters (Food,WASH, Health, Shelter and NonFoodItems,andLogistics)Whiletherapidset-uphelpedtomobilize fundingandstaffforthesespecificclusters,itdidnotleadtooverall improved strategic cluster leadership and more timely results (Rencoretetal2010,GrunewaldandBinder2010)(Notethatagriculture wasnotoneofthefiveclustersactivatedintheinitialresponse)The cluster system was particularly challenged by the influx of internationalNGOsarrivinginHaiti,manyofwhichhadlimitedcapacity and little understanding of the local context (Rencoret et al 2010, GrunewaldandBinder2010)ThemassivenumberofNGOs,many whicharrivedwithpre-determinedplansofaction,madecoordina-

Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

tion extremely difficult (Stumpenhorst et al 2011)To adapt, some clusterscreatedbabyclustersbyseparatingclusterfunctionsintotwo groups:ageneralinformation-sharinggroupopentoallactorsanda strategy-developmentortechnical-guidancegroupwherekeycluster membersdiscussedstrategyThisapproachwasidentifiedasamoreeffectivewayforcoordinatingactivitiesinahumanitariansettingwitha largevolumeofactors(GrunewaldandBinder2010) Theclustersystemdidnotsufficientlycoordinatewithnationaland localauthorities,generallyexcludedHaitiancivilsociety,andfailedto utilize local knowledge In general, government ministries were not adequately supported and recognized and parallel operational structureswereoftenestablished(IASC2010)Theabruptcallforanend togeneralfooddistributionsinMarchbytheHaitiangovernmentand PresidentRenPrval(whofeltthatlarge-scalefoodaidwasnegativelyaffectingHaitianfarmersandlocalmarkets)underscoresthelimited interactionbetweenthegovernmentandinternationalhumanitarian communityandhighlightstheirdifferencesofopinionaboutthenatureoftheresponse Cluster meetings held at the Logistics Base were inaccessible for most Haitians; the majority of meetings were held in English and while some cluster staff spoke French, few were able to communicateinCreole(Bolton2011,GrunewaldandBinder2010,Interview 2011)EnteringLogBaseandgainingaccesstoclustermeetingsrequiredaffiliationwithaninternationalorganization,whicheffectively preventedmany community leadersfrom participating (Heinzelman andWaters 2010) Commenting on the challenges of gaining access toclustermeetings,oneHaitiancivilsocietyleadernoted,Evenfor myselfIamconnected,Ihavefriendsinthosecircles,IhaveaUN badgeIhaveincrediblechallengesaccessingtheclustersystemWhen IwouldhavetogotoLogBaseitwaslikegoingabroadforthefirst timeYouhavepeople,thekeypeopleinthesectorswhocanteven getintothemeetings(Interview2011) Humanitarian responses were often not coordinated with local communitiesThiswasevidentinthefoodaidresponse,asfooddistributionswereoftencarriedoutinaffectedcommunitieswithlittle advance warning (Grunewald and Binder 2010)The cluster system hadchallengesutilizinglocalknowledge,ashighlightedbyUshahidis crisismappingeffort,avolunteereffortthatmappedreal-timeneeds for search and rescue throughcrowd-sourced information, relying onweb-basedsocialmediaandmobilephonesUshahidiseffortsto integrate local knowledge into the cluster systems traditional-informationsharingactivitieswerestifledbytheclustersystemsinabilityto aggregateinformationcomingfromoutsidesourcesanddependence

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oninformationfromformalneedsassessments(HeinzelmanandWaters 2010)This problem was not unique to outside information, as information sharing and management was weak across many of the clusters,especiallyduringtheearlystagesoftheresponse(IASC2010) Major challenges for cluster coordination and information management were high staff turn-over and varying levels of leadership capacity, particularly among cluster coordinatorsWhile the internationalhumanitariancommunitydemonstratedastrongsurgecapacity inHaiti,deployingmorethan400stafftoHaitiinJanuaryalone,few stayedlongerthanafewweeksandaninsufficientnumberweresenior andqualified(IASC2010,GrunewaldandBinder2010,Rencoretet al2010)Theinexperienceofmanyclustercoordinatorspresenteda challengeforclusterleadershipAnevaluationoftheNutritionCluster foundthattheclusterapproachwasnotfullyunderstoodintheearly stagesoftheemergencybysomeoftheHQ,regionalorcountrystaff  (DolanandVervers2010,p6)Thisexperiencewasnotuniquetothe Nutrition Cluster, but was a general issue across clusters (Interview 2011) Despitetheseconstraints,clustermembersgenerallyvaluedcluster coordinationasanimportantmechanismforexchanginginformation and networking with other humanitarian organizations (Grunewald andBinder2010)Theclustersystemalsohelpedfacilitateclosecoordinationwithinternationaldonors,enablingstrategiestobeshared and adaptedThe benefits of close cluster coordination with donors werehighlightedintheFoodCluster,whenUSAIDanditspartners endedtheparallelfoodaidcoordinationsystemthatexistedpriorto theearthquakeandbegancoordinatingitsfoodaidactivitieswiththe clusterThepreviousparallelfoodaidsysteminHaiticreatedprogramming overlap and duplications, as one food aid coordination system was led byWFP and another by USAID, but where only USAIDfundedagencieswouldmeet(GrunewaldandBinder2010) Lessons Learned The large influx of NGOs challenged cluster coordination. Thesheer volume of NGOs arriving in Haiti, many of which were inexperiencedinhumanitarianresponse,createdseriouschallengesforcoordinationThecreationofbabyclustersbyseparatingclusterfunctions intogeneralinformationsharingmeetings(involvingallclusteractors) andstrategicadvisorymeetings(involvingonlytheclusterleadagency andkeyclustermembers)hasbeenidentifiedasagoodpracticeThe

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globalFSCiswellplacedtosharethesegoodpracticeswithcountrylevelclustersinsituationswhenclustersarefacedwithalargeinflux ofactors The cluster system did not adequately include local actors. The cluster system in Haiti did not sufficiently coordinate with national and local authorities and largely excluded Haitian civil societyAnd it couldnt absorb information from local actors, even when it was availablethroughplatformslikeUshahidiThisledtothecreationof parallelcoordinationandoperationalstructures,poorcommunication withbeneficiaries,andinsufficientintegrationoflocalknowledgeand information Staff turnover and weak leadership constrained coordination and response. Rapid turnover and varying levels of leadership capacity of clusterstaff,especiallyamongclustercoordinators,hamperedcoordinationefforts,affectedthecontinuityofoperations,andledtoreinventingthewheelInadditiontoclusterleadagencies,globalclusters playanimportantroleinhelpingtominimizestaffturnoverandfacilitatingsmoothtransitionsbetweenclustercoordinators Transition from food aid to other food security responses was delayed due to inadequate planning and limited flexibility. After the Haitian governmentrequestedanendtogeneralfooddistributions,therewas a two or three month delay in starting up other food security interventionsThe food security response was not sufficiently flexible torespondtochangesinthepost-crisisdynamicandtheAgriculture ClusterandEarlyRecoveryClusterwerenotinapositiontotakeover andfacilitatethetransitiontodifferenttypesofresponses

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Pakistan
InlateJuly2010,heavymonsoonrainsinnorthwestPakistantriggeredlandslidesandflashfloodsintheprovincesofBalochistan,Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas (FATA), andPunjabAsintenserainfallpersistedintoAugust,thefloodwaters flowedsouthintoPakistanssouthernprovinces,breachingleveeson thebanksoftheIndusRiverinSindhProvinceandsubmergingentire villagesalongthewayUltimately,thefloodscausedanestimated$65 billionworthofdamageanddirectlyaffectedover20millionpeople, whichamountedtomorethanthecombinednumberofpeopleaffectedbythe2005Kashmirearthquake,2010Haitiearthquake,and 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (United Nations 2011, Kronstadt et al 2010,Fair2011)Uponseeingthedevastationleftinthewakeofthe floods,UNSecretaryGeneralBan-KiMoondescribedthedisasteras aslow-motiontsunami(UnitedNations2011) Background Priortothe2010floods,thefoodsecuritysituationinPakistanhad beensteadilydeterioratingandcausingconcernduetothecumulative effects of a series of natural, political, socio-economic, and security crisesThe multiple shocks of the Kashmir earthquake of 2005, the 2007 floods and CycloneYemyin, the counter-insurgency campaign andescalatinginternalandregionalconflictandinstability,theassassinationofBhenazirBhutto,risingfoodandfuelprices,andincreasingpovertyandunemploymenthadadevastatingimpactonPakistans levelsoffoodinsecurity(SDPI/WFP2009,KugelmanandHathaway 2010)From2003to2009,foodinsecuredistrictsinPakistanincreased from45percentto61percent(SDPI/WFP2009)Thedeterioration offoodsecurityinPakistanmirroredthecountrysworseningnutritioncrisis,asthenumberofmalnourishedPakistanisalmostdoubled overatenyearperiod,fromanestimated24millionin1997to45 millionin2008(BengaliandJury2010) Although Pakistan had a bumper wheat harvest in 200607 and nearly5percentgrowthinagriculturaloutputin200809,agriculturalproductionvariedsignificantlybetweendistrictsduetoadverse weatherconditionsandtheeffectsofarmedconflict,resultinginlocalizedfooddeficitsinmanyofPakistansmostfood-insecuredistricts (Suleri2009)HoardingandsmugglingofwheattoAfghanistan,combined with the rise in food prices globally, brought about the near doublingofwheatandwheatflourpricesinPakistanduring200708,

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leadingtocivilunrestandriotsthroughoutthecountry(Suleri2009, Kugelman and Hathaway 2010) Meanwhile, rising fuel prices triggereda150300percentincreaseinthecostoffertilizerin2008,makingitunattainableformanyfarmers,especiallysmallholders(KugelmanandHathaway2010) Manyofthedistrictsmostaffectedbythe2010floodswerealready particularly vulnerableThe provinces with the greatest percentage offoodinsecurepeoplein2009theFederallyAdministeredTribal Areas(FATA)(677percent),Balochistan(612percent)andKhyber Pakhtunkhwa(562percent)coincidewithareasthatwereseverely impacted by the 2010 floods (SDPI/WFP 2009) In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,Balochistan,andSindh,manyhouseholdswerestillrecoveringfromthedevastationofthe2007floods,whichresultedinmore than25millionpeopletemporarilydisplaced;420dead;88,000houses destroyed;andcrops,livestockandinfrastructureextensivelydamaged Meanwhile, conflict, violence, and political instability have severely disruptedlivesandlivelihoods,exemplifiedbythelarge-scaledisplacementof27millionpeopleinFATAin2009duetoconflictbetween thePakistanimilitaryandTalibanmilitias(UDin2010,Malik2010) TheUNclustersystemhadbeenactivatedthreetimespriortothe 2010floods:duringthe2005Kashmirearthquake,the2007floodsand the2009displacementcrisisTheclustersystemwaslargelyperceived tobesuccessfulduringthehumanitarianresponsetothe2005earthquake, especially for those clusters that had direct support from the governmentofPakistan(GoP)andthePakistanimilitary(IASC2006) Despite the overall success of the cluster system during the earthquakeresponse,severalgapswereidentified,includinganinadequate understanding of the cluster approach by the country team, insufficientparticipationofNGOs,weakinter-clustercoordination,limited supportforearlyrecovery,andoverlapbetweenclusterresponsibilities andagencymandatesTheseresultedinclustersbeingdrivenasmuch by agency priorities as by cluster responsibilities(IASC 2006, p 7) Duringthe2007floods,however,theclustersystemgenerallyfailed toliveuptoitspost-earthquakeexpectationsduetotheverydifferent emergencycontext,thechallengesofrespondinginconflict-affected areas, disagreements with the GoP and the newly-created National DisasterManagementAuthority(NDMA)onthenumberofclusters and the scale of the international humanitarian response, and insufficient learning and implementation of lessons from the earthquake (Young et al 2007)The overall response to the 2009 displacement wasgenerallyconsideredsuccessful;however,theclustersystemexperiencedsomeofthesameproblemsaspreviously,namelyoverlapping clusterandagencyresponsibilities,poorleadershipandinadequateun-

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derstandingoftheclusterapproachamongclustercoordinators,and thechallengesofoperatinginaninsecureenvironment(Cosgraveetal 2010)Anadditionalchallengefacedbytheclustersystemduringthe 2009displacement(andalsoduringthe2010floods)wasthedualrole playedbythegovernmentofPakistan,whichwasbothapartytothe conflictandproviderofhumanitarianassistance,andwhosedecisionmakingwasofteninfluencedbypoliticalandmilitaryconsiderations overhumanitarianneeds(Cosgraveetal2010) Food Security Impacts With over 80 percent of households in flood-affected areas dependentonagriculturefortheirlivelihoods,theimpactsofthe2010 floodsonfoodsecuritywereparticularlydevastating(UnitedNations 2010)Thefloods,whichstruckattheoutsetofthemonsoon(kharif) seasonharvest,destroyedanestimated33millionhectaresofstandingcrops,includingrice,maize,cotton,sugarcane,fruit,orchards,and vegetablesProductionlossesofdamagedcropsamountedtoapproximately133metrictons(MTs)Anestimated24millionhectaresof agriculturallandweredamaged,over15millionhectaresinPunjab provincealoneOverhalfamillionMTsofwheatseedstocksusedfor thewinter(rabi)plantingseasonwerelostApproximately12million livestockandsixmillionpoultryperishedAgriculturalinfrastructure wasdestroyedthroughoutflood-affectedareas,especiallyroadsandirrigationsystems(FAO2010) Manyhouseholdsandvillageswerecutofffrommarkets,severely restrictingtheiraccesstofoodstocksAccordingtotheMulti-Cluster RapidAssessmentMechanism (MCRAM), some 30 percent of surveyedcommunitiesreportedthattheirnearestmarketwasnolonger functioningafterthefloods(IASC2010)Disruptionofmarketsand lossoffoodstockscausedasharpriseinpricesofstaplefooditems, rangingfroma10percentincreaseinSindhProvincetoover80percentinonedistrictinKhyberPakhtunkhwa(WFP2010) Householdsreportedusingadversecopingstrategies,includingshiftingtheirconsumptiontolesspreferredfoods,skippingmeals,women eatinglessthanmen,andincreasingborrowing(UnitedNations2010) Widespreadmalnutritionwasexposedasacriticalproblemafterthe floods;however,highsevereacutemalnutrition(SAM)ratesaremore likelyrepresentativeofPakistanslong-standingnutritioncrisis,rather thantheimpactofthefloodeventitself

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The Response Thefirstrespondersconsistedmainlyofthelocalpopulation,the Pakistanimilitary,anddistrict-levelgovernmentsThemilitary,incoordinationwiththeNDMA,mobilizedquicklyandplayedacritical role in the first 72 hours, evacuating people and providing essential relief suppliesThe militarys initial response has been credited with havingpreventedlarge-scalelossoflife(Pollastroetal2010,Houseof Commons2011)Duetotheunprecedentedscaleofthedisaster,the GoPrequestedinternationalassistanceandbyearlyAugustthecluster systemwasrolledoutAsduringthe2007floodresponse,theNDMA requested that the cluster system prioritize life-saving activities and activateonlyfourkeyclusters(food,shelter,health,andWASH);however,theUNoptedtorolloutallelevenclusters(Pollastroetal2010) Whilethehumanitarianresponsehelpedtopreventalargedeath toll,ithasbeendescribedaspatchyandreactive(HouseofCommons2011,Pollastroetal2010)Supportoftenarrivedtoolateand in many cases responses were based on assumptions and not on actualneeds(HouseofCommons2011)Theinternationalhumanitarianresponsefocusedmainlyonreliefinterventions,withoutsufficient support and planning for early recovery (Pollastro et al 2010)The UKHouseofCommonsreviewofthePakistanfloodresponsefound thatthequickestandmostorganizedresponseswereinthenorthern provinces(HouseofCommons2011)Whilethisispartlyattributed thefloodsrecedingearlierinthenorthernprovinces,theresponsein theseprovinceswasalsostrengthenedbytheexistenceofhumanitarianresponsesystemsthatwereputinplacebytheGoPafterthe2005 earthquakeInareaswithlessdisasterpreparednessandlimitedexperiencerespondingtodisasters,suchasinSindh,thelocalresponsefell short(HouseofCommons2011,p8) TheFoodClusterresponse,ledbyWFP,beganwithin24hoursof theonsetofflooding,whenWFPinitiatedthedistributionofemergency food assistance By the end ofAugust, 34,000 metric tons of foodaidhadbeendistributedtomorethan3millionpeopleDuring September,foodaidbeneficiariesincreasedto63millionandthen7 millioninOctoberAnestimated70percentoffoodaidbeneficiaries weresupportedbyWFP,whiletherestweresupportedbyotherFood Cluster members, including NGOs, the GoP and Pakistani military (United Nations 2010)Within the first six months of the flooding, members of the Food Cluster had distributed an estimated 500,000 MTsoffoodWhileWFPwashighlysuccessfulatdeliveringfoodin

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an extremely challenging environment, no systems were in place to inform them about who ultimately received the food or its impact (Interview2011) InSeptember,theFood,Health,NutritionandWASHClustersdevelopedajointresponsestrategy,knownastheSurvivalStrategy,that targeted essential interventions to save lives in priority areasWhile theSurvivalStrategyhasbeenwidelypraisedasastrongexampleof theinter-agencyapproachinrespondingtodisasters(UnitedNations 2011,p64),ithasalsobeendescribedasareactiveidea,mainlyappeasingdonors,thatwasimplementedtowardstheendoftheemergency inonlyoneprovince(Interview2011)Jointneedsassessments,such as MCRAM, were examples of an attempt to improve inter-cluster coordination;however,jointprogrammingeffortsbasedonthefindings of these assessments were notably absent (Pollastro et al 2010) As floodwaters receded in some areas,WFP initiated early recovery activities, consisting of food- and cash-for-work programs, and fully transitionedtoearlyrecoverybyApril2011(UnitedNations2010) Ingeneral,earlyrecoveryinitiativeswereindividual-agencybasedand uncoordinatedacrossclusters(Pollastroetal2010) The GoP initiated additional cash transfer programs during the emergency phaseAn innovative cash transfer mechanism, known as Watan,providedanATMdebitcardtoeachheadofhouseholdOverall, theWatan system was considered to be highly successful at revivinglocal markets and supportinglivelihoods, although it has also beencriticizedasbeingcorruptibleandoverlybureaucratic,excluding vulnerablegroups(especiallywomen),anddependingonbasicinfrastructure(ATMs)thatdidntexistinmanyareas(Pollastroetal2010, HouseofCommons2011) TheAgricultureCluster,ledbyFAO,focusedontheprovisionof seeds,fertilizersandtools;therehabilitationofinfrastructure;andthe vaccinationandsupportoflivestockOverhalfamillionhouseholds receivedseedsandfertilizertopreparethemforthewinter(rabi)plantingseason;62,000flood-affectedhouseholdsreceivedasecondpackageofseedandfertilizerinputspriortothekharifplantingseasonThe Agriculture Cluster also supported cash-for-work activities to rehabilitateirrigationinfrastructureDonorresponsetothefundingappeal foragricultureactivities,andearlyrecoveryinterventionsingeneral, wassignificantlyslowerthanforlife-savingactivitiesForexample, whileFAOeventuallyreceived91percentoftheirtotalfundingrequirement,theyhadonlyreceived$205millionoutofatotalfunding requirementof$107millionbytheendofSeptember2010,representingan$865millionfundinggap(OCHA2011)

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Coordination Issues The performance of the cluster system as a coordination mechanismduringthe2010floodswasmixedatbestandineffectiveatworst (HouseofCommons2011,Pollastroetal2010)Inadditiontobeing challenged by the sheer scale of the disaster, successful coordination wasinhibitedbyweakstrategicleadershipandalackofqualifiedpersonnel,especiallyamongclustercoordinators;inadequatecoordination and alignment with GoP and NDMA priorities; the overwhelming numberoforganizationsparticipatinginsomeclusters;andinsufficient integrationofapproachesacrossclusters Reviews of the cluster systems performance during the Pakistan floodresponsehavedescribedtheclustersystemsleadershipaspoor andlacking at both the humanitarian coordinator (HC) level and amongclustercoordinators(HouseofCommons2011,p16)Atthe HC level, many felt that experience in large-scale humanitarian response was lacking and that decision-making was influenced by the prioritiesoftheHCsownagency(HouseofCommons2011,Pollastroetal2010)Similarly,insomecases,clusterleadstendedtoprioritizetheirownagencysinterestoverotherconcerns,resultinginwhat aGoPdistrictcoordinatingofficer(DCO)describedasequivalentto having11captainsofthesameteamonafootballpitch(Pollastro etal,p48)Clusterleadershipandperformancewasalsoaffectedby insufficientsurgecapacityofcapableandqualifiedstaffandbyhigh ratesofturnover,partlyduetothehumanitariansystemalreadybeing overstretchedbytheHaitiearthquakeresponse(HouseofCommons 2011) WhiletheNDMA,linedepartments,andUNagenciesmetdaily tocoordinateactivitiesandshareinformationthroughtheclustersystem,this coordination turnedinto parallel mechanisms overtime as some cluster leads began coordinating with line departments rather thantheNDMA(Pollastroetal2010)Thiswasnotthecaseforall clusterleads,however,asFAO,forexample,coordinateditsactivities with the Ministry ofAgriculture and Livestock, in addition to coordinating with the NDMA (Interview 2011) In general, however, theclustersystemdidnotalwaysalignwiththeprioritiesoftheGoP andNDMA,largelyduetogenuinedifferencesofopinionbetween the GoP and the international humanitarian community about the natureoftherequiredhumanitarianresponseThiswasevidentfrom thestartoftheemergencyresponsewhentheUNdecidedtorollout thetraditionaleleven-clustersetup,ratherthantheGoP-favoredfour

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life-savingclusters2Manyfeltthatbyactivatingelevenclusters,the clustersystembecameunwieldyanddetractedfromcoordinationand theeffectivenessoftheresponse(Pollastroetal2010) Thelargenumberoforganizationsparticipatinginclustermeetings affectedoverallcoordinationDuetothesheernumberoforganizationsinsomeclusters,clustermeetingstendedtofocusexclusivelyon informationsharingratherthanstrategicplanningandprogramming (Pollastroetal2010)Theclustersystemfacedchallengesinitsability toengagewithlocalcivilsocietyInmanycases,thecapacityandreach of local civil society organizations greatly exceeded that of internationalNGOs;however,thesesmallorganizationstendedtobeoffthe radarofdonorsandagenciesand,inmanycases,theydidnotseethe valueofcoordinatingwiththeclustersystem(Interview2011,House ofCommons2011) CoordinationacrossclusterswasgenerallylimitedWiththeexceptionoftheSurvivalStrategy,clusterstendedtooperateindependently, withlittlestrategicplanningandcoordinationThiswasespeciallythe caseforearlyrecoveryinterventions,whichwerecarriedoutwithno overallstrategyandlimitedcoordination(Pollastroetal2010) Lessons Learned Learning from previous cluster system experiences in Pakistan was inadequate. Many of the gaps and weaknesses of the cluster system duringthe2010floodswerethesameasthoseidentifiedinprevious humanitarianresponsesinPakistanIssuessuchasweakstrategicleadership,inadequateinter-clustercoordination,disagreementswiththe GoPandNDMAoverthenumberofclusterstorollout,andlimited supportforearlyrecoveryhavebeencitedasweaknessesduringthe 2005earthquake,2007floods,2009displacementcrisis,andonceagain duringthe2010floods Ineffective strategic leadership and a lack of qualified personnel weakened the cluster system. PoorstrategicleadershipbytheHCandcluster coordinatorsandinsufficientlyqualifiedclusterstaffdiminishedtheeffectivenessoftheclustersystemasacoordinationmechanism,resulting induplicationsanddelaysLeadershipwascompromisedinsomeclustersas,insomecases,clusterleadstendedtofavortheirownagencys interests over other prioritiesThe cluster system was overstretched duetotheHaitiearthquakeresponse,whichlimitedsurgecapacityand theavailabilityofexperiencedpersonnel
2  It should be noted that some of the non-life-saving clusters were established inagreementwiththeGoPandNDMA,suchastheAgricultureCluster(Interview 2011)

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Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

Coordination among clusters was inadequate, especially in the early recovery response. WhiletheSurvivalStrategyandjointneedsassessments,suchasMCRAM,weremechanismsforimprovingcross-sector analysisandplanningamongclusters,theclustersgenerallyoperated independently of one another Cluster lead agencies tended to pursuesectoral-basedstrategiesthatwerelargelyinfluencedbytheirown agencysmandateThiswasespeciallythecasefortheearlyrecoveryresponse,wheredonorsupportwasslow,andstrategiccross-sectorplanningandimplementationofearlyrecoveryinterventionswaslimited TheexperienceoftheMCRAMsuggeststhatjointanalysisisabetter platform for joint programming efforts, but not sufficient to ensure thatjointprogrammingactuallytakesplace

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Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

Kenya
In2011,largeareasofKenyawereaffectedbyoneoftheworstregionaldroughtsinrecentmemory,affectingsome34millionpeople inKenyaaloneasofJuly2011Someareashavereportedthelowest rainfallinhalfacenturyThiswasawell-predicteddrought,coinciding with the La Nia effect that had caused widespread drought in the GreaterHornofAfricaonmanypastoccasionsTheKenyasituation wasquicklyovertakeninattentioninthepressbythedeclarationof famineinSomaliaonJuly20andthewell-publicizedextremeconditions there, but the situation in Kenya remained very seriousnot leastbecauseofasubstantialinfluxofrefugeesfromSomalia DespitebeingoneofthemoreadvancedeconomiesintheGreater HornofAfricaregion,Kenyahasexperiencednumerousfoodsecurity crisesinthepast,andhasbeenthefifthlargestrecipientoffoodaid globallyinrecentyears(WFP-FAIS,2011)Majordroughtemergencies occurred in 19992000, 200506, and 2009While accustomed to slow-onset natural disasters, Kenya also experienced a major humanitarianemergencyinearly2008whenthecontestedpresidential elections of December 2007 resulted in violence and displacement Thepost-electionviolencetriggeredtheUnitedNationstoorganize theclustersysteminKenya Background Kenya has long had a well-functioning, government-led food securitycoordinationmechanism,theKenyaFoodSecurityMeeting/ SteeringGroup(KFSSG,seebelow)Thiswasoriginallysetupunder theArid Lands Resource Management Project, a donor-supported projectintheOfficeofthePresidentTheprojectcoveredearlywarningandresponse,aswellasriskreductionanddevelopmentprograms TheCentralandWesternProvincesofKenyaareblessedwithfertilelandandreliablyadequaterainfall,soaremajorsurplus-producing areas,butthree-quartersofthelandareaofKenyaissuitableonlyfor livestockproductionTheseareasaresubjecttoperiodicdroughts,and KFSSGwassetuptomanagethepredictionofandresponsetothese droughtsThecoordinationmechanismhasfoodsecurityinitsname, but grew to become a multi-sectoral coordination mechanism over theyears,incorporatingtechnicalworkinggroupsinavarietyofareas inadditiontoagricultureandfoodassistanceTheclustersystemwas introducedinKenyain2008inresponsetothepost-electionviolence TheKFSSGtechnicalworkinggroupsandseveraloftheclusters(not

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allofthem)havesincemergedtheirfunctions,soeachtosomedegree retainsaseparateidentity,dependingonthesituationMorerecently, OCHA set up a Kenya Humanitarian Partnership Forum Each of theseisbrieflydescribedbelow The Kenya Food Security Meeting/Steering GroupThe Kenya FoodSecuritySteeringGroup(KFSSG)isatechnicalbodyunderthe Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP), now housed intheMinistryofSpecialProgramsinthegovernmentofKenyaThe KenyaFoodSecurityMeeting(KFSM)istheoverallpolicybody,of whichtheKFSSGisthetechnicalbodyTherearetechnicalworking groupsinvarioussectorsundertheKFSSG,includinggroupsonfood aidandagricultureandlivestock(SeeFigure1)

Figure 1: KFSM/KFSSG Structure

Figure 1. KFSM/KFSSG Structure
Kenya Food Security Meeting

Health and Nutrition WG

Emergency Education WG Kenya Food Security Steering Group WESCORD Data and Information WG Agriculture and Livestock WG Disaster Management WG Information & Reporting Flow Food Aid Estimates Management Support

Source: KFSSG

Source: KFSSG

TheKFSSGisalong-standinggroup,formedinthemid-1990sto managetheresponsetodroughtemergenciesinKenya,linkedtothe earlywarningfacilitiesoftheALRMPThiscoverssome30districts ofKenya,butnotthehigh-rainfallandhigh-potentialareasofCentral, RiftValley,Western and Nyanza Provinces Its main activities are to leadassessmentsinthearidandsemi-aridareas(initiallytwiceperyear, exceptionally four times per year), to issue estimates of the number ofpeopleaffectedbydroughtandfoodinsecurity,andtocoordinate responsesTheKFSSGhasappointedNGOsandotherorganizations

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Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

toleadresponsesatthedistrictlevel,andcoordinatestheseresponses with District Steering Groupsthe main government coordination mechanismatthedistrictlevel WFPandFAO,aswellasotherearlywarningandemergencyresponse organizations such as FEWSNET and OCHA, are members oftheKFSSG,asaregovernmentministriesInthissense,KFSSGhas beentheover-archingcoordinationmechanismforfoodsecurityanalysis and response in KenyaThe KFSSG is charged with overseeing bothhumanitarianresponseandlonger-termfoodsecurityconcerns Intermsofcoordination,itfulfillstheclassiccoordination3-W(who, what,where?)functioninemergenciesButastrongelementalsoexistsofcoordinatingrecoveryandrehabilitationefforts,andtheintentis tomovemoreinthedirectionofcoordinatinglong-terminvestment, disasterpreparedness,andmitigationItscoordinationmechanismson theground,theDistrictSteeringCommittees,aredefinitelynotsimplyemergencyresponsemechanisms The cluster system during the post election violence From an OCHA perspective, prior to the 2008 post-election violence emergency,therewasaproliferationofcoordinationstructuresatnational, sub-national and regional levels (Cooper 2009), defined mainly in termsoffoodsecurityandfoodaidinparticularThesemechanisms weremainlyfordrought,butalsodealtwithlonger-termdevelopment issues Disasters were defined in terms of food aid needsWith the postelectionviolence,Kenyafacedanemergencythatwasnew,and forwhichcoordinationstructuresdidnotparticularlyfitTherewere manynewhumanitarianactorsmostlyNGOsthatwereunfamiliar withtheoperationalenvironmentAndthegovernmentorpolitical partieswithinthegovernmentwereengagedintheprovocationto violence,makingthegovernmentlessabletoplayanimpartialrolein humanitariancoordinationIntheevent,theKenyaRedCrossSociety(KRCS)wasdesignatedbygovernmenttobetheleadagencyfor responseandcoordinationarolethat,fromOCHAsperspectivewas rathermoreexclusivethaninclusiveInresponse,OCHArolledout theclustersystemandhadtenclustersfunctioningbythetimeofthe CERFapplicationandflashappealRelationsbetweentheKRCSand theUNweretenseduringtheheightofthecrisisEventually,anarrangementwasworkedoutforKRCStojointlyleadseveralclusters, along with UN agencies In some cases, a technical working group alreadyexisted(aswasthecasewithfood-relatedclusters);inothers, none did (protection, for example, which was a huge need during thedisplacementcrisisintheaftermathofthepost-electionviolence) Given the lack of familiarity with the cluster system, much of the coordination mechanism relied on people who were seconded and

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Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

didntknowtheKenyaoperatingenvironmentwellanddidnothave establishedrelationshipswithgovernmentpersonnelThissituationresultedinbothduplicationandgaps,andsomedamagedrelationships (Cooper2009) According to OCHA, the KFSSG became thefood aid cluster forthedurationofthepost-electionviolenceresponse,whileapreviouslyexistingagricultureandlivestocktechnicalworkinggroupunder KFSSGbecamethefoodsecurityandearlyrecoveryclusterledby FAOandUNDPThiswasbothanoddcombination(giventhatearlyrecoveryincludedanyotherissuesparticularly,inthecontextof post-electionviolence,thesafereturnofIDPsand,inmanycases,rebuildingshelterforIDPswhosehomeshadbeenburnedorotherwise destroyed), and unusual leadership for food security concerns One respondentnotedthatwhenthefoodsecurityclusterwasintroduced afterthepostelectionviolence,itwasseenasaparallelmechanismto theKFSSGTheclustermandatewasunclear,anddiscussionsfocused moreonthepurposeoftheclusterratherthanonthecoordinationof theactualresponse Fromclusterstosectoralworkinggroups,andtheKenyaHumanitarianPartnershipForumAfterthecoalitiongovernmentwasformed inFebruary2008andsomesemblanceofnormalityreturnedtoKenya,somecoordinationfunctionsreturnedtogovernmentThefood security and early recovery cluster was described as slow to return to government control (Interview 2011)The name of the OCHA mechanism changed to the Kenya Humanitarian PartnershipTeam (laterForum)andwasexpandedtoincludeINGOengagement ClustershavemetamorphosedbacktosectoralworkinggroupsTwo clustersareformallylistedbytheUNanagriculturecluster,witha coordinatorappointedbyFAO,andafoodaidcluster,withacoordinatorappointedbyWFPAtthemoment,thesearebothre-incorporated intoKFSSGssectoralworkinggroups(agricultureandlivestock,and food aid) In 2010, much of the infrastructure of theALRMP was dismantledwhendonorsupportfortheprojectwasterminatedThe projecthasnotbeenrenewed,despitesomequantitativeevidenceof reducedvulnerabilityinthedistrictsservedbyALRMP(ILRI2011) The Ministry of Special Programmes and the Ministry of State for NorthernKenyanowdirectlyoperatevariouscomponentssuchasthe KFSSGACrisisResponseCenter(CRC)wassetup,alsounderthe MinistryofSpecialProgrammes,buthastodatenottakenoncoordinationfunctionsTheKFSSGcontinuestobethemainfood-security coordinationmechanism,butitsrelationshiptotheHumanitarianForumisnotclearlyspelledout(Interview2011)

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Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

Food Security Impacts AsofJuly2011,some24millionpeoplerequiredimmediatefood assistance,withanotheronemillionexpectedtorequireassistanceby September(Figure2)Duetoresourceshortfalls,WFPwasonlyable toaddressneedsin20of30affecteddistricts,withresponsibilityfor theremainingtendistrictsfallingtothegovernmentofKenyaFood prices in Kenya had increased by nearly 100 percent compared to thefive-yearaveragealreadyhighduetothe2008foodpricecrisis (OCHA2011) Giventhesehighpricesandlimitedresources,large-scalelocaland regional purchase of food for affected districts was unlikely, and the possibilityofalarge-scalecashresponsediminishedSoitwasnotentirelyclearhowneedsweregoingtobemetintheshorttermThe KenyaHungerSafetyNet,fundedmainlybyexternaldonors,wasable toabsorbsomeofthebruntofthecrisis,butonlyinlimitedareasand foralimitednumberofgroupsLivestockoff-takeoperationswereongoing,butnotyetatthescalerequiredEmergencywaterandnutrition operationswerealsoongoing Figure 2: KFSM/KFSSG Structure

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Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

Coordination Issues AnumberofcoordinationissuesariseoutofthereviewoftheKenyaexperienceThesearebrieflydescribedbelow,butwiththeintent ofhighlightingissues,notprescribingthebestwaytoaddressthem ThefirstissueisthefocusoffoodsecuritycoordinationOCHA and donors tend to take the view that coordination and the cluster system should be limited to purely emergency responses3The governmentofKenyaandmostoftheimplementingagencies(including someUNstaff)tendtoadvocateamorecomprehensiveapproach addressingfoodsecurityconcernsmorebroadly,includingriskreductionandpreparednesspriortoacrisis,astrongemphasisonprotecting livelihoodsduringacrisis,andcoordinatingresourceflowsandprogramsaimedatrecoveryandrehabilitationinthepost-crisisphaseIn fact,theALRMPwaspartlyresponsiblefordevelopingthedroughtmanagement-cycleapproachthathasinformeddisasterriskreduction anddisastermanagementmuchmorebroadlyintheHornofAfrica Mostfood-securityexpertsfavorsuchanapproach,butsomehumanitariandonorsviewitasmissioncreep,andbeyondthemandateof OCHA Similarly, the humanitarian expertise of OCHA is required inemergenciesasaretheresourcesofhumanitariandonorsThough morebyaccidentthanbydesign,thecurrentsysteminKenyaactually negotiatesthisdividereasonablywell,withmanyofthelonger-term disasterandriskmanagementconcernsarisingingovernment-ledforums,whileOCHAandthehumanitariandonorsstepinduringacrisisIn2011however,somestaffofgovernment-ledforumssuggested thattheKHPFwasduplicativeandunnecessary(Interview2011) Asecond,andcloselyrelated,issueconcernswhoshouldleadunder whatcircumstanceTraditionally,thegovernmentofKenyahasledon coordinationasituationthatmost,ifnotallobserversagreeispreferableDuringthepost-electionviolence,somesawthegovernmentas apartytotheconflict,whichundermineditsabilitytocoordinatean impartialresponse(politicalleaderswerethemaininstigatorsseveral of whom are now under indictment by the International Criminal Court)Inthatinstance,theKenyaRedCrossSocietywasdesignated as the lead, particularly in first-response and in setting up camp facilitiesforthedisplacedAndclustersweresetupAftertheviolence subsided,theleadgraduallyreturnedtogovernmentcontrolButthere are other issues regarding who leads, including the speed at which
3 NotethatemergencyresponsecanincludelifesavingorlifeprotectinginterventionsaswellasthosethatprotectlivelihoodsThequestionhasmoretodowithtransitional programing and longer-term disaster management including risk reduction activities,preparednessplanningandsocialprotection

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Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

emergenciesaredeclaredGovernmentsgenerallyhavelessincentive todeclareanemergency,particularlyinadroughtorslow-onsetcrisis, andthusresponsemaybedelayedInthe200506Manderatriangle drought, the government of Kenya delayed declaring an emergency, andtheresponsewasreducedtolife-savingactivities(ODI2006)even thoughthelessonslearnedfromin19992000wereclearlyaboutinterveningintimetoprotectassets,particularlylivestock(Akliluand Wekesa2002)ManyobserversfeltthegovernmentofKenyawasslow todeclareanemergencyin2011aswell(Interview2011) AthirdissueisabouttheoverlaporclarificationofrolesThecoordination role moves back and forth, and it is not always clear to either the government or the UN what the other is doing So far, thishaslargelynothinderedfoodsecurityoperationsontheground, butintheeyesofoneobserver,itlookslikeduplication(Interview2011)Forthegovernmenttoeffectivelylead,resourcesneedto beconcentratedAtthesametime,KFSSGunderstandsthatOCHA playsacriticalroleinUNcoordination,UNappealsandtheCERF Clarificationoftheserolesinpredictabledroughtemergenciesand in more unpredictable crises such as the post-election violence will beanincreasinglyimportantitemontheagendaofthefoodsecurity andhumanitariancommunityinKenyaThatsaid,allpartiesagreethat currentlyworkingrelationshipsaregoodbutbasedasmuchonindividualrelationshipsasonwell-worked-outinstitutionalarrangements Thefinal issueisabout the overallcoordination of responses and innovationsGiventhecurrentcircumstances,sectoralcoordinationis reasonablygood,butnosinglecoordinationmechanismworksacross all sectors to maximize the effectiveness of an overall response to a crisiswhether of natural or man-made origin For example, while agoodnutritionsurveillanceandresponsesystemisinplace,itisnot directlycoordinatedwithgeneralfooddistributionAsimilargapexistswithregardtolivelihoodssupportDonorsandagenciesareexperimentingwithnovelapproachestofoodassistance,market-ledapproachestolivestockoff-take,etc,butthisexperimentationismostly coordinatedbyadonorgroupnotOCHAandnotKFSSGInformationandlearningisshared,butoverallresponsebeyondthesectoral workinggroupsiscoordinatedonlytoalimiteddegreeA2010consultancywascommissionedtolookintothisbroadercoordinationissuewhichrelatestofoodsecurityissuesbutisboarderinscopebut itsreportisnotyetavailable

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Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

Lessons Learned Food security is both a purely humanitarian concern and a development concern. Almostbydefinitioninchronicallyrisk-proneareas,the coordinationoffoodsecurityresponseisgoingtorequireadisastermanagement approach, rather than a purely humanitarian-response approachWhileclustersaremandatedtoguideonlythehumanitarian response,withregardtofoodsecurity,sometensionislikelybetween thesetwoapproachesatleastintheperspectiveofsomeobservers TheglobalFoodSecurityClustercanandshouldprovideleadership onhowtokeepfunctionsandmodalitiesclearlydelineated,butdeal withfoodinsecurityinaholisticmannerAttemptingtoincorporate foodsecurityandearlyrecoveryintooneclusterdidnoteffectively dealwiththequestion Different actors can work together effectively. Although there have beentensemoments,theKenyastoryincludeselementsofeffective coordinationamongthegovernmentofKenya,theUN,donors,and internationalandnationalNGOsClarityofrolesandclarityaboutthe prioritizationofresponsesunderdifferingcircumstancesarecriticalto makingthesystemworkIndividualleadersorcoordinatorsmakeabig difference,particularlywheninstitutionalrolesarenotwelldefined,or wherenopreviousagreementonrolesexists Good sectoral coordination is necessary but not sufficient for effective response. Agreement is widespread that sectoral coordination works fairlywellinKenya,butforinnovationbeyondtriedandtrueresponses,donorsdidnotlooktoestablishedcoordinationmechanisms toleadThisisatleastinpartbecauseseparatesectoralworkinggroups handledsomeoftheinnovationsdonorswereattemptingtopromote A better-prepared food security cluster that incorporates both food assistanceandlivelihoodresponsesandworkscloselywithanutrition clustercouldprovidethiskindofmechanismforcoordinatinginnovativeresponses Knowledge of context is critical. Beyondtheotherknowncompetenciesforclustercoordinators,knowledgeofthecontext,thebackground,andthecontemporaryactorsiscriticalforstaffwholeadin theeventofasurge

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Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

Cte dIvoire
OnDecember2,2010,theIndependentIvoirianElectoralCommissionannouncedthattheoppositioncandidate,AlassaneOuattara, haddefeatedtheincumbent,LaurentGbagbo,inCtedIvoires2010 presidentialelectionsWithin24hoursoftheElectoralCommissions announcement,CtedIvoiresConstitutionalCounciloverturnedthe pollresultsanddeclaredGbagbothewinnerManyinitiallyviewedthe 2010Ivoirianelectionsasanopportunitytousherinaneweraofstabilityandprogress;however,asGbagborejectedinternationalcallsto stepdown,arenewedwaveofpoliticalviolenceandinstabilityensued insteadBythetimeGbagbowasarrestedonApril11,2011,thecrisis wasresponsibleforanestimated1,000civiliandeaths,overonemillion internallydisplacedpeople,andanadditional100,000refugeeswho hadfledtoneighboringLiberia(Strauss2011) Background During the run-up to the 201011 post-election violence, Cte dIvoirewasexperiencingabriefandfragileperiodofpeaceThesigning of the Ouagadougou PeaceAgreement in March 2007 ended a four-and-a-half-year civil war between the government-held south andtherebel-heldnorth,which,atitsheightin2003,haddisplaced 11 million people across the countryThe 200207 civil war came againstabackdropofdecliningcommoditypricesforthekeyIvoirian exportsofcocoaandcoffee;increasingtensionsbetweenethnicgroups and between Ivoirians and foreigners due to limited access to new arablelandandfewemploymentopportunities;andstrugglesoverpoliticalparticipationandrights,whichcontributedtofeelingsofmarginalization,especiallyamongnortherners(Cook2011) Despitethesigningofthepeaceagreementin2007,thefoodsecuritysituationinCtedIvoireremainedprecariousThelong-term effects of the civil war on agricultural production and a growing dependence on imported staple commodities contributed to Cte dIvoiresheightenedvulnerabilitytotheeffectsofrisingfoodprices Inthe2000s,duringaperiodofrisingfooddemandduetopopulation growthandurbanization,CtedIvoiregrewincreasinglydependent onimportedrice,themaindietarystaple(Moseley2011)Whileper capitariceconsumptionrosefrom55kilogramsin1988to74kilogramsin2006,CtedIvoirebecametheseventh-largestriceimporter intheworld,withimportedriceaccountingforover60percentof nationalriceconsumption(ARC2007,Bassett2010)CtedIvoires

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Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

vulnerabilitytodisruptionsintheglobalricesupplywasunderscored duringtheglobalfoodpricecrisisof200708ByApril2008,prices for imported rice in Cte dIvoire were 52 percent higher than in September of the previous year, substantially reducing household purchasingpowerandsettingoffriotsinurbanareasthroughoutthe country(FAO2008) Beforetheonsetofthepost-electionviolence,anestimated14percentofthepopulationwasundernourished,thepovertyrateinrural areaswasover60percent,andanestimated517,000peoplewerestill displacedduetothe200207civilwar(FAO2010,UNHCR2011) The cluster system was formally established in Cte dIvoire in 2008,althoughonecluster(theProtectionCluster,ledbyUNHCR) waspreviouslyintroducedin2006Priortotheintroductionofthe clusterapproach,theprinciplesoftheclustersystemwereappliedin varioussectoralgroups,whichincludedWaterandSanitation(ledby UNICEF),Education(ledbyUNICEF),FoodSecurityandNutrition (co-ledbyFAOandWFP),Health(ledbyWHO),andGovernance andEconomicRecovery(ledbyUNDP)Duringthehumanitarian response to address IDP needs in 2006, the Protection Cluster and sectoralgroupswerecriticizedforprioritizingpoliticalinterestsover immediateneeds(Derderianetal2007)AccordingtoDerderianet al (2007), instead of addressing emergency needs throughout Cte dIvoire,theUNresponsetargetedtheirinterventionsalmostexclusivelyinthetownofGuiglo,inanattempttoimproverelationsinan areawhereanti-UNriotshadbeenwidespread Food Security Impacts Thepost-electionviolencehadimmediateandsevereimpactson food security in Cte dIvoire, with repercussions throughout the WestAfricaRegionShortlyaftertheonsetoftheconflict,theflowof goodsfromfoodsurplusregionsinthenorthtofooddeficitareasin thesouthwasalmostcompletelydisrupted(FEWSNET2011)Bythe endofDecember,thesupplyofgoodstomarketsinAbidjanslowed, leadingtoshortagesandtriggeringrisingfoodprices,particularlyfor cereals, tubers, and meats By January, food prices had increased 39 percentforcookingoil,50percentforsugar,and50percentformeats, comparedtotheirpre-electionlevels,whichhadalreadybeenextraordinarily high due to the food price crisis (WFP 2011) On January 24, in an effort to oust Gbagbo from power, Ouattara imposed an export ban on cocoa products, a major income source for Gbagbo Thecocoaexportbanbroughtaboutasharpdeclineinthepriceof cocoalocally,causingfarmerstosellcropsatdepressedprices(OCHA

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Addressing Integrated Coordination in Food Security Crises Maxwell&Parker

2011)BylateMarch,over1millionpeoplewereinternallydisplaced duetotheconflict,puttingsignificantstrainonhosthouseholdsand causingshortagesoffoodandwaterinreceivingcommunities(United Nations2011)Beforefleeingtheirhomes,manyhouseholdssoldoff theirassets,includingharvestedcrops,livestock,andseedstocks,while remainingstandingcropsweredestroyedthroughoutconflict-affected areas(OCHA2011,FAO2011) The crisis affected food security beyond Cte dIvoires borders ByApril,anestimated100,000refugeeshadfledtoLiberia(OCHA 2011)Thissuddeninfluximmediatelydroveupthedemandforbasic staples, further increasing food prices that were already high due to underlyinginflationBylateJanuary,pricesforcassava,palmoiland gasolinewere25to35percentaboveaverageinLiberiancountiesnear the Cte dIvoire border (FEWS NET 2011) Many refugees fleeingtoLiberiastayedwithrelativesinNimbaCountyintheLiberian borderregion,puttingtremendouspressureonlimitedhouseholdresourcesArapidhouseholdfoodsecurityassessmentinNimbaCounty conductedinMarch2011foundthat80percentofbothrefugeesand host households had poor food consumption patterns and over 60 percentofrefugeeswereemployingadversecopingstrategies,suchas skippingmeals(TambaandAnderson2011)Theimpactsofthecrisis werefeltthroughouttheWestAfricaRegion,aspricesforcookingoil andsugar,bothofwhicharenormallyimportedfromCtedIvoire, increasedbyasmuchas40percentbetweenDecemberandFebruary inBurkinaFaso,Mali,Mauritania,andNiger(FEWSNET2011) The Response ThecrisisinCtedIvoirecaughttheUN,theclustersystem,and thehumanitariancommunityoffguardSincethesigningofthe2007 peaceagreement,thepoliticalandoperationalfocusoftheUNand donorsinCtedIvoirehadshiftedincreasinglytowardsdevelopment objectivesandfewhumanitarianagencieshadmaintainedasubstantial in-countrypresence(Baldeetal2011)Asaresult,thereweresignificantdelaysinreestablishinghumanitarianresponseandcoordination mechanismsandtheclustersystemwasnotformallyre-activateduntil mid-January,overamonthafterthecrisisbeganAtimelyresponsewas furthercomplicatedasalmostallinternationalstaff,withtheexception ofsomeclusterstaff,wereevacuatedfromCtedIvoirebytheend ofDecemberduetothedeterioratingsecuritysituation(Baldeetal 2011) ThefirstreliefoperationsinCtedIvoirebegantheweekofJanuary17,sixweeksafterthecrisisbegan,whenWFPbegantargetedfood

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distributionsWFPtoIDPsitesAroundthistime,theclustersystemwas activatedatboththenationallevel,inAbidjan,andinthreeregional siteswheresignificantdisplacementhadoccurred:Man,Danan,and DukouGainingaccesstodisplacedpopulationswasdifficultdueto the intense fighting, especially inAbidjan and Cte dIvoires western region Funding for the humanitarian response was particularly slowtomaterialize,partlybecausethecrisisinCtedIvoirecoincided withtheeventsinTunisia,Egypt,andLibya(TheEconomist2011)By April2011,only14percentoftheEmergencyHumanitarianAction Plan(EHAP)hadbeenfunded(OCHA2011) Duringtheearlystagesofthecrisis,theFoodSecurityClusterresponse consisted primarily of general food distributions targeted to communitieshostingIDPsandtoIDPcampsFooddistributionsinitiallytargeted25,000people,butasthesituationdeterioratedinearly March,generalfooddistributionswerescaledupsignificantly,targeting125,000peopleinCtedIvoireandanadditional186,000people inLiberia(WFP2011)Astheviolencesubsidedshortlyafterthearrest ofGbagbo,FAObeganthedistributionofaproductionkit,consisting of cereal seeds, cowpea, okra seeds, tools, and basic fertilizers to anestimated9,000householdsinareasaffectedbythecrisis(OCHA 2011)InJune,FAO,WFP,andotherFoodSecurityClusteractorscarriedoutajointcountry-wideneedsassessmenttomapoutfoodand agriculturalneeds(OCHA2011)InJuly,FoodSecurityClusterpartnerscarriedoutacashandvoucherfeasibilitystudy,andacashtransfer interventioninAbidjantargeting10,800beneficiarieswassettobegin inAugust(WFP2011) Coordination Issues Theclustersystemsperformancewashamperedinpartbythechallenging operating conditions of the crisis, but also because the humanitariansysteminCtedIvoirewasill-preparedtodealwithsuch asituationAnevaluationofUNHCRsresponsetothepost-election crisisfoundthatmany(thoughnotall)ofthemembersofthecluster systemwerehighlycriticalofitsperformanceOneintervieweenoted, Clustersshouldbeaforumforresponse,heretheyareaforumfor stone-throwing(Baldeetal2011,p46)Theexclusionofnational andlocalactorsfromtheclustersystemwasidentifiedasaparticularly concerningissueAlthoughcivilsocietyorganizationsplayedacritical roleinfacilitatingaccesstoaffectedpopulationsduringtheearlystages ofthecrisis,theirparticipationinclustermeetingshasbeenminimal, especiallysincethegrowingreturnofinternationalNGOs(INGOs) toCtedIvoire(Baldeetal2011)

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CoordinationintheFoodSecurityClusterbenefitedgreatlyfrom FAOandWFPspriorexperienceworkingtogetherasco-leadsofthe FoodSecurityandNutritionSectoralGroupduringprevioushumanitarianresponsesinCtedIvoireThisexperiencehelpedtofacilitate afairlynaturalprocessofmergingfoodassistanceandagricultureactivitiesduringthepost-electionresponse(Interview2011)However, whilecoordinationbetweenco-leadsfunctionedrelativelysmoothly atthecountrylevel,situationsaroseinwhichconflictinginformation waspassedonfromthegloballeveltothecountrylevelandviceversa Onerespondentidentifiedaneedforexternaltechnicalguidance, especiallyinrelationtocashandvoucherprogrammingandinformationmanagementFoodSecurityClustermemberswereeagertoroll outcashandvoucherprograms;however,becausethesewerenewactivities,technicalsupportwasrequiredtodeterminethefeasibilityof scalingupStrongertechnicalguidancewasneededalsobecausemany INGOFoodSecurityClusterpartnershadarrivedinCtedIvoire shortlyafterthecrisisbeganandhadlittleofthecontextualknowledgeofthecountryneededtoinformprogrammingdecisions(Interview2011) Lessons Learned Limited preparedness delayed the humanitarian response. Withthe signingofthe2007peaceagreement,donorsandagencieshadshifted the focus of their programming fromhumanitarian todevelopmentandfewhumanitarianactorsmaintainedastrongpresencein CtedIvoireTherenewedviolencein2010caughtthehumanitarian systemoffguard,whichresultedinthelateactivationofthecluster system and an overall delayed responseThis highlights the fact that transitionscangobothwaysandunderscorestheimportanceofpreparingforunexpectedchangesandpossiblesetbacks Technical guidance is needed from the global level, especially for new types of responses. Food Security Cluster partners in Cte dIvoire were eager to roll out cash and voucher programs; however, as this wasanewtypeofactivity,externaltechnicalsupportwasneededto guidetheirplanningandimplementationTheCtedIvoireexample underscoresthepotentialrolethattheglobalFSCcanandwillplay inprovidingtoolsandguidancetocountry-levelclusters,especiallyin thecaseofnewtypesofprogrammingTechnicalbackstoppingdoes notnecessarilyhavetocomefromglobalFSCstaff(asitissmalland boundtobeoverstretched);however,ifitisgoingtobeprovided,it requiresabudget

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References
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Pakistan Case Study Bengali,Kaiser,andAllanJury2010HungerVulnerabilityandFood AssistanceinPakistan:TheWorldFoodProgramExperienceIn Hunger Pains: Pakistans Food Insecurity,edsMKugelmanandRM HathawayWashingtonDC:WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenter forScholars Cosgrave,John,RiccardoPolastroandFarwaZafar2010Inter-Agency RealTimeEvaluationoftheHumanitarianResponsetoPakistans 2009DisplacementCrisisGenevaandNewYork:IASC Fair,ChristineC2011Pakistanin2010:Flooding,Governmental InefficiencyandContinuedInsurgencyAsian Survey51(1) FAO2010FAOsRoleinthePakistanFloodsEmergencyResponse PlanRome:FAO HouseofCommons2011The Humanitarian Response to the Pakistan Floods. London:HouseofCommonsInternationalDevelopment Committee IASC2006Real-TimeEvaluationCluster:ApplicationoftheIASC ClusterApproachintheSouthAsiaEarthquakeInter-Agency StandingCommitteeIslamabad:IASC Kugelman,Michael,andRobertMHathaway2010Hunger Pains: Pakistans Food InsecurityWashingtonDC:WoodrowWilson InternationalCenterforScholars Kronstadt,KAlan,PervazeASheikh,andBruceVaughn2010Flooding inPakistan:OverviewandIssuesforCongressWashingtonDC: CongressionalResearchService Malik,Roshan2010TheFoodSecurity-GovernanceNexusin PakistanInHunger Pains: Pakistans Food Insecurity,edsMKugelman andRMHathawayWashingtonDC:WoodrowWilsonInternational CenterforScholars MCRAM2010Multi-ClusterRapidHumanitarianNeedsAssessment (DraftforComment)Multi-ClusterRapidAssessmentMechanism ACAPS OCHA2011TheFinancialTrackingServiceOfficeforthe CoordinationofHumanitarianAffairsftsunochaorg,Accessed October5,2011 Pollastro,Riccardo,AatikaNagrah,NicolaiSteen,andFarwaZafar2011 Inter-AgencyRealTimeEvaluationoftheHumanitarianResponse toPakistans2010FloodCrisisDARA

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Cte dIvoire Case Study AfricaRiceCenter(ARC)2008AfricaRiceTrends2007Cotonou, Benin:AfricaRiceCenter(WARDA) Balde,MamadouDian,JeffCrisp,EwenMacleod,andVickyTennant 2011ShelterfromtheStorm:AReal-TimeEvaluationof UNHCRsResponsetotheEmergencyinCtedIvoireand LiberiaGeneva:PolicyDevelopmentandEvaluationService, UNHCR Bassett,ThomasJ2010ReducingHungerVulnerabilitythrough SustainableDevelopmentProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107(13):569798 Cook,Nicolas2011CtedIvoiresPost-ElectionCrisisWashington DC:CongressionalResearchService Derderian,Katharine,EricStobbaerts,IeshaSingh,SimoneRocha,and DavidMelody2007UNHumanitarianReforms:AViewfromthe FieldHumanitarian Exchange Magazine 39(June) FEWSNET2011WestAfricaFoodSecurityAlertFamineEarly WarningSystemsNetworkWashingtonDC:USAID FAO2008CtedIvoire:InitiativeonFoodSoaringPricesRome: FAO 2011FAOsRoleintheCtedIvoireandNeighboring CountriesEmergencyHumanitarianActionPlan2011Rome: FAO Moseley,WilliamG,JudithCarney,andLaurenceBecker2010 NeoliberalPolicy,RuralLivelihoodsandUrbanFoodSecurityin WestAfrica:AComparativeStudyofTheGambia,CtedIvoireand MaliProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America107(13):577479 The Economist. 2011ChaoticCtedIvoire:DontForgetItMarch12 UnitedNations2011EmergencyHumanitarianActionPlan:Cte dIvoireandNeighboringCountriesWestAfrica:UNOCHA Strauss,Scott2011ItsSheerHorrorHere:PatternsofViolence DuringtheFirstFourMonthsofCtedIvoiresPost-Electoral CrisisAfrican Affairs110(440):48189 Tamba,SaybaY,andEmmanuelAnderson2011NimbaRefugee Assessment:LiberiaIvorianRefugeeInfluxandFoodSecurity Monrovia:WFPandGovernmentofLiberia WFP2011CtedIvoirePost-ElectoralCrisisDakar:WFP

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